HAFF Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON PROCEDURE AND HOUSE AFFAIRS

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE LA PROCÉDURE ET DES AFFAIRES DE LA CHAMBRE

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Wednesday, November 3, 1999

• 1919

[English]

The Chair (Mr. Derek Lee (Scarborough—Rouge River, Lib.)): I'll call the meeting to order. I see a quorum. We're continuing our study of Bill C-2, an act to amend the Canada Elections Act.

We have a couple of witnesses with us this evening. We'll start with Mr. Miguel Figueroa of the Communist Party of Canada. He's the party leader.

• 1920

Mr. Figueroa, what we've been doing throughout these hearings is to have each of the party representatives make a presentation of about 10 minutes, then we'll get into questioning. So if that's okay with you, please commence.

Mr. Miguel Figueroa (Leader, Communist Party of Canada): Very good. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee.

My name is Miguel Figueroa, and I'm the leader of the Communist Party of Canada. I want to take this opportunity to thank the committee for giving our party this opportunity to present its views concerning Bill C-2, the proposed new Canada Elections Act.

The Communist Party, Canada's third oldest party, was founded in 1921. The CPC became a registered party in 1974, when the system of party registration was first introduced, and maintained that party status until September 27, 1993, when it failed to field 50 candidates in the 1993 general election.

Despite its deregistration, however, our party has continued to function in most provincial jurisdictions and also at the federal level, fielding candidates, although due to our deregistration they were denied the party identifier on the ballot in both the 1993 and 1997 federal elections.

I would like to begin by making some comment about the process of electoral reform, and how the current legislation came about and is being considered. In short, we feel that much-needed reform to the Canada Elections Act is long overdue, but that the current legislation has been introduced in an abrupt and arbitrary manner by the government, without adequate consultation with the Canadian people as a whole through Canada-wide public hearings.

It's our view that this process is inadequate and fundamentally undemocratic. Bill C-2, legislation that, after all, sets out the entire framework for the electoral process at the federal level, is far too important to receive such cursory examination and public debate. We hope the standing committee will make greater effort to solicit the views of all interested parties and organizations, and to hold public hearings so that all Canadians may have the opportunity to express their opinions and concerns on Bill C-2 and on the electoral process as a whole before this legislation proceeds to second and third reading.

On the legislation itself, we would like to raise the following concerns.

First of all, concerning the 50-candidate rule, as stated above, our party, amongst others, was deregistered in 1993 for failure to field 50 candidates during the general election. Just prior to the 1993 election, significant amendments were introduced by the Mulroney government to the Canada Elections Act in the form of Bill C-93, which dramatically increased the financial burdens on smaller parties and also introduced the seizure of party assets penalty on those parties that failed to maintain the registration under these new conditions.

On the eve of our party's deregistration, the Communist Party filed a legal action contesting the constitutionality of several of those aspects of the Canada Elections Act. After several legal delays, our case, Figueroa v. Attorney General of Canada, went before the Ontario Court general division in the spring of 1998. On March 10 of this year, Justice Anne Molloy released her decision, striking down as unconstitutional several provisions in the old act, including the 50-candidate rule, the seizure of party assets, and the withholding of 50% of candidate deposits, which is particularly onerous on smaller parties.

Concerning the 50-candidate rule, Justice Molloy found that this provision violated the charter because it provides an advantage to candidates of larger parties, while denying it to others. In her order, Justice Molloy struck down the 50-candidate provision, reading this provision down to two candidates.

The 50-candidate ruling of the Molloy judgment is currently under appeal by the Attorney General's department. At the same time however, that order has not been stayed, and carries full legal force, at least in Ontario, where the ruling was made.

Therefore, we were dismayed that this government should introduce a new act that contains the same 50-candidate provision as that which was struck down as unconstitutional in the current Canada Elections Act. This shows, in our opinion, contempt for the Ontario court ruling, and for the democratic and legal principles upon which it is based. Accordingly, we call on the standing committee to right this wrong by introducing amendments to subclause 370(1) of the current legislation to change “50”to “2”.

• 1925

On the seizure of assets of deregistered parties, in her judgment, Justice Molloy also struck down the provisions of the current act that require deregistered political parties, for the specific reason of having failed to field 50 candidates, to turn over their assets to the state. Justice Molloy noted that such punitive measures were highly damaging to the democratic process and that it was:

easily possible to protect any government interest in ensuring those monies are not misused without the draconian measure of completely stripping a political party of all of its assets.

The government chose not to appeal this part of Justice Molloy's order.

We had reasonably expected that the new act would therefore eliminate all reference to this thoroughly anti-democratic provision. It turns out, however, that the government is intent on retaining this draconian clause, albeit in modified form.

Under clause 385 of Bill C-2, parties are not required to turn over their assets in such cases if they undertake to run 50 candidates in the next election. If, however, they fail to field the 50 candidates in the following election, they will still be forced to turn over their parties' assets. In other words, parties will now be given a delayed sentence—one more chance to avoid the gallows. The punishment, however, remains the same. In our view, this new provision still violates the intent of the court's ruling and again shows contempt for the Molloy decision.

Why is the government attempting to retain this right of seizure of party assets in disguised form? Is it to force our party and other democratically minded Canadians to expend more time, energy and funds—including public funds—to again challenge this provision before the court to re-establish its own constitutionality? Or worse, is it to force our party and other small parties off the playing field at the federal level altogether?

The standing committee would be well advised to correct this gross error at this stage before it is read into law, by removing all reference to the seizure of party assets in such cases.

I would now like to make some brief comments about other aspects of the legislation before you, and on the electoral process in general.

When the permanent voters list was first introduced, our party and many other organizations and experts expressed the concern that a great number of Canadians would be effectively disenfranchised as a result. We feared that the elimination of a Canada-wide enumeration and its replacement with a permanent list would result, over time, in a proportional reduction in the number of registered voters.

Furthermore, the shift of onus onto individual voters to ensure that they were registered would impact hardest on working class people, especially tenants, the elderly, the young, other first-time voters, citizens whose first language was neither English nor French, workers who must rely on transient and short-term employment, and the homeless.

In fact, such disenfranchisement of Canadian voters has already become apparent, on a large scale and within a very short period of time. Recent experiences in provincial and municipal elections, based on the permanent voters list, especially the recent Ontario election, show serious flaws in this system of voter registration.

