CITI Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE LA CITOYENNETÉ ET DE L'IMMIGRATION

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Wednesday, May 12, 1999

• 1541

[English]

The Chair (Mr. Rey D. Pagtakhan (Winnipeg North—St. Paul, Lib.)): I see quorum in the room, though not necessarily at the table. Maybe in another minute we may have quorum at the table.

I call the meeting to order pursuant to the order of reference of the House dated March 1, 1999, in consideration of Bill C-63, an act respecting Canadian citizenship. We are now in clause-by-clause consideration, as decided by the committee in earlier meetings.

We have witnesses from Citizenship and Immigration Canada, who have been with us before, and the chair is ready to proceed with clause-by-clause consideration.

Mr. Ménard has a point of order.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard (Hochelaga—Maisonneuve, BQ): Yes. Mr. Chairman, would it be possible to request unanimous consent—I've spoken to some colleagues—to change our schedule so that we could sit today until ten in the evening and tomorrow morning from nine o'clock until Question Period, if members wish, but we would not meet again as a committee after Question Period? I will be unable to attend because I must absolutely leave. You may respond that one of my colleagues can replace me, but the clause-by-clause study is complex and one must be familiar with the bill. I would like to be there. As you know, I have attended almost all the meetings. If you would agree to ending our proceedings before question period, I would be very grateful.

If the government side would like us to meet Friday morning, that would be possible for me. I would like to be present for all the sessions. You are aware of my interest in the bill. Tomorrow, I definitely have to leave after question period because I must absolutely return to my riding.

[English]

The Chair: Okay. Mr. Ménard—

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: I can explain why if colleagues would like to know.

[English]

The Chair: —is making a request by way of a point of order. As you may know, we made a decision to proceed this way last week. I suppose even the request may be moved if in fact we finish at any time, but I have no control over that. It is within the control of the committee as to when we feel we may be finished. Who would like to respond to that request?

Mr. Mahoney.

Mr. Steve Mahoney (Mississauga West, Lib.): It seems to me we should try to accommodate, but I think we probably have to move on the bill to see how far we get. I'm sympathetic to the request. I just think we should go ahead and see how we do.

The Chair: On that note, then, let us proceed to clause-by-clause examination.

We shall proceed to clause 2, as advised by the clerk.

• 1545

(On clause 2—Definitions)

The Chair: Is there any discussion?

Yes, Mr. Benoit.

Mr. Leon E. Benoit (Lakeland, Ref.): Yes, under paragraph 2(2)(a), a person born in Canada, what it's dealing with there is.... Pardon me, maybe I don't have the right section. It's paragraph 2(2)(c), regarding actual physical presence in the country, and it refers to the number of days.... It says “a person resides, for a given day, in Canada if the person, during the day”. My question is, what portion of a day would be considered to be a day for the purposes of this definition?

Ms. Raymonde Folco (Laval West, Lib.): I have a point of order. I wonder, Mr. Chair, if we could have a five-minute break. There are a number of things I would like to discuss with my colleagues, and I would request about a five-minute break right away.

The Chair: Do you need five minutes?

Ms. Raymonde Folco: Five minutes would be sufficient.

Mr. Leon Benoit: I would agree to that, although I have to say I'm really surprised the government isn't organized on this. I would agree to that if they would show the same kind of consideration. For example, tomorrow night, I have an extremely important appointment that was made long before this meeting was scheduled. If that time would be allowed to me tomorrow night, or actually just after QP tomorrow, between 3.30 p.m. and 4.15 p.m., then I would certainly agree to this wholeheartedly. With the long hours, I think if we can try to accommodate, that would be reasonable.

The Chair: I think with the speed of requests coming forward forthrightly, I will certainly allow the request for a break in the spirit of cooperation. I would just like to advise the government members to proceed and to please return as quickly as possible.

So I would like to have a five-minute suspension of the meeting at this point.

• 1547

• 1557

The Chair: I resume consideration of the bill. We are on clause 2, and Mr. Benoit was in the middle of his inquiry.

Mr. Benoit, you may proceed or continue.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Yes, well, I don't think I got an answer on that. Did the legal counsel understand? My question is on paragraph 2(2)(c), which states: “a person resides, for a given day, in Canada if the person, during the day”. If it's a partial day, and, for example, you're out of the country on a three-day trip and it's a partial day the first day and a partial day the last day, how many days would that count as?

Mr. Norman Sabourin (Director of Citizenship and Citizenship Registrar, Citizenship and Immigration Canada): The answer is that we continue to apply the same thing that applies under the current legislation. If a person arrives in Canada, that day is counted as a day spent in Canada. If the person leaves Canada, that day is not counted as a day spent in Canada. And if a person arrives and leaves on the same day, that day is not counted either.

Mr. Leon Benoit: You said it's in the current legislation, but in fact I don't believe it's in the current legislation. It's in regulation. Is that right?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: It's actually a policy set by the department on the calculation of the days.

Mr. Leon Benoit: I'd appreciate it if you'd be really accurate on that throughout our discussions, because if you say it's in legislation, I think that should mean that it's in legislation. If it's in regulation, then I'd like to know that. And if it's just a policy that isn't even covered in regulation, I'd like to know that too. It would be really helpful.

Thank you.

The Chair: Mr. Ménard.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: We are of course dealing with the definitions at the beginning of the bill. As for the definition of “citizenship”, we have heard that the treaty signed with the Nisga'a will provide for the granting of a distinct, specific citizenship. What can you tell us about this proposed citizenship, in terms of coherence and consistency?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: I can tell the committee, Mr. Chairman, that Nisga'a citizenship is a specific status that is provided for under the treaty adopted by the British Columbia legislature, but which is not in effect at this time. Under the treaty, Nisga'a citizenship is a status that may be granted by the Nisga'a nation, as defined in this treaty.

• 1600

Mr. Réal Ménard: This means that a propitious opportunity presents itself here for a concept that until now was relatively monolithic to allow other components within the Canadian nation to grant citizenship in the future.

Mr. Norman Sabourin: In order to clarify things, I would say that Nisga'a citizenship has no legal effect in terms of citizenship as it is understood in the current Citizenship Act or in Bill C-63. This status will not change in any way the rights and privileges that Canadian citizens have under various laws and pursuant to Canada's international obligations. It's a status that was created specifically to enable the Nisga'a nation to define who is a member of the Nisga'a nation and who is not. Aboriginal peoples by far prefer this expression to the current term of “status Indian”.

Mr. Réal Ménard: But is reference nevertheless made to the idea of citizenship? I have been told that, in the treaty, the concept of citizenship was expressly mentioned.

Mr. Norman Sabourin: That's correct. That's what is contained in the present text of the treaty.

Mr. Réal Ménard: Do you have the section of the treaty in which this is referred to here with you?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: I don't have it here.

Mr. Réal Ménard: Would you be kind enough to forward it to committee members so that they can clearly understand what is involved?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: I would be glad to get a copy for you.

[English]

The Chair: If I recall correctly, is that not the Jay Treaty?

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Yes, the treaty that was signed with the Nisga'a. I have been told that, for the first time in Canadian history, under the treaty, it will be possible to grant a type of Canadian citizenship which apparently will not have any legal implications. Hence, it is more in the spirit of compromise, for symbolic purposes, but it would still be a kind of precedent.

That's interesting, because the concept of citizenship, which until now was the exclusive preserve of the central State, will be called by another name. If we could possibly obtain it by the end of our deliberations, that would be ideal.

I have no more questions on this subject. Thank you for your answers.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you.

Are there any other questions?

The chair would like to pursue Mr. Benoit's question for greater clarification.

Did I hear correctly that when the person leaves Canada, on the date of departure that person is conceded to be physically present in Canada, but on the day he returns from a three-day trip, when he's again back in Canada, he is considered not physically present in Canada?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: It's actually the other way around. When the person arrives in Canada, it's counted as a day spent in Canada; when the person leaves Canada, it's not counted as a day spent in Canada. It sort of balances out. We don't take into account whether they left at one minute after midnight or 10 p.m.

The Chair: Will that not conflict with the expression “during the day”?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: I would say that provision is certainly subject to interpretation. If you look at the French text, it doesn't use that terminology at all. Obviously, somebody could try to challenge the policy set by the department on how to interpret that provision, but on balance it is a policy that I believe is defensible since it credits people who have spent only part of the time here as having a full day here. At the same time, it does not credit them when they have spent only part of the...and leave Canada during that day.

The Chair: Be that as it may, is it not surprising that a law of Canada, in two official languages, would not have identical translation? Is it a difficulty with the translation itself? How did it happen?

• 1605

Mr. Norman Sabourin: Legislation is drafted by the Department of Justice in both languages at the same time. Neither version is a translation of the other, so expressions are never quite exactly the same in one version and the other. In fact, throughout the bill there are several areas where one version is much longer than the other, or indeed one version contains subparagraphs and another does not. So there is always a measure of difference between the two versions, but I would say at the same time that the two versions do complement each other and in many respects facilitate the interpretation of a given provision, because you can always rely on French to think about the English side and on English to think about the French side.

The Chair: But confronted with your own statement that it is not in the French translation and in light of the question raised during the proceedings, can one not at this point translate the French into English to reflect a greater clarity?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: I'm not sure I have an answer to that. I know the drafting is the result of many hours of work by experts in drafting, and while the two versions are not exactly the same, it has never been the intent of the drafters to do so; rather, it's to capture an idea and then to express it in both languages separately but at the same time. That's what the attempt has been here.

I think the words “for a given day” and “during the day...is...present in Canada” should not be interpreted too literally. Otherwise you could say that somebody who lives in the United States but puts his foot in Canada for part of the day every day is considered to accumulate a full day of residence every day. I would say that certainly could not be contemplated as the intent of the legislation.

The Chair: Intent is one thing, but now that we have been confronted with a question, is there any difficulty in changing the French translation into English if in fact the consensus of the department and the committee is that the original French translation is the intent they would like, to avoid any ambiguity in the future?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: It's a very good point, and if we wanted to clarify something, I would think perhaps it's the words “for a given day” and “during the day”. Those might be problematic. In my view, the French version is perhaps more clear.

The Chair: Would you recommend that to the committee?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: My legal adviser says we could certainly come up with some better wording in consultation with justice officials. If the committee is prepared to receive that wording a bit later on, then we could come up with that wording.

The Chair: I think the chair will take that position and request that the committee stand clause 2 at this point.

(Clause 2 allowed to stand)

(Clause 3 agreed to on division)

(On clause 4—Acquisition at birth)

The Chair: Mr. Benoit has an amendment on clause 4.

Mr. Benoit, please proceed.

Mr. Leon Benoit: I think you've all received a copy of the amendment that I am proposing for clause 4. It's actually an amendment that was proposed by the committee that dealt with this issue. It's recommendation 12 from the report put forth by the committee that—I think it was in 1994—dealt with citizenship, the only committee that has really dealt with citizenship in depth. So what I'm proposing here is the position of the committee, and I'm expecting support for this.

Should I read the motion?

The Chair: Yes, please.

• 1610

Mr. Leon Benoit: The motion reads that Bill C-63 in clause 4 be amended by replacing line 33 on page 2 with the following:

(a) the person is born in Canada of a father or mother, who is a citizen or a permanent resident at the time of birth, or

The Chair: You've heard the amendment—

Mr. Leon Benoit: Perhaps I could say a few words on that.

The Chair: Yes, but be specific.

Mr. Leon Benoit: I've said a couple of the things I want to say already. But as you all know, this is the position the minister came out with and supported after the Not Just Numbers report was tabled. So all I'm doing is proposing what the minister supported at that time, what the committee supported in fact. Again, I ask for the support of the committee in passing this amendment.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Could we have some clarification?

[English]

Do you understand?

The Chair: Yes, please, Mr. Ménard.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: What does the amendment change? Does it mean that we would not recognize the ability to transmit citizenship to the second or third generation? I don't understand the sense of the amendment. The expression “is born in Canada of a father or a mother” is already in the bill. You would like to limit its scope. Would this have the effect of eliminating subclause (b)?

[English]

The Chair: The chair would like to say—and Mr. Benoit can respond—that the way I see the proposed amendment is that the current bill without the amendment is irrespective of the status of the parents, of either parent, whether one is a citizen or not. It is irrelevant in the determination of citizenship by birth on Canadian soil. So it is not about derivative citizenship—

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: What does the amendment bring to it? What is the sense of the amendment?

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Benoit.

Mr. Leon Benoit: What this amendment would do, Mr. Ménard, is change paragraph 4(1)(a), which says that a person born in Canada would automatically be a Canadian citizen; to require that one parent be either a citizen or a permanent resident for that child to automatically become a Canadian citizen.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Then it is restricting. We have to understand everything we are asked to vote on.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Mahoney.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: So I understand this totally, and to use the most recent example, the baby born of Kosovar parents the other day—I think it was yesterday—under current law would be a Canadian, but under this amendment would not be a Canadian. Is my understanding correct?

Mr. Leon Benoit: That would be correct, yes.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Okay.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Part of the reason for this is that there have been several cases, which have been made public, of people who have come to Canada and had a child specifically for the purpose of making that child a Canadian citizen. In fact, in some cases they have used that circumstance, the fact that the child is automatically a Canadian citizen, as an argument for them to be allowed to stay in Canada, even if they're completely unacceptable as determined by the immigration department. So that is an abuse that is there.

The minister's response, when we brought this up before, was that she had no evidence as to how many cases this would involve. Well, I would think before she decides to take a position on such an important issue that she would know. Therefore, I would suggest that we should go along with the recommendation of the committee, which was a Liberal-dominated committee, and the position the minister herself took after the Not Just Numbers report was tabled.

The Chair: Mr. Telegdi.

Mr. Andrew Telegdi (Kitchener—Waterloo, Lib.): Mr. Chairman, on that point, the government's position is that the wording stay the way it is.

As to the problem the member mentioned about the parents using this for the purpose of staying in the country, the courts have ruled on that and there is no obligation...I mean, nothing compels the government to allow the parents to stay in the country because their child was born in Canada and is Canadian.

The Chair: Mr. Bryden.

Mr. John Bryden (Wentworth—Burlington, Lib.): I wonder if the officials could comment briefly on this. As I recall, they had some very interesting things to say on the issue.

The Chair: Greg Fyffe.

• 1615

Mr. Greg Fyffe (Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy and Program Development, Citizenship and Immigration Canada): Mr. Chairman, we did in fact have an exchange on this before. The amendment would certainly have the effect that was described by Mr. Mahoney.

There is certainly the possibility of abuse. It could be from claiming citizenship status in Canada by somebody who has come here temporarily or it could have implications for a refugee determination case. Our feeling when we looked at this was that we have to balance off the historical attachment to the principle of birth on soil against the possibility of abuse, and we do recognize the possibility of abuse. We were simply not able, because statistics have not been kept, to quantify it. We feel, in balancing it, that there should be a balance between the amount of abuse there is—is it a relatively insignificant amount or is it a serious problem—against the attachment of many people to the historical principle of birth on soil.

We have asked, and our minister has asked, for a little more time to gather the appropriate statistics, which means undertaking a study and working with the provinces, and our hope would be that we would have the opportunity to undertake that further review.

The Chair: Ms. Folco.

[Translation]

Ms. Raymonde Folco: I would like to speak against the amendment moved by my colleague in the Reform Party. Here in Canada, it is a historical tradition that when a person is born on Canadian soil, he or she automatically becomes a Canadian citizen. Thanks to this tradition, millions of individuals have become full- fledged citizens. There are of course abuses in any system. However, as Mr. Fyffe very well put it, the fact that there is some abuse is no reason to deny this historical Canadian right to people who would like to settle here. Thank you.

[English]

The Chair: Ms. Augustine.

Ms. Jean Augustine (Etobicoke—Lakeshore, Lib.): Mr. Chairman, I'd like to oppose this amendment for the same reasons Madam Folco has presented. I think if we were to look at our Canadian population we would see that a very high percentage of all people who at present claim citizenship by birth, birth on soil, would fall into that category.

The Chair: Okay. Is there any more discussion before I call on the mover of the motion?

Mr. Benoit.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

First I have to say to Madam Folco and Madam Augustine that just saying there are a few abuses—by the way, Mr. Fyffe said they don't really know because that information isn't available—I don't think is good enough. Sometimes an abuse can take an incredible amount of taxpayers' money, which isn't available then to speed up the rest of the process in the immigration department generally. That's a real concern.

Even a few cases can take a tremendous amount of resources. We've seen the Mavis Baker case. Mr. Telegdi said the court had determined that they didn't necessarily have to respect that the citizenship of a child would determine the citizenship of the parent. That's true, but we have the Mavis Baker case in which now they're using that argument again; to my knowledge that hasn't been settled on.

So, Mr. Fyffe, if I could ask a question just before we end the debate on this, you had indicated that this position would be taken on a temporary basis while you wait for the results of some study. How long do you expect this study would take?

Mr. Greg Fyffe: We're looking now at a pilot project with the provinces to see if we can collect the data properly. I think when we discussed this we were talking in terms of approximately three years, plus or minus, before we would have enough data to make a declaration on this.

Mr. Leon Benoit: You see, this is a real concern to me because this report was tabled back in 1994, when the committee took the position that the change I'm proposing, exactly this change, should be put in new legislation.

• 1620

That in fact was six years ago. So certainly the government has had time to collect the information necessary, and now we'd be in a position where we could go ahead and take the appropriate position based on some fact. I'm really concerned that this warning—you know, it's been five years, I guess, 1994 to 1999, so there's been ample time, and I'm really concerned that a change that has been recommended so widely wouldn't be in this legislation. That's why I'm proposing this change.

Just in regard to the child born of a refugee, let's be very clear on that: the child will very quickly and very routinely be granted citizenship. So that's really not the issue here.

The Chair: Do you have any further comments? You'll leave it at that.

On that note then, you have heard the pros and cons; shall the amendment carry?

(Amendment negatived)

(Clause 4 agreed to on division)

(On clause 5—General principle)

The Chair: Mr. Ménard.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Mr. Sabourin, this clause seems to say that a child who is less than 14 years of age may acquire citizenship without having to take the oath. Is that right?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: That's correct.

Mr. Réal Ménard: It's a provision that already exists, and there's no particular rationale for setting this age at 14. Is it because the code allows for the status of emancipated minor? It could have been set at 13 years or something else.

Mr. Norman Sabourin: You are correct. There is no specific reason for choosing this figure rather than another.

Mr. Réal Ménard: Fine, and it's an exceptional measure.

[English]

The Chair: Any further discussion on clause 5?

(Clause 5 agreed to on division)

(On clause 6—Adults)

The Chair: Yes, Mr. Telegdi.

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: Mr. Chair, we have some—

The Chair: Is this on a point of order?

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: No. When you go on to a new clause, for the sake of coherence, could you give us a couple of minutes to read it quickly so that we will know what we are voting on?

[English]

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Ménard.

Mr. Telegdi, on clause 6.

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: Mr. Chair, we have amendments coming on clause 6. They're going to be duplicated right now, and I wonder if you could hold off on that for the moment. As soon as we get it in, we'll be presenting it to you. We'll have a number of amendments coming in. So I'll be asking you, when we get to one of those clauses, to hold off, and as soon as we get the translation and the amendments for all the members to have in their hands when we're discussing it, we'll proceed at that time.

The Chair: I think that's a reasonable request. But please advise the chair and the clerk when the copies are available so we can proceed as far as possible on a sequential basis.

Mr. Benoit.

Mr. Leon Benoit: If I could just make a comment on that, again I'm quite surprised that the government doesn't have any amendments ready that they would choose to make to their own legislation. I hope that if we support this delay we'll be shown the same consideration later. I think what is demonstrated here is that we need more time from the time the last witness is heard until the time we have the first committee meeting. Even though there was an extension, and I think it was important that there was an extension, it isn't enough.

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With the new rules on having approval by clerks of any amendments in place, you need at least two full weeks from the time the last witness is heard until the committee deals with clause-by-clause. I think you can see this demonstrates that very clearly.

I hope even the government members, who certainly know the schedule a lot better than I do, because we're just kind of let in on it at the last minute, will see this is necessary. In future, this committee should respect that need and have at least a two-week delay between the time of the last witness and the time of the clause-by-clause.

The Chair: I would address the parliamentary secretary to have the amendments in the two official languages circulated as soon as possible.

Mr. Ménard.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Mr. Chairman, I have given my support to this particular amendment. Mr. Mahoney was kind enough to show it to me. I will not vote against it, even though it is not available in French, because we reached an agreement on it.

May I ask a question on clause 6? Or should I wait until we have the amendment?

[English]

The Chair: Just a second now. For the benefit of all members, I think we need to have the amendments copied, in fairness. The parliamentary secretary has made a reasonable request, so we will let clause 6 stand.

(Clause 6 allowed to stand)

The Chair: Now I will call on Ms. Folco.

Ms. Raymonde Folco: On the comments of my colleagues in the Reform Party, I certainly agree that we need a length of time between hearing the last witness and the work we're undertaking tonight. But I would like to remind you, Mr. Benoit, that we had a hard time starting on the witnesses. We had a sort of mini-filibuster on our hands at the very beginning, because we were trying on this side of the House to get the phase of the witnesses started, and we were getting a very hard time from some members from the other side of the House. But on the principle, I certainly agree with you.

Mr. Leon Benoit: I would just like to say that maybe the filibuster was within the member's own caucus.

Ms. Raymonde Folco: I don't think so.

The Chair: Mr. McNally, are you raising a point?

Mr. Grant McNally (Dewdney—Alouette, Ref.): There certainly seems to be a spirit of greater cooperation in the last little while than there was at the beginning with the introduction of this bill. Some other issues we wanted to raise were viewed as being silly—I think that was the word, and there were some other words, which I don't choose to repeat—by members of the government.

I echo Mr. Benoit's concerns, and the concerns that were raised legitimately in this committee last week, that if we need enough time from when we hear the last witness until we do the clause-by-clause, then let's take that time, because we're putting together a very important piece of legislation. It's not about partisanship; it's about getting a good bill together here.

(Clause 7 agreed to on division)

(On clause 8—Adoptees)

[Translation]

The Chair: Mr. Ménard.

Mr. Réal Ménard: You know how important international adoption is in Quebec. In fact, I put the question to the witnesses who appeared before us. Everyone agrees that we should no longer differentiate between natural children and adopted children.

At the time the Minister appeared before us, negotiations were underway with the provinces, mainly on the questions of medical tests and security, especially for adolescents. Could you update us on the negotiations with the provinces, and particularly with Quebec?

Mr. Greg Fyffe: Mr. Ménard, I'll ask Mr. Collinge to answer your question.

Mr. Réal Ménard: Okay.

• 1630

Mr. Dominique Collinge (Director, Selection Branch, Department of Citizenship and Immigration): Mr. Chairman, we had a meeting two weeks ago in Toronto with all the officials responsible for adoption in the provinces. We submitted proposals to the provinces in an attempt to reach a compromise that would be acceptable to the federal and provincial governments. We managed to make a great deal of progress in bringing the positions closer together, and we made a commitment to submit a new proposal to the provinces, which they should receive before the end of the month. More discussions are planned, and we are optimistic that we will reach a compromise that all will find satisfactory.

Mr. Réal Ménard: And so the whole question of testing and of health surveys will fall to the provinces, which is what the provinces were challenging. Is this the area for which the federal government will pay a portion or all of the costs? What is the situation with the proposal?

Mr. Dominique Collinge: At present, the proposal is that we wish to adopt the means of requiring a medical examination and a home study. In terms of the citizenship application, this would meet the provinces' main demand in this regard.

Mr. Réal Ménard: Who is going to pay for it? The federal government?

Mr. Dominique Collinge: No. Currently, the adoptive parents are the ones who pay and, under the new system, the adoptive parents will still be the ones who pay the costs.

Mr. Réal Ménard: The provinces argued that all health tests are currently the responsibility of the federal government which has this expertise inside its Immigration Canada system. You are saying that, under the proposal submitted to the provinces, the parents are the ones who will pay for health tests, which will be administered by a physician of their choice.

