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37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Tuesday, February 4, 2003

0905

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay (Scarborough East, Lib.))

Mr. Keith Norton (Chief Commissioner, Ontario Human Rights Commission)

0910

0915

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay)

Mr. Laurie Arron (Chair, Equal Marriage Committee, Egale Canada)

0920

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay)

Mr. John Fisher (Director of Advocacy, Egale Canada)

0925

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay)

Mr. Michel Morin (Faculty of Law, Ottawa University, As Individual)

0930

0935

0940

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay)

Mr. Kevin Sorenson (Crowfoot, Canadian Alliance)

Mr. Keith Norton

Mr. John Fisher

0945

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. Michel Morin

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay)

Mr. Richard Marceau (Charlesbourg—Jacques-Cartier, BQ)

0950

Mr. John Fisher

Mr. Richard Marceau

Mr. Keith Norton

Mr. Richard Marceau

Mr. Michel Morin

0955

Mr. John Fisher

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay)

Mr. Svend Robinson (Burnaby—Douglas, NDP)

1000

Mr. John Fisher

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay)

Mr. Derek Lee (Scarborough—Rouge River, Lib.)

1005

Mr. Michel Morin

Mr. Derek Lee

Mr. Michel Morin

Mr. Derek Lee

Mr. Michel Morin

Mr. Derek Lee

Mr. Keith Norton

Mr. Derek Lee

Mr. Keith Norton

Mr. Derek Lee

Mr. Keith Norton

Mr. Derek Lee

Mr. Laurie Arron

Mr. Derek Lee

Mr. Laurie Arron

1010

Mr. Derek Lee

Mr. Keith Norton

Mr. Derek Lee

Mr. Keith Norton

Mr. Derek Lee

Mr. Keith Norton

Mr. Derek Lee

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay)

Mr. Michel Morin

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay)

Hon. Andy Scott (Fredericton, Lib.)

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay)

Mr. Monte Solberg (Medicine Hat, Canadian Alliance)

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay)

Mr. Réal Ménard (Hochelaga—Maisonneuve, BQ)

Ms. Marlene Jennings (Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, Lib.)

1015

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay)

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay)

Mr. John Fisher

Mr. Michel Morin

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay)

Mr. Réal Ménard

1020

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay)

Mr. Réal Ménard

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay)

Mr. John Fisher

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay)

Ms. Hedy Fry (Vancouver Centre, Lib.)

Laurie Arron

1025

Mr. Keith Norton

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay)

Mr. Monte Solberg

Mr. John Fisher

Mr. Monte Solberg

Mr. John Fisher

1030

Mr. Monte Solberg

Mr. John Fisher

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay)

Prof. Michel Morin

Mr. Svend Robinson

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay)

Mr. Réal Ménard

Mr. Michel Morin

1035

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay)

Laurie Arron

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay)

Mr. Keith Norton

Mr. Réal Ménard

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay)

Ms. Hedy Fry

Laurie Arron

1040

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay)

Prof. Michel Morin

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay)

Mr. Svend Robinson

Laurie Arron

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay)

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. Keith Norton

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay)

Prof. Michel Morin

1045

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Laurie Arron

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Laurie Arron

Mr. Keith Norton

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay)

CANADA

Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights

NUMBER 013

2nd SESSION

37th PARLIAMENT

EVIDENCE

Tuesday, February 4, 2003

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¿ (0905)

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay (Scarborough East, Lib.)): I'd like to welcome all of you on this absolutely miserable Ottawa day. It's a good day for taxi drivers, tow-truck drivers, and orthopedic surgeons.

Mr. Scott, who's normally the chair of this committee, is in New Brunswick. You probably saw him and some of his constituents digging themselves out in Fredericton, New Brunswick, last night. I don't expect that Andy will arrive any time soon.

We have in you a distinguished panel of witnesses. Some of you have been here before and some of you haven't. I've gone over the procedures with some of you in advance. Ten minutes will be allowed for each presentation, and then there will be a question-and-answer session. Seven minutes will be allotted to each of the parties in round one and three minutes in round two.

We haven't sorted out an order of presentation among the witnesses. Is there any preference? Should I go from left to right or right to left?

A voice: Maybe you should go by age.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): I see. The committee is studying ageism now.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): It will be Mr. Norton, followed by Mr. Fisher, Mr. Arron, and Professor Morin.

Mr. Norton, please.

Mr. Keith Norton (Chief Commissioner, Ontario Human Rights Commission): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Honourable members, I'd first like to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you this morning to discuss the issue of marriage and equality, whether marriage should remain an opposite-sex institution or be expanded to include same-sex couples, and to discuss the options for change that are most consonant with the goals of human rights legislation in Canada.

By way of background, I'd just like to indicate that the Ontario Human Rights Commission was created in 1963. Under the Human Rights Code, we are the provincial regulatory agency responsible for the enforcement of human rights and the prevention of discriminatory practices within Ontario jurisdiction.

The commission discharges its enforcement mandate by first receiving or initiating claims of discrimination, then we investigate and endeavour to settle most claims. Where necessary, we litigate before the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario or the courts.

The commission is also charged with an array of more general, proactive functions. These include the provision of public education on issues surrounding human rights and discrimination and the examination of statutes and regulations that are inconsistent with the principles of the code. Our statutory function includes advancing the policy that the dignity and worth of every person be recognized and that equal rights and opportunities be provided without discrimination that's contrary to law.

The commission has taken an active role in extending the protections of the code to individuals who identify themselves or who are identified by others as gay or lesbian. The ground of sexual orientation was added to the code as part of the Equality Rights Statute Law Amendment Act of 1985, which came into enforcement in December 1986.

Since that time, the commission has investigated and litigated a great number of sexual orientation complaints. These complaints include those in which a gay or lesbian complainant sought and was denied some form of spousal recognition for his or her same-sex partner. Other complaints have involved a challenge to an opposite-sex definition of “spouse” in a provincial statute or regulation.

With the exception of the Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse in Quebec, which has enforced a prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation since 1977, the Ontario Human Rights Commission has investigated and litigated a great number of sexual orientation complaints, in fact more than any other human rights agency in Canada.

The commission was granted leave to intervene in the Supreme Court case of M. v. H. It argued that the opposite-sex definition of “spouse” at issue in that case violated fundamental principles of equality, constituting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in contravention of the charter.

Necessarily, the work of the Ontario Human Rights Commission does not extend to federal matters; however, as the body charged with enforcing human rights at the provincial level, the commission can and does inquire into infringement of equality rights, including the right to be free from discrimination because of sexual orientation.

Thus, while the commission cannot inquire into complaints relating to the right of gay and lesbian persons to marry, it can enforce the right of gay and lesbian individuals to be free from discrimination when those issues arise under provincial law or in the private context in Ontario.

I don't intend to provide a comprehensive legal analysis, either under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms or under various human rights codes in Canada, of the opinions set out in the November Department of Justice discussion paper. Nor is it my intention to provide a survey of the current case law across Canada on the issue of equality and marriage. The Department of Justice paper does that on pages 12 to 14, where it refers to the conflicting decisions in British Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec.

I do think it is helpful, however, to make reference to a recent decision in the Supreme Court of Canada that in my view provides general support for moving toward full recognition of same-sex marriage. That case is the very recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Attorney General of Nova Scotia versus Walsh case, which was released in December of last year.

I wish also to make reference to a decision in my home province, the Ontario Divisional Court's ground-breaking decision in Halpern v. Canada, which was released in July of last year.

It's the commission's view that when regard is had for these two significant decisions, the goal of enhancing equality and the difficulties that otherwise arise, the option that emerges as the preferable means of addressing these issues before this committee is the one that gives same-sex couples the legal capacity to marry.

¿ (0910)

I begin with the recent Supreme Court of Canada decision in Walsh. While this decision did not deal directly with same-sex couples, it is nevertheless instructive for the issue before you.

In Walsh, the court held that the provincial laws respecting division of property on marriage breakdown should not apply to people who have chosen not to marry--that is, to individuals who have chosen to live in what is usually called a common-law relationship. The key to the court's analysis was the issue of choice. It was the court's view that “choice must be paramount”. The court recognized that the decision to marry or not is an intensely personal one. The court stressed that many people do not marry precisely because they have chosen to avoid the institution of marriage and the legal consequences that flow from it.

In the commission's view, the principles enunciated in Walsh make it clear that all persons in Canada should be given the choice to enter into the institution of marriage if they wish to do so. If same-sex partners are denied that choice, then they're denied the opportunity to live under the same type of legal regimen that is in place for opposite-sex couples. They are, for example, denied access to the legal rules governing property division upon the dissolution of the relationship, or upon the death of one's spouse. An opposite-sex couple has the choice to either opt in or opt out of that bundle of legal rights by getting married or by remaining unmarried. Same-sex couples are denied that choice.

In our view, federal legislation ought to be reformed to provide that choice to gay, lesbian, and bisexual couples.

