CITI Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE LA CITOYENNETÉ ET DE L'IMMIGRATION

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Thursday, March 12, 1998

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[English]

The Chairman (Mr. Stan Dromisky (Thunder Bay—Atikokan, Lib.)): I call the meeting to order. We have a quorum for a working committee, listening to witnesses. Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), we are considering the subject matter of modern war criminals.

I'd like to thank the witnesses for appearing before us. I hope we'll be able to get enough information to have a little better understanding and be able to grasp something we can use in helping us to make and reach our conclusions.

From the Department of Citizenship and Immigration we have Georges Tsaï, assistant deputy minister of corporate services; Bill Sheppit, director general of case management branch; and John Sims, assistant deputy attorney general.

I believe, Georges, you will be introducing and making the first presentation, and then we'll switch over to Bill Sheppit for the continuation. I thank you very much. Georges, you may begin.

Mr. Georges Tsaï (Assistant Deputy Minister, Corporate Services, Department of Citizenship and Immigration): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

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[Translation]

Mr. Chairman, we are very pleased to be appearing before your committee once again. Last November, we had the pleasure of appearing before this committee to discuss the question of war crimes and modern crimes against humanity.

[English]

So the purpose of this presentation, Mr. Chair, is to provide an overview of CIC strategy for dealing with modern-day cases of persons suspected of war crimes or crimes against humanity.

In a few minutes, my colleague, Bill Sheppit, will describe how we deal with these cases. But first, with your permission, I would like to take a few minutes to provide the committee with an overview of some important aspects of the environment.

Since we are going to often use the expressions “war crimes” and “crimes against humanity”, let's first try to define these. War crimes are defined as offences against the laws of war applicable in international conflicts. As an example, carpet bombing would be covered as a war crime. Crimes against humanity can be defined as murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, persecution, or inhumane acts or commissions committed against the civilian population or an identifiable group of persons. We could cover under this definition genocide, ethnic cleansing, and other awful things.

There are essentially three tools the Government of Canada can use to deal with persons who are suspected of war crimes or crimes against humanity. We have first subsection 1.F(a) of the United Nations convention relating to the status of refugees. Under this section, which is incorporated in our own Immigration Act, we can exclude from the refugee determination process a person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that he or she has committed a war crime or a crime against humanity.

The second tool we have is paragraph 19(1)(j) of the Immigration Act. This paragraph was part of Bill C-71, adopted in 1987. It created a new inadmissible class that deals with individuals who, there are reasonable grounds to believe, have committed a war crime or a crime against humanity.

Finally, the third tool we have is paragraph 19(1)(l), adopted by Parliament in 1993 as part of Bill C-86, which created another inadmissible class. This is the paragraph that deals with individuals who are or were senior members or senior officials of a government or regime that has been designated by the Minister of Immigration as having committed gross human rights violations, war crimes, or crimes against humanity.

Since then, additional administrative initiatives have strengthened our capacity to deal with war crime cases. In 1996 a centralized national unit was established within Citizenship and Immigration Canada to monitor modern war crime cases. More recently, CIC regions have identified a coordinator to track modern-day war criminal cases, and training sessions have been held for CIC and Department of Justice officials to ensure the best procedures are utilized in the litigation.

[Translation]

This increase in effort can perhaps be partially explained by some positive results we recently obtained and which were reported in the media. However, the praise given in some of these articles must not make us lose sight of the fact that identifying individuals suspected of war crimes or crimes against humanity and, when necessary, revocation of citizenship and deportation are a tremendous challenge made all the more difficult by the present day situation in the world.

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Canada, like many other countries that are preferred destinations for those people with pasts they would prefer to be forgotten, is facing a dilemma. On the one hand, globalization prompts us to facilitate the movement of people and goods and, on the other hand, basic principles prevent us from wanting to become a haven for people who have committed atrocities that conscience if not legislation condemns.

This means that we must, along with our national and international partners, continue to work relentlessly in order to equip ourselves with the best possible tools that will enable both Canada and the international community to wage an effective fight against this modern day plague.

[English]

Back in 1987, in response to the report submitted by the Deschênes commission, the government established a no-safe-haven policy for persons suspected of war crimes or crimes against humanity, regardless of when or where the crimes were committed. This policy was reaffirmed in 1995. It is still the policy that guides our actions today.

With your permission, Mr. Chair, I would like now to invite Mr. Sheppit to continue the presentation at a more detailed level.

The Chairman: Please continue, Bill.

Mr. Bill Sheppit (Director General, Case Management Branch, Department of Citizenship and Immigration): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As Mr. Tsaï indicated, we've been devoting a great deal of attention to the issue of modern war criminals within the immigration program. We thought it might be helpful to you if we could describe what happens when they arrive and how we deal with them.

The vast majority of modern war criminals arrive in Canada as refugee claimants. Some of them have documents properly issued in their own name, some of them have documents properly issued in false names, some have improper documents using false names, and some don't have any documents at all. A very small number are issued visas by our missions overseas. We've identified three cases so far. The rest have been refugee claimants in Canada.

Without proper documentation, the first step we take is to try to identify who they are and what their nationality is. You've had discussions lately with enforcement branch and Brian Grant concerning the difficulties we have in identifying people.

On arrival, or shortly thereafter, they make refugee claims. As part of their refugee claim they complete the personal information form, or PIF form, which outlines their personal history and the reasons for their claim to refugee status. Such claimants often include government officials and military or police personnel of various regimes. They insist that their actions in their home country make it difficult for them to return to that country, and is in fact the basis for their refugee claim. They fear reprisal from the general populace, their former colleagues, or from a new government regime.

Other sources that help us identify potential war criminals are the community here, those from the same country; our security or criminal screening procedure; information received from other countries; international tribunals; new governments in the home country; or intelligence information we gather from a number of sources.

At the time of their initial contact with the department they are usually reported under the Immigration Act for a particular reason. Generally, it's lack of a visa, lack of a proper travel document, or something along those lines. We conduct an inquiry at that time, and they are issued a conditional departure notice. If they are then found to be a refugee and granted permanent resident status, this departure notice ceases to have effect. If they are found not to be a refugee, they are then allowed ninety days to leave Canada, or else the departure notice becomes a deportation notice at that time.

