PACC Committee Report
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HOUSE OF COMMONS
OTTAWA, CANADA
K1A 0A6
OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
CANADIAN ALLIANCE SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT
SUPPLEMENTARY OPINION BY THE BLOC QUÉBÉCOIS
Pursuant to Standing Order 108(3)(e), the Standing Committee on Public Accounts has the honour to present its
TENTH REPORT
The Standing Committee on Public Accounts has considered the May 2002 Special Audit Report of the Auditor General of Canada (Report to the Minister of Public Works and Government Services on Three Contracts Awarded to Groupaction) and has agreed to report the following:
On 8 May 2002, the former Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC), the Hon. Don Boudria, tabled a special audit report by the Auditor General of Canada in the House of Commons. The Report contained the results of an audit that the Minister had requested of three sponsorship contracts issued by Public Works and Government Services Canada between 1996 and 1999 to Groupaction Communications.
On 21 May 2002, the Standing Committee on Public Accounts adopted a motion to the effect that the Committee would hold one or more hearings on the Report. Accordingly, the Committee met with the Auditor General of Canada, Ms. Sheila Fraser, on 30 May 2002 to discuss the content of her report. Mr. Ronnie Campbell, Principal, Office of the Auditor General of Canada accompanied Ms. Fraser.
Since the Auditor General had referred her findings to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, which decided to open an investigation, raising the possibility of criminal charges, the Committee met on 4 June 2002 with Mr. Rob Walsh, Law Clerk and Parliamentary Counsel to the House of Commons to receive advice on how to approach witnesses.
Mr. Walsh advised the Committee that there were no legal constraints that would limit its ability to explore the issue of the three contracts. However, in exercising its powers, he suggested that the Committee should be aware of the limits implied by the relationship between Parliament and Government under responsible government. Under this form of government, public servants are answerable primarily to government ministers who are, in turn, answerable to the House of Commons. Accordingly, instances might occur in which public servants appearing as witnesses before standing committees might decline to answer questions unless specifically authorized by their ministers to do so. Nevertheless, he testified, standing committees have a clear right to summon public servants and former public servants as witnesses and to cite those refusing to appear for contempt in a report to the House.
The Law Clerk pointed out that the Committee might also consider the need to strike a balance between the principles of fundamental justice and the need for members of Parliament to act in the public interest. In other words, the Committee would have to decide when one of several competing interests predominated — the rights of witnesses to justice, the right of the public to know, and the right of the Committee to ask questions and receive answers — as it proceeded.
Finally, Mr. Walsh advised the Committee that evidence derived from witnesses during a committee hearing is not admissible in a court of law and therefore may potentially compromise a police investigation. The Law Clerk is worth citing directly on this matter. Mr. Walsh informed the Committee that:
It is quite clear that no court of law in any proceeding can question on parliamentary proceedings, whether in the House or in a committee. What that means is that what may be said at a committee, or indeed what’s said in the House, cannot itself be presented in a court of law and form part of the evidence before the court…. You may find a witness invoking the Canada Evidence Act. That act doesn’t apply to parliamentary proceedings as such, but it applies perhaps beyond the limits of its own language, insofar as much of what it’s about is in section 13 of the Charter. It is understandable that citizens might well be concerned about the use made of evidence given here. It is the case that parliamentary privilege, however, is available to those witnesses. It’s not something the witness can invoke as such, it’s a privilege that pertains to committee members, as to the House and members of Parliament. But it is the case that anything said in a parliamentary proceeding, including a committee proceeding, is protected by privilege and, …, is not available to be questioned in a court of law and cannot be presented as evidence.
What is of some concern, … relative to a possible police investigation on matters that are at the same time being considered by this committee, is that were the police to have evidence that, in the judgment of the police and crown counsel, supported a charge being brought, an individual or individuals being brought to justice, but they could not establish that the evidence they had was obtained independently of any testimony before this committee, they could have difficulty where the argument is made that their evidence is derivative from protected testimony. It is not just the testimony that’s protected; it’s evidence that’s derived from it. That is to say, if testimony before this committee were instrumental in enabling the investigating authority to find other evidence or in giving the investigating authority an appreciation of the evidence that wouldn’t otherwise be available to them, this would be what’s called derivative evidence. The police may not be able to use that evidence, depending on how the judge considers the matter. One could argue that any subsequent investigation or any evidence developed by a subsequent investigation, where much the same material was covered as in a committee hearing, could put in jeopardy the prospects for any successful prosecution.
Having taken Mr. Walsh’s testimony into account, the Committee determined that its role was to investigate maladministration associated with the contracts, not to conduct a parallel criminal investigation. The Chair advised the Committee to exercise caution in the questions it would ask of witnesses, keeping in mind that the testimony could affect a criminal investigation.
Subsequently, the Committee met in open session on 6 June 2002 with Ms. Janice Cochrane, current Deputy Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, and Mr. Guy McKenzie, Executive Director of Communications Canada. The Auditor General of Canada, Ms. Sheila Fraser also attended this meeting. On 13 June 2002, the Committee met with Mr. Ranald Quail, Deputy Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada at the time the three contracts were issued. Mr. Shahid Minto, Assistant Auditor General, appeared on behalf of the Office of the Auditor General of Canada.
The Committee’s initial invitation to Mr. Charles Guité, former Executive Director of the Communications Coordination Services Branch (CCSB, the branch within the Department responsible for delivering the Program), to appear as a witness was declined on advice of his lawyer. The Committee therefore authorized the Chair to formally summon Mr. Guité to appear before it. It should be noted that the power of standing committees to formally summon witnesses is rarely used and that in doing so, the Committee has demonstrated that this power has not lapsed and remains available to all standing committees of the House of Commons. The Committee also reaffirmed its right to hold hearings into a matter that is the subject of a current police investigation. A second former executive director, Mr. Pierre Tremblay agreed to appear but asked that his lawyer be permitted to accompany him, a request that the Committee agreed to.
Bearing in mind the advice of the Law Clerk and the possibility that the police investigation could lead to criminal charges, the Committee decided to meet with Mr. Guité and Mr. Tremblay in camera. The Committee also decided that evidence from the meetings with these two witnesses will only be made public three years from the date of the meetings, if criminal charges have not been laid, or after all court proceedings, including appeals have ended, if criminal charges are laid. As a consequence, evidence obtained from these two witnesses does not form any part of the report that follows. The Committee subsequently met with Mr. Guité and Mr. Tremblay in two separate in camera meetings held on 9 July 2002.