Mr. Dominique Collinge: It is already the case under the current system that the parents are the ones who pay for medical examinations and they must choose from physicians designated by the federal government. Under the new system, there will be no change at all as far as costs are concerned; the adoptive parents will still be the ones who pay and the examination will still be done by a physician selected by the federal government.

Mr. Réal Ménard: The difference is that citizenship cannot be granted unless both of these tests are conducted. You're saying that the medical investigation required for the awarding of citizenship was the responsibility of the parents and this will continue to be the case. What is new is that the status will be granted from outside the country, even before the child is on Canadian soil. This is a cause of concern to the provinces and Quebec's secretariat responsible for international adoption.

Mr. Dominique Collinge: That is part of the proposal we submitted to the provinces. We will make it mandatory for the province to approve the home study. Under the proposal that we intend to submit, the province will be completely free to require that the child's medical condition be checked when the home study is done.

Mr. Réal Ménard: Therefore, you are saying to us parliamentarians that, whatever happens next, the federal government will not take any action without the agreement of the provinces with regard to international adoption, granting of status and the costs associated with regularizing status.

Mr. Dominique Collinge: That is to say that we are currently holding talks with the provinces and we are hopeful that we will reach an agreement that will satisfy everyone.

Mr. Réal Ménard: I'd like to remind you that I'm the politician. Right now, you are speaking like a politician because you are not answering my question. So, I take it that the talks are continuing and that you are going to do your best to obtain the perfect agreement.

Mr. Dominique Collinge: That's right.

[English]

The Chair: Now I think we are ready to go back to clause 6. Is that right?

Mr. John McKay (Scarborough East, Lib.): We're dealing with clause 8. Did we deal with clause 8?

The Chair: No, we are dealing with clause 7—no, 8.

• 1635

Mr. John McKay: The government has an amendment that should be on the floor, so we'll be discussing this before we leave it.

The Chair: Mr. Telegdi.

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: There's an amendment being put forth by the government, and every member has a copy of it.

I move that C-63 in clause 8 be amended by replacing lines 6 to 18 on page 5 with the following:

citizenship to a person who, after February 14, 1977 was adopted by a citizen while the person was a minor child and whose adoption

(a) was in the best interests of the child;

(b) created a genuine relationship of parent and child;

(c) was in accordance with the laws of the place where the adoption took place and the laws of the country of residence of the adopting citizen; and

(d) was not intended to circumvent the

The Chair: Just a second please. I think you have to connect it to subparagraph 8(b)(iii) at the end.

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: Yes.

The Chair: Is it clear, Mr. Telegdi? Do you want it inserted?

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: It would be paragraphs 8(a), (b), (c) and (d). But you're completing the sentence “not intended to circumvent the requirements under any enactment for admission to Canada or citizenship”.

The Chair: Is everybody clear where we are trying to make the amendment? If not, I would suggest a division of amendment for better clarity. Are you clear?

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: No, no. We don't understand. Could the parliamentary secretary give us an explanation? Apart from the fact that the government has split the amendment and that we now have (a), (b), (c) and (d), what does it add from a legal point of view? Why propose an amendment such as this? What does it add from a legal point of view? The words that are new are "in the best interests of the child". What do they add?

[English]

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: In terms of the justification for it, I think it lessons the distinction between children adopted abroad and children born abroad after 1977. It clarifies that citizenship may be granted after the adopted child reaches the age of majority, provided the child was a minor at the time of adoption.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: No. Mr. Chairman, I would like to hear what the officials have to say because we don't understand what it adds. We understand the general reasoning and agree with it, but what does your amendment “was in the best interests of the child” add? Does it have to do with legal precedents? If Mr. Sabourin can provide an answer, it would be interesting to hear him.

[English]

The Chair: I will allow that question, but just for greater clarity, there have been some movements in terms of the sequence. The clerk was reading the first page of the proposal from the government, but in the government document later on, for greater clarity, clause 8 will be replaced entirely by this thing. Is that correct?

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: Yes.

The Chair: Okay. Do you have a copy?

Mr. Leon Benoit: Yes, Mr. Chair, I do. I'd like the member to explain, clause by clause, the reason for this change. He's made a general statement, and I'd like the officials to respond to each one if they could.

The Chair: Mr. Ménard has posed the same question. I will allow the officials to please respond to the request of the committee members, line by line, and give the rationale for the change.

• 1640

Ms. Folco.

[Translation]

Ms. Raymonde Folco: In order to simplify this part of the question asked by my colleague, Mr. Ménard, I'd like to suggest that we deal only with (a). If we look at the new wording proposed for clause 8 to amendment G-1, we see that in (a), (b), (c) and (d), there is only one subclause, subclause (a), that is added. What is labelled here as (b), (c) and (d) correspond exactly to points (i), (ii) and (iii) and (b) on page 5. So, in order to go a little faster, since the rest is exactly the same, just explain subclause (a), “was in the best interests of the child”.

[English]

The Chair: Having heard all the submissions, I would like the official to respond, letter by letter, to the new proposal and indicate where it is the same, for better clarity.

Mr. Sabourin.

[Translation]

Mr. Norman Sabourin: Mr. Chairman, with regard to the best interests of the child, I will respond first and my colleague, Mr. Collinge, will complete my answer, if necessary. This is an additional provision which was discussed with the parliamentary secretary, which allows for the adoption of criteria in response to provincial concerns, namely concerns regarding medical examinations for children, so that these examinations would be done and the results provided to the parents to assist them in their decision to adopt or not to adopt a child, given his or her state of health.

This is an additional criterion that will allow us to make broader and more detailed regulations that will partially, if not wholly, address the concerns of the provinces.

Mr. Réal Ménard: [Editor's note: Inaudible]... cooperative, in the end. How could one be opposed to that?

[English]

The Chair: We have heard the answers. Are we clear on proposed paragraph 8(a)?

Mr. McKay.

Mr. John McKay: I didn't find the explanation clear at all.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Neither did I.

Mr. John McKay: The insertion of a new test “was in the best interests of the child” is not something I recollect any witness speaking on. I have notes on people speaking on the need for complete health records and stuff with respect to other medical checks of adoptees, etc., but I don't see how your comment is relevant to proposed paragraph 8(a).

This “was in the best interests of the child” is an area of jurisprudence that is enormous in this country. You're literally putting this test in at the last minute, and I frankly don't see how it is at all responsive to any of the testimony we heard.

[Translation]

Mr. Dominique Collinge: Mr. Chairman, at the present time, the way the clause is now drafted, the federal government has no legal authority to require the carrying out of a home study or a medical examination of the child. We cannot draw authority from the relationship of parent and child, from provincial legislation or from the laws of the foreign country. We have no legal means of requiring home studies or medical examinations.

In order to satisfy the provinces, we want to be able to require that a home study be undertaken and that a medical examination be conducted. To be sure that we could require these two elements, we chose to introduce the notion of the best interests of the child. This allows us to say: in order to really determine whether or not the child is a good match for the adoptive parents, there must be a home study and a medical examination of the child so that a proper match can be made between the child and adoptive parents.

• 1645

[English]

Mr. John McKay: If in fact this is the government's response to the testimony we heard, that it is a means by which you can obtain a home study, it strikes me as a sledgehammer and a fly. Why would you introduce a whole area of jurisprudence that has enormous meaning among family practitioners in this country in order to obtain a home study? Why don't you just simply say it? It should be something fairly direct. I haven't frankly thought through what all of this would mean in terms of the best interests of the child, but I can see that some official applying this test of what is in the best interests of a child, which is essentially a judicial test in the context of an official, is going to open up a lot more doors than it closes.

I frankly am a little stunned, surprised, by the use of this kind of language to obtain what might be a legitimate goal for having a home study done.

The other question that comes to mind is you're going to have to see it “was in accordance with the laws of the place where the adoption took place”. In some countries the laws of adoption are a little on the loose side, to say the least, and in some places they don't even exist. It continues “and the laws of the country of residence of the adopting citizen”. For most instances that will mean Canada. In Canada and in most provinces, I assume all provinces, the issue of a home study is in fact dealt with. It is in Ontario; I can't speak with any authority on other provinces. I can't adopt a child in Ontario without doing a home study. So I don't know how I will be complying with the laws of the country of residence, absent of home study, if this was Canada.

I suppose the other question I am still unclear about is this. Why do we talk about the country of residence of the adopting citizen...? I'm answering my own question on that. I understand the broader question that people don't always live in Canada, but you lead to some legal absurdity here. You could have an adoption of a child who becomes a Canadian citizen based upon laws of two foreign countries. Doesn't that strike you as a bit of a legal absurdity? It doesn't? Okay.

The Chair: Would you like to explain why it does not, Mr. Fyffe, very precisely?

Mr. Greg Fyffe: Mr. Chairman, I'd like to come back to the point about why we've used this wording and why it's coming forward now. The basic problem we've been trying to address is the fact that we've moved from an adoption process, which has largely been followed up with an immigration process, to a citizenship process in which the citizenship is attributed really without an immigration process. As we got together with the provinces, we found that there were a lot of bumps on the road to making this work, including the fact that not all of the laws were in place in all of the provinces, and not all of the procedures in the provinces were necessarily available because there wasn't a complete legal framework for this shift.

The way we've tried to deal with it is to take this wording, which comes from the Hague Convention and certainly has its own parameters, which are understood. It's the feeling we have, and it's the feeling of the provinces, that this gives us jointly the ability to put in place a process that meets everybody's requirements. That is, we're able to have the medical exam, we're able to have the home study, and we're able to do it in a manner that satisfies the provinces, which allows the proper medical testing to take place, which allows us to then complete the citizenship process. So we're trying to put the legal underpinnings underneath that will enable a number of provinces with different legal systems, plus the federal government, to have what we hope in the end will be a seamless process, which will in fact meet all of our own requirements, but will also meet in fact the legitimate interests of the child and of the parents.

• 1650

The reason it comes in part-way through is that this is a fast-moving file and a lot of the discussions took place after the bill had been in place. We found that to make this seamless process work, we needed to add a little bit. We feel that these words will give us the appropriate authority to make this process work. The provinces are very comfortable with it. Perhaps there are some legal issues you're raising that we hadn't considered, but we don't feel these words cause us a problem, because they come from the convention and there is a general understanding around them.

Mr. John McKay: You can see my point that these words have a potential to be fraught with abuse. This is a very vague test, which has some legal precision within the four walls of a courtroom, but outside of the four walls of a courtroom can mean anything to anybody at any time.

Mr. Greg Fyffe: Yes, but we feel that this will not in fact happen, that they will be buttressed by an understanding of the Hague Convention, by other rules that are operative, by regulations, and that in their collectivity we will be able to solve the problems we need to solve and we will not be raising other problems we can't deal with.

The Chair: Before I call on Mr. Benoit, are you then telling the committee, as you had indicated and for greater clarity, that indeed there has been agreement, insofar as this provision is concerned, with all provincial governments at this time?

Mr. Greg Fyffe: We agreed with the provinces that words like this would enable us to jointly work out procedures we could all live with. As Mr. Collinge indicated, those discussions are well along, but they're not completed. But this part is an essential part of allowing us to do that.

The Chair: So this is an issue of confidence.

Mr. Benoit.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Mr. Fyffe, along that line, if the work hasn't been done that's necessary to really comfortably put this legislation in place, then why on earth are we forging ahead with it before such a time? Why wasn't this proposed amendment actually in the original legislation? You have given something of an answer. You said, we've been pushing it ahead pretty fast and the legislation came out and then we realized we never had things covered. That's a real concern, and it's a concern I have been expressing from the day this committee started dealing with this bill.

Quite frankly, too much of the background information isn't in place. This legislation is not based on a solid foundation. There are going to be some other problems that are going to come out of this legislation down the road because we're trying to rush ahead too quickly with it. What we have is legislation that is unclear. It needs to be clarified. It is so vague that it is regulation that will determine what it really says. This only makes it less clear. This does not clarify it. This makes it less clear.

Would you agree with that last statement, Mr. Fyffe, that this doesn't clarify it, that in fact it does the opposite?

Mr. Greg Fyffe: The situation we're in is that there are some very complex judicial rulings that we really were studying and we were trying to gather more information on their impact. We felt that these would help us. The provinces felt that this would deal with the situation and allow us to move forward with an agreement. When we have rulings we have to deal with, we can't always wait, because we might find we end up with jurisprudence that puts us in an even worse situation. We don't always have the luxury of time, and that's in this case as well.

Mr. Leon Benoit: But if the proposed law, the legislation that's being put before the House of Commons, is clear, then it's far less likely.... Then it's up to the courts to rule within that law. Here we're waiting for the court to make decisions in so many situations that will determine what legislators put in law. It's backwards. Parliament should be making the laws and the courts should be ruling based on that law.

Mr. Greg Fyffe: The courts have made rulings on the previous law. We're trying to clarify the intent of the law. This unfortunately is inescapably a very complex area of jurisdiction, of legal definition. We feel that these, even though they may appear complex, will clarify the intent and it will enable us to do what's done and do what needs to be done.

• 1655

Mr. Leon Benoit: Mr. McKay's a lawyer and he doesn't feel that way. I'd ask you, what does the Hague Convention deal with?

The Chair: Mr. Fyffe or Mr. Sabourin, Mr. Benoit has asked a specific question on the Hague Convention, which is what does the convention deal with.

Mr. Dominique Collinge: The Hague Convention is an international convention. The full title is the Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption.

Mr. Leon Benoit: International under what body, under what jurisdiction? Is it a UN convention?

Mr. Dominique Collinge: It's a UN convention.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Why are we using a UN convention to determine what we put in Canadian law in this way, in this fashion? To me that's a real concern as well.

Mr. Dominique Collinge: But Canada has ratified the Hague Convention; therefore, we're trying to put into our domestic law what we have agreed on in an international treaty.

Mr. Leon Benoit: So you're saying that you have to use this clause, “was in the best interests of the child”, to comply with the UN convention?

Mr. Dominique Collinge: I wouldn't go that far. We have just chosen to use the same language. It's not compulsory to use those actual words, but we have chosen to use those because that's the language used in the international convention.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Why don't we use language that's far more clear? If the purpose is, as was stated by I think Mr. Sabourin, to allow the department to do a home study and medical tests, then why don't we just say that and get rid of the vagueness?

The Chair: Just a second, please. Mr. Mahoney will have the floor next, then Mr. McKay again, and then Ms. Folco. Mr. Ménard after Mr. Mahoney.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Mr. Chairman, I was going to raise a couple of issues, hopefully, that would clarify it. But I wonder, are we ready to vote? We've heard the answers to the questions. I don't want to give up my spot unless you're prepared to vote.

The Chair: Members wanted to raise questions. I am always at the mercy of the membership of the committee. Are we ready to vote, or would we like to pose some more questions?

Mr. Ménard, would you like to pose some questions?

Mr. Steve Mahoney: If they're going to go on, I will.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Mr. Chairman, I am not opposed to voting, but I think that committee members should take note of the fact that it would have been very desirable to have first completed the negotiations with the provinces. As far as principles go, there is no problem. And as for incorporating international law into our Canadian legislation, there's no problem. That's why we sign agreements. It's the case of the convention that deals with the status of stateless persons and for a host of other agreements. But the difficulty arises from the fact that the negotiations with the provinces have not been completed.

At any rate, I will be voting in favour and I'm ready to vote, but committee members should take note of this, especially the government members and especially you, Ms. Augustine.

[English]

The Chair: Ms. Folco, are you posing a question? Mr. McKay? If not, Mr. Benoit.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Yes, I want to try to get some further clarification on 8(a) as proposed in this amendment, which reads “was in the best interests of the child”. Who would determine what is in the best interests of the child? What implications could that have on the authority of parents in determining what the child...?

The Chair: Mr. Sabourin, precisely.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Parents or other authorities.

The Chair: Anyone?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: Mr. Chairman, maybe I will make a couple of comments and then ask my colleague, Mr. Collinge, to speak on the determination process. The comment I want to make is a point that has not perhaps been fully shared with this committee. It's that the current legislation has been ruled by the courts as violating if not the charter then certainly the Canadian Human Rights Act.

• 1700

We have been told by the courts repeatedly that we must do something to put adopted kids in a situation closer to the situation of kids who are natural-born to Canadian parents abroad. We must do something and we must do it now. We are currently before the Canadian Human Rights Commission, and the only reason they have accepted to give us some leeway with cases currently before the commission is that we have told them the government is preparing amendments to the legislation and Bill C-63 is before Parliament.

So I just want to make that clarification, that we're under immense pressure to propose something, and I would say the wording as it has been prepared today is the best wording we can come up with in consultation with the provinces, with the Department of Justice, and of course with the people at the Canadian Human Rights Commission, and that's why we're moving in that direction.

Perhaps my colleague, Mr. Collinge, wants to speak about the determination process.

The Chair: Mr. Collinge, concisely, please.

[Translation]

Mr. Dominique Collinge: To be more precise, the question was how we would define the child's best interests.

We intend to use this provision to make a regulation that will provide directives on defining the child's best interests. A number of things will be involved. I have already mentioned the home study and the medical examination, but others may also be added, for example, consent by the biological parents to the adoption, the fact that there was no trafficking in children, that fact that the child was not sold. There are a whole series of criteria that we intend to place in the regulations to provide an overall definition of the best interests of the child.

Lastly, it will be up to the citizenship officer to define the best interests of the child on a case-by-case basis using the criteria listed in the regulations.

[English]

The Chair: I will allow Mr. Benoit to speak and then I will go to the government side and we will put it to a vote.

Mr. Benoit.

Mr. Leon Benoit: It sounds like you are suggesting we just buy this pig-in-a-poke, extremely vague and unclear legislation, and just pass it through the House on the assumption that the departmental officials, with the approval of the minister, will put in place appropriate regulation, and that regulation could make this legislation one thing or something entirely different. That's what is being asked for by the government here. To me it is completely unacceptable, and that's part of the reason I think this legislation has to go back to the drawing board, and let's get some clarification. Let's not rush it through as quickly as it's being rushed through.

Mr. Collinge, I think you brought up a really important possible circumstance, and this is exactly one of those I'm concerned with.

If you have a child who's to be adopted, has biological parents who are living, and someone other than the parents has determined that the parents just can't provide this child with the material goods that are adequate, they could just determine, well, in the best interests of the child we're going to allow this adoption to go ahead. I'm concerned about a scenario like that.

The Chair: Any further comment, Mr. Fyffe or Mr. Sabourin?

Mr. Leon Benoit: In the legislation, why don't we specifically put in things like “with the approval of the biological parents in cases where a biological parent is alive”?

The Chair: Any further comments, or have you exhausted your imagination?

Mr. Mahoney.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Mr. Chairman, just on that last point, if the child is up for adoption and there are biological parents who are living—I don't know that this state takes children away without just cause and then puts them up for adoption. I know of no cases where that kind of travesty occurs in this country. This is not Ceausescu and Romania, with the problems that existed there.

• 1705

The other aspect is that the laws are generally determined provincially in relationship to adoption, and the argument I heard that makes the most sense here is the fact that there is an international treaty that we have signed on to. I could read this and agree that paragraph (a) is somewhat subjective at the very least, and it could be subject to interpretation of what the words “best interests” actually mean. But when you read it in the context of the entire amendment, it deals with a genuine relationship that would be part of the best interests for that child, that the child would be adopted by new parents and there would be a genuine relationship. It deals with the fact that the adoption was done in accordance with the laws of adoption, whether it was in this country or another country.

I think you could take either position. Of course the job of an effective opposition critic is to try to perhaps have a bill taken back to the drawing board and redrafted—that's their job and I understand that. I did it for a long time. But the reality is, in my view, we could live with it in either case. We could live without that statement in there—“was in the best interests of the child”—because I believe it's covered in paragraphs (b) and (c) that follow, or we could live with it in there, in terms of the fact that it doesn't cause some outrageous problems.

I don't think it's about material goods either. I see nowhere where we're talking about whether or not the kid gets a Nintendo game or something of that nature. I think what we're talking about in the “best interests of the child”—if we wanted to play that kind of game, and I suppose we could, we'd have to get out the Hague Convention and go through it line by line and find out what exactly they mean; things like nutrition and love and caring and shelter and basic needs, food and water, for goodness' sake. I don't think they mean the level of material goods that reference was made to being provided by the new adoptive parents.

So, frankly, I think it's a bit of a tempest in a teapot. I hear Mr. McKay's argument from the legal perspective in the terms that it could be open to abuse. But how do you abuse the best interests of the child in the case of an adoption here, particularly when you take it in the overall context? If it sat on its own and was strictly “in the best interests of the child”, with no further definitions, then I would agree with those concerns, and I would agree with Mr. Benoit that we're leaving it open. But when you take it as one subclause with paragraph (a) followed by (b) and (c), I think it's something that can make sense.

The explanation I've heard, particularly from Mr. Sabourin, about the fact that our existing law is in violation of our own country's human rights code—well, I think we'd better make the change, and we should make it in the context of the Hague Convention, which is part of our international responsibility, given that we're a signatory to that convention, and in the fact that this overall clause will be, in my view, in the best interests of the child. We're just calling it like it is.

The Chair: Mr. McKay and then Mr. Benoit, and then I will close the debate.

Mr. McKay.

Mr. John McKay: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to respond to Mr. Sabourin's essential argument, which was that the process is under attack by the judicial system because arguably it's a discriminatory way in which we treat adoptees vis-à-vis how we treat natural-born. That's the essence of your argument. The ministry's first response in attempting to narrow that gap was a fourfold test: a genuine relationship, in accordance with the law where the adoption took place, the country of residence, and that it didn't circumvent any requirements under Citizenship.

• 1710

So that's a fourfold test. Now we've got a fifth test, which we're adding on. I'm a little puzzled in seeing how going from four tests to five tests narrows the way in which Citizenship and Immigration Canada treats adoptees versus natural-born. To my mind, not only does it set up another level of test, but it sets up what we've been criticized the most for by the African Canadian Legal Clinic, which was that they wanted 8(a) and (b) out of there totally, because it was vague, because it was arbitrary, and it was a hardship. The Metro Toronto Chinese and Southeast Asian Legal Clinic wanted the elimination of the concept of genuine relationship. So it seems to me, frankly, that the department has responded exactly 180 degrees in the opposite direction to (a) jurisprudence and (b) the concerns raised by these witnesses.

The Chair: Mr. Sabourin, would you like to comment on that?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

What I can say on those points is that what we're trying to do is make sure that if an adoption is legitimate, then citizenship ensues almost automatically. In that sense, the legitimacy of the adoption can be substituted to genuine parentage for a biological child. But we have to make sure that such adoption is fully legitimate. We have not developed these criteria in isolation. You mentioned one group that appeared before you, but the Adoption Council of Canada supports the changes we have put forward. The provinces are generally very comfortable with what we've put forward, although they are concerned about how the process will actually work, legitimately so.

One of the great difficulties we face when we talk about the legitimacy of the adoption becoming the central core decision-making element is that there is a lot of potential for fraud when it comes to international adoptions, from extreme cases of the sale of children to less complex cases, with which I'm sure you're very familiar, where there's some element of fraud or undue process in the adoption.

All the elements that have been identified, including the proposed amendment, go to the legitimacy of the adoption issue. Best interests of the child is just an added tool that can allow us to examine whether or not an adoption was legitimate, and it's a tool that will go to some of the concerns that the provinces have expressed that parents need to be fully informed about the condition of the child and whether or not it will be in the best interest of the child to be adopted by them, the parents.

Mr. John McKay: Have you given any thought about the best interests of the child within the meaning of the Hague Convention?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: I don't believe we've contemplated the addition of those words, although we have felt that in applying and interpreting those words for decision-making purposes we would rely on existing jurisprudence that refers to the convention.

The Chair: Was the answer given, Mr. McKay?