Our preferred solution to deal with suspected modern war criminals is to identify them at an early stage of the refugee determination process and have them excluded from refugee determination under paragraph 1.F(a) of the Geneva Convention, as Mr. Tsaï indicated earlier. We can exclude them from the refugee process. In those cases the departmental representative will intervene in the hearing to show that they fall within the excluded class. This may involve presentation of evidence based on the regime, cross-examination of the claimant, or identification and presentation of expert witnesses to provide some background on what the situation was in their home country.

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In addition to interventions, there are other measures we can take under the Immigration Act. A person who claims to be a convention refugee is not eligible to access the determination system under certain circumstances. If they've been granted refugee status in another country and return to that country, then they're not eligible to access our refugee system. If they're described in various inadmissible classes of the Immigration Act, they can be excluded from that. These classes generally relate to the classes relating to espionage, subversion, terrorism, serious criminality, or, as indicated in paragraphs 19(1)(j) and (l), war criminals or members of regimes.

As a result of changes to the Immigration Act in July of 1995, we can now exclude people from the refugee determination system at any stage of the process. Even if the refugee board has already granted them refugee status, if we have information to indicate that they are war criminals we can overturn that declaration.

We've been relatively successful in exclusion cases from before the convention refugee determination system. So far we've excluded approximately 280 to 300 people.

As our prime goal is to remove suspected war criminals from Canada, we don't really care how we go about it. In some cases, we may have the initial inadmissibility determination. For example, if they don't have a visa and there's a valid deportation order against them, we'll remove them. This accounts for some of the difficulty we have in providing statistics.

I know there was a great deal of previous testimony before this committee about the department's difficulty with statistics, but if, for example, we can remove somebody because they don't have a visa, we don't really care that we don't class them as a war criminal. Our goal is to remove them from the country.

For the most serious cases, though, we will do a report on them, conduct an inquiry, and try to make them inadmissible as a war criminal.

The result of this is that, as I said, we have difficulty with statistics. We are working on a computer system that we hope will be available by the end of this month so that we have a better handle on what we have.

The joy of dealing with these cases is that every decision along the way can be appealed under the charter. For example, the decision to exclude somebody from refugee determination can be challenged before the courts. The decision of their inadmissibility can be challenged. With the court backlogs now, it often means they spend considerable time in the country if they're appealing the decision to remove them.

Once judicial review has been granted by the Federal Court to hear their case, the department is precluded from removing them until that court decision has been made.

At that point, assuming we've won all challenges and are ready for removal, we then have to go through the removal process, which can be difficult as well. The vast majority of these people are coming from countries in the midst of upheaval. It may be politically unpopular for the new government or the current government of that country to accept these people back. It may be difficult for them to prove that they're a citizen of the country. The country's borders may have changed, as in the case of former Yugoslavia. There may be a totally new country, let alone a new government. So it can be difficult to try to remove them.

There's also the difficulty that somebody who has been granted refugee status can only be removed if they constitute a danger to the public or to the security of Canada. In the vast majority of these cases we're dealing with them on the basis of acts they've committed overseas. In most cases they haven't done anything here. They aren't a danger to the security or safety of Canadians. It's just a simple fact that we have international obligations and we don't want them to stay here.

If we can't remove them to their home country, we then look at other removal options. This includes removing them to countries they transited on their way to Canada, or looking for some other third country to remove them to. Both of those happen occasionally.

With regard to statistics, I'm sure some of you have seen the report that was issued, or leaked, to the public back in October, I believe. At the present time, we've excluded approximately 209 cases under paragraph 1.F(a) of the Geneva Convention. Another 62 cases we're working on we've identified as terrorists or modern war criminals themselves. We have another 53 cases where they are senior officials of regimes that have condoned war crimes or crimes against humanity. We've removed 80 people. So the total caseload at this point is about 404.

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As I mentioned earlier, we have difficulty in gathering statistics. What we do is twice a year we conduct an inventory. Because we don't have an overall system at this point, that basically involves a hand count of the files, digging into the files, and seeing where exactly we are with each situation. We decided early on that we would do that twice a year so we have a handle on it. We're conducting the most recent inventory now as part of getting the database ready.

We think we're making progress on the war crimes front. As Mr. Tsaï mentioned, we've been holding training sessions with departmental employees and Department of Justice employees on sharing best practices and inquiry. You'll appreciate the fact that in a lot of these cases, obtaining evidence that can stand up before the Canadian courts is extremely difficult, because of the situation that exists in those countries. They're countries in the midst of turmoil, upheaval, and government change.

We're building our database here in headquarters so our war crimes unit can assist the field in giving them information they can use. We have the new computer system coming in. As part of the departmental budget allocation process we're going through now, we're looking for incremental resources, which we hope to obtain at the beginning of the new fiscal year in April.

So that's where we are at the present time. Georges, did you want to make some—

[Translation]

Mr. Georges Tsaï: Mr. Chairman, this concludes a very general and no doubt incomplete presentation. All three of us would be happy to answer any questions that you and the committee may have. Thank you.

[English]

The Chairman: Thank you very much. We'll begin with the questioning.

Mr. Reynolds, please.

Mr. John Reynolds (West Vancouver—Sunshine Coast, Ref.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Could you advise what is the role of Neil Sher, who's the former director of the United States Office of Special Investigations, within the crime unit looking at war criminals?

Mr. Georges Tsaï: I'll let Mr. Sims answer the question more specifically, but Mr. Sher is not involved in modern-day war crimes.

Mr. John Reynolds: Not at all?

Mr. Georges Tsaï: No.

Mr. John Reynolds: Okay. That's fair.

What happens when a war criminal doesn't have any documents and you've made a decision to get rid of him? If there are no documents, how do you send him somewhere?

Mr. Bill Sheppit: What we'll do is go back to the country where we believe he comes from and look for birth documents or registration documents. Our mission abroad will try to obtain a birth certificate. We'll then present that to the country involved and say “This is our evidence that he's a citizen of your country. You have an obligation to take him back.”

Mr. John Reynolds: What if they won't?

Mr. Bill Sheppit: Then we'll lean on them in various ways. Depending on what's happened internally with the country, as I indicated, they may be very reluctant to take him back. If they won't, then we'll look at other options, including returning him to the country from whence he came to Canada or looking for a third country.

Mr. John Reynolds: Do we have any cases where that's happened, where we still have somebody here because nobody wants him?