In 1997, the government established a program to support sporting, cultural, and community activities in all regions of Canada. Known as the Sponsorship Program or Initiative (hereafter, the Program), the purpose was to encourage a positive perception of the federal government and to increase the federal presence and visibility in communities across Canada, through the use of the Canada wordmark at events and on promotional material.
The Program was managed by a series of evolving branches within Public Works and Government Services Canada. Initially, the Department’s Advertising and Public Opinion Research Sector (APORS) was responsible for procuring a wide range of communications and advertising services on behalf of federal departments and agencies. In 1997, APORS was merged with several other entities to become the Communications Coordination Services Branch (CCSB). This new entity remained within Public Works and Government Services Canada until the fall of 2001 when it was in turn amalgamated with other entities and taken out of the Department to form Communications Canada.
Following the report of the Auditor General of Canada on grants and contributions programs at Human Resources Development Canada,[1] the Department’s Deputy Minister, Mr. Ranald Quail, asked that an internal audit be conducted of management practices within CCSB.
Public Works and Government Services Canada Internal Audit
From 15 March to 11 May 2000, PWGSC’s Audit and Review Branch (the Branch) conducted an internal audit of the Department’s Communications Coordination Services Branch. The objective of the internal audit was to review the CCSB’s management of sponsorship agreements to see if they complied with applicable policies, procedures and authorities. The Branch looked at a sample of 276 sponsorship files drawn from a total of 580 files covering the period from November 1997 to 31 March 2000. The sample was carefully designed to represent all categories of sponsorship agreements.
The final report based on the analysis of these files was dated 31 August 2000. Key findings included the following:
· The procedures used by CCSB to select and contract with communications agencies “did not fully comply with the spirit or the letter” of Treasury Board rules and directives. For example, contracts over $25,000 were not awarded through a competitive process.
· The sponsorship approval and decision-making process was subjective and based on professional judgement and experience. The audit was unable to determine that the ad hoc approval and decision-making processes were consistently applied because of a lack of documentary evidence. In two cases, the former Executive Director chose to override recommendations that requests for sponsorship be denied, and approved them on the basis of his professional judgement.
· The management framework for CCSB’s sponsorship decision-making process was inadequate and did not ensure that CCSB sponsorship decisions were “transparent, compliant with requirements, or appropriate to achieving value-for-money for the Government of Canada.[2]
The auditors who produced the report of 31 August 2000 discussed the results of their audit with the Acting Executive Director and acknowledged that CCSB had already taken steps to correct some of the shortcomings. The auditors recommended that the Acting Executive Director:
1. Take the necessary steps to ensure that CCSB’s contracting processes comply with TB [Treasury Board] directives, policies and procedures;
2. Formally implement appropriate processes and controls over the granting and management of sponsorships to ensure sound management of, control over, and accountability for sponsorship — encompassing due diligence, consistency in approach, transparency of operations and adequate reporting; and
3. Implement adequate management controls to ensure that sponsorship amounts are consistently determined (at a minimum level needed to attain expected results) and appropriately documented; and, the application of effective asset management principles including: control over the disposition of interest earned on cash advances, the establishment and control of production budgets and matching expenditures, control over the inventory of promotional items, stronger linkages between the funds provided and the results achieved and sufficient reporting to support a value-for-money evaluation.[3]
In short, the internal audit found that when it came to sponsorship agreements, poor management practices were widespread in the CCSB.
A follow up was conducted in 2002 as part of the action plan drawn up in response to the original audit. This audit examined 120 of the 323 sponsorship files that were approved between 31 May 2001 and 1 September 2001. This sample represented 37% of the total number of approved sponsorships and 87% of the total value of these sponsorships, and included all of the sponsorships valued at $100,000 and above. Each file was reviewed to verify that it contained all of the required documents.[4]
Following its review, the internal audit team concluded that 115 of the files contained all of the required documents (depending on the file’s “degree of maturity within the sponsorship management process”). Of the remaining five files, three were classified as lacking required documents while there were plausible explanations available for missing documents in the other two. Based on its overall review, the internal auditors concluded
That for the period reviewed, Communications Canada has, with very few exceptions, ensured that all mandatory documents required per the CC [Communications Canada] sponsorship management process exist and have been appropriately included in approved sponsorship files.[5]
Based on this conclusion, the internal audit team made no further recommendations.
As the results of the initial internal audit became known, the activities of the CCSB came under increasing public scrutiny. As a consequence, a number of instances of apparent mismanagement and questionable behaviour not specifically mentioned in the internal audit report began to appear in the media.[6] One particularly noteworthy case involved three contracts (one managed by APORS in 1996, the other two by CCSB in 1999) issued to Groupaction Marketing Inc. of Montreal. In general, it was far from clear whether the government had received the services it had contracted for and in all likelihood it had not.
The Auditor General of Canada: Special Audit Report
On 19 March 2002, following reports in the media and questions in the House of Commons, the then-Minister of Public Works and Government Services, the Hon. Don Boudria, asked the Auditor General to conduct a special audit of three sponsorship contracts issued by the Department to Groupaction Marketing Inc. of Montreal. The Auditor General agreed to the request, conducted her investigation, and the Minister tabled her report containing findings in the House of Commons on 8 May 2002.
The three contracts in question were in force from 2 July 1996 to 31 March 1997, 1 April 1998 to 31 March 1999, and 1 May 1999 to 31 March 2000. These contracts awarded by the Government of Canada in the amounts of $500,000, $550,000, and $575,000 respectively.
In conducting her audit, the Auditor General sought to determine how the Department had chosen the contractor (Groupaction) and awarded the contracts, how the Department had managed and administered the contracts, and what was contracted for and what was delivered. The audit focused exclusively on the actions of senior public servants assessed against government contracting rules and regulations and the requirements contained in the Financial Administration Act.
The results of this audit, by now familiar to many Canadians, were summarized by the Auditor General in her report as follows:
…. senior public servants responsible for managing the contracts demonstrated an appalling disregard for the Financial Administration Act, the Government Contracts Regulations, Treasury Board policy, and rules designed to ensure prudence and probity in government procurement.
The government files on the three contracts are so poorly documented that many key questions remain unanswered surrounding the selection of the contractor and the basis for establishing the price and scope of work for the contracts. In our opinion, the government did not receive much of what it contracted for and paid for.
