FAIT Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

COMITÉ PERMANENT DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES ET DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Thursday, March 23, 2000

• 0939

[English]

The Chair (Mr. Bill Graham (Toronto Centre—Rosedale, Lib.)): Colleagues, this is the second of our hearings on the matter of sanctions and how they apply to Iraq. We have a panel this morning of various experts, and I understand they have some differing points of view about the sanctions, their advisability and how they are functioning at this time. I'm going to ask them if they would give evidence in the order in which they're listed on our order of the day.

If you have been good enough to prepare a written submission, please do not just read the written submission. We have the written submission. Also, I'd ask if you'd be good enough to keep your comments to ten minutes because there are quite a few of you. You will find that the most rewarding part of this process is when the members start to ask you questions because then you get engaged. If everybody talks for 20 minutes, then nobody gets to ask questions and there's no engagement. So I try to keep you to 10 minutes and then we turn it over to questions.

• 0940

Thank you all very much for coming. We appreciate very much your taking the time to come and share your views with us.

I'd ask if Mr. Cleminson, the former commissioner of UNSCOM, could lead off.

Mr. Ron Cleminson (Individual Presentation): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the opportunity of appearing here today. I do so as a private citizen but with some knowledge of Iraq, some knowledge of the Middle East, over a 30-year period. What I've learned from that is how very little one knows about these areas. Therefore I would caution that what I'm going to say comes from that, though I have had an association with the United Nations special commission and with the panel that evaluated the special commission. I've recently received an assignment to the new organization from the secretary general.

I just want to make three points. I've distributed a very short paper. I hope it has the information you would require. I just want to make three points on that.

First, in terms of sanctions, they were not placed by the Security Council in 1991 in a vindictive or frivolous manner. They were certainly established after a very careful stocktaking of what the problem was about, how one could tackle it. My own feeling is that in 1991 no one thought this would have gone on for eight years. As I've said in my paper, I think most felt it would probably be perhaps 18 months to two years, and they based this on the fact that everyone was sure that the Iraqi authorities would cooperate fully because they would want to return to normality and they would want to return to oil production. Nevertheless, eight years later, that had not happened.

I should point out also that during that period the Security Council received the reports and received them with consensus. It was only in the last 15 to 24 months that the Security Council started to see differences within themselves.

The second point I would like to make is that in the interim, in the 15 months that have expired since inspectors were withdrawn from Iraq, there has been a considerable communication between the Security Council and the Government of Iraq and amongst Security Council members. As a result of that, the Security Council established a panel. There were three panels, as a matter of fact, but the one I was on was looking at disarmament and arms control.

We should remember Canada's role in having these panels set up. It was Ambassador Fowler, supported by his staff both in New York and here in Ottawa, who made the proposal. The panels were then chaired by Brazil.

The panels did not look at who was right and who was wrong. Most certainly, the United Nations has created its problems. UNSCOM has created its problems. After all, they've had more than 3,000 inspectors, and most certainly from time to time you can expect that out of that number you'll have some who don't measure up and perhaps others who exceed the standard. As a result of that, they came up with Security Council resolution 1284 of 1999, and it's all-inclusive.

What I'm interested in is the set-up of the new organization, UNMOVIC, and the appointment of Dr. Hans Blix. I would hope parliamentarians might recognize that it's essential at this time that Dr. Blix, who is an extraordinarily gifted individual, who was the secretary general of the IAEA for 12 years, who has been very much engaged in this process from the start.... Most certainly in undertaking their obligations, they were to some degree operating slightly differently from UNSCOM, but only because they were operating with different weapons systems.

• 0945

My third point would be this. It's pointless to look at the past and it's pointless to attempt to assign guilt. What is necessary now is to read the resolution to recognize what the Security Council is trying to attain, to recognize that the Security Council has adopted this without dissent, which of course is different from consensus. Nevertheless, all 15 members of the Security Council have accepted this, and there have been members from each of the P-5 appointed to UNMOVIC.

So we have a situation here where we could have a solution, but it is very much dependent upon the attitude the Iraqi authorities take to this resolution. The Security Council has moved a very long way. They've outlined a new path by which an agreement could take place. My guesstimate, again, being very subjective, is that if there were full cooperation it would probably take 18 to 24 months, and we would be in a fully compliant mode in the future.

Again I would suggest that you, as parliamentarians, follow this very carefully and lend your full support. I can't overemphasize the fact that this is, in many ways, a last opportunity and a best opportunity. I have great confidence in Dr. Blix. I have seen him in action over a period of time. He is a man of complete integrity. He is a man who is action oriented. I would hope, therefore, that we would look at this as an opportunity to get into the problem and to solve it.

While I'm sure that this morning we will be talking about humanitarian concerns—and most certainly those are important—I want to emphasize that you do recognize that sanctions have been imposed for other reasons as well. I'll just name three of them.

One is regional stability. The Iraqi people have been at war for almost 20 years, if you count the last 10 years, which have not really been a peaceful venture for them. They were at war with Iran, then they invaded Kuwait, and then they set fire to the oil fields. The last 10 years have been a venture to sort out those wrongs and to move on.

It's also that sanctions are tied into international security. I'm sure there are going to be people talking about oil, so I won't, except to say that because we are dealing with weapons of mass destruction here—and that is the only thing about UNSCOM the IAEA is looking at, weapons of mass destruction—if those programs are not in action, if those programs have been given up, if those weapons have been given up—and in my own opinion those weapons have been given up—then this is very significant in terms of international security.

The last thing I would say is that it also ties in very much to non-proliferation. I know that the Canadian government has recognized non-proliferation as their number one priority. The NATO council has also recognized that. The Security Council, in 1992, under the chairmanship of the United Kingdom, also recognized non-proliferation as the single most important item in international security.

Therefore I would suggest that this is very much almost a case study here. Can you identify or can you recognize whether these programs are in existence or not? I strongly suggest that members of Parliament take an active interest in this, that they support the move the Security Council has made, recognize the role the Canadian group and the United Nations have played in getting us to where we are now, and most certainly support that whole activity.

Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Cleminson. That is very helpful.

From the Campaign to End Sanctions Against the People of Iraq, Ms. Morgan.

Ms. Linda Morgan (Spokesperson, Campaign to End Sanctions Against the People of Iraq): Mr. Graham, members of the committee, thank you for having this hearing on this very important and urgent issue about our government's policy on Iraq.

I know you have heard and will hear from many expert witnesses. I also know that you are aware of the many reports, such as the recent UNICEF and Red Cross reports, but I would like to tell you about our experience and address some of our concerns.

• 0950

The Campaign to End Sanctions Against the People of Iraq is a Vancouver-based group made up mainly of concerned citizens and endorsed by many peace groups. We formed in November 1997 when we first heard that 4,500 children were dying every month as a result of the U.S.-UN-imposed sanctions. We could not imagine what kind of policy would allow 4,500 children a month to die. We were horrified and outraged to find that this is a policy our government supports.

The Campaign to End Sanctions Against the People of Iraq—CESAPI—has been very involved since then in trying to bring about awareness of the devastation and of how the sanctions are affecting the Iraqi people. Last April, seven members of CESAPI went to Iraq, where we saw with our own eyes the effects these inhumane sanctions are having. We heard many stories that broke our hearts.

We heard that Iraq had a free education system right through to university, which used to be compulsory and valued. What we saw was a lot of street children. Children were begging on the streets, trying to sell goods, and also running into the traffic trying to get drivers to buy what they had. These children should be in school. For the children that did go to school, there was little there for them. Desks and the wood to make the desks have been denied under the sanctions for the last 10 years. Also, there was little in the way of school supplies.

Hans von Sponeck told our delegation that he is concerned that there is a cultural genocide going on in Iraq. He said the deprivation of the young people, which is not allowing them to become responsible citizens, is very troubling for the future.

We heard that Iraq used to have sophisticated hospitals with a universal medical system similar to ours, but what we saw was that the hospitals are now like the third world. The roofs of the hospitals leak, the equipment is old and falling apart, the interiors are dingy, and there are no screens on the windows so there are flies in the wards.

We saw this little girl, shown in our photo here. Her name is Ahiam. She is 19 months old. The photo doesn't show it, but she didn't have the energy to sit up; she was malnourished and she obviously had diarrhea. Her father, who was sitting beside her, looked demoralized, and he had not gotten around to changing her diaper, so the lower half of her body was covered in flies. You can see that one fly has landed on her face.

There are not many nurses left in Iraq. The cash-strapped government doesn't have the money to pay them a living wage. Many were from the Philippines and they have since left.

We have heard that a Canadian delegation went to Iraq in November and that the person who went came back and said there was not a problem, there was food in the stores. Well, this is true. There is a lot of food on the black market, but the average Iraqi person doesn't have the money to buy it. Before the sanctions, one Iraqi dollar was worth $3 U.S. Now, a 250-dinar note is worth 12¢.

The food in the black market is comparable to ours. In fact, before the sanctions, it would have been considered cheap. But if a doctor is earning only about $5 a month and the average person only $2 to $3 a month, they can't go out and buy oranges, for example, for 50¢ a kilo.

So there is a lot of malnutrition, and the malnourished moms are giving birth to malnourished babies. We saw it in the wards this year in Basra. A lot of children looked like this picture we have here. Twenty-five percent of the live births are underweight. That is in comparison to before sanctions, when the rate was only 4%. This is an outrage—in the late eighties, we were told that the biggest problem doctors had for children in Iraq was obesity.

• 0955

There is grief beyond words in Iraq. When we were there, on one of the wards, this child died. This is her death certificate. She was just two years old, and she died for the lack of a 50¢ piece of tubing that the doctors explained was unobtainable under the sanctions. When her father left, he turned to us and said, “This is your fault.”

But when we express our concern to our government about the devastating effects of the sanctions, officials tell us they believe it is the Iraqi government's fault, and they point to the discrepancy between the north and the south. We heard a different story in Iraq from the UN officials and the NGOs there. We heard that the Iraqi government is trying to do its best, but it doesn't have the cash. Hans von Sponeck, who is the former humanitarian coordinator in Iraq.... He's the second one to have resigned. Denis Halliday, who is here, also resigned, as you know. Both of them gave up at least 34-year careers in the UN over this.

Hans von Sponeck told our delegation that there are many reasons the north is better off. For one thing, they get more per capita out of the oil-for-food deal. There are more NGOs there distributing humanitarian aid. The UN has more vehicles at its disposal—Iraq doesn't have the vehicles and is having a hard time getting spare parts to fix the vehicles they do have. Also, there's a market economy there. It's close to Turkey, stuff is getting in, and there's some trade.

Even so, the north is not as well off as it used to be. We have two members in CESAPI who are Kurdish. They're both from the village of Halabja, the village that was chemically bombed by Saddam Hussein. Understandably, they don't have much love for Saddam Hussein because he killed many members of their families. But just before our delegation left for Iraq, one of them said at a public meeting that before the sanctions they had food on the table, shoes on their feet, and good education. Now they have none of that. So if he had to take his chances between the U.S.-imposed sanctions and protection and Saddam Hussein, he would choose Saddam Hussein.

We are told that resolution 1284 addresses this situation and will allow for the lifting of the sanctions. We believe that if a document could be drafted to allow the sanctions to remain in place indefinitely and deflect the blame onto the Iraqi government for not agreeing to this, then resolution 1284 is the most stealthy piece of diplomacy for the job.

It calls for UNMOVIC to verify what may not be there. UNMOVIC has to certify that no weapons of mass destruction, nor the capacity to produce them, exist. Verification of this kind is an unattainable goal. The Canadian government acknowledged this in May 1999 when it proposed that verification as a precondition to the lifting of the sanctions be eliminated. So resolution 1284 is not the answer, as it's impossible to prove this kind of negative.

However, the urgency of the plight of the Iraqi people cannot be overstated. The deaths of more than one million and the many more who are suffering unimaginably are a reality. This must be this committee's priority, not a hypothetical “maybe” that a couple of missiles might show up and kill a few people. The sanctions are killing a couple of hundred Iraqis every day, and the American and British are still terrorizing and killing Iraqis in the illegal no-fly zones.