Mr. Bill Sheppit: I would think we have some here because we haven't been able to remove them yet, but we don't accept it as a dead issue. We keep digging away at them to find some other country or to remove them, as I indicated, to a transit country.

Mr. John Reynolds: What happens if, for a person you have here, the penalty of sending him back would be death?

Mr. Bill Sheppit: There is provision for them to be reviewed. We look at the risk of return. Essentially it becomes a question of the risk of return to their home country versus the risk to Canada and/or the obligations we have under various international treaties. If returning them to their home country is not an option because it appears likely they would face the death penalty, then we would look at a third country.

Mr. John Reynolds: For instance, if Eichmann went back to Israel, they could put him to death. If he had been in Canada, you'd have to send him somewhere else.

Mr. Bill Sheppit: We'd look at a third country.

Mr. John Reynolds: So you wouldn't send anybody back who was going to face the death penalty?

Mr. Bill Sheppit: It would be a decision taken by the minister, but as I say, we would look very closely at the degree of risk they were facing.

Mr. John Reynolds: Thank you. That's fine.

The Chairman: John McKay, please.

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Mr. John McKay (Scarborough East, Lib.): In terms of modern war criminals, the issue is, how shall we say, a moving target at any given time. One of the areas in which we've actually been “recruiting” refugees is in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I was given information by a lawyer, one who should be well placed to know, that somewhere in the order of 10% of your recruited refugee claimants are in fact war criminals, and something in the order of 50% of your entrepreneurial applicants for immigration are war criminals. His point was rather graphic: if they got the money in the middle of a war situation, where do you think they got it from?

I'd be interested in your comments as to whether that is in fact somewhere close to the truth. If there is some truth in that issue, is there a systemic problem that you can analyse?

Mr. Georges Tsaï: With respect to the entrepreneurs, I would be very much interested in knowing the source of the information this person used, because I don't think we have that many people in the entrepreneur category who come from these areas.

When you say refugee claimants, you are probably referring to refugees who were selected abroad, sponsored by government—

Mr. John McKay: That would be right.

Mr. Georges Tsaï: You said 10% was accurate?

Mr. John McKay: Yes.

Mr. Georges Tsaï: We know we have to be extremely careful in dealing with these cases. Again, we are trying to reconcile two opposing elements of our policy. The first one is to be open and to admit and select refugees, and the other one is to protect the country against people who do not deserve to be here.

It is a problem, yes. One could assume that statistically, every time you accept refugees from an area of the world where you have either civil wars or international words, you may end up with some cases like that.

Mr. John McKay: We have a huge irony going on here in that we're actually recruiting our own war criminals.

Mr. Bill Sheppit: As I indicated in my presentation, so far we are aware of three cases that we accepted overseas. We're well aware of the situation in the former Yugoslavia. We work extremely closely with the international tribunal on former Yugoslavia.

We've obtained a great deal of information from Canadian government sources and other government sources relating to where atrocities were committed, what military unit was involved, who was in charge of the military unit and that type of thing. We focus very closely on people who are likely of the age or situation where it was not impossible for them to have been involved in military or quasi-military actions.

Mr. John McKay: As I got Mr. Tsaï's point, he's somewhat skeptical about the entrepreneurial war criminal element but much less skeptical about the refugee war criminal.

Mr. Bill Sheppitt: I'm sure there are some who get through— it's an imperfect system —but we're painfully aware of the fine line we need to walk between accepting people in need of protection and excluding people we don't want. I think probably there more than anywhere else we've focused very closely on very detailed screening of refugee applicants.

Mr. John McKay: Last year, or possibly this year, that was your biggest source of sponsored refugees.

Mr. Georges Tsaï: Yes.

Mr. John McKay: Do you feel you're adequately resourced? I think you're doing it out of Bonn, aren't you?

Mr. Bill Sheppitt: There are three missions that are closely involved in it— Bonn, Belgrade, and Vienna.

Mr. John McKay: Do you feel you're adequately resourced to do that?

Mr. Bill Sheppitt: Yes.

Mr. John McKay: The second question is more general. It has to do with the issue of deportation, which of course the minister has asked us to look at.

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Is it your view that war criminals are a special order of deportation, or is it the general problems of deportation that apply to all— not deportations, but removals? Sorry. I'm catching up on the language here. Does the problem of removals, which is abundantly apparent in the current system, create special issues with respect to modern-day war criminals?

Nobody wants this question.

Mr. Bill Sheppit: No, no. It's very clear that the removal difficulty is more difficult for war criminals than it is for others. As Mr. Reynolds mentioned earlier, it's not impossible that you could be attempting to remove somebody to a country where they face the strong likelihood of death, and that requires us to be much more careful.

It's also not impossible that the government of the day is much less willing to accept them because of potential embarrassment. The person has already said, “Yes, I committed these acts”, and they may be going back to a country where the government is denying that there are violations of human rights. It's a much more difficult situation than with ordinary removals.

The Chairman: Mr. Sims.

Mr. John Sims (Assistant Deputy Attorney General, Citizenship and Immigration, Department of Justice): Yes, Mr. Chair. I'm sorry I was a bit clumsy in trying to catch the attention of the clerk.

The question of Mr. McKay brings me back to a point Mr. Reynolds made a moment ago, and I just wanted to make a point of clarification, if I may.

Sir, you asked, if a war criminal were facing death at the destination to which we were removing this person, would we look for some third country. The example was Eichmann. I just wanted to bring a distinction.

Mr. Sheppit was right in the part he said: if we would be sending a person back to a country where there's chaos, where there's a chance of torture and murder, we wouldn't do it. That kind of risk is not something Canada would undertake. But if the person is being extradited to a civilized judicial system such as in the United States, which has the death penalty— and the particular example you used was the State of Israel, which has a sophisticated, civilized judicial system where they happen to have capital punishment in certain cases —that's a different situation.

It still raises difficult problems, though. In the case of Charles Ng, who was a particularly despicable American murderer and torturer some years ago, he was facing the death penalty in California, and it raised a charter issue, an important question: Would Canada do that? That issue is still not quite resolved. But I just wanted to add that one distinction between going back to murder and going—

A voice: —

[Inaudible—Editor]—

Mr. John Sims: Yes, that's so.

The Chairman: Mr. Ménard, please.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard (Hochelaga—Maisonneuve, BQ): I have four short questions. I will ask them all at once and then you can answer.

