SRID Committee Meeting

SUB-COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

SOUS-COMITÉ DES DROITS DE LA PERSONNE ET DU DÉVELOPPEMENT INTERNATIONAL DU COMITÉ PERMANENT DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES ET DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Wednesday, November 17, 1999

• 1538

[English]

The Chair (Ms. Colleen Beaumier (Brampton West—Mississauga, Lib.): I call the meeting of the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Development of the Standing Committee of Foreign Affairs and International Trade to order.

Today our testimony is going to be on the human rights abuses in Burma. With us today from the Canadian Friends of Burma, we have Murray Thomson, chair of the executive committee; Penny Sanger, member of the executive committee; and Christine Harmston, government liaison. It's nice to see you again, Christine. We've missed you.

In the first section we're going to hear from our Canadian Friends of Burma, and in the second part of these hearings we're going to be hearing from the Department of Foreign Affairs.

You have a presentation, I assume.

Ms. Penny Sanger (Member, Executive Committee, Canadian Friends of Burma): I was going to lead off, Madam Chair, with an update of what's actually going on now in Burma, which some of you will be aware of and others will not.

For the last two or three weeks we've been hearing about thousands of forced deportations from Thailand back into Burma of Burmese refugees or migrant workers. The numbers are somewhere—numbers are notoriously difficult in this part of the world—between 8,000 and 10,000 people being forced from their refugee camps or from Bangkok back over the border into Burma, or sheltering in the forests along the Thai border or in Burma itself.

Let me speak very briefly about the situation that these people, who are mostly of Karen and Shan ethnic backgrounds, are facing. Most of them will find their villages gone, burnt, devastated, their crops destroyed, and their fruit trees cut down. There's been enormous displacement of people, particularly in the ethnic areas—not only, but particularly in the ethnic areas—in Burma. They will find themselves lacking any village to go back to and not wanting to go into the fortified villages, which the regime has herded people into. They will find themselves having to live and forage in the forest, where they may find many others like themselves, who are just keeping out of the way of the Burmese military and trying to exist on what the forest produces.

• 1540

If they go to the cities they'll be marked people because of their ethnicity and they'll be subject to extortion and rape. We know that those two are standard instruments of the regime in power in Burma now.

Forced labour is endemic. The ILO, the International Labour Organization, did a lengthy study of this. It refers to millions of people subject to forced labour in Burma. The numbers of people who are estimated to be forcibly displaced from their homes and livelihoods is one and a half million people.

These deportations are a tragic sign of something that's quite unusual in Burma, and that is a very abrupt and marked rise in violence. This started with the embassy invasion, the invasion by Burmese activists of the Burma embassy in Bangkok. Thailand responded quite gently to that. The result from the Burmese was great hostility. They sent troops to the border and in many places closed the border. The Thais have responded. The result is it's a much more violent situation among Burmese activists and among migrants all along that border than it generally has been. There's a build-up of troops along the border, and the border has been closed.

So many of these deportations I started talking about don't get any further than the actual border. Many people are stranded on islands in the Moei River between the Thai border and Burma.

As probably some of you know as well, there's been a huge rise in the growth of the Burmese army. Its numbers a decade or so ago were 180,000, and it's now closing on 400,000—three hundred and eighty-something thousand.

Defence spending has doubled in the last 10 years. It's almost 40% of the total budget. Health has shrunk from 6% in 1989 to 3% or less. Spending on education has also shrunk, from 14% to less than 10%. In human terms, this means that most school-aged children get only a very few years of elementary schooling, if that. It means that infant mortality has reached 105 deaths per 1,000 births and that among children under the age of five, 150 out of every 1,000 of them die before they reach five years old.

This is for a country that used to be the most literate country in Asia and one of the very richest. Today it depends on foreign investment and its relationship with and aid from China.

I'd like to say something urgently now about the need for the Department of Foreign Affairs to reconsider its stand regarding investment sanctions on Burma. You will know that Foreign Minister Axworthy two years ago introduced sanctions against Burma, which had a very slight effect, because, as he explained, there was nothing he could do about sanctioning Canadian investment in Burma. Now we have quite a few mining companies functioning in Burma, mining gold and copper deposits mainly. The biggest foreign-owned mining corporation in Burma is owned by a Canadian firm from Vancouver, Ivanhoe Mines.

• 1545

We've been told by Foreign Affairs that there's nothing they can do about it because they have not had an instruction from the United Nations and what they see in Burma is not judged by them to be a threat to regional security. We would argue otherwise. We would say that for a regime of this sort, which is reeling still from Asia's financial crisis....

We just heard today that 95% of foreign investment has been cut off; it's dropped 95% in Burma. Violence is growing. Many major corporations have gone. The Americans have imposed investment sanctions, and there's a rise in many U.S. cities and municipalities in selective purchasing agreements, which means these cities and municipalities refuse to buy anything from any corporation that does business with Burma.

We believe this is the time to introduce Canadian investment sanctions on Burma. It's not going to be as effective later. Possibly it won't be as effective later.

There is a big gas pipeline, the Yadana gas pipeline, coming on stream in a year or so that will bring in up to $400 million U.S. annually to Burma. As you know, Burma is in ASEAN, and its position will be more regularized there.

So we really would like the department to reconsider this situation. We believe that Burma's notorious record in drugs at least shows that it is a source of regional insecurity and a source that works against the economic and social development of the whole region, because with drugs—intravenous injected drugs—there's an epidemic of HIV/AIDS.

We would really like the department to reconsider this situation. We can get into the whole drug thing a little bit later. We do have some paper on this.

I would ask my colleagues if they would like to add something about the situation now.

Mr. Murray Thomson (Chair, Executive Committee, Canadian Friends of Burma): Thanks, Penny.

We thought it important for a committee of the House to be updated on the efforts to restore democratic processes in Burma today. I'll give you a little background on this. Many of you will know that back in 1990 a national election was held in which the overwhelming majority of Aung San Suu Kyi's party, the National League for Democracy, were elected. There were 385 members of parliament elected from her party, about 65 members of the ethnic group parties were elected, and about 35 to 40 members of the military regime, then known as the SLORC. What's happened to these members of parliament? The figures we have seen indicate that initially almost 48 NLD members of parliament were forced to resign, another 66 were dismissed, as were 48 from other parties, three of the results were overturned, and 20 of the members of parliament went into exile.

What have the democratic forces tried to do to bring about a representation of the legitimate rights of the people of Burma? They established in September of last year a committee to represent the people's parliament. It was about the same time that the SLORC, now called the State Peace and Development Council, began wholesale arrests of members of parliament. The committee, set up by a working group, consists of seven elected members of the National League for Democracy and three others who are not elected. That includes Aung San Suu Kyi and Tin Oo, of the national executive, and then one representative of the minority ethnic groups. This group of 10 members of parliament hold the proxies of more than 250 elected members of parliament, so they feel they have a great deal more justification for giving direction to the country than the present regime.

You'll recall that the present regime came in, first of all, by a military coup d'état, followed two years later by another military coup d'état, and then the complete rejection of the overwhelming defeat in the national election.

• 1550

The Committee Representing the People's Parliament has promoted a number of measures, including the restoration of habeas corpus, the revoking of the 1950 Emergency Provisions Act—it is used for the suppression of dissent—and one of the earlier village acts, which went back a long way, allowing the conscription of indentured labour, which Penny has referred to, and finally, the protesting of the ongoing violation of laws.

At about the same time, the military set up a 15-person political committee, including two from its reigning regime, formerly the state, now the State Peace and Development Council, together with military intelligence. It's apparent that this is the group that's forming the strategy in the ongoing suppression, which we have heard about in other ways.

I would just add to this that in recent times the National League for Democracy congress met and again called upon the regime to recognize the lawful rights of the elected people. Up to December, more than 200 members of parliament and 700 local constituent members of various executive committees had been arrested. Plus, there was a series of mass rallies, of course trying to discredit the regime. The mass rallies have usually been successful because of compulsory participation; you paid fines—or worse—if you didn't turn up at these mass rallies.

I will say just a word or two about the special rapporteur's report, which was given to the United Nations just last month, I think; it was reported in October. He said that all of the political opposition parties are being intensely monitored, with their movements restricted. Members of political parties can't even leave their homes without permission. If they do so, they can be arrested and interrogated. The National League for Democracy's working committees have been dismantled and the offices shut. The families of political dissidents have also been targeted. There are a number of other things in line with the general policy of suppression.

So you can see the contrast between the ongoing processes of this parliament and our members of Parliament and what your counterparts who have been duly elected in Burma have been facing over the past 10 years.

The Chair: Thank you.

Christine.

