CLAR Committee Meeting

LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE ON BILL C-20, AN ACT TO GIVE EFFECT TO THE REQUIREMENT FOR CLARITY AS SET OUT IN THE OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA IN THE QUEBEC SECESSION REFERENCE

COMITÉ LÉGISLATIF CHARGÉ D'ÉTUDIER LE PROJET DE LOI C-20, LOI DONNANT EFFET À L'EXIGENCE DE CLARTÉ FORMULÉE PAR LA COUR SUPRÊME DU CANADA DANS SON AVIS SUR LE RENVOI SUR LA SÉCESSION DU QUÉBEC

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Friday, February 18, 2000

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[Translation]

The Chair (Mr. Peter Milliken (Kingston and the Islands, Lib.)): Order, please. We now have a quorum for the purposes of hearing witnesses. We are ready to begin.

I would like to mention to Committee members that following a meeting of the Sub-Committee on Agenda and Procedure held this morning in my office, an agreement has been reached with respect to dates for hearing other witnesses.

[English]

After the meeting, I instructed the clerk to proceed with arranging for witnesses to appear before the committee on Wednesday and Thursday of next week.

Subsequently, I received a letter from Mr. Turp.

[Translation]

There are copies for everyone. The letter reads as follows:

Further to this morning's meeting, I am writing to ask that you ensure that the Clerk of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-20 arranges for witnesses to appear in accordance with the list submitted by the different political parties or requests to appear as individuals before the Committee.

In light of the motions passed by the Committee at its first sitting, the Committee Clerk would have no justification for not calling the above-mentioned witnesses.

Yours sincerely, the Member for Beauharnois—Salaberry, Daniel Turp.

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The list is quite full for the time being and we will continue to invite witnesses to appear on those two days.

[English]

I should also advise the committee that I have received notice of a motion from Mr. Alcock, which reads as follows:

That the Committee may, if necessary to further accommodate the list of witnesses, continue to hear witnesses up to 5:30 p.m. on Thursday, February 24, 2000, provided that the Chair shall put, without further debate or amendment, all questions necessary to dispose of Bill C-20 no later than midnight on Thursday, February 24, 2000.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp (Beauharnois—Salaberry, BQ): Mr. Chairman, I have a point of order. With respect to the letter I sent you, am I to understand, in light of the information you have provided today, that you will be calling as witnesses people who wrote to the Clerk expressing a desire to be heard, as well as those who made that request orally?

The Chair: No, I have asked the Clerk to schedule 45 witnesses, who were selected among the names submitted by the parties, in accordance with the motion passed by this Committee.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Could I be told what motion or section of the Standing Orders applicable to this Committee you are relying on to make the determination that you will not hear from individuals who have expressed a desire to appear before the Committee?

[English]

The Chair: Yes. I do it on the basis of the motion adopted by the committee, which was that there would be 45 witnesses, distributed according to party, and they were specified in the motion. Those were the witnesses the committee was instructed to hear, and those are the ones I'll hear. If we're instructed to hear more, we will do it.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: Based on your interpretation of the Standing Orders and the motions, you cannot hear individuals who have requested to appear.

The Chair: A number of individuals requested to be heard by the Committee. The Committee is not required to hear them; it is up to the Committee to decide. If the Committee decides to hear more than 45 witnesses, or to hear from witnesses whose names do not appear on the lists submitted by the parties, that's fine. The Chairman is prepared to follow the Committee's instructions.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Could I ask the Parliamentary Secretary whether he is prepared to allow the Committee to hear from people who have requested to appear as individuals?

The Chair: This discussion should more appropriately be held at the Sub-Committee on Agenda and Procedure, rather than before witnesses that we are ready to hear. I would like the Committee to start hearing from the witnesses present. If you don't agree, we can pursue this discussion elsewhere.

Mr. Bernard Amyot is President of the “Groupe des Cent”. He is accompanied by two colleagues, Mr. Clemens Mayr and Mr. Sébastien Gignac. Welcome, gentlemen.

[English]

We thank you for taking the time to appear before us and look forward to your testimony.

Under the rules we've adopted, you have 10 minutes for your presentation, and then there will be questions from the committee, for a maximum of 35 minutes.

[Translation]

Mr. Amyot, please proceed.

Mr. Bernard Amyot (President, Groupe des Cent): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would first like to thank Mr. Milliken and the Clerk for giving us this opportunity to address the Committee. Before I begin, I would briefly like to give you some background with respect to the genesis of the Groupe des Cent and an indication of where we're coming from and where we're going.

The Groupe des Cent was created five years ago almost to the day, in February 1995, on the eve of the October referendum held that same year. It is a small think-tank made up of young entrepreneurs, young professionals and federalist Quebec academics who took up the challenge of bringing together 100 of their colleagues for the very simple purpose of demonstrating to our fellow Quebeckers how outdated and unnecessary the plan for Quebec independence really is.

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Not only were we able to meet the challenge of bringing together 100 young Quebec professionals, entrepreneurs and academics, but by the end of the 1995 referendum campaign, we had rallied to our cause 1,000 people who were prepared to help us fulfill our mission.

Unfortunately, because of the call made by the then Premier, Mr. Parizeau, the very evening of his referendum defeat, and his disturbing remarks with respect to the role that money and minorities played in the referendum, and because of subsequent revelations suggesting that in the event of a victory for the YES side, however narrow, he intended to proceed with a unilateral declaration of independence, we felt we had no choice but to continue. Under the circumstances, we have attempted since to repeat our message in the newspapers and at seminars, particularly at the time of the Supreme Court Reference.

We had an opportunity to debate this issue with Professor Laforêt, a confirmed sovereignist who, rather ironically, declared in La Presse this week that pursuing independence would harm Quebec and that the Parti Québécois had weakened Quebec's position within the Canadian federal system. On our side, we are content to simply state that this is an outdated and unnecessary plan. I note that he uses the term “harmful”. So, we clearly are not the only ones making this argument.