In your opinion, what has been the impact of the Supreme Court decision in the Finta case, which was that we cannot convict someone if he obeyed superiors? In your opinion, what impact has this decision had on your department's capacity to deal with the issue of war crimes?

Let's remember Canada's participation in international courts of law. Do you see this as an obstacle in that it deals with crimes to come and that, under the terms of this international court, there is no retroactivity, where one could take a position relating to crimes that are behind us?

Some groups in Canada are demanding that the process for revoking citizenship and the process for expulsion should be conducted at the same time, and not in two separate stages. I would like to know your opinion on the matter.

There are two recent cases where people lost in court. I'm referring to the Maciukas case and the Bogutin case in 1998. I've been told that your department has not done much follow-up on the matter. Could you talk to us about this?

To conclude, right now a person has his citizenship revoked because of a false statement of identity. If you were able to revoke citizenship because a person was clearly identified as a war criminal, would this not facilitate the process? I will stop here.

Mr. Georges Tsaï: Mr. Chairman, we will answer the member's questions as a team. I am sure that Mr. Sims will want to deal with questions 1 and 2. If I may, I will begin by answering question 3.

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You asked a question about possibly conducting the process to revoke citizenship and the process for removal at the same time. Indeed, this issue was discussed during the current review of the legislation. The recent report on the legislative review that was submitted to Minister Robillard contains a recommendation that deals with this issue very specifically; this is recommendation 136 or 137, or somewhere around there.

This matter will be subject to review. The minister has just ended a first round of consultations. The goal of the process now is to analyze all the comments made to date, not only oral presentations, but also everything written that was sent to the minister.

I will now give the floor to John so he can answer questions 1 and 2.

Mr. John Sims: I understood the first question bearing on the Finta decision. You're totally right. It's an important barrier preventing criminal suits here, in Canada. There were two or three elements in the Supreme Court decision from a few years ago and you mentioned the first; in other words, if you managed to prove you were following orders given by a superior, that was a defence. But two other elements of that same decision also present a problem. Minister McLellan, as did her predecessor, Mr. Rock, promised to do something to overcome those barriers.

The second element is the fact that there are two burdens of proof. First, there is the normal burden, as in any crime, as to whether the person had mens rea, when the offense was committed under the Criminal Code. Second, it must be shown that the person being prosecuted in the criminal system, at the time that person was committing the crime, knew that what was being done was a crime under international law, which is very difficult.

Before explaining the status of the case, I would like to point out that even if we were able to fill in those gaps or settle those problems with the legislation, as Mr. Sheppit was mentioning earlier there's also the fact that often, very practically speaking, it's very difficult to get the necessary proof because you have to go on site. Those things were done elsewhere, by definition, abroad, and often in a very difficult and agitated context. Even if we didn't have to deal with those obstacles, the sole fact of having to find necessary evidence would be very difficult, in principle.

There is work being done, as we speak, with a view to upholding the commitment made by those two ministers and amending the legislation in view of the Finta decision. The review of that decision was slowed down, recently, because the United Nations are doing some work in New York and the Canadian group wants to align itself with the international work being done, especially in the area of defining the content of those war crimes.

I don't know if I answered your question to your satisfaction. It is, of course, a problem. The various elements of the Supreme Court decision were entrenched in the Charter. So it's very difficult for Parliament to—

Mr. Réal Ménard: Have any of your staff come up with alternatives or undertaken analyses that could be sent to this committee?

Mr. John Sims: We certainly have analyses concerning the problems created by the decision.

Mr. Réal Ménard: Could you send them to our clerk?

Mr. John Sims: Yes.

Mr. Réal Ménard: Fine. Would it be possible for you to say something about the two cases that were lost in court in 1998 where your department seems to be hesitating in undertaking expulsion procedures?

[English]

Mr. Georges Tsaï: Mr. Chairman, I need some instructions here, because I think the member is referring to two World War II cases. We would be prepared to answer the question if you think it would be appropriate to do so, but it has nothing to do with modern-day war crimes.

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The Chairman: My understanding was that we'd be dealing with the processes and so forth regarding modern war crimes. I don't think we should be going all the way back to World War II or whatever, unless you feel the information you possess pertaining to the question that has been raised by Mr. Ménard would have some direct bearing on the major topic we are discussing.

[Translation]

Mr. John Sims: I can give you the status quickly, in 30 seconds. I didn't get the first name, but the second one was Bogutin. Would this be Maciukas?

Mr. Réal Ménard: yes, that's it.

Mr. John Sims: The Crown won the Bogutin case. It wasn't a defeat, if I understood your question.

Mr. Réal Ménard: That's true: the appellant lost and the Crown won.

Mr. John Sims: That matter must now be sent to Cabinet.

Mr. Réal Ménard: By an order of reference to the Governor in Council?

Mr. John Sims: Yes, the minister is to send it to the Governor in Council.

Mr. Réal Ménard: But why are things being delayed, finally? That's the delay the humanitarian groups don't understand. You won and there's a possibility that things will be done but they get the impression that there's undue delay.

Mr. John Sims: There is no delay; it's just a matter of getting the documents together and putting them in proper order for Cabinet.

Mr. Réal Ménard: Fine.

Mr. John Sims: Mr. Maciukas withdrew his notice of appeal submitted to the Federal Court. There again, it's a matter of sending the necessary documents to Cabinet.

Mr. Réal Ménard: Fine. As for the removal being carried out now, would it be more simple?

Mr. Georges Tsaï: Could you repeat your question?

Mr. Réal Ménard: My question has to do with the tools you have to fight against contemporary war criminals but also against Nazi war criminals because, basically, it's often the same problem although there are fewer of them. Humanitarian groups, B'nai Brith being first and foremost, say that it's rather unbelievable that there are two distinct processes. One process that can lead to revoking citizenship, that you've already mentioned, and subsequently a process that leads to expulsion. Why, as legislators, don't we see to it that you have the necessary tools to have this done up front? So I am asking you if it would be simpler and what you could expect as future results if you had those tools?

Mr. George Tsaï: I'd answer in a very general way, Mr. Chairman, that it's always simpler to proceed under a single Act rather than under two different Acts. It's always simpler for a public servant to proceed under a single Act. But there are other considerations, nonetheless, and as I said, there are considerations that will be settled within the context of the legislative review process.