It has been suggested by some that those voters who were not registered under the new system and therefore did not utilize their franchise right have only themselves to blame. Our party categorically rejects this cynical argument. On the contrary, we believe there exists a social responsibility to ensure that every citizen is registered and fully informed of election dates, voting places and times, and so on.

That responsibility devolves on the federal government under the charter to ensure that all citizens have the means to exercise their right to an informed vote. It is our strongly held view that this social responsibility to guarantee all Canadians the fundamental democratic right to vote can only be achieved through enumeration prior to each federal election.

On third-party advertising, the standing committee does not need to be reminded that the issue of third-party advertising came sharply to the fore during the 1988 general election. Large financial and other corporate interests spent hundreds of millions of dollars in the final days of the campaign to influence the election, in order to re-elect the Mulroney Conservative government and secure the passage of the free trade agreement with the United States.

The public uproar over this corporate intervention led to the establishment of the Lortie commission and its sweeping recommendations to curtail the extent of third-party advertising during elections. At long last, the current government seemed prepared to introduce some reform in this field. But under intense pressure from corporate interests, this government has made a wholly unprincipled retreat, in our view.

• 1930

The grossly inadequate provisions under Bill C-2 would only give the appearance of restricting this practice, while allowing for substantial third-party advertising by corporate Canada to influence the democratic process. Our party condemns this retreat and urges this committee to introduce amendments that would substantially strengthen restrictions on third-party advertising in Canada.

While the broadcast provisions are not specified under Bill C-2, and instead are covered by the Broadcasting Act, these provisions directly affect the electoral process as a whole. Therefore, our party wishes to take this opportunity to again urge Parliament to amend these undemocratic provisions, to guarantee more equitable access, through the mass media to the Canadian people, for all political parties in Canada.

Under current legislation and practice, the large established parties not only receive the lion's share of allocations for paid advertising, but they also benefit most from available free broadcast time, both during and between elections. The allocation of a paltry three minutes of free broadcast time for the smaller parties, in both official languages, is completely farcical. Because the Canadian people are effectively deprived of a chance to hear and consider the positions and platforms of all political parties, their charter right to cast informed ballots is essentially impinged. The current provisions are not adequate, and tend to promote and perpetuate the status quo.

The Communist Party therefore calls for the introduction of a better system for allocation of free and paid broadcast time for all parties, including a higher base allocation for smaller parties.

On proportional representation, as the standing committee is well aware, there is growing support, both inside and outside of Parliament, for the adoption of some form of proportional representation in Canadian elections. Our party has long supported the introduction of PR as vastly more democratic and reflective of the wishes of the Canadian people than the current first-past-the-post system of constituency-based elections. Unfortunately, the current government has again turned a deaf ear to this growing chorus of public support for PR.

We therefore strongly urge the standing committee to propose that this government immediately organize a series of wide-ranging public hearings across the country on this and related questions of electoral reform.

On the length of election campaigns, we consider that the reduction in the campaign period is essentially detrimental to smaller alternative political parties and the democratic process as a whole. The step-by-step reduction in the campaign period from 60 days to the current 36 days not only gives partisan advantage to the governing party, but it also gives an overwhelming advantage to the largest established parties as a group—those with highly developed electoral machines and massive campaign funding.

On the other hand, smaller alternative parties lack the tremendous financial resources needed today to publicize their political messages and platforms to the Canadian people. The smaller parties simply cannot afford to run high-impact publicity and paid advertising campaigns through the national press and electronic media. Instead, they must most often rely on door-to-door canvassing, leaflet drops and so on, which take much more time to organize and execute.

The shorter campaign period therefore constitutes a staggering disadvantage to alternative parties. The shorter election period also makes it much more difficult for community and other democratic organizations, such as unions, farm groups and so on, to organize all-candidates meetings in constituencies to provide opportunities for voters to meet local candidates, compare their platforms, and ask questions of the respective parties and candidates.

Shorter election campaigns therefore truncate the democratic process, replacing meaningful discussion and dialogue with the one-way transmission of buzzwords, sound bytes, pretested slogans, and quick-hit electronic images. The electoral process is reduced to a commodity, with electors transposed into passive consumers and political parties into professional hucksters.

Our party therefore considers that the 60-day campaign period, which was in effect until the 1988 general election, should be restored.

Members of the committee, thank you for your attention. This concludes my presentation on behalf of the Communist Party to the committee. I would be happy to answer any questions you might have.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Figueroa. You have touched on a fairly large number of items in the bill, and I know members will have questions.

Mr. White.

Mr. Ted White (North Vancouver, Ref.): Yes. I signalled.

The Chair: Oh, I'm sorry, I was waiting for the hand signal.

• 1935

Mr. Ted White: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Figueroa, you mentioned the 50-candidate rule and also the ruling of Justice Molloy obviously being at two. Is there a specific number of candidates that would satisfy you that would be higher than two? Or are you sticking firmly to the position of the two candidates?

And I do have some other supplementaries.

Mr. Miguel Figueroa: I'll try to give a short answer to it.

When the Canada Elections Act was first introduced in 1974 and the 50-candidate rule was established, it wasn't established on any objective basis or analysis of the socio-economic and political situation of the country. In fact the Liberal government of the day proposed 75, the opposition Tories proposed 25, and they cut the difference. And that's how they arrived at the 50-candidate rule. At that time, however, our party accepted that and fielded 50 candidates for a number of elections from 1974 onwards.

We have always had the view that political parties should be able to be registered and have certain rights under registration, which would include the name of the party identifier on the ballot. This is not a privilege to parties; this is a basic right for citizens who walk into a ballot booth to know who they're voting for. And when people cast ballots for Miguel Figueroa, I would like them to know that they're voting for a Communist and not for an independent or for a blank.

There are other basic rights that should accrue to political parties that shouldn't be geared to any number higher than two. Justice Molloy in her ruling made a very good argument, that one candidate could well be considered to be an independent, but more than one candidate running on the same platform, and particularly in a party that meets all of the other qualifications of having an independent auditor and having officers and democratic elections and constitutions and so on and so forth, should be considered a party and they should have certain basic rights under the act.

If you're asking me to suggest some other figure, you know that the Lortie commission looked at different numbers. I think they tossed out the idea of a dozen or 15.