The brief we submitted is divided into four main sections: first, we examine the sources of Bill C-20 and the legitimacy of the Supreme Court of Canada; secondly, we denounce the myth surrounding the supposedly automatic operation that would be launched following a YES vote; thirdly, we reiterate the need for clarity in this debate; and fourthly, we reiterate the need for clarity with respect to the level of support received before negotiations can begin.

First of all, we believe that this legislation proceeds from the reasoning laid out by the Supreme Court of Canada in the August 1988 Reference. So, there are two choices: either we comply with the ruling handed down by the Supreme Court of Canada and respect the entity that is the Supreme Court of Canada, in terms of its legal authority and constitutional legitimacy, or we attack the very essence of our parliamentary democracy. In our view, the choice is a simple one; you cannot blow hot and cold on such an important issue.

We believe it is imperative to reaffirm the authority of the highest court in the land. Although we are in the year 2000, some of the comments we are hearing would lead us to believe we have returned to a dark period in our history, and that is obviously extremely worrisome.

The Supreme Court simply told us that we had to abide by the law and Constitution. They make no provision for secession. On the other hand, you cannot hold back a province against its will. If there is a desire to secede, there is an added requirement that secession proceed in a context of clarity, transparency and with clear support for a plan clearly laid out for Quebeckers. Only under such circumstances would the door be open to negotiations on the terms of a potential secession.

That brings me to the second point: the myth surrounding the magical process that would be set in motion in the event of a victory for the YES side in a referendum. We suffered the disastrous effects of pre-referendum uncertainty on two occasions. It took us several years to get over it. We know the kinds of problems caused by pre-referendum uncertainty; so one can easily imagine the chaos that could ensue and the problems....

Mr. Daniel Turp: [Editor's Note: Inaudible].

Mr. Bernard Amyot: Mr. Turp, you will have an opportunity to speak. You behave just like a child. Decorum requires that you listen to the person who has the floor.

Mr. Daniel Turp: I'm listening.

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Mr. Bernard Amyot: So, we know the kinds of problems that result from a referendum. It is illusory to think that even after a massive YES vote, one group alone, working in isolation, could bring an end to a partnership without first having to account for its actions to its future former associates. If the rest of Canada has a duty to negotiate with Quebec if Quebeckers express a clear preference for secession, it seems quite obvious that Premier Bouchard cannot then claim in the same breath that he will never have to take into consideration the views of his federal and provincial counterparts. It is obvious that the process leading to secession cannot magically be set in motion via a unilateral declaration coming from only one of the parties. To deny that inescapable reality is to delude Quebeckers as to the consequences of a majority, or even massive, YES vote in the next referendum.

The third thrust of our brief is that the issue must be clearly defined. Once again, we have two choices: either we claim to act legally and propose a clear plan, or we simply want to change the current agreement, in which case, there are mechanisms for doing that.

However, if their only intention is to confuse people by asking an ambiguous question about sovereignty and partnership, while saying privately that they will proceed with a unilateral declaration of independence, then the gap between secessionist leaders' rhetoric and their actual intentions clearly demonstrates the pressing need for clarity in all these areas. If confusion allows ideologues to achieve an unavowed goal, we will most certainly have erred, Mr. Chairman.

The fourth and final thrust is the necessary clarity of the result before any negotiations can begin. It is our view that without a broad consensus, such a plan is doomed to failure.

The Supreme Court did not state that a simple majority would be clear. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that one person out of five or six million could constitute a definitive answer to such an important question. In fact, we believe that would be the worst possible scenario. It would lead to a harmful political deadlock for all concerned, with the result that the province would be carved up rather than united by an inspiring plan, and we would come out of this debate diminished and weakened, as Professor Laforêt stated.

Indeed, René Lévesque himself had understood this, declaring as early as 1968 on the subject of independence in his book Option Québec, and I quote from page 47 of his book:

Our hypothesis can only be realized in the medium term, which means that we have the time to prepare. When a clear majority has appeared, has weighed and expressed its desire for a new direction for Québec, and has a government which will perfectly reflect that direction...

One never gain respect through ambiguity. Clarity has the constant virtue of avoiding misunderstandings. Thank you.

[English]

The Chair: Ms. Meredith, you're the first questioner.

Ms. Val Meredith (South Surrey—White Rock—Langley, Ref.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank you for your comments. I listened carefully to understand what position you're taking on this. As I understand it, you believe Bill C-20 will bring clarity to the issue of a question in Quebec, as well as to the majority that is required. What exactly in Bill C-20 provides you with that clarity? What exactly in this bill do you see as clarifying that issue?

Mr. Bernard Amyot: I believe Bill C-20 clarifies the issues surrounding the rules that must be followed before negotiations are undertaken and in order to assess whether the process was transparent and clear, in line with the requirements set by the Supreme Court of Canada in its referral decision.

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Ms. Val Meredith: In the Supreme Court's decision, they indicated that it required a clear majority of the people of a province in order to make that decision to start negotiations. Neither the Supreme Court nor the clarity bill refers to numbers. What does your organization feel is a representation of a clear majority of a province for secession?

Mr. Clemens Mayr (Legal Counsel, Ogilvy-Renaud, Groupe des Cent): Mr. Chairman, the Supreme Court of Canada as well as Bill C-20 allude not only to clear majorities, but also to the quality of the chosen option. In trying to determine the quality of the consent to a proposed option, a number of factors must be looked at, including numbers. I think the one thing that is clear, especially in the Supreme Court decision, is that one cannot conclude simply that a 50%-plus-one majority is what the Supreme Court meant by a clear majority, because otherwise how would you define an unclear majority, 50% plus 0.5%?

There's also a call for the political actors to take on their role and their responsibilities in the definition and in putting in place the appropriate safeguards to make sure the quality control of the decision be met, so that that standard of quality in the approval process be met, in order to allow subsequently for negotiations within the legal framework and eventually also in the context of an ultimate consensus at the international level to allow the whole process actually to come to a fruitful conclusion and not be a dead-end operation, where everybody ends up losing.