Mr. Réal Ménard: At the present time, you can lose your citizenship for having made a false or misleading statement. Would it change anything in your work if it were possible to revoke someone's citizenship directly based on belonging to a group considered to be made up of war criminals? The defenders of human rights seem to say that the link is not that direct. You don't revoke citizenship directly because the person was associated with a group that was made up of war criminals; you strip someone of their citizenship because they made a false statement or gave false information.

Mr. George Tsaï: Mr. Chairman, I could try to answer that question, in part. Perhaps my colleagues will also want to contribute. It is clear that it is sometimes difficult to prove that someone actually committed acts that can be qualified as war crimes or crimes against humanity whereas it may perhaps be easier for a government to prove that someone made a false statement. At that point, you are trying to attain an objective through perhaps less costly means. I wonder if Mr. Sims and Mr. Sheppit have anything to add.

Mr. John Sims: In the program concerning war criminals or people involved in awful things during the Second World War, it has to be shown that there was a false statement. But it's not the same situation for modern war crimes where, under paragraph 19(1)(j), you want to show that the person is under suspicion of having been a direct participant in war crimes. So this is not a matter of an untruthful statement.

Mr. Réal Ménard: Could we get a copy of the witnesses' text?

[English]

The Chairman: Yes.

Ms. Augustine.

Ms. Jean Augustine (Etobicoke—Lakeshore, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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I know we're dealing with modern war crimes, but I want to put one question to Mr. Sims— it could have a short answer in light of your past explanation —and put forward some other smaller questions.

Are the legal issues the same for modern war criminals as they are for Nazi war criminals? Do we have two different legal processes, or issues related?

Mr. John Sims: Yes, the programs are different, Madam. As your colleague across the floor was saying a moment ago, in the case of World War II war criminals, or people who committed crimes against humanity or were engaged in reprehensible acts at that time, the government is attempting to demonstrate that these people entered Canada and sometimes became Canadian citizens by misrepresenting the true nature of what they did during the war.

The Crown goes further, that it's not simply a lie, and proves typically that the nature of the lie was a material misrepresentation. To demonstrate that it was a material misrepresentation one shows the nature of the acts in which the person was engaged.

But that's a different process from what is going on in the program my colleagues have described, where one typically tries to prove more directly the nature of the acts the people were engaged in to prove that they committed war crimes, to either exclude them in the refugee stream or, if they're coming in, under subsection 19(1), not as a refugee, to bar them under paragraph 19(1)(j), for example, by showing that they were engaged in the commission of a war crime. So it's a slightly different process.

Ms. Jean Augustine: I see.

My other question has to do with what is currently done overseas in order to identify modern war criminals. Could you describe the overseas screening process? Could you also give us some ideas as to what is happening in other jurisdictions and how our system compares with what happens in other jurisdictions?

Mr. Bill Sheppit: Generally all applicants for immigration visas overseas are refugee status. There's a security screening process involved.

Depending on the situation— as Mr. McKay alluded to earlier. In cases such as the former Yugoslavia, where we're aware of the fact that there were atrocities or crimes against humanity committed, we do a much more detailed screening. For example, there we routinely consult with the international tribunal on former Yugoslavia. We get information from them about indictments that may have been issued about ongoing investigations.

We have consultations within the Canadian government as part of the security screening and as part of an enhanced security screening that we do. I'd really prefer not to get into too much detail on that, but that's routinely done as well.

Then, as I mentioned, in countries of upheaval the war crimes unit here at headquarters has a great deal of information that we've obtained, which we forward to the posts involved in taking people from countries in that type of upheaval.

With regard to what other countries are doing, we think our legislation is better than what's currently available out there, particularly because of the part of paragraph 19(1)(j) that allows us to refuse somebody where we have reasonable grounds to believe, which to the best of my knowledge is not available in the immigration legislation of the United States, the U.K., Belgium, France, or most other immigrant-receiving countries. We don't require that there be proof along the same lines as the burden of proof you require in criminal investigations, but we require reasonable grounds.

There are provisions in the American legislation, for example, where somebody can be excluded from entry, or deported. It's essentially similar types of things— terrorists, bombers, criminals —and there's a very close link between criminality and crimes against humanity.

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In the U.K. their war crimes legislation provides for World War II criminals only, not modern cases. Australia does have procedures for surrender of war criminals to international tribunals. There is genocide legislation as well in Australia to deal with people who are guilty of crimes of genocide. Belgium has specific provisions giving Belgian courts jurisdiction for atrocities committed overseas, and they do have links with the international tribunals as well.

So that's a flavour of what the others are doing. As I say, in our case the big difference is the reasonable grounds provision.

The Chairman: Ms. Hardy.

Ms. Louise Hardy (Yukon, NDP): I'm trying to understand how we prove what the war criminals do. Is there actually a trial in a Canadian court where we have to prove beyond any kind of doubt that these people have committed crimes?

Mr. Bill Sheppit: No. Essentially, as I indicated, what we need are reasonable grounds to believe that somebody has committed war crimes or crimes against humanity. In the case of members of regimes, five regimes are currently designated by the Minister of Immigration as having been guilty of crimes against humanity. In that case, senior members of the regime or senior officials of the regime are automatically deemed to have benefited by their position in the regime and are therefore inadmissible. Those regimes are the Marxist regime in Afghanistan, Somalia, the Bosnian Serb regime during a particular period of time, Haiti, and Iraq. There's a designated list of senior officials who are deemed to be included in that group.

As for people we are going after, either to exclude under the refugee convention or to determine that they themselves committed crimes against humanity or war crimes, as I mentioned earlier, for example, we will do things such as identify where an atrocity took place. Based on military intelligence information, media reports, and what units were involved at the time, we'll track down the person's history. Were they involved in a military group, a militia, or a paramilitary group? Can we locate them in the place at the same time the atrocities took place, and were they sufficiently senior to have been in a situation of control of the situation, or are there witness allegations?

As I indicated, the international tribunals have done a lot of work on that sort of thing, all in the context that the majority of people we deal with here as refugee claimants have already told us they're a refugee because they were involved in such-and-such a country at such-and-such a time doing such-and-such a job. So that gives us the area for further investigation.

Ms. Louise Hardy: Once you've determined that someone's a war criminal, are they then detained?

Mr. Bill Sheppit: It depends on the situation. The detention guidelines are the same as they are for other immigration cases: Are they a danger to the public or are they likely not to appear for removal and further proceedings?