Ms. Christine Harmston (Government Liaison, Canadian Friends of Burma): Thank you.

Just to quickly recap, the situation is obviously extremely dire. The situation is regressing every single day. The peoples of Burma are suffering incredibly. The democracy movement has been calling for the following things that we are telling you about today: investment sanctions and a Canadian parliamentary official support statement of the Committee Representing the People's Parliament, which would go a long way in endorsing the democracy movement in Burma. Not only are we asking for that on behalf of the democracy movement, but we are also working actively on an effort for the Canadian International Development Agency to support the establishment and the buildup of a future administration of a democratic Burma.

CIDA has been supporting some projects along the Thai-Burma border for a number of years now and has been supporting a medical clinic on the Thai-Burma border that is assisting in providing emergency medical relief to the internally displaced.

There is also the peacebuilding, as Ms. Brown will obviously relate later. There has been some peacebuilding work with the ethnic groups.

This current initiative that Canadian Friends of Burma is embarking on, what we've been discussing for a while now, is to open up an envelope within CIDA for multi-year funding, which would allow for a series of sustainable projects on all of Burma's borders. That would involve health, education, communications, human rights, gender, and environment projects.

• 1555

Burma obviously has not been allowed ODA. The regime has not been given ODA since 1988. This is something we continue to support and are not asking for a “re-decision” on. But we believe strongly that the democracy forces should not be punished for the regime not being allowed to receive ODA in terms of CIDA saying they don't have a Burma desk so therefore they cannot work through the different branches to provide funding to Burma.

We believe an envelope could be set up within CIDA in order to have funding go to the democracy forces on Burma's borders, in India and primarily in Thailand, to the groups with whom we can work freely and openly in an accountable and transparent way. We are developing a concept paper in order to start a whole series of capacity-building projects. In fact, a number of our colleagues are in Thailand right now, reviewing this initiative with partner groups of ours.

Today we first want to thank the subcommittee for their past support of initiatives such as these, and we continue to ask for your support for our initiatives in this area, because there is something we can do. We cannot right now go inside Burma because of the situation, but we can work from the borders in a very effective way to strengthen the democracy movement and build up a future administration.

The Chair: Christine, after the last time you appeared before our committee we put forth a resolution in the main committee advising or suggesting that CIDA give support to Friends of Burma. I had an unofficial phone call telling me that the committee's support may in fact have hindered your procurement of funds. Do you know if there's any validity to that?

Ms. Christine Harmston: No, not to my knowledge. It was greatly welcomed. It enabled us to show the officials that there was parliamentary support. This was something we were very appreciative of.

The Chair: Okay. I just wanted to clarify that because I had been told by a couple of people that we may in fact have hindered more than we helped.

Ms. Christine Harmston: I don't know who stated that, but it's certainly not from our end.

The Chair: Great. That's good to know. Thank you.

Mr. Rocheleau.

[Translation]

Mr. Yves Rocheleau (Trois-Rivières, BQ): Good day.

Ms. Sanger, you stated that the sanctions introduced by Canada had had very little effect to date. Could you elaborate on that statement for us? Could you also tell us what the international community is doing and if you are satisfied with the sanctions it has introduced, if in fact it has imposed sanctions?

Finally, realistically and pragmatically, what can we do as long as this regime is still in power? Should we not try and work with it, to some extent? At issue, of course, is the question of state sovereignty. However, how far can the international community go while this horrid regime is still in power?

[English]

Ms. Penny Sanger: Well, as I said, the United States are the only ones that have imposed investment sanctions. We believe there is a case to be made regarding the security of other countries, not only Burma. It's not just interfering in the affairs of Burma itself, although I think that would be warranted because of the huge increase in HIV and AIDS as a result of injection drug use.

The roots of illegally exported heroin have been definitively traced into China and into India on one side and then up through Afghanistan and into central Europe. Burmese heroin, which is very strong, has been found as far south in India as Madras. We think this is an international and certainly a regional crisis, not only for drugs but for the health of the peoples of those countries. That of course goes for Thailand as well.

• 1600

We are arguing that the drug issue constitutes a reason for imposing our own investment sanctions on Burma. We don't believe that imposing our own investment sanctions is going to bring this regime to its knees, but I think other middle powers might follow.

There's a sort of feeling around of “Who is going to go first on this one?”I speak from talking to other activists who are pushing this in their own countries. It's not only heroin, it's amphetamines too. The amphetamine business has exploded in the last 18 months. Actually, I was really hoping we could bring a video, but we didn't get it in time. A video has been made of Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt, who is the leader of the Burmese regime. He was evidently filmed surreptitiously when he visited a new building just over the Thai border that is strongly believed to be manufacturing amphetamines, which are then exported into Thailand illegally.

Nobody is able definitely to pin a leading member of the regime to the drug industry, but it's widely known that certain more junior generals and officers who are posted in battalions on the border run their own heroin refineries and are deeply implicated in the heroin-exporting business, and possibly amphetamines as well.

So with this knowledge we argue there is no point in dealing with the regime, as we understood Minister Axworthy suggested. We're not sure that is still the policy of this government or not. The only way to deal with this crisis is to help build democracy. You can't deal with drugs where there is no freedom of information, where everybody's scared stiff to register as a drug user.

That is really our response for the whole business of investment.

I realize what you're saying about sovereignty, and I realize there are not many other countries that have applied investment sanctions against Burma. But we think it's a question of failure of political will on the side of this government and not a real legal case.

We've had a lawyer on this for over a year now. His paper should be available to you. That's his conclusion, that it's a failure of political will.

Ms. Christine Harmston: Just to support that, if I could just quickly add that in terms of sovereignty, the elected legitimate leaders of Burma, who have not been allowed into power, have asked the international community to impose sanctions on Burma because of the current situation.

So it really is a matter of perspective. The legitimate leaders are calling for international intervention on this. It's the military regime, which is the illegal entity currently in power, that does not want this to happen. But the democratically elected leaders do and have stated that over and over again.

Ms. Penny Sanger: Maybe I could just add too that there were investment sanctions on trade, but they weren't effective. Since the investment sanctions were applied, trade between Canada and Burma has grown so that now there is even more. The major commodity is cotton clothing, but that's been overtaken by shrimp and shellfish, which are now our major imports. I don't have the figures in front of me, but the value of the trade is much higher than it was two years ago.

• 1605

The Chair: Thank you.

We'll take a little break for a moment. Please forgive my lack of manners. For the benefit of the committee, I'd like you to know that we have with us today His Royal Highness Norodom Sirivudh, Prince of Cambodia. Accompanying him is Dr. Kao Kim Hourn, executive director of the Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace, and Pierre Lizée, a political professor at Brock University. They're here to watch how we conduct our hearing. Welcome. We know you have issues as well.

Mr. Robinson.

Mr. Svend J. Robinson (Burnaby—Douglas, NDP): Thank you, Madam Chair. I want to join in welcoming our witnesses here from Canadian Friends of Burma and to thank them for their tireless efforts on behalf of the people of Burma, along with others, including Amnesty International and the Vancouver Burma Roundtable, a group I'm familiar with from my own area.

To follow up on a couple of issues that have been raised—I know we have limited time because we have departmental officials here as well—I want to ask questions in two areas.

First of all, just to note—and Ms. Sanger made the point in terms of trade—as I understand it, trade has almost doubled in the last two years to about $23 million. I believe that's the correct figure. So since the imposition of some of the measures by the minister, trade has in fact gone up, not down, while repression has in fact gotten worse.

This would be the worst possible time, I believe, Madam Chair, for Canada to engage with the Burmese government, as the minister is reported to have suggested we do. He said we want to do that to deal with the drug problem, and I think we've heard a very powerful argument as to why that would be a profound mistake.

Instead, I believe we should, as a country, be showing leadership here. I will be giving notice of motion that this committee adopt a motion at our next meeting, Madam Chair, and I'm just giving notice of that motion now. The motion will have two major components. The first would be calling on our government to recognize as the legitimate authority in Burma today the Committee Representing the People's Parliament, the CRPP, as has been requested; and secondly, urging our government to impose investment sanctions on the illegal regime in Burma. I'll get the wording of that to the clerk of the committee, but I wanted to give notice that I intend to proceed with that at the next meeting.

I heard a very powerful witness, Aung San Suu Kyi, on a video last month in Berlin at the Inter-Parliamentary Union conference, in which she pleaded with parliamentarians around the world to recognize the CRPP. This would be a very powerful signal to them and also to the illegal regime, and I hope this committee is prepared to make that recommendation to our government.

The witnesses mentioned that some cities and municipalities in the United States were attempting to use their procurement policy, purchasing power, to stop buying goods from companies that trade with Burma. Yesterday in the committee on foreign affairs and trade, I raised the issue of the State of Massachusetts, which attempted to do precisely that and was told that WTO rules don't allow it.