Mr. Sébastien Gignac (Legal Counsel, Advanced Research Technologies Inc., Groupe des Cent): I think we don't need to provide in advance an exact percentage or number. Our position is that if we look at past experience, in almost every case an overwhelming majority has approved the secession of a constituent state. If we look at a number of cases, it is also clear that there is no need necessarily to set out a percentage. The result is what counts.

I think what the bill does is outline the criteria that allow the political actors of the Supreme Court specifically to state that the ones appreciating the results need to do exactly that job. Our position has always been that if Quebec, for instance, is to secede from Canada, it can only do so effectively if it is able to garner a very strong consensus in order not just to provide the adequate response in terms of the legalese of the process, but also to make sure that if this is the outcome really sought by Quebeckers, it is in the end viable.

Ms. Val Meredith: I'm not going to quibble with you here, but if the level that is required is not indicated before a referendum, then how can anybody hope that a decision that is made after a referendum, whether it's 55%, 60%, 70%, or 85%...? If you're leaving that decision to somebody else after the fact, then what respect will that be given by the people, whether it's 55%, 60%, or 70%? If you have 55% or 60% of the people of a province, over half the people, indicating that they don't want to stay, how are you possibly going to force them into that kind of situation?

The Chair: I'm sorry, but we've run out of time.

Mr. Bernard Amyot: I think what has to be assessed is whether a large consensus transpires from the event in clarity, first of all. The Supreme Court of Canada has been wise enough not to set that standard arbitrarily, but I think one can make conclusions as to the quality of a consent after the fact.

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[Translation]

The Chair: Mr. Guimond, you have the floor.

Mr. Michel Guimond (Beauport—Montmorency—Côte-de-Beaupré—Île-d'Orléans, BQ): Monsieur Amyot, what do you? You're a lawyer. How is your practice going overall?

Mr. Bernard Amyot: Is that a relevant question? My practice is going very well.

Mr. Michel Guimond: Just answer, please. Stop being insolent and playing Mr. Know-It-All. Just answer the question.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

The Chair: That comment was unnecessary.

Mr. Michel Guimond: Yes, but....

The Chair: Abuse of witnesses is not allowed here.

Mr. Michel Guimond: I'll try to....

The Chair: Please proceed with your questions.

Mr. Michel Guimond: How is your practice going overall? Is it going well? Are most members of the Groupe des Cent professionals? Are they in business?

Mr. Bernard Amyot: Our membership also includes academics.

Mr. Michel Guimond: Do they work mainly in Quebec?

Mr. Bernard Amyot: They work exclusively in Quebec.

Mr. Michel Guimond: Exclusively in Quebec.

Mr. Bernard Amyot: Yes, they work in a number of different regions.

Mr. Michel Guimond: If I were to put the same question to Mr. Mayr, Mr. Gignac or the other members of the Groupe des Cent whose names appear here, would they all say that business is good overall?

Mr. Bernard Amyot: You'd have to ask them.

Mr. Michel Guimond: But to your knowledge, business is good for them as well?

Mr. Sébastien Gignac: It could be better.

Mr. Michel Guimond: It could be better, you say?

Mr. Bernard Amyot: It could be better if our taxes were lower, there were less uncertainty in the province....

Mr. Michel Guimond: I see.

Mr. Bernard Amyot: ...because of a third referendum that has been hanging over our heads for five years now.

Mr. Michel Guimond: So, you are now changing your answer to the first question, because you said a few moments ago that your practice was going well.

Mr. Bernard Amyot: My practice is going well.

Mr. Michel Guimond: I see.

Mr. Bernard Amyot: It's going well despite the efforts of the sovereignist movement to weaken Quebec's position within the federation.

Mr. Michel Guimond: Despite the chaos and apocalyptic events that followed the 1980 referendum and that you were describing earlier, things are going well.

Mr. Bernard Amyot: I never said that.

Mr. Michel Guimond: Could you provide us with specific indicators of areas that suffered a serious decline after the 1980 referendum? Can you provide us with any?

Mr. Bernard Amyot: Quebec....

Mr. Sébastien Gignac: If you don't mind, that is not what my colleague said earlier. We didn't refer to apocalyptic or chaotic events.

Mr. Michel Guimond: Did you not talk about chaos?

Mr. Sébastien Gignac: We did not say that there had been chaos in the past.

Mr. Michel Guimond: You didn't?

Mr. Sébastien Gignac: I said there was a danger of that happening. We said that there was a danger that things might come to that if we didn't proceed in a civilized, transparent and legal fashion.

Mr. Michel Guimond: In other words, I misunderstood. In any case we can always look at the blues. I misunderstood when the Groupe des Cent....

Mr. Sébastien Gignac: Excuse me, Mr. Guimond. I never insinuated that you had misunderstood; I simply said that we didn't say that.

Mr. Michel Guimond: Oh, you didn't say....

Mr. Sébastien Gignac: You can check the Committee proceedings, if you wish.

Mr. Michel Guimond: Mr. Amyot, did you not talk about chaos before, during and after the 1980 referendum campaign....

Mr. Bernard Amyot: No.

Mr. Michel Guimond: ...and before and after the 1995 referendum campaign?

Mr. Bernard Amyot: I said....

Mr. Michel Guimond: Can I finish asking my question?

Mr. Bernard Amyot: Sorry.

Mr. Michel Guimond: Did you not talk about chaos before, during and after the 1980 referendum campaign, and before, during and after the 1995 referendum campaign?

Mr. Bernard Amyot: What I said was that the referendum debate, both in 1980 and 1985, had caused profound uncertainty and weakened Quebec, both politically and economically. That much is quite clear in Montreal. I don't know whether you ever go there, but Montreal is now picking up again, despite your efforts to pull it down. It takes a pretty gutsy city to keep trying to move on amidst a negative and harmful atmosphere. That's all I said. People can sense that, and it's an inescapable reality. You don't have to agree.

Mr. Michel Guimond: You say you can make a direct connection between holding a referendum and the economic situation. Can you give us some examples of economic indicators?