As I mentioned, the majority of those cases are not considered to be a danger to the public or the security of Canada. If they are, yes, we detain them.

A voice: It's not to the Canadian public.

Mr. Bill Sheppit: Yes.

Mr. John Sims: Mr. Chairman, if I may just add one point to amplify my colleague's answer for Ms. Hardy, in a small number of cases, these proceedings do turn into very long trials or hearings. A really good example was the case of Léon Mugesera in Montreal, which went on for the better part of a year in the first round, and it's going on now in a second round for a very long time, to demonstrate that he had been inciting people to genocide in Rwanda. It's an extremely complex, long, bitterly fought fight. But that's not the typical case. The typical case is as described by Mr. Sheppit.

Ms. Louise Hardy: Do we pay for their lawyers here? Does legal aid pay for this?

Mr. Bill Sheppit: I think it depends on whatever the provincial legal aid guidelines are.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Mr. Mahoney.

Mr. Steve Mahoney (Mississauga West, Lib.): I heard one of you say— I'm sorry, I forget which gentleman it was —that we currently have a caseload of 404. The data I've been provided by research says there are 300. I'd like an answer on that.

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As well, a perception appears in the media from time to time, and certainly people talk to us as members of Parliament, that we are a haven, a soft touch, for war criminals. Yet I hear Mr. Sheppit saying— and you didn't use these words, but this was the implication —that we have the toughest legislation because of our ability to refuse them just on reasonable grounds.

I wonder if you could address that. Is perception reality? Is the number of 404, your number— and I assume that's the accurate number —an excessively high number in Canada as compared with other countries?

Finally, of the 404, are we absolutely certain they're war criminals? Are they just suspected or are they charged? When you say “caseload”, what are we talking about? Maybe you could give us some of the details on that.

Mr. Georges Tsaï: I'll let my colleague, Mr. Sheppit, deal with the inventory.

With respect to the comment in relation to whether Canada is a haven, I think we have to look at the situation in very relative terms. We may have, of course, a higher number of suspected war criminals than in other countries, but it is also because we accept a larger number of people, either as refugees or immigrants, than other countries.

Going back to the comment I was making earlier with respect to facilitation versus the control approaches, compared with other countries, for example, we don't have any exit controls at our border, which maybe makes the control of the movement of people much more difficult, and we may end up, in absolute terms, with higher numbers than other countries.

I would be very careful, though, about qualifying the number. Is it high? I think you can have any answer on that one. It may look high in actual terms, but if you look at the entire picture, at the number of people coming to Canada, you may be able to see this number as relative.

The Chairman: I would point out to members that you did receive a report with some information. That came from the October 2, 1997, report addressed to Bill Sheppit from Randy Gordon, project manager of the war crimes and crimes against humanity case management branch. He does clearly indicate in this report that the numbers can fluctuate on a regular basis, and there could be an increase, depending on the number of cases coming forward claiming refugee status.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: The report I'm working from is dated March 12, 1998, so I don't think it could be more current. That's the research.

Mr. Georges Tsaï: As Mr. Sheppit said, we're working on the new inventory, the new set of numbers. With the system we have in place, we hope to have these numbers produced in a more practical and timely fashion.

Mr. Bill Sheppit: The other comment I would make with regard to numbers, in the other element of your question, is that of the 404, 80 have been removed. That brings it down to 320. In terms of the others, essentially, until they've been removed or until all court action has been successfully won against them, they're allegations. They're not proven war criminals, according to the Canadian justice system.

Now, we obviously think we have strong cases. Otherwise, we wouldn't have launched the investigation.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Where the obvious goal would be to prove and identify an individual as a war criminal and deport them, what would be your biggest difficulty? Would it be actually getting proof in the Canadian justice system or would it be charter difficulties— that is, the ability to claim rights under the charter —or would it be in some way the deportation process?

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Mr. Bill Sheppit: I think from the case consideration, the biggest difficulty is evidence. You run into various situations where the country is in the midst of upheaval. You receive allegations on a routine basis from one side of the upheaval that so-and-so is a war criminal, so-and-so committed crimes against humanity. That's all well and good, but it's not good enough. You can't take action against somebody on the basis of hearsay. Trying to find out what the actual circumstances are so that we have reasonable grounds is extremely difficult. It's part of the environment in which we function.

The Chairman: Mr. Doyle.

Mr. Norman Doyle (St. John's East, PC): I was interested in your opening remarks on your definition of a war crime or a war criminal. I'm sure we've heard it said many times that what one person might consider a terrorist may very well be someone who belongs to a freedom-fighting organization. I've had quite a great deal of correspondence from refugee claimants from Sri Lanka, claimants who've been associated with the Tamil Tigers, a Tamil organization. Depending on your point of view, that person is a member of a freedom-fighting organization or the opposite— a terrorist or what have you.

How do you define a war criminal in that kind of context with a high-ranking member of the Sri Lankan government, for instance, because of their oppression of a minority? How would he be considered if he came to Canada? Would he be considered a war criminal? Would you have to have specific evidence?

Mr. Georges Tsaï: That's not an easy question, but let me answer it.

With respect to war crimes, we have to rely on definitions that are included in international treaties and also in well-established precedents. I referred to the very specific context in which actions can be considered war crimes: it's really offences against the laws of war applicable in international conflicts. For crimes against humanity, we would be dealing with a situation of civil war and a regime inflicting on an element of the population bad treatment, genocide, ethnic cleansing, etc.

Terrorism is another issue that is not covered here. As for your specific question about at what point somebody is a terrorist or a fighter for a noble cause, we have to rely on the core values of our country and some of the moral values that are accepted internationally.

This is the kind of answer I can give you. Maybe Mr. Sims can provide you with something more specific.

Mr. John Sims: That's a very good general description. Sir, it's partly a question of scale. It moves from murder to a crime against humanity when it's part of an activity directed against an identifiable group of persons in the population and it's more broadly carried out against the civilian population. That turns it.

Then there are other technical elements. It has to be recognized by— I'm glancing down because I have a section of the Criminal Code in front of me in which it's defined. A crime against humanity means some offences that, if the rest of it weren't there, would just be ordinary criminal offences: murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, persecution, or any other inhumane act or emission. Then we start adding the conditions, such as if it's committed against any civilian population or any identifiable group of persons. And we keep on adding the conditions.