I wonder if perhaps our witnesses could just give us a bit of background on that, because some of us are concerned that indeed this could be a barrier, and that Canada should be raising the issue in Seattle about this kind of barrier to cities, municipalities, and other jurisdictions, and taking this kind of stand. I wonder if we could get a bit of information on what actually happened in Massachusetts and what you'd suggest Canada do in response to that.

Ms. Penny Sanger: We were discussing this just before. We actually don't know whether Massachusetts is appealing that—

Mr. Gerry Schmidt (Committee Researcher): They are.

Ms. Penny Sanger: They are appealing.

Mr. Gerry Schmidt: In the U.S. Supreme Court.

Ms. Penny Sanger: Okay, great. Good.

I think there are 23 cities and municipalities that are using this legislation as of now, and it has a very respectable history. Probably some of you here will remember, when the apartheid regime was in power in South Africa, how careful we all were about buying South African wine. That had a big effect on South Africa's trade.

• 1610

We have tried to do the same thing here.

I think I'd better hand it over to Chris.

There was some problem that happened with the City of Vancouver, Svend.

Ms. Christine Harmston: In brief, it was sort of a problem of legality, the way the lawyers for the City of Vancouver proceeded in the court to carry out the case of Shell versus Vancouver, during the South African apartheid era. It was actually just poor procedures on the part of the lawyers for the city, which allowed for the case to be in favour of Shell. We've had a number of lawyers review that, and they have argued that if it were done again, the case could be won in favour of the city.

That has had sort of a chill effect in many areas. In the city of Toronto, we've tried to pass city-wide selective purchasing. The chill effect of Shell versus Vancouver is still in existence, but it's starting to thaw.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Have you looked at the impact of the WTO on this, given the Massachusetts decision?

Ms. Christine Harmston: With your permission, maybe we could provide more information for you at a later date.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Sure.

Ms. Christine Harmston: Basically, with Canada and Burma signatories to the WTO, there must be some form of trade happening between the two countries, and the same goes for the U.S. So the WTO is intervening, saying when you're a signatory to the WTO, there cannot be a complete halt on trade. That's a very simplistic definition.

Mr. Svend Robinson: That's not the issue; the issue is procurement policies.

If you could get some more information for the committee, that would be helpful. Thank you.

Thanks, Madam Chair.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.): Merci beaucoup. Thank you.

Thank you for your visit here in Ottawa. I also met the Friends of Burma in my office in Montreal. I don't accept the regime, that's for sure.

I have a couple of questions, and also questions for Ms. Harmston regarding the ODA.

Last August, the Australian human rights commissioner went to visit Myanmar. Is his report available to us, so we can know what his concerns are? Mr. Alvaro de Soto, the Deputy Secretary General of the United Nations, also went to Myanmar last October. I don't know if you have any reports from him. It would be good if our committee could study these reports to see what the impact of their visits has been over there.

On ODA, I was in Japan last week and I discussed it with my counterparts in Japan. For sure, Japan is the largest contributor of ODA in the world—over $12 billion U.S. What they're doing right now is a little bit the opposite of what you're asking us on sanctions. They are investing very few dollars—maybe $10,000—in growing crops. They started last December to grow crops to try to replace the poppies or the heroin—I mean the drug itself. This year, they told me they are going to increase it and grow sugar cane, lychees, and some apples.

If we put on more sanctions, I'm not sure it will work, because effectively it didn't work. We increased the sugar trade with them. But if we try to help them, even if we don't accept the regime itself.... I don't know.

I just want to get your opinion first about this visit of the Australian commissioner and also the Deputy Secretary General of the United Nations, and then on the ODA.

Ms. Penny Sanger: We have copies, and I'll send them along to you, of the UN special rapporteur's visit. That just came in.

I haven't heard anything from the Australians.

Ms. Christine Harmston: We have all those reports on the Internet, and we can definitely get them to you.

Ms. Penny Sanger: Helping crop eradication is a biggie. The UNDCP, the UN international drug control program, has not had very great success in doing that. I don't know what the success rate of the Japanese has been.

Mr. Bernard Patry: It's one year. They started this in December last year.

Ms. Penny Sanger: It obviously has to be done. Those people have to have something else to live off completely.

• 1615

But the larger social situation in which they live will ultimately help bring the whole drug problem under control: that is freedom, freedom of expression, free flow of information, and lack of fear.

People in the countryside would not for one minute register as being HIV positive or heroin addicts. The Burmese regime considers these terrible sins in the Buddhist religion, and they don't want to admit to them.

We don't have the resources ourselves to help with crop eradication. We don't know of anybody in Canada who would be skilled and effective at doing that kind of thing. We stand by our argument that there will be no change in the situation that will allow drugs to be really eradicated, or at least brought under control, until you get a more democratic situation. People must feel free enough to speak and publish, and turn themselves in as heroin addicts and HIV-positive.

Ms. Christine Harmston: If I could also add to that, in the area of drugs, as Penny was saying, there are certain junior officers in the regime who are personally involved in heroin production.

The regime as a whole is systematically involved in heroin production, in terms of funnelling heroin money into state enterprises, and drug laundering in Rangoon. The tourist industry is being funded largely by heroin production. Roads and physical infrastucture are being built by drug lords, who have moved to Rangoon and are now working hand in hand with the regime in business deals.

While crop replacement of the poppy is a small intervention, it's very much a band-aid approach to the more systematic core issue. As Penny was saying, the emphasis should first be placed on political reform in the country, because then you will be able to use your time, energy, and financial resources far more effectively than if we started doing something now.

Mr. Bernard Patry: Thank you. Merci.

Mr. Murray Thomson: If I could just add to that and strengthen it, those are not our opinions so much as the opinions of our allies and friends in Burma, many of whom have been risking their lives for years. They say “Don't do anything to increase the legitimacy of this grossly illegal regime that is oppressing us.” It's that emphasis that gives us direction in our proposals.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Bellemare.

[Translation]

Mr. Eugène Bellemare (Carleton—Gloucester, Lib.): Thank you, Madam Chair.

[English]

This is my first experience on this committee, so I will ask you who are and what is the Friends of Burma, in a nutshell?

Mr. Murray Thomson: About 10 years ago, many of us who knew something about Burma and were concerned about what was happening there held a seminar. Thanks to Svend Robinson, we held it in the Centre Block. There were 175 people who took part in that seminar from 10 states of the United States and right across Canada.

Out of that came the idea that we should have an ongoing committee or group that would speak for the rights of the Burmese people, as we understood them. That is where the Canadian Friends of Burma came from.

It's essentially a small committee but with a large network across Canada now of people who share our concern and are trying to do something about the objectives.

Mr. Eugène Bellemare: Where do you get your financing?

Ms. Christine Harmston: We have been receiving funding every year, since 1992 or 1993, from the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development in Montreal. They give us core funding. We receive funding from the Open Society Institute, George Soros' foundation in New York, for our newsletters. We also have membership fees and have received funding from major labour and church organizations in Canada for various campaigns we're doing.

Mr. Eugène Bellemare: What kind of money are you talking about here—$10,000, $10 million?

• 1620

Ms. Christine Harmston: Our operating budget per year is roughly $20,000 to cover everything, and then we will have $5,000 and $10,000 campaigns.

Mr. Eugène Bellemare: Would you be recognized as an NGO?

Ms. Christine Harmston: We are a non-governmental organization.

Mr. Eugène Bellemare: How can you certify or prove everything you say if you tell us that you can't go in, that you have to be at the border? Do you listen in against the post?

Ms. Christine Harmston: The veins of what happens in Burma get transferred and follow out into the border areas. The people who flee from the cities and the urban rural areas of Burma are fleeing to the borders, and there is a constant flow of information back and forth. From—

Mr. Eugène Bellemare: No one has actually been in to certify, to say, “Yes, I have seen this”?

Ms. Christine Harmston: Do you mean amongst ourselves?

Mr. Eugène Bellemare: Yes, you, for example.

Ms. Christine Harmston: Yes, I was in Rangoon in 1996, and I met with Aung San Suu Kyi, and I was able to witness forced labour and child labour first-hand. I met with elected members of parliament. I met with students who had just come out of jail. So I have had first-hand accounts of what's happening inside the country.

We work with partners who have organizations that are based on the border. They work with people inside who work underground in the rural areas, documenting with little video machines and cameras. They document what's going on and they send it back out to the border areas.

Mr. Eugène Bellemare: Forced labour? Give me an example of what you have seen.