Mr. John McKay: Well, this is the kind of phrasing in which all the little legal bells go off, Mr. Chairman. I understand Mr. Sabourin's concerns. I understand, probably not nearly as well as he does, the abuses in the process and the offence it gives right-thinking people. I am questioning and criticizing the response, whether this is the best response the department can make to what is an area of abuse, and may well be a growing area of abuse.

• 1715

At the same time, one has to be concerned about the application of these tests. They are very subjective tests, conducted by a person who has no level of accountability. There is no accountability that flows from here. They're not conducted in any sort of a public forum; there's no argument back and forth; there's no ability to question the decision-maker in a direct sort of way. So when you give the decision-maker these authorities, these abilities, one naturally, as a legislator, immediately says these are very significant tools with which to deny citizenship to a minor child. This is the basis for my hesitation.

The Chair: Mr. Sabourin, before I give the floor to Mr. Benoit, you indicated in the explanation that the Hague Convention concerning the rights of the child was a pivotal force as a basis for this particular amendment (a). Is that right?

Mr. Dominique Collinge: No. Actually, the purpose of the amendment is to be able to meet the provincial concerns about home studies and medical examination. That was the main reason for the proposed amendment. As I said at the beginning, with the present wording we have no legal way of requiring a medical examination or a home study.

The Chair: If I may interrupt, what you are saying is that were the Hague Convention not in existence today, you would have gone with this proposal as well. Is that right?

Mr. Dominique Collinge: Yes, absolutely. Maybe we would not have used the same language, because the language “the best interests of the child” is the Hague Convention language, and that's why we chose it. But even without the Hague Convention we would have chosen to give ourselves the tool to be able to meet the provincial concerns.

The Chair: But to follow Mr. McKay's questioning, since the definition of the phrase “in the best interests of the child”, by your admission now, emerged from that convention, would it not be wiser to indeed indicate that this phrase is used here knowing the definition of this term or the understanding of this term within the Hague Convention? The purpose for that, as I was hearing Mr. McKay, is if the jurisprudence that has emerged to date, following the Hague Convention, has been based on the interpretation of the Hague Convention, and if there is any other potential interpretation in the future of this phrase, it might be wiser to indicate a friendly amendment, as suggested by Mr. McKay, if I heard him correctly, that it is the interests of the child as understood in the Hague Convention. What is the objection to that?

Mr. Dominique Collinge: Personally, I have no objection in principle. But I will have to ask my legal colleague to see whether that would be acceptable or not. That's all I can say.

The Chair: The minds are conferring.

Mr. Benoit.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Thank you, Mr. Chair. I think Mr. McKay has brought forth some very important and salient points.

Mr. Sabourin, the intent that you stated is honourable, and I think we all agree with that intent, your statement that there is some element of fraud here, and that's what you're trying to protect against. I understand that. I know that is the case, although, interestingly enough, Madam Folco and Madam Augustine have both said not to worry about a little bit of abuse; why do we focus on a little bit of abuse? But if it's even one child that is put in a situation that is a really dangerous and unhealthy situation, then I think we should be concerned with even a little bit of abuse.

So what I'd like to ask about is.... Actually, Mr. Mahoney made a comment earlier. He said that Canadian adoption law wouldn't allow some of the problems I was referring to. But in fact, in this clause, Canadian adoption law is irrelevant. What is relevant is that the adoption is done in accordance with the laws of the place where the adoption took place and the laws of the country of residence. It could be a Canadian citizen who is not a Canadian resident, because they've been away from the country, they don't have property and so on, but who is a resident of this third country, which would be determinant. So Canadian adoption law doesn't even come into play in this issue.

• 1720

So I hope Mr. Mahoney is clear about what this amendment would actually do, and that Canadian adoption law is irrelevant and would not apply. I am concerned that because those two factors are key factors—where the adoption took place and the residence of the adopting citizen—we reconsider this amendment.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Let's vote.

The Chair: Are we ready for the vote on the whole, or on just a part?

I'd just like to ask one question on paragraph 8(d)—I have done with paragraphs 8(a), (b), and (c). Is paragraph 8(d), then, to mean that we have taken into account adoption of convenience as a so-called basis for immigration?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: Yes.

The Chair: Thank you.

Are we ready for the vote? Shall the amendment carry?

Some hon. members: No.

Mr. Leon Benoit: I'd like a recorded vote.

The Chair: We are voting on the amendment.

Mr. John McKay: Did we ever get any response as to whether they were prepared to entertain the Hague Convention as a friendly amendment?

The Chair: The chair apologizes. I was waiting for the conference of the officials about the response to the specific question. Could I have unanimous consent to suspend the voting at this point?

Some hon. members: Agreed.

The Chair: Mr. McKay raised a point about whether we agree to propose a subamendment to the amendment.

Are we getting a reply on that?

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: Mr. Chair, it's a friendly amendment from Mr. McKay.

Mr. John McKay: It might be very friendly, but that's not what I hear from the department.

Mr. Greg Fyffe: Mr. Chairman, there are implications to going beyond using the words of a convention and specifically referring to the convention, and I'd ask Mr. Sabourin to comment on that.

The Chair: Mr. Sabourin.

Mr. Norman Sabourin: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. What I can say is that in a way the words “best interests of the child” were used because of the scope it gives us to accommodate the provincial concerns. If we add the words within the meaning of the convention, then it binds us and it ties us to jurisprudence regarding the convention. It robs us of any flexibility in interpreting those words.

To follow up on Mr. Benoit's point, we not only have to come up with wording that will satisfy the adoptions that take place in Canada, which have to comply with provincial jurisdiction in matters of adoption, but we have to make sure the wording equally applies to the situation of a Canadian citizen living abroad who decides to adopt a child abroad, when that child may come from another country. That is part of the reason those words were chosen. It gives us the flexibility to assess the legitimacy of the adoption. And it might be—

Mr. John McKay: I understand your—how shall we say—legal absurdities here. You know, literally you could adopt a Thai child, be a resident of Thailand, and create a citizen of Canada.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Absolutely.

Mr. John McKay: I understand the problem, but I'm criticizing the remedy. I'm also, if you will, literally trying to tie you down to what the Hague Convention means by the best interests of the child, not what the province of Ontario or any other province means by it.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: In any event, whether referred to or not, that will in no way change our ability to refer to precedent and be bound by it since we are signatories.

• 1725

[English]

Mr. Greg Fyffe: Perhaps, Mr. Chairman, I could just refer to two principles that we've been trying to follow. One is that we're trying to make sure that adoptions parallel as closely as possible the situation that would apply in the case of a natural birth. This might, for example, be someone who was resident in one country abroad travelling in another country abroad. There are incredibly complex situations, and we could find down the road that because we haven't allowed ourselves sufficient flexibility, we get into complications that we could avoid if we foresee them now.

The other thing is that on the addition of the exact reference to a convention—and this issue comes up in other contexts—as opposed to just using the words of a convention, if we tie ourselves to the exact jurisprudence around the convention, we might very well be tying ourselves to interpretations of the convention that are in international courts, that are outside Canada, that would be difficult when applied within Canada.

The appropriate means to us have been to try to use those words and then allow Canadian jurisprudence to develop from that route, rather than trying to tie it to overseas interpretations.

Mr. John McKay: But in some respects, by using this phrasing, you are picking the universe of interpretation and saying to the committee, we will use only this part of the universe of interpretation.

The Chair: Having heard the discussion, I could say that Mr. Mahoney gets to put this to a vote, but Mr. Benoit has a comment to make on another paragraph of this proposal, and I think we should listen to that. But let us resolve this particular paragraph 8(a) first. I heard from the departmental officials that there could be some problem from their point of view. I heard from the parliamentary secretary—if I can get his attention, Mr. Telegdi—that it is considered a friendly amendment—

Mr. John McKay: No, no. He doesn't think it's friendly anymore.

The Chair: Go ahead.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Canada has been a signatory to treaties on economic and socio-cultural rights since 1966. Even if this had come into force, the report was late. Is there anything in our domestic law that refers to other types of international treaties or conventions that Canada has signed, or in your opinion, would this be a precedent for Canadian legislation to refer explicitly to an international convention?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: I don't know the exact answer, but I do know that it is extremely unusual to allude to an international instrument in Canadian law. It's extremely unusual, if not—

Mr. Réal Ménard: Is it not the case in the Canadian Human Rights Act?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: I don't think so. I think that Canadian law generally uses the terms used in a convention, but does not refer to the convention itself.

Mr. Réal Ménard: But the bill does refer to the convention relating to the status of stateless persons, doesn't it? Would you like to bet a beer on that?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: The wording of the Act refers to the terms of the convention almost verbatim, but does not refer to the Act itself. I will gladly accept my beer wherever it suits the member.

Mr. Réal Ménard: We'll get back to this, Mr. Chairman.

[English]

The Chair: If Mr. Benoit will make it brief, then it will be the last word.

Mr. Benoit.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Yes, I just need a clarification. In paragraph 8(b), we have “created a genuine relationship of parent and child”, which is the proposed legislation—that's the amendment—of the government. It's subparagraph 8(b)(ii). I would just like someone to define what a “genuine relationship” of a parent and child is. What creates a genuine relationship of a parent and child?

The Chair: Mr. Collinge.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: We're in the middle of a vote, Mr. Chairman.

An hon. member: That's out of order.

Mr. Leon Benoit: I'm asking for clarification.

The Chair: Just a second. Procedurally, we can go ahead, but I did ask for a suspension. And since it's a very brief request for clarification, I have allowed it.

So, Mr. Collinge.

Mr. Leon Benoit: It's a very straightforward question.

[Translation]

Mr. Dominique Collinge: There are two aspects to the filiation link: there's the legal aspect and factual aspect. The legal aspect states that adoption must create a link between parents and children, a link that guardianship does not create. Therefore, we will not recognize...

• 1730

[English]

Mr. Leon Benoit: Excuse me. There's no translation coming through here.

Mr. Dominique Collinge: I can speak English, but bear with my English and it will be okay.

The general parent-child relationship still has two aspects, the legal aspect and the de facto aspect. The legal aspect is the fact that there is indeed, from a legal point of view, a new relation between the parent and the child, and that must be a parent-child relationship that, for example, a guardianship would not give. So if in certain countries adoption is impossible—and some countries do not have an adoption law—then that type of adoption would not be a legal parent-child relationship. So that's the legal aspect of the parent-child relationship.

Mr. Leon Benoit: You've only told me one thing that it is not. My question is, what is it? What does it mean?

Mr. Dominique Collinge: For example, in all Canadian adoptions, each provincial law says this adoption will create a parent-child relationship and therefore will sever the ties with the biological parents.

Mr. Leon Benoit: So if different provinces have different laws, what are we working with here?

By the way, you mentioned earlier all of the provinces. Did you say every single province has approved the wording to this clause, to this amendment?

Mr. Dominique Collinge: No, the amendment to this was not made known to the provinces, because we could not do that before it was tabled here.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Has every province approved the wording that is in the government's proposed legislation in clause 8?

Mr. Dominique Collinge: No. Again, the amendment was tabled today.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Not the amendment; I mean the government legislation, the proposed legislation that we're dealing with.

Mr. Dominique Collinge: No. Actually, they couldn't because, as I explained before, the previous wording did not allow us to meet the provincial concerns; therefore they were not necessarily in agreement. But with the new addition of “best interests of the child”, they will most likely be in agreement with the new text.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Most likely?

Mr. Dominique Collinge: As I said, the new text will allow us to make regulations to meet the provincial concerns.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Okay. Going back to my question, again, what does “created a genuine relationship of parent and child” actually mean? You've said just one thing; you said the provinces define that. How does that work out with this legislation? Which province do we take?

Mr. Dominique Collinge: Most adoption laws in the world do create a parent-child relationship, because it severs the ties with the biological parents. Basically, from a legal point of view, that's the definition of a genuine parent-child relationship.

A voice: Isn't that what adoption is?

Mr. Leon Benoit: Could that be put in the legislation for clarification?

The Chair: I think we have heard enough.

Mr. Leon Benoit: There's no answer?

The Chair: Is there any answer to that?

Mr. Dominique Collinge: Actually, we do not really see the necessity to include that in the text of this act, because, except in very specific cases, as I said, in countries where there is no adoption law, most laws do actually define adoption as creating a parent-child relationship that severs the relationship with the biological parents.

The Chair: So the answer is given. It may not be satisfactory, but it is given.

Can we put it to a vote?

Mr. Leon Benoit: I didn't hear an answer, but okay.

• 1735

I'd like a recorded vote, please.

The Chair: A recorded vote on the amendment to clause 8? All of them?

A voice: There's no other amendment by Mr. McKay.

Mr. John McKay: It's not friendly now, so therefore I haven't moved it properly, and therefore it dies, and therefore we're back to the original amendment.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: This is amendment (a),

[English]

the first amendment the government tabled.

Mr. John McKay: Yes.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Are you referring to the first government amendment or Mr. McKay's amendment, seeking to refer to the Hague Convention? That's the government's amendment.

[English]

Mr. John McKay: Mr. McKay no longer has an amendment because what was friendly has become unfriendly, and therefore, since it's not properly moved—

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Mr. McKay, don't let anybody destroy you within your caucus. Don't accept that.

[English]

Mr. John McKay: I'm a very friendly guy. You know that.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Therefore, it's the government's amendment (a) which states: "was in the best interests of the child".

[English]

The Chair: Okay. The clerk will proceed with the recorded vote. This is on all the amendments, all paragraphs.

(Amendment agreed to: yeas 5, nays 4)

(Clause 8 as amended agreed to: yeas 5, nays 4)

The Chair: The parliamentary secretary is ready for clause 6.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Mr. Chairman, could we have a three- to five-minute break, please?

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: Well, if you're going to take a break, we may as well go and grab some sandwiches.

The Chair: We'll take fifteen minutes for supper. The meeting is suspended.

• 1738

• 1801

The Chair: The meeting is resumed.

Are you ready for clause 6, Mr. Parliamentary Secretary?

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: Mr. Chairman, let's just put clause 6 in abeyance and proceed with others.

The Chair: Okay. We shall proceed to clause 9, then.

(On clause 9—Direction by Governor in Council)

The Chair: Is there any discussion on clause 9? Mr. Benoit.

Mr. Leon Benoit: I was expecting clause 6.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?

[English]

The Chair: We'll hear from Mr. Ménard while Mr. Benoit is getting organized.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: We're at clause 9, aren't we? Mr. Sabourin or Mr. Stevens, could you give me an example of the reasoning that underlies clause 9?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: I can give you an example. It's a provision that allows us to cover cases that could fall between the cracks of the provisions of this legislation. For instance, let's say a person came to Canada at a very young age with his or her parents, resided here for many years, and for some reason, cannot obtain citizenship under one of the provisions of the legislation. It would still be possible to give that person citizenship by virtue of exceptional power.

Another example must be that of a person who does not meet the usual naturalization requirements but who has provided services of an exceptional value to Canada, whether abroad or in this country, and who wants to become a full-fledged member of the Canadian community.

Mr. Réal Ménard: Let's take an example. Ms. Indira Gandhi comes and settles here, wants to renounce Indian citizenship and provides services to Canada in mediating a very important conflict. The purpose is in fact to make certain people honorary citizens. That would be a possibility and that falls within the discretionary powers of the Minister.

Mr. Norman Sabourin: This is a power of the Governor in Council; it is therefore highly exceptional. It does not grant citizenship on an honorary basis, but full citizenship pursuant to the Act.

Mr. Réal Ménard: My colleague is giving me the example of Lucien Bouchard, which is surely inappropriate; I imagine she's thinking of the future. I understand the meaning of the clause, Mr. Chairman.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Benoit, are you ready to ask your question?

Mr. Leon Benoit: Yes. My question on clause 9 is, is there a standard legal definition of “unusual hardship” and “reward services of an exceptional value to Canada”?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: There is not, Mr. Chairman. It is a discretionary power, so those words are subject to the interpretation of the governor in council.

• 1805

Mr. Leon Benoit: So the definition is wide open. There's no standard legal definition. Would you expect that the current regulation would be applied to that, or is there a regulation regarding that?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: There are neither regulations nor definition nor departmental policy, because it is a governor in council authority; it's not a minister's authority. It's up to the governor in council to decide on what the interpretation of those words might be and then to give direction to the minister at the governor in council's discretion.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Is that why in this clause that authority is given to the governor in council rather than to the minister? In practice it doesn't really change the way this will be scrutinized or the way the decision will be made. Is that the reason it actually is worded like that in the clause, so that it doesn't have to be defined any further either in this legislation or in regulation?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: The reason for this wording is that they're simply the same words as used in the current legislation that give the broad authority to the governor in council and say that because it is such an exceptional power, it shouldn't be strictly at the minister's discretion.

Mr. Leon Benoit: So as a justification or reason for this clause being the way it is, you're saying that's what is in the current act.

Have there been cases in the history of the act where this clause in the way it's worded has caused a problem, where it has been either challenged by a court or even become a real public issue that reflects negatively on the immigration department?

The Chair: Mr. Sabourin.

Mr. Norman Sabourin: I don't think it has been a problematic clause. The power is exercised very rarely. There might be one case in a year, no cases in another year, and three cases in another year. It's highly exceptional.

My colleague, Mrs. Pressé, reminds me of the example of a women who was advised in writing by embassy officials in the early 1970s that if she acquired French status, she would not lose her Canadian status. In those years, of course, by becoming a French citizen she automatically lost. She tried to come back to Canada once her job was terminated, because she had no family in France, etc., and there was no way to bring her back to Canada other than to grant her citizenship through this special provision.

Mr. Leon Benoit: In this clause as it is now, for how many years could the decision made by the governor in council not be made public? There's no access to information that would allow the public to receive documents that would present the arguments for the decision.

Mr. Norman Sabourin: As regards the order in council itself, it's a public document that's published in the Canada Gazette. However, the name of the person covered by the order in council is protected under the privacy legislation. So that—

Mr. Leon Benoit: Is the reasoning published, the decision, the reasons that...?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: The governor in council's order is published in the Canada Gazette as a public document.

Mr. Leon Benoit: You mean the order just saying this has happened, not giving the reasoning that has led to this.

Mr. Norman Sabourin: It would not give any detailed reasons. It would simply say the governor in council is of the opinion that the person named in the annex suffers unusual hardship and hereby directs the Minister of Citizenship to grant citizenship to the person. But the name of the person would be protected under privacy legislation.

Mr. Leon Benoit: What would the effect be if you took governor in council out and just had this as a decision made by the minister? With the name whited out, would that be available under access to information, the arguments?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: There would be no difference as to who exercises the power. Personal information remains protected under privacy legislation. I think the reason for not making it a minister's power is that the minister feels it is too exceptional a power to be exercised directly by the minister; that being a very exceptional power, it needs a very exceptional decision-maker.

• 1810

Mr. Leon Benoit: There are no guidelines whatsoever on “to reward services of an exceptional value”. This is a kind of far-out example, but it's possible. Say someone comes in and does an exceptional job in running the campaign of a government candidate. That could be considered to be a service of exceptional value, and a decision could be made based on that. How would the public know? I'm using a bit of an extreme example to make a point. It could happen and the public would never know.

Mr. Norman Sabourin: One answer I can give, Mr. Fyffe has reminded me, is that really the granting of citizenship has historically been a crown prerogative, and it's up to Her Majesty to decide how to exercise that prerogative. The legislation covers normal sets of circumstances for the granting of citizenship, and the exceptional power rests with the governor in council as perhaps the continuation of this crown prerogative.

The Chair: Mr. Benoit, are you done?

Mr. Leon Benoit: Yes.

The Chair: Mr. McKay. I'm sorry, Mr. Bryden first, then you.

Mr. John Bryden: Just a quick observation. This really is a clause that gives citizenship for valour. Is that not so?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: Yes, that's correct.

Mr. John Bryden: That's what it's all about—valorous acts.

The other thing is that I can see a circumstance where I would award citizenship to Mr. Ménard, that is, if he did indeed separate and still run a Liberal campaign on behalf of the federalists.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Is there consent? I want a vote on this.

[English]

Mr. John Bryden: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The Chair: On that dose of humour, Mr. McKay.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Are you running for the Liberals?

Mr. Réal Ménard: [Editor's Note: Inaudible]

The Chair: Order, please. Mr. McKay has the floor.

Mr. John McKay: A concern raised by the Canadian Citizenship Federation was that this clause could be used as kind of an amnesty clause to clear up a backlog. Do you have a response to that?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: The only thing I can say is that it's entirely within the governor in council's authority to decide to whom to grant citizenship under that provision. But the governor in council, meaning several ministers of the crown, would have to get together and agree that they wish to consider a large group of people as falling under the definition of “special and unusual hardship”. I can't comment much more than that. It's a discretionary power.

Mr. John McKay: The Somali group that came in as undocumented refugees spent a long time in this country before they were able to apply for citizenship. Could this clause be used for something of that nature?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: I don't see any bar to the governor in council adopting the view that this could be done. But certainly each and every individual would have to be identified as falling within the scope of that definition.

An hon. member: Put the question.

The Chair: Just for the record, to your knowledge has this provision ever been used to grant so-called amnesty in the kind of situation Mr. McKay alluded to earlier?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: For the example that was used, no. There was never this type of amnesty granted, although there have been occasions where several people at once were given citizenship pursuant to existing subsection 5(4) of the legislation.

The Chair: Would this be to ease a backlog?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: Yes, we could probably call it that. As a matter of fact, it was to deal with the situation where several people in a region near Toronto had been waiting something like two and one-half years to obtain citizenship. There were several problems operationally with dealing with them. A submission was made by the minister at the time to grant citizenship to such groups of people through the special provision, and the governor in council accepted the submission and proceeded to grant citizenship to these people.

• 1815

The Chair: You've heard the explanation.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Can I just have one more question?

The Chair: Just one, yes.

Mr. Leon Benoit: I'm getting conflicting answers here. I was told in response to my question—not in response, but as a comment made in your response to my question—that this is used about once a year. I'd like to ask how long this clause has been in the legislation. Has it been in from the start, 1977? If so, how many times has it been used? How many people have been allowed in under this clause?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: The provision, the current subsection 5(4) has been in force since the current legislation came into force in 1977, and each year, to the best of my knowledge, there have been no more than three or four cases. There was one year, however, Mrs. Pressé has reminded me, where there was recourse to the provision to grant citizenship to several people. Several hundred—I don't know the numbers—were granted citizenship pursuant to that provision, in one year, since the legislation has been in force.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Several hundred.

Mr. Norman Sabourin: Correct.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Just as a comment here, I'm concerned that this explanation wasn't given to me. Your answer really led me to believe that it's only used once or twice a year, and several hundred in one year is saying quite a different thing. If someone up there knows that an answer that's being given isn't quite complete, I'd really appreciate it if that person would kind of cut in and say that answer isn't complete.

Mr. Norman Sabourin: Mr. Chairman, this is what this is all about. As soon as I spoke, my colleague Mrs. Pressé wrote out this note to remind me that in one year there were more than three cases.

Mr. Leon Benoit: But I asked that question—

Mr. Norman Sabourin: And I'm happy to share that information. I'm happy to share each and every bit of information I have in my vast corporate memory, but my corporate memory is not perfect.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Okay, thank you.

(Clauses 9 and 10 agreed to on division)

(On clause 11—Statelessness—bloodline connection)

The Chair: I understand the government has an amendment. Mr. Telegdi.

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: Yes, Mr. Chair, it's my pleasant duty to move an amendment that Bill C-63, clause 11, be amended by replacing line 41 on page 5 with the following:

(d) has resided in Canada for at least 1,095 days during the six years immediately before applying for citizenship;

I'm very pleased to move that and to let the honourable members around the committee know that certainly the government has been listening to....

The Chair: Mr. Ménard.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: I thought that the criterion of actual residence was something quite fundamental in the government's legislation. Why are you now amending the clause by replacing “five years” by “six years”? Where does that come from? What's the reasoning behind that amendment?

