PACC Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC ACCOUNTS

COMITÉ PERMANENT DES COMPTES PUBLICS

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Thursday, March 2, 2000

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[English]

The Chair (Mr. John Williams (St. Albert, Ref.)): Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Our order of the day is pursuant to Standing Order 108(3)(e), consideration of chapter 14, “National Health Surveillance: Diseases and Injuries”, and chapter 15, “Management of a Food-Borne Disease Outbreak”, of the September and November 1999 report of the Auditor General of Canada.

Our witnesses this afternoon are, from the Office of the Auditor General of Canada, Mr. Denis Desautels, the Auditor General; Ms. Maria Barrados, Assistant Auditor General; and Mr. Ronnie Campbell, Principal, Audit Operations Branch. From Health Canada we have Mr. Robert Lafleur, Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, Corporate Services Branch; Dr. Joe Losos, Assistant Deputy Minister, Health Protection Branch; and Mr. Michael Shannon, Director General, Laboratory Centre for Disease Control, Health Protection Branch. From the Canadian Food Inspection Agency we have Mr. Ron Doering, the President; Dr. Brian Evans, Executive Director, Animal Products Directorate; and Mr. Robert Carberry, Director, Plant Health and Production Division.

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Good afternoon to all of you. We will start, of course, with our opening statements, and we'll start as usual with Mr. Desautels.

Mr. Denis Desautels (Auditor General of Canada): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to present the results of our audit on national health surveillance, diseases and injuries, and management of a food-borne disease outbreak, as reported in chapters 14 and 15 of the 1999 report tabled last November.

Health surveillance is particularly critical now, given that global factors have dramatically increased the danger of communicable diseases being transmitted worldwide. Health concerns are no longer always the responsibility of one jurisdiction. Collaboration and cooperation among jurisdictions are vital to effective surveillance.

National surveillance of communicable disease and chronic disease is conducted mainly by Health Canada's Laboratory Centre for Disease Control, or LCDC. But LCDC depends largely on interaction and collaboration with the provinces and territories and a variety of other federal departments and non-governmental organizations. This includes the Canadian Food Inspection Agency in the event of a disease caused by food.

[Translation]

Chapter 14 covers national health surveillance in general, including the handling of threats to public health.

Chapter 15 flows from the audit of national health surveillance and focusses on how a recent outbreak of a food-borne disease was managed. The case illustrates many of the issues discussed in the other chapter.

Our audit found weaknesses in national health surveillance that, taken together, have clear implications for public health. These weaknesses compromise Health Canada's ability to detect, anticipate, prevent and control health risks associated with outbreaks of communicable disease, and other health threats. They also compromise the Department's ability to plan, carry out and evaluate programs that deal with the causes and treatment of diseases.

There is no national framework for public health. No specific legislation, policy or agreement exists that links separate components of public health functions at the various levels of government. In fact, there is a void. Current health surveillance activities are largely carried out on an ad hoc basis.

We found few formal agreements and protocols covering roles, responsibilities and procedures for handling threats to public health. The audit identified examples such as controlling diseases at ports of entry, responding to outbreaks of food-borne diseases and dealing with influenza pandemics. The lack of attention to formalizing the way these threats are to be managed places the health of Canadians at unnecessary risk.

[English]

There is a need for better management of disease outbreaks. The way the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, Health Canada, and provincial agencies handled one of the largest food-borne disease outbreaks in Canada is disturbing. Some important aspects of the response to the outbreak worked well, but others did not. We found delays in the exchange of information to identify the scope of the outbreak. We also found less than full cooperation among the agencies in responding to this outbreak. In addition, we noted that Health Canada and the CFIA need to ensure that they maintain appropriate records on food emergencies.

Finally, key surveillance systems that we looked at were not working as intended. They do not enable Health Canada to effectively monitor communicable and chronic diseases, such as influenza, AIDS, tuberculosis, and diabetes. Problems in collecting data include a lack of common standards for reporting information at the provincial and territorial levels. We also found significant gaps in surveillance information on certain diseases and injuries.

These weaknesses need to be fixed. Health Canada needs to champion change by ensuring that all players work together to improve the surveillance on which Canadians rely to protect their health.

Both Health Canada and the CFIA have agreed with our observations and have committed themselves to implementing our recommendations. We were also encouraged by Health Canada's timely and comprehensive response published on its website immediately following the tabling of our report.

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Work has begun on strengthening surveillance, including the proposal for an integrated national health surveillance network. It's important to maintain momentum in implementing this ambitious and very complex undertaking. The success and timely implementation of the network are vital to address some of the weaknesses we observed.

Mr. Chairman, your committee may wish to review the progress the department is making with its commitments, specifically the budgets, the milestones, and the actions it has taken to date.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my opening statement, and my colleagues and I would be pleased to answer your questions. Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Desautels. Now we'll turn to Mr. Lafleur, s'il vous plaît.

[Translation]

Mr. Robert S. Lafleur (Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, Corporate Services Branch, Department of Health): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, let me say first of all that Health Canada appreciates the work done by the Auditor General as part of the two audits that we are discussing here today. We found the recommendations which were made to be useful and we have already begun to implement them.

However, Mr. Chairman, I think it's very important to view this report in its proper context so that the committee and the public understand that Canada is a world leader in health surveillance.

We have a long-standing tradition of federal-provincial cooperation which goes back many decades and reflects a genuine social union.

The Auditor General has highlighted several problems that need to be corrected. Clearly Health Canada shares these concerns and is working hard to remedy this situation accordingly.

Surveillance and disease control are critical to public health and represent one of the basic responsibilities of Health Canada and its provincial partners.

By its very nature, surveillance, that is the gathering and analysis of specific data and the use of the resulting information to target action, is a scientific activity requiring the cooperation of many partners.

The process involves numerous stakeholders on a world-wide scale, including the federal government, the provinces, hospitals, health centres, medical practitioners, professionals, associations and many others.

[English]

In Canada the partnership for national surveillance is a voluntary one, but it works. It has been an important factor in giving Canadians a health status that is among the best in the world. It should be noted that most industrialized nations follow a similar approach to health surveillance. In order to be effective, this partnership must have clear accountabilities. Although most industrialized countries do not have a legislative base for their health surveillance activity, Health Canada has embarked upon a process of legislative renewal, which will look carefully at this requirement.

It is also important to note, Mr. Chairman, that the science of surveillance is a continuously evolving field. As science and technology advances, so does our ability to collect, analyse, and disseminate critically important information for public health decision-making.

Whereas only a few years ago one of our major tools for shipping bacterial specimens to Health Canada was by mail, we are now transferring genetic and molecular information instantly over the Internet.

I am tabling for the information of the committee several maps of Canada that depict surveillance systems and their growth over the last 10 to 15 years. I draw your attention to the changes that have occurred since the Auditor General's review.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I can say that the surveillance system is evolving through a new impact assessment framework that necessitates more comprehensive agreements between the federal government and the provinces, through continuous improvement in the interaction between Health Canada and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency and through an enlargement of our outreach internationally. The system must continue to evolve, since public health is now practised on a global scale, in food safety and in numerous other areas important to the health of the public.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Lafleur. The clerk acknowledges receipt of the maps you referred to in your opening statement. While they will not be appended to the minutes of this meeting because there's quite a stack of them, for the record, if anybody ever needs to have a copy, they're available from the clerk's office. He's going to distribute copies to the committee members at this point.

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We'll now turn to Mr. Doering for his opening remarks.

Mr. Ron Doering (President, Canadian Food Inspection Agency): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished members.

I have three points today: the first is that at the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, food safety is our first concern. It's the overriding importance in all we do.

[Translation]

The CFIA, in partnership with other levels of government, industry and consumers, works very hard every day to make our food safety system one of the best in the world.

Our reputation for safe food is based in sound food safety laws - founded on the most up-to-date scientific knowledge available....

[English]

Mr. Philip Mayfield (Cariboo—Chilcotin, Ref.): Mr. Chairman, Mr. Doering is going so quickly that the interpreter is having trouble, and I'm having trouble hearing the interpreter. I would like to hear Mr. Doering's remarks and understand them, please.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Doering, perhaps you could go a little slower, please. I know that you have a long statement and want to get through it in the five minutes we would normally allow for opening statements, but—

Mr. Mac Harb (Ottawa Centre, Lib.): I have a suggestion.

The Chair: Mr. Harb.

Mr. Mac Harb: If the statement is long, maybe we can put a motion that it be deemed to be part of the record, and then he can take his time and talk about whatever he wants to talk about. This way I think we can get the best out of the department. Mr. Chair, with your permission—

The Chair: Mr. Harb has made a motion. I think it's what I would rather see. If it's unanimous, I think we can accept that.

Mr. Mac Harb: Yes, sure. Absolutely. He can take his time and talk about whatever he wants to talk about, and then we will have it in the record.

The Chair: Mr. Mayfield.

Mr. Philip Mayfield: If he's going to take his time and talk, he could just as well talk about what's in the statement. This has just been given to me, and I'd like to understand what's in it before we begin our discussion, Mr. Harb.