Mr. Bernard Amyot: We have written newspaper articles about that. I could send you copies of the articles we wrote for La Presse during the fall election campaign, which resulted in your sister party being returned to power. That what we said in those articles, and I would be pleased to send them to you.

An hon. member: We have them.

Mr. Michel Guimond: But since 1995....

Mr. Bernard Amyot: You've probably seen them.

An hon. member: We have them.

Mr. Michel Guimond: Yes, we do read the newspapers, even though we're from Quebec, and we even go to Montreal on occasion.

Mr. Bernard Amyot: I often go to Quebec City.

Mr. Michel Guimond: No need to get hung up here. We don't want to be victims of navel-gazing.

Mr. Bernard Amyot: You're telling me!

Mr. Michel Guimond: Do you have any specific indicators showing a decline after the 1995 referendum?

Mr. Clemens Mayr: May I answer that one, Mr. Chairman?

I am also a lawyer and working in the area of securities in a large national firm. I could speak at length about my practice in Montreal and in Quebec in general. I could also tell you about the practices of my associates in Toronto and elsewhere in Canada, about their standard of living, their income level, their taxation level. We could talk about all these things at length, but I don't think that this Committee is the appropriate forum in which to engage in another debate this afternoon about the connection between political uncertainty and the economic impact of a referendum on the province of Quebec.

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Mr. Michel Guimond: You're the one that raised this.

Mr. Clemens Mayr: Then let me finish. There are many studies dealing with this, and we ourselves at the Groupe des Cent have written on the subject. Other studies do make that connection, and I would be very pleased to share them with you. We do not have them with us today because that was not the purpose of the debate, but these studies establish that linkage. There are differences of opinion as to the exact nature of the linkage, but there most definitely is one, and I believe there is a consensus on that point. All self-respecting economists know that. If you like, I can talk about how it affects my specific area, which is securities at the Montreal Stock Exchange.

Mr. Michel Guimond: The unemployment rate....

The Chair: Your time is up, Mr. Guimond. Mr. Dubé, you have the floor.

Mr. Jean Dubé (Madawaska—Restigouche, PC): I'm very pleased to add my voice, as a federalist Francophone from outside Quebec, to this extremely important debate. I, too, am happy that we have this opportunity to talk to young entrepreneurs belonging to a group in Quebec. But I must say, Mr. Chairman, that I'm very, very disappointed with the way this legislation has been presented. This bill is incredibly important to our country, and yet we are being forced to review it much too quickly. We could hear from many more witnesses on the subject, such as the ones here today, but the Liberal government seems to be in a great hurry to push this through even though it is of the utmost importance to Canada.

This legislation deals with clarity. And I'm very concerned because once again, we are the ones who started this debate. Before the bill was tabled, there was no talk of separation. The Bloc Québécois would refer to it now and again in the House of Commons, of course, but otherwise, nobody talked about it. We tended to talked about things that would unite the country. We talked about strengthening our ties.

I understand that the government saw this as a problem. I fully understand that. But as far as I'm concerned, the real problem is that the country is having this debate. People are talking about partition and political players. But who are the political players? I will ask Mr. Amyot to tell us whether he thinks, with respect to an issue as important as this one is, that the provinces should take part in the debate, and whether they should also participate in the decisions made by the Parliament of Canada when those decisions affect Canadian unity and the unity of one province within this great country.

Mr. Bernard Amyot: They probably should do so in their legislature, in accordance with their powers under the Constitution.

Mr. Jean Dubé: You mentioned, sir....

Mr. Bernard Amyot: They are stakeholders in the debate.

Mr. Jean Dubé: Yes, yes, I understand.

According to you, the Supreme Court stated in its ruling that there was no provision for secession. Do you think that there is now provision for it as a result of Bill C-20?

Mr. Bernard Amyot: As I understand the ruling handed down by the Supreme Court, it states that nothing in the current Constitution provides for the secession of a province. I think everyone agrees on that. The question the Supreme Court attempted to answer was how one can achieve secession legally, despite the fact that the Constitution is silent on that specific point.

Mr. Jean Dubé: Mr. Chairman, the Premier of New Brunswick, Bernard Lord, also found it regrettable that the federal government had not consulted the provinces about its legislative intentions with respect to the Quebec referendum issue. It's important to realize that this issue is very important to New Brunswick, and particularly to Francophones living in that province. As entrepreneurs, are you worried? There is definitely uncertainty at this time, which makes things difficult for business people in Quebec—even you're managing, things are difficult, and I certainly understand your point—but do you think that following separation, Quebec business people would have an even tougher time?

Mr. Bernard Amyot: Yes, they would, in every respect.

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I am a child of the Quiet Revolution, and unfortunately, people of my generation all find themselves facing the same old debate and 1960s' ideology that no longer fit the reality of contemporary Quebec. We find this extremely regrettable, because we are forced to continue to debate a subject we consider completely obsolete.

Quebec has asserted itself within the current federal system, is still doing so and, I hope, will continue to do so for a very long time. And no one, since I was very young, has ever been able to convince me that I was any way oppressed within the current legal and constitutional framework. I am confident, my colleagues are confident, and our generation is confident in the future of Quebec, which can continue to grow within the current system. Tearing down the whole structure won't make it easier to resolve a few problems. On the contrary, we will just have to rebuild, after all we've already achieved. We are on solid ground. Let's continue to build on that, please.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Nystrom.

[Translation]

Mr. Lorne Nystrom (Regina—Qu'Appelle, NDP): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I want to welcome you to our Committee this afternoon. I am not the New Democratic Party critic in this area; Bill Blaikie is, but he could not be here today. However, between 1980 and 1990, I was the NDP critic five times: on repatriating the Constitution; Charlottetown; Meech; and so on. This issue has been around for a very long time, from even before I was born, and it's a very complicated issue.

[English]

I also want to say, Mr. Chair, that our caucus decided to support the clarity bill in principle in second reading, which is of course the vote in principle of having a clear question with a clear majority. We come to the committee with a very open mind in terms of trying to resolve some of the questions that are bothering people.