It doesn't matter whether the law where these acts are being carried out doesn't make it an offence there if, according to customary international law, it would be considered criminal.

But the main thing in the context of what we're saying here is the sheer scale of what's going on. So in a civil war situation it could well be a crime against humanity.

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The Chairman: Thank you.

Now we're going into a two-minute cycle, and we'll try to stick to it as strictly as possible. We now will hear from Mr. McNally.

Mr. Grant McNally (Dewdney—Alouette, Ref.): Thanks, Mr. Chair.

I want to ask you quickly about the refugee level numbers you mentioned earlier, and also about the fact that it's been stated that this process not only allows modern-day war criminals to come to Canada but in some ways facilitates this happening. What are the levels and what's being done to stop this process?

Mr. Bill Sheppit: I'm not sure I agree with your—

Mr. Grant McNally: I'm just referring back to this October 2 report, which you mentioned earlier, where it says it must be made with respect to refugee level numbers, when we're concerned about real war criminals being admitted to Canada— in fact facilitated to get here —through this levels exercise.

Mr. Bill Sheppit: As Mr. Tsaï indicated earlier, it's a balancing act between our international obligations and our desire to grant protection to people in need of protection, and between our international obligations and our desire to keep out people who don't deserve that protection. It is a challenge.

As I mentioned earlier, all we can do is get as much information as possible in the hands of the people making the selection decisions. Based on what we've seen so far, we've been able to identify three cases in our current inventory that were accepted overseas. But it does exist. It's a constant challenge.

The Chairman: Anyone from the Liberal side? Mr. Mahoney.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: On the issue of criteria, intelligence must be a huge part of your business. I wonder if you could briefly explain in more detail, partly following on Mr. Doyle's question, what criteria are used to identify organizations, groups, the areas you've talked about specifically, or modern war criminals specifically?

Mr. Bill Sheppit: Essentially it starts with reading the newspapers—

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Really? Good grief! Are we down to that?

Mr. Bill Sheppit: No, but in terms of identifying—

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Sure, we get our information from reading the newspapers and generally form our opinions on them, but I would have hoped that would not be the case in the war crimes division of the immigration department.

Mr. Bill Sheppit: It's a starting point on identifying areas of concern to us. If we're sitting here minding our own business and we learn from the media that there's an outbreak of whatever in such-and-such a country, that's the starting point.

We deal within the Canadian government. In the case of Yugoslavia, for example, we deal with international tribunals. We'll consult right across the board with other countries, with our mission on the spot, with NGO organizations, with labour unions, and with people interested in human rights.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Let me be specific. The Tamil organization was identified as a terrorist organization, but at one time it wasn't. What criteria did you use to make that determination?

Mr. Bill Sheppit: I'm not sure. I'd have to check that we have identified it as a terrorist organization. It's been identified in the Federal Court in a specific case decision, and a specific person has been identified as a terrorist due to his membership in that and the actions he conducted.

Going back to Mr. Doyle's point earlier, in that specific case there was a long, drawn-out hearing in the Federal Court, debating the International Declaration of the Rights of Man and at what point freedom-fighting became terrorist activity. The Federal Court ruled on that and gave us an interpretation, but as I say, I'm not sure we have specifically said that specific organization is a terrorist group.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Mr. Ménard.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: I will ask the question quickly because I have to leave you, unfortunately. I am sorry.

How many officials are working on this right now? In the case management branch, you have created a special unit that is working on the war crimes issue. You have shown us how the process starts and you have told us that it was often in the context of a claim for refugee status. You do not always have control over that, and we understand.

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Your senior manager who did the analysis, Mr. Randy Gordon, is concerned that the number of cases will double and he is worried about the number of employees available in your services. How many employees are working there? Do you agree with the results of the analysis done by your senior manager, to the effect that if there are not adequate resources, the process might be opened up to a very large extent?

Mr. Georges Tsaï: Mr. Chairman, a report prepared by a departmental employee can obviously include certain desires and opinions. That is quite understandable and legitimate. The organization's leaders then have to decide what resources it is appropriate to allocate for a given activity. At present, and I will let Mr. Sheppit give details afterwards, we have a unit of 3.5 persons. But it is important to keep in mind that the work is done not only at the centre; some persons work in the field, we have regional coordinators and our foreign missions also carry out this work. We are not alone. There are federal partners and people from other services that help us in this work. We must therefore not rely just on the statistics for this unit.

[English]

Mr. Bill Sheppit: Just to add to that, the headquarters unit is to provide support and monitoring for the field. A large part of this activity, or virtually all of it, is done as a routine part of the day-to-day activities of the department. So if somebody arrives at Pearson airport and makes a claim for refugee status, and gives us indications that make us think they may be a war criminal, they'll be dealt with there by departmental employees.

There are specialized coordinators in each region. There's one in each of the five regions. That's part of the difficulty we have in gathering statistics, because the work is done as a part of day-to-day activity.

[Translation]

Mr. Georges Tsaï: If I may, Mr. Chairman, I would like to add that the team dealing with Second World War cases is obviously not the same as the one that comes under the Department of Justice. It is important to realize that this work is not done by that unit.

[English]

The Chairman: Thank you very much.

Anyone from the government side?

I believe Mr. Reynolds has a question.

Mr. John Reynolds: I'll be really quick.

Somalia is one of the countries from which we bar any senior officials who were involved in war crimes. Mr. Mohamed Olo is in Canada as a citizen. I know he got here before the rule came in, but he admits that he was a senior official in the government. He admits that he would have been killed if he hadn't followed orders.

How did he get through the net? Is it just because of the law coming in after he got here? Do we not go back and say he was there, in charge of killing people?

Mr. Bill Sheppit: Again, I think I'm bound by privacy, which is a discussion we've had before. I don't know if anybody from the privacy commission has yet had the opportunity to come and discuss with the committee the constraints under which we have to work. I mean, I'd be pleased to be able to deal with the question—

Mr. John Reynolds: Let me ask without the name, then. If a senior official in that government got into Canada before the law was passed that would bar officials, would that mean he was safe in Canada?

Mr. Bill Sheppit: No. When we designate regimes, if we're aware of cases where somebody fits the definition of senior official, or where there's evidence that they committed crimes against humanity, we routinely would take action against them after the fact.

Mr. John Reynolds: But we have no way of knowing if you're looking into this particular case other than what we read in the media.