The Chair: We do have a motion on the floor. You may object, if you so desire, Mr. Mayfield.

Mr. Philip Mayfield: I object.

The Chair: Are you objecting?

Mr. Philip Mayfield: Yes.

The Chair: Then, Mr. Doering, continue reading.

Mr. Mac Harb: I make a motion, Mr. Chair, that we allow him to go through his statement until it has been completed, so that we don't rush him.

The Chair: Yes. He's going to read his statement.

[Translation]

Mr. Ron Doering: The CFIA inspects over 3,500 federally registered plants; our provincial and municipal counterparts inspect thousands of other food premises. Increasingly, we work as cross-jurisdictional teams, drawing on the expertise of safety experts across the country.

The CFIA is constantly on alert against food safety threats. When emergencies occur, quick, synchronized action is put in motion on a national scale. According to Health Canada, which assesses the effectiveness of our work, the CFIA has an excellent record. In 92 per cent of the recalls reviewed, the CFIA completed its preliminary assessment promptly, in many cases, within 24 hours. The CFIA makes it its business to be ready for emergencies, with staff on call 24 hours a day, seven days a week.

[English]

In the first two years following the creation of the CFIA, we successfully handled 11,775 investigations, which led to 442 food recalls.

We have worked extremely hard on our food emergency readiness, and, with our food safety partners, we continue to improve our responses by building on lessons learned from previous experience. We have a public health and consumer protection mandate, and we take our responsibility very seriously.

Secondly, with regard to the specific case in hand, the CFIA welcomes and supports the Auditor General's reports and recommendations relating to improving the overall food emergency response system. As indicated in the report, this case was one of the largest food-borne disease outbreaks in Canadian history, involving many provinces and agencies.

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The CFIA's initial priority was to protect consumers, and on March 31, 1998, the day the laboratory confirmation of contamination of a lunch product was received, a food recall along with a national health hazard alert was issued.

On April 13 the CFIA confirmed the presence of salmonella enteriditis in cheese sticks sampled from the inventory of the company supplying the cheese to the lunch product manufacturer. In the interests of public safety, the agency, supported by Health Canada, issued a food recall and a public health advisory.

The Auditor General's report highlights a decision by the CFIA not to lead a seventh inspection of the cheese plant. It is important to note that the CFIA, Health Canada, and other public health agencies had investigated the plant on six previous occasions, and that the CFIA participated fully in the seventh investigation led by the Ontario Ministry of Health.

The CFIA keeps the minister informed of all matters that may have an impact on public, animal, or plant health. The minister's office was explicit in its support of the technical competency of the CFIA to conduct its handling of the outbreak investigation according to normal operating procedures to ensure the protection of the Canadian public.

In spite of a committed and thorough effort from each of the jurisdictions involved, no definitive conclusion could be made on the cause of the contamination. This occurrence is, unfortunately, not uncommon in situations where a product has been manufactured some four months previous to the outbreak of the illness.

A review of this case by the public health branch of the Ontario Ministry of Health clearly demonstrates that the measures taken by the CFIA and its partners rapidly limited further illnesses.

Third, the agency is a continuous-learning organization. We agree with the Auditor General's recommendations and are working toward their full implementation.

Since its inception in 1997, the CFIA has recognized food emergency management as one of its highest priorities. It was also recognized that the emergency response system would benefit from review and redesign to ensure it was operating effectively in this changing environment.

A review of the CFIA's food emergency response system was completed by Health Canada in 1999. In addition, our corporate audit and review directorate developed an action plan for addressing some of the issues raised by Health Canada.

These reviews, together with ongoing efforts to clarify and update working relationships and the underlying agreements with Health Canada and the provinces, have resulted in significant improvements to the management framework, operational processes, and basis for the coordination of food emergency management.

The CFIA is working with Health Canada and provincial and territorial counterparts to finalize the food-borne illness response protocol, which is designed to improve the coordination efforts and response to food emergencies by all partners.

The CFIA recognizes that it must continue to devote a sustained effort to ensure that the food emergency response system remains responsive to the food safety needs of all consumers. Already a significant number of changes have been made to the CFIA's management of food recall emergencies, including, among others, the creation of the Office of Food Safety Recall in July 1999.

In summary, to repeat my three points, safe food and consumer protection are paramount in all we do at the CFIA. Two, in the case at hand, the CFIA took measures it felt were required to rapidly limit further illness. Three, the CFIA is committed to continuous improvement of its food emergency response system and will continue to work in collaboration with all levels of government. In this regard, our work is never done.

Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Doering.

Mr. Mayfield, first round, eight minutes, please.

Mr. Philip Mayfield: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like to thank the Auditor General for his report and thank the representatives of health and food inspection for being here today to meet with us.

I read the reports with some interest and, I must say, some concern, particularly as I look at what turns out to be a case study of the way the various agencies work together in providing surveillance and determining the cause of outbreaks.

It seems as though there was a lack of coordination. I don't think I need to repeat it at great length, but the chronology of events begins in early March of 1998 with Ontario, I believe, finding some rising numbers of salmonella. Apparently they're not that well organized to begin with. Then Newfoundland discovers they have an outbreak. I believe it's Newfoundland who calls the LCDC first, if I'm correct. The same day, or perhaps the day after, Ontario is there, at which time probably the penny drops that there's a problem that needs to be looked at fairly quickly.

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Despite the lack of coordination, it was gratifying to see that one person in Guelph realized somebody had to take charge and actually set about doing something, calling the troops together, as it were, and getting on with the job. About this time, I believe, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency was brought in.

I note in the Auditor General's report that CFIA was responsible for conducting investigations to determine the cause of contamination. In addition, this agency was responsible for enforcement. We're going along here....

First of all, could you describe what a class one recall is, please, for the benefit of everyone here, including me?

Perhaps Mr. Doering would like to answer that question.

Mr. Ron Doering: I could, but the actual determination of the class of the recall is made by Health Canada.

Do you want to do that?

Dr. Michael Shannon (Director General, Laboratory Centre for Disease Control, Health Protection Branch, Department of Health): Sure.

To form the basis of the assessed risk to the public that has been determined to relate to a food product, what's required here is that the microbiologists in the lab, the public health people in the field, and the epidemiologists in the field have to link all of the specimens from the individuals infected, the product on the shelf, and from the factory.

Mr. Philip Mayfield: But it's also related to the seriousness of the outbreak—

Dr. Michael Shannon: Absolutely.

Mr. Philip Mayfield: —the jeopardy to health, and perhaps even the cause of death. Is that not correct? This is really a first-rank emergency that has to be attended to. Is that the situation?

Dr. Michael Shannon: That's correct. It's usually based on an assessment—

Mr. Philip Mayfield: All right.

I have a number of questions here, and I'd ask you to cooperate with me so that I can get as much in my eight minutes as I can.

What concerns me is there was some difficulty in determining exactly where this disease was coming from. Just about the time that everybody agreed to go make another inspection, there were phone calls. There were letters. CFIA was going to lead the charge on this.

There was a problem with the company. They felt there was some unfairness and demands that were not reasonable. A letter was written to the minister and a phone call was made.

Just about that time, everything crashed. CFIA said they weren't going to lead the thing or write reports. A person in the field was told she was only to answer questions. There were to be no written reports or offers of technical support.

I would like to know why, after the senior officials got together, this decision was made. I'd also like to know whether the minister was involved in this decision.

Mr. Ron Doering: Thank you, sir. Dr. Evans had integral involvement throughout all aspects of this recall. I'd ask him to comment on that.

Dr. Brian Evans (Executive Director, Animal Products Directorate, Canadian Food Inspection Agency): First and foremost, I'd like to address the comment on whether there was any involvement from the minister's office. Categorically and unequivocally, the answer is none, at the technical level.

Mr. Philip Mayfield: What about at any other level? Because if the minister was involved....

I'd like to know why this was shut down. You guys are leading the charge. You're responsible for the protection. All of a sudden the leaders say “We quit.” That doesn't make sense to me.

Dr. Brian Evans: Unfortunately, that's not the case. That's not what happened. In effect, as was indicated in the report, the establishment in question had been visited and inspected on four separate occasions in the previous three weeks by CFIA.

Mr. Philip Mayfield: But, sir, may I remind you—

An hon. member: [Inaudible—Editor]

Mr. Philip Mayfield: This is my time, okay?

The Chair: This is his eight minutes.

Mr. Philip Mayfield: May I remind you, sir, that there was a letter, there was an agreement that everybody was going to go and do this reinspection. Suddenly the CFIA was no longer a part of that. I would like to know why.

Why did you drop out? Obviously everything was set up, and then it quit.

Mr. Mac Harb: [Inaudible—Editor].

The Chair: No, Mr. Harb, that's fine. Let Mr. Mayfield ask the question.

• 1600

Dr. Brian Evans: In effect the CFIA did not withdraw from the inspection. We were a full participant in two of the three investigation teams that went in on the seventh inspection.