[English]

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: The rationale for having it six years instead of five is, as the member would know, when we talked about the situation as it pertained to people who come to Canada and work out of the country, but who have established Canada as their home base, this would make it easier for them to become citizens, for one. This recognizes the greater mobility of Canadians.

• 1820

I think what I want to point out to the member is that 1,095 days is still a requirement. That's still the standard. You have to be here 1,095 days. But instead of having to be here three years out of five, it has been amended to make it three out of six, because concerns were expressed by members of this committee and people appearing as witnesses that it would exclude too many people. It could exclude people from becoming Canadian citizens whose only reason for not being able to fulfil their requirements is that they're working for a Canadian firm overseas, if you will. I think one of the gentlemen talking about Placer Dome would fall into that category.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: In the description we have before us, it says that the provision applies to stateless persons; it will not apply throughout the Act. You're amending the period of reference; it will no longer be five, but six years. However, this does not concern permanent residents, only people coming from abroad.

[English]

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: This is one of the issues we will be dealing with when we do the amendments to clause 6, to make sure we're consistent throughout the legislation, making the five become six—three out of six.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Can you give me the scoop about what's coming up for clause 6?

The Chair: Mr. Ménard.

Mr. Réal Ménard: Mr. Chairman, it's important that this be understood. Tomorrow is my birthday. Be nice to me.

[English]

The Chair: No, no. I'll come back to you, because Mr. McKay has a friendly suggestion.

Mr. John McKay: Mr. Chairman, this is what is called a consequential amendment to an anticipated amendment. Since we've moved on past clause 6 where the foundational amendment would take place, this amendment, I respectfully suggest to the parliamentary secretary, is premature.

Until you deal with the amendment to clause 6, you shouldn't be dealing with clause 11. We've already made the decision to move on with respect to clause 6 for a variety of reasons.

My suggestion would be that either we move on past clause 11 or we deal with clause 11 as is without the amendment being moved at this time; that the parliamentary secretary move the amendment at the point where we deal with clause 6. If there is a change to clause 6, then this amendment needs to be moved.

The Chair: I think the chair would rule that that would be the proper approach.

Mr. Ménard, do you have any—

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: In the course of the very pleasant exchange that I had with Mr. Sabourin—you'll see that my beer is gaining in value, Mr. Sabourin—, it states in the reasons:

This new provision respects Canada's international obligations under the Convention on the reduction of statelessness.

That's exactly the view that I wanted to express. Do you agree with this argument? It's not that I always want to be right—I'm not a Liberal—with a few exceptions.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Telegdi, I have a proposal. If I may, I suggest, pursuant to the suggestion of Mr. McKay, to which I buy in as a reasonable intervention, that you withdraw the amendment at this time with unanimous consent of the committee and then handle the amendment when we go to clause 6. We will stand the clause.

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: Mr. Chair, you're saying we just don't deal with this section then.

The Chair: Yes. The clause will stand.

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: Okay.

The Chair: Is there unanimous consent?

Mr. Leon Benoit: No. Just before we deal with it, could I have clarification as to why we're not going back to clause 6 now?

The Chair: Mr. Telegdi.

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: There is something that's being worked on in the amendment that we haven't got worked through yet, Mr. Chair. It's the only answer I can give to the honourable member at this particular time.

The Chair: So you're not prepared to move an amendment yet to clause 6?

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: We're trying to make you happy.

Mr. Leon Benoit: If I could then just reiterate what I think I've heard, you're trying to sort it out over there as to what you want to do with this clause and you haven't done that.

Some hon. members: No.

• 1825

Ms. Raymonde Folco: We're working on it to try to get the right libellé. But we know what we're doing, Mr. Benoit; don't you worry about that.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Thank you, Madame Folco.

(Amendment withdrawn)

(Clause 11 allowed to stand)

(On clause 12—Rights and obligations)

The Chair: Madame Folco.

Ms. Raymonde Folco: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

So that the opposition understands that we're not trying to put anything over on them, there's going to be something in clause 6 regarding the number of days that the applicant must show physical presence inside a maximum number of years, which at the present time is five, but we want to move it to six. That's what we're trying to do here. This is going to be in clause 6. So there's a link between clause 6 and clause 11.

So we're suggesting that we leave that alone for the time being, and then when we get to clause 6, we can vote at that particular time on everything that flows from clause 6. That's what we're suggesting.

The Chair: Shall clause 12 carry?

Mr. Ménard.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Let's remain calm. Mr. Chairman, don't go too fast because we have to take a look at this to make sure that we understand what we're voting on. You have to keep your cool sometimes, Mr. Chairman. I have no questions about this clause.

[English]

The Chair: I am always calm when I propose and I look at you.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: You're very endearing, Mr. Chairman.

[English]

The Chair: We are on clause 12 now. Clause 11 has been allowed to stand. We have not taken a vote on clause 11 because—

An hon. member: You said “carried”. I heard you.

The Chair: No, because if we pass clause 11, I have been advised by the clerk that to revisit clause 11 following the passage of clause 6...to amend clause 11 would require unanimous consent.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: So we got wrong legal advice. Is that what we're hearing?

The Chair: Mr. Ménard, do you have any inquiry on clause 12? Are you ready to proceed?

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: No, Mr. Chairman. I'm in favour of clause 12.

[English]

The Chair: Are there any more questions?

(Clauses 12 and 13 agreed to on division)

The Chair: Clause 15 has the same situation as clause 14, a consequential amendment again because of the number of days. Let's start.

(On clause 14—Automatic loss)

The Chair: Are we ready to move the amendment on clause 14?

Clause 14 is dependent on clause 6, so clause 14 stands.

• 1830

(Clause 14 allowed to stand)

(On clause 15—Renunciation of citizenship)

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Clause 15 is about renunciation of citizenship. That's when an individual wants to—

Ms. Raymonde Folco: We're on clause 14.

Mr. Réal Ménard: No, we said that clause 14 would be allowed to stand. Did we stand the amendment?

[English]

The Chair: We will not proceed with clause 14 because part of it requires a consequential amendment.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Ms. Folco, you misled me. I'll leave it up to you, but you misled me. We are at clause 15.

Ms. Raymonde Folco: If I were polite, I would apologize to you...

[English]

The Chair: Yes.

[Translation]

Ms. Raymonde Folco: ...but I won't.

Mr. Réal Ménard: Don't do that. That would be most unlike you. Always be true to yourself, Ms. Folco.

Ms. Raymonde Folco: Always.

Mr. Réal Ménard: We're at clause 15?

The Chair: Clause 15, yes.

Mr. Réal Ménard: So, renunciation of citizenship is when an individual voluntarily wants to renounce his or her own citizenship.

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: Amendment 2.

Mr. Réal Ménard: This committee is a real circus! Mr. Parliamentary Secretary, you're completely out in left field. I'm talking about clause 15 and you are back at clause 14. We have a real conjugal relationship, you and I: you don't listen to me and I don't listen to you.

Some Hon. Members: Oh, oh!

Mr. Réal Ménard: Will you allow me to get to clause 15?

[English]

The Chair: Order.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Calm down a little.

We're at clause 15. Renunciation of citizenship is when someone voluntarily renounces their citizenship. If we understand this clause correctly, it gives the minister the power to recognize that state of fact for an individual. Are we reading this correctly?

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: Yes.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Ménard. The parliamentary secretary has indicated to me that there is a government amendment. Perhaps we can listen to that and then pursue your inquiry.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Well, the parliamentary secretary has to follow the game.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Telegdi.

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: Mr. Ménard, this one is a simple technical amendment. I hope you have it in front of you.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Wait.

[English]

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: It replaces lines 22 and 23 under “Renunciation of citizenship”:

15.(1) The Minister shall, on application, allow a citizen to renounce their citizenship, if the citizen

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: We don't have that amendment; these Liberals are completely lost.

[English]

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: Section (b) of the amendment replaces line 32 with:

(d) resides outside of Canada.

The Chair: Mr. McKay.

Mr. John McKay: I just don't know what the point is.

The Chair: Mr. Telegdi or Mr. Sabourin, would you like to reply to that?

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: Go ahead.

Mr. Norman Sabourin: I discussed this with the parliamentary secretary. It's a technical point. It's twofold.

First, we wanted to be entirely clear that this is not a discretionary authority of the minister to allow somebody to renounce citizenship. So instead of the words “a citizen may apply”, it should be “the Minister shall grant”.

Secondly, at paragraph 15(1)(d), instead of “does not reside in Canada”, the words “resides outside of Canada” are to ensure that a person could not leave Canada, apply to renounce, and return right back to Canada and then there might be an interpretation that the minister would be forced to approve the application. Of course, we don't want a person to be able to renounce citizenship if they're in Canada unless there is a very exceptional circumstance that applies.

The Chair: Mr. Benoit.

Mr. Leon Benoit: I have a question on the process you would go through in the department in drafting the legislation. What kind of scrutiny is there on the legislation after it has been drafted and gone through the many drafts before it actually comes to us?

• 1835

I ask this since I see the government here making several amendments, some of which are clearly because there simply wasn't proper scrutiny before the legislation came to the House. Are you that short of people inside the department, or what's the problem?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: I can comment on that, Mr. Chairman, by speaking of my visit to the charcutier in France, who asked me to help him make some sausage. He said “Lawyers make good sausage together, because anybody who enjoys sausage and respects the law should never watch either one being made”.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

Mr. Norman Sabourin: The fact is that in drafting a bill, it's a long, difficult, arduous, and demanding process. There are many, many lawyers involved, and being one, I know how troubling that can be.

We go through many processes of scrutiny to try to make sure we have the very best product before us, but when we come before this committee we aim for perfection. We hear the comments made by members of this committee and we try to incorporate suggestions that will make this bill a better and more perfect bill.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Boy, that was a pretty smooth answer.

You know, I can understand what Mr. Sabourin is saying. But then I think the committee should also be allowed as much time as it takes to go through this. This is directed to the government, I guess. Again, the waiting period between when the last witness is heard until the time the bill comes to clause-by-clause is very important, and allowing as many witnesses as.... I don't understand what the real rush is on this. I think we could have heard more witnesses, because in the end we'd come forth with an even better piece of legislation, with fewer errors.

The Chair: Is there any comment to the comment?

Mr. Ménard.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: The comparison that Mr. Sabourin has drawn is very interesting. It has occurred to us that bills are not only made with sausage, but were made by a butcher. That's not the case with the bill we're examining here, and we're convinced that you put all your skills at the service of parliamentarians.

[English]

It's a joke.

The Chair: John says we should get our sense of humour in a university.

Mr. Telegdi.

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: Mr. Chair, it's continuous improvement by another name, and I think certainly everybody around the table should feel good about it.

The Chair: Okay.

Mr. McNally.

Some hon. members: Call the question.

The Chair: Mr. McNally has the floor.

Mr. Grant McNally: Mr. Sabourin, you mentioned putting the word “grant” in. I always pay attention when that word is said. I don't know why. It's just coincidence.

Ms. Jean Augustine: Well, because your name is Grant.

Mr. Grant McNally: So that's why. Yet I don't see it here in the amendment. It still says “the Minister shall, on application”. You made a point earlier about changing the word so it wasn't a discretionary power on the minister's part. How does this amendment change that, from your perspective?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: What it does is clearly say that the minister has a duty and an obligation to allow the citizen to renounce citizenship, if they meet the criteria set out in that section, whereas in the current wording it's not clear whether it's a duty or a discretionary power, because it says “a citizen may apply to the Minister”. It was for a point of clarity only.

Mr. Grant McNally: All right. I still don't see how this makes it her duty that she has to do it—“The Minister shall, on application, allow a citizen to renounce”. She's still allowing them the opportunity, so they still have to come forward with that themselves, Is that not right? Does it substantially change the meaning?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: I think in legal terminology the word “may” has a very clear connotation of either being discretionary or permissive, whereas the word “shall” has a directive or obligatory connotation.

Mr. Grant McNally: Okay. I'm learning more about law all the time.

The Chair: Mr. Bryden.

Mr. John Bryden: I was just going to make a point, as a literary person. There is huge difference between “shall” and “may”, and the witness has explained the difference. I hope those in the teaching profession appreciate that distinction as well.

Mr. Grant McNally: Thank you.

The Chair: Having heard that elucidation and erudition, shall the amendment carry?

(Amendment agreed to)

• 1840

(Clause 15 as amended agreed to on division)

(On clause 16—Revocation order)

The Chair: Mr. Telegdi.

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: I have an amendment on clause 16, to replace line 2 on page 7 with “by knowingly concealing material circumstance”.

The Chair: Mr. Benoit is asking for the test.

Mr. Leon Benoit: I may have it, but I have a lot of amendments.

The Chair: Mr. Telegdi, you are now on paragraph (a) and paragraph (b) of the amendment for clause 16. Is that right?

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: Clause 16. It just replaces line 2 where it talks about representation or fraud or concealing—putting in “knowingly concealing”.

The Chair: Did everybody get that? Mr. Benoit, is that seen?

Mr. Leon Benoit: I understand what he's saying. I have a question, though.

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: Mr. Chairman, that was put in there because people wanted to make sure it was in there, because it gives more protection to the person who has citizenship. We heard a number of witnesses in that regard, in response to those concerns.

The Chair: Mr. Benoit.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Could I ask the parliamentary secretary to explain the way it's actually in the bill before amended, what that means? What happens in a circumstance where someone is found to have been knowingly or who has accidentally, I guess, concealed something? How does that treatment compare to the treatment under the amended clause, as the parliamentary secretary has proposed?

The Chair: Mr. Telegdi.

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: Clearly, Mr. Chairman, it puts a higher test on it. One has to show that information was knowingly withheld versus inadvertently, if you will. I think that's a significant emphasis.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Under the law, what would you have to do to prove that it was knowingly concealed?

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: It raises the bar. It's more difficult to do that, but it also provides more protection, if you will.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Maybe an example would be helpful.

Mr. John Bryden: May I throw in my twenty-five cents here? I think it's the idea and law of wilfulness, that you shouldn't be penalized when you do something that's entirely accidental. As it stands here, my interpretation of this clause is that without the word “knowingly”—or you could use “wilfully concealing”—there's a possibility that somebody may be penalized by revocation because, as the parliamentary secretary said, they accidentally didn't conceal. This puts the onus on the minister to demonstrate or require proof that the person had deliberately withheld information. As it stands now, the minister could act without having to demonstrate that the person had wilfully concealed information.

• 1845

Mr. Leon Benoit: We could ask legal counsel about the practical implications of this change.

The Chair: Mr. Stevens.

Mr. Eric Stevens (Legal Counsel, Office of the Assistant Deputy Attorney General, Citizenship and Immigration Canada): It will simply make it more difficult to revoke citizenship. It will move us a bit closer toward a criminal law setting where the mens rea element is a requisite to proving the offence. So it puts an additional burden upon the government to take citizenship away from someone who has acquired the status.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Could this be appealed to the courts then? What would the requirements be on the department in dealing with someone who claimed they just didn't know...they didn't intentionally conceal? Could we end up with a lot more trips to court here?

Mr. Eric Stevens: Since it would make it more difficult to prove our case, we might end up with fewer trips to court.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Are you saying it would make so much difference that you would have to pretty much accept the word of the person involved when they said they just didn't know and they didn't mean to conceal?

Mr. Eric Stevens: That wouldn't be the case. If a person who was clearly prohibited from acquiring citizenship made a representation to the effect that they had no prohibition, that would be a false representation. We would, in all likelihood, take that person to court and try to take away citizenship. We would ask the court to draw an inference from the actions as to what the intent must have been.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Would you have to take them to court without the amendment, under the clause the way it is in the proposed legislation?

Mr. Eric Stevens: Yes, we would. The way the revocation scheme works, we let the person know their citizenship may be revoked. They have the opportunity to request the matter be referred to the federal court for a finding of fact, as to whether or not it was acquired by false representation, fraud, or the concealment of material circumstances.

Mr. Leon Benoit: So you're saying if it is appealed to the federal court...I don't understand what you're saying there.

Mr. Eric Stevens: It's simply that in a case involving revocation, the individual always has the right to say “You have the situation wrong. I want to go to federal court and have the court determine the matter factually.”

Mr. Leon Benoit: What new onus would it put on the court to prove, in a case like the one you are referring to? How would it be judged?

Mr. Eric Stevens: The test is balance of probability. We would simply have to go into court and show that the person not only failed to reveal something to us, but they intended to not reveal it. We would presumably ask the court to draw an inference from the facts of the case that the intent must have been there, but it would leave more room for a person to say they didn't intend to do that.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Would an appeal be allowed beyond the federal court in this clause?

Mr. Eric Stevens: No.

Mr. Leon Benoit: It wouldn't be allowed under any circumstance.

Mr. Eric Stevens: There would be a finding of fact by the trial division. Then a determination as to whether revocation should follow would be made by the governor in council.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Okay. Thank you.

The Chair: Okay.

Is proposed paragraph 16(1)(b) almost the same thing—just inserting the word “knowingly”, Mr. Telegdi? There's no need for further explanation.

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: That's correct.

The next part is to delete lines 16 to 19.

The Chair: That's proposed subsection 16(4).

Proceed, Mr. Telegdi.

Is there any discussion on the deletion of lines 16 to 19 on page 7?

Mr. Leon Benoit: I want to have a look at it.

• 1850

The Chair: Subclause 16(4) is now being deleted, as proposed.

Mr. Leon Benoit: This seems to be a fairly substantial change. I'm just wondering why there is this pretty dramatic change in position on the part of the government here.

Mr. John McKay: This is a response to the evidence of the African Canadian Legal Clinic, the Inter-Church Committee for Refugees, and the Canadian Bar Association, etc. So I congratulate the government for responding—

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: What a good government.

Mr. John McKay: I just want to deal with the B'Nai Brith's position here and question whether by inserting “knowingly” in any of this it will have any impact on the rules of evidence with respect to how a governor in council revocation occurs. In effect, is there any change in the rules of evidence by inserting this?

The Chair: Mr. Stevens.

Mr. Eric Stevens: The rules of evidence would be the same. The Canada Evidence Act would still apply in federal court proceedings.

Mr. John McKay: Okay.

The Chair: Thank you.

Are there any further inquiries on clause 16?

(Amendment agreed to)

(Clause 16 as amended agreed to on division)

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Mr. Chair, on a point of procedure that might help us move along, although we do seem to be moving, it seems to me, with all respect to you, sir, that when you ask whether it is carried and everyone says “carried” and no one says “contrary”, you don't need to take a vote. Once it's carried, it's carried.

On a couple of occasions I have noticed that's happened and you've looked over and asked them.... I mean if they're paying attention they're going to say no when you ask the question. So we're almost double-voting on everything.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Just on that, Mr. Chair, I've been saying “on division”. Is that being recorded? Are you saying it to all these clauses?

The Clerk of the Committee: With all these clauses, it's on division.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: My point is to just call the vote once.

The Chair: I take the submission of Mr. Mahoney. The chair just wanted to be sure the opposition was given the certainty of response. Now that it has been proposed by Mr. Mahoney, we can pay attention to that and it will facilitate our process.

(On clause 17—Notice of decision)

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: I hope everybody has the amendment.

The Chair: Yes, we have the amendment.

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: That's on “knowingly concealing material circumstances”.

The Chair: I suppose that's in consequence of the previous amendments.

Mr. Leon Benoit: I don't have the amendment in front of me.

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: It's on the same page as clause 16. Go back to the amendment on clause 16 where it deals with it in parts (a) and (b).

The Chair: Have you found it, Mr. Benoit?

Mr. Leon Benoit: Yes.

The Chair: I'll give you a few seconds. Are there any inquiries?

Mr. Leon Benoit: I have a question on clause 17. Where is the amendment?

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: We're basically just inserting the—

The Chair: Excuse me, Mr. Telegdi, please.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: It's the last line in proposed paragraph 17(1)(b).

Mr. Leon Benoit: Okay. They don't refer to proposed paragraph 17(1)(b), only proposed paragraph 17(1)(a). I have some questions.

The Chair: So it's not on proposed paragraph 17(1)(b) then.

Mr. Leon Benoit: No.

The Chair: This amendment is on proposed paragraph 17(1)(b).

Mr. Leon Benoit: Yes. We should probably deal with the discussion on proposed paragraph 17(1)(a) first.

(Amendment agreed to on division)

The Chair: Now we'll proceed to the amended section.

Mr. Leon Benoit: I have some questions.

The Chair: Mr. Benoit and then Mr. Ménard.

• 1855

Mr. Leon Benoit: On paragraph 17(1)(a), the notice of decision, it reads:

the person does not, within 30 days after the sending of the notice, request the Minister to refer the matter to the Federal Court—Trial Division;

Now in regard to this 30 days after sending the notice, is there no requirement, then, that the person has received the notice?

The Chair: Mr. Sabourin, would you like to reply to that?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: Mr. Chairman, although there isn't a requirement in the legislation that the minister must be satisfied the person has received the notice, there is an obligation of fairness pursuant to rules of natural justice that the minister should satisfy herself that a notice has been received. The reason it's not explicitly stated in the legislation is to make sure we are not faced with a person who constantly tries to evade notice, so if we've taken all reasonable steps to serve the person, including hiring process servers who have made repeated attempts to find the person and personally serve the notice, we can still proceed by telling the court we did everything that can reasonably be done.

Mr. Leon Benoit: I think you'll find that some of the government members will probably oppose this, because they don't think it's wise to try to go after the exceptions and to cover that ground. They've expressed that before on a few occasions. That's the issue. So you think that's really covered, then, under common law—natural justice.

Mr. Norman Sabourin: I do, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Ms. Augustine has the floor.

Ms. Jean Augustine: Mr. Chairman, on a point of clarification in terms of the remarks and the positions that were taken earlier to which Mr. Benoit keeps alluding, no one, I think—neither Madam Folco nor myself—was saying anything about neglect. We were talking in the general principle way. I think the remarks being thrown from the members across there are a bit unfair, because we did not say what you assumed we said.

The Chair: Okay. That's well noted and observed. I think we can proceed to clause 17 as amended.

(Clause 17 as amended agreed to on division)

(On clause 18—Annulment order)

The Chair: I understand there's a government amendment on clause 18.

Mr. Ménard, let's get the amendment and then—

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: Basically, monsieur le président, it's about informing persons about an annulment and making an order under subsection (1). It reads that:

On making an order under subsection (1), the Minister shall inform the person who is the subject of the order that the order has been made and advise them of their right to apply for judicial review under section 18.1 of the Federal Court Act.

Basically, it provides for the minister to inform the person subject to an annulment order of their right to apply for judicial review.

The Chair: You've heard the amendment.

Mr. Ménard.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: I would like to understand the general meaning of the scope of this provision of the Act. Could the minister invoke this provision to revoke, within five years, the citizenship of a war criminal who entered Canadian territory?

Some witnesses whom we heard were concerned about that fact that these provisions could also apply to children. They feared that there would be an automatic citizenship revocation process that also affected children, but in the wording you've provided, I see no reference to that. Perhaps I'm on the wrong clause, but I would appreciate it if you could clarify that point.

Mr. Norman Sabourin: I could provide you with some explanations to attempt to clarify the scope of clause 28.

• 1900

First of all, this a power of cancellation. We declare that a person did not really acquire citizenship in objective circumstances because he or she was subject to a criminal prohibition or had used a false identity. Since we're stating that citizenship was never granted, the effects of this revocation of citizenship applies to children, be they natural or adopted. The interventions you heard before your committee are accurate; a child who obtains citizenship through the parents' status would also lose it.

Mr. Réal Ménard: Don't you think that this is somewhat excessive and that we should be concerned about it? Of course, you might answer that since citizenship can be transmitted by affiliation, the reverse must also be true. But the representations we heard regarding the human case and the human interest do seem to merit some serious consideration.