To this end, the most straightforward approach is to reformulate the federal common law rule so as to give same-sex couples the capacity to marry. This option makes choice paramount, in accordance with the principles in Walsh. This option also dovetails with the existing laws respecting marriage, and so would not require wholesale amendments to existing provincial and territorial legislation. For example, most provincial laws, except in Alberta, dealing with who may solemnize a marriage would remain as they are. In addition, the married same-sex couple would acquire the bundle of rights that attach to opposite-sex couples under the Divorce Act, and provincial laws dealing with the division of property and other such responsibilities.

It's true that these marriages might not be recognized outside Canada. However, this is a matter that the same-sex couple can take into account when making the decision on whether or not to marry.

We agree with the discussion paper that no religious official would be forced to perform a marriage contrary to that person's fundamentally held religious views. The Ontario Divisional Court has already made this the law in Ontario. In its decision in Halpern, the court held in paragraph 263 that

I cannot conclude that freedom of religion would be threatened or jeopardized by legally sanctioning same-sex marriage. No religious body would be compelled to solemnize a same-sex marriage against its wishes and all religious people—of any faith—would continue to enjoy the freedom to hold and espouse their beliefs.

In any event, I'm of the view that the Ontario Human Rights Code currently provides in section 18 an exception for religious organizations that would permit them to refuse to perform marriages with which they disagree. In the event that it proves necessary to do so, I would be prepared to recommend to the Ontario legislature that such an exception to the code be made explicit, in order to protect religious freedom.

I referred to the decision of the Ontario Divisional Court in Halpern as supportive of extending the capacity to marry same-sex couples. I would like to refer briefly to this case now, as I believe the reasoning of the court accords with the equality rights perspective, and provides direction as to how full equality is to be achieved.

In this case the three judges in the Ontario Divisional Court concluded that the federal common law rule for capacity to marry constituted a clear impediment to same-sex marriages. That rule defines marriage as “one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others”. In the view of the court, the rule is inconsistent with constitutional values in modern Canadian society, and offends the equality rights or gays and lesbians.

On that particular point, the three judges were unanimous in the case. But they did differ with respect to the implementation. As Halpern indicates, and as discussed in the November discussion paper, the option of simply legislating the status quo does not address equality concerns and, indeed, violates the charter. It is available to Parliament only if reliance is placed upon a notwithstanding clause. For Parliament to use that clause for the very first time on this issue would send a chilling message to gays and lesbians that they're not valued in the same way that other members of society are in Canada.

¿ (0915)

The next option of legislating the opposite sex, but at the same time creating a status of “equivalent to marriage”, is not as diametrically opposed to the principle of equality as the simple enshrining of the status quo. However, it's fraught with the same risk, and would undoubtedly require the use of the notwithstanding clause.

Accordingly, it is the view of the Ontario Human Rights Commission that to enhance the equality of all Canadians, and to be consistent with the principles set out in two recent and significant cases in court, and to avoid the practical difficulties arising from other approaches, the preferred option ought to be legislating a definition of marriage that would remove the inequality in the common law, and declare that marriage is no longer to be confined to one man and one woman.

Thank you very much.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): Thank you, Mr. Norton.

Mr. Fisher.

Mr. Laurie Arron (Chair, Equal Marriage Committee, Egale Canada): Mr. Chair, my name is Laurie Arron.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): You've done a switch, have you?

Mr. Laurie Arron: We're splitting the ten minutes and are going to talk for about five minutes each, if that's okay.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): That's fine.

Mr. Laurie Arron: I'm chair of Egale's equal marriage committee, and John Fisher is Egale's director of advocacy.

Egale is Canada's national organization advocating for equality and justice for gay, lesbian, bisexual, and trans-gendered persons across Canada.

I'd like to thank you for giving us the opportunity to speak today. We are here to ask that you recommend that the government legislate equal marriage for same-sex couples.

Our presentation has three themes: first, that gays and lesbians need equal marriage; second, that including same-sex couples won't weaken the institution of marriage; and third, that it's your duty as lawmakers to let us marry.

Why do gays and lesbians need equal marriage? The first reason is equality. Historically we've suffered greatly under the weight of stigma and prejudice. Our society has come a long way in dealing with this, but it's got a long way to go. We still face verbal and physical attacks; many of us grow up in isolation; and gay and lesbian kids still face significantly higher suicide rates than heterosexual kids.

I know from personal experience what it can be like to grow up gay. I first realized I was gay when I was about 14 years old. I was horrified at the time. I didn't want to be gay and I thought people would never accept me. I didn't tell a soul for years and years. It wasn't until I was 27 years old that I finally came out. Until then I had no contact with the gay community, no contact with other gay men.

I want to live in a world where we're not stigmatized for being lesbian or gay, and this world cannot exist if we are excluded from marriage. Marriage is the most prominent way in which we recognize loving, committed relationships.

Our exclusion from marriage speaks volumes. It tells people that our relationships are somehow inferior; that there's something wrong with being gay or lesbian. This message comes from the Government of Canada.

Another reason we need marriage is for social recognition. Marriage uniquely conveys the nature and legitimacy of a committed romantic relationship and the idea that you and your spouse have a shared destiny. Telling people you're married encourages them to support you in your marriage. Same-sex couples need this support as much as anybody. Why shouldn't our love and commitment be recognized through marriage?

I'd like to read a brief quote from our brief, from page 5 at the bottom. This is from Tina Reilly, whose sister Elizabeth is in a relationship with a woman named Dawn:

My five-year-old daughter asked, “Are Dawn and Elizabeth married?” “Yes,” I lied, “they're married.” What my daughter really wants to know is this: will Elizabeth and Dawn's relationship endure? Will Dawn be around for the rest of our lives? So I tell her that yes, they are married, because that's the only language my daughter can understand. This small deception matters to me. I should not have to lie to my children to convey the truth about their aunts.

Another reason we need marriage is family. Same-sex couples have and raise children. Our children deserve the same protections and benefits as children raised by opposite-sex parents. We want to take care of our kids, and I'm sure you want to take care of your kids too.

Any one of you might have children or grandchildren, either now or in the future, who are gay or lesbian. Don't you want them to be happy, to enjoy happy, fulfilling lives in an accepting society, to have the same choice to marry as their brothers and sisters?

Our second theme is that including same-sex couples won't weaken the institution of marriage. We have three things to say.

First, equal marriage won't change existing marriages. There will be no change to the legal rights and responsibilities imposed by marriage. Equal marriage simply won't change what marriage is all about, any more than allowing women to practice medicine changed what a doctor was all about. Marriage should reflect social reality, and opening up marriage to same-sex couples would merely reflect this.

Our second point is that equal marriage won't stop anyone from marrying. People just don't turn away from marriage because others who are eligible to marry don't meet their moral standards. Murderers can marry; rapists can marry; atheists can marry. It seems unlikely than any opposite-sex couples are going to turn away from marriage just because same-sex couples can marry.

¿ (0920)

Our third point is that equal marriage won't restrict freedom of religion. As Mr. Norton has said, legal marriage is not religious marriage, and allowing same-sex couples to marry will not force religious institutions to perform marriages for same-sex couples. Right now, clergy don't have to perform interfaith marriages, and priests don't have to marry divorced persons. Religions are free now to set their own requirements for marriage, and legal marriage for same-sex couples won't change that. The charter guarantees this freedom, and Egale has formally adopted a policy affirming each religion's freedom to choose. In addition, those religions that want to marry same-sex couples will have the freedom to do so.

The claims that equal marriage will weaken the institution are just not true. Where is the threat? In court, the government's lawyers had no answer to this question. That's because there is no answer to this question. Frankly, those who claim that equal marriage will weaken the institution are like Chicken Little running around crying, “The sky is falling.” Well, honourable members, the sky will not fall when you let us marry.

I now turn to John Fisher to look at why it is your duty as lawmakers to let us marry.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): Mr. Fisher, we are down to four minutes, but we have some flexibility here.

Mr. John Fisher (Director of Advocacy, Egale Canada): Thank you, Mr. Chair and honourable members.

Some people consider this a complex legal issue. It's actually very simple. We have a constitution that requires that all Canadians be treated equally under the law. Opposite-sex couples can get married. Same-sex couples can't. That's not equality. It's discrimination, and it's prohibited by the Charter of Rights. Upholding the Constitution is not just an optional extra; it's your duty as lawmakers.

Some members of this committee have questioned whether this is discrimination. You said you needed convincing. I've been with my partner, Jerome, for over seven years. I love him. When the government tells us we can't get married, the message we hear is unequivocal. You're telling us, we'll give you the financial rights, we'll certainly give you the financial responsibilities, but don't you dare imagine that what you feel for each other is as valid, as real, as the love between a husband and wife.

Human rights are guaranteed to us by the charter. No heterosexual has to justify their reasons for wanting to marry. I shouldn't have to come here and beg for equal recognition of our basic human dignity, our equal right to participate in this fundamental Canadian institution.

We know, of course, that the time will come when same-sex couples in Canada have the right to marry. I'd like to refer you to page 13 of our brief, in which we look at some of the trends, some of the poll results, the international and political support for this issue.