We urge this panel to recommend that this government support the immediate and unconditional lifting of the sanctions and to disassociate itself from this genocidal policy by joining with France, Russia, and China in speaking out publicly for the immediate lifting of the sanctions. Furthermore, we hope this panel will advise the Liberal government to work within the UN for the immediate end to the illegal American and British sorties in the no-fly zones, and for the government to help repair damage done to Iraq and its people.

• 1000

Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Ms. Morgan. I appreciate it.

We have Mr. Chouaib, from the National Council on Canada-Arab Relations.

I gather Ian Watson is with you, who is familiar to many of us.

Mr. Mazen Chouaib (Executive Director, National Council on Canada-Arab Relations): Yes. Thanks.

I would like to start by thanking the committee for addressing the issue of the sanctions and for giving concerned Canadians the opportunity to express their concerns to Parliament and, through you, to the Government of Canada.

The National Council on Canada-Arab Relations has been actively seeking solutions to end the illegal and inhumane sanctions that have been imposed on the people of Iraq. In its continuing support of the sanctions regime long after the weapons inspection process has been almost completed, Canada has become complicit in the humanitarian disaster that continues to be inflicted upon Iraq's civilian population. Canada must re-examine its role in supporting the sanctions. We urge the committee to take a position that conforms with our Canadian tradition as makers and builders of peace.

Since the committee will be looking at the role of sanctions in future conflicts, their legal implications, and their effects on civilian populations, I would like to draw your attention to two issues related to examples of the use of sanctions.

First, many have drawn parallels between the sanctions that were imposed on South Africa during the apartheid period and their supposed or perceived success. Canada, as you all know, was a leading supporter of those sanctions. The case of South Africa is extensively used to illustrate the workability of sanctions as an alternative to a military war. However, the fundamentals and the nature of the South African example have often been overlooked.

There are differences between these two cases. The people of South Africa were demanding sanctions be imposed on the apartheid regime. Given that, and despite the need and calls by the people of the country, Great Britain and other countries maintained relations with the apartheid government of the time. Secondly, South Africa had sanctions imposed on it without a military war.

In the case of Iraq, it was, first, a war that devastated the country and undermined the social and economic infrastructure. Simultaneously, a siege was put into place that severely affected the people of Iraq. Thus, the two cases are fundamentally different.

Second, when sanctions were initially imposed, the U.S., Canada, and other allies claimed that by imposing severe sanctions on a population, they would, ultimately, after suffering the hardships of these sanctions, revolt and eventually change the government. The hypothesis that sanctions would encourage a revolt and weaken the government has been tragically misguided. As the mounting evidence of the cost of economic sanctions clearly demonstrates, the people of Iraq are busy trying to put food on the table, rather than looking for methods to topple the government.

According to numerous UN reports and independent studies by humanitarian organizations, sanctions are destroying Iraq in all its aspects—environment, health, education, cultural heritage, and social fabric.

We look at the past to indicate where Iraq was and to illustrate what Iraq could have achieved had these sanctions not been imposed on it. One of these issues is intellectual embargo.

The oil-for-food program funds are barely enough for Iraqis' urgent and immediate physical needs, with nothing made available for intellectual needs. The result is complete intellectual deprivation. At the physical level, schools are deteriorating, and Iraq's textbooks from elementary school through university are almost all 10 years old.

According to UNESCO, the educational policy in Iraq included provisions for scholarships, research facilities, and medical support for students. By 1989, the combined primary and secondary enrolment ratio stood at 75%, slightly above the average of the developing countries at 70%. That's according to the Human Development Report of 1991. Education accounted for 5% of the state budget in 1989, above developing countries' average of 3.8%. That as well is according to the development report.

A 1999 UNESCO report prepared for the Security Council's panel on humanitarian issues, which Canada was very instrumental in putting together, notes that literacy rates by 1987 had increased to 80%. This is attributed to the success of the massive literacy campaign conducted during the late seventies and early eighties. In 1995, the rate of literacy was estimated at 42%, a major shift in favour of illiteracy.

• 1005

In 1993, UNESCO emphasized the severe educational damage. Since then, the educational system has only collapsed further. I quote:

During the Gulf War and its aftermath, more than 5,500 of Iraq's educational institutions were badly damaged.... The embargo...has meant that materials cannot be imported to carry out the necessary repairs—unless they come in as humanitarian aid—

The Acting Chair (Mr. Ted McWhinney (Vancouver Quadra, Lib)): We can allow, because of the number of witnesses, only seven minutes, and you've used up about five. You seem to be reading the brief—which is a very good brief; we've all read it. But I think Mr. Watson also has to be accommodated in your time. Do you think you could sum up rather than read?

Mr. Mazen Chouaib: I'll go with five minutes.

Regarding the initiative by the Security Council, resolution 1284, it is very important to note that from the start four countries abstained from voting on the resolution—France, China, and Russia, as well as Indonesia, from the non-permanent members—sending a clear signal of the dissatisfaction on the new proposal and continued sanctions. Canada happily voted in favour. Iraq rejected it outright.

A careful analysis of the resolution indicated that this proposal is mired with traps, open for multiple interpretations, and doesn't go far enough in addressing Iraq's concerns for ending the sanctions.

I will highlight only a couple of points, and there's a good analysis that I've submitted by Dr. Phyllis Bennis there.

Resolution 1284 calls for the following: the creation of a new inspection regime; adjustment of the current oil-for-food program; and suspension of sanctions.

On the first issue, UNMOVIC will have to start its operation from scratch and not from where UNSCOM, its predecessor and spy-infested agency, left off. So Iraqis will have to endure the intrusive and politically motivated inspection of this newly created agency.

I would like also to highlight that Mr. Tariq Aziz, Iraq's foreign minister stated:

We would accept monitoring to confirm disarmament.... If they decide to lift sanctions and say they just want to come to inspect the military for that, it would be hard for our people to understand if we rejected that.

This illustrates Iraq's ability and willingness to work with UNMOVIC and the new resolution.

The current oil-for-food program would have some superficial changes that would not substantially change the process by which Iraq gets its supplies.

The third point is that sanctions will be suspended for a renewable 120 days and will be lifted if, and only if, Iraq complies fully and completely with UNMOVIC and the International Atomic Energy Agency. The suspension could be annulled if either one of the directors of these two agencies were to deem Iraq non-compliant.

Article 33 states:

to suspend for a period of 120 days...prohibitions against the import of commodities and products originating in Iraq, and prohibitions against the sale, supply and delivery to Iraq of civilian commodities....

This allows for a wide area of interpretation by the Security Council or any of its members that could result in an immediate halt to the suspension of the sanctions.

We recommend the following: to clearly indicate, state, and act on lifting the economic sanctions from the people of Iraq; to respond in good faith and address Iraq's grievances; and to accept Iraq's stated calls for maintaining military sanctions and lifting the economic ones—as I mentioned Tariq Aziz himself stated.

We also ask you to recommend that the Government of Canada, similar to its decision on other regions, open the Canadian embassy in Iraq or open a diplomatic office in order to facilitate the flow of information and help in finding solutions to this problem; to insist and encourage the Government of Canada to play a constructive role in bridging the differences between Iraq and the United States; and to facilitate discussions with the intended goal of finding an end to the problem. We feel that the U.S. and Great Britain are deadlocked in their own rhetoric and need help in finding a solution to this crisis.

Thank you again for allowing us this opportunity to present our concerns.

The Acting Chair (Mr. Ted McWhinney): Thank you very much.

Mr. Watson, I welcome you back to this House. You were elected, I think, in the revolution of 1968, correct?

Mr. Ian Watson (Senior Advisor, National Council on Canada-Arab Relations): No, that was 1963.

The Acting Chair (Mr. Ted McWhinney): That was 1963, before the revolution. You were a member for about 16 years?

Mr. Ian Watson: Twenty-one.

The Acting Chair (Mr. Ted McWhinney): Twenty-one years. Well, welcome back. We're happy to hear from you.

Mr. Ian Watson: Thank you for the plug, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like to add my thanks to the committee for giving us the opportunity to express our views and concerns regarding the sanctions.

We're not here to defend the present regime in Iraq, but we do argue that the people of Iraq do not deserve the treatment they've received from the UN and the international community, including Canada, during the past nine years.

When the Iran-Iraq war ended, the Iraqi people were looking forward to peace and prosperity, and suddenly they found themselves, in 1990, dragged unenthusiastically into Saddam's Kuwait adventure.

• 1010

Fifty-one years earlier, Hitler had led an almost totally supportive and enthusiastic population into war, and when Germany surrendered unconditionally in 1945, the victors did not continue to punish the people of Germany. With wisdom and foresight, the Allied leadership, led by the U.S. with its Marshall Plan, opted to rebuild Germany's infrastructure and to build from scratch the modern democracy we know today. Nine years after Iraq's unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait, their population continues to be punished for an adventure it was not responsible for and did not want.

You've heard in detail the horrifying impact of sanctions from other witnesses, the impact on the basic structures of Iraqi society. But it should be clear to all of us that with our treatment of Iraq in this way for so long after the sanctions have in effect produced what we originally wanted them to do, which was to seek out the arms capacity of Iraq and eliminate it, we are laying and have laid the basis for a more extreme view of the world within Iraq.

The west's position on sanctions is also fuelling anti-western sentiment throughout the Arab world. The plight of the Iraqi people, the double standard the Arab public in general views is applied to the lack of sanctions against Israel, which is in breach of not only Geneva conventions but many, many other areas of international law.... This double standard and the plight of the Iraqi population under the sanctions regime are causing, without question, a growth of fundamentalist sentiment in that part of the world—not only in the Arab world but in Iran as well.

We do appreciate that your committee is seeking ideas on what Canada can do differently with regard to the Iraqi sanctions. I'd like to ask the committee's permission, if the chairman and the steering committee take a look and agree, that the two papers both Mazen and I have used extensively in our notes—one by Ranya Masri and the other by Phyllis Bennis—be appended to the minutes. I don't know whether this is still done, but it's something you might want to consider, because they're both excellent research papers and well worth becoming part of the public domain.

Very, very briefly, there are two areas I don't think have been touched on to any extent by other witnesses. One is depleted uranium and the other is the impact on agriculture and animal health. I'd like to very quickly touch upon those.

In the case of depleted uranium, which was used extensively in tank-piercing shells during the Gulf War, Iraq has been reporting an alarming increase in cancer cases, mutations, and birth defects. And of course there have been claims by Canadian and allied Gulf War veterans about unexplainable sickness as well.

According to a document signed between the White House and the Pentagon, the United States military obtained a waiver from the National Environmental Protection Act for its operations in the Gulf. This clearly indicates the knowledge of the Pentagon that their operations would have severe environmental consequences.

• 1015

Depleted uranium is used as a coating material for bullets and shells, and tests have shown that depleted uranium results in greater penetrating or piercing capability. There are issues relating to the use of depleted uranium against Iraq that require elaboration. Also, as I believe all of you are aware, it was used in the latest NATO action against Serbia, where Canadian planes were involved.

The legal implications of the use of a known radioactive in a war, especially against civilian population, is something Canada should be taking a careful look at. The Geneva conventions, in particular the 1997 protocol, stipulate:

It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove, or render useless objects indispensable to agricultural areas for the production of food stuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water, installations and supplies, and irrigation works....

etc.

What has happened is there are now clear indications that this depleted uranium has entered the food chain in Iraq. Between 5,000 and 6,000 rounds of DU, depleted uranium, armour-piercing shells were used by the British and U.S. air forces, and the air force itself apparently used 50,000 during the Gulf War.

It is estimated that 300 metric tonnes of radioactive uranium now litter wide areas of Iraq and Kuwait. The Military Toxics Project and Dr. Hari Sharma of the University of Waterloo recently concluded that the U.S. military's use of DU munitions in the Gulf War resulted in an increase of 20,000 to 100,000 fatal cancers in Gulf War veterans and Iraqi citizens. And it goes on and on.