The sequence of events in detail was this. On March 20 there was a sharing of the reports of our previous four inspections of the plant, in addition to the sharing of the two reports from the two investigations done by the local public health unit. The group agreed they needed two or three days to review the findings of that report, which took us to an agreement to meet on Wednesday to determine whether the seventh inspection would proceed. As you indicated, all parties agreed there were issues arising from the identification of a water contamination with a coliform bacteria identified by the public health unit. The discussion in the group was that this particular finding, although of public health consequence—

Mr. Philip Mayfield: Sir, you're not addressing my question.

Dr. Brian Evans: I am.

Mr. Philip Mayfield: In 15.57 of the Auditor General's report, it says:

CFIA officials told us that senior management decided, upon reviewing the file, that based on their analysis of previous inspections there was no further need for the Agency to inspect the plant. The Agency decided that it would no longer lead the inspection of the plant. In effect, it changed its role to one of assisting Health Canada in determining the cause of contamination, rather than maintaining a lead role in the investigation.

Your mandate hasn't changed; it's just that you decided not to do it. Is that right?

Dr. Brian Evans: No. We did not. The issue at the moment was, as I said, a coliform investigation warranted by a finding of a water contamination by the Ministry of Health. We were leading an investigation into a salmonella contamination, a different bacteria.

The inspection that had taken place prior to that time had confirmed that process controls, water controls related to water involved in the production of the product, were operating at standard and there was no issue with the water involved in the cheese process. The water contamination of the well water, which is not used in the cheese contamination and is a separate type of bacteria, was being investigated primarily because it did have public health implications for staff working in the plant but was unrelated to the food-borne illness situation.

On that basis we determined that it was important that we continue our lead role on the salmonella food-borne investigation and that it was appropriate for the Ministry of Health to lead the investigation on water.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Mayfield.

[Translation]

Mr. Sauvageau, you have eight minutes.

Mr. Benoît Sauvageau (Repentigny, BQ): Good day, Mr. Desautels, gentlemen, madam. I'm not angry. On the contrary, I'm pleased to see you and I promise not to ask you any questions about raw milk cheese.

My first question is directed to Mr. Lafleur and concerns paragraph five of Mr. Desautels' opening statement, which reads as follows:

5. Our audit found weaknesses in national health surveillance that, taken together, have clear implications for public health. These weaknesses compromise Health Canada's ability to detect, anticipate, prevent and control health risks associated with outbreaks of communicable disease, and other health threats.

I'd like either Mr. Lafleur or one of his colleagues to comment on this statement by Mr. Desautels.

Mr. Robert Lafleur: We believe that as a result of the concerted efforts of Health Canada and the provinces, Canada benefits from a comprehensive health surveillance system. We've apprised ourselves of the Auditor General's recommendations and we are in the process of implementing them. Dr. Losos could fill you in a little more on what we are doing.

[English]

Dr. Joe Losos (Assistant Deputy Minister, Health Protection Branch, Department of Health): Thank you, Mr. Lafleur.

It's important to note that surveillance is a very complex science that is in an exponential growth. It's in an exponential growth not only in Canada but in the United States and in every jurisdiction going. Our global system is under the World Health Organization. It is not yet a perfect system, but it is quickly becoming a much more complex, effective, and efficient tool for monitoring of public health risk in every jurisdiction.

That's why we took the recommendations of the Auditor General to heart and seriously, and as we will demonstrate to you, we have made a lot of progress since the audit. We do not claim it's perfect, but I would say it is moving very quickly to becoming and is one of the leading systems in the world.

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The science of epidemiology is only several decades old. The technology is changing very quickly. The information age has allowed us to become much more effective in surveillance.

We aren't perfect. Ten years from now we're going to be light years better than we are now. But we are very good. We handle dozens and dozens and dozens of these types of outbreaks every year, not only in food but in a variety of other diseases. There are sometimes glitches; there are sometimes scientific fights over the results. I don't think that's a weakness. I think that's good debate among scientists. These systems are increasing in not only complexity but efficiency very quickly.

So overall the bottom line is these systems are very good, and you'll see them getting even better very quickly.

[Translation]

Mr. Benoît Sauvageau: First of all, let me say that I have no knowledge whatsoever of the study to which you are referring. I am, however, prepared to give you the benefit of the doubt, almost without any hesitation, regarding epidemiology and related matters.

Admittedly, it's nice to claim that one is a world leader, that everything is fine and that there are no problems. However, when the Auditor General, who is not an opposition member, tells us that there are certain problems, the situation does not appear to be as clear cut.

Are you satisfied, Mr. Desautels, with the answers you received from Health Canada further to your recommendations? Do you think the department will move quickly to rectify the problems identified in your statement and in your report?

Mr. Denis Desautels: Yes, Mr. Chairman, we are satisfied with Health Canada's response to our recommendations. The department accepted our findings and promised to take whatever action was necessary to implement our recommendations. As I observed in my opening statement, Health Canada even published on its website a comprehensive response to our report, something that we don't see happen very often. The department's response has been very positive. Now all that remains is for it to follow through on our recommendations. As I stated to committee members earlier, it might be a good idea for you to ask the department to provide you with a timetable indicating what specific action needs to be taken and listing corresponding deadlines.

Mr. Benoît Sauvageau: Thank you very much. For your information, and not to advertise the program, I heard on the news this morning that TVA was planning to broadcast a program this evening on what would transpire if there was an outbreak of a strain of flu for which there was no vaccine. The information that will be conveyed to viewers was verified by scientists. The broadcast might well strike fear in the hearts of many viewers who are likely to believe that this pandemic is real and who will be giving you a call. I'm just telling you what I heard.

I have a question for CFIA representatives. Mr. Desautels, who is a great source of inspiration to me, noted the following in paragraph 8 of his opening statement:

8. There is a need for better management of disease outbreaks. The way the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, Health Canada and provincial agencies handled one of the largest food-borne disease outbreaks in Canada is disturbing.

Messrs. Doering and Evans, would you concur with Health Canada officials that the problems identified by Mr. Desautels in his report and in his statement are on the verge of being corrected? Have you set a timetable for addressing these problems? Would you care to comment on this?

[English]

Dr. Brian Evans: Very succinctly, yes, we fully do support, as we have indicated, the Auditor General's recommendations. A number of the recommendations made by the Auditor General in fact had been implemented and rectified in advance of the audit having taken place.

We have created the Office of Food Safety Recall for coordination across the country. We have worked very closely with Health Canada on redefining the memorandum of understanding on roles and responsibilities. We do have a federal-provincial-territorial protocol now in place for food illness investigation purposes that has been agreed to by all provinces and territories and is in the process of being signed off by those respective jurisdictions.

[Translation]

Mr. Benoît Sauvageau: I'd like to discuss the outbreak of diseases. Let's assume for the sake of argument that genetically modified foods are not dangerous and that everyone can eat these products without worry.

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Why are the CFIA and Health Canada reluctant to recommend that these products, which do not pose a health risk, since they have been inspected by Health Canada, be labeled as genetically modified products?

[English]

Dr. Joe Losos: Under the Food and Drugs Act we review novel foods, which include biotechnologically engineered foods. If we go through our multi-step process and we feel there is any risk whatsoever, under our legislation, we require labelling of the food—for allergies, for example, or for non-equivalence of nutrient content. So if there's a health and safety issue, we require that legislation.

We feel our present cadre of science is adequate for the relatively simplistic biotechnology of today. But the budget just announced this week infuses quite a significant investment into the Health Protection Branch throughout our programs—in therapeutics, in food safety, in environmental biotechnology, and in the Laboratory Centre for Disease Control—to strengthen our science capacity in food. That will translate into scientists, it will translate into longer-term studies, and it will translate into a much more rigorous anticipation of the increasing complexity of biotechnology as it goes on. It may be a few years from now that it isn't just one gene that is manipulated; it may be more. We need to be proactive and ready for that to happen, and this investment should go a long way to help that.

[Translation]

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Sauvageau.

[English]

Mr. Harb.

Mr. Mac Harb: I want first to thank the witnesses, both from the Office of the Auditor General and from the Department of Health. The responses of the Department of Health have been among the most comprehensive responses to date, and I've been on this committee for a number years.

I want to thank you very much for agreeing pretty well 100% with what the Auditor General said, but not only agreeing. You're doing something about it, which is good.

Lately we heard some reports coming out of the United Kingdom about some meteorites coming down on the planet, in particular in the U.K., and causing some of the chaos and some of the diseases that exist. I don't know whether that's fiction or it's true. I wanted to find out first if you have looked into those kinds of allegations that came from some of their officials in the government of Britain. That's one.

Two, I want you to tell me a little bit about how often you go out in the communities to work, for example, with outreach organizations, such as health clinics—in my constituency I have a couple of them—community centres, community organizations, and stuff like that. How often do you do outreach programs? And if you don't do enough, do you have a plan to do more in the future?

Dr. Joe Losos: Thank you, Mr. Harb.

The Health Protection Branch is responsible for a lot of things, but meteorites are not one of them, luckily for us. I'm not trying to be facetious, sir, but I know of no impact. But certainly we will look into that.