I should say at the outset that we feel very strongly that this is not a question of what's popular. It's not a question of some kind of popularity contest. This is about doing the right thing. It's about the values of the Constitution.

Nonetheless, the government itself has conducted polling on this issue. What has been found is that the majority of Canadians are comfortable with allowing same-sex couples to marry, and we've excerpted in our brief a comment by the chairman of Pollara, Michael Marzolini, who conducted a poll for the Liberal government. In that poll he found that support for same-sex marriage is highest amongst young Canadians and is likely to continue to increase. Analyzing the data, what he said was this:

The writing is on the wall for this issue. It will become more popular. It will become more and more acceptable. Government can lead public opinion or it can follow it and this is an opportunity to lead it rather than follow it.

Clearly the mood is changing. The new generation of Canadians are far more supportive of gay and lesbian marriage than the previous generation. These numbers will increase just as a result of demographics.

Similarly, we're seeing an increase in international support for this issue. I was here on Thursday when the question was raised, what about Belgium; have they yet allowed same-sex couples to marry? Well, on Friday they did, and with each country that changes its laws and allows same-sex couples to marry, Canada's claim to being a world leader in international human rights issues falls further and rings more and more hollow. This is the time when we have to lead, and we have to recognize our responsibilities.

I've attended all of these hearings so far. I've listened to your questions to other witnesses. I've heard government members say, we've been excluding same-sex couples for thousands of years; how can that be discrimination?

I heard the Conservative member say, don't we have other priorities, like homelessness? I even heard an Alliance member say to the president of the Law Commission, why do our laws have to be rational?

The bottom line is, folks, if you are looking for an excuse to deny us equality, you'll find one. At the same time, I know many of you have been very supportive on these issues, and I know many of you are genuinely struggling with this issue and are coming to see it as a question of basic human rights.

We're here to help, but at the end of the day, you have a clear choice to make between inclusion and exclusion. There is no middle ground on this. We've reviewed the other options in the justice department options paper, and we're not interested in some kind of constitutional booby prize: We won't give you equality, but what's behind door number two? The courts have already likened that to the segregation that used to exist for people of colour in the U.S. They've already rejected that as an option.

This is about equality. Some day same-sex couples in Canada will have the legal right to marry. That's inevitable. As with every major human rights advance, from ending racial segregation to allowing women the right to vote, future generations will look back and wonder how anyone could have opposed such a basic human right. When that day comes, I hope you'll be able to look back on your role in history and feel proud that you were part of building a Canada based upon the values of fairness, equality, and respect.

Thank you.

¿ (0925)

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): Professor Morin.

Mr. Michel Morin (Faculty of Law, Ottawa University, As Individual)

I would like to thank the committee members for inviting me to appear today. I must say that my perspective is more of a strictly legal one, since I am a professor in the civil law section at the University of Ottawa. The brief that was distributed to you is a very short summary of a much more detailed text of 51 pages that I sent as an appendix but which was not distributed to you, I believe, because it could not be translated in such a short time. So if you would like more references or information, please contact the committee clerk, who will provide you with a copy of that brief. I imagine that if the need is felt, a translation can be provided. Of course that is completely outside my authority.

I will quickly give some historical background. Once again, detailed information is contained in the appendix to the brief. I would simply remind members that the concept of marriage between same-sex spouses is not a completely new phenomenon. There is no doubt that it has been quite a rare event, but this point was made in the Halpern case. In many societies, same-sex unions are given some form of recognition, and in the Western world, male Roman citizens celebrated marriage ceremonies until this practice was forbidden in 342 A.D., on pain of death. So there are precedents, at least concerning the desire of same-sex spouses to have their union recognized by society.

I also give an overview of canon law, which forms the basis for civil law and the rules of common law, since the Anglican Church recorded the rules of canon law and kept them for centuries, until the XVIII^th or XIX^th century, establishing what everyone probably knows very well: permission for spouses to marry has never been subject to their ability to have children. Neither sterility nor a refusal to have sexual relations can be used as a ground for having a marriage annulled. In certain periods and still today, there has been limited recognition given to the inability to have sexual relations, but even in that case, the other spouse was usually free to accept the situation and decide to get married even with the knowledge that the other spouse would not be able to have sexual intercourse.

Since this historical overview brings up key religious issues, I would like to emphasize, as Egale did as well in its brief, this important aspect. We witnessed, through the media, a marriage between men and between women in a Toronto church, the Toronto Community Metropolitan Church, and we saw that there are genuine and steadfast believers who want to celebrate their union before God. They believe that God loves them just as he loves everyone, without discrimination, that God's love is not discriminatory. At least one religious community—I am not sure of the exact name—does celebrate marriage between same-sex spouses. One wonders why Parliament would approve a traditional vision of religion, when in fact there are people who are very sincere, honest, law-abiding, people who go to church every Sunday to celebrate the Lord, and who wish to marry but cannot. I admit that I do not understand the grounds on which, in a pluralistic society, legislators would decide to hold on to a traditional view of religion.

I would point out that in the Egale case in British Columbia there is a coalition of liberal rabbis that has intervened to support Egale's position and ask that same-sex unions be recognized and that the rights of these couples be formalized through marriage. So there is controversy even among believers and the faithful themselves. I am agnostic, myself, and I personally have no desire to get married in a church to my partner of 12 years. I am speaking here today only from a personal point of view.

As the previous witnesses pointed out, the case law is clear. It is discriminatory to prohibit same-sex spouses from marrying; in my appendix, I describe the various Supreme Court rulings. All arguments based on heterosexual capacity for procreation have already been examined and rejected by the Supreme Court.

¿ (0930)

Judges in British Columbia, Ontario and Quebec have applied the Supreme Court ruling in an entirely logical, rational and convincing way. They have concluded unanimously that the exclusionary rule is discriminatory. Only one of the five judges, Mr. Justice Pitfield of British Columbia, held that the prohibition was a reasonable measure in a free and democratic society because, in his opinion, allowing gays and lesbians to marry would weaken the institution of marriage. I think that the arguments presented earlier by Mr. Arron refuted that argument completely.

In M v. H, the majority ruling by six of the nine Supreme Court justices asked where the threat was and what would be taken away from heterosexual couples who are married. Mr. Justice LaForme of the Ontario Divisional Court went even further: he stated that he had a great deal of sympathy for Egale's argument that the whole issue of heterosexual procreation was a way of affirming the superiority of one type of sexual and spousal relationship over another, and that such an objective was totally unacceptable for legislators, if that was indeed the legislator's objective.

The four judges agreed that there was no rational connection between the framework of marriage and the issue of heterosexual procreation or even any logic to the idea that marriage is necessary for the proper upbringing and development of children, since gay and lesbian couples have children and bring them up and they have just as much need of legal recognition as heterosexual couples who are raising children.

So what options does Parliament have? In this regard, my position differs slightly from that of Egale. I would point out once again that this is only my personal point of view and you are free to forget it once you have heard it. In universities, we are quite used to that kind of treatment.

The reason that the common law rule prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying was suspended for two years was because the judges wanted to give Parliament time to think about the issue and discuss possible solutions. Mr. Justice LaForme stated categorically that only the right to marry would provide full equality of status to gays and lesbians. Justices Blair, Smith and Lemelin have said that they prefer not to give an opinion ahead of time and that Mr. Justice LaForme may be right that other legislative regimes may also be acceptable. They simply said that they did not know and that they did not want to make any presumptions without having legislation before them to consider.

I my view, any type of registered partnership would only perpetuate the discrimination. By definition, registered partnerships entail a more restricted list of rights than marriage.

That approach merely reaffirms the fact that same-sex couples are not entitled to the same rights as married couples. The option of civil unions, which is quite new, is one that I feel should be given further consideration. Legislation in this regard was passed in Quebec in 2002, and I think that the basic distinction between civil unions and registered partnerships has not yet been clearly understood by everyone. A civil union is a marriage by another name. To my mind, a civil union is merely a different designation for the same reality. These spouses are united in the same way as in marriage, before a religious community or the competent provincial secular authorities, and spouses in a civil union have to be treated exactly the same way as married people.

You may be wondering why a different name has to be used if the rights involved are exactly the same. On that point, I agree with you and with Egale: the simplest and best solution, and the one that entails no constitutional risks, is to allow two men or two women who love each other and who want to do so to get married. Once again, this approach is much less problematic from a constitutional view point.

Civil unions were first introduced in Vermont, in a political context where allowing same-sex spouses to marry threatened to raise the ire of voters, so that civil unions appeared to be the only politically viable option. So the name was changed to ensure that the measure would have some staying power and political viability.

The situation in Quebec is different. The National Assembly did not have the constitutional authority to allow gays and lesbians to marry, with the result that the civil union designation was introduced. It is clear that the objective was to guarantee full equality. I would simply point out that there is a genuine debate underway in the United States as to whether civil unions are comparable to racial segregation in the 1950s. Some people say that they constitute a form of segregation that is as unacceptable as racial segregation, whereas other people do not agree.