As I read the country, there's not as much debate on the clear question as on what is a clear majority. There is some concern in the country about leaving the definition of “clear majority” to a parliament after the fact. We assume parliaments will act responsibly, but there have been times in the past when a parliament has not been responsible, so we can't assume absolutely everything is going to be responsible.

Have you given some thought to what we should do about tightening up what a clear majority means? Some people say 50% plus one. The problem with that for some folks is that you could have hypothetically a 70% vote and 60% turnout, which means you get 42% of the people pronouncing in favour of independence. Or you could have 50% plus one with a 90% vote, and you get 45% of the people pronouncing in favour of independence. So the 50% vote actually is more people saying yes than a 70% vote, depending on the turnout and so on.

Have you thought about the idea—I'm not recommending it; I'm just asking you a question, because you're the experts—of 50% plus one of eligible voters, perhaps, as a solution? Another idea I've heard bounced off by some folks is maybe it would be declared a clear question if you had a double majority in the Quebec National Assembly, where a majority of the opposition said “Yes, that is a clear majority” and a majority of people in the government said “Yes, that is a clear majority”, and then Parliament takes its cue from the National Assembly.

Or do you have any other ideas? I'd just like you to spend a few minutes trying to.... This is a point of anxiety with a lot of people. It's like the horse leaves the barn and the barn door is closed, and we're putting our faith in a very responsible Parliament. Who knows, 20 years down the road? Even Mr. Mills won't be here at that time, perhaps. So how do we know it's going to be a responsible decision?

I know it's not an easy question.

Mr. Sébastien Gignac: I think it would be a mistake, and I think the Groupe des Cent in general would think it would be a mistake, to set in advance a number or a percentage requirement, partly for the reasons you give. There are many formulas possible, and the federal government or Parliament should not prejudge in advance what the numbers should be.

The intention of the bill is to give effect in a juridical sense to the opinion of the court on the matter, which was wise enough not to predetermine that outcome. That judgment in essence creates an obligation on all parties of good faith to act in good faith; to behave in good faith; and to consider all matters, including the possible dismemberment of Canada, in good faith.

It is quite a huge obligation that the court has placed on all the political actors in Canada. I don't think there is any modern democracy that's envisaged its own dismemberment in such a rational way.

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We should take this for what it means. An obligation of good faith means if there is a clear result, however that result is numbered is something you will always have to assess ex post facto. I mean by that, even if you were to say it takes 55%, for instance, if it's 55% in a context that is confused, ambiguous, and so on, you may actually mislead people, and people may give an answer that in fact does not reflect really their point of view.

So it prejudges the outcome. What is better is to go back to past precedents and look at the situation in other countries that have had a constituent part secede. In those cases, most of the time there was no requirement that it be more than 50%. But the end result, in the case of Norway in 1905, I think was in the order of 99%. Who can contest that there's a clear will when that happens?

I'll leave it at that, if I may.

Mr. Lorne Nystrom: What about the second part of the question? Some people suggested that if you have unanimity in the election assembly of the province that wants to secede, i.e. Quebec or whatever, or perhaps a double majority, where the majority of the opposition and the majority of the government both say “Yes, that is a clear majority'... Is that something to look at? Again, I'm not necessarily advocating this, but people have raised that question with me.

Mr. Sébastien Gignac: It's an interesting idea. The fact is in the past we've never had unanimity in the National Assembly. We did not even have unanimity over the question.

Mr. Lorne Nystrom: The majority of the opposition plus the majority of the government gets you away from unanimity.

Mr. Sébastien Gignac: You mean in the National Assembly?

Mr. Lorne Nystrom: Yes, a majority of members in the opposition party plus a majority of members in the government party. Maybe that would indicate it's a clear majority.

Mr. Sébastien Gignac: I don't think Bill C-20 precludes this. It leaves it open to the political actors, including the House of Commons, when the time comes, to determine that this may be a way to satisfy.

The Chair: Mr. Cotler.

[Translation]

Mr. Irwin Cotler (Mont-Royal, Lib.): I have a question for Mr. Amyot.

Mr. Amyot, sovereignist leaders are referring to the current legislation as a serious attack on democracy and an affront to the people of Quebec.

In that respect, I would like to hear your views on the current advertising campaign being carried out by the Government of Quebec against the Clarity Bill.

Mr. Bernard Amyot: First of all, I do not see the current process as being undemocratic, since it proceeds from a ruling of the Supreme Court of Canada, which is the final arbiter, and democracy is indissociable from the concept of the rule of law. The Court took the trouble of requiring the clear expression of a will to secede, and on such a serious issue—René Lévesque recognized this as you saw in the passage I quoted earlier—a clear majority and transparency are essential. I hardly see how transparency could be undemocratic.

As for the advertising campaign, I find it distressing, for both its lack of discernment and its tendentious and partisan nature. In my view, the stupidity of this process is matched only by the utter contempt it shows for Quebeckers who, it is assumed, can be manipulated in this way.

Mr. Sébastien Gignac: If I could make a comment, Mr. Chairman, the Supreme Court was very eloquent on this particular point, and I think it's worth listening to what the judges had to say. One thing they said was that it would be a grave mistake to equate legitimacy with a will for sovereignty alone or with majority rule alone, to the exclusion of other recognized constitutional values. They also added that Canadians had never accepted the notion that our system was governed entirely on the basis of the simple majority rule.

I think the advertising campaign that the Government of Quebec is currently running completely evades that part of the issue.

The Chair: Mr. Proulx, do you have a question?

Mr. Marcel Proulx (Hull—Aylmer, Lib.): Welcome to the Committee. Mr. Amyot, in your view, what issues would have to be negotiated if Quebeckers clearly opted for secession in response to a clear question?

• 1315

Mr. Sébastien Gignac: Sub-clause 3(2) of Bill C-2 refers to various issues that would have to be negotiated. The legislation is certainly not exhaustive in that respect, but I don't think it needs to be either.