In particular, [the Auditor General of Canada] found the following:
· The documentation that Groupaction produced on the second and third contracts had similarities because the government itself called for similar work in both contracts. It is not clear why the government awarded the third contract in 1999.
· The government did not receive everything it contracted for and paid for. Key elements of what was specified in the contracts were never delivered, and no one has been able to find a report for the second contract, for which the government paid $549,990.
· Officials approved payments for work that varied considerably from what the contracts specified. In a few cases, payments were approved with the knowledge that the requirements of the contracts had not been fully met.
· Payments were made that [the Office of the Auditor General was] told were for verbal advice, but no such advice was either stipulated in any of the contracts or documented as having been received.
· The first contract had been amended to double its value without any documentation to support the need for the amendment.
· None of the documents examined contained any explanation of how the government had determined the need for the services or why it had decided that contracting was the best way to fill the need.
· No evidence was found that a proper selection process was followed in awarding the first contract.
· There was little documented support for the decision to award the second and third contracts to Groupaction.
· Officials did not comply with the requirements of the Financial Administration Act and contracting regulations and did not verify that the amount of time billed for by the contractor was an acceptable reflection of the work that was done.[7]
OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
No Effort to Ensure Government and Taxpayers Received Value for Money
Two fundamental principles form the basis for government contracting: best value and open access to contracting opportunities. These principles and the contracting rules based on them direct public servants to obtain best value (the best combination of value and price) and to provide open access (fair opportunity for all qualified vendors to do business with the Crown). The government has determined that the optimal way to do this is through competitive bidding; all contracts valued above $25,000 must be let through a competitive tendering process. Exceptions to this rule can be made in very narrowly defined circumstances, which must be clearly documented in departmental files.[8] The audit results clearly demonstrate, however, the government contracting policies were not followed and the principles underlying them were ignored in the awarding of these three contracts.
According to the Auditor General, the senior public servants responsible for the three contracts “broke just about every rule in the book.”[9]. As Ms. Fraser testified, “one of the executive directors informed us that he was aware [of the rules regarding contracting, including the requirements contained in the Financial Administration Act],” while “one other was probably less aware … because he was in his position for a very short time.”
A series of reports by the previous Auditor General over the years have revealed that failure to adhere to government contracting regulations is far too prevalent.[10] Furthermore, with respect to poor or no documentation contained in CCSB’s contract files, the Auditor General reported that “the retired Executive Director …told [the auditors] that this was how business was done while he was responsible for the program.” This was confirmed by the results of the internal audit, clearly suggesting that these three contracts were not handled any differently than others the Branch was responsible for.
Impenetrable complexity might have provided some explanation for this widespread failure to follow the rules. However, in contrast to many other regulations, the government’s contracting rules are a model of clarity. As the Auditor General told the Committee, “it’s just basic good management practice that’s encoded in these rules. They’re not a lot of very complicated and detailed rules that are not relevant to any kind of normal business practice.” In effect, the rules are so simple that it cannot be said that ignorance of them explains why they are so persistently ignored.
On several occasions, the Committee has put forward recommendations to clear up the malaise in government contracting. For example, the Committee has twice recommended that promotion for those engaged in contracting be based, in part, on following the rules.[11] Treasury Board Secretariat has not met these proposals with enthusiasm. Consequently, some public servants may get the impression that breaking the rules brings with it no sanction and that advancement depends on an ability to satisfy other criteria. The claim by the previous Auditor General in 1998 that “… breaking the rules in letting sole-source contracts seems to be widespread. Perhaps this is because it seems to bring few consequences” [12] still ring true four years later.
The Committee has not changed its mind. If anything, this recent audit reconfirms the need for effective incentives to encourage government employees to obey contracting rules. Those who cannot do this do not warrant advancement. The Committee therefore repeats its previous recommendations:
RECOMMENDATION 1
That when public servants engaged in contracting are being considered for promotion, strict adherence to conduct and discipline regarding contracting rules and regulations be one of the leading criteria taken into account.
Given the serious nature of the activities brought to light by this audit, however, the Committee believes that the government should go one step further. Those who have a proven pattern of breaking these rules are demonstrating that regardless of whom they may be serving, it is not the government or the people of Canada. They therefore should not remain in their employ. Consequently, the Committee strongly and without hesitation recommends:
RECOMMENDATION 2
That public servants who have demonstrated a proven pattern of disregard for the government of Canada’s contracting rules and regulations should be subject to administrative and disciplinary measures up to and including termination of employment from the Public Service of Canada.
It is particularly noteworthy that no disciplinary action was taken or considered, either against the former executive directors, nor any of the employees working in the CCSB. In the absence of meaningful sanctions against those who, in the words of the Auditor General, “broke just about every rule in the book,” it is difficult to believe that others will be deterred from similar actions in the future.
In his 1999 Report, the former Auditor General commented that when it came to sole-source contracts for professional services, “it is clear that the problems we have observed are government-wide in nature.”[13] The present Auditor General is currently conducting a government-wide audit of advertising and sponsorship programs, and plans to report the results by the end of 2003. It is the Committee’s firm belief that the situation warrants a full review leading to an analysis of what went wrong and how to fix it. Accordingly, the Committee applauds the Auditor General’s decision to conduct a full-scale audit of advertising and sponsorship programs, and looks forward to the results.
Ms. Cochrane informed the Committee that following receipt of the Auditor General’s Report on the Special Audit, she asked for a detailed review of all sponsorship files from November 1997 to March 31 2000 to determine if there were other cases where the Crown had not received value for money. “I can assure all members,” she stated, “of my commitment to dig very deeply.”
The Committee fully supports the Deputy Minister’s determination to have her department’s sponsorship files audited. Given that this is a subject of intense interest on the part of both Parliament and the Canadian public, the Committee recommends:
RECOMMENDATION 3
That the report produced by the Audit and Ethics Branch of Public Works and Government Services Canada focused on all of the Department’s sponsorship files from November 1997 to 31 March 2000 be tabled in the House of Commons without delay following its completion.