In the area of agriculture, let me just touch on the most dramatically terrible effects.

The Acting Chair (Mr. Ted McWhinney): Mr. Scott, I wonder if I could ask you again, because of the number of witnesses, if you could wrap up.

Mr. Ian Watson: The details are in this piece by Ranya Masri. I will simply indicate now some of the things we believe your committee should consider when it does make its recommendations to the government.

We'd like to see your committee recommend that Canada take the lead, as it did with landmines, in seeking an international treaty that would ban the use of depleted uranium in weaponry.

We'd also hope Canada would respond to the call by the present sanctions resolution 1284 for UN member states and NGOs to supplement the oil-for-food program with additional humanitarian assistance to Iraq. Canada should try to do more, quite apart from the food program that is in place at the UN.

We would urge that, particularly in the area of agriculture and water treatment, Canada offer its help in the form of vaccines, equipment, and expertise, concurrently with seeking the removal of any sanctions impacting on agriculture, human and animal health, and water treatment.

The more I consider this entire issue of sanctions, it seems to me there is no way out, other than removing almost all of them and perhaps limiting the remaining sanctions to prohibition of imported weapons and clearly obvious material that could be used for weapons of mass destruction. But apart from that, it seems to me we should be now considering removal of sanctions generally.

Thank you.

The Acting Chair (Mr. Ted McWhinney): Thank you, Mr. Scott.

We will circulate Dr. Masri's paper to members of the committee and we'll bring it to the attention of the steering committee according to the present procedures of the committee.

A voice: It's Mr. Watson.

The Acting Chair (Mr. Ted McWhinney): Oh, Mr. Watson, I'm sorry. We will do that.

I believe the next witness is Mr. Halliday.

• 1020

Mr. Denis Halliday (Individual Presentation): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm honoured to be here this morning.

In addition to my text, which has been distributed, I have brought with me a copy of the documentary made by Carlton Television of London, created by John Pilger, which has been shown in Britain to over three million people. I highly recommend that the committee give time to view this before you conclude your work. It's accompanied by an article by John Pilger, from the Guardian, which is a companion to the video itself.

Distinguished members of the committee, I realize you have been very well briefed on the horrific humanitarian impact of sanctions combined with Gulf War bombing of civilian infrastructure—damage that remains today. You're aware of increased mortality rates. You're aware of widespread malnutrition. You're aware of some of the social consequences and indeed the political dangers. We've just heard of the political dangers that now will follow this period of Iraqi history.

In summary, the UN is sustaining the economic and social conditions for massive loss of life in Iraq, a condition of famine, as I believe Dr. Sheila Zurbrigg of Calgary mentioned just a few days ago. Her paper is quite brilliant.

It's a program of genocide caused by the deliberate retention by the Security Council of economic sanctions for almost ten years, in the full knowledge of the deadly consequences for the children and adults of Iraq. The UN's uniquely comprehensive and prolonged economic embargo on Iraq over many years has become a form of silent warfare that, in breach of the Geneva conventions and protocols, specifically targets innocent children and adults. The Baghdad government may have diminished the political and civil rights of the Iraqi people, but it is the United Nations that has taken away the fundamental human rights of the people, including the right to life itself.

You may ask, what about the oil-for-food program? Not only does this program not satisfy the basic human rights of the Iraqi people, as in the Declaration of Human Rights itself, but it has reduced the country to the status of a massive refugee camp and the people to a collection of beggars, bartering food for children's clothes, critical drugs, household goods, meats, eggs, and other dietary necessities. This program, under the umbrella of the UN embargo, has trashed both the spirit and the wording of the United Nations charter.

What about the new resolution, the resolution promising suspension, 1284? It's too little too late. It is no solution, as China, Russia, and France have demonstrated through abstention. The 24 months Mr. Cleminson referred to is simply too long. Can Canada allow another 100,000 Iraqi children to die?

This resolution lacks sincerity, given the statements of Washington: no lifting of sanctions before the removal of Saddam Hussein. It establishes ill-defined goals that are therefore unobtainable. It continues disarmament of Iraq alone while continuing to neglect paragraph 14 of resolution 687. It continues the element of overkill in targeting and killing the populace when the government is presumably the target.

Resolutions 687 and 1284 are deemed illegal by many international lawyers, including, I believe, Richard Falk of Princeton University. As Linda Morgan and other Canadians have said, the new, ill-defined resolution that took one year to draft and may even appear enlightened, such as by lifting the oil ceiling, accomplishes little more than sustaining the deadly impacts, the deadly regime, of UN economic sanctions indefinitely. It constitutes the means to sustain an open-ended embargo. It runs in the face of statements in the west that only the toppling of the president will result in the lifting of the embargo itself.

One may ask who is damaged most by UN economic sanctions, the embargo on Iraq. There are no winners in regard to the economic embargo on Iraq, only the deaths of hundreds of thousands of innocents, plus significant damage to the United Nations, whose charter has been grossly undermined in both spirit and word and whose Universal Declaration of Human Rights is damaged. Likewise the U.S., the U.K., and Canada—a country seen in the past to be independent of U.S. foreign policy—are greatly diminished in terms of leadership and moral authority.

• 1025

What can be done? Are there solutions? I believe there are some ideas I'd like to share.

The member states of the UN Security Council need to acknowledge that their regime of prolonged economic sanctions is responsible for genocide in Iraq. The council must also recognize that its embargo targeting the innocent children and adults of Iraq is morally and legally unacceptable and incompatible with the intent of the charter and other international humanitarian laws.

Whereas the United Nations must retain all possible means to inspect and monitor arms and weapons of mass destruction, not only in respect of Iraq but in regard to the countries of the Middle East, as per paragraph 14 of resolution 687, using existing international oversight devices, economic sanctions and the supporting military embargo must be lifted immediately. There is no legal or moral justification to sustain this deadly embargo.

In addition, Iraq must be facilitated to rebuild its civilian infrastructure and its economy in order to restore the standard of living enjoyed by the people back in 1990. Financial resources need to be made available by countries like Canada for capital investment projects.

The illegal no-fly zone bombing attacks by the United States and the United Kingdom that terrorize the children and people of Iraq must stop. There must be an open dialogue and communications with the government and people of Iraq, as we have seen recently develop in respect of North Korea with positive results.

In summary, with respect to Iraq, the member states of the Security Council must terminate their program of genocide, lift economic sanctions targeting children, and focus on military sanctions and inspections combined with dialogue and assistance for the recovery of the Iraqi economy and standard of living.

With respect to Canada, Canadian parliamentarians can and must play an influential role, through the presence of Canada in the United Nations and on the world stage, in keeping with Canada's previously recognized and distinguished reputation for taking independent and moral leadership stances on issues of global importance, such as the ongoing genocide in Iraq caused by the prolonged misapplication of the United Nations charter and neglect by the United Nations itself of its own declaration of human rights. This role for Canadian parliamentarians is particularly critical today given the tragic foot-dragging of Canada's Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the deadly impact of economic sanctions.

Canadian parliamentarians can and must insist on the reversal of Canadian economic sanctions policy and insist on the start of a new dialogue with Iraq, together with reopening its diplomatic mission in Baghdad.

It seems to me Canada must end its blind support for the heavily flawed UN resolution 1284, which fails to respond with any sense of urgency to the ongoing daily humanitarian crisis in Iraq of death, malnutrition, and destruction of a people and their very future.

Lastly, I believe Canada should lead the way in demanding the lifting of the economic embargo tomorrow while retaining military sanctions and inspections for Iraq and the countries of the Middle East consistent with non-proliferation treaties and all other existing provisions of international law.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Halliday.

We don't usually have applause in our committee—certainly not when one of the members speaks, anyway—but I think the applause is an indication of the respect that people have for your courage in having resigned your position in the circumstances you did and for your professional integrity. Thank you very much for that.

Mr. Millholland.

Mr. Arthur Millholland (President, Oilexco): Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you very much for having me here today. My name is Arthur Millholland, and I'm from Calgary.

I've been going back and forth to Iraq since 1997. I have a written brief here today that is an essay from my heart. I don't intend to read it. There are some things in there that I think all of you should think about.

Everything that has been mentioned here today concerning the humanitarian situation in Iraq, of the people, is absolutely true. Since that first trip I made in 1997, I've been back a dozen times—or more than that; I lose track. On my last trip, I returned at the beginning of February and was there for 10 days.

• 1030

I'm a little different as a Canadian. I believe I have much better contacts, higher in the Iraqi government, than even our government does. I keep somebody in Bagdhad all the time, so we can call for ongoing intelligence on the situation in the country.

Through that, and through my quest to find and search for answers—because I've read all sides of the issue to see what is the truth and to answer those questions—that has taken me right to the levels of the senior advisers to Mr. Saddam Hussein himself, but also, through that, it has given me access as a foreigner and as a Canadian to Iraq, to the country, to the people, which is not normally done unless you are trusted. What I've seen is a nation of people who don't have fangs, who look at themselves and ask themselves what they have done to deserve what has been put on them.

To answer a comment from Mr. Cleminson on Canada's position on the non-proliferation treaty, Mr. Tariq Azziz, the deputy prime minister, brought this up to me this January: We know Mr. Axworthy's position on the non-proliferation treaty is one of the strongest in the world. There are three nations that have not signed that non-proliferation treaty, one being Cuba, one being North Korea, and one being Israel—and I think everybody in this room knows Israel has nuclear weapons. But why are our children dying at the rate of 3,000 to 5,000 per month when the Government of Canada does not stand up and say to Israel, admit you have nuclear weapons and sign the non-proliferation treaty?

That's a huge double standard. The Israelis have 200 to 400 tactical nuclear weapons. The Iraqis fully admit that they were this close to building a nuclear weapon—one.

I think that's an injustice, and I think as Canadians we're better than that. We're better than standing up and supporting a policy of the United States, which is really what it is, which is to influence the region to get cheap oil for their economy. But to stand up and not say killing children is wrong...we don't do that. We have never done that as a nation. I'm ashamed to stand here today to tell you that's what's going on and that we support that.

I can't tell you the number of times I've gone to 125 Sussex Drive and offered my services, offered the people I know, the contacts, the dialogue—that's what solves problems. There is absolute refusal even to talk to the Iraqis. They have an embassy staffed at 215 McLeod Street here. They have people here—mind you, not high level. Dialogue can happen. The answer I get from our Foreign Affairs at 125 Sussex is, well, the dialogue can happen in New York.

There's no dialogue in New York. One-sided conversations are not dialogue. Bombing a nation in December 1998—which I escaped from personally within eight hours—is not dialogue. It's a crime what has happened here.

So how do we solve the problem? I agree with Mr. Cleminson that we can't look back. There is too much distrust on both sides.

For example, the Iraqis claimed for years that UNSCOM was an intelligence operation of the United States. Madam Albright, Assistant Secretary of State James Rubin, and Richard Butler flatly denied it. What happened in January 1999? It was admitted that in fact the CIA was collecting intelligence using UNSCOM as its vehicle.

For the Iraqis to trust a new weapons inspection regime and accept that is a big step. Mr. Azziz said to me in January, as did a senior adviser to Mr. Saddam Hussein, a first cousin of his, “We will accept UNMOVIC in Iraq”—this was the day after Mr. Blix was approved—“but we would like some consideration of what we've done in the past and what's going to happen in the future”.

• 1035

Resolution 1284 states we will consider lifting sanctions. That's not good enough. If the central government in Ottawa said to the Government of Alberta, “You pass your health care legislation and we will consider whether to challenge it or not”, we all know what that would mean. It would probably be contested under the Canada Health Act.

Look at the past history with Iraq. When UN resolution 1284 states unequivocally “We will consider lifting sanctions”, that tells an Iraqi, a Jordanian, a Syrian, or an Arab that they will never be lifted, because what motivation is there? Our Ambassador Fowler stated in his speech to the Security Council after the passing of 1284 that Canada would stand by the language in that resolution. Our time on the Security Council runs out on December 31, but we have not assured the Iraqis of that.