Mr. Norman Sabourin: I believe that the amendment that the committee has just made to clause 16 in order to exclude children from the scope of a revocation order addresses this concern. Within the framework of the cancellation power, we must remember that from a legal standpoint, it could be said that the minister did not, at the outset, have the authority necessary to grant citizenship to this person since the legal prohibitions were clear. If the person used a false identity, it's even worse because the Minister has then granted citizenship to a person whose identity was fictional, a person she didn't even know. If the minister does not have the power to grant citizenship at the outset, all we're doing is declaring that it had no effect at the outset and therefore there should not have been secondary effects for the children.

Mr. Réal Ménard: The logic is flawless. It's quite clear that if one has never obtained citizenship for oneself, one cannot obtain it by descendance, but still, this could lead to very severe hardship for the children concerned, from a humanitarian standpoint.

Mr. Norman Sabourin: To avoid the negative potential impacts of this decision, it has first been limited to a five-year period. This power may not be exercised after five years.

Secondly, as we saw a little while ago, under clause 9 the Governor in Council may always intervene in exceptional cases if children are affected, one way or another.

Thirdly, there are all sorts of mechanisms under the Immigration Act that would allow for intervention on humanitarian grounds, on behalf of a child in compelling cases.

Mr. Réal Ménard: You are reassuring.

Mr. Norman Sabourin: Thank you.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. McKay has the floor.

Mr. John McKay: For Mr. Ménard's benefit, an annulment is a procedure of the Catholic church whereby they annul conjugal relationships.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Are you saying that I have no conjugal relations? I would like you to know that I am a much sought-after single man.

[English]

Mr. John McKay: I've never seen you quite so animated, Mr. Ménard.

[Translation]

Ms. Raymonde Folco: Mr. Ménard, quantity does not indicate quality.

[English]

The Chair: Please proceed.

Mr. John McKay: I'm assuming that on the limitation period on subclause 18(4)—which will now become subclause 18(5)—which states that: “The Minister may not make an order under subsection (1) more than five years”, that sentence just continues on to “after the day on which the citizenship was granted”. Is that correct?

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: That's correct.

Mr. John McKay: Okay. Thank you.

The Chair: Are there any more questions?

(Amendment agreed to on division)

(Clause 18 as amended agreed to on division)

(On clause 19—Resumption of citizenship)

Mr. Leon Benoit: Clause 19 deals with restoration of citizenship. Subclause 19(2) says that:

Despite subparagraph 2(2)(c)(i), a day on which an applicant for citizenship is a permanent resident residing with the applicant's spouse who is a citizen engaged, other than as a locally engaged person, for service or employment outside of Canada in or with the Canadian armed forces or the public service

• 1905

I'm wondering why this clause makes an exception “for service or employment outside of Canada in or with the Canadian armed forces or the public service of Canada”. My question is on “or the public service of Canada”. Why would that be in there as an exception?

The Chair: Mr. Fyffe or Mr. Sabourin, whoever from the panel, please.

Mr. Leon Benoit: I understand the reference to the Canadian Armed Forces completely, but my question is on the public service.

Mr. Norman Sabourin: Mr. Chairman, this provision follows a report of a royal commission in the 1970s regarding foreign service officers who represent Canada abroad. They expressed the view to the royal commission that it was very prejudicial to them to be posted abroad and then if they marry somebody who is not yet a citizen but wants to become a citizen, that person could never meet the residence requirement if they're posted abroad for long periods of time.

Mr. Leon Benoit: But isn't that argument exactly the same for a lot of business people who carry on business abroad? Why should a civil servant be given treatment that an ex-citizen or an aspiring citizen would not be given? It seems inequitable.

The Chair: Ms. Atkinson.

Ms. Joan Atkinson (Director General, Selection Branch, Citizenship and Immigration Canada): Mr. Chairman, thank you. If I could jump in here, with regard to the royal commission Mr. Sabourin is referring to, the issue there involved individuals who are employed by the Government of Canada in the armed forces or with the public service and whose terms and conditions state that employment must be rotational, that is, they agree as part of the terms of that employment that they will reside abroad for a considerable period of their career. Those individuals may marry or enter into conjugal relationships with individuals who are not Canadian citizens, and those individuals have to go through an immigration process and get permanent resident status. But they're accompanying an individual who, due to the terms of their employment, does not reside in Canada for long enough periods of time in any given home posting that the spouse or the partner is able to gather sufficient days to meet the residence requirement. This particular provision allows for the exception in order to allow those individual families to have access to Canadian citizenship.

Mr. Leon Benoit: But why the different treatment? It seems as if there's inequitable treatment between someone who works in the civil service and has terms of employment whereby they are rotated out of the country and those working for a private sector business that operates on the same or similar terms. Why the different treatment?

Ms. Raymonde Folco: Mr. Chairman, could I be allowed to provide an answer to Mr. Benoit.

Mr. Leon Benoit: You'll have to wait for the chair to.... If I could just get an answer to that, please.

Ms. Raymonde Folco: Let me just say what my answer is, Mr. Benoit.

Mr. Leon Benoit: I'm actually asking the question of the officials, Madam Folco. If you want to throw something in later, I'd certainly welcome that.

The Chair: After Mr. Benoit's exchange, I will call on Ms. Folco.

Ms. Atkinson, please.

Ms. Joan Atkinson: The only thing I would add here is that a business immigrant who comes to Canada and gains permanent residence and who has business outside of Canada is in a different situation from a Canadian citizen who enters into a career in the foreign service or as a member of the armed forces and marries a person who is not a Canadian citizen. This is to protect the interests of those families to make sure those spouses or conjugal partners have access to Canadian citizenship. So it's a different situation altogether.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Are you saying that exact same situation or a situation so similar that you couldn't really describe a difference doesn't exist in the private sector?

Ms. Joan Atkinson: What I'm saying is it would be very difficult for the Government of Canada and the armed forces to recruit individuals to serve Canadians and Canada abroad if they were not able to offer these kinds of exemptions to the families of those public servants who serve Canada abroad.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Could it not also be difficult for people running a private business in exactly the same way?

• 1910

Ms. Joan Atkinson: It's in the public interest to ensure that we are able to recruit individuals to serve Canada abroad in the foreign service and the armed forces. It's a different situation, as I said, for private individuals.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Is it not also in the public interest of Canada to allow companies to operate under similar circumstances? It seems self-serving in a way, if you'll forgive me, to have different terms for people in the private sector operating under similar terms of employment. It just seems inequitable.

The Chair: Have you exhausted your answers?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: Yes.

The Chair: Ms. Folco.

Ms. Raymonde Folco: Let me put it another way, Mr. Benoit. This is the way I see it, and I think I share this view with a great many people who work in the public service. The public service is called the Public Service of Canada. In other words, people who work in this public service work in the service of Canada. There is a difference in our way of life, I think, with regard to people who work in the public service as opposed to people who work in business. It's not that one is better than the other or that one is worse than the other. It's simply that people who work in the government are deemed to be at the service of the Canadian population. Therefore, if you follow that logic, it is not fair to them that by working on behalf of the government and the Canadian population they themselves or a member of their family should be in some way handicapped because of this service to Canada. There's a difference between that and a business person who is not a citizen of Canada and who wishes to go and carry out business elsewhere. He's free to do so, but he's not in the service of Canada. In fact, he's in the service of his own self to try to make a living for his family. But it's not the same thing.

The Chair: We have exhausted the debate on this one. Shall clause 19 carry?

An hon. member: No, opposed.

The Chair: Okay. Is it carried on division?

Mr. John Bryden: Mr. Chairman, I've listened very carefully to the remarks of my colleague across the way, and I would like to postpone for a day or so the vote on this particular clause, if that's okay.

Ms. Raymonde Folco: I'd like to ask the reason for this.

The Chair: I shall follow procedure. Shall clause 19 stand? By “stand” I mean deferred.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Mr. Chairman, apart from the difference of opinion, are we standing the review of clause 19 because we have to wait for further information?

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Bryden.

Mr. John Bryden: Yes. I have to be candid here. I think there's room for improvement in this particular clause, and I'd like to negotiate with my colleagues a little bit on this. I don't have the opportunity, so I have to ask the members opposite if they would allow the clause to stand. I will make my representations and—

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Mr. Bryden, are you, as a member of the government majority, planning to establish a parallel between someone who works in the public service and someone who works in the private sector?

[English]

Mr. John Bryden: No, nothing like that. Mr. Chairman, to you, I just feel that this clause isn't complete as written. As a person who's very interested in words, as some of us are here, I think there's an opportunity to improve it. But my difficulty is that I don't really think I can just—

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: That's fine.

[English]

Mr. John Bryden: I have to at least give my colleagues the courtesy of sharing my thoughts. This goes back to Mr. Benoit's comment that this bill is moving through fairly quickly and we have to do some things on the fly. If we could have the clause stand until tomorrow, that would be helpful to me.

The Chair: I cannot say until tomorrow. Shall the clause stand?

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: I agree that we stand reviewing this clause if we feel that it can be improved.

[English]

The Chair: Is it carried on division? Ms. Folco.

Ms. Raymonde Folco: I'm against the clause standing.

• 1915

The Chair: So you're against it standing. Okay. Shall the clause stand?

(Clause 19 allowed to stand on division)

(On clause 20—Citizenship for certain women)

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: In light of his expertise, could Mr. Sabourin explain to me the substance of clause 20? Its meaning is still not clear to me.

Mr. Norman Sabourin: Clause 20 is aimed at women who lost their British citizenship prior to 1947 because they married a person who was not a British subject. As such, they lost their automatic right to acquire Canadian citizenship on January 1, 1947. This provision in the bill is consistent with a clause in the current legislation which allows these women to advise the minister of their wish to have their Canadian citizenship restored. The process would now be automatic.

Mr. Réal Ménard: Canadian citizenship legislation was first enacted in 1947. Correct?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: Correct.

Mr. Réal Ménard: Cases like these are extremely rare. However, I suppose the legislator must allow for every possible situation.

Mr. Norman Sabourin: YouÂre right. Such cases are extremely rare. In fact, I think 1998 was the first year in a long time that no written notices were received by the Minister.

Mr. Réal Ménard: This provision simplifies things then.

Mr. Norman Sabourin: ThatÂs right.

[English]

(Clause 20 agreed to on division)

(On clause 21—Report of Minister)

The Chair: Mr. Benoit.

Mr. Leon Benoit: I don't think this has been answered before today. The question in clause 21 of “in the public interest”, and how that's defined—can I have some explanation of “in the public interest”, what that means in this clause?

The Chair: Mr. Sabourin, definition of “public interest”.

Mr. Norman Sabourin: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There is no definition of public interest that exists in the legislation. However, it is a concept that has been covered by the courts from time to time. In terms of the interpretation it would receive under this legislation, I would give similar comments to those I made for section 9. It is up to the governor in council to decide what “public interest” means.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Oh, we did deal with it in clause 9? We dealt with that “public interest” in 9? The same phrase?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: No, I'm sorry. I didn't want to confuse the issue. In clause 9 we spoke of different words, “special and unusual hardship”. But the same logic applies, that it's a governor in council prerogative to determine the meaning of those words. So the same reasoning applies in clause 21, that the governor in council can determine what the words “public interest” signify.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Could I have a few examples of cases to demonstrate how “in the public interest” has been defined in the past under this legislation?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: This is a new power, so it doesn't exist in current legislation. But one example that comes to mind that Mr. Fyffe alluded to in earlier testimony would be somebody who, for example, has been repeatedly found guilty of promoting hate-mongering under, for example, human rights legislation, but whose case doesn't fall neatly within the defined prohibitions of the legislation. If the situation is so abhorrent that it would devalue Canadian citizenship for that person to become a citizen, we can see governor in council intervening to declare that the person should be prohibited regardless of the other provisions of the legislation.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Isn't that providing an unusual level of discretion to the minister, a really unusual level of discretion?

• 1920

Mr. Norman Sabourin: I would say that it is in a way nothing more than the counterpart to clause 9. If the governor in council can exercise wide discretion in directing a grant of citizenship to somebody who doesn't fall into the general provisions of the legislation, then the counterpart of this power is for the governor in council to say this person should not get citizenship.

Mr. Leon Benoit: You know, I just have a real concern with that level of discretion going to the minister. I understand in some parts of this legislation the minister needs discretion, and I've acknowledged that, but this just seems to be a highly unusual amount of power vested in the minister.

Mr. Greg Fyffe: Mr. Benoit, through the chair, this is a power that is only contemplated as being used extremely rarely. It would be used against persons to whom the granting of citizenship would call citizenship into disrepute. It's not one of those instances where the fact that it's governor in council effectively means it's with the minister. It's the kind of decision that would in fact be considered in depth by a cabinet, and it would be cases with I think a fairly high profile and where most Canadians would agree with the decision. It is not something that would be used with any frequency, but the principle is that there should be the ability to override the normal provisions in extremely exceptional circumstances.

Mr. Leon Benoit: What would the fallback be for citizens if they perceive that the cabinet had overstepped any reasonable bounds? What could a group or the general public do to counter that?

Mr. Greg Fyffe: The prohibition would only last for five years. It would be the citizenship that would be revoked. The person would in most cases still be in the country. This could deal, for example, with modern war criminals, with very serious criminals, with people who are obviously spreading hate connected, for example, with Holocaust denial and that sort of thing. It's at that level the provision is envisaged.

The Chair: Mr. Fyffe, are we speaking about revocation or refusal to grant citizenship?

Mr. Greg Fyffe: I'm sorry, yes, this is refusal to grant—

The Chair: This is refusal. The person is not yet a citizen.

Mr. Greg Fyffe: That's right.

The Chair: Mr. Telegdi.

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: Mr. Chair, I think another case could be if the government has very good reasons to believe that somebody could be involved in organized crime but we cannot as such prove it in court at this point in time, it would be contrary to the public interest to allow that person to get citizenship.

The Chair: Are you telling me, Mr. Telegdi, that on an allegation of an offence he should be—

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: No, we'd have to have some very strong indications, though.

The Chair: But there is a fundamental principle of the Canadian judicial system: one accused before a court of law is presumed innocent unless proven guilty.

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: That's true in the States. I don't think it's true in Canada. You're watching too many television programs.

The Chair: Mr. Ménard.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Am I mistaken in saying that this is one of the recommendations of the Deschênes Commission, and that the Jewish community made many representations along those lines? We are talking about people who have been linked to crimes against humanity and genocide, not to people who have committed simple criminal offences linked to organized crime. We are referring to an exceptional situation where people have committed extremely serious offences. This has nothing to do with organized crime since, in any case, before citizenship is granted, there is a security investigation, and persons who have already been sentenced for criminal offences are excluded.

Mr. Norman Sabourin: That's quite correct, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Réal Ménard: When I was studying law, I was most interested in criminal law. There were no classes on citizenship at that time.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. McKay.

Mr. John McKay: We heard a lot of testimony on this. We had the African Canadian Legal Clinic, who weren't happy with public interest, not being fair; the Inter-Church Committee for Refugees, ill-defined public interest; the Canadian civil liberties were against it; Jane Reble was against it; the Metro Toronto Chinese and Southeast Asian Legal Clinic, arbitrary and secretive; National Council of Canadian Filipino Associations, minister's power, limited rights of appeal, etc. I mean, it's quite a line-up of groups that oppose this submission on your part.

• 1925

Just so I understand the process, this is a person who has applied for citizenship, and in all other circumstances would be granted citizenship, and the minister at the last point makes a decision that this person...or makes a recommendation to the governor in council that this person not be granted citizenship and says so in a report 30 days after?

I suppose my question to you is this. On the justice committee we hear of charter-proofing almost continuously. One member considers it charter constipation. I would be interested in knowing whether you've done a charter analysis of this clause.

Mr. Norman Sabourin: Well, Mr. Chairman, as for each and every provision of this bill, there has been a charter analysis, and the bill is presented and was tabled in Parliament with the consent of and on the advice received from the Minister of Justice on the bill.

There's no question that this provision, like perhaps several other provisions, will be the subject of court challenges. What we can do is try to predict and protect against successful challenges. But the advice we have received to date is that we can withstand such a challenge.

Mr. John McKay: So your feeling is that the absence of a forum for an individual to respond to the minister's concerns will withstand a charter challenge, and the absence of any clear guidance as to what constitutes public interest will withstand a charter challenge?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: I believe they certainly will, to the extent that the minister and the governor in council follow rules of natural justice in coming to their decisions regarding the individual, and also give the individual an opportunity to be heard, making representations in writing, as is provided for in this section. With these provisos, yes, I believe the provision will withstand the challenge.

The Chair: Mr. Sabourin, just to follow that question, subclause 22(3) says the order is final despite any other act of Parliament and is not subject to appeal or review by any court. Who will determine that natural justice and fairness were followed, in the ultimate analysis?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: Well, Mr. Chairman, the courts have clearly said that even in the presence of a privitive clause or even in the presence of clauses such as the one before us, it doesn't allow a decision-making body, even the governor in council, not to follow rules of natural justice. So even though there's a privitive clause in the provision, it still forces the minister and the governor in council to follow rules of natural justice in advising the person and making sure representations are heard before reaching a decision. And each and every step of that process is subject to judicial review by the courts.

What is not subject to being reopened is the order once it is made. If it has been made in accordance with all those rules of natural justice, then that order will stand and cannot be attacked.

The Chair: So you're telling the committee that during this process of the 30-day period, before the order is made final by the order in council, the applicant can appeal the case to any court of law on the basis of denial of natural justice?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: What I'm suggesting is that the actions taken by the minister in making the report are all subject to judicial review by the federal court, and if the person alleges some violation of a rule of natural justice, then of course the federal court will intervene and force the minister to comply with those principles of natural justice.

The Chair: Mr. Bryden and then Mr. Mahoney.

• 1930

Mr. John Bryden: In contemplating this clause, did you consider using the word “Canada” instead of “public”; instead of saying “not in the public interest”, saying “that is not in Canada's interest”? It seems to me “Canada's interest” would be much more narrowly aimed at what you're trying to accomplish here. Was that ever considered?

The Chair: Mr. Sabourin.

Mr. Norman Sabourin: It was not considered. I cannot think of an objection as a matter of principle just thinking about it, but I think the reason the words “public interest” were chosen is because they do carry a certain connotation that has been interpreted from time to time by the courts.

Mr. John Bryden: The reason I raise the point is that this bill is about citizenship and it's about the relationship of the state to the people who would like to become members of the state. I would have thought it would be more appropriate to narrow down the state's concerns rather than the pubic interest. When you use public interest, “public” is a term that could apply beyond our borders, for example, whereas “Canada's interest” could apply certainly to war crimes or all kinds of other things. It's probably a little late in the game to raise this point, but I wonder if it ought to have been contemplated.

The Chair: Any further comment or response?

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Clause 23 of the bill refers specifically to national security, and this comes back to what you were saying.

[English]

The Chair: Before we go to that, Mr. Mahoney.

Mr. Benoit, last one.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Could we get an answer to that one.

The Chair: To that question? Would you like to answer, comment, or add on?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: I don't have any further comment. As I said, I don't see an objection in principle to it.

The Chair: Mr. Bryden again.

Mr. John Bryden: Maybe if I could, I would put a suggestion on the table that perhaps we could let the clause stand for 24 hours while the officials consider the implications of what I'm suggesting here. I only put it forward because, as Mr. Ménard said, it's elsewhere in the bill, and it's a little bit more closely focused on what we should be concerned about. But I'm not a lawyer or a specialist in international law.

The Chair: Mr. Ménard.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: You should never be disappointed because you are not a lawyer. It seems to me that clause 23 already refers to national security, and this seems to meet what Mr. Bryden was saying.

[English]

The Chair: The chair would like to say, if I may, since I'm not a lawyer, that there is a difference between national interest, security interest, and public interest, from my understanding.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: I think that there is a great difference because national security exists in criminal law and in international law. There is case law. This is a normal provision. Public safety or public interest are broader issues.

[English]

The Chair: Are you still requesting that we stand the clause, Mr. Bryden, or are you satisfied?

Mr. John Bryden: No, I would like to have the clause stand and give the officials a chance to consider the suggestion. You don't want the clause to stand?

Some hon. members: No.

Mr. John Bryden: As you wish.

(Clause 21 agreed to on division)

(On clause 22—Order of the Governor in Council)

The Chair: Mr. Ménard.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Have we reached clause 23?

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Benoit.

Mr. Leon Benoit: I'm going to have a look at this 22(3), which says:

The order is final and, despite any other Act of Parliament, is not subject to appeal or review by any court.

I'd like an explanation of why that's in there.

• 1935

The Chair: Mr. Sabourin, why is it not subject to appeal for review by any court? You explained earlier that at any time there may be a judicial review. But Mr. Benoit may have another point.

Mr. Norman Sabourin: Mr. Chairman, it was put there to emphasize the nature of the exceptional power, to emphasize that once an order is made it cannot be attacked on technical grounds on whether the order should or should not have been made. It does not change, as I explained earlier, the obligations of natural justice that are placed on both the minister and the governor in council.

Mr. Leon Benoit: So it doesn't really mean what it says then, that it's not subject to an appeal. In fact, it is subject to an appeal, even with that in there?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: No. As I explained, the order is not subject to any review or appeal. Once the order has been made, that's it. It's the process leading up to the order that is subject to review by the federal court.

Mr. Leon Benoit: I understand what you're saying now.

The Chair: As an extra dose of protection, there is clause 4, a sunset clause, to that order. Right?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: That is correct. Because it is such an exceptional power, it is limited in time to a period of five years.

(Clause 22 agreed to on division)

(On clause 23—Definitions)

The Chair: Mr. Ménard.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Perhaps you would like to make a general presentation on this article before I ask my two questions.

Ms. Raymonde Folco: We have already had comments on the presentations.

Mr. Réal Ménard: Yes, I read them, Ms. Folco.

Ms. Raymonde Folco: That's the point.

Mr. Réal Ménard: You can count on me, I've completed high school and I can read.

Ms. Raymonde Folco: But we also have to try and understand.

Mr. Réal Ménard: Ms. Folco, in a democratic institution, we ask questions when we don't understand. I believe that my questions are relevant, and, until now, I have not wasted the committee's time. I believe that my interventions represent added value. Do you agree? I believe that asking questions is part of our job as parliamentarians. If I was spouting nonsense, I would not understand the comment, but I do not believe that this is the case.

A while ago, reference was made to the principles of natural justice. Does the generic notion "principles of natural justice" automatically include a right of appeal? We know what the principles of natural justice are: the right to be heard in due time, the presence of a lawyer, the right to be informed, etc. But you are saying that is case law with respect to how this should lead to the Governor in Council, and I am tempted to think that the principles of natural justice are closely linked to the right to be heard and to always have to access to judicial review. I would like to hear your point of view on this.

Secondly, at the present time, does the RCMP conduct citizenship investigations to determine whether someone has a court record? This is not linked to CSIS, is it?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: All applications for citizenship are subject to three types of checks: immigration check, a criminal check by the RCMP and a national security check by CSIS.

Mr. Réal Ménard: Are these checks cumulative?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: Yes, that's correct.

Mr. Réal Ménard: In this case, what is the role of CSIS? Do we have any guarantees that this will be known? You have to admit that there is something secret here. If my colleague, Michel Bellehumeur, who is the Bloc Québécois Justice critic were here, he would tell you that it is extremely difficult for parliamentarians to obtain information from CSIS, even when its representatives appear before this committee. How can you assure us that the process will be transparent, and that the rights of individuals will not be violated?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: Clause 23 and the subsequent clauses dealing with national security basically repeat the process and provisions set out in the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, including that the Service reports to the Canadian Security Intelligence Review Committee. This clause repeats all of the procedural safeguards set out under the system.

• 1940

The purpose of the clause is to allow the minister to make a statement on the basis of advice provided to him by CSIS. If the minister believes that someone falls within the definitions, which, once again, are set out in the CSIS Act, he will report to the Review Committee. At this point, the usual procedures of the Review Committee come into effect. The Committee will inform the person involved, hear the information provided by CSIS, review the file, and make a decision.