I would add that it is very difficult to say whether the federal Parliament could create a civil union regime which would apply to both the federal and provincial level and constitute marriage for gays and lesbians. In my brief, I state that if Parliament ever decided to go down that path, it would be worthwhile seeking a reference from the Supreme Court to ensure that its jurisdiction over marriage could in fact be extended to civil unions. It would be far too risky for Parliament to try to introduce civil unions that would be valid under provincial authority without the assurance that the federal government had that authority under the Constitution.

¿ (0935)

¿ (0940)

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): Thank you, Professor Morin.

Mr. Sorenson, for seven minutes.

Mr. Kevin Sorenson (Crowfoot, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thanks to each of you for coming and making your presentation this morning.

I have a couple of questions. First of all, I think Mr. Arron and Mr. Norton have already answered this question, but I'll ask it so that I can get answers from the rest of you on the record.

In the event that Parliament should choose to go the route of separating the state from marriage by creating a new registry for opposite-sex and same-sex couples and leaving it to the religious institutions to conduct a religious ceremony, what would happen within a religious institution if a same-sex couple requested a ceremony in that specific church? Many different religions, perhaps many different denominations of some religions, would not permit a ceremony in that church. Would your rights then be hindered? Would you feel that was discrimination by that specific denomination?

We're not asking necessarily the religious freedom question. Given that religious freedom would be protected, would you still believe that would be discrimination against that couple?

Mr. Keith Norton: Perhaps I should respond initially, and then perhaps Egale can follow.

On the face of it, I think it would still be discrimination, but it would be lawful discrimination. The Human Rights Code speaks of unlawful discrimination. There are all kinds of forms of discrimination that are permissible in our society.

The reality, of course, is that in the field of human rights we're often called upon to balance competing rights, if you will. In this instance the right to freedom of religion is expressly provided for in the Ontario code, for example, by protecting religious institutions and permitting them to discriminate, even in the area of employment. If they wish to hire only someone who is a member of their faith, they can turn away individuals who are of other faiths.

I don't really think that anything would change significantly from where it is today with regard to religious institutions. In fact, many religious institutions do not recognize some legal marriages in our society today, such as those performed by a judge. That's true for the Muslim faith, for example. So the idea that there is one form of marriage that all faiths embrace at the moment is not a correct perception whatsoever. They already define who it is they will marry and under what circumstances. Those who choose to be married otherwise, whether it's in a different religious institution or in a civil ceremony, they don't recognize. In fact, I believe that's still true of the Roman Catholic Church.

Mr. John Fisher: Laurie has already provided the position of our organization, but just to add to it, it's our position also that the rules set by particular faiths are protected by their freedom of religion.

You've asked whether it would be discrimination. In my view, discrimination is a legal concept. Some people within the particular faith may feel something is unfair, but that doesn't necessarily give them a legal claim, and currently we do recognize the right of religions to conduct marriages in accordance with the rules of their faith. It's explicitly recognized in the Quebec Civil Code, but it's still the law across the land, and the right to freedom of religion is protected by the charter.

There may be some individuals—for example, if the Catholic Church doesn't recognize women priests, then doubtless women, or some women within that faith, will feel that's unfair—who work within their faith to raise the issue. But that's not a legal or even a political question; it's more a personal or religious question for them to address within the rules of their faith.

I think Madame Des Rosiers, from the Law Commission of Canada, made the point very well that what we're looking at here is not an examination of the religious institution of marriage, but of the government's role in the legal and state institution of marriage. Religions can do what they want when it comes to their domain over aspects of their faith, but when it comes to an institution that has a legal status in which the government is involved, the obligation of government is to ensure that it doesn't exclude people from that institution based upon factors such as their sexual orientation.

¿ (0945)

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: I have just one other quick question.

We seem to be talking about churches, or the ceremony. What about the recognition of same-sex marriage within an institution? You may say that isn't what we're discussing here, but I'm thinking of religious colleges, not necessarily the church itself, denying employment, for example, not only because the one who is seeking employment is in a same-sex relationship but now has gone the extra step to a same-sex marriage. Would that be discriminatory, Mr. Morin?

Mr. Michel Morin: I will answer in English, since the question was in English.

I think the Supreme Court of Canada case of Trinity College answers your question and others. In that case there was an institution, which was based on religious faith, that held it was wrong to have sexual relations between same-sex partners. This institution wanted to be authorized to confer degrees that would allow teaching in public schools. The granting authority in British Columbia refused, because of this particular tenet of their faith and of the institution, but the Supreme Court of Canada said that as long as there is no actual discriminatory practice against individuals, your own beliefs are up to you.

I think the question you're asking is like saying a divorced person who can't marry at the front of the Catholic church suffers discrimination. This claim has never been made, to my knowledge, but even if it were to be made, the freedom of religion would be paramount, especially in light of this recent Supreme Court of Canada case. I don't think it's an issue.

It is the same thing for employment. There was a 1984 case in British Columbia—I don't know if it's still good law—which at the time held that Catholic institutions could refuse to employ divorced persons. There's certainly a lot of support for the principle that religious beliefs should not be coerced, and people are allowed to act for themselves and within their own religious communities as they wish, as long as they don't have public power.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): Thank you, Mr. Sorenson.

Monsieur Marceau, vous avez sept minutes.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau (Charlesbourg—Jacques-Cartier, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, thank you for your presentation. I am going to start by apologizing, because in a few minutes, I will have to go to the House to speak on divorce. We are talking about marriage here, and I will have to go to the House to talk about divorce. I hope that you too will one day have the right to divorce, if that is your wish.

First of all, the issue of compelling a church to unite or marry a same-sex couple is something we hear about regularly. Obviously, we cannot use the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to force churches to marry a same-sex couple, since the Charter applies only to government, whether it be at the federal, provincial or municipal levels.

The other thing that people do not seem to fully understand, unfortunately, is that at present—and you stated this quite eloquently, Mr. Fisher—there are examples of discrimination in religion that are accepted, because freedom of religion is protected.

For example, the Catholic Church does not allow Catholics to get a divorce. However the state does. No one forces the Catholic Church to remarry people who are divorced. And Nathalie Des Rosiers, from the Law Commission of Canada, provided an analogy which, to my mind, was very valid.

However, in order to alleviate or even eliminate fear, would there be, as it seems to me there is, a consensus among witnesses here to accept an act or measure that would contain a provision equivalent to section 367 of the Quebec Civil Code? More explicitly, is there consensus around the table for the adoption of an equivalent section in order to clarify issues and remove certain fears?

¿ (0950)

Mr. John Fisher: As for us, we would be prepared to accept a clause like that in an act to, as you stated, clarify the fact that marriage for same-sex couples does not affect religious rights.

In our opinion, it is not necessary, because that is the law as it currently exists, and it is protected by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. But if you need a clause like that to reassure religious groups, we are prepared to accept it.

Mr. Richard Marceau: Do Mr. Norton and Mr. Morin share that opinion?

[English]

Mr. Keith Norton: Yes. I think I indicated in my remarks that I would even be prepared, if it were necessary, to recommend to the legislature to which I report that such an express provision be included in our Human Rights Code that would not be used to in any way coerce persons of any religious faith to engage in the performance of celebration of marriage against their beliefs. I don't think anyone is trying to impose anything upon any religious group. We're talking here about the public civil law, the law of the land. The law of the religious institutions varies, one to the other.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: Okay. I have another question.

The options that the government has presented in the discussion document include civil union.

Mr. Norton, you say that a status equivalent to marriage is not as diametrically opposed to the principle of equality as the simple enshrining of the status quo, but you nevertheless express some reservations.

Mr. Morin, you point out that we are not even sure that the federal government has the right to do that. Unless I am mistaken, it seems that historically, the reason why the federal government has had jurisdiction over marriage and divorce, whereas the rest of family law came under provincial jurisdiction, was for religious reasons, and we can say frankly that it is because Quebec was Catholic, and the government wanted namely to maintain the right to divorce. That was the main reason.

I have two questions.

If this committee were to make a suggestion like that, first of all, would that not raise major constitutional issues? Does the federal government have the authority to do that? Personally, I doubt it, because as regards family law, the Constitution very specifically limits federal jurisdiction to marriage and divorce.

Secondly, knowing John Fisher as I do, I know full well that he will continue and go as far as the Supreme Court to obtain the right to marry. So if the committee makes that suggestion, won't we once again be making it easier for unelected people to make decisions in the place of elected officials, thus excluding legislators, or us, from the debate?

Could Mr. Morin...?

Mr. Michel Morin: To answer the first question, I think there is an argument based on the doctrine of progressive or dynamic interpretation of the Constitution and new realities. Just as the decision was made that the term "person" could apply to women that the government wanted to appoint to the Senate, even if it was inconceivable in the mind of the legislator in 1867, it is clear that Parliament can change the definition of marriage. But some may contend that the government could also use a different term to describe a completely new reality that has never been associated with marriage. The nature of the jurisdiction appears essentially the same; in this case a legal term is being used. The parties proceed with a ceremony to be entitled automatically to a series of rights and obligations, and for their relation with their children to be formalized.