Ms. Christine Harmston: I saw shackled political prisoners in Mon State, which is one of the ethnic states. These are political prisoners from a nearby jail who are working in a rock quarry. They're shackled to each other in leg irons, and they have to carry huge boulders by hand from the top of the mountain down to the bottom. Major roads and railways and tourist industry works are being built by forced labour, by political prisoners, as well as by individuals who are basically taken from their villages and forced at gunpoint to build Burma's infrastructure.

Mr. Eugène Bellemare: We talk of investment sanctions and/or commercial sanctions. Do you feel investment sanctions would not hurt the communities, the people who work there?

Ms. Christine Harmston: They are not benefiting from the investment that is going into Burma at this time.

For example, the major gas pipeline that is being built by California's Unical and France's TOTAL has been built with massive forced relocation. In the area where the pipeline is being built, thousands of villagers have been forced to leave their villages and have been moved to relocation sites that are under the regime's control.

Mr. Eugène Bellemare: Without consultation?

Ms. Christine Harmston: Exactly, yes. TOTAL and Unical have hired foreign mercenaries and have also paid the Burmese army to come in and basically secure the area.

Mr. Eugène Bellemare: This is an American company?

Ms. Christine Harmston: Yes, Unical.

Mr. Eugène Bellemare: What is the United States doing about that?

Ms. Christine Harmston: Actually, there is a lawsuit against Unical under the Aliens Tort Act, and it is now currently going on in California.

Mr. Eugène Bellemare: Who instituted the lawsuit?

Ms. Christine Harmston: The U.S. There's a law—

Mr. Eugène Bellemare: The government?

Ms. Christine Harmston: No, not the government, but major law firms in the States have used the Aliens Tort Act.

Mr. Eugène Bellemare: Has the government itself been doing anything?

Ms. Christine Harmston: The American government has imposed a “no new investment” sanction, but it is not retroactive. Unical is therefore still allowed to operate.

Mr. Eugène Bellemare: How can CIDA help out in health and education? One of you three mentioned that health and education is something we should get into.

Ms. Christine Harmston: Yes.

Mr. Eugène Bellemare: How can we be helpful? Of course, to be helpful, you have to be able to go in. Could we go in?

Ms. Christine Harmston: This is what I was referring to before. If you go to the Thai-Burma border, the India-Burma border, the Bangladeshi-Burma border, or the Chinese-Burma border, there are ethnic groups and Burmese groups working there. They have a series of very professional and effective programs whereby they go into the ethnic areas and give emergency medical relief. They're called medical mobile teams. They also have hospitals in areas where the regime is not fully occupying the areas. Through the border, they're able to implement these programs in the ethnic areas. They are not going into Rangoon, not into the urban centres. They are going into the rural areas, where the situation is most dire.

• 1625

Mr. Eugène Bellemare: Without the permission of the Burmese government, of course.

Ms. Christine Harmston: Well, yes.

Mr. Eugène Bellemare: This could create an incident.

Ms. Christine Harmston: Our perspective is that the Burmese regime is killing people, that there is systematic rape and torture, that arbitrary executions are going on. They are the ones who are creating this catastrophe, and it's our position that we want to support the pro-democracy movement.

Mr. Eugène Bellemare: How could Canada impose itself on the Burmese communities, let alone the Burmese government?

Ms. Christine Harmston: It's not imposing itself. As we said before, Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader of the elected government, is asking for international intervention, and she also supports these border-based operations.

Mr. Eugène Bellemare: But is she in power?

Ms. Christine Harmston: No, Aung San Suu Kyi is not in power. It's the Burmese military regime that is illegal, and it's in power but through the force of the gun.

The Chair: Okay, thank you. Your time is up.

I have a couple of questions. Is Ivanhoe still registered out of Vancouver, or have they not in fact moved? Is that not a company that's been sued many times for many ecological disasters and is no longer—

Ms. Christine Harmston: I think it's still being traded on the Vancouver Stock Exchange.

The Chair: Okay, but the company itself is not registered in Canada any longer, is it?

Ms. Christine Harmston: I believe Mr. Ivanhoe himself has moved to Sydney, Australia, and I know a large portion of the operations have been moved because of the restraints that were being placed on the company, but it's still being traded on the Vancouver Stock Exchange.

The Chair: On this forced labour, am I not correct in assuming that there are a lot of children used in this forced labour as well?

Ms. Christine Harmston: Yes.

The Chair: I'd like to draw to your attention a letter I got from Senator Finestone today, as the chair of the IPU group, in regard to the Berlin conference, where the committee was investigating violations of human rights. The parliamentarians in the exercise of their mandate as legislators had 142 cases that they examined from Argentina, Belarus, Bhutan, Burundi, Cambodia, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Ecuador, Gambia, Guinea, Honduras, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nigeria, Moldova, and Turkey. Out of those 142 cases of human rights abuses, 59 were from Myanmar, and I think the next closest was 30 in Burundi. So the IPU—parliamentarians—generally recognizes that the human rights abuses in Burma are of an extremely serious nature and are plentiful.

That's just a little bit of information, and you can get the IPU report.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Could the clerk circulate a copy of the letter?

The Chair: Sure.

I thank you very much for appearing once again and for your determination to bring a high profile to the situation.

Mr. Murray Thomson: Thank you.

Ms. Penny Sanger: Thank you.

Ms. Christine Harmston: Thank you very much.

The Chair: We're now going to be hearing from DFAIT.

• 1630

We now have with us Ingrid Hall, director general of the South and Southeast Asia Bureau; and Philip Pinnington, deputy director of the International Crime Division. That sounds impressive.

Mr. Philip Pinnington (Deputy Director, International Crime Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): Thank you.

The Chair: Are you going to present, or are you just here to be grilled?

[Translation]

Ms. Ingrid Hall (Director General, South and Southeast Asia Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): Both.

I'm delighted to be here this afternoon to update you on the situation in Burma since our last appearance before your committee.

[English]

I think the first question I would like to ask is, why does the Canadian government call the country Burma and so many others call it Myanmar? For us, it is Burma. Aung San Suu Kyi won a democratic election. The military voided the election. We have never accepted the fact that the election was voided. We call the country Burma. Any document you see issued by an international organization asking a multilateral organization...will say Myanmar. We always refer to the country as Burma.

What has happened recently? We were asked to distribute talking points, which we have done in both languages. I assume you have these.

I also understand that Minister Pettigrew undertook that there would be a written explanation that would be circulated in advance of this meeting. I understand that this has been done. The explanation of—

Ms. Aileen Carroll (Barrie—Simcoe—Bradford, Lib.): We don't have any of those documents.

The Chair: George thought he would be distributing it when you were making your presentation.

Mr. Eugène Bellemare: Madam Chair, this is the first time I have come to a committee in which we have witnesses and we don't have briefing notes beforehand; we don't have notes on what people are going to be presenting us. The Department of Foreign Affairs is coming, and obviously they have notes. They even asked at the beginning of their presentation if we had looked at them, if we had received them.

I find it appalling that we, as committee members, are sitting here wondering what is happening. Maybe we will be presented with a load of paper and the question will be whether or not we should be reading while people are talking to us. Or should we be listening and not reading what they wrote to us? I think the staff ought to be reprimanded for not providing the material we need in order to do our work.

The Chair: Excuse me just a moment. I think we'll let George speak on this. However, I must say that you're extremely fortunate if you've never attended a committee meeting at which briefs have been handed out just before the presentation.

Mr. Svend Robinson: I have a point of order here, Madam Chair.

[Translation]

Ms. Aileen Carroll: I read French, but I would prefer to have a copy of the talking points in English, please.

[English]

The Chair: Please pick—

Mr. Svend Robinson: It's worth a reference to him, but perhaps you could address another issue. Yesterday, I raised the issue of Burma and the WTO, and the minister undertook to provide something to the committee. Where is that?

The Chair: It's in the package that's coming.

Could we please hear from the clerk before we go for his jugular vein?

• 1635

Mr. Svend Robinson: Do all members of the committee have this clarification on the WTO?

Mr. Eugène Bellemare: Madam Chair, am I supposed to get material, or am I supposed to go and get my own material? To whom do I address this point, you or the staff?

The Chair: You should probably address it to me and I can address it to the staff. I'm not particularly a happy camper myself.

Mr. Eugène Bellemare: This won't be repeated?

The Chair: I would assume that it won't.

Mr. Eugène Bellemare: Otherwise it's a waste of time to come to the meeting.

The Chair: I understand that the department did not want these papers handed out until just prior to their presentation and that is why we did not have them in advance.

A voice: We had them in advance—

The Chair: But they weren't handed out in advance. We had them in advance, but we were told not to distribute them. I wasn't told anything, but I believe we were not to distribute them until—

Mr. Eugène Bellemare: Can we ask why?