Mr. Bill Sheppit: Right.

The Chairman: Mr. McKay, please.

Mr. John McKay: Subsection 19(1) of the Immigration Act sets out categories of government officials and goes through those categories. Presumably on an annual basis, or even more frequently, you designate which particular countries will be subject to that interpretation.

Now, the problem is, we have a variety of government systems across the world where some categories of government officials— even ambassadors, say, people we would think of as representing the country —may be in fact be forms of political exile. It might even happen here.

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Mr. Steve Mahoney: Worse than being in the back benches.

Mr. John McKay: We're talking ridiculous, now.

It's supposed to be a position of influence, which we now know is nothing at all, and may not be in fact a government position. It may be, as I say, a position of exile and actual absence of influence.

My curiosity is that when we're looking at amending our system, is there some way in which that issue could be addressed on a legislative basis?

Mr. Bill Sheppit: Yes. There is an exemption. I'm looking for the exact wording in the legislation, but I can't lay my hands on it immediately. There is a clause after the categories of senior officials are outlined that states something like, “except for those people who, in the opinion of the minister”. Notwithstanding the fact that somebody occupied one of those positions, they may be allowed in by use of a minister's permit, by the minister.

For example, we may want to deal now with a senior official in the agriculture ministry in Somalia. Possibly CIDA is looking at some type of aid program, and it's in our interest to allow this person to come in and do discussions. There is an exemption there so that he can be allowed in.

Mr. John McKay: Is there a better way of handling it so that the minister is not put into these hopeless, hopeless positions of second-guessing the entire system?

Mr. Bill Sheppit: It's a developing area. The legislation was passed just a few years ago, and with the delays in the court system, we're just now seeing the results of court challenges, which so far have been supportive of it. The courts have ruled that there is no rebuttable presumption, that the fact that you occupied one of these positions is sufficient for you to be excluded.

What we do is designate regimes for the most part during specific periods of time, when there were the worst atrocities committed, so that people who occupy senior positions in the government of the day now aren't necessarily caught by that. It's limited to a narrow period of time, hopefully.

The Chairman: Ms. Hardy.

Ms. Louise Hardy: In here you have categories of senior military people who are automatically excluded because they would have benefited in oppression. Is there an equivalent category for entrepreneurs? I'm really curious about Mr. McKay's comments. If there is some business that you know profited from forced civilian labour, or that sold chemicals that killed people, are they automatically excluded?

Mr. Georges Tsaï: If we go back to the definition in paragraph 19(1)(l), it really deals with senior officials or senior members of the government. It would not necessarily be dealing with somebody who is in the private sector.

Ms. Louise Hardy: There isn't anything equivalent?

Mr. Georges Tsaï: Depending on what they have done or not done, we would examine it, but it would not be under paragraph 19(1)(l).

Mr. Bill Sheppit: No. It could be under “criminality”, or it could be under “crimes against humanity”, but they wouldn't be captured by “members of a regime”.

Ms. Louise Hardy: Thank you.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Reynolds): Any other questions?

I have one question, to follow up on what Mr. McKay was asking and what I was asking on the Somalia issue. In terms of the individual I mentioned, if there's been some exemption given to him because of information of the government, I could understand that, but how do we find that out rather than having to go back to the newspapers that have printed stories about what he did and why he's here?

We ask questions and we get, well, it's the Privacy Act, but if there has been an exemption granted, is that a fair question to ask?

Mr. Bill Sheppit: Did we miss a coup, by the way?

Voices: Oh, oh.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Reynolds): I'm not sure.

Mr. Bill Sheppit: Speaking of crimes against humanity—

I think what we need to look at is the definition of “senior official”, because it is quite detailed in how it defines senior officials. Then, of course, we look at whether there is any evidence that the person was involved in war crimes or crimes against humanity.

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I would be happy to discuss with you that specific case outside the confines of this environment.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Reynolds): That's fine.

Mr. Georges Tsaï: In light of the Privacy Act, of course, we have had an opportunity in the past to discuss the issue of what kind of information you can divulge to either a committee or individual members.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Reynolds): Any other questions? Mr. McNally.

Mr. Grant McNally: Going back to Mr. McKay's comments, if you have an individual, for example, who ends up in Canada, who fits into one of these classes of a regime, and who might not, by what he actually did in a prior country, fit into that category— you know, he's laid out in the act as being in this particular category —what can that individual do? What's the process for someone who would be in that boat?

I know you mentioned that the department can look at a third country to deport to, or a minister's permit could be issued from the minister. Is there any humanitarian or compassionate review similar to when they are termed a refugee? If they're in an inadmissible class, is that avenue not then available?

Mr. Bill Sheppit: There would be a review of the risks they would face if they were removed to their country of origin, as I mentioned to Mr. Reynolds earlier. In that case, we would look at an alternate country.

Of course, they do have access to the Canadian judicial system to challenge the initial determination. Presumably they would do that and argue, well, yes, I was an ambassador, but I was exiled because the president's family didn't like me, and sent me to wherever. Presumably they would argue the determination before the final decision to remove them had been made.

Mr. Grant McNally: So now you have this individual who is in limbo, waiting to find out. Let's say they're under a deportation order, and they don't know what's happening. Let's say the minister decides not to give a permit because they fit into this category. They're in this wheel of not being able to get out of it—

An hon. member: The wheel of fortune.

Mr. Grant McNally: Or the wheel of misfortune.

Is there any other avenue? Do they just wait to be deported? If there's no minister's permit coming, if they're turned down for judicial review and they're deemed in this category, do they just wait around?

Mr. Bill Sheppit: There is the ongoing, routine provision where any person in Canada can make an H and C application either before or after. I mean, they could make an application at that stage, but our prime aim would be to remove them.

As I indicated, the intent of Parliament at the time the legislation was enacted was that notwithstanding the fact that they may have been innocent themselves, they were in a suitably senior position to influence the activities of the government that has been designated.

Mr. Grant McNally: I guess that becomes the point of debate. Who weighs the evidence and who makes the final decision in that process?

Mr. Bill Sheppit: The adjudicator and then whatever decision-makers in the judicial process.

Mr. Grant McNally: Okay. Thanks.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Reynolds): I would like to thank the witnesses.

Shall we adjourn?

Some hon. members: Agreed.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Reynolds): Thanks. We are adjourned.