The committee should know that in Britain, for instance, two is the figure. In terms of the party identifier on the ballot, two or more candidates qualifies for having the party identifier on the ballot and so on. So it's rather complicated.

We have a ruling, however, from a high court striking this figure down to two, and we're confident that it will be upheld on appeal. We've stated that we're quite prepared to take it right to the Supreme Court, because we think there are substantial charter arguments in favour of this.

Mr. Ted White: Actually, I quite agree with the position you made that the voter should be given that information. It shouldn't be considered a benefit for the party; it should be considered a benefit for the voter. And you illustrated it very well. The voter should know that he or she is voting for a Communist, and this should be the way it's seen. So in that respect Reform is supportive of your efforts.

I have two other short questions.

Considering the flaws in the enumeration process as it existed, your criticism of the electronic voters list and your stated wish to go back to the enumeration process.... You know how it worked. Nobody has to provide identification. A person comes to the door and says, “Are you a Canadian citizen? What's your name? And do you live here?” If you wanted to go back to the old enumeration system, would you support, though, the idea that a person would have to show proof of residency and proof of Canadian citizenship in order to get on that voters list?

Mr. Miguel Figueroa: Do you mean at the doorstep, when the enumerator comes to the doorstep?

Mr. Ted White: Yes. When the enumerator comes.

Secondly, in terms of the unconstitutionality of things within the Canada Elections Act, you mentioned third-party spending. With all due respect, you can't have it both ways. There is another group of people in Canada who have successfully twice struck down third-party provisions as being unconstitutional. Now you want those reinstated. You're arguing for things you want removed, that they're unconstitutional, but surely you have to recognize the arguments against third-party spending also, that it's not fair to put restrictions on certain people.

So perhaps you could comment on those things.

Mr. Miguel Figueroa: First of all, concerning the enumeration and the question of verification, when a voter goes into an actual polling station on election day he's not registered. Under the old system and the new system they had to provide identification. Under the new system, they have to provide not necessarily proof of citizenship but certainly a valid identification, driver's licence and such. Under the new system, for those people who are automatically registered this takes place without proof of citizenship.

• 1940

I'll give you a good example. I just became a homeowner in the last year, and because I became a homeowner I was automatically placed on the voters list. Yet you don't have to be a citizen to buy a home. In fact, I might well be a non-citizen but appear on the voters list.

Our contention about the voters list has to do with the fact that by placing the onus on the individual voter, it's a kind of Americanization of the registration system. I don't mean entirely, but the requirement that the individual citizens make sure they're on the voters list and therefore they know where the polling station is, when the vote is, and that they in fact have the right to vote, we think, has resulted effectively in the disenfranchisement of thousands of voters. The Ontario elections demonstrate that. As a matter of fact, in regard to the early retirement of the former chief electoral officer of Ontario, while it was not only for this reason, certainly this was part of the criticism that took place after the recent Ontario elections and led in no small part to that retirement by Mr. Bailie.

What is the answer? We don't think that a return to mandatory enumerations before elections is the total answer, but we think certainly it would guarantee that more citizens were registered and would be conscious and know that they had the right to vote. There are many Canadians who may be citizens, who have been here for many years, but English is not their first language, for instance, and when they don't receive that form in the mail that we used to get, saying “You're a registered voter and this is when you vote and so on. Take this to the polling stating”, they don't go to vote.

There are those, as I said, who say that's their own fault, that they're to blame for it. We think, on the other hand, that the savings that have accrued by eliminating the enumeration process and moving to a permanent voters list don't come anywhere near to comparing to the impact, particularly on poor people, on tenants, on those workers who have to travel across the country, on students, and youth who have been effectively missed out through the shift to the permanent voters list.

On the other question, third-party advertising, there certainly were rulings in the Alberta court and so on, the National Citizens' Coalition and other rulings. I would point out, however—and we make this point in the written brief that we would like to submit to the committee—that in the Supreme Court ruling, in the Libman et al case, in fact the Supreme Court ruled quite differently, pointing out that there was a basis for the government to put reasonable limits on third-party advertising. In fact those limits weren't there. The government considered introducing it, and it really never came into force in an actual election. It hasn't really been tested in terms of an election, and now there is a retreat and we think it's unfortunate.

We think the vast majority of Canadian people want the democratic process to be as equitable as possible and not one that can be bought and paid for through the massive use of finances to influence elections in the critical days before the vote. So for that reason we are in support of it. I don't think the two questions are connected, if you will, Mr. White—our view with respect to third-party advertising and our concerns with respect to constitutionality and other points that we've raised.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Knutson.

Mr. Gar Knutson (Elgin—Middlesex—London, Lib.): I'd like to get your comments on the whole issue of proportional representation. It was once suggested to me by a European member of Parliament that the advantage of our system was that MPs were more rooted to their community. Take my example. I got elected by a certain group of people in Elgin—Middlesex—London. Mr. Richardson got elected out of Perth. We have to account to that group.

• 1945

But you remove that once you move to proportional representation. Really, whether you get into Parliament then depends as much on your status within the party, on your ranking within the party system. Because it gets 40% of the votes and it gets 40% of the candidates, it's the party that determines whether you're in the top 40 or the bottom 40. I think that would be a bad situation, because it would cut out accountabilities to communities.

I just wonder if you want to comment on that.

Mr. Miguel Figueroa: As you know, Mr. Knutson, it's not just a black-and-white, either/or situation. There are various systems that have actually been implemented in different countries, including modified proportional representation or mixed systems that allow for some constituency-based representation as well as a proportional representation system that tends to more effectively reflect the collective desires of the people. We recognize that there is this contradiction under a total proportional representation system. However, there are other ways and means by which that can be remedied.

One of the concerns we have, and we referred to it in terms of the Broadcast Act and the whole question of the way campaigns are conducted—the shorter campaign period and so on—is that while it's true that under a constituency-based system MPs and MPPs and so on, at the provincial level, still have a constituency that they're ultimately answerable to, the emphasis has shifted overwhelmingly under these new conditions towards identification with parties, as opposed to individual candidates. This has been a gradual development in Canadian political history, reflected in 1974, by the way, when the system of party registration was first introduced. Before then, even though there were Grits and Tories and so on, they did not run under the party banner; they ran as individuals, even though everyone knew they were members of different parties.