The Supreme Court has recognized—and this bill is intended to give effect to the Court's ruling—that these issues will be extremely complex and numerous. It would be impossible to prepare in advance an exhaustive list of everything that needed to be negotiated. The legislation provides adequate indications of the types of issues and questions that would at the very least be subject to negotiation, without necessarily going beyond. Personally, we feel comfortable with that approach.

The Chair: Mr. Assad.

Mr. Mark Assad (Gatineau, Lib.): Mr. Amyot, welcome.

Mr. Bernard Amyot: Thank you.

Mr. Mark Assad: You represent entrepreneurs and businessmen. Your exchange with Mr. Guimond is a partial response to this question. We are all aware of the comments made by Mr. Lisée, former advisor to Mr. Parizeau and Mr. Bouchard, in his book Sortie de secours regarding the possibility of a YES vote in the referendum and an exodus of both Anglophones and allophones. He said that there was no doubt such an exodus would harm Quebec in all sorts of ways.

I obviously know Mr. Lisée by repute and I know that the comments he made in his book are warranted and that he is convinced they are true.

I've always believed that when there is an exodus, it's generally the people who can afford to who pack their bags and leave. What would happen if that were to occur? What kind of damage would that do to Quebec's economy?

Mr. Bernard Amyot: First of all, we would lose a significant proportion of Quebec's population. I hope it will never come to that.

It's also important to remember that Bill 101 was passed into law in Quebec under the current legal framework. The Quebec Charter of Rights and Freedoms—we often boast about it—is a good example of that. If secession were to occur, what better protection could Quebec Francophones have than Bill 101? What better protection could minorities ask for after secession than that provided by a Charter of Rights that is enshrined in the Constitution? It seems to me we have all the ingredients for a winning solution. Why ruin things? That's what I'm wondering.

Mr. Clemens Mayr: If you don't mind, I'd like to add a few comments of my own.

The Chair: Mr. Mayr.

Mr. Clemens Mayr: We obviously believe that one way of avoiding such an exodus is to develop a plan that is inspiring and the subject of a broad consensus among all Quebeckers. If there is such a plan and if that plan, which involves seceding from the rest of Canada, is the subject of a broad consensus, obtained by means of clear information about the nature and scope of the plan, then secession can occur, as we have seen through recent examples where such a broad consensus did exist, without the disastrous consequences of an exodus and the other negative effects associated with it.

That is why we would reiterate that it is absolutely essential that the plan be the subject of a broad consensus, and that in the absence of such a consensus, it not go forward.

[English]

The Chair: Val Meredith.

Ms. Val Meredith: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'm still curious to know how you can go into a referendum, how you can go into any election, which is what a referendum is, asking a question of the people, without a clear understanding—and this is what this bill is supposed to do—of how far you can push the issue before you're kicked out the door.

• 1320

What I hear you saying is that you feel that has to remain unclear until after the referendum is held to determine what kind of support determines when they're kicked out the door. I just don't know how you can play a game as important as this without setting the guidelines so that the people who have to make a decision, whether it's in Quebec or in British Columbia, understand that at this point the ramifications of their decision will take effect.

I think you're misleading Canadians, misleading the people who have to make that determination, if you're saying we'll determine after the fact how many of you are going to determine whether or not you're allowed to enter negotiations. I just think it's very misleading.

I can't understand why people who feel 50% plus one, which is used universally, even internationally.... If that's not good enough, then why can't we put another measure on the table so that the people who have to respond understand at what point their response is going to be taken seriously?

[Translation]

Mr. Bernard Amyot: First of all, during the last referendum, the result was not 50,000 votes and 50 per cent plus one, but 50 per cent with 50,000 votes. And we also saw the result: the next day they were out rallying the troops to pick up the crusade once again.

The quality of consent can be analysed in many different ways, including by taking into account the clarity of the question and of the majority obtained. The Supreme Court was wise to take the trouble not to determine that in advance. It believed that would be more harmful than assessing it after the fact, giving due consideration to all the appropriate factors, including people's support for and understanding of the issue. It could even happen that even with a clear question, politicians could generate confusion around the different themes in a campaign. It doesn't necessarily follow that a clear question yields a clear result.

[English]

Mr. Sébastien Gignac: Mr. Chairman, I would like to add one little thing.

You mentioned in your question being “kicked out the door”. I don't think the issue is really much about being kicked out. I think it's about a rational process that is as much as possible orderly and stable. Therefore, measuring whether there is a consensus or not can take many forms, but it's certainly not the result of a mathematical equation of 50% plus 0.00001, and therefore we're just kicking you out the door. I think there's much more at stake than that.

So the measure of the level of support for an outcome as drastic as that has to be very carefully gauged.

Ms. Val Meredith: On what grounds?

Mr. Sébastien Gignac: On the parameters that have been set out in the bill, very clearly.

The Chair: Mr. Turp.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: Mr. Chairman, first of all, for the benefit of those who've been talking about the disastrous consequences of pre-referendum uncertainty, chaos, exodus and heaven knows what else, there are economic indicators suggesting that Quebec's economy has been doing very well since the Parti Québécois was elected in 1994: a drop in the unemployment rate from 12.4 to 9.3 per cent, a more significant increase in private investment in Quebec than in the rest of Canada, and so on.

When you hear things like that and comments to the effect that sovereignists want to tear down the whole structure—that's exactly what you've said—it's hard not to think that there is some contempt for people like Réal and me and others in Quebec who are promoting a plan that should be respected, even if one does not agree with it. That's what democracy is all about. We can talk about democracy. You talk about consensus. I have heard that word “consensus” many times. You're saying a plan must be the subject of a broad consensus among Quebeckers.

But it seems to me that Bill C-20 which you have come here to talk about benefits from no such broad consensus. In Quebec, the three political parties, including a federalist political party and even l'Action démocratique do not agree with this legislation. Many people will be coming before this Committee saying they do not agree with the legislation: we will be hearing from unions, women's groups and others expressing their disagreement.

There is dissent, and you're part of it, of course. In the House of Commons, federal M.P.s from Quebec representing the Conservative Party and the Bloc Québécois are against this bill. So, tell me if there is consensus on Bill C-20 and whether the consensus rule should also apply to this bill.