The question of whether the government paid for services that were not rendered is particularly troubling. The Auditor General found that the report submitted under the first contract lacked key items that had been called for and that the value of the contract was doubled while less work was done than originally contracted for. The report produced to fulfill the second contract, which cost the government $549,990, has not been located[14]. The third contract, valued at $575,000, resulted in a report that was missing much of what the government contracted for. Nevertheless, when questioned about recovering monies spent for services not received, Ms. Cochrane testified that the government did not have “sufficient evidence to ascertain whether value for money was or was not received,” and that it would be “premature” to initiate a civil action to recover funds. Instead, she indicated that decisions on recovery would depend on advice from the Department of Justice and the outcome of RCMP investigations. The Committee strongly believes that recovery of monies paid for services not received is imperative and therefore recommends:
RECOMMENDATION 4
That the Government of Canada make every possible effort to recover any and all funds paid out in connection with the three contracts audited by the Auditor General of Canada that did not result in the receipt of services that were contracted for, and inform Parliament of the outcome.
When the Committee reviewed the audit results contained in Chapter 26 of the 1998 Report, it learned that the Treasury Board Secretariat has a role to play in monitoring and assessing departmental contracting activity, and reporting the results to Parliament. This role was only being partially fulfilled. The Secretariat was taking contracting data from the departments, aggregating the numbers, and reporting them. It was not assessing them. It relied to some extent on departmental internal audits for information on contracting performance, but the Auditor General reported that the departments had “done some internal audit work on contracting practices, but generally not at a significant level.”
In contrast, section 5.1 of Treasury Board Secretariat’s Contracting Policy states that:
Two mechanisms will be used to monitor government contracting activity: departmental audits and an annual report on contracting. Departments will be evaluated on their compliance with contracting policies and the level of competitive contracting.
All departments and agencies awarding contracts and/or amendments, are required to submit an annual report to the Treasury Board Secretariat on all contracting activities.
The Treasury Board Secretariat also conducts periodic reviews of contracts for the services of individuals, including those for less than $5,000. In addition, departmental auditors need information about contract situations. Contracting authorities are to ensure that contract files include substantiation of the appropriateness of the fees paid and of the need to contract instead of using the staffing process.
Consequently, the Committee made a recommendation using wording taken from section 5.1 calling on Treasury Board Secretariat to adhere to this aspect of its own policy.[15] However, the audit results showed that this policy was not being rigorously applied and Treasury Board Secretariat’s reponse to the Committee’s recommendation showed that it had very little interest in changing its approach.
The Committee is concerned that the reporting process to identify troubles in contracting for advertising did not work. The appropriate departments, central agencies, and individuals did not appear to have been appraised of the problems.
The Committee believes that there is a role for Treasury Board Secretariat that goes beyond the simple, unquestioning collection of statistics. This role is best expressed through a proactive and vigorous application of the elements of section 5.1 of the Contracting Policy. Problems in the area of contracting need to be detected early and resolved quickly.
The problems represented by just these three contracts alone covered a period from July 1996 until 31 March 2000, a period of almost four years, and cost the government a known total of approximately $1.6 million. There may be no more eloquent or persuasive argument than this to support a call for greater scrutiny of, and involvement in government-wide contracting activity by Treasury Board Secretariat. The Committee therefore recommends:
RECOMMENDATION 5
That Treasury Board Secretariat actively monitor departmental contracting activity in accordance with section 5.1 of its contracts policy placing a greater emphasis on a challenge function, and intervene to correct problems as needed.
RECOMMENDATION 6
That Treasury Board Secretariat provide Parliament with an analysis of those instances in which contracting rules have been contravened and of the corrective actions it and the department or agency concerned have taken in its annual contracting activity report. The analysis should indicate how many irregularities have occurred, in which departments and agencies, and the amounts of money involved.
While Treasury Board Secretariat needs to enhance its monitoring activities, the Committee also recognizes that the Secretariat’s work in this area depends to a large extent on effective internal auditing.
In 2001 Treasury Board Secretariat introduced a new policy on internal audit that refocused the function’s goals and created a centre for excellence for internal audit within the Secretariat. These changes were accompanied by new funding for internal audit units within departments. These new initiatives showed promise and the Committee welcomed Treasury Board Secretariat’s renewed interest in internal audit.[16]
The Policy, however, failed to address a fundamental flaw that may overshadow any new benefits it promises to deliver. The structural and reporting arrangements for internal audit units remain essentially unchanged. Under the new policy, deputy heads of departments are required to establish an internal audit function and an internal audit committee headed by a senior departmental executive. According to the Policy, “in most departments, the deputy head or associate deputy head chairs the committee.”[17]
Although deputy heads must inform Treasury Board Secretariat of “significant issues of risk, control, or other problems with management practices” on a “timely basis” after they have been identified by internal audit, internal audit reports must first pass through the deputy head and the internal audit committee.[18]
These arrangements have several consequences that may compromise internal audit’s effectiveness. Internal audit currently functions within the confines of departmental control and the findings it produces must pass through departmental processes before they reach Treasury Board Secretariat or are posted on departmental Web sites. At the very least, the goal of timeliness is defeated. Secondly, internal audit functions are placed in the potentially awkward position of having to inform the person in charge — the deputy head who is ultimately responsible for managing the department — that they, or someone under their direction, has failed in some aspect of their duties. These conditions effectively place significant constraints upon the ability of internal audit functions to do a thorough and forthright job of investigating, assessing, and reporting instances of poor management practices within departments.
The best way of overcoming these difficulties is to remove internal audit from the internal departmental reporting chain and redefine it as a function under the authority of Treasury Board Secretariat. There is a precedent for such an arrangement that could serve as a model. Many of the Department of Justice’s lawyers work on-site in some 30 other federal departments and agencies. Under its government client services business line, the department’s lawyers working in dedicated legal services units are able to provide advice to the heads of departments and ensure that policies, programs and operations of the department or agency conform to the law.
Bringing internal audit functions under Treasury Board Secretariat’s authority would allow internal audit units to continue providing services to departments. At the same time, the units would be provided greater autonomy within departments and given the ability to bring significant problems to the Secretariat’s attention in a timely and forthright manner. In turn, this change would provide the Secretariat with the assurance it needs, and that Parliament needs, that internal audit results in areas such as contracting activity are available, reliable, and based on consistent methodology.
Gathering the units together under the authority of Treasury Board Secretariat would provide other important benefits. It would promote greater consistency across government in identifying and managing internal audit priorities in areas such as contracting, and grants and contributions. Following its review of the new Policy on Internal Audit, the Committee noted that previous policies on internal audit were good; the problem was that they had never been fully implemented. This new arrangement would allow for smooth, consistent, and full implementation of internal audit standards and new policy changes. It would also facilitate training and information sharing.