So if marriage is understood to be a series of rights and obligations that are automatically conferred all at once and that are governed by a series of provincial and federal acts, and if the government's position is that to take into account a new reality perhaps different terminology could be acceptable, then the doctrine of progressive interpretation could allow that. But we could also have a more historical interpretation stating that only marriage confers those rights and we must not confuse matters by using a different term. So that is why in my brief, I suggested ensuring, by way of a reference or a reference to the Supreme Court, that it is possible for the federal Parliament to adopt such legislation. That way, instead of going to appeal courts in Canada, we could submit the following question: Would adopting legislation on civil union be violating the right to equality? If the federal government intends to take this battle all the way to the Supreme Court, it might as well go there directly. Proceeding by way of a reference would save at least one step.

¿ (0955)

Mr. John Fisher: You are also right as regards the legal commitment to full equality. The key to understanding what happened in the case of civil union in Quebec is that the Quebec government did not have jurisdiction to enable same-sex couples to marry, as that is a federal matter. It is not that the gay and lesbian community in Quebec did not want it. I think there will be other witnesses who will appear and say the same thing: that the federal government continues to seek marriage and that Quebec has done its part. In Quebec, the community clearly supported civil union when it recognized that that was all the Quebec government could do.

I also agree that there are two major problems at the federal level with respect to civil union. First of all, the federal government has jurisdiction over marriage. So just giving us civil union is second rate; it is not full equality. Secondly, there is the issue raised by Prof. Morin as to whether the government even has jurisdiction to create a status like that.

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): Mr. Robinson.

Mr. Svend Robinson (Burnaby—Douglas, NDP): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I too want to thank the witnesses for their eloquent presentations and for the work they've done over many years in the struggle for equality for gay and lesbian people. It's timely. I've had the privilege of working with Egale on this issue for quite some time.

Once again, next week I'm going to be presenting, tabling in the House, a private member's bill, as I've done for many years, to permit gay and lesbian couples the choice of marriage. I timed that strategically around Valentine's Day for reasons that I'm sure members of the committee will understand.

With seven minutes, it is difficult to pursue a particular line of questioning, so I want to pursue just a couple of areas and really focus on this question of civil union and say I think it would be a waste of taxpayers' money, and frankly, just a dead-end road, to go to the Supreme Court of Canada to pursue this issue, because I don't know of many gay and lesbian people, and certainly not many gay and lesbian organizations in this country--perhaps Mr. Fisher can correct me if I'm wrong, but I don't know of anybody--who are asking for civil union. I see it as a second-class status, and I'm not prepared to be a second-class citizen in my own country. I'm just not prepared to do that.

Frankly, one of the reasons civil union was extended in some jurisdictions was more to extend the bundle of rights and responsibilities associated with it at the provincial level. At the federal level, we have all of those. Bill C-23 extended everything, all the rights and responsibilities. There were a couple of little areas around, I think, the Canada Evidence Act and a couple of other things. So there's nothing else left. You don't need to create that status.

I find it offensive that it should be suggested that somehow my relationship with my partner, Max, who many of you know, is not just as strong, just as loving, and just as committed as any other relationship, and that we should have to plead for some kind of civil union status--oh, no, we're not going to let you go to marriage, but we'll give you this little sop here of civil union.

I'm sorry, it's not on. And at a very personal level, it makes a difference. I'll give you a couple of examples.

My nephew, Jason, got married last November to a wonderful, beautiful woman, named Sarah, from a Pentecostal family, deeply religious. Max and I were, with some concern, invited to the wedding. But my own nephew felt that he couldn't even introduce his uncle and his uncle's partner, who've been together for eight years, because that might be offensive to the people there.

That hurts. That's painful. And that relationship is somehow invisible in the eyes of those people? No.

I'll give you another example. I speak a lot to kids. I love speaking to kids in schools. I spoke to a grade 3 class at Parkcrest Elementary School in Burnaby. Kids can be very perceptive. They can be very sharp in their questions. One of them asked me about being gay, and did I have a partner. I said, “Yes, I do; we've been together for some time.”

That was actually shortly after the accident I had, and Max had been pretty instrumental in helping to save my life, which is pretty significant. They'd seen that; they'd seen him in the news. So they asked, “Well, are you married?” I stopped for a minute and said, “No, we're not married; we're not allowed to get married.” And the little girl said, “But that's not fair.”

It's not fair, I say to my colleagues, through the chair. It's not fair. What on earth threatens those of you who are involved in marriage if I and my partner are also allowed to marry? It doesn't weaken your relationships. It doesn't mean you're suddenly going to stop procreating, those of you who still have the capacity to procreate, as I've mentioned before.

Lesbian couples, as was pointed out by Madame Des Rosiers, don't need guys anyway to create children. They don't need them. I hate to say that to my fellow males, but not needed, with turkey basters and everything else, right?

So for God's sake, get rid of this idea of civil union. I hope, and I say this to my colleagues, don't go there; we don't want it. I can't pretend to speak on behalf of all gay and lesbian people. There may be some who want it, but here's one who doesn't, and I suggest that before the committee even considers going there, you canvass very carefully people from the gay and lesbian communities.

So I guess that's a comment. I would just ask the witnesses before us whether they are aware of any groups--and I'm talking about groups here, not individuals, because there are certainly individuals--across Canada, in any of the provinces and territories, that are actually pushing for the status of civil union as opposed to the right to marry.

À (1000)

Mr. John Fisher: I'm certainly aware of groups and individuals that are not enthusiastic about marriage as a concept. Some members of our community would choose to marry; some would not. I think when it comes to a question of fundamental choice, what virtually all groups and individuals I've spoken to in my travels across Canada have said is, we want to have the same rights to choose that heterosexuals have. Not everyone's opposed to the concept of registered partnership or civil union as a supplement to marriage. There may be things those institutions could achieve, for example, in recognizing non-conjugal relationships. When it comes to conjugal relationships or marriage, we want the same choices.

I think an example used by one of the members the other day was around the question of whether we should build new institutions—like new farmhouses on land—and what if there were a multiplicity of options. I think what it boils down to for us is, you can create new institutions—you can build as many farmhouses as you like—but what you can't do, as government, is deny access to any of those institutions to a sector of Canadian society based upon their race, their sex, their sexual orientation. As long as marriage is an institution that has the legal sanction of the federal government, you cannot deny access to that institution to members of our community without leaving us feeling marginalized, excluded.

As I said in my opening remarks, I don't want some kind of second-class option. We already have all of the rights and responsibilities through the Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act. There may be one or two small things that can be tidied up, but it would add nothing. It would not achieve the constitutional demands of equality, and frankly, if that were the issue I'm not even sure we would be here. If we can't achieve equality through the political process—and we hope we can achieve it through the political process—then that's what the courts are for: to ensure that our rights as minorities to full equality are respected.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): Thank you.

Mr. Lee.

Mr. Derek Lee (Scarborough—Rouge River, Lib.): Thank you.

I appreciate all of the anecdotes and the Valentine's Day stories, but we've got to get back to law here. I'm going to be a little picky about some of the submissions in the few minutes I have.

First, to Mr. Morin—and it's just to Mr. Morin—in your submission you referred to the so-called right to marry—the right. I want to question that. I want to get you to say that it is not a right; that there is no constitutional right to marry. Marriage is a privilege; isn't that correct?

À (1005)

Mr. Michel Morin: Certainly the lower courts have held that there's a constitutional right to marry for gays and lesbians; otherwise we wouldn't be here. There might be conditions attached to that right, but certainly also the United States Supreme Court has said there's a constitutional right to marry, at a time when it was forbidden to marry on the grounds of race.

So I don't think marriage is a privilege at all. Like many rights, you may have conditions to meet before you are entitled to exercise that right.

Mr. Derek Lee: Let's deal with that. A right, in my view, is a right. If a person has a right, you can't take it away. So I maintain that marriage isn't a right. It's not stated anywhere in our law as a right, and I don't really care what the justices in the Supreme Court of the United States have to say. In Canada, in our legal system, if you have the right to marry, then you have the right to marry. However, there are conditions; there are statutory requirements placed upon the privilege of marriage, and that includes obstacles related to consanguinity, gender, age. And of course you cannot already be married; you can't get married if you're already married.

So as a lawyer, do you want to continue to say that marriage is a right, or do you want to qualify that?

Mr. Michel Morin: I'll just stick to my statement; it's a right provided you meet the conditions.

Mr. Derek Lee: Okay, it 's a right with conditions.

Mr. Michel Morin: And if the conditions are discriminatory and forbidden by the charter, then you're running into havoc.

Mr. Derek Lee: Okay. I'll accept that answer. I don't necessarily agree with it, but I'll accept the answer.

I want to go to Mr. Norton. I'm trying to avoid some of the oversell here in terms of dealing with the issue. In your submission, you said the Ontario Divisional Court has already made this the law of Ontario—that is, the reference to not removing people's religious freedoms. But courts don't make laws, and certainly lower courts don't make laws; legislatures do. That was a lower court, and the portion of the judgment you've referred to is obiter dicta; it wasn't even part of the judgment.

Why would you suggest to us, the justice committee here in the House of Commons, that the Ontario Divisional Court has already made this the law of Ontario when it's incapable of making laws? Courts interpret and resolve disputes.