Nowadays, it's not at all uncommon—in fact I would suggest to you that it is more likely the case in the majority of instances—that voters decide to elect a certain party and its platform, to elect a certain leader to lead the country, and that they don't even know the name of their local candidates until they actually walk up to the ballot box. I think this is particularly true in urban ridings.

Mr. Gar Knutson: Like Mississauga, for example.

Mr. Miguel Figueroa: If we're honest with one another, I think we recognize that this is a real fact of the political process. That's not to say, however, that the principle that elected officials should be responsible to their electors should be dispensed with. I think this is one of the questions that, in our view, should be put before the Canadian people.

We should be looking at different models and having an open discussion about it. Unfortunately, the reality is that it will probably not be introduced for a long, long time. That's because in any one given circumstance it's in the best partisan interest of whoever happens to be the ruling party of the day to continue with the present system. It's kind of like a catch-22 situation. In our view, however, the fact remains that Parliament and the Canadian government as a whole cannot indefinitely forestall this question because there is growing support right across the political spectrum for the introduction of some sort of proportional representation system.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Ms. Dalphond-Guiral.

Ms. Madeleine Dalphond-Guiral (Laval Centre, BQ): First, I'd like to make a short comment. I rather agree with you regarding party identification, even if it has only two candidates, to make it easier for voters to make their choice. It should be rather easy to do and it should be done.

In your presentation, you said that as far as you are concerned, the election period is too short. True, maybe the current election period is a bit short, but I'm not convinced that we should go back to a 60 day-period. I'd like it if you could give me some arguments to convince me to support your views.

• 1950

[English]

Mr. Miguel Figueroa: Well, first of all, thank you for your comments about the question on the number of candidates.

With respect to the election period, the election period was in fact 60 days for many elections. I think the onus would be on those to substantiate in real terms why this was disadvantageous to the Canadian people and to the democratic process. As you know, it was shortened to 48 days. It was then shortened again relatively quickly, this time to 36 days. The argument was that there was a certain political exhaustion that took place among the Canadian people because they were bombarded with political messages.

I should point out in this respect that there was an election campaign in Israel recently, the one in which Ehud Barak was elected, that went on for months and months. If you'll recall, I think it went on for at least four or five months. I don't think the Israeli people were exhausted by that. In fact, the voter turnout was much higher than it normally is in Canadian elections. Of course there's a different political circumstance, but the fact remains that under the old system here, there were certain limits on mass advertising—television commercials particularly—until about halfway into the election campaign.

The impact of a shorter election campaign—and it's even a bigger problem at the provincial level, where they're 28 days in many cases—is that it makes it extremely difficult for newer parties, for smaller parties, for parties that don't have substantial corporate funding, to even get into the game and to survive. Bear in mind, for instance, that the candidates must be nominated 21 days before the election. Under the present system, that provides essentially two weeks for parties to find candidates, and to get into the field and to build some sort of momentum for the campaign. For the larger, established parties, and for those parties that have a narrow electoral list focus—all they do is run in elections, and between elections they spend three and a half to five years fine-tuning their electoral machines and their strategies and tactics for the coming election—that's one thing. Smaller parties have neither the ways nor the means to do that, and there is a tremendous scramble that goes on. As a result, even when parties are able to field the necessary number of candidates, their ability to reach their voters, to campaign, to get out and visit 20,000 households in an urban riding and so on, is very curtailed.

So that's why we think there's a fundamental democratic question involved in this. I think some of the problems related to having a longer election campaign are much more easily dealt with and ameliorated than the inherent problems of having short election campaigns. In our view, the latter simply serve the interest of those who are already part of the club.

[Translation]

Ms. Madeleine Dalphond-Guiral: In your presentation, you mentioned a number of requirements you'd like changed. If I were to ask you to keep only one, which one would it be?

[English]

Mr. Miguel Figueroa: Well, you have to tell me whether you're going to implement one or not, and then I'll tell you.

[Translation]

Voices: Ah, ah!

Ms. Madeleine Dalphond-Guiral: No, no, but I'd like...

[English]

Mr. Miguel Figueroa: Well, this is very hard, of course—

[Translation]

Ms. Madeleine Dalphond-Guiral: I am sure.

[English]

Mr. Miguel Figueroa: —because we think all of them have—

[Translation]

Ms. Madeleine Dalphond-Guiral: You can well imagine that it's also difficult for an opposition party.

[English]

M. Miguel Figueroa: Yes, well, in some respects the proposals break down into two basic camps. One deals with electoral reform as a process in the whole. If the standing committee and the government of the day were to consider, as did the Lortie commission—which was a truncated process, with many of its recommendations never fully implemented—introducing a genuine process of popular consultation about rethinking the democratic process as a whole in this country and involving the Canadian people through public hearings, we think that could address some questions, such as the issue of proportional representation, the length of the election period, and so on, which are all related questions.

• 1955

In terms of the actual Bill C-2, we think some of the specific proposals in Bill C-2, particularly the question of the 50-candidate rule, are very serious, as is the question of the permanent voters list.

So I haven't really answered your question—

[Translation]

Ms. Madeleine Dalphond-Guiral: Yes, I understood that.

[English]

Mr. Miguel Figueroa: —but I would say that if the committee were to consider two things, one would be to change the 50-candidate rule, and the other would be to propose to the government that a broader process of Canada-wide consultation and public hearings on the whole electoral process would be a very useful undertaking, perhaps after this legislation is even considered. Such issues would be those like the right of recall and proportional representation. All of these questions could be dealt with in such a broad consultation.

The Chair: I'll go to Ms. Parrish.

Ms. Carolyn Parrish (Mississauga Centre, Lib.): Thank you very much. I'm pleased that I finally found the room, because I've been trailing all over the place. You'd think I'd know what I was doing around here by now.

Based on what I heard of your presentation, I think you're very articulate and very pleasant and have some interesting ideas. One of the things I'd like to get back to is this proportional voting. Let me tell you about one of the things that I think works here.

I've monitored elections in other countries. I was in the Ukraine, where they have a run-off situation because they have thirty parties and thirty candidates. They take everybody that got a certain amount, and they run a vote again in a couple of weeks. That's only based on the fact that more than 70% of the people voted in the Ukraine. I wasn't sure what they'd do if they didn't, but they did. They voted in great numbers there, because it was their first democratic election. I wasn't there for the run-off two weeks later, but I was in Bosnia when they did run-off elections there.