Concerning outreach, I thank you for the question, because LCDC is not a facility in Tunney's Pasture nor in Winnipeg. LCDC is an octopus through the country that relies very heavily on non-governmental organizations, provinces, and professional associations. Those maps that were handed out are a reflection of the need to involve the grassroots practitioners in Canada to get information to us.

Surveillance is not always a passive system. Very often there are sentinel systems or very aggressive systems in getting information. Our job is not the administrative databases of Stats Canada. We're not interested in that. They're very capable and efficient in doing that. We want to surf through their information. We want to use the Pediatric Society, community groups, and whoever else will get us the information so that we can react, be it on food-borne disease or elsewhere.

So we use outreach programs really quite unabashedly and get a lot of cooperation and therefore mobilize an incredible power scientifically in Canada by being part of our networks.

Mr. Mac Harb: Thank you.

[Translation]

The Chair: Go ahead, Mr. Clouthier.

[English]

Mr. Hec Clouthier (Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Since we're talking about food inspection and Health Canada, I'd just like someone, no one in particular.... I know Brian talked about process. Hypothetically, if in my riding or in rural Canada, even in urban Canada, there were, say, tainted hamburger and a lot of people got sick as a result, what would be the process? I know we have a medical health officer. What would be the process from start to finish?

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Dr. Joe Losos: If I might start, Mr. Chairman, what happens in food-borne illness or any other kind of illness is that the systems pour information into the Laboratory Centre for Disease Control, and they do so for a variety of reasons. This meningitis and that meningitis may not be related in the community, so you have to do the fine fingerprinting.

We will pick up on these collections of infections, which are probably food-borne but not yet proven, so the Food Inspection Agency has not yet kicked in. We get a lot of these. We get 20,000 to 30,000 reports annually on these types of enteric, as they are called, infections. Any time there is a suspicion of a food, the Food Inspection Agency is triggered, and the compliance machinery gets into gear.

Mr. Ron Doering: Just to carry on from there, we have 4,500 people across the country who have a variety of responsibilities for food safety, animal health, and plant protection.

If in your own riding, sir, it was identified that there was a food-borne illness problem, it could come to us through a variety of ways. It could come through the medical officer of health from Renfrew or Pembroke, in which case it would trigger up through the provincial government; or if it turned out that it came to our attention, we would do an immediate investigation ourselves together with the province.

If it's fairly obvious where it came from, particularly if it was from a federally registered facility, say a meat plant in your riding, we have on site in that plant a full-time veterinarian and meat inspectors. So we would have an opportunity to have the people who are actually there work with our own people to do an immediate investigation.

We handle on average around 6,000 or 8,000 per year of these kinds of complaints, everything from “There's glass in my soup” to “People are sick from E. coli 0157:H7” or something like that, in food.

Once the source is determined, if the agency knows where it came from, the agency would immediately be in touch with the people involved. In that case almost invariably the company would immediately want to recall that product. We would participate with them and with Health Canada in an assessment of whether a recall is appropriate, and we would make a public announcement and issue a public notice. The whole machinery of how recall would work would come into play. That, as I say, happens hundreds of times every year.

Mr. Hec Clouthier: If someone were found to be at fault, who would have the jurisdiction regarding the enforcement of the law?

Mr. Ron Doering: We would, sir. If it involved an activity in a federally registered facility—and we're in thousands of these now, particularly meat plants and other kinds of processors—there are a variety of ways in which you could enforce compliance. You could pull the registration so that they couldn't produce this product any longer. In exceptional circumstances, particularly if it were known that these people were deliberately engaged in activities that were inappropriate, the agency would take them to court and charge them, as we do many times every year.

[Translation]

Mr. Hec Clouthier: One last question. Do you agree with this, Mr. Desautels?

[English]

Ms. Maria Barrados (Assistant Auditor General, Office of the Auditor General of Canada): Yes, we agree with that description. It's a general kind of description. The kinds of observations we were making in the audit dealt with how the specifics can work when you're looking at individual situations. That's where our recommendations are for improvement.

[Translation]

Mr. Hec Clouthier: Thank you very much.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Richardson, do you have a short question?

Mr. John Richardson (Perth—Middlesex, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Looking at the process and protocol used, I assume you'd have in place standard operating procedures for a variety of incidents. Could you share it with us without getting into Buck Rogers and Flash Gordon, the space-age policemen? It would be important for us to know that flow. If you would share it with those of us around the table, as members of Parliament, we'd appreciate it. It would make us a little more cognizant of what's taking place.

• 1620

Dr. Michael Shannon: If I may, perhaps I should answer that. In fact, it might very well answer the previous question as well, in terms of specifics.

At least about 95%, if not 99%, of food-borne outbreaks that occur with humans, because the product has left the manufacturer, are picked up by public health officials, by the public health community, through various systems, shall we say. Normally, if a number of cases present in a particular unit.... Let's say we're talking about a specific riding with the public health unit in a local hospital. The cases present themselves either to the local doctors or to the local hospital. An attempt is made to diagnose. Specimens are taken and sent off from there to the provincial health lab. The public health unit in the area keeps tabs on that.

It's important to note that routinely we have these kinds of cases presenting right across the country. So one of the challenges we have—and we're working very diligently on that—is to develop algorithms or methods by which we can detect or separate out signal from background noise. This is happening all the time.

As the numbers begin to build, at some point someone—it's oftentimes the public health officer, but occasionally it's the lab—happens to notice that the numbers are climbing above what would be considered “normal” for this particular time of year in this particular location. This is the current system. They advise the chief medical officer of health, and the chief medical officer of health for that province then begins to conduct an investigation. He or she may elect to advise—and under the current protocol they are routinely advising—LCDC of any of these kinds of outbreaks.

Now what we have to do at LCDC is then decide whether or not we have anything going on anywhere else in the country that appears to be somewhat unusual that perhaps can be linked. We don't really know, though, at that point, because we haven't conducted anything other than a study at the provincial lab that tells us which bacteria we're dealing with, bearing in mind that these things happen routinely, at any rate.

If, let's say, in the case of the outbreak referred to in chapter 15, we have a growing number of cases in Ontario and a growing number of cases in Newfoundland that would appear, on the basis of the evidence we have, to be the same outbreak, at that point, LCDC, in accordance with the protocol, takes over. It assumes the lead on that portion of the risk management process that is involved or takes us to the identification of the particular risk and the subsequent analysis.

Then, in conjunction with all of the provincial medical officers of health and chief epidemiologists—and that's done in accordance with the protocol, initially through a teleconference and then the establishment of an outbreak investigation coordinating committee—LCDC at this point assumes the lead on this process. We begin to support the provinces by dispatching our field epidemiologists. In the case of what was described in chapter 15, we had two people assigned to the situation in Ontario and one person assigned almost immediately to Newfoundland.

That still doesn't solve the problem, though, because we still don't know, from a CFIA perspective.... And incidentally, they're informed immediately as well whenever we have anything that has to do with food or that we suspect has to do with food, bearing in mind what Dr. Losos said, that we have outbreaks, infectious problems, of all different types and that we have to slowly zero in on what we think the causative agent is. As soon as we begin to suspect it's a food, CFIA is involved.

Incidentally, in response to what the Auditor General mentioned in chapter 15, there was, for this particular outbreak, an apparent problem with the Newfoundland rep trying to identify somebody in LCDC to contact. That has been solved now, in accordance with our protocol.

On the basis, then, of a network of microbiologists, field epidemiologists, and public health people, we collect specimens and we begin the process of attempting to zero in on the cause. That's an epidemiological study. We have to collect specimens and, through some very sophisticated microbiological techniques, demonstrate that the infective agent we've identified that is in the specimens taken from the individual, the samples in the hospitals, whatever we think is on the shelf, and then ultimately the source and the manufacturer, are exactly the same. The CFIA takes over, begins their investigation, and if necessary, a class one recall occurs.

• 1625

The Chair: Thank you.

Ms. Wasylycia-Leis, please.

Ms. Judy Wasylycia-Leis (Winnipeg North Centre, NDP): Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.

Time is really short for a very important issue. This is something I think we should have before the health committee. We've had some trouble getting it on the agenda. I hope that as part of recommendations from this committee you might suggest in fact that further review of this serious incident take place.

I want to start by asking the Auditor General a question. In section 15.19 of the report, you make a very strong statement about lack of cooperation in your investigation from the Canadian Food Inspection Agency. I found it quite a stark, critical comment, and I am wondering if you have ever had occasion in the past to make such a critical comment about departmental response during an investigation.

The Chair: Ms. Barrados.

Ms. Maria Barrados: Yes, Mr. Chairman, that is an unusual statement for us to be making. We made it because we feel it's important in our reports to Parliament that parliamentarians fully understand the type of assurance that we had with the material we're presenting and the processes we followed.

Ms. Judy Wasylycia-Leis: I'm not sure who to ask this question of. I'm wondering if, as a result of this report, the minister responsible for the Canadian Food Inspection Agency took any necessary steps to call upon his officials in the Canadian Food Inspection Agency to show more cooperation and willingness to participate in investigations of any sort.