Can you help me out with that?

Mr. Keith Norton: Certainly courts don't legislate as legislative bodies, but in the course of interpretation and application they do contribute to the evolution of law. And albeit this is a decision of--

Mr. Derek Lee: The Ontario Divisional Court, which is a lower court. We're not talking about the Supreme Court of Canada here.

Mr. Keith Norton: Even though it is a lower court--and I didn't say it was the law of Canada, or that it applied anywhere outside the province of Ontario--within the province of Ontario, the decision of that court, unless it is overturned, or a principle enunciated by that court, applies. It could be overturned by a court of appeal or ultimately by the Supreme Court of Canada, but if they enunciate a principle of law, it's applicable within the jurisdiction of Ontario.

Mr. Derek Lee: It could be overturned by the same court. It might even be followed by the same panel and the same court might not even follow the same judgment. So they haven't made it the law, they've interpreted the law for that particular case, isn't that correct?

Mr. Keith Norton: That's correct.

Mr. Derek Lee: All right.

Mr. Keith Norton: I don't think we're on opposite sides of the argument.

Mr. Derek Lee: I just wanted to avoid the oversell.

Mr. Arron--and by the way, I'm probably a lot closer to where you are than you think I am by this line of questioning--you said that atheists and drug dealers can get married, so why can't gays and lesbians? But I put it to you that atheists cannot get married if they're not opposite gender. So I don't know why you would use that analogy. Are we discriminating against atheists of the same gender because they can't get married?

Mr. Laurie Arron: I'm not suggesting that atheists could have a constitutional challenge. I'm suggesting that people don't run away from marriage because there are some people who get married who don't meet their moral standards.

Mr. Derek Lee: Okay. I understand where you're coming from, but I just wanted to prevent a bit of oversell here.

Mr. Laurie Arron: On the other hand, if you specifically excluded atheists from marriage, they'd probably have a freedom of religion claim, or freedom from religion claim....

À (1010)

Mr. Derek Lee: Which takes me right to the next question, to Mr. Norton, where in his remarks he says, “In our view, federal legislation must be reformed to provide that choice to gay, lesbian and bisexual persons.”

Bisexual persons are not prevented from marrying. If you had male and female bisexuals getting married, there's no barrier at all. There's no obstacle at all to bisexuals. So I'm wondering why that's thrown in there when clearly there is no obstacle to two bisexuals getting married provided they're opposite gender. Isn't that correct?

Mr. Keith Norton: Correct. But if they were of the same gender, they would not be able to.

Mr. Derek Lee: So we don't have to provide the choice for bisexual persons provided they're opposite gendered? Wouldn't that be correct?

Mr. Keith Norton: That's true.

Mr. Derek Lee: They're already there. So there's no discrimination against bisexuals.

Mr. Keith Norton: There is if they wanted to marry someone of the same gender.

Mr. Derek Lee: That's correct. Yes, I buy that.

That's allowed me to be reasonably picky. Whatever portion of the time is left, I'll throw it back into the pot.

Mr. Keith Norton: Mr. Chairman, I would like to briefly respond to Mr. Lee's issue around whether marriage is a right.

On whether it is a right or a privilege, it may be viewed by some as a privilege because it requires the issuance of a licence by the state in order to marry, but even if that is the case and it is a privilege, in your view, to marry, it is nevertheless contrary to existing law to discriminate in the issuance of that licence based upon a prohibited ground of discrimination.

Mr. Derek Lee: I understand that. Thank you for clarifying it.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): Thank you, Mr. Lee, although Professor Morin I think is still feeling he has to get back in here.

Mr. Michel Morin: Yes, as a legal historian steeped in the civil law tradition, I found it somewhat startling to hear that laws are made by legislature only. I thought Ontario was a common law jurisdiction where the courts made the rules incrementally, and this is exactly a large part of the debate in the Halpern case--that is, whether the courts would modify immediately the common law rule or would wait for Parliament to step in.

So clearly there are two sources of law in Ontario as far as I am aware, and the rest of Canada outside of Quebec--legislation and common law.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): Thank you, Professor Morin.

Let the record show that Mr. Scott has arrived through hail, sleet, snow--

Hon. Andy Scott (Fredericton, Lib.): No power.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): --no power, and various impediments to being here, so welcome, Mr. Scott.

Mr. Solberg.

Mr. Monte Solberg (Medicine Hat, Canadian Alliance): I have nothing to offer right now.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): I see.

To Mr. Sorenson. No?

Back to the Liberal side, to Ms. Jennings.

Or hang on; it's the opposition, with Mr. Ménard.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard (Hochelaga—Maisonneuve, BQ): I do not object to going second. What counts is having time to ask my questions.

Ms. Marlene Jennings (Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, Lib.): I will start by thanking my colleagues opposite. Next, I would like to apologize to our witnesses for arriving late; I had trouble finding a taxi to come to work this morning. I waited 35 minutes, and as a result I missed part of your presentations. But while other witnesses were speaking, I did read your brief, and I thank you very much.

I would simply like to ask the following question: is marriage a right or a privilege? To my mind, that is secondary in comparison to the possibility of exercising this right or this privilege without discrimination based on a person's sexual orientation. I think that as legislators, we have no choice: we must amend our legislation to authorize or recognize marriage among people of the same sex.

Secondly, I believe it was Mr. Fisher who said that some people, heterosexual and homosexual, do not want to get married, but would like to be able to chose civil union, for reasons of their own. I would therefore like you to address that issue, and in my opinion, we should legislate to ensure recognition for same-sex marriage.

But as regards civil union, I see that the following question is raised in some briefs: does the federal government have jurisdiction to legislate in the field of marriage and divorce and to create a new status or a new type of relationship?

As for me, I know heterosexual people as well as same-sex couples who are not interested in getting married. However, these people would like to have a legal status that would give them all of the rights inherent to marriage. In this regard, I would like to know if Parliament could recognize marriage among same-sex couples and, either at the same time or at a later date, create a new legal and constitutional status that would allow some people to make other choices.

À (1015)

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): I would just remind witnesses that this is actually a three-minute round.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Oh, you didn't tell me before, so that starts to operate for the next member of the committee.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): The questioner has used up two minutes and 53 seconds, so in seven seconds....

Not having advised the witnesses in advance that this was a three-minute round, I'll be a little bit more lenient.

Ms. Marlene Jennings: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[Translation]

Mr. John Fisher: As regards whether marriage is a right or a privilege, I must clarify that the right applied under the Constitution is the right to equality. The fact that marriage is a legal institution recognized by the State implies that we have the same right to have access to this institution.

As regards civil union, if the government creates additional institutions and ensures that everyone has equal access to these institutions, the right to equality will not be violated. However, if it is a question of jurisdiction, I cannot answer.

Having access to the same choices as heterosexuals is what is fundamental for us, as gays and lesbians.

Mr. Michel Morin: I am going to summarize what I said earlier. I would like to know if the federal Parliament has the necessary jurisdiction to enact provisions on civil union; I do not have the slightest idea if it does. The sharing of jurisdictions is not my area of expertise, but I do not believe that there is a clear legal decision, even with regard to a relatively similar matter.

As a result, the answer may be yes or no. Arguments can be made one way or the other. As I indicated, it would be somewhat irresponsible for Parliament to create this institution without ensuring first and foremost that it has the jurisdiction to do so. It is entirely possible to verify this by way of a reference.

Moreover, the issue of a register seems extremely difficult, since the celebration of marriage is a matter of provincial jurisdiction. I have great difficulty imagining a register that would not be a kind of celebration of marriage. The term solemnization is used in English; it is a bit broader in meaning than the word "celebration."

The fact remains that the road ahead is full of obstacles. I fully agree that marriage would give same-sex spouses 100 per cent equality. Civil union is different, and would perhaps confer less. Equality is perhaps at 90 per cent or 85 per cent. But from your perspective, you would start with the right to marriage and then create civil union.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): Mr. Ménard, three minutes.

Mr. Réal Ménard: Mr. Chairman, you are well-known for your generosity.

I do not think that I need to remind anyone of all the legal arguments that we are familiar with and that I endorse. This exercise in committee leads me to remind you that there have been four major debates on the rights of gays since I have been in Parliament: hate crimes; sexual orientation in the Canadian Human Rights Act; the Rosenberg decision; and the act on same-sex spouses, common law marriage. There has always been a group of about 40 members who have voted against any kind of recognition.

So this committee's mandate, to my mind, is not so much with respect to legality as it is with respect to citizenship, because I agree that marriage is not a constitutional right. There is a right to equality and a right to equality that is linked to a value, which is one's status as a citizen.

In my environment, the homosexuals I know who want to marry do not want to marry for legal reasons, as a free-union contract can be better for us, and we can have more or less the same benefits. They want to marry because qualitatively speaking, they do not accept being told that when someone is a homosexual and loves a person of the same sex, they are not entitled to this recognition. For me, the additional step through marriage is a matter of re-establishing full-fledged citizenship. That is fundamentally why this debate is important.