• 1325

Mr. Sébastien Gignac: You talk about consensus. One of the clearest cases of consensus in Quebec's recent history found expression in the Report of the Commission on the Political and Constitutional Future of Quebec, otherwise known as the Bélanger- Campeau Report.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Yes.

Mr. Sébastien Gignac: I would also point out that there were quite a few signatories to that report, including Mr. Lucien Bouchard, who signed it without reservation. Unlike Mr. Parizeau, he did not place a small asterisk next to his name. It says on page 60 of the report:

In the absence of such an agreement, the move towards sovereignty in Quebec would occur through a process of unilateral secession based on the unquestionable and clearly expressed will of the people.

The terms used are “unquestionable and clearly expressed”, meaning that it can't be challenged. Obviously in a case such as Norway, a 99 per cent vote in favour is difficult to challenge. We're not saying it needs to be 99 per cent, but it's clear that even the Bélanger-Campeau Commission, with the full support of Mr. Bouchard, declared that the will of the people had to be unquestionable and clearly expressed. We believe that Bill C-20 gives effect to that.

Mr. Daniel Turp: But you're not answering my question.

Is there or is there not a consensus in Quebec on Bill C-20? If consensus is that important and you can see that there is no consensus in Quebec either among elected representatives, within the civil society or in the polls, how can you claim that this bill has legitimacy? How can you come before this Committee to defend it? If it passes in the House of Commons, 60 per cent of Quebec Members of Parliament will have voted against it.

Is consensus important or not as regards Bill C-20?

Mr. Sébastien Gignac: There is consensus in the Bélanger-Campeau Commission Report, which clearly states....

Mr. Daniel Turp: I'm talking about Bill C-20. Stop talking about Bélanger-Campeau. Let's talk about Bill C-20. Is there a consensus on Bill C-20?

The Chair: Order, Mr. Turp. Give the witness a chance to answer. You asked him a question.

Mr. Daniel Turp: There are witnesses passing answers over there; that's quite something. There are M.P.s passing answers to the witnesses.

The Chair: Mr. Turp, really....

Mr. Daniel Turp: What did our colleague just do here?

Mr. Sébastien Gignac: I don't know what you're talking about. We may have been given a note by mistake, but it's obviously been taken back.

So, I was saying that as regards consensus in Quebec, Quebec society, at least at the level of its elites, clearly recognizes, as evidenced by the Bélanger-Campeau Commission Report, that the will of the people must be unquestionable and clearly expressed. It states that a number of times, including on page 59 or a little bit before that, where it talks about the democratic expression of the clear will of the people of Quebec.

Mr. Daniel Turp: He is not answering my question.

The Chair: Question period with our witnesses is now ended. I want to thank the three witnesses that appeared this afternoon. It was a pleasure meeting with you. Thank you very much.

• 1330

• 1332

The Chair: Order, please. We will resume our hearings.

Mr. Ménard, you raised a point of order.

Mr. Réal Ménard (Hochelaga—Maisonneuve, BQ): Mr. Chairman, I know that everyone can count on the assistance of research staff and so on, but do you think you could ensure that there be a little more subtlety and discretion? If the Privy Council which, as you know, is the largest political science department in Canada, wants to influence the questions and answers here by passing papers, do you think it could be asked to do so with more discretion and delicacy, and less ostentation?

[English]

The Chair: I am not—

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Mr. Chairman, you know that the Privy Council should be more discreet.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Particularly with respect to questions on television ad campaigns.

The Chair: Order, please. There are a lot of people in this room helping Members of Parliament and their colleagues. It is not up to the Committee to make any such decision.

Mr. Réal Ménard: We're talking about the Privy Council, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Daniel Turp: This is a little like what happens in the House when a Liberal Member puts a question to a Liberal Minister.

The Chair: Order. Another Member has asked for the floor.

[English]

Mr. Alcock.

Mr. Reg Alcock (Winnipeg South, Lib.): This is on the same point of order.

I think the treatment of witnesses, as evidenced by your party, needs to be considered a little bit. People who come here to give testimony don't come to be insulted by anybody.

The Chair: Order, please.

Mr. Daniel Turp: You'll note I'm not handing papers to witnesses, as Mr. Assad did—

The Chair: Order, please. Order!

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: At least don't start handing papers to witnesses.

The Chair: Order! Order! Order!

[English]

There is nothing wrong with members passing papers back and forth. It happens all the time. The chair is not getting into it, and neither will the chair entertain arguments on the subject. I think it ill befits the committee.

We have before us this afternoon

[Translation]

Mr. Jean-Pierre Derriennic, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Laval University.

We are very pleased to welcome you to the Committee today, Professor Derriennic. You will have ten minutes to make your opening comments, after which Members of Parliament representing different parties will have 35 minutes to ask you questions.

Mr. Jean-Pierre Derriennic (Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Laval University; as individual): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.

As I only have a few minutes for my opening remarks, I will have to present my arguments very briefly without having the time to develop them to the extent that would be appropriate.

The bill which you are considering states things that should be self-evident, and thus it might seem unnecessary. But it also raises strong objections that would be very serious if they had some basis. The most important of these, to my mind, are the following: Parliament is attacking democracy in two ways, by intervening in an area that is not its concern, and by challenging the so-called “50 per cent plus one” rule. I will briefly address these two arguments.

The first can be summarized as follows: the Government of Canada does not have the right to intervene in the process by which the decision on Quebec's independence would be made; it is up to the Government of Quebec and the National Assembly to choose that process, because the decision is ultimately a decision for Quebeckers alone—and I emphasize the word “alone”to make, pursuant to their right to self-determination.

• 1335

The bill runs counter to the notion of self-determination. The practice in civilized states in the second half of the 20th century was that the principle of self-determination established the right to declare a new state in cases where people lived under a political authority that denied them true citizenship; such was the situation experienced by people living in colonies and Palestinians living in Israeli-occupied territories.