This seems to be something that's being brought in in countries that haven't had democracy before, or ones that haven't had it for a long time. They're not reinventing the wheel, they're just coming out with a brand new wheel the first time out of the chute. Ideally, then, it is a system that seems to be quite popular.

In Canada, we have a long tradition of party affiliation and community affiliation. There are very few MPs who don't run in their own ridings, and there are very few who would be comfortable serving a riding that's several provinces away. In the proportional representation systems that I've looked at, some of them just involve appointing somebody in the area once a party gets so many votes or whatever—and I'm sorry if I missed the beginning and you clarified this.

What type of proportional voting would you be more interested in, the type in which they do the run-off, like the ones in Ukraine and Bosnia, or the one in which they elect x number for a party and then the party selects its candidates? I know that happens in some countries too.

Mr. Miguel Figueroa: Thank you for that question.

Ms. Carolyn Parrish: I'm sorry I took so long.

Mr. Miguel Figueroa: No, it's a good question.

With the cautionary note that I'm not an expert in these matters, I'll just say that, to the best of my understanding, the system of run-off elections—which is also used in France, by the way, as well as in many other countries—is used in more of a presidential system rather than a parliamentary system. Those run-off elections are not for local MPs, but rather for the president of the country. We don't elect a president, we elect a governing party, which then names the leader of that party as the prime minister.

It would be difficult to see how a run-off system—which, we could say, would be a democratic advance in some respects—could be easily transferable to a parliamentary system. Because some countries have a presidential structure, however, there are also cases in which they have a run-off system of elections for the president, and proportional representation for the national congress at the same time.

In New Zealand, as I indicated earlier, there is a mixed system. They actually do have constituency-based members in the New Zealand Parliament, but they also allocate something like 40% of the seats on the basis of proportional representation. It doesn't precisely address all of the aspects with regard to proportional representation, but it essentially helps to shift the composition of those Parliaments more in the direction of reflecting the overall wishes of the electorate.

• 2000

Ms. Carolyn Parrish: Perhaps if we had run-off-type balloting here, we wouldn't have to have the Reform and the Tories form one political party. People would have a second shot. If one right-wing party didn't win, then they could vote for the one that did on their second run at it.

Mr. Miguel Figueroa: In fact, the experience of run-off elections, where they're used, is that it tends to lead to that kind of direction. Certainly in French presidential elections that is the impact. So you have socialists versus communists and the Green Party supporting the presidential candidate who got the highest percentage on the first round, and the right-wing parties supporting their presidential candidate.

I don't want to abuse our opportunity before the committee, but there is a connection here with regard to the possibility of forming coalitions of parties in order to gain a majority and how the current act and the new proposed act make such a possibility much more difficult. If you look around the world, you'll see that it is now not an uncommon thing for parties in one election, or maybe even in several elections, to decide that they have such common interests, particularly around certain issues of big importance to the country, that they choose to work in coalitions. They actually field coalition candidates in certain elections. Under our act, for instance, it's impossible to do that.

Ms. Carolyn Parrish: I'd like to make one more comment, Mr. Chair. This is really fascinating, and I've had fascinating discussions on this with many other people. The only people who seem fascinated by it are people who are in politics.

Before the 1997 election I had a riding with 350,000 people in it. I received correspondence up to here every day, e-mails, the whole bit. I didn't have one person ever talk to me about this or write or phone me about it. One of the things I really enjoy is going grocery shopping, but it takes me four hours to do a one-hour job because everybody stops to chat in the various aisles. You pick up your beans, and you go to the next aisle. I've never had anybody talk to me about this except people who are really into politics.

Mr. Miguel Figueroa: You mean the proportional representation.

Ms. Carolyn Parrish: Yes. I've heard other people who have sat here before you—

Mr. Miguel Figueroa: People have so many concerns about so many things, such as jobs, health care, and so on.

Ms. Carolyn Parrish: —say that everybody's really concerned about democracy and everybody's really concerned that this system is going to hell in a handbasket because the system's no good. But the public doesn't seem to feel it as much as the people who are really into politics.

That's just a comment. I don't expect you to respond.

Mr. Miguel Figueroa: I think it's a fair comment. But I would just remind you, and you will remember, that at the time of the 1988 free trade election, there were more than a few people in Canada who would have died to have a proportional representation system or some way of expressing the majority view of the Canadian people with regard to the most important issue in that election, namely, free trade.

Ms. Carolyn Parrish: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: You're welcome.

I want to go now to Mr. Jean-Serge Brisson. I hope Mr. Figueroa can stay, because there will be some further discussion, I'm sure.

Mr. Ted White: Excuse me, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Mr. White.

Mr. Ted White: I just had a comment to wrap up that session with Mr. Figueroa. Would I be able to make that? It's not really a question. It's just to get a clarification.

The Chair: If you think it would help the record by keeping it all in one place, that would be all right.

Mr. Ted White: I believe it would, because it relates to what we've just been discussing.

Ms. Parrish mentioned she didn't get feedback from her constituents about the need to move to proportional representation. In the New Zealand case nobody showed any interest until they were asked, and then they said overwhelmingly that they wanted it. In fact they chose the MMP system you mentioned, which is 50% elected first past the post and 50% proportional.

But also for the record, I would encourage you to call or write to the Chief Electoral Officer regarding the recent experience in Ontario with the electronic list. I don't want to go into detail here, but he can give you his impressions, and I think they might satisfy a lot of the concerns you have.

I would also mention that with regard to the electronic voters list itself, it's updated in many ways. As people become citizens, they can check a box on the forms they fill in that puts them automatically on the voters list. Young people turning 18 years of age are automatically mailed. The driver's licence records for most provinces are used, so that as people move and update those records their listing gets moved. I also moved to a new home recently, and it moved with me—the records updated the voters list. So it's actually very good at keeping track of people, and I'm sure that's what happened in your case.

• 2005

Finally, the Libman case with respect to third-party advertising was about a provincial referendum. The Supreme Court commented on the two cases in Alberta when it had never heard the evidence. It didn't hear the cases. It's actually outrageous that the court would comment on cases it hadn't heard. So the NCC, I can tell you, is just as adamant that they're going to challenge any restoration of third-party spending as you are in terms of the 50-candidate rule.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The Chair: Okay, wrapping up that part of the record, thank you, Mr. White.