The Chair: Was that your understanding?

Ms. Ingrid Hall: Mr. Jacoby handles these matters, and when this was organized—

The Chair: With your permission, we could perhaps deal with this later. The time is going and we would like to get on with the issue.

Ms. Ingrid Hall: I agree.

The Chair: We'll do our housekeeping after.

Ms. Ingrid Hall: Thank you, Madam Chair.

The Chair: Thank you. Continue.

Ms. Ingrid Hall: Thank you very much.

Mr. Eugène Bellemare: I still don't have anything.

The Chair: You don't have anything? Could we please get Mr. Bellemare his papers?

Ms. Ingrid Hall: Thank you very much. I will run through the talking points in terms of this stock-taking.

• 1640

Since 1998, Canada's ambassador in Thailand has been to Burma nine times, and other Canadian embassy officers have visited Burma 14 times. We cover Burma from Bangkok.

Mr. Svend Robinson: I'm reluctant to interrupt, but are you going to read this whole thing? We can all read. If you could maybe just highlight the key points....

The Chair: I think that's what she's doing.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Oh, sorry, I thought she was going to read the whole thing.

The Chair: I didn't see her reading it particularly.

Ms. Ingrid Hall: May I have some guidance from the chair?

The Chair: Yes. You have the floor.

Ms. Ingrid Hall: I have the floor, and may I have guidance? Should we take the talking points as read, or do you wish a summary?

The Chair: No, I don't think they have been read. Could you highlight the key points for those who have not had the benefit of reading this nor the benefit of years of involvement with it?

Ms. Ingrid Hall: They're very short. Should I just go through them?

The Chair: Yes, please. You have the floor. Just highlight them.

Ms. Ingrid Hall: All right.

The Canadian ambassador has visited Burma nine times; other Canadian officers have visited 14 times. The embassy has had 10 separate meetings with Aung San Suu Kyi, including one with Ambassador Giroux last week.

In the course of the last 15 months, the ambassador and embassy officers, with the cooperation of UN agencies, have visited several major areas: the far west, north central, north, and northeast of Burma.

Consistently, visit reports indicate that the situation of human rights continues to deteriorate. There is no difference in view between ourselves and the Canadian Friends of Burma on this issue: the human rights situation in Burma is clearly deteriorating.

The SPDC has made no efforts to encourage a political dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi or with the National League for Democracy.

The SPDC's actions have been condemned consistently by the international community. The International Labour Organization has banned Burma from attending further ILO meetings and from benefiting from any ILO technical cooperation assistance.

[Translation]

You mentioned Mr. DeSoto's visit. He's been to Rangoon twice, first in 1998 and again last month, when he was accompanied by a World Bank official. They were there to find out whether any political dialogue was possible.

[English]

There has not been an official report. We understand that no progress was made.

Earlier, a member of your committee asked whether there had been a report from the representative of the Australian Human Rights Commission who had visited Rangoon. Reports came out in the media that there was no progress. The EU sent in a special mission about a month later, with no progress.

There was the hostage incident in Bangkok when young people took over the Myanmar embassy. One Canadian was amongst the hostages. The hostages were released.

Since that time, Thailand has looked very closely at the status of Burmese in Thailand. You have seen, and we have seen, press reports that indicate that large numbers of Burmese have been returned to Burma. This causes us considerable concern. We have been in close touch with the Thai government, and most recently made démarches earlier this week with the senior levels of the ministry of interior to ensure that political dissidents are not returned and to ensure that the UNHCR has access to individuals that the Thai government seeks to repatriate.

We have been at the forefront of international condemnation of Burma's regime, at the UN, the ILO, and elsewhere. Right now, in the Third Committee at the UN a resolution on Burma is being negotiated. In the past two years we have not co-sponsored because we found the language too weak. We are hoping, in the course of today and tomorrow, that the language will strengthen so that we will be able to co-sponsor.

• 1645

We work very closely with the Canadian Friends of Burma. I have deep respect for the Canadian Friends of Burma, as do my colleagues and many of my predecessors. The work they do is extraordinary. One of their members, Terry Cottam, recently died. He was a tireless campaigner, and we should honour him. His work really has our respect.

In 1997 Minister Axworthy presented the Burmese foreign minister with a list of eight actions. These are outlined in the news release that was distributed with the background material. They appear in the annex under the backgrounder, about halfway down the page.

There has been no progress on any of these areas, with the exception of access by the International Red Cross. The International Red Cross has been able to visit Burma in the course of this year. Information in the public domain indicates that the International Red Cross has visited 20,000 prisoners in Burma, including 800 political detainees, and that the International Red Cross has been able to revisit freely 2,700 of these prisoners.

When the SPDC did not respond to the proposals put forward by Minister Axworthy, Canada decided to impose further economic measures. We withdrew Burma's general preferential tariff eligibility and placed Burma on the area control list.

We discourage Canadian firms from entering into investment agreements or commercial ventures in Burma. All Canadian exporters to Burma must first obtain an export permit from our department. Permits are only granted if the item is of a humanitarian nature. No sales of military products are permitted. There are no Canadian export programs open to Burma. Canadian exports to Burma have dropped by 72% from 1997 to 1998, and they are minuscule, at slightly over $1 million.

When we withdrew the GPT eligibility, the price for the import of Burmese goods rose because of tariffs. Burmese imports into Canada have been largely seafood and clothing products. We had expected imports to decline. The statistics show they have risen. The figures are in the talking points. Again, this is very small, but they have risen.

When we imposed the economic measures, we wanted to send a very strong message to the SPDC that we were seriously concerned with the deteriorating human rights situation and the suppression of political freedoms in Burma. Ambassador Giroux has met with many of the members of the inner councils of the SPDC and in each meeting has raised the eight proposals we wish the Burmese to engage in. Apart from the International Red Cross, there has been no movement whatsoever.

Our measures will remain in place until there is some progress on the political dialogue. I must say we are very skeptical that there will be in the reasonable future.

Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you.

Ms. Brown, welcome to the table.

Ms. Brown is chief of the peacebuilding unit, international humanitarian assistance, CIDA.

Did you have something you wanted to add?

Ms. Susan Brown (Chief, Peacebuilding Unit, International Humanitarian Assistance, Canadian International Development Agency): Yes, thank you.

Canada's aid policy on Burma is designed to support democratic reform, to alleviate the suffering of refugees, and to curb the production and trafficking of drugs. Constructive engagement is the key to this policy, and this includes the promotion of a peace dialogue.

Canada's bilateral aid program peaked during the period of 1979 to 1983. The aid program was suspended in 1988 as a result of the massacre of thousands of pro-democracy demonstrators in Rangoon.

In the summer of 1988, an interdepartmental consultation was held at the request of the Canadian NGO community and the Friends of Burma, along with representatives of the Canadian International Development Agency and the Department of Foreign Affairs.

• 1650

We reaffirmed at that time that bilateral aid programming would remain suspended, but that humanitarian assistance and food aid programs would continue to be eligible in refugee camps where Burmese were involved.

It was also agreed that given the sanctions environment, the only vehicle by which CIDA could provide support to the Burmese peace process was by promoting dialogue on a peaceful transition to democracy, and that that vehicle was the newly established CIDA peacebuilding fund. In fact this kind of activity was precisely the reason the peacebuilding fund had been established.

Since 1988 Canadian humanitarian and peacebuilding support to these refugees has amounted to $14.6 million, which has been targeted at the Burmese diaspora, consisting of 150,000 official refugees and 850,000 migrants to Thailand. This amount was also matched by $752,000 of food aid.

On March 4, 1999, as a result of a proposal from the Canadian NGO community, the peacebuilding fund approved $500,000 to support Canadian Lutheran World Relief. This was the NGO that, on behalf of the Canadian NGO community, submitted their proposal for support to the peacebuilding fund. This project seeks to facilitate the process of dialogue, consultation, and policy development necessary to the success of the Burmese democratic movement and the overall peace process.

The director of Canadian Lutheran World Relief is also the chair of the National Reconciliation Plan, which is an initiative seeking to engage Burma's various ethnic groups in a dialogue and conflict resolution negotiations. The National Reconciliation Plan is currently in process. It consists of many meetings where the Burmese of various ethnic groups meet with their like-minded friends around the world.

To date, the Myanmar regime, currently known as the State Peace and Development Council, has not changed its position on power-sharing with the elected representatives of the Burmese people. But the purpose of the CIDA peacebuilding project was to assist the Burmese diaspora in coordinating their democracy movement and creating a stable environment in which the transition from a dictatorship to a peaceful democracy could take place.