If that is secretive, it is no more or less secretive than what already exists in law today. We are merely repeating the provisions that exist in the CSIS Act.

Mr. Réal Ménard: Do you believe that the principles of natural justice include a de facto right of appeal, or is this not necessarily the case?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: I do not think that it includes the right of appeal. The principles of equity and justice include, rather, the right to be heard. It is primarily the right to be heard and to be heard before an impartial person.

Mr. Réal Ménard: And in due time, because Q. v. Askov will invalidate...

Mr. Norman Sabourin: That's correct.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. McKay.

Mr. John McKay: Canada is a country that is really a nation of immigrants, and we have, in any given situation, quite a number of conflicting, almost irreconcilable views—the latest of which might be Kosovo—among certain segments of our population. Would I understand this correctly to believe that if I were a landed Serbian and I was demonstrating against the war in Kosovo and I engaged in an activity that constitutes a threat to the security of Canada, possibly a demonstration, possibly organizing funding for—

A voice: The KLA.

Mr. John McKay: —not necessarily the KLA, although of course it could work both ways—but the greater Serbian motherland, I could quite easily find myself subject to a CSIS review and have my citizenship revoked? Is that a fair analogy?

The Chair: Would you like to respond to that question, Mr. Fyffe.

Mr. Greg Fyffe: Mr. McKay, I think you've certainly raised the basic problem in the fact that there are so many different groups in Canada. I think the things you have cited you could picture as a certain escalation. To belong to a certain group and to be publicly identified with it, to participate in demonstrations and to gather money, might bring you to the attention of CSIS, but they wouldn't constitute a threat to the security of Canada. It's only if the barrier was crossed in which CSIS would see that there was an actual threat to Canada—that is, that there was a threat of violence or a breach of security within Canada—that a procedure like this would begin to come into play. Participating in a demonstration or anything like that in fact is not construed as a threat to the security of Canada.

Mr. John McKay: But we've had within our own memory people of Japanese extraction and people of German extraction who the authorities at the time thought to be threats to the security of Canada and forcibly removed from coastal areas of British Columbia. I'm not quite sure what they did with them in Ontario.

• 1945

I must admit I find this a little bit problematic, that constituting a threat to the security of Canada is a bit in the eye of the beholder. Can there be any more precise language, or can there be an easier right of the citizen to argue their position? I apologize for the vagueness of the question, but in some respects we are at a somewhat foundational level here in terms of the ability of the state to intrude into the civil liberties of the citizen and to impose on that citizen sanctions that are really quite substantial.

The Chair: Mr. Fyffe.

Mr. Greg Fyffe: The difficulty with the security cases, of course, is that it's very difficult to in fact be transparent, so you look for substitutions for procedures that are seen as fair and that give an adequate opportunity for hearing. It's always a tension within a democratic society. As Mr. Sabourin said, we're trying to copy a procedure that has worked fairly well with CSIS, and I think he wants to make a further comment on this aspect.

Mr. Norman Sabourin: What I want to say is a point I made earlier in this committee, which is that in 22 years we've had two such cases of referral to the SIRC for a declaration of a person who was a security threat. I would say in both cases they were very clear-cut cases of highly undesirable individuals.

In conclusion, I would say if we don't mirror the provisions of the CSIS Act in the Citizenship Act, we would be in the—in my view—strange situation that a person who applies for citizenship could be granted citizenship even though CSIS advises the government that the person is a threat to the security of Canada. That would be a little unusual.

The Chair: Mr. Bryden.

Mr. John Bryden: I just want to side a little bit with the officials in this instance. I'll put on my hat as a historian and somebody who has written in the field of security and intelligence. There's a huge difference between somebody who's here in Canada and stages protests, which we regard as a right, and somebody who comes to Canada and raises money, for example, for ethnic conflicts abroad, which is an analogy that was made here. I would think that if anything, this clause is rather soft on that. As we know from recent news reports, Canada has a growing problem with being seen as a place where money can be raised, laundered, and used to finance murder, rape, pillage, or whatever else in other parts of the world.

So I have a lot of sympathy for the language of this clause, because it's very difficult to walk the line of looking after your legitimate interests and being a democracy. We only hope that the Security Intelligence Review Committee does its job, because that's really where the check exists in this legislation, not in the legislation itself.

The Chair: Mr. Benoit, then Mr. Telegdi, and then we will close debate on this clause.

Mr. Leon Benoit: I think Mr. Ménard should be a little more concerned about this clause than he's demonstrated so far.

This is a very complex section. In trying to consider some possibilities of how this could be used, I think back to the time of the last referendum, when a Bloc MP called for the military to abandon Canada and come on side with Quebec if there were a yes vote. Sedition is what that was, most probably, although someone determined it wasn't—I can't even remember who, probably his government. It seems to me this could be used in a situation like that. It just lends itself ideally to a situation like that. I'd like the comments of government officials.

The Chair: Mr. Sabourin.

• 1950

Mr. Norman Sabourin: Mr. Chairman, all I can say is that the provision can only apply when CSIS advises that a person is a threat to Canada's security and the Security Intelligence Review Committee, hearing all the evidence, agrees that that's the case.

The Chair: Mr. Telegdi.

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: Mr. Chair, I just wanted to underline the expertise of Mr. Bryden on this whole issue of security and to let members know that if they were to get his book, he'd be more than happy to autograph it. It is quite the book.

(Clause 23 agreed to on division)

(On clause 24—Appointment of retired judge)

Mr. Leon Benoit: My question in this regard is how the pay scale for this appointment would be determined.

The Chair: Mr. Sabourin.

Mr. Norman Sabourin: Mr. Chairman, clause 24 deals with the case where the Security Intelligence Review Committee would be unable to act, for example, because of bias. If it were unable to act, then the process would become paralysed. So clause 24 is a security valve that allows the appointment of a person to take the place of SIRC.

The appointment process for that person is the same process that must be followed for the appointment of members to the Security Intelligence Review Committee. That is to say, the prime minister must consult the leader of each party in the House of Commons that has 12 members or more before making a decision on whom to appoint to that position.

Mr. Leon Benoit: My question is on how much this person would be paid. Subclause 24(3) says they're entitled to receive for each day.... I have to read it:

A retired judge appointed under subsection (1) is entitled to receive, for each day on which the judge performs duties and exercises functions or powers, the remuneration that the Governor in Council fixes.

I'm just asking how that would be determined.

Mr. Norman Sabourin: Mr. Chairman, as I recall, remuneration is usually a result of tables set for the payment of moneys to retired judges when they're called upon under various statutes to perform duties. As retired judges they get paid a certain amount of money every day. My legal adviser is telling me it would be the same remuneration that a member of SIRC would receive for such a day.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Is there one standard rate of pay?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: I don't know the answer to that.

Mr. Leon Benoit: My concern is that we've recently seen a case of a Liberal MP who was defeated in the last election who received the total amount of pay in three months that an MP receives in a year. In this case it is a retired judge, but I still think we ought to know what range within which this person would fall.

The Chair: Would the panel care to comment to the question and observation? Mr. Sabourin, would you like to add anything at this point?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: I don't know this for sure, but all I can say is it is my belief that the rate to be paid to retired judges is already provided for in other statutes. But—

Mr. Leon Benoit: Is it a set rate of pay, then, or a set range?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: That is my understanding.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Thank you. That was my question.

The Chair: Mr. Ménard.

• 1955

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Mr. Chairman, will you allow me to move that we pause for 15 minutes after approving that clause?

[English]

(Clause 24 agreed to on division)

The Chair: There's a request for a break. With members' consent, we're suspended for 15 minutes.

• 1955

• 2020

The Chair: We will resume our meeting.

(Clauses 25 and 26 agreed to on division)

(On clause 27—Declaration)

The Chair: Mr. Benoit.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Along the same vein, the question is again the amount of power given to government in clause 27. It's the same. On division.

(Clause 27 agreed to on division)

(On clause 28—Ineligibility)

The Chair: The government has an amendment on clause 28. Mr. Telegdi.

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: My amendment is to replace line 16 of clause 28 with the following:

sections 8 and 20, no person shall be granted citizen-

The Chair: Do you have copies of the amendment?

Mr. Ménard.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: We are at clause 28, aren't we? The Andrews decision said that it was not possible to discriminate on the basis of citizenship. That is why section 15 of the Charter was enriched by a prohibited ground for discrimination.

Clause 28 states that no person shall be granted citizenship nor take the oath of citizenship during the three listed periods, particularly when in a penitentiary, jail or reformatory. Do you not think that this may be challenged on the grounds of being discriminatory? Is this already being done, and do you think that this clause would pass the section 15 test?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: I think, Mr. Chairman, that there is no doubt that these provisions may be subject to a challenge under section 15. These provisions already exist, and they provide criteria that make it possible to determine whether a person may be granted citizenship. The provisions of clause 28 do not aim to make a distinction between citizens and permanent residents, but rather to determine who can obtain the status of permanent resident. Persons who are prohibited, who have been found guilty of a criminal offence or who are in the other circumstances listed in clause 28 are not eligible for citizenship.

Mr. Réal Ménard: I do not believe that this clause contains the conditions to qualify for citizenship that are found earlier in the bill. The three criteria to which I refer deal with people who cannot, under very specific circumstances, take the oath and become citizens. Therefore, these are not the qualifying conditions that are listed in the previous articles of the bill.

We should recall that the government had difficulties before the courts in the case of the Royal Commission on electoral reform and on party financing. Parliament said that some categories of prisoners could not vote because voters had to be adequately informed, and this was not possible for people in maximum security institutions.

It seems to me that this may be challenged under section 15. Your guess is as good as mine and no one can confirm this with certainty. Are you certain that this provision is sound, and that no challenge is possible in the case of someone held in a penitentiary, jail or reformatory?

• 2025

Mr. Norman Sabourin: I would say that there are never iron-clad guarantees with respect to the Charter and its interpretation by the courts. However, we are in a very solid position to defend any judicial challenge.

Mr. Réal Ménard: Could we not look to the Andrews decision?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: I don't see how this could be done. Though you have raised the fact that this clause does not specifically list the criteria for obtaining citizenship that, obviously, are listed in clause 6 of the bill for naturalisation of an adult, nevertheless, there are criteria to the extent that a person cannot be granted citizenship if that person is subject to one of the prohibitions set out in this clause.

What Parliament and the committee will be doing in approving this provision is to state that to become a citizen, a person must not only meet what I would call the positive criteria, namely knowledge of the language and residency, but also must not fall within the negative requirements, namely, time spent in a penitentiary, being sentenced for a criminal offence, etc.

Mr. Réal Ménard: Or parole. At least, let's hope that's the case. The Andrews' decision involved a person who wished to practice law in British Columbia. The decision clearly stated that there should be no discrimination on the basis of citizenship or its corollary, lack of citizenship.

A person who is on parole cannot be placed in the same category as someone who is incarcerated in a penitentiary. I wondered about this, but you know that the law is a breeding ground for speculation. It's better to ask questions at this stage than later on. I'm prepared to let you set my mind at rest.

Mr. Norman Sabourin: Our counsel told me that we believe we are on a very sound footing to defend any legal challenge that may be brought on this ground. However, as you said, this is a subject of speculation.

[English]

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: We could offer a two-for-one deal—parole and citizenship.

The Chair: Mr. John McKay.

Mr. John McKay: The Canadian Bar Association raised the issue of clause 8 and clause 11. You say, despite anything in this act, other than in clause 8, no person shall be granted citizenship. So if this is why a person is prohibited from becoming a citizen, other than clause 8—

A voice: And clause 20.

Mr. John McKay: —and clause 20, why not clause 11?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: Clause 8 is excluded from the scope of the prohibitions because we're trying to put adopted children as closely as possible in the same situation as natural-born children. Natural-born children are, of course, not subject to any criminal prohibitions. If you're born to a citizen you're a citizen. It's the same idea.

As for clause 20, the motion put forward by the parliamentary secretary is on the women who lost their ability to become citizens in January 1947 as a result of their marriage to persons who were not British subjects.

Mr. John McKay: I understand that, but the question is on clause 11. The Canadian Bar Association has asked why you don't put clause 11 in as well.

Mr. Norman Sabourin: It's probably a valid question and a valid point. We would certainly be within the scope of the international convention on the reduction of statelessness if we did not make these persons subject to the criminality prohibition.

Mr. John McKay: Then should we amend our amendment?

• 2030

Mr. Greg Fyffe: I wonder, Mr. McKay, if you'd allow us to check out the implications of that and come back tomorrow. In principle, what you're saying makes sense. It appears to be something that should fall under the same principle, but there's some legal advice that goes a little the other way. We'd appreciate the opportunity to consider it in a little more depth.

Mr. John McKay: Gentlemen, that's fine. Perhaps the chair could note it, just so we don't lose track.

The Chair: So we will stand that clause and the amendment. After all, we have stood clause 11.

(Clause 28 allowed to stand)

(On clause 29—Ministerial examination for conformity)

The Chair: Mr. Benoit.

Mr. Leon Benoit: I have a question on clause 29. Under the new legislation the decision will be administrative. You're talking about the timelines. As a result, this provision seeks to ensure that applicants are dealt with expeditiously.

Under the current legislation, there is a timeline set for the judges, I believe, and it can be extended at the request of judges. Yet no such timeline is set for departmental personnel, in spite of the fact that having the department handle this should streamline the process. So I'd just like to know why there's no timeline set in that.

The Chair: Mr. Sabourin.

Mr. Norman Sabourin: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Although there is a timeline imposed on judges to make decisions under the current legislation, there's no timeline imposed on the minister for when to refer a file to a judge. So the minister could wait one year, two years, three years or four years—not that she does, of course. We're as diligent as possible. But there is no timeline on the minister for the processing of files today. The only timeline kicks in once the minister gives the file to a judge and asks for a decision.

In clause 29, we have made sure the duty on the minister to process applications as quickly as possible is clearly spelled out. We cannot put in a timeline per se because there are certain types of cases where the timeline cannot be anticipated. For example, in conducting verifications with the RCMP or with CSIS, more time might be required before a decision could be made on whether or not a person met the requirements of the legislation than would be the case in a routine application.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Then how can it be clearly spelled out?

Mr. Greg Fyffe: These and similar requirements of the government to do its job within a reasonable time tend to be covered under the performance standards under which we report to Parliament and to the Treasury Board. We try to set standards we can meet and then be publicly accountable for them.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Okay.

(Clause 29 agreed to on division)

(On clause 30—Power to reverse decision)

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Could we have a general introduction to this clause?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: Certainly. Clause 30 allows the minister to reverse a decision, if there appears to have been a material defect in the initial decision.

This power ensures that there is an internal process within the department to ensure consistently sound decision-making for the entire department, so that a quality assurance program, for example, may be used to detect possible defects in decisions. If such defects are found, the minister will have the authority to reverse the decision.

It's important to understand that this power applies only to cases where the initial decision is to refuse citizenship to an individual. It does not allow the minister to reopen an initial decision by which citizenship was granted to an individual.

• 2035

This power to reverse a decision will not only guarantee applicants a sound decision-making process, but will also assure the Federal Court, in cases where judicial review is requested, that the department took all the necessary measures to make a sound decision on the applications submitted.

Mr. Réal Ménard: So this is an administrative review process that precedes an appeal at the first level to the Federal Court.

Mr. Norman Sabourin: That's right.

Mr. Réal Ménard: Does this already exist?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: This power is not set out explicitly in the legislation at this time. It's a power that the minister has exercised, for example, with regard to the issuing of certificates. The minister believes she has this power in certain areas, but this particular provision does not exist currently; it definitely doesn't exist with regard to the granting of citizenship, because this now lies with citizenship judges.

Mr. Réal Ménard: And naturally, this is in keeping with the other powers to revoke citizenship that have been given to the minister under very specific conditions.

Mr. Norman Sabourin: That's correct, but it's also a key component because the Federal Court may conduct a judicial review of all the minister's decisions. In order to avoid recourse to the Federal Court for all decisions, especially where there has been a material defect in a decision, the minister is allowed to review the decision, which is to the applicant's advantage because only decisions to refuse citizenship may be reversed.

Mr. Réal Ménard: It's to the advantage of the person who goes to court.

Mr. Norman Sabourin: That's right.

[English]

(Clause 30 agreed to on division)

(On clause 31—Appointment, tenure, removal and renewal of office)

The Chair: Mr. Benoit.

Mr. Leon Benoit: I have a lot of questions on clause 31. I would just like to start with a general question. We've asked this before, but we didn't get very clear answers. I would like an explanation of why this position of commissioner will be retained at all. It's really not clear that there will be a function beyond a public relations function, and you'd expect that to come out of the heritage department or some other department. I just wonder if you could give me the best explanation you possibly have of why this position has remained. We've heard conflicting descriptions of what the commissioners would now do, I believe.

Mr. Greg Fyffe: As you point out, we have touched on this before. I think it's well known that there was a consideration of whether it would be appropriate not to have citizenship judges.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Excuse me, the translation doesn't seem to be working here. I can't hear either. The translation is a problem. I'm getting it on all the channels. If you could just try again, I'll see if I can hear you. I prefer it in French, if you don't mind. We're allowed two official languages here.

Mr. Greg Fyffe: I can do that, but I'll try to be clear in English.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Okay.

Mr. Greg Fyffe: There was certainly a discussion about whether it was appropriate to go to a totally administrative procedure or whether there should be some consideration of the role of judges and now commissioners. Within the government and the department we felt there was a good case for moving away from the involvement of judges directly in dockets; that, especially in current circumstances with the complexity of applications and the fact that we've gone to processing centres, this was a stage that could be done more efficiently by public servants.

However, we feel there is an aspect of citizenship, especially the attribution of citizenship, and the possibility of advice to ministers and certain kinds of appeal functions that were not appropriate for public servants and that there was a justification for another role for what had been the citizenship judges. Even for ourselves as officials, being responsible for some sort of citizenship ceremony, as much as we're proud of the role we play in Canadian society, we didn't feel that our presence in giving citizenship would really give the weight to the ceremonies and the process that was appropriate.

• 2040

Mr. Leon Benoit: But there have been several other options presented as possibilities, including elected officials, such as mayors, councillors, and so on.

Mr. Greg Fyffe: For a period of time others were used, in particular recipients of the Order of Canada.

This becomes extremely complex to organize, especially with the number of citizenship ceremonies involved. So all things considered, the decision was that we should shift the role but that the role should be kept in the act.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Why would it be any more difficult to organize using other elected officials rather than these appointed commissioners?

Mr. Greg Fyffe: It has in fact proved to be logistically quite difficult. There are a lot of citizenship ceremonies involving a lot of people, and we felt it was necessary to have a group who were familiar with the role, who knew how to handle it, who were available, and who could be scheduled long in advance. There is an expertise involved in the role set out here that is not easily duplicated by everyone—certainly many public officials but not in every instance.

Mr. Leon Benoit: What roles, as an example?

Mr. Greg Fyffe: The ability, certainly, to understand the whole citizenship process, to be able to speak about it, to be able to take the public educational role that's set out in the bill, and also to have enough expertise on the act on an ongoing basis so that some of the other functions that are referred to in terms of appeal and advice to the minister would be available.

Mr. Leon Benoit: It isn't laid out here in any way whether a commissioner would ever be asked by the minister for their opinion on issues.

Mr. Greg Fyffe: That's the intention, and I'll turn to Mr. Sabourin for further detail.

The Chair: Mr. Sabourin.

Mr. Norman Sabourin: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In terms of the duties of the commissioner, which are largely found in subclause 31(7), the key responsibility, as Mr. Fyffe has described, is to preside at citizenship ceremonies. To be very pragmatic about it—and Ms. Pressé will correct me or add to this, because she used to manage a citizenship office and judges in addition to officials to get through the business of granting citizenship—it's a day in, day out job. There's ceremony in the morning, there's ceremony in the afternoon, there are people coming, and there are people scheduled. If you have volunteers coming, whether they be public officials, eminent Canadians, Order of Canada recipients, or chancellors of universities, it's very complicated to get these people day in, day out to come on time—

Mr. Leon Benoit: Are you saying it would require a high degree of expertise?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: In terms of the expertise, I think it can be found in many people who are eminent Canadians. That's why subclause 31(6) talks about the conditions for a person to be appointed a commissioner. But in terms of the duties in subclause 31(7), in addition to presiding at ceremonies, there is the advice function in paragraph 31(7)(c), which you alluded to, and I think the process there is fairly explicit. The minister makes requests for advice on either individual applications, how to exercise discretion, or how to evaluate applicants on their knowledge of an official language and the responsibilities of citizenship, and then the commissioners must respond to those requests.

Mr. Leon Benoit: The only qualifications listed in subclause 31(6) are:

To be eligible for appointment...a person must be a citizen, have demonstrated an understanding of the values of good citizenship

—whatever that means—

and be recognized for their valuable civic contribution.

That's a fairly loose set of qualifications that are required.

The Chair: Do you want to comment on that, Mr. Sabourin?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: All I can say is that I believe the current body of citizenship judges is comprised of eminent Canadians. The vast majority are Order of Canada recipients. They've all been recognized for very active participation in their community, and we've been well served by them.

• 2045

Mr. Leon Benoit: Instead of having patronage-appointed commissioners and citizenship judges—now commissioners—why don't we go to a normal hiring process, go through a process where the qualifications are carefully checked, where much more clear qualifications are set out, where testing is done to determine qualifications?

The Chair: Mr. Sabourin.

Mr. Norman Sabourin: I would say, Mr. Chairman, that's a policy decision of the minister to propose this process.

Mr. Leon Benoit: One of my concerns is that I've had actually a couple of ex-citizenship judges talk to me about this and also some ex-IRB members, which is a different job. In the case of the IRB they actually recommended that the patronage appointments be replaced with the proper hiring process. They were told by cabinet, in no uncertain terms from the Prime Minister's Office, don't you touch those appointments; we want those there. When you hear that from a few people you wonder why you don't change that or why the government doesn't change that and replace it with a normal hiring process.

I have another question. Is there anything that would restrict current department officials from being appointed as commissioners? Is there anything that would restrict recently retired department officials from being appointed as commissioners? What are the restrictions there?

The Chair: Mr. Sabourin.

Mr. Norman Sabourin: It's certainly possible under the Public Service Employment Act to provide for a leave of absence for an individual to be appointed. There are rules that apply under public service employment for these kinds of things. It wouldn't preclude that kind of appointment.

Mr. Leon Benoit: In fact, recently there have been judges appointed who have just very recently retired, so the restrictions can't be very restrictive at all. I don't think you can call them restrictions.

Mr. Norman Sabourin: I think you're right that there aren't many restrictions in terms of the appointment. There are severe restrictions, however, in terms of the payments made to individuals. There can be no double-dipping.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Which means you can't collect a pension at the same time as you're working as a—

Mr. Norman Sabourin: That's correct. Or you can't be paid a public servant salary while you're getting paid as a citizenship commissioner.

The Chair: Mr. Bryden and then Mr. Ménard.

Mr. John Bryden: Mr. Chairman, I wanted to express for the record my disappointment that there was no consensus on this side of the table to change “citizenship commissioner” back to “citizenship judge”, which I still believe is a more dignified term and a more effective term. I can tell you that if I were a member of the opposition on this committee table, I would be moving an amendment to that effect. But as it happens, I am a government member at this table, and I know my side does not have consensus on this issue, so I cannot move an amendment. This is one of the—

Ms. Jean Augustine: You can move it, but you'll lose.

Mr. John Bryden: No, it's not that. No, no.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: He's a team player. There's no “I” in team.

Mr. John Bryden: You would lose it if you were on the opposition side. I'm a team player on this side, and I've already consulted my colleagues. But boy, I wouldn't have, shall we say, spent all that time exploring issues we've already debated when I had an opportunity to move an amendment suggesting that it be changed to citizenship judge. It's passed now. But for the record....

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: I have a few questions to ask.