The Chair: Mr. Doering.

Mr. Ron Doering: As I said in my opening address, sir, both prior to that time and after, we've taken a number of steps to try to respond to an increasing number—

Ms. Judy Wasylycia-Leis: No, my question was whether the minister actually sent a directive down into the department based on this report, yes or no.

Mr. Ron Doering: No.

Ms. Judy Wasylycia-Leis: Okay.

With respect to the follow-up, the department's response suggests that protocols have been developed and that procedures are in place, and that these have been completed in June 1999 and September 1999. I would assume we could have copies of the framework document and the protocols.

Mr. Ron Doering: Yes, of course.

Ms. Judy Wasylycia-Leis: Thank you.

I'm wondering, based on this, why incidents continued after the incident and after these deadlines had transpired. Specifically I'd like to know why, in June 1999, we had the particular problem of veterinary food inspections at slaughterhouses not being up to task and inspectors blaming this on insufficient staffing.

I'm wondering why, in July 1999, we had—

The Chair: Do you want to take them one at a time?

Ms. Judy Wasylycia-Leis: I could. Maybe I could just throw out the three, because I do have a lot of other questions.

The Chair: Okay.

Ms. Judy Wasylycia-Leis: I want to know about the incident in Beausejour, Manitoba, in July 1999, when carcasses from cattle fed with contaminated feed were rendered and put back into the whole food system and it apparently took CFIA 10 days to notify farmers.

I want to know why, in October 1999, we had the serious incident of botulism in New Brunswick in terms of meat from a certain slaughterhouse and it took CFIA 13 days to determine if there was a danger to human health.

Did we learn anything from this March and April 1998 incident and the Auditor General's investigation, and why does this continue?

Mr. Ron Doering: I'll make the general comment and then ask Dr. Evans, who is in charge of animal health and the meat side, to give more specific ones in terms of some of these events you have mentioned, Madam.

The business we're in is that you will always have these. There will always be animal health problems and plant protection incursions, and there will always be food-borne illness and food-borne outbreaks. Too, we live in a federal system, where there is always going to be an issue with respect to whether this is primarily a provincial matter or primarily a federal matter, so it is very important that we work together. There have been protocols and undertakings and agreements in place for many years, but that doesn't mean there won't be ongoing problems. That's why our work is never done. This happens throughout the world and it certainly happens in our world.

All you can do in cases of this kind is to do the very best you can to protect the Canadian public. That's our first job. But you should not think that because we have protocols in place there won't be outbreaks of food-borne illness. There always will be, and our job is to maximize our opportunities to minimize these and to respond when we can.

• 1630

Dr. Evans, maybe you could deal with a couple of these specific ones that Ms. Wasylycia-Leis talks about.

Ms. Judy Wasylycia-Leis: We don't have time for all the detail. I just want to know this: did you change the procedures, according to the Auditor General's recommendations, to be able to deal with these kinds of situations? It's pretty scary. It would seem that it was only because of luck we didn't have a fairly major disaster on our hands subsequent to the worst outbreak of a food-borne disease in the history of Canada.

Mr. Ron Doering: In the year that you're talking about, 1999, we did something like 8,000 investigations where there were complaints, problems, issues that we came up to, and these culminated in 300 or 400 cases in which we actually did recalls. You don't hear about the cases where we do investigations and find out what the source of the problem is.

The Chair: I think Ms. Judy Wasylycia-Leis' question, which was whether you had changed your systems, got a nod from Mr. Evans. Unfortunately, nods and shaking your head don't make it to the public record, so perhaps you could just confirm your answer to Ms. Wasylycia-Leis' question.

Dr. Brian Evans: Okay. I'll be as quick as I possibly can. The issues she has identified identify the reality, I think, that risks occur at all points in the food chain, on the farm situation as she alluded to in Beausejour....

Obviously the agency is not on every farm in Canada when an owner decides to treat his animals a certain way, but the reality was that when the issue was identified, the agency went to extreme lengths, both in terms of digging into the pit to verify where animals had been redirected from the rendering plant to the landfill site.... We had a number of people up to various parts of their anatomy digging through the garbage to identify the cattle. Furthermore, testing was already underway, collaboratively with the Province of Alberta and others, to verify whether the tissue samples of these animals verified whether there was in fact any level detectable of the particular agent that had been applied to the cattle. All reports came back negative.

At that point, we felt we were in more of an education mode, with private practitioners and the veterinary profession at large, to redo public awareness that when these issues do happen, these types of materials should not get into the rendering and food supply system. But we were able to demonstrate that in fact there was nothing that got into the system and that we were able, through available analyses, to determine that there was any source of infection.

Ms. Judy Wasylycia-Leis: I just think it seems that we had the same problem that happened with salmonella outbreak. An incident is reported and there's a huge delay in terms of response by the CFIA.

I would like to know if.... In fact, it seems to me that there's an inherent problem in the structure of the CFIA. I think the scientist who spoke out last fall may have identified it. It is your dual mandate, the fact that you're responsible for marketing of products and agriculture promotion as well as for food inspection and health protection. I would wonder if in fact that's not a problem that should be changed—if we learned anything from the mad cow disease in Great Britain.

As part of that, at least Health Canada officials.... Have they been asked to make a comment to the government on Bill C-80, which seeks to further solidify health inspection under the CFIA, despite all of these difficulties, problems, and looming disasters inherent in the situation?

The Chair: Now let's hear what Dr. Evans has to say.

Dr. Brian Evans: Again, I'd like to clearly state that the agency has no role in agriculture promotion.

Our mandate is very specifically public health, animal health, plant health, and consumer protection. The fact that we are able to provide very high health standards for animal diseases or absences of those diseases in Canada, that we have the ability under the agency to deal with risks to public health, whether it's rabies, brucellosis, those types of issues.... We have the broader mandate scope now so that we can deal with all those risk factors in a much more effective manner.

The other point that I would like to make at this time is that the Auditor General's report did not criticize the CFIA for a delayed response. In fact, when we were brought in on March 26, we were complimented for the rapidity by which the illnesses fell off. By virtue of the fact that the product was removed from the marketplace, consumers were made aware of the risks out there. The graphs that are available, I believe, as part of the epidemiological outbreak, show that within a matter of five days after the CFIA was involved, there was an almost negligible level of illnesses being reported. I think that was borne out by some of the compliments in the Auditor General's report.

Ms. Judy Wasylycia-Leis: I would still like an answer to the question about Health Canada or LCDC, in particular, being invited to make comments on Bill C-80, which was before the House and then was pulled back. While you're at it, could you explain why the minutes—

The Chair: I think, Ms. Wasylycia-Leis—

Ms. Judy Wasylycia-Leis: —of your post-mortem were not circulated?

The Chair: —if you're on to Bill C-80, then we'll leave that for the next round.

• 1635

Mr. Mahoney, please.

Mr. Steve Mahoney (Mississauga West, Lib.): Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

I've found in my couple of years around here that generally everybody comes in and agrees with the Auditor General. He's a man of amazing power—and with justification.

But I'm curious at the comment, Mr. Doering, that you made on page 2 of your presentation, where you say “The AG report highlights a decision by the CFIA not to lead a seventh inspection of the plant.” You say it is important to note that you had already done six. Is that a little bit of disagreement that I see there? Was it necessary to do the seventh?

Mr. Ron Doering: Just by way of a general comment, we agree with the recommendations of the Auditor General. There are various interpretations that can be put on the facts and in terms of approaches to what happened here.

Dr. Evans and Bob were both intimately involved in this. I think Dr. Evans tried to explain the fact that we were at the seventh inspection and that it had to do with the change in what the lead consideration was at that time. It had to do with whether or not we had the lead or the province had the lead.

Do either of you want to elaborate on that?

Dr. Brian Evans: Very briefly, Mr. Mahoney, I will just make the statement that, again, this was a multi-jurisdictional team from the outset. There was representation from Health Canada and the MOHs. We tried to operate within the outbreak such that the people with the highest level of expertise or jurisdictional authority would lead any one part of the investigation.

As I indicated, we had done the process control inspections four times in the previous three weeks, found all operating to standard, and were in agreement with re-inspection of the plant. There was no issue there.

But where we had a communication issue and a leadership issue was the fact that it was the public health department in Ontario that was concerned about this chloroform contamination of water that they found as part of one of their investigations. As I say, because it was a public health finding, it was not the same bacteria. That water source was not involved in the cheese processing piece. It was their jurisdictional and expertise lead that we felt was appropriate to take that to the seventh level.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: So in that particular case, the Ontario Ministry of Health had, to use your words “the highest level of expertise”, in your view, and you would basically work under them.

Dr. Brian Evans: Well, not “under them”, but collaboratively with them, to provide our technical expertise in terms of the processing, how water moves through the plant, the sterilization, and the processes that are involved with other water sources, related to the approval of how the plant operates to standard. Yes.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: I guess the bottom line is that you participated in the seventh investigation that the Auditor General was referring to—

Dr. Brian Evans: Yes.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: —so you did agree that it was necessary.