Currently the various groups vital to this process are fragmented and geographically dispersed, making it very difficult for them to develop a consensus or to consolidate a democracy transition plan that would focus the international community's attention and assistance. Organizing a dialogue amongst these various ethnic communities and their relations to both national and regional democratic institutions is daunting, but it is critical to the achievement of a consensus broad enough to establish, nurture, and sustain Burma's democratic administration.

Failure to address these issues and the many other challenges confronting the fledgling democracy in Myanmar would seriously undermine the prerequisites for an orderly and bloodless transition to democratic rule. That is why the CIDA peacebuilding fund is working with this group very actively, in consultation with the Canadian NGO community and the Department of Foreign Affairs.

We are ultimately looking for a peace transition plan to come from this group, which will then form the basis of both bilateral dialogue and international consensus-building on a plan of action for Burma.

Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Pinnington.

Mr. Philip Pinnington: I was asked to come and speak on the question of illicit drugs from Burma. I'll be brief.

Some talking points were distributed. I don't propose to go through them. Unfortunately I was not here for the earlier presentation, but I would expect that the Canadian Friends of Burma may have set out some of the problems.

Burma's production of illicit drugs is a concern for Canada, for ASEAN, and for the world. The production of raw opium, which is translated into heroin, has increased in the last 10 years. However, crop surveys for this year would suggest they in fact have calmed down significantly, in the order of 30%. The production of raw opium is estimated at about 1,200 metric tonnes, which translates into about 100 tonnes of heroin.

• 1655

An argument is going on right now in the press in the Far East about the reasons for the decline this year. A survey was run by the Americans, and the conclusion would appear to be that it is drought, not eradication programs on the part of the government. The government of course is claiming it is because of eradication programs they are running. The concern is that given current cultivation trends, should the drought break, production will increase significantly.

It's estimated by the RCMP that 70% to 75% of the heroin that comes to Canada is Burmese heroin. It is not trafficked by Burmese; it is trafficked through China, through Vietnam, and through Thailand. As you may be well aware, this poses a particularly serious problem in downtown Vancouver.

I want to point out two trends in world drug production.

One, while we tend to focus, particularly with Burma and Afghanistan, on crop-based plants, i.e. narcotics, in fact one of the two major trends is the rise in the use of synthetic drugs, chemically based drugs. Increasingly Burma is a source of synthetic drugs, in particular the stimulant methamphetamine, which is flooding into Thailand. Several months ago the Thais actually closed several border crossings in response to that issue alone.

The reason it's interesting to point that out is, again, these are drugs that are produced in mobile labs. Just today there was another article in the Bangkok Post about the movement of some of the known drug producers closer to the Thai border. They've moved their labs and are producing in the tens of millions of these tablets. Thailand has a very, very serious problem with these synthetic drugs.

The second trend generally, and it's true in Burma, is increasing use within the developing world. Burma is experiencing a rise in the use of these drugs.

In August, following consultations with ministers from ASEAN countries, Minister Axworthy proposed that Canada would explore ways to become more engaged with regional partners in dealing with the problem of drugs from Burma. We have been looking at how we can further that.

The first move was to consult with Aung San Suu Kyi. Our ambassador has met with her twice and raised this issue with her. As the Canadian Friends of Burma stated earlier, she has said the only solution to this problem is the return to democracy, including the ethnic groups who are involved in the drug trade. She advised that no direct assistance should be given to the regime.

She did, however, express support for the work of the UN international drug control program, or UNDCP. She particularly expressed support for the work of the head of the Rangoon office of the UNDCP, who is a former RCMP officer by the name of Richard Dickins.

UNDCP is the principal multilateral organization involved in the region, and they have developed a regional program of projects that cover demand reduction, alternative development, and law enforcement training. That program was developed following the signing of an MOU between UNDCP and six countries in the region: China, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand, and Burma. Canada has made modest contributions to the UNDCP's regional projects in the past.

A representative of the Canadian embassy and the RCMP liaison officer will in fact be in Burma next week to participate in a UNDCP-led field trip into the Wa region, which is one of the principal regions for production of opium. We anticipate from their report that they will be able to give us a better view of the situation in the country.

Also, following up on the minister's pronouncements, we have been discussing with Thai officials whether there would be possible joint activities we could undertake to deal with the problem.

Finally, on the multilateral level, which probably has most promise, Burma is a member of ASEAN. ASEAN has committed itself to a drug-free ASEAN region by 2003; I'm sorry I don't have the date exactly. Our intention when we go to meet with ASEAN ministers, Burmese in particular, is to point out that the commitments that have been made in anti-drug work are not being met.

• 1700

I suppose I would conclude by simply saying that the Burmese foreign minister said that Burma would like to work with the international community on the drug issue. Our intention is to put them to the test, to test that commitment.

Thank you very much.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Rocheleau.

[Translation]

Mr. Yves Rocheleau: Thank you for your presentations. I've three questions for the witnesses.

Do the parliamentarians in exile, who number 36 as I understand it, receive any kind of support from Canada and the international community? Do they receive any kind of recognition from the international community?

Has the military regime in power been fully recognized by the international community? What stand has the Canadian government taken? I read that the International Labour Organization had passed a resolution banning Myanmar from attending further ILO meetings. What position has Canada taken vis-à-vis this military regime?

Has either Canada or the international community given any thought to recognizing a government in exile?

[English]

Ms. Ingrid Hall: On the question of recognition, we recognize states and not governments. I take the example of the United States. We do not go through a process every time there is a new government.

So we recognize Burma. Since 1988 we have reduced significantly any contact we have and now visit only through our accredited representatives in Bangkok.

Burma is a member of ASEAN. When Burma was admitted to ASEAN, we did not let Burma accede to the economic cooperation agreement we have with individual ASEAN members. When Cambodia entered ASEAN last summer, we did extend this benefit to them.

Yes, indeed, the Canadian ambassador and embassy staff make calls on the SPDC. That's the difference.

[Translation]

Mr. Yves Rocheleau: Is there some way for us to possibly recognize these parliamentarians in exile, to provide them with some kind of assistance and ultimately, to recognize a government in exile? There are historical precedents for this.

Ms. Ingrid Hall: Ms. Brown spoke of providing assistance to the representatives of the government in exile through the peacebuilding fund. We've been in touch with the government's representatives, particularly in New York and Washington. The last meeting with Ambassador Duval took place in New York. When President Sein Win arrives in Ottawa, more meetings will be held.

Mr. Yves Rocheleau: Thank you.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Robinson.

Mr. Svend Robinson: To follow up on Mr. Rocheleau's question, I'm wondering what the position of the Government of Canada is with respect to the Committee Representing the People's Parliament. As the director general is aware, Friends of Burma, and indeed the elected representatives of the people of Burma, have urged that there be a form of recognition.

I understand that states are recognized, but there is certainly ample precedence for our government extending if not full diplomatic recognition then an acknowledgement, a respect, a form of recognition, as given such groups as the African National Congress and others.

What is the position of the Government of Canada with respect to recognition of the CRPP?

Ms. Ingrid Hall: As I said, we recognize states and not governments—

Mr. Svend Robinson: I recognize that. We've acknowledged that.

Ms. Ingrid Hall: —so I think it's clear, but then we have individual meetings.

Mr. Svend Robinson: So as far as the Government of Canada is concerned, it's either recognition of a state or an individual, one-on-one meeting. There is no other form of acknowledgement or recognition of a—

Ms. Ingrid Hall: Oh, we meet with individuals and groups regularly in Washington, New York, and here in Ottawa, but our policy is clear. We recognize states and not governments.

Mr. Svend Robinson: At what level has Canada recognized the CRPP? Has the minister met with the leadership of the CRPP? Has the Secretary of State for Asia-Pacific met with the leadership of the CRPP? Are they prepared to do that?

• 1705

Ms. Ingrid Hall: I would have to check the records. May I get back to you on that with dates, etc., because there have been meetings here, yes.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Yes, and at what level because—

Ms. Ingrid Hall: I don't have it with me, so I think I should report back.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Fair enough, but if—

The Chair: Ms. Brown would also like to answer that.

Ms. Susan Brown: I will obviously not comment on the government policy of recognition, but I can tell you about how CIDA is prepared to engage with the elected representatives of the Burmese people.

The national program, which I told you is ongoing and which we are providing support to, has a formal steering committee, which involves the National Council of the Union of Burma as well as the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma, the National Democratic Front, and the National League for Democracy, which deals with the ethnic groups that have come together.

Mr. Svend Robinson: If I may just interrupt, I appreciate CIDA's involvement. I'm talking about the political recognition, which is an important distinction—

Ms. Ingrid Hall: I undertook to report back.