Do we support the lifting of sanctions if the Iraqis do what they have to do? I can't get an answer out of 125 Sussex Drive. Can you? Has Mr. Axworthy ever said what his policy is? He won't even meet with me; he refuses to. As far as I know, he told a friend of Ms. Morgan's, who's in attendance today, two weeks ago that as long as this government was in power, they'd never be lifted. That sounds like Madam Albright talking. That was Linda Murphy. Arthur Clark, who was here on Tuesday, sent me a.... I don't know if that conversation was off the record. I haven't talked to the lady, but I believe it because I haven't been able to hear what the policy is. This is after three years.

I offered as late as last week.... I came to Ottawa and sat with one of his advisers, Mr. John Clarke. I passed on a message from Mr. Azziz, the first cousin of Mr. Saddam Hussein. He said they were willing to send Mr. Azziz or Mr. Nuzzar Hamdoon, the former Iraqi ambassador to the UN, to Canada.

I invited Mr. Azziz to Calgary last year to attend a forum at the University of Calgary on the impact on international law of the sanctions on Iraq—to give the Iraqi side of the story. He was turned down; a visa would not be issued to him. I was told last week that the Government of Canada will not allow the Iraqi diplomats to come to Canada to talk.

How can we have a dialogue if we are not willing to talk? That's shameful. Lester Pearson was a Nobel laureate and won the Nobel Peace Prize for diplomacy, but we as a government do not and are not willing to have diplomacy on this issue.

You may not like what you hear from them. We don't have to like what we hear from anybody. You may not like what I have to say today, but at least we have a dialogue. We're talking because you're going to ask me some questions, or I hope you do.

The Chair: Not if you go on too long.

Mr. Arthur Millholland: All right, I won't.

I will wrap it up and just say there is reason to listen to the issues of disarmament, in addition to the humanitarian issues, and the humanitarian issues are real. But one should not be tied to the other, and the Iraqis have said that to me.

So I hope you do something with what you're hearing today and it goes somewhere, because that's what Canadians have to see and hear.

• 1040

Members, remember you're elected by the people to represent the people. You're not elected by Americans, nor are you answerable to that nice big fortress of an embassy they built here. Neither is Mr. Axworthy.

Thank you very much.

The Chair: Thank you very much, sir. I'm sure Mr. Axworthy will be happy to take up that challenge. But I don't want to leave the idea that we have never protested about Israel. Canada's policy has always been that Israel should sign the non-proliferation treaty.

This committee recently did a study on nuclear disarmament and also called upon Israel to sign the treaty. However, I don't disagree with you. There's an inconsistency there because they do have a nuclear weapon, and that certainly affects the whole balance of the situation in the area, there's no question about that.

From the point of view of your statements, I'm sure there's somebody here from the department and they're listening. I hope when the officials come on Tuesday, they'll give a response to some of your observations about lack of both communications and where we should be going.

The last witness is Mr. Scott.

[Translation]

Mr. Doug Scott (President, The Markland Group): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for inviting me to come and discuss the issue of sanctions.

My name is Douglas Scott. I am a retired lawyer. I founded the Markland Group in 1987, and I believe you all have a brochure that contains information on our group. I apologize that my spoken French is so limited. For that reason, if there are any questions in French, I would prefer to answer them in English.

[English]

I'm going to argue today the case in favour of sanctions. One of the arguments put forth by those who oppose sanctions is that they have been ineffective and, if for no other reason, should be abolished because they have failed to produce the intended results.

After the Gulf War, the Security Council decided that sanctions were needed in order to persuade Iraq to dispose of its weapons of mass destruction. There can be little doubt that the sanctions have succeeded in persuading Iraq to destroy, under UN supervision, a large proportion of its chemical weapons, biological weapons, long-range missiles, and virtually all of its nuclear weapons' capability. Despite these successes, the sanctions have not achieved their final objective.

Iraq still has a remnant of prohibited weapons, and because of this the UN must keep the sanctions in place. The opponents argue that even if there is a need for sanctions, the price is too high because of the suffering they inflict on the people. This assumes that the cause of the suffering is the sanctions. We have looked at that problem very carefully in The Markland Group, in order to determine whether in fact the sanctions are responsible for the suffering.

We've come to the conclusion that may have been true during the original phase of the sanctions, before oil for food, but when the current phase started at the beginning of the oil for food program in 1997, it then was no longer possible to say the suffering was caused by the sanctions.

The oil-for-food program not only allows Iraq to export all the oil it can produce, it also requires that the oil revenue be spent for the benefit of the Iraqi people and not for the elite or armaments. The net effect of the program is that the Iraqi people are entitled to the full benefit of the oil revenues. Billions are now flowing into the Iraqi economy, just under $10 billion U.S. according to this UN report, which is dated November 30.

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We do not deny that the people are still suffering, but we say that with the coming of oil for food, the suffering is now caused by other factors. There are three of them. The first is the drought that has been affecting the country for the last two years. The second is a group of policies that the Iraqi government has seen fit to adopt. We characterize those generally under the heading of malfeasance.

I have two examples. The first is wasting precious resources on armaments, palaces, luxury resorts for the elite. Another example is failing to cooperate fully with the distribution of food and medicine under the oil-for-food program, with the result that the people are not getting all they're entitled to.

The third reason is probably the most important, and that is the ongoing after-effects of the original sanctions as they existed before 1997. We sometimes forget that the Iraqi economy was utterly devastated by the Gulf War. During the years 1991 to 1996, the original sanctions made it difficult or impossible to rebuild the damaged infrastructure that occurred during that war. Here I'm talking about electrical generating plants, the transportation system, and the water treatment facilities, all vital for the well-being of the Iraqi people.

The oil-for-food program allows money to be spent for these structural items. The Iraqi government has opted to spend 61% of the oil-for-food budget for that purpose. The situation is therefore on the mend, but there are still enormous deficiencies in the physical infrastructure. Whether they're in the field of power generation or elsewhere, they are responsible for a large part of the suffering in Iraq today. The fact that these deficiencies still do exist, unfortunately, is due in large part to those original sanctions, the way they existed before 1997.

This is possibly where the confusion has arisen. It really is quite true to say that the cause of the suffering in Iraq today is the sanctions, but it is not the current version of the sanctions that is responsible. The culprit is the old-style sanctions. Billions are now being spent on the structural items and the situation is improving. The original sanctions....

I might say before I pass on from this that it might be wondered whether the original sanctions were justified. Ron Cleminson said it's pointless to be rehashing the past and what went on, but it shouldn't be forgotten that the UN Security Council from the very beginning exempted food and humanitarian commodities. That obviously was not sufficient because they still didn't have enough money to buy any of these things.

Very early in the picture, a couple of months after the end of the Gulf War, April 1991, the UN offered the oil-for-food deal to Iraq. Iraq had to accept it. They had to cooperate with that in order to pump the oil and in order to cooperate in the distribution of the food and medicine. Well, they didn't accept it. Many months and years went by before they finally did say they would look at it in 1996, and eventually it was put into effect at the beginning of 1997.

We now have a situation where it's quite clear that the original sanctions were intended to operate on the leadership indirectly by putting pressure on the people. But the current version of the sanctions, which we call the new breed of sanctions, in effect exempts the people and operates directly on the leadership. It does that because it deprives the leadership of the right to buy armaments, the right to rebuild the weapons that have been destroyed, the right to buy luxuries for the elite, and even the right to manage the economy.

• 1050

Through sanctions, the UN is able to determine how approximately 60% of Iraq's GNP is spent. I don't want to be held to that percentage because nobody knows quite what Iraq's GNP is. Nevertheless, the leaders hate this arrangement. We've certainly heard it for years now, and the complaints get more strident every day. This is what gives the current sanctions their power. It's not the power to affect the people; it's the power to affect the leaders directly.

In a word, we're saying that the current sanctions impinge strongly on the leadership. They are no longer inhumane. They have achieved many successes in the past and they are still needed.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Scott. We appreciate that.

Mr. Martin.

Mr. Keith Martin (Esquimalt—Juan de Fuca, Ref.): Merci beaucoup, monsieur le président.

Thank you all for coming out here today. We really appreciate your testimonies on this important issue.

First let me suggest to you that with the current situation, there's no doubt about the suffering of the Iraqi people today. No one wants to see the civilian population in Iraq hurt. Furthermore, we recognize that what we're doing is sowing the seeds of western discontent in the future, and indeed if anybody is benefiting from that, it is the elite of the country.

Let me just say that we have perhaps two situations and a middle ground where we can do something to effect relief for these people. The status quo is clearly unacceptable, but in the realpolitik world, the lifting of sanctions today would also be unacceptable. In the middle we have a plan that can be adopted that can achieve the objective of rapidly and quickly improving the state of affairs for the Iraqi people while not compromising the security concerns the international community has at this point in time with respect to the regime in Iraq.

What if we removed sanctions relating to water, sanitation, power, health, education, and started to, piecemeal, remove the economic sanctions that would enable the Iraqi people to get their economy kick-started, sanctions that can be removed that would be acceptable to the nations that are concerned about the security threat that Saddam Hussein poses in the region? We could also allow weapons inspectors to go in at this point in time.

I'd like to know from particularly Mr. Cleminson and Mr. Halliday if that would be a start-off plan that could be rapidly implemented to achieve some help for these people.

My second question is, what are the targets that have been bombed today? The third question I have is, why doesn't the Iraqi regime today allow the weapons inspections and the demands or the requests by UNMOVIC? Why isn't the Iraqi regime fulfilling the requests put forth by UNMOVIC?

I'd like Mr. Halliday and Mr. Cleminson to please answer those questions. I can repeat them if you'd like.

The Chair: Do you want to go first, Mr. Halliday?

Mr. Denis Halliday: Sure. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The immediate reaction one has to your first proposal that somehow sanctions be modified, that they be removed in respect of certain aspects of Iraqi needs, is attractive. But I think you also have to look at the real situation. This is a sovereign state with a perfect right to manage its own economy.

The recurring budgetary expenditures that the oil-for-food program sets out to begin to assist were of course inadequate from the very beginning. As our colleague Doug Scott has pointed out very clearly, the Iraqis turned it down in 1991 because the program represented 20¢ per day per person. When they finally reluctantly accepted 986 in 1966, that represented 21¢ per day per person. Today, the oil-for-food program represents 50¢ per day per person. Is that a serious program for a country of 23 million people who enjoyed a standard of living comparable to southern Europe? It's not. Your proposal obviously would improve that. There's no question about that. I would hope you'd include ending the no-fly zone bombing, which is terrorizing Iraq, and you'd also, perhaps, postpone reparations. You do understand, from the figures we have heard today, that 30% comes off the top and is set aside for repayment back to those who lost goods and properties in Kuwait while Iraqi kids are dying.

• 1055

My problem with your suggestion, although I agree it moves us forward and I imagine Iraq might be reluctant but would accept it in a sense, is it precludes the possibility of a stability; it excludes capital investment, which is absolutely fundamental in the case of the economy of Iraq. As I think Mr. Scott mentioned very well, the Gulf War damage is still there. They are beginning to invest, but every time they invest in water systems, of course, they deny themselves access to medicines and drugs, which are in short supply. It's a very difficult balancing act between food, water systems, and infrastructure. It's an agonizing decision they have to make. So I'm not quite wedded to your proposal.

Mr. Keith Martin: If I could interrupt for one second, Mr. Halliday, what I'm trying to do is, of course as you recognize, move the ball forward rapidly so at least we start the process by which an improvement can take place very quickly for the Iraqi people. And I recognize the importance of investment. If we move the ball forward, if the confidence of the international community can be there under circumstances where the regime in Iraq can start to demonstrate some goodwill towards weapons inspections, then perhaps—we hope—more sanctions can be removed. But this is a step forward, to try to bring people together so that confidence can be established between both groups, rather than trying to go for something that's not acceptable to both sides.