As for the process associated with the citizenship commissioners, it is understandable that the bill provides that judges are not to occupy these positions, inasmuch as these are fairly routine duties. We have even heard that there are many related functions that don't necessarily make it a legal process. I too would have preferred that these positions be subject to the Public Service Employment Act, but that's not a decision on which you can comment. The following questions are perhaps more within the scope of your work.

First of all, does the wording that has been chosen to define the citizenship commissioners and their duties have legal meaning? How is one to interpret “to promote active citizenship in the community”? Do you think that this wording leaves room for Quebec's specificity to be taken into account? That is my first question.

• 2050

Mr. Norman Sabourin: In carrying out their duties, the commissioners will obviously have to reflect the wording of the Act as closely as possible. They must therefore promote citizenship in the community as best they are able. They will need to do so by taking into account the realities of Canada as a whole and giving effect to the directions of the minister to achieve the Act's overall objectives. That is why paragraph (d) is in there.

Mr. Réal Ménard: So you are telling us that the meaning attached to the duties of the citizenship commissioners—we know very well that these will be political appointments—will depend on the directions of the minister. There will be a very close connection between those two things.

Mr. Norman Sabourin: I would not go as far as to say that the one depends on the other, but there is no doubt that each provision must be interpreted in the context of the other provisions. Since the commissioners must preside over citizenship ceremonies, which is a very symbolic but also an administrative duty, as well as advise the minister at his or her request and give effect to the directions of the minister, I would say that the other provision must be interpreted in the context of this one.

Mr. Réal Ménard: All right. So it is difficult for you to assess the interdependence between the two. I imagine that you have already done what I did a couple of weeks ago, which is to read the document provided to permanent residents who are becoming Canadian citizens to help them prepare for the assessment. The description given of Quebec is no larger than that of the North West Territories. Someone from another country, who does not know Canada at all and is unable to make a judgment, could never conclude that Quebec had a specific role or was a distinct society, to use an expression with a connotation that you are aware of. Do you have the feeling that this document will be a useful guide in helping citizenship commissioners understand their role? Would you even go so far as to say that it could be a sort of platform or channel for promoting Canada?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: I would say that it is an excellent illustration of how administrative tools that have been approved by the minister will be used by the commissioners under these provisions.

We're always looking to improve the content of the guide A Look at Canada. We have incorporated a number of suggestions by the government of Quebec and the Quebec Chief Electoral Officer. Efforts are made to work with people from all provinces interested in promoting civics and citizenship in order to improve the document as much as possible so that it is a good reflection of Canada as a whole.

Mr. Réal Ménard: I will make a comment that you are not obliged to react to because it does not deal with the technical aspect of the bill. We know that you are a person of good faith, and if you are telling us that this administrative tool is representative of the types of tools that will be used by the citizenship commissioners, you see before you a worried man. If Quebec was consulted on what is written about it in A Look at Canada, I am sure that it was not very pleased. This is not the place for such a debate, but when you read this document, the specificity of Quebec is not apparent enough. But I see that as another debate.

Here is my last question. In the minds of those who drafted this legislation, was there an intention to involve Quebec more closely in promoting certain values that are both common... I will reword my question to make it clearer, since we are all getting tired. How will it be possible for Quebec to join in on this concept of citizenship commissioners? Or will it not be brought into it, given that the appointment of these people is the prerogative of ministers?

• 2055

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Sabourin, would you...?

Are you asking for an answer?

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: If the question is political in nature, I apologize, but if you felt you could give even a partial response, I would appreciate it.

Mr. Norman Sabourin: I do not believe I understood your question very well.

Mr. Réal Ménard: You were saying that you are trying to get the Chief Electoral Officer and the various governments involved in drafting this guide, which has room for improvement, as you said, to use a euphemism.

Mr. Norman Sabourin: That is true.

Mr. Réal Ménard: Regarding the legal functions of the citizenship commissioner, you said that there will be administrative tools, which the minister has the power to issue. Would there be a more specific way to get Quebec involved in that?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: All that I can say, is that we are always looking for suggestions for the guide A Look at Canada. Of course, the guide is approved by the Minister of Citizenship, but we are always very open to suggestions, including from Quebec and from organizations that are affected by these provisions, such as the Chief Electoral Officer, where the census process is concerned.

Mr. Réal Ménard: Immigration is constitutionally a shared jurisdiction, but not citizenship, is that not right?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: That is right.

[English]

Mr. Gregg Fyffe: I think one thing could be added, that the guide has a fairly limited purpose and that there are many programs for integration in Canada that are complementary. Of course, under the Canada-Québec Accord there's a fair amount of money available for integration in the province of Quebec, which the province of Quebec uses very effectively.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Yes, $96 million, but that has nothing to do with the fact that this guide is provided to permanent residents on Quebec soil who become Canadian citizens when they take their oath. The integration programs you are talking about come under the Canada-Quebec Accord and involve about 40% of immigrants to Quebec. Are you in agreement with me on that? But all these people, given their status, will ultimately pledge an oath to Canada.

Ms. Raymonde Folco: We hope so.

Mr. Réal Ménard: Do not say that, Mr. Folco; it makes me feel bad.

[English]

The Chair: I will yield the floor to Mr. Telegdi, Mr. Benoit, and then Mr. McKay.

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: I think it's important for Mr. Benoit's sake, because we went through this before, to point out that we have a shortage of judges out west, and I can tell you that our Judge Somerville—

Mr. Leon Benoit: No, I don't want an appointment.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Don't worry; it's okay. Actually, you wouldn't quality.

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: I think it's important that we understand where some of these people are.

The judge from our area, Judge Somerville, was appointed by a previous government—

Mr. Leon Benoit: Some are excellent people.

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: Let me finish.

He was an educator. He has been reappointed by this government on a couple of occasions. So it wasn't our initial appointment, but we reappointed him because he was doing a good job. But also, this is not a civil service position in the sense that you have to make a career of being a commissioner or a citizenship court judge. You do it after you have been active in the community; you have been active in a profession. Then you understand the situation, and you become active for so many years in promoting citizenship in your community—as much as possible in your community, but in the case of our citizenship court judge, he does it in B.C. as well.

But I think it's important to remember some of the witnesses we had who actually said there's a real import to be had by promoting Canadian values and how in this country different groups that might not get along in the place they came from have to get along over here. So it really can fulfil a very important function to make sure our communities and our country function well.

The Chair: We'll go to Mr. Benoit.

Mr. Leon Benoit: My comment to Mr. Telegdi is, first of all, if these people are as qualified as he said—and I know some of them are; I know some citizenship judges are very much qualified, and I also know others that have really no qualification—then why couldn't they win an honest competition rather than just be the lucky ones that are Liberal supporters or whatever—well, maybe not, but mostly that's what it is, let's not pretend—and get the patronage appointment? To me, that is degrading to the people in that position to some extent, knowing that those are the terms on which you get this. That is a genuine concern of mine.

• 2100

I guess I don't have to say any more. I've already expressed my case here.

The Chair: Two observations have been made.

Mr. McKay, do you have a question for the department's delegation?

Mr. John McKay: Subparagraph 31(7)(c)(iii) reads:

appropriate methods to evaluate citizenship applicants about their knowledge of an official language, of Canada and of the rights and the responsibilities of citizenship;

Since that is a changed idea, if you will, from being a judicial or a quasi-judicial function, is there any particular reason you didn't put in an educative function with respect to these citizenship commissioners? After all, this is a point where not only are you testing their knowledge, but is it not also an opportunity to educate the citizenship applicant simultaneously?

In some respects, if you will, you have half the equation as opposed to the entire equation. You're simply emphasizing the evaluation rather than the education and evaluation.

The Chair: Mr. Sabourin, do you have a comment to the question?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: My only comment, as I understand the question, is why aren't some of the qualifications to be an educator...? Do we want all commissioners to be educators? Is that the question?

Mr. John McKay: No. The question has nothing to do with the individual's qualification to be a citizenship commissioner; it has to do with their roles and responsibilities.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: John, doesn't subclause 33(2) do that? It says:

33.(2) In order to heighten the awareness of new citizens to the responsibilities and privileges associated with citizenship, the Citizenship Commissioner presiding...shall

Ms. Raymonde Folco: Also, paragraph 31(7)(b) seems to mean clause 32:

to promote active citizenship in the community

Indirectly, it's a training; it's an information kind of role.

The Chair: Could I ask departmental officials to respond directly to Mr. McKay's question? Hearing the comments of the members of the committee, is it within that purview that education of the applicants is envisioned to be included under paragraph 31(7)(b)?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: I think that is definitely part of the role of the commissioner in that paragraph, but it's not the only way in which the department ensures that there are tools to enable applicants to learn about citizenship, to learn language. There are lots of programs within the department to promote the acquisition of a language by newcomers to Canada. There are also citizenship promotion programs themselves to promote civic awareness for citizenship applicants, and there is also, of course, the study guide, A Look at Canada, which we discussed earlier.

Mr. John McKay: I appreciate that there's a great deal being done, but in the response, you're describing in effect what a citizenship commissioner does. Obviously evaluation is a very important role, but I wonder why we have also not said that it's important to “educate” as well as “evaluate”.

The question is simple. Did you address your mind to that, and if you did, why did you arrive at this decision as opposed to any other decision?

The Chair: Madame Pressé.

Ms. Debra Pressé (Acting Manager, Legislative Compliance Integration, Citizenship and Immigration Canada): We've certainly addressed it. We spent a lot of time discussing it and promoting active citizenship. The commissioners, the current judges, are sitting down now looking at the bill and saying, what are we going to do? They're looking forward to the opportunity to do more of that. They certainly see part of their role as educating.

• 2105

Mr. John McKay: Does it say this in the bill, that it's their responsibility to evaluate and educate?

Ms. Debra Pressé: We see that as incorporated in 31(7)(b).

Mr. John McKay: In (b)?

Ms. Debra Pressé: In 31(7)(b), to promote active citizenship. In order to be an active citizen, you must first be an educated one.

Mr. John McKay: That's a legitimate response. Thanks.

The Chair: Ms. Augustine.

Ms. Jean Augustine: I have one elementary question. In the present bill, once the quasi-judicial responsibility of the present judges is taken out of this, could you outline for me the major difference between that responsibility and the present responsibility?

The Chair: Mr. Sabourin.

Mr. Norman Sabourin: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The main difference is that currently each and every citizenship application, without fault, has to be received by the minister, processed, inquiries are made, and then it's given to a judge. The judge must make an independent decision and give it back to the minister.

Under the new proposed process, this decision-making function is going to be the responsibility of the minister. All the other functions that currently exist for the citizenship judge are largely preserved. They include presiding at citizenship ceremonies and getting involved in the community to promote citizenship, which is something judges do not have a lot of time to do right now. They will also be ensuring that there is feedback given to the department, to the minister and to officials, on what applicants need and require in order to become citizens, and whether or not the methods for evaluating whether or not they comply with the legislation are adequate methods. So those functions will all remain as they're identified in clause 31.

The Chair: Mr. Benoit, and then Mr. Ménard.

Mr. Leon Benoit: You just said that commissioners would retain most of the responsibilities the current judges have. However, they wouldn't determine eligibility for citizenship. That's done by departmental officials now.

What will the pay scale be for commissioners? What's the range, and how does it compare to the pay scale for current citizenship judges?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: The pay scale for any governor in council appointee is determined in accordance with set rules. There's going to be a review done of functions or type of job description of commissioners. Those job functions are going to be evaluated by officials in the Privy Council Office and then a pay scale is going to be set for commissioners according to that evaluation.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Would the commissioners receive less money than the judges do? For example, would people who are currently judges and become commissioners get a reduction in pay?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: I can't answer that. The evaluation will come once we've finalized. There is a working group right now looking at the functions of citizenship commissioners. That working group includes representation from the Privy Council Office to try to assess as clearly as possible all the scope of responsibilities. The review of the salary scale will only come after that.

The Chair: Mr. Ménard.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: You know, once a year, Quebec holds a Quebec citizenship week. Do you agree with me that there is such a thing as Quebec citizenship? It is possible to make a distinction, which is quite well documented in the literature, between political citizenship and legal citizenship. I do not think that we can say that there is a legal citizenship, but we can say that there is a political Quebec citizenship.

In some countries, in other federations, it is possible for certain regional components, for example Swiss cantons, to grant citizenship. Let us hope that this message is heard by Stéphane Dion.

• 2110

I make that statement, of course, with all due prudence and rigour, since you are going to say that it takes 14 years to obtain Swiss citizenship and only 2,000 people a year are allowed in. I know that you are an expert, as is Mr. Stevens, who also has a great deal of expertise in this area. In your opinion, can a claim be made that Quebec citizenship exists?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: Mr. Chairman, I believe that the member has already answered his own question in talking about the Constitution. Citizenship in Canada is indeed a responsibility of the federal government. When we talk about citizenship, we are talking about the legal status of Canadian citizens.

The constitution of Switzerland, for example, is quite different from ours. As you know, it is an extremely decentralized federation and its constitution stipulates that before a person becomes a Swiss national, he or she must first be naturalized in one the Swiss cantons.

Mr. Réal Ménard: In fact, I haven't quite answered my question. Your point of view is important to me, because I know that you have a great deal of expertise. That is why I made a point of distinguishing between legal citizenship and political citizenship. As I, like you, have taken some constitutional law courses, I know that this is an attribute of the federal government, but since we have a Quebec citizenship week, there must be such a thing as Quebec citizenship.

[English]

M. Steve Mahoney: Point of order.

Ms. Jean Augustine: That's where the problem is.

The Chair: On a point of order, Mr. Mahoney.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: We're doing clause-by-clause of a bill that is entitled the Citizenship of Canada Act. We're not discussing perceived or political or provincial or parochial citizenship that might be in the mind of any member. we're currently on clause 31, which deals with citizenship commissioners.

With respect to Mr. Ménard, I think his questions are political in nature and inappropriate to be asked of the bureaucrats who are here to deal with the clause-by-clause items in this bill.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Mr. Chairman, it's not up to...

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Ménard, can you relate it to the bill?

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Yes, just a minute. It's not up to Mr. Mahoney, who by the way was nodding off, to decide what is in order or out of order. We are fortunate enough to have a citizenship expert with us, and I just asked him...

[English]

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Mr. Chair, I ask you to rule on my point of order as to relevance to the issue.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: It's none of your business.

Mr. Chairman, may I finish? I did not interrupt Mr. Mahoney, and I would appreciate it if he could do the same. I said...

[English]

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Ask relevant questions.

The Chair: Mr. Mahoney, just a minute. Proceed.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Take a deep breath, stay calm.

[English]

Keep quiet.

[Translation]

I said, and let me say it again—

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Shut your mouth, in French, Mr.

[English]

That's what you said to me.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: No, no. I told you keep quiet, remain calm.

[English]

And “shut your mouth” is not the same expression.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Oh, “close”. Close the mouth.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Mr. Chairman...

[English]

Mr. Steve Mahoney: It's the same effect.

The Chair: You have the floor.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Mr. Chairman, I appeal to you. I don't want to intimidate or embarrass the witness. He is a citizenship expert. I asked him a question about citizenship that related to the role of the commissioners. If he doesn't want to answer the question, that's his prerogative. I would appreciate it if Mr. Mahoney would let Mr. Sabourin, who is a rather intellectually alert man, decide what questions he will answer and what questions he will not.

[English]

The Chair: The chair will allow Mr. Sabourin to comment, should he wish to.

Mr. Norman Sabourin: You're so kind, Mr. Chairman.

[Translation]

I believe I should restrict my remarks to the legal status that is recognized in the current legislation and in Bill C-63. If your questions have to do with the promotion of citizenship in its wider meaning, or on the promotion of civics and so on, which the commissioners are responsible for under Clause 31, my answer is that the commissioners will have to take account of Canadian reality overall and that they will promote citizenship throughout the country, bearing in mind the reality and the specific nature of Quebec, just as they will bear in mind the reality of Newfoundland or British Columbia.

I don't believe I can add any more on that topic.

Mr. Réal Ménard: Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the answer. Thank you.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Ménard.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Thank you.

[English]

The Chair: Before I yield the floor to Mr. McKay, and before I forget, I want to ask you, Madame Pressé, were you made aware of the testimony of Mr. Tom Denton of the Citizenship Council of Manitoba when he eloquently articulated before the committee the need for public education on citizenship? Were you aware of his submission? Did you have a chance...?

• 2115

Ms. Debra Pressé: Not his. I'm aware of Madam Rivera's, though, of the Kitchener-Waterloo Multicultural Centre.

The Chair: Then I would submit to you that you could just look into it, and then at a later date inform the committee if it is the type of approach one may want to adopt.

Ms. Debra Pressé: Assuming the group will look at all the submissions, yes.

The Chair: Mr. McKay.

Mr. John McKay: I just wanted to say for the record, Mr. Chairman, that my Canada includes the canton of Scarborough.

The Chair: That's noted in the committee record.

(Clause 31 agreed to on division)

Mr. Leon Benoit: Mr. Chair, before we go on here, I would just like to have clarified what our schedule will be tomorrow.

The Chair: Will the clerk indicate the schedule we have as of now?

The Clerk: What the committee had agreed was that we'd have a meeting tomorrow morning from 9 a.m. to noon, and then from 3.30 p.m. to 10 p.m. That was what was agreed to, and that's why I sent the notices out.

The Chair: Madam Folco, Mr. Mahoney, and then Mr. Ménard.

Ms. Raymonde Folco: On that note, Mr. Chair, I'd like to point out that you reminded everyone there would be a vote tomorrow around 5.30 p.m. or 5.40 p.m., I believe, and that this vote would last more than an hour. So I think we should take that into consideration.

There is also the fact, from what I understand, that several people who are sitting around the table now will not be available tomorrow after the vote. I would suggest very strongly that we go on until the moment of the vote, since all of us will have to be here for the vote, and that we stop at that particular point, that is at 5.30 p.m.

The Chair: Well, okay.

Mr. Mahoney.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Mr. Chairman, I think in respect of the request by Mr. Ménard that we try to finish by Question Period tomorrow, which would be 2 p.m., it seems to me we're certainly three-quarters of the way through this bill—perhaps with a few contentious issues to deal with tomorrow—and we should be able to deal with this. If we were to agree to sit from 9 a.m. until 2 p.m., through lunch—

Mr. Leon Benoit: We can't do that.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Well, can you give us an option?

Mr. Leon Benoit: It's scheduled until noon, I believe.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: I had the schedule saying from 9 a.m. until 10 p.m. tomorrow. That was the schedule that was approved.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Yes, and then from 3.30 p.m. until 10 p.m. tomorrow.

The Chair: Can you play it by ear, Mr. Benoit, Mr. McNally, and say between 12 p.m. to 2 p.m., in case...? Can he come...?

Mr. Leon Benoit: No.

The Chair: Yes, Ms. Folco.

Ms. Raymonde Folco: Mr. Benoit, if I remember correctly, at the very beginning of this meeting tonight, when I asked for the five-minute recess, you said, yes, on the condition that we study carefully the possibility of not meeting tomorrow night. So you're not available tomorrow night, is that correct?

Mr. Leon Benoit: I may or may not be as necessary. I have another appointment.

A voice: It was a ploy.

Ms. Raymonde Folco: I was ready...I mean, I took it in good faith, and as you heard, I'm ready to say let's not meet tomorrow night. It seems to me—

Mr. Leon Benoit: I'm not expressing a problem with that. I was asked to meet from noon until 2 p.m. and I said I cannot do that.

Ms. Raymonde Folco: Before that you talked about not meeting tomorrow night, so I took for granted that you didn't wish to meet tomorrow night.

Mr. Leon Benoit: I don't.

Ms. Raymonde Folco: It seems logical.

The Chair: In fairness, I think one may mention a possibility, but unless it's concluded, it is not a conclusion.

Is there any other debate on this issue?

Mr. Benoit, before I call on Mr. Mahoney, would you like clarification?

Mr. Leon Benoit: Yes, I just want some clarification of the schedule.

The Chair: That is the dilemma we have. I guess as you may know, we would like to hear the minister on the estimates and the performance report. I can reflect to you the feeling of the chair as one person in the committee. I would like a particular project to be finished so that we can go to the next agenda, and that is my plea to you. But I am at the pleasure of the membership at large.

Mr. Mahoney.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: I didn't hear what you said. Did you say we're meeting tomorrow?

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The Chair: No, no. My point is that I would like us to see the conclusion of this bill. We have an original plan. A plan that is implemented remains a plan, but there has to be a compelling reason to change that plan.

Now, my point of view, as chair, is to see the conclusion of this bill.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: When?

The Chair: By what we have agreed upon in principle, which at this point is, if you recall, Mr. Mahoney, by Thursday, I think. At least in principle, that was the general understanding the chair took, and if we can conclude as many hours...there have been requests since then for a cancellation of part of the meeting.

There are votes forthcoming, beyond our control, in the House. The plea the chair is making is about how you can accommodate each other, and you have to decide on that.

Mr. Ménard.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: When we met the last time, I told you that I wouldn't be able to attend on May the 13th after Question Period. I asked you to take that constraint into consideration. I really can't make it, otherwise I would be there, and you know that. Even so, the notice that we received, shows a meeting after Question Period. I had advised colleagues as early as last week that I would not be able to attend in the afternoon. I think that we have to work together. I can't ask one of my colleagues from the Bloc Québécois to replace me, because he is not familiar with the bill. I realize that Mr. Benoit may have a conflict. We could resume consideration once we are back from reading week.

I am willing to keep on sitting this evening, perhaps even to midnight, but you mustn't ask the impossible of people. We will have worked until 3 p.m., then until 10 p.m. If we sit tomorrow from 9 a.m. till noon, that will make three more hours. Is it urgent to pass such a large bill in two days? I think we have to look at this rush in relative terms.

If we can finish clause-by-clause tomorrow, fine, but we have to ask questions and we have to make sure we fully understand what we're doing. I would like us to keep everyone's constraints in mind, and with all due respect, I don't think it would be the end of the world if we had to work on the bill one more day once we were back from our week in the riding. The government took a week and we didn't work on it; it still can be passed before the end of the session. If I could be there tomorrow afternoon I would be. But we still are going to have three weeks.

The Chair: All right.

Mr. Réal Ménard: Is Mr. Benoit willing to work until 2 p.m. or not? Is it really impossible for us to sit from 9 a.m. until 2 p.m.?

[English]

Mr. Leon Benoit: I can, but just until noon. Then I had asked for the committee not to start meeting until 4:15 p.m., because I have an important appointment between Question Period and 4:15 p.m.

The Chair: Okay. From time to time, our schedule will not....

Madame Folco.

Ms. Raymonde Folco: Yes. Considering what's happening tomorrow afternoon, I'm going to pick up on Mr. Ménard's suggestion. I would suggest we stop talking right now about how we're going to do it, and continue. I would suggest we continue until past 10 p.m., that we go much later, and if we can get through a lot of it tonight—we've already gone a long way—and finish it tomorrow morning, it would solve the problem of both Mr. Benoit's and Mr. Ménard's absence tomorrow afternoon, because it would mean by noon tomorrow we will have finished. I would suggest we get started now.

The Chair: Okay.

Mr. Telegdi, do you have a different suggestion?

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: Basically, no. I will support what Madame Folco said. I think it would accommodate everybody.

The Chair: Okay. Shall we proceed and then see what happens? We can go on tonight past 10 p.m. and see what happens.

Mr. Leon Benoit: No. I don't agree with going past 10 p.m.

The Chair: Yes.

Ms. Jean Augustine: I just wondered if you want to check with the officials if they have child care and other kinds of arrangements made.

The Chair: Mr. Sabourin.

Mr. Norman Sabourin: Mr. Chairman, after 20 years of waiting, I'm happy to go all night.

Ms. Jean Augustine: Are you speaking for all your colleagues?

Mr. Steve Mahoney: We're not.

The Chair: Now we have just seen and heard the commitment of the civil servants.

Mr. Leon Benoit: I still haven't received any clarification on what the schedule is going to be tomorrow.