Dr. Brian Evans: Yes.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Okay.

Mr. Losos, someone asked you a question and you mentioned meningitis.

The Chair: Mr. Mahoney, Ms. Barrados would like to say something, I believe.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Just as long as she doesn't use all my time, that's fine.

Ms. Maria Barrados: It's just a quick comment about the nature of our comments. Our comments were that because there was this change in role.... At one point the CFIA was leading and then the CFIA was no longer leading. It resulted in quite a bit of confusion and some delay. That was our issue. We reflect in the report that there was a difference of interpretation as to how that actually played out.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Thanks for that, because I think the different jurisdictional battles can cause problems. They do in just about everything we do in this country.

So you probably shouldn't be any different. I was going to go to the issue that was mentioned about meningitis because it seems to cause jurisdictional problems, more so at the community level. It seems like every year or two, or at least every three, some young teenager dies of meningitis somewhere in this country. In a couple of instances, it was in my own community. It's all mysterious, nobody can explain how, and everybody gets excited about getting all our kids vaccinated. Then the medical officer of health comes out and says it's not necessary to vaccinate all our children, even though we're all busy attending a funeral.

As a political representative who, by the way, has served municipally, provincially, and now federally, I had this when I was on council and dealing with the medical officer of health, and I've never been able to give anybody an answer as to what kinds of regulations, what kind of investigation, what kind of thorough analysis is done in terms of this horrible disease that seems to come out of nowhere. It's never been my impression that it comes from food. I've always thought of it as a virus or something of that nature. I wonder if you could help me with any of that.

Dr. Joe Losos: Yes, sir. Meningitis is not spread by food. It's spread by mouth to mouth, in droplets spread between individuals. It does cluster in the winter months. The reason it's so difficult to manage as far as vaccine campaigns are concerned is that it varies in clone or in species of meningitis, so the vaccine does not necessarily work on all types of vaccines.

• 1640

At the provincial level, they can usually tell if it's a type A or a type B meningitis. What happens is the voluntary system.... And it is a provincial jurisdiction whether to go ahead with the vaccination program or not, largely supported by our National Advisory Committee on Immunization and LCDC, which would give them advice as to how to manage it.

We would get these specimens and we would do the fine fingerprinting on these that would tell them if this case is related to that case or if these are just two sporadic cases in the same community. If they're sporadic, then an immunization program or a limitation of meeting places—cancelling the hockey games, for example—really isn't going to help a lot.

The fingerprinting LCDC does is isoenzyme typing, and it's one of ten or eleven laboratories in the world that can do that. So that's the type of support of provincial and municipal jurisdictions LCDC provides. But meningitis is a very fulminant—literally in 24 hours or 48 hours—awful, awful disease. Technologically, as a species, we're really not quite there yet as far as being able to explain it or manage it is concerned.

The Chair: Mr. Mahoney, I forgot to tell you we're on the second round and limited to four minutes. Although you're over the four minutes, I'll give you another brief question.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: That's very nice. Thank you.

I guess this would be for Mr. Doering more, but it's on the same kind of issue. Your second-last paragraph on page 2 says:

In spite of a committed and thorough effort from each of the jurisdictions involved, no definite conclusion could be made on the cause of the contamination.

Surely to goodness, with all of the science we have available to us these days, you can find out what causes this stuff. I'm puzzled at that.

Mr. Ron Doering: Well, I'm not a scientist, sir, and I can tell you this is hard to explain to people, but the fact of the matter is we still don't know what caused this. Dr. Evans is, and so is Mr. Carberry. Maybe they could elaborate a little bit.

Dr. Brian Evans: I'd just very briefly state again that the reality of the investigation we were undertaking dealt with a product that had been manufactured some four months prior to the illnesses starting to be expressed. And as I say, in spite of the fact that eight different possible locations were looked at in terms of production, processing, and possible contamination points, in no situation could we definitely link a common cause through the whole system that would say this is where the contamination took place four months ago.

As I say, the operating controls at all of the plants were verified. Records were looked at. Public Health looked at the illness situation in the plants to determine whether in fact there was any relation to illness of employees working in the plants, near the products—whether the employees were the source of the contamination of the water product.

It's important to note also that it's very clearly indicated that this was the first time in our history that we'd ever found this particular bacterial organism associated with a dairy product. Tradition and historical patterns would have said this should have been related to poultry meat or other meat-type products. That was part of the issue of confusion at the outset, because the lunch meat products we were dealing with were a combination of dairy product, i.e. cheese, and various meat factors.

Again, as Dr. Shannon was indicating, we were able to find pure culture of the organism that linked the illness of the people to the cheese portion in the lunch meat. But we were not able to find at that point, in the whole system of production of the lunch meat, how that salmonella got into the system.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Mahoney.

Gentlemen, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, as we've heard in testimony already, is to deal with the protection of the Canadian public to ensure food is of a quality that is not going to make people sick. Therefore it seems to me you're primarily a regulatory agency. Am I right in saying that? Do you see yourselves as a regulatory agency?

Mr. Ron Doering: Yes. In fact I think we're Canada's largest science-based regulator.

The Chair: Therefore why would the Auditor General say it's your standard practice to keep the minister involved? I thought we had a fairly clear separation between politics and regulation. Why do you have a policy of advising the minister of everything?

Mr. Doering, I'd like you to answer. You're the CEO.

Mr. Ron Doering: Under our various pieces of legislation, the minister is responsible, and our practice has always been, as every government department does, to keep the minister involved. We're not a quasi-independent administrative tribunal in that sense.

The Chair: No, I didn't suggest you are. I just said, and you acknowledge, that you are regulatory, and I'm wondering why you have to keep the politicians involved in regulation.

• 1645

Mr. Ron Doering: Well, he's our minister.

The Chair: Perhaps you may want to revisit that policy.

I'm concerned about the change in role. The Auditor General points out in 15.52 that at an interagency conference, it was decided that CFIA would lead the investigation, which included several inspections of the plant and so on and so forth. But two days later—I think it was two days later—all of a sudden you changed your mind. We've already heard testimony of Dr. Evans saying to Mr. Mahoney that you agreed there was still a need for that seventh inspection, but you didn't want to lead it. Why did you drop the lead, even though two days earlier you'd agreed that you would take the lead on this investigation?

Mr. Robert Carberry (Director, Plant Health and Production Division, Canadian Food Inspection Agency): I don't think those facts are precisely right. What happened was there was a meeting on a Monday to discuss a potential visit back to the establishment.

The Chair: Well, let me quote—

Mr. Robert Carberry: There was an agreement on the Wednesday to carry out that inspection. At that point in time—

The Chair: Are you talking about the seventh inspection?

Mr. Robert Carberry: I'm talking about the seventh inspection on the Wednesday. The decision was made on the Wednesday to go forward with that.

The Chair: Yes.

Mr. Robert Carberry: That decision was made by a multi-jurisdictional team down in Guelph.

The Chair: And you decided you weren't going to lead it.

Mr. Robert Carberry: No. At that meeting, three parallel processes were actually occurring. There were various conference calls, where actually some of the people out of the Guelph meeting left to contact Health Canada, etc., and there was some confusion about who—

The Chair: Well, let me just quote the AG here. It says: “...based on their”—that's your—“analysis of previous inspections there was no further need for the Agency to inspect the plant.” Dr. Evans said yes, you agreed with the seventh.

So let me ask the Auditor General's department, do you still stand by the statement that you were told that by CFIA?

Ms. Maria Barrados: Mr. Chairman, that is what we were told by CFIA, and CFIA confirmed to us that the facts as we had reported them were correct. In fact we also noted that we were not entirely confident we got all the material.

The Chair: Okay.

Mr. Carberry, do you want to continue, or Mr. Doering?

Dr. Brian Evans: Mr. Chair, I'd just make the point that again, the issue wasn't that we were not in favour of the inspection or participating—

The Chair: No, my question is why did you drop the lead? You were appointed the lead.

Dr. Brian Evans: Yes.

The Chair: Then you said you were no longer the lead. Why did you drop the lead?

Dr. Brian Evans: As I indicated, first and foremost the issue was we felt there was no need to do further inspection of processing controls, which is why we had the lead, because that is our inspection and technical competency mandate. We felt the processing control piece did not need to be revisited, having been investigated on four different previous occasions.

The Chair: But you just told Mr. Mahoney you agreed.

Dr. Brian Evans: We agreed there was warrant in continuing to examine the issue from a public health perspective, based on the MOH finding of a total coliform count in well water—

The Chair: I disagree. You told Mr. Mahoney the CFIA agreed the seventh inspection was necessary.

Dr. Brian Evans: To deal with the coliform count, sir, not dealing with process controls, where we had the lead. Therefore the jurisdictional lead, we felt, should transfer to MOH in Ontario, because again, they were now starting to investigate a public health risk not related to cheese, not related to the food-borne illness. Our technical competency then was still required to work them through the process of the plant, of the well water and how it did or did not enter into—

The Chair: So there was a coliform infection, if that's the proper word—

Dr. Brian Evans: Contamination.