Mr. Svend Robinson: —and Ms. Hall is going to get back to us on that. If those high-level contacts haven't taken place, I would certainly encourage that they do so.

In terms of investment in Burma and investment sanctions, clearly the measures adopted in 1997 haven't worked to the extent that Canadian imports from Burma have increased dramatically. Why is the Government of Canada not in fact imposing investment sanctions?

Ms. Susan Brown: There is an act called the Special Economic Measures Act. It can be invoked to impose sanctions in one of two circumstances: when there is the recommendation of an international organization, be it the Commonwealth or the UN Security Council, or when it is a grave breach of international peace and security. Grave breach is a very, very high threshold. It basically means close to war.

When the lawyers looked at this, they established that the situation in Burma did not meet this threshold. There have been meetings between the lawyers from DFAIT and the lawyers from the Friends of Burma, and this has been significantly discussed. It is one of the few areas where we and the Friends of Burma have a difference in view.

Mr. Svend Robinson: When has SEMA been applied? In which jurisdictions has that been applied?

Ms. Ingrid Hall: On a unilateral basis, I'm not aware of any.

Mr. Svend Robinson: So that statute has never been implemented under that particular criteria.

Ms. Ingrid Hall: On a unilateral basis, I believe not.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Despite the horrifying violations of human rights, the million and a half people and so on, it's the position of the department that that still doesn't meet the threshold.

Ms. Ingrid Hall: Of a grave situation, that's right.

Mr. Svend Robinson: I see.

In terms of the people who are investing in Burma and importing and exporting, do we know the names of the companies?

Ms. Ingrid Hall: Of the importers, no.

Mr. Svend Robinson: We don't know the names of the importers. Is it not possible under current policy to get those?

Ms. Ingrid Hall: I've asked. These are consumers. What we have to look at is the way in which one can deal with consumers. We were very surprised to see that the figures went up. We had expected them to go in the other direction. We thought it important to table them, because it should have gone the other way and it did not.

Mr. Svend Robinson: I agree. But we have $11 million worth of fish, crustacean, mollusc, and other aquatic invertebrates. Does the department not have any way of knowing who these people are who are importing this?

Ms. Ingrid Hall: As we find out who they are, we usually phone and explain what the Canadian government policy is.

Mr. Svend Robinson: So you're saying you know who they are, then.

Ms. Ingrid Hall: We know if the information comes our way. Do we have an automatic means of knowing? No, we do not.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Is the department able to provide at least a list of those the department is aware of, both importing and exporting?

Ms. Ingrid Hall: I can ask our trade people. Yes, I'm willing to ask.

Mr. Svend Robinson: I think it would be helpful for Canadians to know who is in fact—

Ms. Ingrid Hall: I will ask if they know.

Mr. Svend Robinson: And that can be provided to this committee. Is that the undertaking?

Ms. Ingrid Hall: It is.

Mr. Svend Robinson: My last question—sorry, just before I get—

The Chair: Could you ask your last question next time around? We'll be back to you in a moment.

Mr. Svend Robinson: No, I'll just finish. We have figures for the first half of 1999 for exports but not for imports, and I'm just wondering if those figures are available.

Ms. Ingrid Hall: From January to June is here. It's $13.7 million.

• 1710

Mr. Svend Robinson: Oh, I'm sorry. Okay.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mrs. Bakopanos.

Ms. Eleni Bakopanos (Ahuntsic, Lib.): I was looking at the figures. If I understood your presentation—and I'm a little more naive or not as well read on Burma as Mr. Robinson is—you removed the tariff protection with the assumption that there would be—

Ms. Ingrid Hall: The price goes up, so consumers don't buy.

Ms. Eleni Bakopanos: That's right. The figures for January to June are about half of what they were in 1998, which is $13,719 million and $22,945 million. Is it because there is more demand for the goods? Let's say, for instance, that we are having problems in terms of our waters, so shrimp are becoming less available in Canada, and therefore we don't—

Ms. Ingrid Hall: We don't know the answer. We had expected imports to decline. The whole purpose—

Ms. Eleni Bakopanos: Has any study been done, though, to see why there is an increase in the demand? As the price is rising, there is still an increase in demand. Is there any knowledge as to why this is happening?

Ms. Ingrid Hall: No.

Ms. Eleni Bakopanos: Okay. It might be useful to find out why.

Ms. Ingrid Hall: It has gone in the opposite direction to what we had intended.

Ms. Eleni Bakopanos: But it's still only 15% higher, if I understood your notes. It's still not acceptable, but just the—

Ms. Ingrid Hall: We had expected imports to decline.

Ms. Eleni Bakopanos: To what percentage? Fifteen percent is still not, as Mr. Robinson referred to it....

Ms. Ingrid Hall: We had expected exports to decline.

Ms. Eleni Bakopanos: Okay, but do you still—

Ms. Ingrid Hall: Consumers usually go for a cheaper price. They don't go for a more expensive one.

Ms. Eleni Bakopanos: Agreed.

In the background paper you provided us, Mr. Axworthy put forward last July 29 about eight proposals. Have any of those proposals been met?

Ms. Ingrid Hall: The only progress has been on the International Red Cross—

Ms. Eleni Bakopanos: Have they been allowed in?

Ms. Ingrid Hall: —and its ability to visit prisoners and to make return visits. Making return visits is important, because it means the individual is not under threat. But that's the only measure in which there has been any change.

Ms. Eleni Bakopanos: I would like to pick up on a question asked earlier about our ongoing dialogue in terms of the department. Never mind the political side, because there is a distinction to be made between Mr. Axworthy and the department. Is there ongoing dialogue with both the CRPP and its leader? Have there been formal or informal discussions in or out of Burma with any representatives?

Ms. Ingrid Hall: These individuals are outside of Burma, and the meetings take place outside.

Ms. Eleni Bakopanos: Do we have contact? That's what I'm asking you.

Ms. Ingrid Hall: Yes.

Ms. Eleni Bakopanos: The department does meet with them, and you do discuss the needs and in what way we can continue to work together and cooperate.

Ms. Ingrid Hall: Yes.

Ms. Eleni Bakopanos: That's good.

We apparently are going to get a copy of the report of the special rapporteur for the United Nations. Perhaps you could provide it. I'm sure the department must have copies of it.

Ms. Ingrid Hall: We can take it off the Internet as well.

Ms. Eleni Bakopanos: Okay. So it would be the same thing. That would be a—

Ms. Ingrid Hall: It would be exactly the same.

Ms. Eleni Bakopanos: I noticed in one of your documents that with regard to the illicit drug trade, representatives from the RCMP and our department, I gather, go with UN representatives. I'm trying to find where I read it.

A voice: It's on the second page.

Ms. Eleni Bakopanos: Yes. There is one going on November 19. Is this on an ongoing basis?

Mr. Philip Pinnington: No, it's not. It's a special tour that the UNDCP has organized. It's actually not a tour. It's not organized by the regime. It's to show people the situation. The Wa region is where the UNDCP is undertaking its alternative development projects. They want to show them the production and the situation on the ground.

Ms. Eleni Bakopanos: But we are called upon just the same either by the United Nations or other organizations to participate—

Mr. Philip Pinnington: We're invited to, yes.

Ms. Eleni Bakopanos: —and we usually do, I gather from reading your material.

Mr. Philip Pinnington: Yes.

Ms. Eleni Bakopanos: Thank you, Madam Chair.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Rocheleau.

• 1715

[Translation]

Mr. Yves Rocheleau: I have two questions for you. As we know, a number of Canadian investors have invested in Burma. Can these investors count on receiving any support from the Export Development Corporation?

Ms. Ingrid Hall: They are not eligible for any kind of support in this instance.

[English]

Someone asked about Ivanhoe. Ivanhoe is registered in Singapore now.

[Translation]

Mr. Yves Rocheleau: Why can't they count on receiving some support from EDC?

[English]

Ms. Ingrid Hall: We don't have any government programs of support.

[Translation]

Mr. Yves Rocheleau: EDC lends support to Canadian firms wishing to invest abroad. Isn't that correct? Is Burma an exception? That's what I'd like to know.

Ms. Ingrid Hall: Yes, it is an exception.

Mr. Yves Rocheleau: Fine.

Ms. Ingrid Hall: These firms are not eligible for financial support in this instance.

Mr. Yves Rocheleau: You state the following in your presentation:

Withdrawal of General Preferential Tariff eligibility has increased the cost of Burmese imports, principally seafood and clothing products. Despite this measure, imports increased by 15 per cent from 1997 to 1998.

How do you explain this phenomenon?

[English]

Ms. Ingrid Hall: We cannot explain that. That's just—

[Translation]

That's just the way it is.