Based on the above considerations, the Committee recommends:
RECOMMENDATION 7
That the Government of Canada restructure the departmental internal audit functions in government so that they come under the authority of the Treasury Board Secretariat Centre of Excellence for Internal Audit.
When the new policy on internal audit was introduced, the government announced increased spending on internal audit. Departments were to be allocated an additional $7.2 million in fiscal year 2001-2002, and an additional $15 million in fiscal year 2002-2003 for internal audit. While this amount appears impressive, it is spread over a large number of departments and comes after years of reduced spending on internal audit.
The Committee questioned whether the additional funds would be sufficient.[19] It recommended that both implementation of the new policy and the funding levels associated with it be subject to careful review.[20] In light of the central importance of internal audit in identifying and rectifying problems associated with the mismanagement of contracting and sponsorship programs, the Committee believes that funding issues need to be examined sooner rather than later. Accordingly, the Committee recommends:
RECOMMENDATION 8
That Treasury Board Secretariat conduct an evaluation of the level of funding provided to the internal audit units to determine whether that funding is sufficient and report the results to Parliament by
31 October 2003.An issue that interested the Committee was the extent to which some senior departmental officials knew of decisions being taken in the Department’s Communications Coordination Services Branch. According to a series of organizational charts provided by Ms. Cochrane, before 1997 the executive director of the Advertising and Public Opinion Research Sector (APORS) reported to the Department’s Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM) of Government Operational Services. Following the creation of the CCSB in 1997, the Executive Director reported directly to the Deputy Minister.
As Mr. Quail testified, the Department is a large one and can only function on the basis of authorities that are delegated to others. A governance framework was established, an accountability chain and clear reporting relationships were in place, and there was an active audit function. In addition, an ethics program had been established that has been identified by the Office of Values and Ethics in Treasury Board Secretariat as a best practice.
Mr. Quail indicated that he relied heavily on the governance framework and had absolute trust in his departmental subordinates. As Deputy Minister however, after the problems experienced by Human Resources Development Canada, Mr. Quail thought it would be prudent to have internal audit confirm his trust in his subordinates to conduct business properly within the rules and procedures of government. The Committee considers that this adds support to its call for a coordinated internal audit function across departments and agencies, particularly those engaged in grants and contributions, and programs similar in nature to the Sponsorship Initiative.
Mr. Quail and Ms. Cochrane both emphasized that PWGSC is a large department with a complex mandate. The Department has approximately 14,000 employees and an annual budget of about $2.1 billion. It would therefore seem logical to conclude that a deputy minister in charge of such a department might not be expected to know the details of every action taken by every employee. However, Mr. Quail did testify that after November 1997, both former executive directors of the CCSB reported directly to him. This should have provided — and indeed was probably intended to give — the deputy minister ample opportunity to familiarize himself with the CCSB’s operations. Yet despite this reporting relationship, Mr. Quail testified that he was unaware of possible breaches of the Financial Administration Act committed by the CCSB, and unaware of the problems brought to light by the internal audit (that reviewed files dating from November 1997, the date that the direct reporting relationship began) and the Auditor General’s investigation (that focused on three contracts issued in 1996, 1998, and 1999). The responsibility to ask probing questions and get answers, especially about a particularly sensitive dossier, lies squarely on the deputy minister’s shoulders. Thus Mr. Quail’s professed lack of knowledge about what was going on in the CCSB reveals a disturbing lack of rigour and attention to key detail that one would normally expect of a deputy minister.
At one point during the meeting with Mr. Quail, one committee member questioned whether there was a high turnover of staff in the CCSB caused by frustration over the mismanagement of the sponsorship files. Mr. Quail denied knowledge of such turnover and testified that departmental employees could and did send “brown envelopes” that the Department had a way of dealing with. The current deputy minister testified that a newly introduced policy on internal disclosure (Policy on the Internal Disclosure of Information Concerning Wrongdoing in the Workplace) would provide safeguards for employees wishing to report instances of unethical behaviour.
The Policy on the Internal Disclosure of Information Concerning Wrongdoing in the Workplace came into effect on 30 November 2001, and is intended to “allow employees to bring forward information concerning wrongdoing, and to ensure that they are treated fairly and are protected against reprisal” provided they follow the procedures set forth in the Policy. The Policy defines wrongdoing as “a) a violation of any law or regulation; or b) the misuse of public funds or assets; or c) gross mismanagement; or d) a substantial and specific danger to the life, health, and safety of Canadians or the environment.” Deputy ministers are made responsible for applying the Policy and are required to designate a senior official in their departments to receive complaints of wrongdoing.
The Office of Values and Ethics in Treasury Board Secretariat is required to verify that all departments and agencies have internal disclosure mechanisms in place and the Policy will be subjected to review no later than three years after its implementation.
The Committee questions whether the Policy will be effective in allowing public servants to report instances of wrongdoing such as occurred within CCSB, whether employees will be adequately protected from reprisal, and whether complaints lodged under the Policy will result in appropriate corrective and/or disciplinary action. These concerns stem from similar reservations that the Committee has with regard to the current arrangements for internal audit units. Under the Policy on Internal Disclosure of Information Concerning Wrongdoing, the reporting and investigation of cases of suspected wrongdoing are primarily internalized within a department. Although the Policy creates the position of Public Service Integrity Officer to act as an external entity of matters of disclosure, departments are the first line in the disclosure process. This raises many of the same concerns raised above regarding potential reluctance to report suspected wrongdoing in an open and forthright manner. To avoid potential problems in this respect and to ensure that cases of suspected wrongdoing are dealt with expeditiously, in strictest confidence, and with maximum effectiveness, the Committee recommends:
RECOMMENDATION 9
That the Policy on the Internal Disclosure of Information Concerning Wrongdoing in the Workplace be amended to place the authority for its administration under the Office of Values and Ethics of the Treasury Board Secretariat and the Public Service Integrity Officer.
Furthermore, in the interest of transparency and to provide Parliament with information on the application of the Policy, the Committee recommends:
RECOMMENDATION 10
That the Public Service Integrity Officer monitor the application of the Policy on the Internal Disclosure of Information Concerning Wrongdoing in the Workplace, taking note of the number of instances of reported wrongdoing, their nature and outcome, and include this information in their annual report to the President of the Privy Council for tabling in Parliament beginning with the report for 2003.