Now we'll we go to Mr. Jean-Serge Brisson, who is party leader for the Libertarian Party of Canada. Welcome.

Mr. Jean-Serge Brisson (President, Libertarian Party of Canada: Thank you. I just have to make a correction. I'm not the party leader, I'm the party president.

The Chair: Okay. Mr. Party President, welcome. Would you be in a position to make a presentation to us now, a submission of about 10 minutes?

Mr. Jean-Serge Brisson: Yes. I put something together quickly, because I only found out on Monday about this board.

The Chair: That's fine.

Mr. Jean-Serge Brisson: Basically, I wrote something down about what hurt us the most in the last election. It was the $1,000 candidate's fee.

In the past few years the election process has changed dramatically in Canada. The electoral process was in the past a forum easily accessible for anyone and everyone who wanted to contribute time and effort in order to bring about a better way of life in this country. It has been totally changed and is now controlled as an exclusive club, providing you meet the standards laid down by those who wish to keep the competition in check. Competition is the fringe parties and the possibility that they might become a factor in winning or losing an election.

In many elections, 5% of the national vote can swing an election. If the fringe parties were not put under stringent controls by these changes in the Election Act, the electoral map in Canada might sometimes be different, especially when one party wins a majority by only a couple of seats.

For the Libertarian Party of Canada, the major changes to the Election Act that affect the fringe parties are the minimum of 50 candidates and the $1,000 deposit in order to be able to run as a candidate.

For the political parties that are represented in the House of Commons, an amount of money such as $1,000 per candidate might not seem to be a large sum. But for the fringe parties and independent individuals who do not have that kind of money but wish to try to make a difference, this clause has killed all hope of ever being able to even attempt to run in an election.

The $1,000 is refundable, but only under certain conditions. If a candidate does not garnish a certain amount of votes, then they definitely lose $500. Even if all conditions are met, the money is not available for months. The appalling side to this is that for the winning candidate, there is the possibility of actually making money with this clause, at taxpayers' expense.

The purpose of the Canada Elections Act was to make sure the rules set for seeking office were followed by everyone, that no party or candidate, or those volunteers working in the election process, take advantages that would tip the scales in their favour. After all, the purpose of an election is to allow the voters the full opportunity to choose the most competent person they feel can do the best job at running the country and protecting their rights.

As it stands now, these changes in the Canada Elections Act only allow an elite group of people to run as candidates. To me, elections should be not only for the elite but for everyone and anyone who wishes to make a difference. The act should make it easier for someone to run as a candidate, instead of hampering that.

Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Now I'll ask members if they have questions.

Mr. Ted White: I thought I indicated that to you earlier.

The Chair: We did make eye contact, absolutely.

Mr. Ted White: I'm still trying to be subtle, like some people.

The Chair: So am I. Anyway, we'll go to Mr. White for the first round.

• 2010

Mr. Ted White: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Brisson, you should really thank the gentleman sitting beside you, because thanks to his work in the courts, your $1,000 would be refunded under the new bill.

So the question I need to ask you is, if it can be fully refunded, is $1,000 still too high? Does it need to be lower? And if so, what would be a reasonable amount, in your opinion?

Mr. Jean-Serge Brisson: I understand your question. The problem is that some people will run a campaign on about $500 to $1,000. And when you take that money away.... The average little guy or little woman who works in a factory, a shop, or a small business may have a problem making ends meet day to day, but they want to make a difference, they want to run. In the last election, I had 30 people who said they just couldn't afford the $1,000. It would be tied up for too long a period of time.

The previous $200, as you know, wasn't refundable if you didn't win, and that was acceptable. But you lose $500 if you don't even get 15%, and that's tough. That's very tough. The last election....

Mr. Ted White: It was the last election, yes.

Mr. Jean-Serge Brisson: Now, as I said, I only read a quick summary yesterday, so I'm not aware of every change that's been made. But in the last election, that was the problem. The people knew they were going to lose $500. And if they only had $600 or $700 to contribute to the whole campaign—to make pamphlets and everything—that was it.

If a bond were to be put up that would be fully refunded, that would address some of the problems.

Mr. Ted White: And $1,000 in that case would be okay?

Mr. Jean-Serge Brisson: I can understand why you want to make it a certain amount of money, you know, a fair size, a certain amount of commitment. I'd have to go back to my party members and ask them if they're willing to accept $1,000, or if it's still too high. But I do know that if it's fully refundable, that helps.

But the amount is still very high. I haven't seen what the proposals are. I have no idea what they are. As I said, I found out about this only on Monday.

The Chair: Well, just for the record—I'm sure staff will correct me if I'm wrong—the current bill provides for a full refund of the $1,000 deposit, provided that the required election filing after the E day is made by the candidate.

Is that correct?

A voice: That's correct.

The Chair: Thank you.

Do you have other questions, Mr. White?

Mr. Ted White: I would just mention that my personal view is that $1,000 is too high. I thought you might suggest something a little lower, but as you haven't.... Probably with a fully refundable deposit, provided that certain papers are filed, it opens up the opportunity for people to perhaps take an assignment at a bank for a short-term loan or something like that. The bank would know it's going to be refunded, provided the papers are filed. So it is much more flexible than the situation that existed.

Mr. Jean-Serge Brisson: That's right. The last one was a shock to many candidates who came along with their $200 and didn't know about the change. They said, “What's this? I can't run.” We lost half our people that way.

The Chair: Your chair has a couple of questions, colleagues. I want to direct them to Mr. Figueroa and Mr. Brisson as well.

As you know, the current bill and the existing act have thresholds for party status, and along with having party status come obligations for filing and a fair bit of paperwork. Is it your view that a party of only two or three candidates, with not much more infrastructure than that, could handle the paperwork and filing requirements, which appear to me at first blush to be fairly onerous, with audits and lots of paperwork? My first reaction is that two or three people deciding to run as a party in a particular location might not be able to handle that much paperwork. Do you have a reaction to that?

Mr. Miguel Figueroa: Well, Mr. Lee, I'm not sure that's the best argument to make, in a political or jurisprudential sense, that there might be too much paperwork, so we're doing you a favour.