The Chair: —in the plant, which is a food processing plant.

Dr. Brian Evans: No, it was not in the plant. It was in well water outside the plant.

The Chair: Oh.

Dr. Brian Evans: Then on the subsequent investigation, when the seventh team did go in, they were not able to duplicate. The results were negative on the seventh investigation.

The Chair: And the well water wasn't used in the plant?

Dr. Brian Evans: The well water was used only in the plant in the washing of surfaces. But it's an enclosed system, and there's no opportunity for that water to engage or come in contact with the cheese process.

The Chair: But even though the contaminated water outside the plant was being used inside the plant, and while they had, you're saying, an enclosed system and an unenclosed system, you, as the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, charged with public health and making sure the food was non-contaminated, felt you didn't have a role to play?

Dr. Brian Evans: No, I said we did have a role to play, and we did participate.

The Chair: Not a lead role to play.

Dr. Brian Evans: Not the lead role, because the jurisdiction on potable water rests with the public health unit, not with the CFIA.

The Chair: I think Health Canada and CFIA have to do a lot more talking. It seems to me if there's a problem inside a food plant, CFIA has a real responsibility to maintain a very senior role, if not the lead.

• 1650

I was concerned also about paragraph 15.73 of the Auditor General's report. Here we're talking about the review. There was a meeting—I don't think anybody denies that there was a meeting—and there was an agenda that stated:

...that the participants would discuss, among other things, the recall reality, chronology of events, investigation overview, what went well and areas for improvement, strategy development, and recommendations.

In essence, that's a post-mortem of what went on.

Then it goes on to say:

However, CFIA officials told us that the meeting was not specifically for the purpose of discussing the outbreak, and there were no minutes of discussion....

First of all, did you have a post-mortem?

Dr. Brian Evans: Yes, we did.

The Chair: You did. Was that documented?

Dr. Brian Evans: Yes, it was.

The Chair: Did you make that documentation available to the Auditor General?

Dr. Brian Evans: There's confusion between the post-mortem that was called by LCDC as part of the overall investigation out there—

The Chair: No, I asked if you had a post-mortem.

Dr. Brian Evans: Yes, we had discussions with all of the parties involved, and records were provided that related to our individual discussions with the parties involved.

The Chair: Did the CFIA have an official, formal post-mortem of this problem?

Dr. Brian Evans: Not in the entirety of all the people involved, no, we did not. The lead on the post-mortem call was Health Canada—

The Chair: I'm trying to focus on the Canadian Food Inspection Agency. You are a department under the Minister of Agriculture, and Health Canada is under the Minister of Health. You have the responsibility of ensuring the quality of food in this country as produced by plants. We had a plant that had a serious health problem. Did you have a post-mortem on your handling of the case?

Dr. Brian Evans: I would just point out, sir, that we were not able to confirm that the health problem originated from the plant.

The second point is, as I say, that we did agree with the Auditor General's recommendation for formal post-mortems to go forward. It is now a formal part of the food illness protocol with all territories and provinces. We have continued to conduct those post-mortems. There was the Belgian dioxin crisis and the multi-jurisdictional—

The Chair: So you didn't have a post-mortem on this issue.

Dr. Brian Evans: We did not participate in the Health Canada post-mortem—

The Chair: I didn't ask that. I'm trying to say, did you as an agency have a post-mortem?

Dr. Brian Evans: We did not have a formal post-mortem in the sense that was recommended by the Auditor General. We have now implemented that process and have carried it out in every subsequent investigation.

The Chair: Mr. Desautels, do you think that after an issue of this magnitude it would have been appropriate for an agency of the crown to have a post-mortem?

Ms. Maria Barrados: Mr. Chairman, yes, we do believe it's important to have a post-mortem after these events. There was an opportunity for the agency to participate in the post-mortem of the LCDC or to have their own. We expect the information to be shared and post-mortems to be held.

The Chair: Who was at this meeting that is reported in paragraph 15.73?

Dr. Brian Evans: Are you referring to the LCDC post-mortem?

The Chair: No. There's an agenda for this meeting, and this appears to be a CFIA meeting. Am I correct that this is a CFIA meeting? Mr. Campbell, you were intimately involved in the audit. Can you tell us about this meeting?

Mr. Ronnie Campbell (Principal, Audit Operations Branch, Office of the Auditor General of Canada): The meeting, Mr. Chairman, that we refer to in paragraph 15.73 was a meeting held by CFIA.

The Chair: Do you know, Mr. Doering, who was at that meeting?

Mr. Ron Doering: Are you talking about the December 10 meeting referred to at the beginning of paragraph 15.73?

The Chair: That's correct. You had a full agenda, but it seems to be that the participants denied that was actually what the meeting was all about.

Mr. Ron Doering: I wasn't there at the time, but I was trying to think of when there was a meeting on December 10 in Ottawa. It turns out that there was no meeting on December 10 in Ottawa. This was a meeting in Downsview, Ontario, and the people there were Joan Wakeman, Doreen Moore, Blake Ireland, and Barb Driscoll. These were the people who were at the Canadian Food Inspection Agency internal review meeting on this particular item.

The Chair: Mr. Mayfield, four minutes.

Mr. Philip Mayfield: Just to follow up, were those all the people who were there? Were you there, Mr. Doering?

Mr. Ron Doering: No, I wasn't. This was the local inspection team that was responsible for this.

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Mr. Philip Mayfield: I've looked at the recommendations and at the responses of Health Canada and the Food Inspection Agency. I notice that Health Canada often says “agreed and implemented”. I don't see that kind of language in the CFIA's response. I see language that tends to be a bit more qualifying, which leads me to wonder if the relationships worked out among the various agencies have been worked out in a satisfactory manner.

The kinds of problems I'm looking at when this was going on are that at one point Ontario had two concerns: one was that the contaminated products were not being removed from store shelves as quickly as possible. When they offered to help, apparently CFIA didn't want that. It says in the Auditor General's report that a month later, on April 3, there were still 134 stores with shelves containing these products. I'm wondering why in a situation like that there would not be a willingness to kind of fully cooperate with one another. A month later people are still buying contaminated stuff. It does concern me. Do you have an explanation for that? More importantly, do you have a way of working around that problem if a similar situation should arise in the future?

Dr. Brian Evans: I'd just respond that in fact the CFIA did acknowledge with great appreciation the support of the MOH in Ontario in doing the recall effectiveness checks. The final record was that over 3,700 establishments were visited by the multi-jurisdictional group to verify that the product was no longer on the shelves. We disagreed, and we said in the report that we did not agree. We had documented correspondence between our staff and the MOH in Ontario, accepting and welcoming their offer of assistance. The only issue of contention that came out in the discussion was the best way to organize the work so that it was not being duplicated between CFIA staff and ministry staff in Ontario.

Again, the reality is that the distribution lists that are provided by the company only take us down to the level of distribution to where they have sold the product. The isolations that were found sometime after the fact were in fact gas station retail outlets where someone would possibly go to Price Club and buy in bulk that type of product and stock it on their own shelves. That's not covered by—

Mr. Philip Mayfield: I have only four minutes, I'm sorry, and I want to deal with this other thing.

Ontario was also concerned about a second source of this disease, and they were wanting to match that with the distribution lists. Apparently, those lists were not available for several months—so long that they were not even useful. Has that problem been sorted out?

Dr. Brian Evans: Yes. We have verified with the Province of Ontario that in fact they did receive the list in a timely manner. They were not distributed within the province of Ontario to the level they would have liked. But they were provided the same day they were received by CFIA, and that has been confirmed through verifying the fax transmissions.

When they identified the possible concern around cheese, as was indicated by Dr. Shannon, in order to do the public alert and get access and do the recall on the distribution list, we have to have a definitive link between the illness and the product, and there was no link made to any product other than the Lunchmate product. But when we did the voluntary recall on cheese as a precautionary measure, that list was provided directly to our counterparts in Ontario.

Mr. Philip Mayfield: Thank you, Dr. Evans.

I have one more question. I mentioned some concern about the nature of the language in CFIA's response to the Auditor General's recommendations. First of all, I'd like to know if there is a timeframe you could give us within which all these recommendations would have been implemented.

Mr. Ron Doering: Thank you, sir. First of all, as a matter of clarification, there are three recommendations directed to us.

Mr. Philip Mayfield: Just to beat the chairman's gavel, within that timeframe, could you supply to this committee the results of the implementation of these recommendations in your department?

Mr. Ron Doering: Yes, sir, I would be—

The Chair: Why don't you just send the full report to the committee, Mr. Doering.

• 1700

Mr. Ron Doering: We'd be very pleased to send our own audit report, but I think it's important to correct a point about the three directions or recommendations to us.

In each case, 15.80, 15.81, and 15.82, this was the Canadian Food Inspection Agency response: Agreed. So in all three recommendations directed to us, sir, the immediate response was that we agree.

However, we did our own follow-up in terms of how we've responded to these various recommendations, as referred to in my own opening remarks, done by our own independent audit review group. I'd be pleased to table that report with this committee.