That leads me to also recall that contrary to what some may think, there are people who are attached to the values associated with marriage. I would like us to debate that. Marriage comes with values, values that some may find conservative or not, but values such as mutual support, commitment and fidelity, and that is what the legislator must recognize.

You may know that Statistics Canada appeared before our committee to remind us of some very interesting statistics on individual attachment to the institution of marriage, which may be experienced in different ways in practical terms. But the main philosophical values of attachment, support and commitment are still there. That is very important, and we cannot achieve that simply by putting it in a legislative text. It is achieved by transmitting values. And that is what worries me, because the 40 or so members, both on the Liberal side and in other parties, who vote against that can say that they believe in equality, but they do not see the contradiction in voting against it.

So what could you say in terms of values that would convince our parliamentary colleagues who tend to vote against the institution of marriage from the perspective of it being equivalent to recognizing citizenship?

And in passing, if my partner asks me to marry him, I will say yes.

À (1020)

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): Mr. Ménard is stretching my notion of generosity to nine seconds and three minutes.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Mr. Chairman, loosen up a little bit. You are a bit too straight for my liking.

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): You're going to tell me it's your birthday again.

Who would like to take on Mr. Ménard's question?

[Translation]

Mr. John Fisher: If I knew how to convince those who are against these things, I would have already done it, but I must note the fact that I recently passed my test to obtain my citizenship. It was something I had wanted to do for several years. Finally, I did it and I must say that it was difficult for me to pass this test, when I knew that all the values and all the principles shown in the government document are not always recognized by the government itself.

The recommendation speaks of Canada as a country where equality is recognized, where values include respect for all citizens, and I know that when they are gay, that is not always the case. So I do not know how to convince those who continue to oppose equality, but I think that we should emphasize the fact that it is an issue that concerns values, citizenship, and the sharing with heterosexual Canadians of the same pride that we have in being citizens of this country.

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): Monsieur Ménard, I've been very generous with you. You'll have to work in your answer in some other way.

Ms. Fry.

Ms. Hedy Fry (Vancouver Centre, Lib.): Thank you very much. And I hope we're not taking that out of my three minutes.

There has been a lot of discussion here with regard to rights and privileges. Regardless of whether there is a right or a privilege to marriage, I think there are two components here we need to look at. Mr. Morin said we talked about the issuance of a licence. The second one, of course, is the statement in the Constitution Act, section 91, item 26, that says a marriage is between a man and woman, to the exclusion of all others.

If you are going to exclude people—as Mr. Lee suggested, consanguinity is one ground, and age is another—you need to have a rationalization for it. Consanguinity and age both have rationalizations. They are protective mechanisms: consanguinity can lead to certain diseases being passed on, to certain congenital problems being handed down; and age, of course, is protection for people below a certain age so they cannot be exploited.

What, then, would one ever hope to find as a rationalization for excluding same-sex couples from marriage? It certainly is not with regard to procreation, because we now know that is very moot, given that we now have reproductive technologies that can allow for reproduction to occur within same-sex couples. Can anybody here, therefore, give me a rational argument why same-sex couples should be excluded from the issuance of a licence?

Laurie Arron: I think you have to ask whether anyone anywhere can give you a rational reason for excluding us. We submit that the answer is, no, there is no rational reason for excluding us. The only reason to exclude us is to condemn being gay or lesbian. That's it.

À (1025)

Mr. Keith Norton: I certainly don't know of anyone who can give a clear rationale, other than personal conviction.

I want to make the point that I'm not here speaking only for myself. While I do support the position I have put forward, I had the opportunity to canvass my colleagues. There are 12 of us who are commissioners at the Human Rights Commission, broadly representative of all the major faiths, racial groupings, ethnic and social backgrounds. I was pleasantly surprised when we reviewed the options in this paper—and by the way, there are two clerics, a Christian priest and a Muslim cleric, with people of all the major faiths—that we were able to come to a fairly clear consensus on the options that were set out.

In fact, it was not my expectation, but at the conclusion of our discussion, the consensus was that the changing of the definition to be an inclusive definition of marriage was the only option that would really give full equality and would get around some of the very complicating factors that are attendant upon some of the other options.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): Thank you.

Mr. Solberg.

Mr. Monte Solberg: Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman.

I just want to follow up on a question that I gather my friend asked earlier with respect to conflicting freedoms and how the freedom of religion seems to always, in our judgment, be at the bottom of the pecking order. I think this was illustrated maybe in the Vriend decision.

Is it correct, Mr. Fisher, that in the Vriend decision...? I suspect your group probably did intervene on behalf of Mr. Vriend. Is that correct?

Mr. John Fisher: It's correct that we intervened. It's incorrect that the issue of freedom of religion was raised in that case. The case was about whether sexual orientation should be read into Alberta's Individual's Rights Protection Act, but not whether Mr. Vriend personally had a valid human rights complaint against his Christian college.

The Supreme Court held unanimously that sexual orientation must be read into Alberta's human rights legislation, but that the actual individual question of whether he had a valid complaint was a question for another day, once he had the right to even bring the complaint. His concern was that he couldn't even bring the complaint, because there was no protection anywhere for gays and lesbians in Alberta.

Mr. Monte Solberg: Okay, I accept that.

I noted with interest the last paragraph on the first page of your introduction where you say that Egale would uphold the right of churches to decide whether or not they wanted to sanction gay marriage. And I guess what I'm asking you--I've read this, and I'm glad to see it--is whether I can have your personal guarantee that when this is challenged, as it certainly will be, you will stand up and say we oppose people challenging the right of churches to defend whether or not they sanction gay marriage.

I guess what I'm asking for is your personal guarantee.

Mr. John Fisher: If I give you my personal guarantee, will you give me your personal guarantee to support same-sex marriage?

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

À (1030)

Mr. Monte Solberg: No, I won't go that far.

Mr. John Fisher: I'm confident that we will, some day, have the equal rights to marry, and you have my guarantee that we will not be seeking to impose upon religions the values or responsibilities that are inconsistent with those of their faith.

In relation to your broader question about the notion of the pecking order, I think it's worth acknowledging that there are different rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. This is not one where I see those rights and freedoms coming into conflict, but the freedom of religion guarantees anybody's right to live their life in accordance with their personal faith and personal religion. Where they're having problems sometimes in some cases before the courts is when people want to go outside the boundaries of living their lives in accordance with the values of their own faith and to see other people living their lives in accordance with that faith. That's where the rights collide.

In this particular case it's about equality on the basis of sexual orientation, and we're not trying to impose that on anybody. No one will have to enter into a same-sex marriage if this becomes the law. It will just protect everyone's right to live their life in accordance with their own values.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): Thanks very much.

Is there anyone on the government side?

Before I go to Mr. Robinson, there was another comment.

Prof. Michel Morin: I would like just to summarize briefly what I said earlier. The Supreme Court of Canada dealt with a similar issue in the Trinity College case. You weren't there when I mentioned this, but I think it guarantees the right to have religious beliefs about gays and lesbians that are not particularly agreeable to all of us here but nonetheless can be the basis for internal rules for an institution such as Trinity College.

I think the member is right in focusing on freedom of religion to the extent that in the Halpern case we had a wedding ceremony by a church of very honest and devoted Christians who believe in true equality and who went to court to have this conception of their Christian faith recognized. How can legislators decide which vision of religion is the right one and sanction that into law?

Mr. Svend Robinson: I did want to just pick up on the point Monte was making, and I made this point at our previous hearing. I think it really does go to the heart of the issue. I think it is important, if I may say, both in the context of this issue of the right of gay and lesbian people to marry, and also in the context of the legislation that is also before this committee on hate propaganda, to make it crystal clear that one is not in any way, through extending equality, attempting to impose a particular set of moral or religious beliefs on existing religious institutions. That would be totally unacceptable.

And it's not a question of personal guarantees. I have absolutely no doubt—and I'm sure our witnesses would agree—that the courts would vigorously defend that, and indeed have done so in the case of the Trinity College decision. That was a Supreme Court of Canada decision, and there are many examples of this. There are churches that do not allow women to be ordained. Theoretically, that's a breach of the equality rights of women. The Catholic Church is one of the most important churches in Canada and does not allow women to be ordained. And yet it is crystal clear—and I'm sure Mr. Norton as Chief Commissioner of the Ontario Human Rights Commission would agree—that any suggestion that this philosophy of the Catholic Church would lead to a successful challenge under human rights legislation would be just frankly thrown out of court.

So whether it's women, or whether it's gay and lesbian people, if religious institutions are prepared to breach what would otherwise be equality provisions, the courts will not intervene in those circumstances. There are those who argue on the basis of religious texts, for example, that women must obey their husbands and be silent in the church. Certainly that was one of Paul's injunctions, and Timothy's, that I'm sure some members of this committee are aware of.

There are some people who would say that's kind of offensive to women. But being offensive and being discriminatory doesn't mean you can actually be challenged in a court of law or in a human rights commission. I think it's really important that we be clear on that as well.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): Are there any other comments?