But let me just say that in the act, of course, there are other requirements for the registration of parties. They have to establish that they have a certain membership when they apply for registration. I think parties that find themselves in that circumstance would voluntarily ask to be deregistered precisely because of the onus of maintaining their party registration.

• 2015

Now, I know that concerns have been voiced by the minister, and in fact in court on behalf of the government, that this threshold is required to ensure, for instance, not only that frivolous parties do not enter the electoral arena....

It was interesting, by the way, when Justice Molloy pointed out that in fact there was a party led by a magician, who advocated levitation and so on, which fielded 191 candidates, whereas the Communist Party, whatever you may think of us, is the third oldest party in the country and is very serious. Because we didn't field 50 candidates, that hardly makes us frivolous.

But in any case, one other argument is the question of abuse, particularly of public funds, indirectly in the sense of the income tax rebate, which is available to individual Canadians who donate to political parties. This in fact may be used indirectly as a scam and so on and so forth. Our party doesn't consider that this is not an important question. However, in the 25-odd years of party registration since the system was introduced in 1974, there have been no indications of that kind of abuse of the registered party status—at least to our knowledge, anyway—as a scam.

Sometimes I think these questions are thrown up as a justification for keeping the 50-candidate rule: it would be either too complicated or too onerous, or there would be too much paperwork, or there's a danger of frivolous parties entering the fray, or there's a danger of financial scamming and so on. The court has found that this is not legitimate.

One other question is of course the argument that has been made—that is, if you were to drop it to two candidates or five candidates or ten candidates and so on, these parties could then access other benefits, including, for instance, rights under the Broadcasting Act.

In our view, we think it is quite possible and even beneficial to have differing thresholds for parties, depending on what we're talking about. Certainly having access to reach the Canadian people is a privilege. It is a privilege directly connected to the democratic process, but nonetheless it is a privilege.

It's one thing to make the case that there should be a higher threshold for those parties to access broadcast rights, for instance, but with respect to things like party identifier or the question of issuing tax receipts, this is something that infuriates our party.

When our party was deregistered, during the deregistration process we had to tell people to vote for our candidates and support our program but, whatever they did, not to send us money. Why? Because every cent that was sent to us during the deregistration period had to be turned over to the government. Can you imagine the absurdity of telling people not to send us money during an election campaign?

What's more, even after the election when we were deregistered, members, supporters, and non-members who support our party have continued to donate to our party, but they cannot access an income tax receipt because they're supporting a small party. Is that really fair and reasonable? Even if only 100 people in this country want to write out a cheque for $25 to their chosen political organization in the country, shouldn't they have the right to receive a benefit from that?

This is in fact what Justice Molloy found as well: that it was patently unfair that some Canadians can donate to some political parties and get 75% back—and then 50%, then 33.33%—but other Canadians, who donate to another political organization, which is a bona fide party by any other standard, cannot access that basic right under the Canada Elections Act.

These things need to be certainly addressed.

The Chair: Getting back to party thresholds, we in this Parliament have to write a threshold for parties; we have to do that.

• 2020

You mentioned the decision of the court in your favour. All of my colleagues would acknowledge that this type of litigation has a very important purpose. It moves the goalposts in society. It tests laws. It tests it against charter and other constitutional compliances, but at the end of the day, our job here, on behalf of Canadians who send us here, is to write the laws.

Earlier you used the word “contempt”, I think, for this House to rewrite the 50-candidate threshold in the face of a court judgment.... Well, I don't think it will be a surprise to you, because you probably already know, but it is constitutionally impossible for this place to be in contempt of a court. It is in fact our job to write the laws; it is not the job of judges.

So whoever the judges are out there who enjoy writing, my colleagues would probably want to suggest to them that they consider other ways of doing their judicial functions.

That's without taking away at all the success that you have achieved in your or your party's litigation.

That brings us back to what we have to do here: to write a threshold for party status, possibly involving the number of candidates. Yes, in theory it might be two, but it might be 50. I think you indicated at one point that the Liberal Party of many years ago thought it should be 75.

In your mind, is there some yardstick that we might use from the perspective of your party in setting that party threshold—candidacies or memberships?

Mr. Miguel Figueroa: Thank you, Mr. Lee.

One consideration, which astounds people when they hear about it, for instance, is.... First of all, let me preface this by saying that in 1974 when the 75-candidate proposal was introduced by the Liberal government, one of the arguments in favour of 75, not made formally but alluded to, was that it would preclude the possibility of a regional party coming to life in a certain part of the country.

An hon. member: Prince Edward Island.

Mr. Miguel Figueroa: Prince Edward Island.

Well, of course, with the 50-candidate rule and the situation such that there are now regionally based parties, the Bloc Québécois in particular, it is an astounding contradiction that in an entire region such as the Atlantic—the Maritimes and Newfoundland—you could not have a regionally based party. Everybody would concede that Atlantic Canada has major regional concerns. Were such a party to run candidates in every single riding in Newfoundland, Labrador, and throughout the Maritimes, it still could not achieve registered party status in this country. That's a contradiction that needs to be addressed.

If I'm not mistaken, the Lortie commission recommended 10% of ridings, which would be approximately 30. There have been others who have suggested other figures—a dozen or 15.

I certainly understand your point about the final responsibility to write this legislation being with Parliament. The court made a ruling with respect to the charter in terms of the 50-candidate ruling. Our purpose in raising this question was connected with other aspects of the act as well: the seizure of party assets, the non-refundability of deposits, and other aspects of the act as a whole that made and continue to make it incredibly difficult for smaller parties to participate in the political process.

If this committee were to come forward with another proposal, a more reasoned proposal, we would look on it as real progress.

The Chair: What about party assets for the deregistered party? The cash assets and many of the physical assets of a party would, for the most part, have been acquired with funds to which the taxpayer had made some kind of, as we call it around here, tax expenditure contribution—in other words, a tax deduction, a tax deferral. I think that is the driving factor in not letting a collapsed party, if one were in theory to totally collapse, to simply walk away in an unaccounted-for fashion with assets that were taxpayer assisted.

• 2025

Do you have a solution for us there? Let's say a hypothetical party has $750,000 in assets, and there's a taxpayer expenditure involved underlying that. What do we do?

Mr. Miguel Figueroa: First of all, we made the case in our presentation before the court and also in previous submissions to the government. Our party was founded in 1921. The party registration system wasn't introduced until 1974. Our party didn't just appear in 1974. We had assets, property, and fax machines. Did they have fax machines in 1974?