The Committee questioned whether a breakdown in ethics was among the root causes that led to the maladministration of these files. Ms. Cochrane, the Department’s current deputy minister denied that this was the case. She told the Committee that “what we are dealing with is maladministration. Very poor administrative and management practices. I wouldn’t go so far as to say they were unethical.” She added that her department’s ethical framework coupled with the recently introduced policy on internal disclosure would discourage further unethical behaviour. Ms. Cochrane may be correct on the efficacy of new measures; only time will tell if she is right. However, some committee members question her conclusion that there was no ethical breakdown during the period in which the three contracts were issued.
Apart from the rules, policies, and guidelines that define how government contracting is to be managed, there is something else — a tacit understanding that governs (or should govern) behaviour in the conduct of this and all other kinds of public business. And that is a duty of loyalty, not just to the government as an employer, but to the citizens and taxpayers of Canada. Public servants are more than just employees; they are stewards of the public trust. Canadians depend on public servants to make careful choices, to spend public monies prudently, and to treat the public interest with care and the public with respect. There is no room for self-aggrandizement, no place for self‑serving or self-interested behaviour. There is only room for public service.
Some public servants, in their zeal to deliver a program, may be tempted to apply a personal perspective to public policy. This can result in cutting corners, in bending the rules, and in taking steps that, although contrary to government policy, appear justifiable in light of the goals they are said to serve. Nothing could be further from the truth. The ends never justify the means. An impropriety in the service of a good end still remains an impropriety.
During the testimony, it was never directly established why the executive director of the CCSB reported directly to the deputy minister, as shown by the organizational charts distributed by Ms. Cochrane. Although the Branch was delivering a particularly sensitive and important aspect of public policy, testimony suggested that it was completely removed from political decision making. None of the witnesses would acknowledge any ministerial involvement in the Branch’s operations and indeed, the Branch seems to have operated in a political vacuum. This appears to have been a result of how the reporting relationships were structured in the Department and the end result was to impede the government’s accountability for a major program being delivered under its auspices. The Committee believes that this kind of organizational arrangement should be eliminated and therefore recommends:
RECOMMENDATION 11
That the Government of Canada review its organizational charts to ensure that the reporting arrangements that existed between the former Communications and Coordination Services Branch and the Department of Public Works and Government Services are not replicated in its other departments and agencies.
As indicated earlier, Ms. Fraser told the Committee that while one former executive director of the CCSB should have been familiar with government contracting regulations, “one other was probably less aware … because he was in his position for a very short time.”
Under section 39(4) of the Public Service Employment Act, a person who has been employed as a minister’s executive assistant, special assistant, or private secretary for a minimum of three years is “entitled” for the period of one year after leaving that position, “to be appointed without competition … in priority to all other persons to a position in the Public Service, at a level at least equivalent to the level of private secretary to a deputy head, for which, in the opinion of the [Public Service] Commission, the person is qualified.”
The Committee questions whether this section of the Act is helpful in filling key public service positions, many of which are sensitive and require extensive knowledge of the internal policies, rules, and regulations of government. Those who hold jobs at the executive level in the public service are authorized to make important decisions, often involving significant levels of expenditure, often of a politically sensitive nature. They are also called upon to direct the actions of subordinates and to assess their performance. In the absence of appropriate skills and knowledge of public service procedures, it is difficult to understand how someone could be expected to meet the demands associated with these positions. Furthermore, maintaining the integrity of the public service is so vital that any mechanism that even remotely threatens to undermine that integrity by creating opportunities for conflicts of interest — or even a public perception of it — should be eliminated immediately. Lastly, the Committee believes that this section of the Act directly contradicts the mandate of the Public Service Commission, which is “to maintain and preserve a highly competent and qualified Public Service in which appointments are based on merit,” and to “ensure that the Public Service is non-partisan.”[21] Accordingly, the Committee recommends:
RECOMMENDATION 12
That the Government of Canada initiate a thorough review of sections 39.2‑39.6 of the Public Service Employment Act to ensure that they are being applied properly.
In his December 1998 Report, the former Auditor General concluded by observing that “In the past, we have made many recommendations to the government for improving contracting practices. Essentially they can be reduced to one: follow the existing rules.”[22]
In the end, maladministration of these three contracts demonstrates one thing. All of the rules, regulations, guidelines, and codes of ethics and values in the world cannot guarantee good behaviour and good performance. This is also the lesson to be derived from the way in which government contracting has been managed. The presence of a good framework of rules has not produced good contracting practice. Somehow, those rules have to be followed. This will only happen when proper incentives are in place, when an effective, independent internal audit function is in place, and when public servants who witness wrongdoing can report their concerns in a confidential manner to a neutral third party with the authority to act swiftly and decisively.
The audit findings were deeply disturbing, even for this committee, which is accustomed to problems with adherence to, and enforcement of, government contracting policies. The Committee hopes that its concerns and recommendations will receive careful attention and will contribute to develop a more transparent and effective contracting regime for the Government of Canada.
Pursuant to Standing Order 109, the Committee requests that the government table a comprehensive response to this report.
A copy of the relevant Minutes of Proceedings (Meeting Nos. 9, 12 and 17) is tabled.
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN WILLIAMS, M.P.
Chair
[1] See, Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons, October 2000, Chapter 11, Human Resources Development Canada — Grants and Contributions.
(http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/ reports.nsf/html/0011ce.html).[2] Public Works and Government Services Canada, Audit and Review Branch, Directed Audit of the Management of Sponsorships at the Communications Coordination Services Branch (CCSB) Final Report, 31 August 2000, p. 2-3. http://www.pwgsc.gc.ca/arb/pdf/2000-723-e.pdf.
[3] Ibid, p. 4.
[4] Required documents included a Sponsorship Proposal, a Sponsorship Approval Letter, a Visibility Plan, an Event Post Mortem Report, formal Estimates for the production of additional promotional materials, all contract documents, and fully supported invoices.
[5] Public Works and Government Services Canada, Audit and Ethics Branch, Follow-up Review of Sponsorship Files Final Report, 4 March 2002, p. 3. http://www.tpsgc.gc.ca/arb/pdf/2001-717-f.pdf.