Mr. Philip Mayfield: Thank you very much.

I'll just give you an illustration of the language that concerns me. For example, in the last page—

The Chair: We'll come back to you.

Mr. Philip Mayfield: —it says, under paragraph 15.82:

The review process described encourages the development of specific recommendations that will allow all participants....

There's no firm comment that this is going to be implemented. You're “in process”.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Mayfield. Your point is noted.

In addition to the report we're going to get from the CFIA, perhaps Health Canada would also want to give us a report on their strategy and the lessons learned from this particular episode.

[Translation]

Mr. Sauvageau.

Mr. Benoît Sauvageau: You told me that you concurred with the AG's recommendations. I'm sorry if I'm straying from the subject a little, but I believe you. I don't have a problem.

Mr. Harb's question surprised me a little. He asked Mr. Lafleur if the CFIA monitored community agencies in his riding that distribute food. I'm familiar with this country and I know that there are jurisdictions that must be respected.

I think I know the answer to my question, but I want to hear you say it anyway. Because you operate at the federal level, do you have jurisdiction over municipalities, provinces, the federal government and so on? Or is there an understanding in place whereby municipalities and the provinces are responsible for handling their own affairs, just as you must handle matters that fall under your jurisdiction?

I'd like you to answer the question for the benefit of Mr. Harb and the others who think you have jurisdiction over everything that lives and breathes in Canada.

Mr. Robert Lafleur: I may be able to answer your question. I don't think we're claiming jurisdiction over everything. We already have our hands full with our federal responsibilities. I believe Dr. Losos was describing the partnership in the field of health surveillance between the different jurisdictions. That is how you should interpret his comments on the presence that is maintained in different parts of Canada.

Mr. Benoît Sauvageau: I see. Therefore, there's nothing unusual about the fact that you have never visited the community agencies in Mr. Harb's riding because they do not fall under your jurisdiction. Is that the only reason why?

Mr. Robert Lafleur: This or some other Health Canada directorate has undoubtedly had some contacts with them at one time or another, because other programs involve activities carried out in partnership with other jurisdictions across the country. For example, we always work in partnership on health promotion or information programs targeting various communities across Canada.

Mr. Benoît Sauvageau: If I may, I'd like to focus on GMOs for a moment. Dr. Loso, you stated that the Canadian public shouldn't be concerned because GMOs weren't dangerous. If ever in the course of your investigations, you discovered that it was important to place warnings on labels cautioning about allergic or other reactions, then you would do so.

Why doesn't Canada automatically label such products, like the European Union has been doing since 1997 and like Japan will be doing come the spring of 2000? Why wait until allergy problems have been observed? Why not label these products as a matter of course if they pose no health risk?

[English]

Dr. Joe Losos: We have been doing a review of all novel foods, biotechnologically engineered foods as well, voluntarily, 100% for five years. We've just put it into legislation, so now it's required.

We go through everything from the immunology to the growth to the nutrition content to allerginicity. If there's any risk to health at all from any of these analyses, we require labelling under the Food and Drugs Act.

[Translation]

Mr. Benoît Sauvageau: I'm sorry, but I'm not convinced by your arguments. I agree with you that these products pose no danger. However, instead of labelling products only when there is a risk, why not label products so that people can choose between product A and product B, one of which might contain GMOs? I understand that there is no risk and that you have inspected the product. I trust your good work. On the flip side, a product may not contain any GMOs and may also be healthy.

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Why label only those products that may pose a health hazard? I could understand if we were setting an international or world precedent, but other countries are already labelling these products and are none the worse for it. Why must Canada wait until a problem arises before labelling occurs, since, if I understand correctly, you carry out the proper inspections and do your job in a professional manner?

The Chair: Mr. Sauvageau...

Mr. Benoît Sauvageau: I'm taking as much time as you did.

Why doesn't Canada label these products?

[English]

Dr. Joe Losos: The voluntary labelling of whether or not it has genetically modified foods or components is in Agriculture-CFIA legislation. The two ministers, Minister Vanclief and Minister Rock, have a number of mechanisms already underway to do public consultation on exactly that.

It's a difficult thing to label, because so many of the modern processing techniques pool large portions of the ingredients, canola oils and otherwise. To separate these into separate tracks is not a small task, nor is it a task without a lot of cost. So the two ministers have struck a committee of the Standing Committee on Health and the Standing Committee on Agriculture and Agri-Food. The Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee is looking at the whole issue. There's an expert advisory committee struck by the Royal Society to look at the science of biotechnology.

These questions you ask are very important. They are mandated in Europe, and they have not been able to do it, just because of the complexity. But we as a society in Canada, over the summer months and fall months, will have a very fulsome consultation and discussion as to what we should do. That's a very healthy development.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Losos.

Mr. Harb.

Mr. Mac Harb: Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Just for the record, I think what I have heard, both from the officials as well as from the Auditor General, is that every single one of the recommendations the Auditor General has made, the department is going to implement. Is that correct?

Dr. Joe Losos: That's correct.

Mr. Mac Harb: And you have agreed?

Dr. Joe Losos: Yes.

Mr. Mac Harb: My interest in this whole meeting is to first get information on the record about what the agency is doing in terms of outreach programs and getting information out, and also at the same time to get informed on some of the things you do. I want to ask you a question.

My colleague, Mr. Mayfield, as well as the chair, tried to lead us to believe that really it's your responsibility to lead a situation, even though it's not your jurisdiction. I'm talking about the issue of the contaminated well and the MOH and you, when you decided to move out and then they moved in, in order to carry on with the job. It reminds me of some of the movies you see where you have a cop at the municipal level, you have the FBI, and then you have the CIA, and you have every other agency trying to deal with the same crime and decide whose jurisdiction it is.

Is there some sort of mechanism in place now where you guys, along with the provincial and territorial governments, say to yourselves, “Okay, notwithstanding the jurisdictional level, whenever there is a problem, this is what we will do before we get to the scene”? Is there something like that? And if not, is there any plan to do something like that?

Dr. Brian Evans: I made reference earlier to the completion of the food illness protocol with the provinces and territories, and it does exactly that. It lays out the roles that are played respectively and how we can collaborate and draw on other people's expertise to drive us to a better conclusion, to make sure we've covered all the various elements that may have been a factor in the situation.

If I could, I'd just very briefly mention a recent issue that has had some play in the press in Canada, which dealt with pig ears used for dog treats. Again, it's not defined as food by Health Canada. Humans do not normally consume the dog treats, but there was an identified risk to children and aged people potentially handling the wet treats after the dogs had had them and getting salmonella, the same problem we had in the lunch meat situation. Again, it's a situation where it's not defined as a food, neither is it a food for animals, so it fell into that broad gap of, whose jurisdiction is it?

• 1710

There was a very effective response at the provincial level with Health Canada in terms of their surveillance to identify the outbreak early and the use of CFIA legislation, even though it wasn't particularly a food, to resolve the problem and make sure manufacturing processes were put in place to protect the public.

So there are recent examples that show the system does work.

Mr. Mac Harb: Okay. I have a final question. Tell me something about what happened to this famous well. At the end, what happened to that processing plant my colleague was asking about? You pulled out and MOH stepped in. Where is everything at now?

Dr. Brian Evans: As was indicated in the report, in fact the plant was no longer operating at the time this inspection was scheduled to take place. It was shut down for renovations. In fact the plant is no longer operating now, for reasons unrelated. To our knowledge, the decision was taken.... With consolidation of the dairy industry, a number of very small milk processing plants owned by the company were shut down. It had nothing to do with health and safety factors.

So the reality is, there is no production from that point any more. And as I said, on subsequent isolations, there was no contamination in the water either. The coliform count was found to be within acceptable limits after.

Mr. Mac Harb: A happy ending.

Dr. Brian Evans: A happy ending in that we haven't had any further of this type of illness outbreak related to cheese products in Canada.

The Chair: On that closing comment, which may not be unanimous, we will bring the meeting to a close, because we have scheduled another meeting of the subcommittee, and we are also expecting bells to ring. Therefore I would invite the Auditor General to make some closing comments.

Mr. Denis Desautels: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Because of my voice, I'll be very quick tonight.

I am encouraged by the commitments of both organizations to make improvements. I note, for instance, the protocols that have been developed and put in place since our audit. Those are quite important.

When it comes to national health surveillance, as I said earlier, I am indeed quite impressed by the plans of the Department of Health to implement our recommendations. It will not be easy, because as we've just heard, this is not a strictly federal jurisdiction. It is a partnership between jurisdictions. Therefore it will take a lot of collaboration from other parties for Health Canada to actually implement the recommendations we've made.

So it will be important to have a subsequent follow-up of this. We will look at this again in the normal timeframe, but given the importance of this subject, it's important to keep a close eye on that particular implementation plan.

Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you.

May I remind Mr. Doering and Mr. Lafleur to both send the new strategies to the committee and for the Auditor General's perusal as well, so that we can see you are making progress. The health of all Canadians is very much everybody's concern—not just yours and ours, but everybody's concern.

The meeting is adjourned.