The Chair: Can we then visit that question? Can we proceed until 10 p.m., and then at that point revisit that issue? Some of the answers may be forthcoming. When we reach 10 p.m., we will have seen where we are, and I think the members would be able to intelligently respond to a particular plan.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Have we gone back to clause 6 yet?

The Chair: No, not yet. If I may suggest, let us go to where we can go up to 10 p.m. Is that okay? But I will revisit the issue before we end.

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Ms. Augustine.

Ms. Jean Augustine: I'm just asking that we proceed.

The Chair: Yes, thank you for that.

(Clause 32 agreed to on division)

(On clause 33—Ceremony)

The Chair: Mr. Bryden.

Mr. John Bryden: I have a quick remark and a question to the officials on subclause 33(3), where it says the minister may excuse a person from the requirement of taking the oath and designate another person to administer that oath and give certificates. Would that “person” apply to an elected official? In other words, could the minister designate an elected official to give that oath or give those certificates?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: Certainly the minister could designate any person to do so. The flexibility is there to accommodate any type of special arrangement.

Mr. John Bryden: Then I would like to point out for the record that Mr. Benoit's concern about having elected officials available to serve as citizenship commissioners is provided for in subclause 33(3).

The Chair: Shall clause 33 carry?

Mr. Leon Benoit: No, I asked to speak on it.

The Chair: Okay.

Mr. Leon Benoit: On subclause 33(3) I'd just like some clarification again on under what conditions the minister may excuse someone from taking the oath.

The Chair: Mr. Sabourin.

Mr. Norman Sabourin: Perhaps the best thing I can do is give an example that happens regularly. A person is terminally ill in a hospital. She is becoming a citizen along with other members of her family. It's very important for her to become a citizen. There's an urgency for her to obtain her citizenship, but there's no commissioner available to travel to the hospital, and because of timing issues and travel constraints we would designate an official, or perhaps a member of the community that she trusts, or the mayor, to go and deliver the certificate and administer the oath of citizenship.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Okay, thank you.

(Clause 33 agreed to on division)

(On clause 34—Oath—Schedule)

Mr. Leon Benoit: That's on the form of the oath?

The Chair: Mr. Telegdi.

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: Mr. Chairman, it relates to the schedule, but it relates to the oath where we're going to change the word from “defend” to “uphold”.

The Chair: It's one word.

The Clerk: It's to the schedule at the end, not to the clause.

The Chair: Shall clause 34 carry?

Mr. Leon Benoit: I thought 34—

The Chair: The clerk tells me the change is being made in the schedule. We have not reached the schedule at this point.

Mr. John McKay: No, deal with the oath when you get to the oath. Don't deal with the schedule. It's out of order.

Mr. Leon Benoit: I have a question.

The Chair: Mr. McKay has ruled you out of order. Seriously, I think it is premature at this point, Mr. Telegdi. I think we can pass judgment on clause 34 at this time. We have a decision to make on the schedule itself.

Mr. Benoit.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Yes, I'd just like clarification as to what exactly 34 does. What's it there for?

The Chair: Mr. Sabourin.

Mr. Norman Sabourin: Clause 34, Mr. Chairman, merely says that the text of the schedule is the text that must be administered for satisfying the provisions of the bill that deal with the taking of the oath.

Mr. Leon Benoit: So can you pass clause 34 and then still change the schedule?

The Chair: Mr. Sabourin.

Mr. Leon Benoit: It seems kind of an odd way of doing it.

Mr. Norman Sabourin: My understanding would be that section 34 is merely a procedural and technical section dealing with the fact that the oath must be taken in the form it has in the schedule. Whether this committee wants to debate the contents of the schedule now or later I can't advise on.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Okay.

The Chair: The chair will make the ruling that we can proceed on this, and the schedule is still subject to change.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Okay, no problem.

The Chair: Shall clause 34 carry?

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[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Can we ask questions about the oath at this stage or do we have to do that when we are considering the schedule?

[English]

The Chair: I would suggest when we go to the schedule.

(Clauses 34 to 36 inclusive agreed to on division)

(On clause 37—Cancellation of certificate)

The Chair: Mr. Benoit.

Mr. Leon Benoit: I'd just like to ask what the process might be for the minister to make that decision. Just explain it a bit here.

The Chair: Mr. Sabourin.

Mr. Norman Sabourin: It's very simple in terms of the process. The issuance of certificates can only take place for a person who is a citizen. So when there's information that comes forward that a person is not a citizen, then the minister must cancel the certificate. It's sort of a technical power, but it must be there in order for the minister to say that a certificate that is in circulation is no longer valid.

Mr. Leon Benoit: How is that done, by letter...?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: Typically it will be done by way of a letter to the person advising them of the minister's decision and the fact that the decision is based on the legal fact that the person is not a citizen and that they're requested to return the certificate to the minister. This is the same thing that currently exists under the regulatory scheme, but rather than leave it in regulations, it's been incorporated into the proposed text of the bill.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Is there any assurance that the person will have received this letter? Is it a double registered letter, something to ensure that the person actually understands that they've had their citizenship certificate cancelled?

The Chair: Mr. Sabourin.

Mr. Norman Sabourin: Usually the terms of the letter are pretty explicit because there is a duty for the minister to inform the person of the circumstances as to why the certificate is cancelled, the basis for the decision. So the letter is usually very explanatory.

Mr. Leon Benoit: My point is, is there any assurance that the person ever gets the letter?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: Well, if the person doesn't get the letter, then we're unlikely to get the certificate back.

Mr. Leon Benoit: So you ask again?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: Yes, we do, and we try to make sure we can deliver the letter.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Okay.

(Clauses 37 and 38 agreed to on division)

(On clause 39—Definition of “certificate”)

The Chair: Mr. Benoit.

Mr. Leon Benoit: I guess the good thing about clause 39 is that finally we know what the value of Canadian citizenship is.

It says here:

(3) Every person who is guilty of an offence under subsection (2) is liable

(a) on conviction on indictment, to a fine of not more than $10,000

(b) on summary conviction, to a fine not more than $1,000

Then it goes on to say that “A person is guilty of an indictable”.... Well, I just thought I'd read it for you in case you couldn't.

So under paragraph 39(4)(b), in the case of a counterfeit certificate, the maximum fine is $10,000, I believe. So we know what citizenship is worth anyway.

(Clauses 39 to 42 inclusive agreed to on division)

• 2135

(On clause 43—Regulations)

The Chair: Mr. Telegdi.

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: I have some amendments. These are just replacing paragraphs with sections.

The Chair: Okay.

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: We have the amendment out there.

The Chair: Excuse me. Your amendment is in reference to what line?

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: Line 25.

The Chair: Mr. Benoit, your amendment is referring to what line?

Mr. Leon Benoit: Line 17, for one. I'm just trying to see how many I have. Page 22, line 25; page 43, lines 17 to 23; and I've got some others too. Eighteen—this is for an English version.

Mr. Andrew Telegdi: Line 25, page 22. This is only in the English.

Ms. Raymonde Folco: The reason (b) has been taken out is because there was a discrepancy between the English and the French text. The original French text just says article 8, whereas in English it said 8(b), so it's just a matter of making those texts in both languages exactly the same.

The Chair: Okay, we will hold it in abeyance, Madam Folco, because I think Mr. Benoit has an amendment to an earlier line.

The legislative clerk is just asking for a little time.

• 2137

• 2143

The Chair: Mr. Benoit.

Mr. Leon Benoit: The first amendment is to clause 43. I move that Bill C-63 in clause 43 be amended by replacing line 38 on page 21 with the following:

parentage and evidence of residence in Canada for the purposes of paragraph 6(1)(b), and the times when those ap-

The Chair: You've heard the amendment.

Mr. Benoit.

Mr. Leon Benoit: This is to lead into the amendments I'm going to bring to proposed paragraph 43(b) and others down the road.

• 2145

The Chair: Mr. Benoit, if I may, it adds “evidence of residence in Canada for the purposes of proposed paragraph 6(1)(b), and the times when those ap-”. You were inserting that phrase after parentage.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Yes, that's right.

The Chair: So it's self-explanatory. Is there any debate on the amendment?

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: It's not very clear.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Ménard.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: It adds, “... and evidence of residence in Canada for the purposes of paragraph 6(1)(b).” What is that changing? From a legal standpoint, we must always say what it changes, otherwise we don't understand.

[English]

The Chair: Okay.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Or Mr. Sabourin.

[English]

The Chair: Is it clear now that the amendment is being—

Mr. Leon Benoit: Can we deal with this when clause 6 hasn't been dealt with yet?

The Chair: Do you want to stand the clause?

Ms. Jean Augustine: We have to set this down.

The Chair: Mr. Sabourin, before I stand it—

Mr. Norman Sabourin: If it helps the committee, Mr. Chair, on a point of clarification, as I understand what is being proposed, it is something that is already provided for in proposed paragraph 43(l) regarding the evidence to be provided for all applications, including evidence regarding proposed paragraph 6(1)(b).

Mr. Leon Benoit: Yes, there was some reason for putting it in there. I can't remember what it was right now. As we went on to the next amendment, there was some reason for putting it in there as well.

The Chair: Clause 6 has been stood.

Mr. Leon Benoit: If clause 6 has been stood, we can't deal with this one.

The Chair: Okay. Mr. Sabourin has suggested we stand clause 43. I think there will be unanimous consent to withdraw this amendment at this time until we come back to it.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Mr. Chairman, I think that Mr. Sabourin understands the meaning of the Reform Party amendments; perhaps he could explain them to us.

[English]

A voice: He was ahead of me.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: This man is a real brain.

[English]

The Chair: I have conflicting advice here from the membership.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: You don't want him to?

[English]

You don't want to discuss this amendment now?

The Chair: Suggestions have been made to stand the clause. I think it might be best to stand the whole series of amendments at this time.

An hon. member: No, not the others.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Let's stand it. Are we moving to clause 44 now?

[English]

Mr. John McKay: Submit your amendments when we bring up clause 43 again. We're standing down clause 43 because we're trying to get through some of the less contentious points of the bill. Then we will bring back clauses 6, I think 11—

Mr. John Bryden: Clause 19.

Mr. John McKay: —19 and 43, and we'll have real debate. So clause 43 would go into that pool of clauses that are stood down, along with the amendments. Then you would present your amendments when the clause is brought back up.

The Chair: Is that agreeable with everyone?

Mr. Leon Benoit: Why don't we just end the meeting for tonight then?

Some hon. members: No.

Mr. Leon Benoit: It seems at the convenience of the government we're standing these clauses down.

Mr. John McKay: We'll go to 10 o'clock and we might do a couple more clauses.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Why don't we go into my amendments on clause 43?

Mr. John Bryden: We're trying to get through—

Mr. Leon Benoit: Sorry. I'm having trouble hearing you.

The Chair: Order, please. One at a time.

Unanimous consent has not been obtained to withdraw the amendment, so we have to go with the amendment. After the amendment is adopted or defeated, we can answer the question to stand the amended or non-amended original motion.

• 2150

A suggestion was given earlier by Ms. Augustine, in a friendly way, to stand the whole thing, including precluding the presentation of amendments at this time. Since we have obtained unanimous consent to withdraw the amendment that has already been moved, the chair will rule that we have to proceed with the amendment as presented.

Mr. Leon Benoit: The amendment as presented, though, refers to another clause that has been stood down.

The Chair: So are you then agreeing to withdraw that amendment?

Mr. Leon Benoit: I can stand that amendment, but let's go on to the other ones for clause 43.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: There's some confusion. Can you tell us what amendment we're on? When there is an amendment, could the person who is moving it explain it so that we can understand what we're talking about and what we'll be voting on? Otherwise, we'll be wasting our time. What amendment would Mr. Benoit like us to discuss? How does that change the law?

We have to proceed that way, otherwise we won't understand each other.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Benoit, for greater clarity, what amendment are you proposing at this point?

Mr. Leon Benoit: It's reference number 2893. That's the amendment that replaces line 40 in clause 43 on page 21.

The Chair: Okay. Do you have a copy of that amendment?

Mr. Leon Benoit: It refers to a clause that hasn't been dealt with.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: What does that mean?

[English]

What is the general meaning of your amendment?

Mr. Leon Benoit: Is it now time for me to speak on this amendment?

The Chair: Yes, please proceed.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

First of all, I'll read the amendment. I move that Bill C-63 in clause 43 be amended by replacing line 40 on page 21 with the following:

(b) subject to alternative resolution of the House of Commons, specifying who may make an applica-

It should be “affirmative”, by the way. There's a typo. Does your copy say “affirmative resolution”?

Mr. Steve Mahoney: It says “alternative”.

Ms. Susan Baldwin (Legislative Clerk): It should be “affirmative”.

Mr. Leon Benoit: “Affirmative” is what should be in here. That's what this is all about.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Well, I have—

The Chair: One at a time, please. Address your remarks to the chair, please. Mr. Benoit, you had the floor.

Mr. Leon Benoit: The motion is to replace line 40 on page 21 with the following:

(b) subject to affirmative resolution of the House of Commons, specifying who may make an applica-

The purpose of this is to ensure that the regulation having to do with paragraph 43(b) is approved with full debate in the House of Commons so that there is a chance for some kind of accountability here on these important issues, including the issue that's covered in paragraph 43(b), which specifies who may make an application under this act on behalf of a minor.

The Chair: You have heard the amendment. Is there any debate on the amendment?

Mr. Leon Benoit: The purpose is to have the approval of Parliament, not to have this done behind closed doors by departmental officials with the approval of the minister.

The Chair: Is there any debate on the motion? Mr. Mahoney.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: I have a question for clarification. Are you suggesting that every time the application is made there has to be a debate in Parliament on that specific application?

The Chair: Mr. Benoit.

Mr. Leon Benoit: No. I'm suggesting that the regulation that goes along with these clauses referred to is approved by the House of Commons, by Parliament.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: So the governor in council may make regulations and said regulations would be subject to an affirmative resolution of the House of Commons.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Exactly.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: So if the governor in council makes a regulation, you want that regulation then debated on the floor of the House of Commons.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Exactly.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Do you mean in every case or just once?

Mr. Leon Benoit: When the initial regulation comes, it should be debated. If there's any change made, it should be debated.

• 2155

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Could I just have some understanding? Is there any precedent in government where regulations would be debated on the floor of a legislative assembly, provincial or federal, or anywhere else where that kind of situation would occur and that would require an affirmative decision before the regulations were put into practice?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: I can say a couple of things. Number one, I don't think it could be called a regulation. It would be a legislative provision. Number two, there is, as far as I understand, a parliamentary committee that deals with the review of regulations.

Mr. Leon Benoit: I'm saying that a parliamentary committee isn't enough in this case. For these it should be a review of Parliament.

Mr. Norman Sabourin: Number three, I don't understand what is so special about paragraph 43(b), which is only to clarify who can apply on behalf of a minor when it's not clear who is the custodial parent of the minor.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Then it would be no problem.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: The next one says the same thing.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Does the next one do the same thing?

The Chair: Are you done with your questioning, Mr. Mahoney?

Mr. Steve Mahoney: I'm done. I'm going to vote against it.

The Chair: Mr. Bryden.

Mr. John Bryden: I think all three amendments in this category that Mr. Benoit is proposing are all similarly flawed in that it makes no sense in legislative language that I can see. When you talk about affirmative resolutions in the House of Commons, what you're talking about is votes and bills. I haven't noticed any resolutions that we vote on in the House of Commons, unless you're referring to private members' motions or government motions. The language of these amendments is, in my view, ambiguous and flawed. I don't mean to disparage the efforts of my colleague, but—

Mr. Leon Benoit: We had legal counsel advice.

Mr. John Bryden: I think you need to get better legal counsel because they obviously don't know how Parliament works.

I would suggest that it's back to the drawing board on these, because not only can I not support them, I can't even understand them in the context of how the House of Commons works. In other words, it's as the official said; it's either legislation or it's regulation. Whatever the heck that is, it seems to be neither fish nor fowl.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Would you have a problem with Parliament approving a regulation? For example, another one that's coming up here—

Mr. John Bryden: Mr. Benoit is—

Mr. Leon Benoit: —is paragraph 43(i), which is defining a spouse. You yourself expressed—

Mr. John Bryden: Mr. Benoit, it's the language that's flawed. You've used the wrong words. Resolution is not what goes on in the House of Commons. We vote on legislation and motions. What the heck this is, I don't know. Maybe it's what you do in your caucus, but it's not something that's done in the House of Commons, as far as I've seen during my five years here.

Ms. Jean Augustine: Be nice. Be nice.

Mr. John Bryden: I'm just trying to explain the....

The Chair: Just a second now. May the chair advise the membership that there are a variety of reasons we may or may not support a particular amendment. It could be that, one, we disagree with the substance of the amendment; two, we would like to disagree with it and vote against it; or, three, we disagree because of the ambiguity of the proposed amendment. For a variety of reasons, we may vote against it. But I will leave it to your judgment. I think once debate has taken place and positions have been taken, then the conscience must decide on how to vote.

Mr. Ménard.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Mr. Chairman, may I ask a general question about the general thrust of Clause 43? Mr. Sabourin is certainly aware that several witnesses are concerned about it. This clause contains several very important concepts that will not be defined within the bill, but rather, in regulations. For example, will the basic definition of “spouse” include same sex spouses? Will it be the usual legal definition, that is to say, common repute, marriage or cohabitation? You are familiar with the criteria. Why are there so many things in this clause? Why does it cover so much ground, nearly 40 definitions that will not be subject to the close scrutiny of members of Parliament, including the definition of “spouse”?

I understand that the Reform Party is concerned about this. We shouldn't support their amendment, but even so, we must agree that a number of very important terms will be defined in regulations, not in the Act. The Canadian Bar Association, which you belong to, I'm told, expressed concern about this. For your peers, what can you tell us about this clause, which is very disturbing for legislators?

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Sabourin.

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[Translation]

Mr. Norman Sabourin: Mr. Chairman, I would say that except for the subsection that deals with the definition of “spouse,” which I won't comment on for the time being, Clause 43 deals with matters of procedure, housekeeping and accuracy for issues relating to evidence and administration of the Act. These matters cannot be easily incorporated in to the Act.

Mr. Réal Ménard: Mr. Sabourin, the bill says the following about a relationship of parent and child:

(j) defining what constitutes a relationship of parent and child for the purposes of determining entitlement to citizenship under any provision of this Act;

Then it goes on to talk about the oath.

I think you have to agree that that's not administrative.

Mr. Norman Sabourin: With respect to a relationship of parent and child, which is very substantive, once again more specific information is needed, primarily about issues relating to medical evidence to demonstrate such a relationship. We cannot contradict the Act, which mentions itself. The Act says that the child of a citizen is a citizen or that the child of a citizen is eligible for naturalization. We cannot contradict that and redefine what a child is.

As for a relationship of parent and child, the regulation makes it possible to establish what evidence is in order, for example, medical evidence, to determine that there is indeed a relationship of parent and child.

Mr. Réal Ménard: But why, in your opinion? What is the merit of that? What is the added value? In this case, what is the advantage of not defining the concept of spouse, considering the shape it must take in many other Canadian laws? There are 70 different pieces of federal legislation that contain a definition of “spouse”. Why do you think the government did not define it in this case?

Mr. Norman Sabourin: Except for the spouse issue, I must stress that even so, in my opinion this clause covers administrative and procedural concerns.

As for the spouse issue, perhaps the assistant deputy minister has some comments to make on that point.

Mr. Réal Ménard: There's a philosopher who sang the praises of fleeing difficulty, but I understand.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Fyffe.

Mr. Greg Fyffe: I think the committee has touched on this before and understands that there are a large number of acts that are touched by the question of the definition of “spouse” and that the government is looking at it with great care to try to determine a wording that could touch all pieces of legislation and be completely consistent. There's some work to be done there yet. I'm sure the government will eventually proceed, and I think there may well be a definition that would touch this act as well. It's a matter of being consistent across the board, but in relation to a number of acts in which the import of spouse is completely different, it's a question of consistent definition, but the circumstances in each act are quite radically different.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: I fully understand, and I very much appreciate the example of solidarity that is unfolding before my eyes, and which is reminiscent of some elements of my own caucus. As a matter of fact, strictly from a legal point of view, you recognize that 70 different acts in Canada contain definitions of "spouse" that are built on three elements: common repute, cohabitation and mutual support, unless I'm mistaken.

In this case, you are saying that to the best of your knowledge, the government did not define it because we must harmonize the concept of spouse with the concept found in other legislation. However, if there's no definition in the Act...

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Ménard, a point of order has been raised. I think they were asking what we're discussing. We're discussing the whole of section 43.

Ms. Raymonde Folco: Colleagues, I would really ask that we not discuss for the time being the definition of “spouse”, but that we discuss the amendments Mr. Benoit has brought in. This is what we're on, Mr. Benoit's three or four amendments, and I'd like to get back to that.

The Chair: Mr. Ménard asked permission of the chair. The chair allowed it because Mr. Benoit was trying to organize his papers there.

Are you prepared, Mr. Benoit?

Mr. Leon Benoit: In fact, no. The government side needs more explanation.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: If I can't speak, I'm going to leave.

[English]

Mr. Leon Benoit: The principle behind making these amendments was to have the scrutiny of Parliament over important issues like the definition of a “spouse”, and there were several witnesses who had expressed concern with civil servants defining “spouse” without ever having it be determined by Parliament. What this would do is in fact ensure that the definition, including what is included in the regulation, would have the scrutiny of Parliament. And, Mr. Bryden, I think you owe the legislative counsel and myself an apology—

Mr. John Bryden: I don't.

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Mr. Leon Benoit: —for saying that in fact this isn't something that's possible. I've been told that it is in order and it is possible. It's not commonly used, but it would meet the end that I intend it to meet, which is to provide the scrutiny of Parliament on these particular clauses or subclauses.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Mr. Chairman, I don't understand. I hadn't finished speaking. I get the impression that the Liberals don't like me anymore.

[English]

Mr. Leon Benoit: On a point of order, Mr. Chair.

The Chair: I am allowing debate on the motion, on the amendment itself.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: You're changing your mind.

[English]

The Chair: Yes, only because at the time, in the interest of time, I allowed you to proceed when Mr. Benoit was trying to ensure that we have the amendment in place, in fairness. Now that he is ready, and a point of order has been called to that effect, I would allow Mr. Benoit to proceed to the debate on the amendment.

Mr. Benoit.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Mr. Chair, I see that it's after 10 p.m. and I think this meeting is over.

What is quorum, Mr. Chair?

The Chair: Nine.

Mr. Leon Benoit: We no longer have quorum.

Ms. Raymonde Folco: You're being unfair.

Mr. Leon Benoit: No, the time is up. We agreed to go to 10 p.m.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: We also agreed we'd go from 9 a.m. until 10 a.m. tomorrow. We already agreed to that.

Mr. Leon Benoit: That's fine with me. We'll do what we have to do.

The Chair: Okay.

Mr. Leon Benoit: I've had it for tonight.

The Chair: In fairness, I think we made an agreement to proceed.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: We tried to accommodate him, and he doesn't want to. He wants to stall and play games.

Mr. Leon Benoit: No.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: We'll deal with the bill. We'll have our own quorum arranged and we will pass the bill. So no more Mr. Nice Guy there, my friend.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Is that the way it works?

Mr. Steve Mahoney: We tried to give you a break.

The Chair: Mr. Benoit, are you going to be able to stay for another half hour?

Mr. Leon Benoit: No, I can't do it.

The Chair: Since the quorum has been broken—

Ms. Jean Augustine: It's not broken yet.

Mr. Benoit, we're appealing to you because...[Editor's Note: Inaudible]

Mr. Leon Benoit: I'm tired. The agreed time was 10 p.m. It's very apparent that others are tired, and it's time to close it down, because there is no longer a quorum.

The Chair: The meeting is adjourned until tomorrow at 9 a.m. We will proceed until noon and then from 3.30 p.m. to 10 p.m., as agreed to.