Mr. Yves Rocheleau: Well then...

Ms. Ingrid Hall: Products are more expensive. Usually, the opposite happens in such cases.

Mr. Yves Rocheleau: Thank you.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Robinson.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Thank you.

Of course, one would have thought that there might be one or two of these corporations that were importing who actually had some sense of corporate citizenship as well as a responsibility and would recognize the immorality of dealing with this regime. It's apparently not the case, which is why I hope we get those lists.

Ms. Ingrid Hall: As I said, I will undertake to get in touch with the appropriate people, and I will report back.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Right. I appreciate that.

The minister was quoted—and I'm not sure if he was quoted accurately—about the possibility of being prepared to “engage” with the Burmese government on the drug issue. We've heard the very strong admonition of Aung San Suu Kyi, who is saying don't do this, this would be unacceptable and inappropriate. What's the government's position on this?

Mr. Philip Pinnington: Perhaps I could style it this way, and this is certainly the way I would say the minister explained it to the Friends of Burma when he met them, on August 23, I think it was.

The objective is not necessarily to deal with the Government of Burma on the question of drugs. The objective is to deal regionally with the problem of drugs from Burma. This came from discussions he had with ASEAN foreign ministers. He styled the discussions as having developed significantly in two years; two years ago he raised the issue of drugs and nobody wanted to talk about it. Now they're actually talking about it because they recognize that they have a problem.

What he has asked us to look at is how we can work regionally and multilaterally to deal with this problem, working with ASEAN members.

Mr. Svend Robinson: And bilaterally?

Mr. Philip Pinnington: We do talk to the regime through the liaison officers. The political officers do visit and they do talk about the issue of drugs. We have no intention of working with them in terms of projects or anything along those lines.

Mr. Svend Robinson: In your final sentence, you said the Burmese foreign minister said that Burma would like to work with the international community on this issue and that we will put them to the test. That sounds to me like engagement with the Burmese regime, this illegal regime, on drugs. What we're hearing from the Friends of Burma and from Aung San Suu Kyi and others is, don't do that.

Mr. Philip Pinnington: I think I can say that's not the intention. It's not the intention to work with the Government of Burma. The problem is, though, that when we go to ASEAN fora, we are sitting at the table with Burmese. The intention is to say, look, if you are using your membership in ASEAN to legitimize your regime, plus you are saying that you're seeking international support to deal with the problem of drugs, then let's test you on the commitments you are making to respond to the undertakings you've already made through your ASEAN membership.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Well, given the fact that they are working hand in glove with the drug dealers and producers themselves, it's a kind of unusual test, I would have thought.

On the Massachusetts law, I just want to get clarification on one point. I appreciate that the procurement obligations don't apply to provinces and municipalities under the GPA. I'm wondering if the federal government is in fact under any obligation with respect to federal procurement policies.

Ms. Ingrid Hall: The answer is yes.

• 1720

Mr. Svend Robinson: The answer is yes. So if the Government of Canada wished to implement a policy similar to that which was implemented by the state of Massachusetts, saying that we won't purchase from some of these companies that are immorally engaging the illegitimate regime in Burma, under our WTO obligations, as I understand it, we can't do that. Is that correct?

Ms. Ingrid Hall: We don't do it unilaterally.

Mr. Svend Robinson: So I'm correct. That would be struck down under WTO rules as they stand now. Is that correct?

Ms. Ingrid Hall: We don't do it unilaterally.

Mr. Svend Robinson: So we could not implement that policy ourselves.

Ms. Ingrid Hall: We do not.

Mr. Svend Robinson: And we could not under WTO rules.

The Chair: I believe there's been no ruling made on this.

A voice: At the WTO panel.

The Chair: The panel has been suspended.

Mr. Svend Robinson: This briefing note states that Canada has not agreed to any obligations respecting procurement by provinces and municipalities. What the briefing note conveniently overlooks—and I assume it was just an accidental omission—is that in fact the Government of Canada itself is bound by those obligations respecting procurement. This is a rather significant omission, I would suggest.

Thanks.

The Chair: Could we have a clarification on that?

Mr. Svend Robinson: We've had our clarification. Canada is—

The Chair: Canada is bound.

Mr. Svend Robinson: —bound by that, and if we wanted to implement the policy that was implemented by the State of Massachusetts at the federal level, we couldn't under WTO law.

The Chair: Do you concur with that statement?

Ms. Ingrid Hall: The clarification is that we would object to unilateral implementation, as we objected to the U.S. implementation of the Helms-Burton sanctions against Cuba. We would not object if it were done multilaterally.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Right. That's the point I'm making. If Canada wanted to do it, we couldn't do it.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Thank you.

The Chair: Mr. Pinnington, I would like to deal with the drug issue and the UNDCP in Burma. What exactly is the UNDCP doing in Burma? What is the drug program? I've heard some criticism of this. I've been told that the moneys are being used to improve the road systems in order to help police get these drug dealers, when in fact these roads are only giving SLORC easier access to the people in the villages, the people they are persecuting. So I'd like you to tell me what the positive aspects of the UNDCP are.

Mr. Philip Pinnington: The UNDCP has principally two projects they're undertaking right now. One is alternative development or crop substitution. The second one is assistance on crop surveys. To my knowledge, if there is improvement of infrastructure, it's associated with the first. With alternative development, the idea is that you show people how to find an alternate source of income rather than raising a crop that can be refined into a narcotic drug. You may have to teach new ways of agriculture. You may have to develop new distribution systems. Unfortunately, with opium gum—and it's the same with coca—it's a very easy item to transport; therefore, if you wish to take raw opium gum out of a certain area, you can do it on your back. If you wish to raise something else, such as cabbage, you have to develop the infrastructure to get that product to market.

I must say, though, the UNDCP programs—there are five areas they've identified in the Wa region—are quite modest programs. I'm afraid I don't have the exact figure, but I don't think it's more than, say, about $1.5 million U.S. It's not a lot of money. It's quite modest. I couldn't see, within the parameters of that amount of money, that they could really be doing enough improvements to infrastructure that it would be a direct support to the regime. I can't categorically say it's not. But the intention is to try to teach or show people how they can, as I say, raise something else that would be marketable in order to supplant the income they make from the opium poppy.

• 1725

The Chair: However, I think we all have to acknowledge that a drug industry of this size is not done without not just the knowledge but the cooperation of the powers that be in any nation. There's no way that SLORC can divorce itself or say it is not directly benefiting from the drug trade in Burma.

We're talking about engaging a government. It looks to me as though it's not really the people we have to encourage with better crops, because I don't really believe it's the people who are benefiting from these crops as much as it is government. So how do you offer an incentive for SLORC to get out of the drug business?

Mr. Philip Pinnington: Well, Canada is not in a position to offer any incentive to SLORC or to anybody to get out of the drug business. Our total contribution to UNDCP for this year was $1 million. It doesn't give us a lot of leeway to do much.

Is the government involved in the drug trade? There's more than enough evidence to suggest that it is. I would only point out that the Americans, who are relatively hardline, will not categorically say they have the evidence that this is the case, although clearly, in certain regions, certain officers of the army are benefiting from it. It is also an issue in terms of the relationship between the central government and the ethnic groups in the areas. There is a tacit approval of drug smuggling in order to maintain peace. It's a very convoluted, complicated situation.

The UNDCP programs, as I say, are modest. It's an effort to show what might be done. Is it successful? They can claim they have decreased production, but probably if we looked at the figures, they would show it's the same issue as generally—the climatic conditions are not being conducive to raising the opium.

So in answer to your question about what we can do to convince the people to get out of drugs, there's probably not a lot in terms of project work that we can do. But we aren't interested in it. Historically, Canada has never been involved in alternative development programs, whether in Burma or anywhere else in the world. That's not our intention. We don't have the resources to make a major impact on the drug trade. Our intention is, as I was saying earlier, to seek to undermine the legitimacy the Government of Burma might have or seek to have in ASEAN by pointing out to Burma and ASEAN that they have a commitment there for a drug free region, and Burma is not fulfilling that commitment.

The Chair: Thank you.

Ms. Brown.

Ms. Susan Brown: I'd just like to respond to a question that you asked Ms. Harmston earlier in the proceedings about the rumour you had heard that the standing committee recommendation for the Government of Canada and CIDA to expand their engagement in Burma might have hindered their access to financial assistance. Certainly from the CIDA side, I can report that the committee recommendation was actually provided to us as part of their project documentation. It was well received in the interdepartmental committee, and when we put the peacebuilding fund project forward, part of the rationale was that it had the support of the committee.

The Chair: Thank you.

Our time's up. Thank you all for appearing. The meeting is adjourned.