Mr. Denis Halliday: I think you've made a very good point, and I tend to think this would be very well received. I think the Iraqi government is open to military inspections. They know that's going to be the price at the end of the day come what may. But they are reluctant to take on 1284 and allow Mr. Blix, who is a man of integrity—I endorse what Doug Scott said. The fact is, they do not want to enter into 1284 in the situation where Washington and London and others are making other conditions that are not in the resolution, and one such condition is to remove the head of state. That is not going to work. You cannot demand the removal of the head of state and expect friendly collaboration. That's unreal.

Mr. Keith Martin: Is that a condition upon the removal of sanctions?

Mr. Denis Halliday: That's a condition made by Washington and London and many others.

Mr. Keith Martin: It's not in 1284.

Mr. Denis Halliday: Of course it's not in 1284. But there are unwritten conditions linked to 1284, and the removal of Saddam Hussein is clearly one of them, which to me undermines the sincerity and the intent of the entire resolution.

Mr. Doug Scott: May I comment on what Dr. Martin said.

The Chair: Sorry, Mr. Scott, I was going to call Mr. Cleminson.

Mr. Keith Martin: Sorry. Thank you.

Mr. Ron Cleminson: Mr. Martin, I think the idea you have for moving things forward is exactly what the new resolution indicates, and by appointing Dr. Blix as the head of that, in which he's asked for and probably expects to receive the maximum flexibility.... Dr. Blix has been associated with the weapons of mass destruction through the NPT through his directorship of the IAEA for more than 12 years. He knows the Iraqi leadership and the Iraqi people very well, and he has visited Iraq on many occasions. He has also visited Iran.

I remember when someone mentioned to me one time the Blix complex. I said at the time I didn't know whether Blix was a person or a disease. But I supported him, because Mr. Blix has always been a very forward-looking individual, a problem solver, and you can see that of course in the dealings with North Korea. If Iraq accepts the resolution and decides to go on with what you're saying and say, yes, we will accept the weapons inspections, then I think this most likely would be a starter.

You have to remember that Iraq is a party to the original, resolution 687. Every nation is a party to that because of the chapter VII United Nations thing, but Iraq accepted those responsibilities, and it is simply the weapons of mass destruction—not the other systems to defend the country but the weapons of mass destruction capabilities—which is what the IAEA in terms of nuclear and UNSCOM in terms of chemical, biological, and ballistic missiles over 150 kilometres were looking at.

• 1100

UNMOVIC today is taking the principles that were established, but at least the resolution is providing a new path. I said I thought—and these are only personal opinions—that the Security Council had moved very much forward and I think in the direction you were talking about.

The suggestion here was that the French, the Russians, and the Chinese don't accept it. In fact, the French, the Russians, and the Chinese have accepted it. I said it was accepted without dissent. If they had rejected it, they would have voted no.

I also said there's a difference between “without dissent” and “by consensus”, and most certainly when Ambassador Ekeus was in UNSCOM, he always tried for consensus and had consensus in the Security Council for at least the six years of his tenure.

Ideas like that, I'm sure, are on Mr. Blix's mind. The fact is to get the thing moving, the ball is now in the court of the Government of Iraq.

As to the removal of the present leadership and this sort of thing, as you rightly said, it is not a United Nations policy. Most certainly people in the United States and elsewhere can make any statements they want, but that is not in the resolution and so it does not bear on what we're talking about here.

What I'm suggesting, and I think what you're suggesting, is look at the situation we have now, look at the proposal there, implement it, and see if we can move in. When I used the expression “two years”, I did say at the time that it was my subjective feeling, because when UNSCOM started I thought that with full cooperation from Iraq—and in many cases we had very solid cooperation from Iraq—probably in two years we would have been moving to ongoing monitoring and verification, which is what the aim is now.

Mr. Keith Martin: You asked about—

The Chair: Mr. Martin, we've now run out of your time.

Mr. Keith Martin: It's a simple question and I only wanted to know what was being bombed in Iraq.

Mr. Denis Halliday: As you know, artificially and illegally, outside any UN resolution, as we've just heard in the case of killing Saddam Hussein, the United States and the United Kingdom flew 30,000 sorties over Iraq last year—30,000. They dropped ordnance apparently on 16,000 different occasions in the so-called no-fly zones. That's most of the country, frankly, except a band that includes Baghdad.

Mr. Keith Martin: What are they targeting, Mr. Halliday?

Mr. Denis Halliday: They're supposedly targeting anything that fires back, whether it's guns or artillery, whatever it is, but they also target structures. People have been killed, about 150, and sheep and other livestock have been killed. It's an extraordinary, illegal program.

Mr. Keith Martin: I would appreciate it if you could submit to the committee whatever factual information you have concerning that. Whatever factual information you have of targets that have been bombed of a civilian nature would be appreciated.

Mr. Denis Halliday: Millholland wants to speak because he was missed by one of them.

The Chair: Mr. Millholland.

Mr. Arthur Millholland: I've seen it. One thing, if you'd like to attach, I have the report of the secretary general to the Security Council dated March 10, 2000. He writes these reports every 180 days explaining how the funds are spent and where they're spent.

The primary targets of the no-fly zone are the telecommunications system in Iraq, and that's when Mr. Halliday was formerly in his position and Mr. von Sponeck, who resigned from the same position here recently.... It makes it difficult for the distribution of food and medicine to a city like Basra, which has 2.5 million people.

Basra is six hours from Baghdad by highway. The Iraqi telecommunications system is predominantly microwave driven with repeater stations through the desert. They did have an early first generation fibre optic system in place in the country, but again with repeaters.

Those are ongoing targets of the U.S. and the U.K., and their logic, from what I can find by reading information out of the U.S. that's unclassified, that's available, is that by removing the telecommunications capability into southern Iraq, they can in fact disable the air defence system. The problem you then have, from a humanitarian standpoint, is that it's almost impossible for the UN workers to make a telephone call to Basra and southern Iraq.

• 1105

The Chair: Thank you. That's helpful.

I'm going to have to cut it off here because we're well over the time.

Madame Debien.

Mr. Doug Scott: Can I comment on Dr. Martin's...?

The Chair: No. I have to cut it off here because we're well over the time for this period of questioning. You might have a chance later on. You'll probably get an opportunity as we go on.

[Translation]

Ms. Debien.

Ms. Maud Debien (Laval East, BQ): Good morning, ladies and gentlemen, and thank you very much. We would like to thank you for having accepted to appear before our committee. I have several questions that I'm going to throw out there for everyone, and those of you who would like to respond or who have the most relevant information can answer them.

First of all, I would like to talk about the famous Resolution 1284. A lot has been said about that resolution, namely that Russia, France and China, and Indonesia as well, I think, have refused to sign it. I would like to know why. What reasons did these countries give in refusing to sign the resolution? Canada, however, did sign it. Why did Canada sign it? I would like your answers to cover both aspects of the question.

I do know, however, having heard about it, that one of the main changes to Resolution 1284 as compared to the previous resolutions 687 and 715 is a structural change; in other words, from now on, the Secretary General is responsible for enforcing the resolution, and not the Security Council, which seems to be somewhat of an improvement. I would also like to hear your comments on that. What is the difference between resolutions 687, 715 and 1284? What are the most significant changes with respect to the latest resolution?

My other question deals with Resolution 1284. We know that Iraq has rejected it. Some of you have given us some reasons, including Iraq's almost permanent subservience to the sanctions. It affects national sovereignty.

Since 1998, there have been no weapons inspections in Iraq. Can any of you tell us about the state of Iraq's weaponry? Do you have any information on the current state of Iraq's weaponry? Some witnesses have told us that almost 25% of Iraq's weaponry has been destroyed to date, including their nuclear capacity and missiles. There was some uncertainty with respect to the biological weapons, because they can be produced very easily. Is there any information you could give us regarding the current state of Iraq's weaponry?

Mr. Scott, I have a little bit of trouble identifying with your brief or your opinions, especially when you say that current sanctions do not pose a problem in Iraq. Most but not all of the witnesses who are here have said the opposite. I think we heard from seven or nine yesterday who all said exactly the opposite.

I have a question for you, Mr. Scott, and it is not biased or intended to offend you. Has anyone in your group gone to see the situation in Iraq recently?

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Colleen Beaumier (Brampton West—Mississauga, Lib.): Mr. Scott.

• 1110

Mr. Doug Scott: I'd like to respond first to the direct question you've just put, and that is that you don't understand how it is that all the other witnesses are pointing out all the suffering that's taking place in Iraq on account of the sanctions, whereas we're saying that the current sanctions are not responsible although the original sanctions are. I think I'm just going to say that the other witnesses haven't dealt with our point. The point we're trying to make is simply that under the current sanctions there are other reasons there would be suffering. Most important—and perhaps I should have made specific reference to this, and it gets to what Dr. Martin was saying—the Iraqis are already exporting as much oil as they can possibly produce. Mr. Halliday was saying that it's only producing 50¢ a head. I don't know if that figure is right, but no matter how little it's producing, the fact is that's all the money there is. It's $10 billion a year that is going to humanitarian purposes, and I don't know where the rest of the money is going to come from.

Dr. Martin was saying let's lift the sanctions on certain structural aspects in the economy. I think it would be nice if we got more structural items, such as water plants and electrical power generating things, but I don't know where the money is going to come from to build all those things. It's not just the sanctions any more that's preventing that. It was in the beginning, but it isn't now. I just think the current sanctions are off the hook.

I wanted to respond to your question as to why France didn't support 1284. I don't know. I haven't talked to them, but I've read rather carefully what they've been saying, and I also read very carefully what they were saying immediately before the resolution was adopted on December 17. They were proposing another middle ground, which Dr. Martin talked about, that is, they would not actually lift or abolish the sanctions, but they would suspend them, and they would suspend them in accordance with an arrangement whereby they could be automatically reimposed without another vote of the Security Council in the event Iraq was determined not to cooperate with the inspectors. It would have to be a deal where we would say we can suspend the sanctions right away if you let the inspectors back in, but if you don't cooperate, they will automatically be reimposed.

Now, I thought that idea made a lot of sense, and I explain it in a little bit more detail in a paper that is referred to in our brochure. It's the paper entitled Getting the Inspectors Back Into Iraq. That idea is not entirely dead because there is some reference to it in 1284. But it's not a very positive reference, and in fact most people have missed it. I think it's in paragraph 36. One of the problems with that idea is whether it can be put into place at the same time as maintaining the restrictions on armaments. That might be a difficulty.

The Chair: Mr. Halliday, did you have something to add to that?

Mr. Denis Halliday: I'd like to respond very specifically to the questions, but first I'd like to clear up a misrepresentation by Mr. Scott. The $10 billion per year is a gross figure. As I've said already, 30% goes to reparations and 5% goes to overheads, so it comes down to much less than he has in fact just indicated.

Mr. Doug Scott: That's the 66% I'm giving you. That's not the gross. The gross is $15 billion.

Mr. Denis Halliday: That's not correct. But let's not quibble over details.

With regard to the issue of abstentions, it's a very interesting question, but my understanding is that Russia abstained because they did not want embarrassing questions about Chechnya and they wanted American support. For France, we've perhaps heard some theories here. I won't get into that. China doesn't want to be tackled on Tibet. This is a deal. This is the old boys' club at work on the Security Council. It's totally corrupted. The only clean member is Malaysia, which abstained because they have principles. In the case of Canada, when I went to see Mr. Axworthy, I was allowed to speak to his staff, and I was informed very clearly, look, we cannot take a position against Washington's policy because the relationship, the trade, with the United States is too important to Canada. So I can assume Canada has been compromised in the Security Council for the same reasons.

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Why did Iraq refuse 1284? Despite this rather naive reaction that somehow the removal of Saddam Hussein is not relevant because it's not a UN resolution, of course that's correct, but it's a reality, and when it comes from Clinton, Albright, and Blair, they take it seriously.

But the fact is that 1284 is just too little. After nine and a half years of sanctions, it's too little. It holds up this sort of dream of suspension, but suspension doesn't do it. Suspension may not happen because UNMOVIC may not be able to give it a clean bill of health. Also, suspension for 120 days will not guarantee investment and rebuilding of the economy. So the stranglehold remains. It just postpones it farther and farther. It sustains the status quo, which I'm sorry to say, in my view, is the position the member states of the council want to have, which, as we know, is an appalling situation.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Thank you. We will now go to Ms. Davies.