[6] The Auditor General has indicated that the three contracts audited by her Office “were not sponsorship contracts like those that were audited in 2000” by the Department’s internal audit service. The same point was made by Ranald Quail, the Department’s Deputy Minister at the time the three contracts were issued. However, the findings of the internal audit are similar to those of the Auditor General to the extent that they show that disregard for contracting rules, failure to maintain proper documentation in the files, and a reliance on personal judgement instead of using objective means of selecting suppliers was standard behaviour in the CCSB.
[7] Office of the Auditor General of Canada, May 2002 — Special Audit Report, Report to the Minister of Public Works and Government Services on Three Contracts Awarded to Groupaction, p. 1-2.
[8] According to the Government Contracts Regulations and Treasury Board Secretariat’s Contracting Policy, sole-source contracting can only occur if at least one of the following conditions is present:
§ The contract is valued at less than $25,000;
§ There is a pressing emergency;
§ It is not in the public interest to solicit bids; or
§ Only one firm or person is capable of doing the work.
[9] Office of the Auditor General of Canada, News Release, 8 May 2002.
[10] Report of the Auditor General of Canada, December 1998, Chapter 26, Contracting for Professional Services — Selected Sole-source Contracts; Report of the Auditor General of Canada, September and November 1999, Chapter 30, Sole-Source Contracting for Professional Services: Using Advance Contract Award Notices.
[11] House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Accounts, 28th Report, 1st Session, 36th Parliament, Recommendation 4, tabled 5 May 1999; House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Accounts, 12th Report, 2nd Session, 36th Parliament, Recommendation 1, tabled 8 June 2000.
[12] Report of the Auditor General of Canada, 1998, Chapter 26, paragraph 58.
[13] Auditor General of Canada, 1999, paragraph 30.83.
[14] The working papers for the report were reconstituted and submitted after the contract had expired.
[15] Standing Committee on Public Accounts, 28th Report, 1st Session, 36th Parliament, Recommendation 1, tabled 5 May 1999.
[16] Standing Committee on Public Accounts, 7th Report, 1st Session, 37th Parliament, tabled 5 November 2001.
[17] Treasury Board Secretariat, Policy on Internal Audit.
[18] Ibid., p. 2.
[19] Standing Committee on Public Accounts, 7th Report, 1st Session, 37th Parliament, tabled 5 November 2001.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Public Service Commission of Canada, Web site: http://www.psc-cfp.gc.ca/centres/mission_e.htm.
[22] Auditor General of Canada, 1998, paragraph 26.58.
Dissenting Opinion regarding the Report of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts considering the May 2002 Audit Report of the Auditor General of Canada.
(From Mac Harb, Liberal M.P. and Member of the Committee)Breach of Parliamentary Privilege (In-Camera Order)
In preparation of this report, the Standing Committee on Public Accounts heard from many witnesses. On July 9th 2002, the Committee heard from one former Executive Director of the Communications Coordinators Services Branch, the branch responsible for delivering contracts. The Committee decided to convene an in-camera meeting with this witness. At the conclusion of this meeting, instead of respecting the pledge made to this witness, not to disclose information, some Opposition members breached the in-camera order by providing interviews to the media immediately after the closing of the hearing. The disclosure of information, even in part, in relation to the questions posed and answers given by the witness is contemptuous and is in direct breach of parliamentary privilege. To contravene the secrecy and confidentiality of the hearing by disclosing any part of it is a misconduct that jeopardizes the rights of a witness to justice and a fair hearing.
Some Committee Members Exceeded their Mandate
The Committee’s mandate is to investigate the administration of government programs and services, not to duplicate the work of the police or that of the Auditor General. Rather than attempting to focus on fulfilling this mandate, some opposition members may have betrayed their duty to Canadians. Guided by partisan interests, these members conducted a hearing that resembled a witch-hunt and rather than ask relevant questions, made a mockery of the process. Their actions diminished the committee’s credibility by breaking the confidentiality rules.
We have the finest public service in the world. It is unfortunate that certain Opposition committee members’ self-interest came at the expense of the integrity and efficacy of the public service.
Recommendation
It is recommended that the House of Commons condemn the action of those Opposition members in breach of the in-camera order and refer the matter to a parliamentary committee for investigation. Further, the House of Commons should ask the Committee to provide a Report naming those who broke the rules and provide options for disciplining them.
CANADIAN ALLIANCE SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT
TO THE REPORT OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON
PUBLIC ACCOUNTS ON THREE CONTRACTS
AWARDED TO GROUPACTIONThe findings of the Auditor General and the Public Accounts Committee regarding contracts awarded by the Government of Canada to Groupaction demonstrates the malaise, maladministration and misuse of the hard-earned dollars of Canadian taxpayers that is the hallmark of this government. Unfortunately, we must also conclude the contracts awarded involved the corruption of public officials. The Liberal government has made every attempt to cover-up this affair and prevented Canadians from learning the facts of the actions of the bureaucrats and politicians involved. It is because of this kind of conduct that Canadians do not trust their government.
The Canadian Alliance members of the committee would like to recognize the work of the Chairman of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts in trying to achieve consensus amongst members of the committee from all political parties. The Canadian Alliance wishes to thank him for his continued strong leadership of the committee.
The Canadian Alliance also acknowledges that the hearings into contracts awarded to Groupaction must be considered to be incomplete since a number of other key witnesses proposed by the opposition parties, who would have had knowledge of contracting practices of Public Works and Government Services Canada were rejected by the Liberal majority on the committee. They included the former Minister of Public Works, the Hon. Alfonso Gagliano, as well as senior public servants.
While the Canadian Alliance concurs with many of the recommendations in the report, we believe the report fails to acknowledge the ethical deficit emanating from the politicians, namely the Prime Minister and the former Minister of Public Works and Government Services and current ambassador to the Kingdom of Denmark, the Hon. Alfonso Gagliano.
The testimony provided from a number of witnesses, including the former Deputy Minister of Public Works, Mr. Ranald Quail, indicates that Mr. Gagliano was involved in sensitive political decisions. Mr. Quail was asked whether the former exeutive directors of the Communications Coordination Services Branch of PWGSC, Charles Guité and Pierre Tremblay, both reported directly to him, or to anyone other than him (61:1150). Mr. Quail responded, “They reported to me, but that doesn’t mean they didn’t have discussions with all kinds of people.” Mr. Quail went on to say that Mr. Guité and Mr. Tremblay “would have had discussions with the Minister (Mr. Gagliano) and his staff.” Under further questioning about the internal audit and a subsequent communications plan, Mr. Quail stated, “We had discussions with the PCO (Privy Council Office), and there was a subsequent meeting with the PCO and the PMO (Prime Minister’s Office).” (61:1225).
