NDDN Committee Related Document

The fire aboard HMCS Chicoutimi on 5 October 2004 was the latest and the most serious incident in the trouble-plagued history of the acquisition of four Upholder class submarines for the Canadian Forces. This acquisition was controversial even before the official announcement in April 1998 that Canada had reached an agreement with the United Kingdom to obtain submarines previously operated by the Royal Navy. Over the years, the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs has raised some issues about this acquisition during its review of the budget for the Department of National Defence and its studies such as the one on the readiness of the Canadian Forces. However, the gravity of the latest incident has prompted the Committee to undertake a full-scale examination of the submarine acquisition project. The Committee will not duplicate the work of the Board of Inquiry established by the Canadian Forces to investigate the fires onboard HMCS Chicoutimi. It will instead review the military, departmental, and government decisions concerning the acquisition of the four submarines and the measures necessary to bring them up to full operational status. The main parameters of the Committee’s study are as follows:

ASSESSMENT OF THE EQUIPMENT NEEDS OF THE CANADIAN FORCES

The Committee will examine how the equipment needs of the Canadian Forces and its various elements, including the navy, are assessed, with particular attention to the acquisition of the four Upholder class submarines from the United Kingdom. In line with Canada’s defence policy as enunciated in the 1994 Defence White Paper, the Canadian Forces have a number of maritime tasks to fulfil. These include the protection, surveillance, and control of Canadian territorial waters, the assertion of Canadian sovereignty in those waters, and participation in maritime operations anywhere in the world in support of multinational actions, such as those undertaken by the United Nations. The Committee will examine how decisions were reached concerning the capabilities required by the Canadian Forces to fulfil their maritime tasks and the specific equipment or platform deemed necessary to provide those capabilities. In particular, the Committee will review the decisions to maintain a submarine capability by replacing the old Oberon submarines and those which led to the selection of the Upholder submarines offered by the United Kingdom when other options were available to Canada. The value of submarines, especially for surveillance of Canadian waters, will be compared to the capabilities provided by surface ships and maritime patrol aircraft and those offered by Uninhabited Air Vehicles (UAVs) and other advanced technology. Given the increasing attention paid to Canada’s ability to assert its sovereignty in its Arctic waters, the limited capacity of the selected submarines to operate in northern waters, especially under the polar icecap, will be an issue. The lack of an Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) system aboard the selected submarines and any plans to add such a capability at some point in time to improve the effectiveness of the submarines in Arctic waters will also be studied. In short, the Committee will examine why the Government decided, as indicated in the 1994 Defence White Paper, to pursue the option of acquiring diesel-electric submarines and to what extent the boats obtained meet Canada’s requirements, both in terms of submarine capability and overall military readiness.

ACQUISITION PROCESS

The acquisition of the Upholder submarines has at least two features not usually found in military equipment purchases. The equipment was used for a short period by another country’s armed forces before it was delivered to Canada and the contractual agreement involves the leasing and eventual purchase of the submarines with, according to initial announcements, an exchange of goods and services. The Committee will examine why the submarines were obtained in such a manner and compare this method with the usual process through which equipment is acquired for the Canadian Forces. Issues for investigation include the tendering process, if any, undertaken to obtain the submarines and the equipment required for the Canadianization measures; the options available from other foreign countries and from Canadian and foreign suppliers to replace the old Oberon class submarines; the evaluation of the costs to acquire and operate the submarines; and the actual contract between the Canadian and United Kingdom governments. The Committee will also focus on the evaluation made on the extent to which the equipment selected meet the navy’s criteria for effective and safe operational use and on the delays caused by the problems encountered while preparing the submarines for delivery from the United Kingdom and while bringing them up to operational status within the Canadian fleet. During the examination of the acquisition process, particular attention will be paid to the role played by the lead department, the Department of National Defence, in determining how the submarines would be acquired; on the actions of the contracting authority, the Department of Public Works and Government Services; and on the involvement of any other government department in the acquisition process.

DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

While examining the specific decisions taken concerning the submarine project, the Committee will also look in general at the decision-making mechanism at all levels of the process. The Committee will review the different layers of decision-making concerning the major capital projects of the Department of National Defence. Some of the issues to be considered include how the various elements of the Canadian Forces such as the navy decide their equipment needs; how the department determines the priority given to the various capital projects it undertakes; the role of the Minister of National Defence in guiding the choice of priorities made by the department and in obtaining the approval of capital projects by the Cabinet; and the impact of government budgetary decisions on how military capital projects are funded.

TRAINING OF CANADIAN SUBMARINERS

The delays in replacing the old Oberon submarines and in bringing the Victoria class to full operational status have had an impact on maintaining the training level of experienced submariners and the training of new crewmembers. As a result, the Committee will review the training provided to Canadian submariners and the extent to which the delays in the acquisition process affect the ability of the navy to generate the required number of submariners for its fleet of submarines. While the navy has taken measures to provide various tools such as simulators, training aboard an operational submarine is an important factor in maintaining the skills of experienced submariners and training new ones. The Committee will look at how the navy has adjusted its training program to deal with the delays in the acquisition process, in the Canadianization of the submarines, and in bringing them up to full operational status.