Ms. Maud Debien: Will Ms. Picard have some time?

The Chairman: Yes. I will come back to you, Ms. Picard. The 10 minutes are up. I will come back to you in the next round.

Ms. Pauline Picard (Drummond, BQ): Okay.

[English]

Mr. Denis Halliday: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: I'm going to pass on, because other members will not get to their questions. Next is Madam Davies, followed by Madam Beaumier.

Ms. Libby Davies (Vancouver East, NDP): Thank you, Chairperson.

First of all, I'd like to thank the witnesses for coming, and I extend my apologies for running in and out. I'm trying to cover two committees. Our usual representative on this committee, Mr. Robinson, unfortunately couldn't be here today because he's also at another committee, and I'm trying to cover for him.

I haven't heard all of your presentations, but I have read through the material you've presented today.

I wanted to make a comment to Linda and say welcome, coming all the way from British Columbia. One of the things that has really concerned me, and I know a lot of people, is when we see resolutions through the UN and the international community as instruments of foreign policy become in effect weapons of mass destruction.

I want to tell you that I think the campaign your group has undertaken is incredibly courageous. For a group of citizens to raise money and to get all the necessary approvals to go and visit Iraq to see first-hand what's going on is, I think, remarkable. It really is a great reflection of what a lot of Canadian believe, that is, that in terms of the international community, we should be leading the way to end these terrible sanctions. So I really wanted to congratulate your group on the outstanding work.

One of the problems we've had is gaining visibility for this issue. I've read with interest the comments you've made about the misinformation that comes out of the Foreign Affairs office. You have a little group trying to counter that, and there's a massive government apparatus that is continually peddling this information.

I'm curious to know if you have been able to have any discussions with Foreign Affairs about, for example, resolution 687. It seems to me that there is an incredible double standard here. Canada's stance, when it comes to Iraq and the sanctions and then sort of blindly turning an eye in terms of the region as a whole and disarmament and demilitarization, is just a glaring contradiction. I'm curious to know if you've had any discussions with the minister or the department on that issue, and I'd like to hear from you as to how we can provide more information about that to Canadians. This is a double standard that's being practised by our own government, and we're playing along with what's going on in the international community. I would be interested also in hearing Mazen's comment on that.

Our job here is to deal with our own government, and if our own government is basically acting in a way that promotes these double standards, I think that's very serious. I'm very interested in how we might counter that and be more fair and consistent in terms of the foreign policy we apply.

Perhaps you'd like to comment, and Mazen as well.

Ms. Linda Morgan: Thank you for your comment.

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We have been trying to talk to Mr. Axworthy's office at Foreign Affairs, and we speak to the people at the Iraqi desk. They do acknowledge that there is an inconsistency in standards as far as Israel and what's happening in Iraq are concerned. They do acknowledge that Israel is breaking the rules and is not being sanctioned, whereas Iraq is, but that's as far as we have gotten.

They have been very aggressive with us. In fact, they've attacked some of our callers when we've called in. We have had phone-in campaigns. People across the country have phoned in, starting in Halifax and working their way across to Vancouver Island, and we have had a very negative response.

There is a group in Montreal called Voices of Conscience. They are trying to get a meeting with Mr. Axworthy, but they haven't been able to do that so far.

Mr. Mazen Chouaib: We actually have been trying. We had a meeting with Foreign Affairs two days ago, right after the hearings that we had here. Unfortunately, we didn't get anywhere, because Foreign Affairs sticks to 1284 as the best solution there is. In a sense, it's the golden egg for Iraq, and it's for Iraq to take it up and deliver on that.

I was very disappointed, because normally I get along really well with the Department of Foreign Affairs on other issues. This time, the dilemma I'm facing here—and forgive me for being a bit passionate—is that I'm a Canadian and I'm of Arab origin. Sitting across the table from four guys, four bureaucrats, presented me with a major dilemma. I'm sitting there talking about Arab children. I'm talking about Iraqi children, our kids, and I'm talking to people who do not care about what is going on. All they think about is that the calorie intake is increasing, that the basket of food is increasing in Iraq and that's good for now; that's going to sustain Iraq. As long as Iraq can deliver the promises, that's fine. The suspension will take over, and hopefully, one day when they decide to lift the sanctions, they will lift them. All I can think of is four people in Foreign Affairs deciding the fate of our children in Iraq. I get really passionate and I get really disappointed as a Canadian. I take major pride in being a Canadian, but I'm seeing that happening in our Department of Foreign Affairs, in our country. I see Canada being responsible for the deaths of children in Iraq.

Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you.

Ms. Morgan.

Ms. Linda Morgan: One of the things we do hear out of that office is the fact that Iraq is a threat to its neighbours. One of our members, Steve Staples, went to a meeting last August in Dhaka, Bangladesh, where there was an Asian parliamentary committee meeting. They voted unanimously for the lifting of the sanctions. If Iraq's neighbours are not afraid of Iraq, then why is Canada?

Ms. Libby Davies: Actually, I was going to ask you that, Linda, as a result of that meeting. I don't know how major a gathering it was, but it sounds significant. Has anything come out of that in terms of any follow-up that you're aware of from your committee?

Ms. Linda Morgan: No. If one of our members hadn't been there, I don't think we would have heard about it.

Ms. Libby Davies: You wouldn't know.

Ms. Linda Morgan: As for how major it was, most of the heads of state from that particular region were there, except those from India and Israel.

The Chair: Thank you.

Madam Beaumier.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'm wondering if perhaps we shouldn't be hearing from Foreign Affairs.

I have to tell you about one of the problems I have, Mr. Cleminson. I don't think most Canadians believe anything they hear in terms of the information that's coming out of the UN. I think most Canadians believe the situation in Iraq has been perpetrated, and they don't really know why.

Right from the beginning of the Gulf War, many of us did not understand the real reason for that war. I don't think any of us believed, especially in the double standards that we operate under in our world today, that this actually was to defend the human rights of the Kuwaitis. During the Gulf War, not only did we kill civilians, we destroyed an infrastructure.

Not long ago I was at a meeting with Mr. McNamara of Vietnam War fame. He was talking about the number of humans he had killed, but he boasted by saying he had not been immoral because he hadn't destroyed a nation. He was talking about the infrastructure.

• 1125

We know that due to the residue of U.S. and British weapons, the environment there was contaminated during the war.

What I want to know is how Iraq proves that it no longer has weapons of mass destruction. I think proving something does not exist is an almost impossible task. How many times do they have to open their doors? How many times do they have to be subjected to these searches, especially now, when we know the CIA is one of the major players?

We know that sanctions don't work. We don't employ them against any other nations where there are horrific human rights abuses occurring. Why do you think this is going to be different, and how is Iraq going to prove it has met with the U.S. conditions?

Mr. Ron Cleminson: I guess the answer to that is, first, that I do have faith in the United Nations. If we don't have faith in the United Nations, then we have a great problem internationally. People who work for the United Nations are dedicated public servants who oftentimes are hung up by the national priorities of others, but they do the best they can. In other words, when we criticize the United Nations, we criticize ourselves.

If you ask how Iraq can do that, it's very simple. On nuclear weapons, for example, the IEA has indicated in its reports that to its knowledge, from the information it has, there are no nuclear weapons and there is no clandestine nuclear program. If one were established, they would identify it—perhaps not within a year, but they would identify it.

I would guess that at the level of cooperation that the Iraqis have provided in that area, if they provided that same level of cooperation in the other three areas, you would have the group.... They will never come up with 100%. Anybody who expects monitoring and verification to be 100% effective is going to be disappointed, but there is a place where you can say to the best of your knowledge what's based on the information.

I would guess that in the chemical weapons, if all the documents were looked through, in a very short period we could probably come up with proof that they were complying there. In ballistic missiles, it's probably even better. But in biological weapons, not at all. When you're talking about biological weapons, you're talking about international terrorism as well. As I understand it, the Iraqi government said for many years that it had no biological program. Each time the information was brought to the Iraqis, they said, all right, they did research in that area but they never produced anything. When they finally decided they had produced something, they said they never weaponized it. When it was shown that it was weaponized, they said perhaps it was, but they didn't deploy.

This is why I say the past is the past. I think the indication is there of how Iraq and UNMOVIC can come to an agreement. I would use as the case study the IEA on nuclear weapons, and I would move from that. If we eliminate all of this other information and say this is one more opportunity, I think that's where the path is. It's in 1284. We have an excellent person leading this. He has the confidence of the Iraqi government. What we need is for them to come to an agreement and say, yes, they will accept these inspections.

Most certainly, eight years more is not in the cards, but with the cooperation of Iraq, I do think it would probably be eighteen months to two years—and again this is my subjective judgment, not being in the government, not being in whatever. We would know one way or the other. The case study is right there, and it's very simple to document.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: Thank you.

The Chair: Mr. Halliday and Mr. Scott want to make a quick response to the same question.

Mr. Denis Halliday: Yes, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

• 1130

Just very briefly, I agree with Mr. Cleminson. We must support the United Nations, and Canada must support the United Nations. It's an organization of member states, of course. The staff members are simply there to serve the instructions of the member states. Of course, the Iraqi sanctions program is in the hands of a Canadian. The Deputy Secretary General of the United Nations is Louise Fréchette, who is a Canadian. You have access to somebody of great influence who, on a daily basis, is in fact responsible for what's happening in Iraq.

However, I do not agree with Mr. Cleminson when he talks about the biological situation. If he has listened to Mr. Butler and Mr. Ritter, we know the nuclear capacity is gone. I agree with them. We know that 817 long-range missiles have been destroyed. But with chemical and biological weapons, it's much more difficult, as Mr. Blix has very honestly admitted. But the question that he has not answered, and he might like to tell us, is who supplied those chemical weapons, who supplied the biological weapons? The Americans did, out of Maryland and with the approval of the Department of Commerce. You know, we are part of the problem.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ron Cleminson: Can I just respond to that? In terms of the chemical weapons, Iraq, in the al-Muthanna state establishment, had one of the largest chemical weapons production facilities in the world. We're not exactly sure on the biological side, but there are indications that there were also biological weapons produced in al-Muthanna, and perhaps weapons were filled.

But I reiterate that this is in the past. We now have a solution that the Security Council has passed, resolution 1284. No nation has turned it down. France has not turned it down, nor has Russia or China. For that matter, neither has Malaysia. I don't think there's a great conspiracy there. Certainly there is a natural sort of thing that has been in the Ottawa Citizen every day about the operation of the Security Council, but that's the best we have. We should move with the best we have. The resolution gives a pathway, and if the Iraqis accept that in some sort of consultation with Dr. Blix, then I think we move forward. That's where we should be moving forward rather than looking back.

The Chair: Thank you.

We have about a minute left in this session, so we'll quickly hear from Mr. Scott, and then Ms. Morgan.

Mr. Doug Scott: I just wanted to respond to what Mrs. Beaumier was saying, because it's something that worried us for some little while. That is, have we gotten to the point where we're talking about a very small remnant? How could Iraq prove that there's absolutely nothing left in the way of weaponry of mass destruction, because how do you prove a negative?

It's a difficult thing to do. However, there is one indication that Iraq could give that it has made a very major change of policy, and I talk about it in my paper. It could adopt legislation, as it is required to do under resolution 715, in order to qualify for the lifting of the sanctions. It could adopt legislation that would make it a legal responsibility of all Iraqi individuals, including government servants, to cooperate with the inspectors.

In addition to that, although this isn't referred to in resolution 715, if it wanted to do so, the Iraqis could abolish the decrees they passed immediately after the Gulf War. Those decrees required all citizens in Iraq to refuse to cooperate with the inspectors, and in fact to conceal all the information they can from the inspectors. Those are the concealment decrees. Now, they haven't done that. They have been asked to do it and they've never refused. They have always said they will do so, but it has never happened.