Monsieur Ménard.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Mr. Chairman, as you interrupted me, with your characteristic sense of responsibility, I wonder whether I could ask the witnesses to say something about the values conveyed in this message. I am taking courses at the University of Ottawa Law Faculty, and I understand that we, as legislators, produce positive law, but a bill is not a merely abstract entity; it refers to values and thus it conveys messages. I would like to hear what the witnesses have to say about this aspect. I think that it would be a mistake to approach this debate from a merely legal point of view. Am I wrong?

Mr. Michel Morin: Let me briefly say that I share this concern, and I think that Canadian society is following its ideal of equality by applying it to same-sex marriages. Polls have reflected this, and courts have confirmed it. I am touching on the legal aspect once again, but I think that the symbolic or educational aspect of marriage as an institution is essential. The courts tell us that after studying depositions and arguments that lasted for weeks, they have concluded that there is no rational argument for preventing same-sex couples from marrying. This means that tradition cannot be defended and that evolution is unavoidable and must be reflected in the legislation. Thus, in my opinion, society is more advanced than the federal legislators.

This is why in Quebec, civil marriage was unanimously approved by all parties in the National Assembly, without any substantial opposition, but this is not what happened in France, and we will probably not see this happen in this Parliament, even if I would very much like to see the unanimous adoption of an act on same-sex marriages. But I have few grounds for optimism.

Thus, I think that social values and change are already present, and it is up to the Parliament to make them concrete. I must say that my very personal hesitation regarding the distinction between a marriage and a civil union are due to the fact that in my mind, the term "civil union" conveys a very positive message that basically, if we grant the same rights to and impose the same obligations on same-sex partners, if we treat them practically in the same way by letting them celebrate their unions as they wish, the choice of terms may not be essential. This is my opinion. I do realize that many people believe that the term "marriage" should be used to ensure a perfect integration of values and equality. But I am still wondering about this. Maybe I will change my mind. An academic is free to do so.

À (1035)

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): Mr. Arron and then Mr. Norton.

Laurie Arron: I think it's quite clear that the values conflicting here are, on the one hand, the values of fair play, equality, inclusiveness, diversity; and, on the other hand, the values saying there's something wrong with being gay or lesbian. This is the conflict of values.

In this case, the resolution of the conflict is very easy because Canada has already stated in its charter what kind of country it wants to be. The charter talks about the notions of equality. When judges and Canadians talk about what the charter means, they clearly come down on the side of equality, fair play, justice, and inclusiveness, or of all Canadians being included into society. This comes back to your concept of citizenship.

The notion there's something wrong with homosexuality is just something the Canadian government cannot say, unless it wants to change the charter. So for those who want to say that, everybody's free to have that belief. But this is not a belief that can be enunciated by the Government of Canada. It just can't.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): Mr. Norton.

Mr. Keith Norton: Perhaps I could just take a slightly different approach. I'm not sure how broadly you were referring to values, but something that often comes up in the discussion of the issues around same-sex marriage is the issue of family values and the fact that, in the minds of some people, the equal recognition of same-sex marriage would somehow undermine family values.

I've never quite understood that argument, because it strikes me that what in fact is happening is the reverse, that we have a group of individuals who wish to embrace family values as represented in the institution of marriage, and they are being barred from doing so. In fact, it would be strengthening family values to welcome them into the fold, and not keep them marginalized by saying their relationships ought not to be viewed in the same context as family values generally.

Often, I think, family values are confused with structures.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: If I may be allowed to raise a few legal points [Editor's note: inaudible] , those were the very arguments put forward by former Judge Claire L'Heureux-Dubé. I am finished, thank you.

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): Are there any other questions?

Madam Fry.

Ms. Hedy Fry: I always preface my remarks by saying that I'm not a lawyer. So if my question is a little bit off the mark, it's because I'm not a lawyer.

Is there a valid argument for suggesting that because some churches are currently sanctifying this marriage...? There's the Metropolitan Church, and we know that in the Anglican Church, the Bishop of New Westminster is beginning to suggest that he should marry people in his church, and we know that the United Church does. Could one therefore argue that this is denying freedom of religion to allow people to marry within those churches, if those churches wish them to do so? Is that an argument? I mean, you flip the argument over here.

Laurie Arron: Right. That's exactly the argument that the Metropolitan Community Church of Toronto made in the Halpern case. It's an argument that I think has a great deal of validity.

À (1040)

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): Are there any other questions?

Prof. Michel Morin: Can I just interject briefly?

The argument for freedom of religion was not successful, but the argument for equality was. They said that the denial of the right to marry was a violation of the right to equality.

The problem with that argument is that it is perhaps a little too broad, because you don't want to argue that Parliament should recognize all the tenets of different religions. You don't want to argue, as was the case in the 1910s and 1920s, that Catholics should not be allowed to divorce or to remarry, or things like that. For instance, polygamy would be a violation of the fundamental values of the charter, the equality of rights of women. In other countries, you might have some religions that promote polygamy.

So I think the argument is that perhaps the violation of the right to equality is also reinforced by the fact that it is sanctioning one set of religious beliefs over others, which should not be the role of Parliament. You can't just focus uniquely on the freedom of religion argument.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): Mr. Robinson.

Mr. Svend Robinson: I just wondered if the witnesses from Egale could perhaps follow up on the important question Ms. Jennings asked on the issue of federal jurisdiction and civil unions. Perhaps Egale could clarify its position on this point.

Laurie Arron: We've actually looked at that point. Basically, with marriage comes many rights and responsibilities, which are contained in both federal and provincial legislation. For instance, the province has the power over property rights and civil rights and the federal government has the power over immigration. There are all sorts of powers, which are divided between the two.

So in coming up with a civil union scheme, you would need to ensure that each province and territory recognizes the federal civil union. To do this, you obviously need their permission. So the federal government could have a civil union scheme that covers only federal rights and responsibilities; you could do this on your own. But to have a comprehensive institution providing all the same rights and responsibilities as marriage, you would need the consent of all the provinces and territories to do this.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): Mr. Sorenson.

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: I just have a very quick question, which came to mind during Mr. Morin's presentation. Today we're discussing same-sex marriage, or the gender part of marriage, and why we would allow or disallow same-gendered couples. But what about the numerical part of the definition of marriage? Mr. Morin just brought up polygamy.

To Mr. Norton, is it an infringement on those individuals who would ask for equality under the law of Canada if they perhaps wanted to be involved in a polygamous relationship? We define marriage as one to one. Right now we define marriage as one man and one woman, to the exclusion of all others. You're asking that we take out the gender part. But what about the numerical part?

Mr. Keith Norton: You know, I don't know that there's a simple answer to that other than to say that I suppose in Canada today there's nothing to prevent an individual from taking more than one spouse, but they couldn't do it legally. In other words, if they were a member of a faith or a religious group believing in polygamy, I don't know there's anything preventing their clergy from secretly, if you wish, solemnizing that union within the context of their faith. But it would certainly not be recognized in law in Canada, and that's not part of what we're advocating, of course.

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: That's exactly the point: Why not? Why not recognize that in law?

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): Michel Morin first, and Laurie Arron second.

Prof. Michel Morin: There's certainly a section in the Criminal Code on bigamy. Now, whether it would apply to a private ceremony not purporting to be legal, I'm not clear on this. I'd have to look at the text. But there's no question that bigamy is a criminal offence. That's the first part.

Just to reiterate what I said, polygamy, or one man having many wives, is a perpetuation of discrimination against women. It really runs not only against the values of the charter, but also against clear sections within the charter. So there's no way a court, in the name of freedom of religion, could completely disregard sections 15 and 28. The court has always said you must look at all sets of sets of rights and balance them.

À (1045)

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Maybe this doesn't have anything to do with religion. Maybe this is a consensual, loving relationship. I'm certainly not condoning it; it goes against my values and beliefs. But we are here today, and you're picking the gender part of the makeup of marriage, and you're basing it on equality of those individuals within that relationship. A very small percentage of Canadians are involved in that. We also know that there are some who would believe in a consensual, loving family relationship. It doesn't line up with my set of values. But are we then opening the door on a human rights level to...?

Laurie Arron: No, I don't think we're opening the door. This is--

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Why not? Why should we open the door?

Laurie Arron: You mentioned numbers, and I think numbers are very important. There's the number one and there's the number two, and what we're talking about here is the right to marry one person, not the right to marry two people. If all Canadians have the right to marry one person, then the charter says you can't exclude a certain group from that right to marry one person based on their sexual orientation. There's no equality right that says that if one is entitled to one, then others are entitled to two. It's just not an equality claim, and what we're talking about today is equality.

Mr. Keith Norton: I think it's important as well to bear in mind that what we're addressing is this issue within the context of the scope of existing Canadian law, which happens to prohibit discrimination on certain prohibited grounds, one of which is sexual orientation. There is nothing in the existing Canadian law that I am aware of that prohibits discrimination based on some numerical formula. So presumably that is a legal form of discrimination, if you regard it as discrimination.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): This room is to be used in another 10 minutes for another committee hearing, so I have to bring the meeting to an end.

I want to thank all of the witnesses for appearing here this morning. This has been a very useful discussion and a significant contribution to our study. I want to thank each and every one of you.

The meeting is adjourned.