The Chair: No, they had telex machines.

Mr. Miguel Figueroa: I'm not sure. But in any case we had telephones, photocopiers, and so forth, and none of those assets were taken into account to say what your assets are as you come through the door and then what your assets are at the end. That was never calculated.

In fact, the legislation on the seizure of assets was only introduced in 1993. There was frankly very little consideration by Parliament about the impact of it. It seemed like a good idea, but it wasn't broadly discussed.

It seems to us, at least, that it was after the fact, after the government had become wedded to this legislation—and being the stubborn political animals we all are, once you pass something, you find argumentation and justification to defend it—that the argument was made that somehow the public interest has to be protected. Again, there were no cases where the public interest and the public trust had been violated by parties.

There was the Social Credit Party, for instance—

The Chair: Help us out. Do we have a responsibility to put something in the statute or not? If we do, where do we turn here?

Mr. Miguel Figueroa: Once again, our party and most smaller parties do not receive anywhere near the kind of public support from the public purse that the large parties do. We do not, for instance, receive the rebates on election expenses that the larger parties do, and that's millions and millions of dollars. We have a much smaller base of public support than that of the larger parties.

If a smaller party collapses, then they fail to meet other aspects of the act, not just the issue of the 50 candidates.

The Chair: I realize that.

Mr. Miguel Figueroa: In those cases, under Bill C-2 those assets would be seized if they failed to meet other responsibilities, including having an audited statement accounting for how they used their funds and so on and so forth.

Our contention has to do specifically with the issue of the 50-candidate rule and those parties that, for whatever reason, fall below that, for instance, because they're rebuilding or because they've had difficulties. It's an open secret, Mr. Lee—

The Chair: So what do we do? Tell me what you think we should do. Should we do nothing or something?

Mr. Miguel Figueroa: What we're proposing is that the clause in Bill C-2 that says this would be deferred for another election should in fact be removed, and there should be no seizure of party assets specifically in the case of parties who fail to field 50 candidates in any given election. That's the way it was for 19 years. There was no evidence that it was abused in any way, so we're saying it should be returned to that.

The Chair: Okay.

Mr. Brisson, do you have a comment on that aspect?

Mr. Jean-Serge Brisson: I have to agree with Mr. Figueroa as to why change it. I can understand if funds are disappearing that you can't account for, but if you get the audited statement and the money is still there, why do you need to see the assets? The party got deregistered because they had a problem running in that election. That doesn't mean they're going to disappear. If you're afraid they're going to take the money and run, then it's a whole different issue.

But as my colleague is saying, the party has failed to field 50 candidates and to meet certain criteria, but they want to be back next time around. The assets should stay maybe in trust, but they should not be seized by the government. They were not given to a party so that a government could come along and seize them. Those people have a political ideal, they feel they want to support that ideal and they didn't have a successful election, but they hope to be there the next time around, and they'll continue donating and giving money to that party, hoping that they'll come out and run again in the next election and be more successful. But to do this kind of seizure, it kills all hope to revive the party further on.

• 2030

The Chair: Yes, the seizure sounds fairly final, doesn't it?

Mr. Jean-Serge Brisson: Yes.

The Chair: Like a bankruptcy.

Are there further questions? The chair has one more. I hope you'll forgive me. I don't get to ask too many questions.

Mr. White will perk up on this one. It has to do with proportional representation.

In our system here in Canada—and I'm not that familiar with other systems around the world—we have to work within a regime of some party discipline to a greater or lesser degree on both sides of the House. Each of the parties has to deal with it. This is true in almost every country that has political parties. You get this regime of party discipline. If we had a proportional representation model in our parliamentary system, it seems to me that the party whips, who somehow, some way, would begin to control the party lists in the proportional representation model, would begin to realize how much power they really had around the House of Commons, and their ultimate discipline would be to determine where each of the MPs who came through PR would be on the list next time. So it seems to me the party whips would have even more disciplining mechanism available to them around the House of Commons with a PR type model and listing.

Some of us from time to time around here are concerned about party discipline and the impacts it has, positive and negative, and we talk about it. Do you have any reaction to that?

Mr. Miguel Figueroa: There is a danger, and there have been problems with respect to this in terms of where you are on the list. It's rather subjective, and in parties that are hierarchically and undemocratically structured there is a big danger of that. However, it seems this is a question that needs to be addressed elsewhere. It needs to be addressed in terms of the democratization of political parties and, for instance, requirements that political parties not only have conventions but that their elected representatives, caucuses, for instance, cannot overturn decisions reached in conventions of the party membership, and so on and so forth. That is the best guarantee that there is not that kind of concentration of power in the hierarchy of political parties that would allow for this kind of abuse.

However, it's an interesting question that you raise and I think it requires a lot of examination. I'm not convinced that this danger still doesn't exist under the current system, in the power of the party leader, for instance, to give the nod to certain candidates and certain constituencies and what not. But obviously there are revolts. We all know about those revolts. And certainly, of course, MPs still have the power to cross the floor and so on and to break out on their own, voluntarily leave caucus or have caucus leave them.

In any case, these questions are why we're not coming forward with a detailed proposal for proportional representation, but rather we say there is something there, and where there's smoke there's fire. In that sense, I think it behooves the government and the standing committee to say that we should find some sort of process to have a genuine debate and dialogue on this question among the Canadian people as a whole.

The Chair: Thank you.

The clerk has just reminded me I've gone past my time.

Are there any further questions, then? One last question to Mr. White.

Mr. Ted White: I'd like to make a comment. I did perk up when you mentioned proportional representation, not because I particularly support it—

The Chair: I thought you would.

Mr. Ted White: —but because it is a very complex area. There are numerous methods of proportional representation, but even within MMP, the mixed member proportional system that is used in New Zealand, there are two different ways you can select your list. It can be selected by either the riding associations, which takes the power out of the hands of the whips, or by the party—or by a combination of both.

• 2035

So even within that one system there are different variations. It is a very complicated area. We could sit here for weeks discussing proportional representation.

The Chair: We might, we might not.

I want to thank both of our witnesses for making it here tonight. Thank you very much for your contribution.

To Mr. Brisson, obviously we're working on the $1,000 issue.

We're adjourned.