It could be that you could say this kind of legislation would be ineffective in an authoritarian state. It might not be, I quite agree. But at the same time, I'm very impressed by the fact that they have not done that. Apparently that legislation will have some effect on them. It's very interesting. At any rate, certainly it would have a lot of effect on the rest of us if they did that, because I think it would indicate that they've had enough of these games, that they're going to stop trying to retain this last remnant of their weapons of mass destruction, and that they really do want to get rid of the sanctions. They could do it quite easily, and we'd know it very quickly. It's not a question of them proving a negative. They could prove it very quickly by their attitude and by their behaviour.

The Chair: Ms. Morgan, just briefly, if you could, please.

• 1135

Ms. Linda Morgan: I think the whole question of weapons of mass destruction is actually a red herring. Any country in the world that has a university could make chemical weapons. You can actually get recipes off the Internet, I understand. As the people in Oklahoma found out, you can make it with fertilizer. In fact, as far as the weapons of mass destruction go, these sanctions are a weapon of mass destruction. They have killed more than one million people.

The Chair: Thank you.

[Translation]

Ms. Picard, five minutes.

Ms. Pauline Picard: Yes, I will be brief, Mr. Chairman. My question is for anyone who can answer it.

I would like to talk about the Oil for Food Program. In 1995, Iraq was allowed to sell 2 billion dollars' worth of oil under the program. In 1998, the amount was increased to $5.2 billion, but the money was placed in an escrow account that was sequestered by the United Nations.

Thirty per cent of that amount went into a compensatory account for Kuwait. Part of it was also set aside for various UN activities, for disarmament, and another amount was used for humanitarian needs. How did this humanitarian assistance reach Iraq?

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Halliday.

Mr. Denis Halliday: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Madam, as you know, I ran the oil-for-food program in Iraq for over a year. It ran because the government worked with the UN. The UN alone could never have managed that program. The government built on its own existing system. As we've heard already today and in the paper of Sheila Zurbrigg, they ran a very tight, claustrophobic social welfare program of their own long before we ever turned up.

Every Iraqi citizen has a card. With that card, they now of course have access to food under the oil-for-food program through 49,000 agents employed by the government. They are provided with food under observation by United Nations staff. I have 150 staff in Iraq at all times observing the process of wheat, of milling, of distribution through the agents and so on, interviewing recipients. So it has worked extremely well, thanks to the Iraqis.

Up in the north, where they have some three million Iraqi Kurds, the World Food Programme does it directly, in keeping with the arrangements for semi-autonomy. That also has worked very well.

There have been some slip-ups on the medical front. There have been many delays in provision of drugs and medicines. There have been accusations of stockpiling, which in fact is a normal phenomenon endorsed by the World Health Organization.

In the case of food, it's been an extremely effective program. The tragedy is that it wasn't designed to succeed; it was designed to stop further deterioration. Maybe it's just about done that, and even that is not quite clear because mortality figures and malnutrition figures have continued to climb under the oil-for-food program. That is the tragedy of it. So we have sustained mortality and malnutrition situations.

[Translation]

Ms. Pauline Picard: Some of the people we met with yesterday said that with the distribution of humanitarian aid, there was the possibility of black markets being set up. Are you aware of that problem?

[English]

Mr. Denis Halliday: Yes, absolutely. This is one of the big dangers. When you hear references to calories of 1,500 or 2,000, that sounds wonderful, but we know that the quantitative provision is about three weeks' worth per month.

Secondly, Iraqis have no other medium of exchange. Money has become just about worthless. The average salary now of an Iraqi professional may be about $10 a month. It simply doesn't buy necessities. What's happening is that Iraqis are forced to sell some of this food to pay the rent, to buy books for their children, shoes for their children, just to keep their lives going.

They also have to buy substitute food in that the food basket of the UN does not provide animal proteins, with a very minor exception in terms of whole cream milk powder and some cheese, which was introduced when I was there myself. The animal protein component is largely missing. There's an absence of vitamins and an absence of minerals. So they are buying eggs and meat and chicken and other things if they can afford them, but it means trading in the rice and the wheat flour to try to make all this work. I think that is what's bringing down the level of nutrition, in addition to all the other problems. Of course the underlying problems of Gulf War damage and water supply systems are of paramount importance.

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[Translation]

The Chairman: Thank you. Mr. Paradis.

Mr. Denis Paradis (Brome—Missisquoi, Lib.): I would like to start by thanking you for your presentations.

Before starting, I would like to clarify something in response to Mr. Chouaib's comments. I must point out that four officials at the Department of Foreign Affairs are not solely responsible for the Canadian government's entire foreign policy. You can see how transparently this committee operates. This study on sanctions in Iraq is, of course, supported by all members who sit on this committee, the majority of whom are Liberal, and therefore represent the government. So I would like to set the record straight and say that we are very open and very interested in hearing everything you have to say about the situation in Iraq.

Moreover, and you already mentioned this, Mr. Halliday, Canada plays a specific role at the UN, through Ms. Fréchette, and starting in April, we will chair the Security Council. So I think that we play an important role and that you are in a good position to put Iraq on the agenda, on the eve of our taking over the chairmanship of the Security Council.

[English]

Many people told us that the oil-for-food program doesn't quite work, or it should be better; it should be improved. Maybe it should be oil for people's needs, oil for humanitarian aid, oil for life—with a bigger spectrum. Maybe we should think about making a separation between the sanctions that are directed toward the people and the inspections that are directed toward government or Saddam's regime.

I will ask this question to Mr. Halliday. Are there any other tools that we should think of that would be more related to Saddam's regime instead of the population?

Mr. Denis Halliday: There is a discussion that is ongoing and has been ongoing for many years about the concept of smart sanctions, meaning sanctions that are more focused on those responsible for bad decisions. So those who made the error of going into Kuwait and who should be responsible for the calamity that Kuwait represents, for example, should be sanctioned more directly.

In other words, you avoid the punishment of the mass, the people, who are of course not consulted on Kuwait. Many were not even born when Kuwait was invaded. They should be exempted from all of this punishment aspect and the focus then should solely be on the government and the decision-makers, the elite, as you may wish to call it. That is the discussion that's taking place in the UN right now.

There's a good paper prepared by the office of the Secretary General talking about some of the issues. The bottom line, unfortunately, is that it's awfully difficult to create smart sanctions that will focus on those as opposed to the mass of people. That's why sanctions have never succeeded. It's sad to say that, because they are a legitimate tool of the Security Council in the charter, chapter VII. None of us can produce an example where it really works, and always the consequence is for the innocent of the country.

There's no easy way out, I'm afraid. I think the only way to go is to separate, as you have suggested. Keep the military and the human apart. Lift the economic sanctions, retain the military inspections and all of the other safeguards that may be required, but let Iraq rebuild its economy and get people back to work. That's the only way to go. There is no other way, in my view.

Mr. Denis Paradis: Thank you.

The Chair: Mr. Chouaib.

[Translation]

Mr. Mazen Chouaib: Mr. Chairman, thank you for recognizing me.

[English]

I do appreciate all you're saying, and that's exactly why we're here today presenting; we believe the Canadian government is not just sitting in an office. We believe the Canadian government has a great role to play, and we believe your role is very significant in convincing the Canadian government of the need to change this policy.

I would like to stress what Mr. Halliday has said. We can't separate between economic sanctions and military sanctions. Iraqis themselves, the Government of Iraq, have asked for that too. We should take them up on that offer instead of saying no, let's isolate them, let's not deal with these people.

Thank you very much.

The Chair: Mr. Martin.

• 1145

Mr. Keith Martin: Very briefly, Mr. Halliday, what is the impasse with the Iraqi government to their agreement to weapons inspectors? If that were done as an issue of goodwill, then we could substantially have a lot of political capital to take to removing some of the sanctions.

The second question is, in your view, what are the most effective pressure points that this committee can go to, to apply some constructive solutions to improving the health and welfare of the people in Iraq? You named one—Madame Fréchette—but if there are any others, we'd like to know.

Mr. Denis Halliday: Thank you. I'm sorry for hogging the floor, but it's involuntary. I hope you understand.

There's a misunderstanding here. When the inspection team, UNSCOM, left Iraq in December 1998, the impression has been given that Iraq threw them out. That is not correct. They were withdrawn by Mr. Butler, who had presented a report to Washington and for the Secretary General that set up an environment of lack of collaboration, which then allowed, of course, the bombing attacks by Britain and America in December before Ramadan and Christmas. It was Butler who took them out, and that should be very clearly understood. He also departed in the middle of the night, at 3 o'clock, leaving behind the humanitarian workers, who in fact suffered some damage because of the missile attacks that then came in the following week. It was a very strange way to behave.

I think Iraq has said quite clearly, we understand the price of lifting sanctions. We know there must be inspections. We know what you will need to do. You need to satisfy the UN and everybody else. We'd like to see the same thing happen for the neighbourhood, because that is part of resolution 687, paragraph 14. We'll accept all these things, but just give us some dignity, some sovereignty, some respect; avoid the total humiliation of this great country. That's the way Iraqis quite rightly see, I think, Iraq and Mesopotamia, and so on.

But that is the way to go. Separate the two, and I think that issue of sanctions and inspections will go away. But lift the sanctions.

As to the pressure points in the UN, as several of you have said, and I've said, and we all believe, Canada is uniquely powerful in the world and in the United Nations, given Canada's reputation for standing up, often saying the right thing under difficult circumstances. Here is a glorious opportunity to line up with, I would say, the majority of member states of the General Assembly. They would agree with you if Canada proposed lifting sanctions, retaining military inspections, and what have you, sanctioning the sale of military weapons to Iraq and to other countries. Canada can do that. You have to understand the power that Canada has, and you now have a golden opportunity.

As you were just being reminded, Ambassador Fowler will chair the Security Council starting in April. There's a perfect opportunity to blow this myth up and get past resolution 1284, which is never going to work, and do something much more dramatic that would respond to the catastrophe for the people of Iraq.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Halliday, you'd be surprised how many witnesses come before this committee and insist on the power of Canada. I wish you'd go and tell the American congressmen a little bit about that. We might get more respect when we go down there.

Mr. Denis Halliday: I will be down there on April 5. I'll try to remember that.

The Chair: Let them know we're up here and threatening.

Mr. McWhinney.

Mr. Ted McWhinney: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We've had a couple of weeks of fascinating debate on Kosovo, in which there was really no explicit international law base but people reached out for general principles. Yesterday, as you rightly said, was almost a debate between positivism and natural law, where there is an explicit legal base; that people were arguing for overriding it by general principles of certain sorts. But if you do have an explicit legal base, you have to interpret it normally in a restrictive manner.

I'll ask you three basic questions. One is about Hans Blix. He is my colleague in the Institut. I've known him for years. I wonder if too great a trust for salvation hasn't been put in his hands.

Nevertheless, in his mandate, which you've undoubtedly read and I will read—I guarantee that—is there or isn't there an explicit authority in relation to the sanctions issue?

Secondly, regarding the basis for the sanctions, as they're now being applied, is the explicit legal authority one that is in 1991, or has it been explicitly, and in terms renewed subsequently, because we're currently in a post-post-war situation?

• 1150

The third thing in relation to sanctions is this. I go on my own contact with press reports, but we saw how in Bosnia sanctions programs basically were ruined because neighbouring states didn't cooperate. They disapproved. So I'd ask you about the position of neighbour states to Iraq. What is known of the position of the Iranian government—today, I'm speaking of now—the Saudi Arabian government, and others, who were certainly allies in the Gulf War in the case of Saudi Arabia? Are the neighbouring states cooperating? And I make a distinction between tacit verbal cooperation and practical cooperation.

I will do my own research, but if Mr. Halliday or others are in a position to advise me, it would help to have their on-the-spot responses.