From this testimony it is difficult to believe a vacuum existed where senior politicians were not aware of what Mr. Quail, Mr. Guité and Mr. Tremblay were doing. It also suggests that the subsequent breakdown of ethics and the use and abuse of power at the most senior levels of the Government of Canada likely had its genesis with the former Minister, Alfonso Gagliano, and his staff. Under the Westminster system, it is the Minister who is ultimately responsible for his or her department. Therefore, the Canadian Alliance remains deeply concerned that Ministerial influence and “discussions” with senior public servants contributed to these very serious breaches of administrative and management practices.
The contracts referred to the RCMP by the Auditor General indicate the likelihood of impropriety and illegality with regard to government contracting within Public Works. Testimony from a greater number of witnesses would likely have brought further revelations to light. The reluctance of Liberal members to hear more witnesses suggests that certain members of the committee were more interested in saving the Prime Minister’s legacy rather than truly investigating what was happening within the PMO, PCO, and Public Works.
New information reveals that 11 contracts are now under RCMP investigation: 4 are for advertising and 7 for public opinion research. For the advertising contracts, there is no evidence that Public Works was notified as required by the Treasury Board policy on contracting. The contracting authority was not properly exercised. In one case, it did not exist at all. Therefore, an independent judicial inquiry is clearly required.
In conclusion, it is worthwhile to recall the words of the Auditor General herself. In her press release of 8 May 2002 she said, “This is a completely unacceptable way for government to do business. Canadian taxpayers deserve better.” The Canadian Alliance members of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts could not agree more.
Respectfully submitted by: Philip Mayfield, M.P., Val Meredith, M.P., Paul Forseth, M.P.
SUPPLEMENTARY OPINION BY THE BLOC QUÉBÉCOIS
Context
The Bloc Québécois subscribes to all the recommendations in this report. The administrative changes that it calls for will surprise taxpayers, who no doubt assumed that such measures already formed part of the federal administrative framework.
In this supplementary opinion, the Bloc Québécois would like to denounce the Committee’s failure to address the political reasons underlying the shambles in the sponsorship program and, more specifically, the federal government’s granting of three contracts to Groupaction, a communications agency with close ties to the Liberal Party of Canada.
An unfavourable context
The Bloc Québécois would like to point out that the government and the main witnesses in this matter were not co-operative and that the terms of the review were extremely difficult, as follows:
4. The Minister responsible for all this had been removed from office and sent to Denmark;
5. The Executive Director of the Communications Coordination Services Branch (CCSB) at the centre of the issue had to be compelled to appear;
6. Some meetings were held in camera, sheltered from the public eye;
7. Committee members had to question certain witnesses, even though they new that they might be hindering a parallel criminal investigation;
8. A number of the public servants questioned were not in their current jobs when the reports were commissioned from Groupaction;
9. Committee members were unable to meet with Groupaction executives.
The report ignores the essential issue
In many ways, the report’s recommendations appear rather unsubstantial in light of the immensity of the problem of cronyism and sweetheart deals.
10. It was revealed that Groupaction has been implicated in a variety of other questionable activities that testify to the Liberals’ largesse.
11. It was also shown that Groupaction maintained close relations with the Liberal Party of Canada.
The Bloc Québécois is proposing solutions that are tailored to match the scope of the problem
In addition to exposing and denouncing various problems with the federal government’s contracting process, the Bloc Québécois has proposed specific measures to ensure that the taxpayers’ money is managed in a more acceptable manner.
12. We are calling for an independent public inquiry to throw light on the close connection between the Liberal Party and the federal government’s contracting system.
13. For a long time now, we have been asking for a review of political party financing in order to establish a more progressive system that is based on public financing.
Odina Desrochers
Bloc Québécois Public Accounts critic
(Report to the Minister of Public Works and Government Services on Three Contracts Awarded to Groupaction)
The New Democratic Party dissents from this report on the grounds that we believe it fails to reflect all the elements of the investigation and study undertaken by the Public Accounts Committee into the mal-administration of the three advertising contracts awarded to the Groupaction public relations firm, and fails to make any reference to the serious allegations of political interference that were a key aspect of the questions put to witnesses.
While the report criticizes senior bureaucrats and department officials for displaying an appalling disregard for the rules designed to ensure prudence and probity in government procurement, and even recommends strong punitive measures up to and including dismissal of public servants who have demonstrated a pattern of disregard for these contracting rules, it lacks any reference to lines of questioning by several committee members to try to determine if there was any political influence that may ave contributed to the widespread, yet unexplained, flaunting of government standards.
Members of the Committee tried to pursue the truth about allegations of political impropriety or possible “kickback schemes” and money-for-nothing contracts. Our attempts to resolve these troubling questions once and for all through the evidence of additional key witnesses were prevented by a Committee vote in which the government majority overrode the wishes of other Committee members. Regrettably, this served to reinforce suspicions rather than to answer them.
The Report’s silence on this matter could leave Parliament with the impression that the committee was satisfied that it had completed its investigation into this affair. Many opposition members were not at all satisfied and spoke out strongly against concluding our study. It was felt that neither the RCMP investigation nor the further investigation of the Auditor General would have the ability to answer the important questions surrounding possible political interference and that only the continued work of the committee could unearth these facts on Parliament’s behalf.
New Democrats believe that while it is important to report to Parliament that rules were broken or ignored in the awarding of these contracts and to recommend measures that may preclude such abuse in the future, it is equally important to alert Parliament that there remain significant unexplored elements of this issue.
New Democrats further believe the Report should have recommended the introduction of substantial and comprehensive whistle-blower legislation instead of referring only to the Policy on the Internal Disclosure of Information Concerning Wrongdoing in the Workplace as an avenue of recourse for public servants. We do not believe the Internal Disclosure policy is adequate to give employees assurance that they can report wrongdoing without fear of reprisal, especially in matters as serious as the subject of this report. Instead we refer Parliament to the many Private Members Bills that have been developed on this subject in recent years and encourage the prompt adoption of such measures without delay.
It is our opinion that, as it stands, the Committee Report is incomplete in its accounting of the Committee’s work and that neither Parliament’s nor Canadians’ interests have been well served by this investigation into the Groupaction sponsorship advertising contracts.