Mr. Denis Halliday: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As I understand it, the mandate of Mr. Blix is limited very much to the whole UNMOVIC mandate, and that is to confirm or to state categorically that Iraq is free of the capacity, of the wherewithal, to create weapons of mass destruction, whether it's nuclear or long-range missiles, chemical and biological war capacity. That's an impossible task, but I won't go into that. That limits his mandate, but of course the result of his work would allow the Security Council to lift the sanctions under the 1284 provision. So his role is just fundamentally important. It's a tremendous burden, as you've implied, for any one individual. He is a man of integrity and known to be such.

The present sanctions regime is a package of many components. It began with resolution 661, which was designed to get Iraq out of Kuwait. That obviously failed and we had the Gulf War. Then resolution 687 was introduced, which was resolution 661 plus a new component designed to disarm Iraq totally, particularly of course of weapons of mass destruction. Now resolution 687 is alive and well. It's now referred to in the preamble to resolution 1284. Many international lawyers will tell you this is where the whole thing has gone wrong, because 687 and now 1284 are inappropriate legal devices. They're out of line with the reality of the need. The need is to disarm a country through its government, through the regime that runs this program. The need is not to destroy and to punish the people of the country.

So many international lawyers, including our friend in Princeton, Richard Falk, believe these are illegal applications, misapplications, of Security Council authority under chapter VII to impose some sort of embargo.

Mr. Ted McWhinney: Do you know of anybody else but Mr. Falk? I don't say that to denigrate the quality of your recommendation, but do you know of anybody else who's expressed themselves on this point?

Mr. Denis Halliday: Yes. I could give you a list of lawyers in France, Germany, Holland, and the U.S.

Mr. Ted McWhinney: Of the same quality as Mr. Falk?

Mr. Denis Halliday: Who agree with Mr. Falk.

Mr. Ted McWhinney: But of the same general quality and stature?

Mr. Denis Halliday: Yes, yes, good people.

Mr. Ted McWhinney: I'd be happy to have that.

And the third issue, the attitude of the neighbouring states?

Mr. Denis Halliday: The UN does provide actually, in theory at least, the capacity to compensate neighbours who lose out in terms of trade and what have you. This normally does not materialize.

In the case of Iraq, there's a huge trade between Turkey and Iraq. The government sells gasoline to the Turks and in exchange in comes some food, some vegetables. But the border is very porous. This is one of the reasons the Kurdish north is better off, because drugs and medicines have been coming in through this border. The traffic is well known, because the satellites of course are overhead, as are American military aircraft. I myself have seen lines ten kilometres long of trucks coming in in this barter trade. It's a very important part of the Iraqi economy, outside oil for food itself.

In the case of Jordan there's a formal agreement. There's a protocol whereby I think a quarter of a billion dollars worth of goods are allowed to enter Iraq in exchange for oil. Jordan remains totally dependent on Iraqi oil for its energy requirements.

Iran is a bit more misty. There have been stories or theories that the Iranians have allowed their waterways to be used for crude oil to be shipped out into the Gulf. I think there is much more collaboration between these two countries than we perhaps know. They certainly are sustaining a relationship much better than previously. But I can't give you any details.

Otherwise it's those bits and pieces of leakage. For example, the police force in Iraq today has new Korean automobiles. Somebody must have brought in 500 cars in exchange for something, presumably oil.

But the big issue is Turkey and Jordan, which is well known. A blind eye has been turned to that trade.

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Mr. Ted McWhinney: Have Iran and Iraq re-established formal diplomatic relations such that normal missions are there, since they were the former enemies, as you know?

Mr. Denis Halliday: Yes, yes. There's an Iranian ambassador in Baghdad. Vice-President Ramadan has been to Teheran. They enjoy pretty good relations. But of course they're probably somewhat united by the United Nations, the Americans, and others. They are neighbours and Arab brothers in a sense also. These are important factors.

Mr. Ted McWhinney: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Monsieur Patry.

Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.): Thank you. I have a question for Mr. Halliday.

It seems you have a different position from Mr. Cleminson regarding the 1284 resolution. You told us it took about a year of discussion to reach that resolution in the United Nations. We know right now there is a movement of United Kingdom parliamentarians to request a lifting of the embargo itself, and we know our committee will draft a report. Sometimes the reports we draft have some impact with the department, such as the one we drafted regarding the nuclear position of Canada.

My question is very simple. What are the chances of success, and how long would it take if Canada requested to lift the embargo? You mention in your last recommendation:

Canada should lead the way in demanding the lifting of the economic embargo tomorrow while retaining military sanctions and inspections.

What are the chances now? How long will it take to succeed, according to your experience?

Mr. Denis Halliday: I agree time is absolutely of great importance. We have to acknowledge that as many as 3,000 or 4,000, maybe even 5,000, children under 5 die every month. So every time we.... We just had a discussion, and we probably lost another 30 Iraqi kids this morning. So we really have to move, and that's where Canada has to play a role.

I'm not going to say it's easy. But I believe, you see, that Clinton and Albright and Blair are desperately seeking a way out. They know they're in a very deep hole. They know it's illegal. They know it's immoral. They want a way out. So if there is a solution....

There are, you know, 70 or 80 congressmen who feel, as you do—that's the feeling I'm getting in this meeting—that something has to be done and done quickly. They have spoken up recently. They've signed a letter to Clinton about de-linking economic from military sanctions.

There are gaps. There are opportunities, it seems to me, in the U.K. and in Washington where it counts. Despite what we've heard, I think the Russians and the Chinese and the French.... With a solid proposal from the leadership of Canada for de-linking totally but retaining strong military inspections and all these things—which may be unattractive to the Iraqis, but I think they'd have to accept them—I believe you'd get French and Russian support very quickly. It has to be floated, and I think Mr. Fowler is the man to do it, with, of course, your very strong support. But you know, with all due respect, his immediate boss is probably the Minister of Foreign Affairs, so I'll leave that problem to you.

Thank you.

Mr. Bernard Patry: Thank you.

The Chair: Very quickly, I have one question for Mr. Halliday.

Mr. Scott suggested that in fact Iraq was not fully cooperating with the oil-for-food program. Have you any evidence of that? In other words, are some of these problems a bit self-inflicted? What is the record for that when you were there, in terms of local cooperation?

Mr. Denis Halliday: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As I mentioned, I had 150 full-time observers throughout the country monitoring this program. They were never, ever able to report one incident for me that I would send to the Secretary General. So the Secretary General, in almost three years now, has been unable to report improper diversion of foodstuffs or medicines under this program. That satisfies me. In UNICEF, FAO, and World Food, we have never seen in Iraq diversion of foodstuffs.

In fact it's been the reverse. When we had delays—and you know there are some Canadian ships currently off Basra that are not being unloaded because of difficulties—the Iraqi government took from its own reserves wheat flour and put it into the so-called oil-for food program, and we distributed their wheat under the program to sustain the basket for the Iraqi people, who are of course totally dependent on this source of foodstuffs.

Thank you.

The Chair: Mr. Scott, you'll probably want to respond to that, because it was your idea.

Mr. Doug Scott: Yes, I would like to respond to what Mr. Halliday said in connection with the cooperation given by the Iraqi government. I'm only going by the figures contained in the UN Secretary General's reports. In the one on November 17, 1999—this is actually the report of Mr. Savan, who I'm sure you know, the executive director of the Iraq program. This is only an example, because there are lots of other instances. He says the distribution rate for medical supplies was just over 76%. This meant the medical supplies had already arrived in Iraq and only 76% had been distributed. Then he gets down to medical equipment, and the rate there was 30%, which meant that 30% of the health equipment that arrived in Iraq had actually been distributed.

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That situation might have improved since then. It probably has—I hope it has—but at any rate I don't think it's right to say there are no instances of any lack of cooperation. I don't know whether that's lack of cooperation or just stupidity or whatever, but it's some kind of involvement of the Iraqi government.

The Chair: It might be failure of the infrastructure to enable it to be distributed along the lines that have already been described.

Mr. Millholland, you wanted to add something. Ms. Morgan was ahead of you, but I'm going to ask you both to be extremely brief because we are now over the time.

Mr. Arthur Millholland: I will just briefly answer Mr. Scott. I suggest he should go to Iraq. I've looked at this myself, and the Government of Iraq is dealing with old computers and a lot of them don't work. Think of it as being like 20 years ago when you were doing things manually. That's what it's like in Iraq.

They also have a ministry of health, like we have Health Canada, that tests drugs that come into the country. Do you know that a lot of drugs coming from the United States are expired when they get into Iraq? Do you know why they're expired? It's because the drug manufacturers get a big tax write-off. They ship them six months before expiry, and by the time they arrive in Iraq they're expired. Is that what this program was intended to do? Absolutely not.

So they test those drugs. Would you put up with it, Mr. Scott, in this nation, if our Health Canada allowed expired pharmaceuticals to be sold to Canadians, without being adequately tested? Absolutely not.

It's wrong to call them stupid and it's wrong to say they're diverted, because I've been to those health labs. They've asked for forklift trucks to move pallets. The sanctions committee has turned them down. You need refrigeration equipment to store this stuff or it expires. The sanctions committee has turned them down.

Like every story, like any marriage that fails, there are two sides. You need to go there yourself to see what the truth is, because you've missed it. Looking at one piece of paper doesn't tell it. I've gone and I've spent in excess of $1 million looking at what the problem is. I'm a witness. I can say I've seen it.

Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you.

Ms. Morgan.

Ms. Linda Morgan: Dr. Khadir went to Iraq in January and spoke to Hans von Sponeck. Hans von Sponeck said exactly the same thing to their delegation, Voices of Conscience, as Denis Halliday just said. They now have 500 observers in Iraq.

The Chair: Thank you all very much. We appreciate your testimony. I think it would be fair for me to say that as a sort of consensus amongst the panellists, while there's a disagreement as to the necessity of some sanctions, this idea of de-linking the military and economic sanctions seems to be a way one could maybe get out of this impasse. The question is, how can it be effective and how can you manage it?

I don't want to really open a door to another long conversation, but we've just looked at other areas, such as Kosovo and Serbia, and the suggestion is there should be some economic sanctions that at least seek to bear on the regime, if it is not playing ball. You should have some. Maybe you could have an economic sanction regime that hit the leaders—don't let them travel, don't let them go to their night clubs wherever they are, or whatever they do.

Are there any economic sanctions, just very quickly, we could justify retaining because they are specifically directed at the lifestyles of those who we could say are partly responsible for the whole business, rather than the ordinary citizens who are getting side-swiped by the consequences? Is there anything there that should be retained?

Mr. Denis Halliday: Mr. Chairman, you've raised an important issue, it seems to me. We've spoken about smart sanctions, and the Secretary General has addressed the issue. There's a real feeling that we can never again repeat the Iraq experience. We have to do it differently.

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Finding smart sanctions of course is very difficult, but you can block the travel of the head of state, you can attach his bank account overseas, and do certain things like that. But in the context of Iraq today, if you continued sanctions or smart sanctions on the government, I think it would begin to constitute punishment, and I don't think the Security Council and the charter provide for punishment per se. So it would get us into a whole interesting area, in which I don't think I'm competent.

Thank you.

The Chair: Very briefly, Mr. Scott, and then we're going to wrap up.

Mr. Doug Scott: I just want to say I think you're really asking the wrong question. You're talking about whether there is anything we can do about the economic sanctions. I'm saying the economic sanctions went out the window in the first part of 1997. We now have political sanctions. The economic sanctions were against the people; the political sanctions are against the politicians and the people who are running the place. I'm sorry, I seem to have failed to make my point.

The fact is there is really nothing that can be had by improving the amount of money that is going to the Iraqi people under the oil-for-food program. There's only so much oil that can be sold, and all of it is being sold. Where do you go from there? If you can't sell any more oil, where do you get the money for a more generous deal? I'm very sorry there are only so many cents per person, but where's the extra money coming from? That's my point. There is no extra money, therefore we really don't have economic sanctions any more.

The Chair: I think the other witnesses have clearly indicated there has to be some latitude to restore the economy of Iraq too, before people all starve to death. Anyway, we'll look at that.

Thank you very much. We're adjourned until 3.30 this afternoon, when we will have a joint committee meeting with the defence committee to consider the issue of relations with the United States in NORAD.