For all those who have full and effective citizenship, which includes Quebeckers in Canada, the creation of a new state is not a right; it is an option, an option that is normally exercised through mutual consent of the parties concerned. Recent examples of independence, such as Czechoslovakia and the USSR, followed this pattern in every respect. In Yugoslavia, things were not quite as straightforward. I develop these arguments further in my brief.

Decisions on self-determination made by fully independent countries are more relevant in determining what is and what is not acceptable in Canada. In France, a decision on the independence of Algeria was made in 1962 by two referendums, one in France and one in Algeria. In 1975, the Comoros gained independence following a referendum on the islands and a vote in the French legislature. In 1979, the Jura separated from the canton of Berne following a series of referendums, one of which included all Swiss voters. In 1997, the referendum on the status of Scotland was conducted according to rules set by the British Parliament.

None of these examples is identical to ours. In each case, there are some differences; no situation is identical to our own. However, these examples do permit the following general observation: the self-determination of a territory is not a decision to be made by the inhabitants of that territory alone; it also involves the central government of the state the territory is part of and all the other inhabitants of that state.

As I see it, this is essentially a moral point, rather than a legal one. In a democracy, everyone has rights and duties in relation to his or her fellow citizens. Quebec independence would have consequences for all Canadians, not just those living in Quebec. A fair decision-making process should therefore take into account the opinions, interests and rights of all.

Contrary to the charge made against it, Parliament is not violating any democratic principle by intervening in the decision of Quebec's independence. It is the assertion that the decision is for Quebeckers alone to make that is unacceptable in a democracy. Parliament is therefore perfectly entitled to intervene in the decision on any future independence and to set conditions for that process.

That does not mean that every condition would be fair—which brings me to my second point: is it true that 50 per cent plus one is a mandatory rule?

In a democracy, majority rule, which is correctly defined as more than half the votes, and not 50 per cent plus one, does not apply in the same way to all decisions. As far as I know, neither Canada nor any other country has a clear, written constitutional rule stating that the independence of a territory is determined by a vote of the majority of the inhabitants of that territory. Those who argue that this is a fundamental rule therefore assume that it is a general principle of law—a principle so obvious that it applies automatically without having to be spelled out in a statute.

But it cannot be a general principle of law, because it would have absurd consequences for purely statistical reasons. If nine people are asked to vote on an issue, as happens in the Supreme Court of Canada, and the result is five to four, that is a very clear decision. When a parliamentary assembly with 300 members is asked to vote, more precautions have to be taken. That is one of the reasons why in a Parliament, a bill is voted on several times, rather than just once, to ensure that the decision is not accidental or inadvertent, simply because some members happen to be absent that day.

This problem obviously increases with the number of voters. In a referendum, where millions of people are voting, there are many uncertainties as a result of possible errors with respect to voter registration, identifying spoiled ballots or having thousands of people counting millions of little pieces of paper.

• 1340

A majority vote means nothing in that instance. Several hundred or several thousand majority votes still make for considerable uncertainty. In a referendum, there has to be a majority at least equal to that margin of error, a fairly strong result so as not to give the impression that it would have turned out differently if the vote had been held a week earlier or a week later.

In an election as well, some candidates may be elected with very small majorities, but there are two key differences between an election and a reference on independence. The first is that in an election, something has to be decided. A constituency cannot be left without a representative. The candidate with the most votes, even if that number is very small, is the least poorly elected candidate in that constituency. In contrast, many referendums deal with decisions that are by no means essential. If the majority is very small, it is reasonable to think that it would be better to decide nothing at all, to abandon the idea or to wait for the population to reach a stronger opinion.

There are exceptions to that observation. Some referendums on self-determination are held in situations where something must be decided and where the least bad decision is better than no decision at all. That was the case in Newfoundland, whose dependence on Great Britain was about to end and had to be replaced with some other status. It was also recently the case in Timor, whose occupation by Indonesia had not been accepted by the people of Timor or the international community.

Quebec, on the other hand, has normal political status; changing that status is neither necessary nor urgent. It is therefore far better to decide nothing than to make a decision that is open to challenge or impossible to implement because there is not enough popular support. I suspect that it is precisely because they know that so many people in Quebec today do not want anymore referendums. It is far better to avoid trying to win independence by the skin of their teeth, as the expression goes.

The second reason why small majorities are more acceptable in an election than in a referendum is that an election establishes a Parliament or government for a limited time. People who are unhappy with the outcome know that they will soon have a chance to vote again. There are two types of exceptions to this observation. Some referendums deal with decisions that are easy to overturn or rectify at a later date. An example would be when people in Switzerland vote the amount of parliamentary allowances or fuel prices. The 1997 referendum in Scotland also falls into this category, because the British Parliament can cancel Scotland's autonomous status at any time.

On the other hand, some governments have very ambitious policies that can create irreversible situations. Their ability to act then depends on the strength of their popular support, and not just the legality of their election. In some cases, governments that have won elections with small majorities have nonetheless undertaken ambitious reforms, as was the case in France in 1936 or in Chile in 1970. In both case, the reforms contributed to the government's downfall. This is not a legal problem, but a political problem which no magic number can resolve. The same is almost certainly true of a referendum the aim of which is to set in motion a plan as ambitious as the independence of a state.

So, in our current circumstances, the best solution would be for nationalist leaders to understand that they should refrain from organizing referendums on independence until they are sure that this option has the support of the vast majority of the population. That was the dominant attitude in many of the countries that have achieved independence over the past ten years, following referendums that produced majorities greater than 70 per cent in all cases, and greater than 90 per cent, in many cases. Please, if you would just allow me....

The Chair: Yes, you have one minute left.

Mr. Jean-Pierre Derriennic: The other solution is of course to fairly apply the concept of an advisory referendum, which is part of our law, and which is the definition given in the 1977 Quebec Referendum Act. An advisory referendum forces no one to make a decision and its results have to be assessed by the appropriate authorities. In our case, the appropriate authorities are obviously the Quebec National Assembly and the House of Commons here in Ottawa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Professor.

Ms. Meredith has some questions.

• 1345

[English]

Ms. Val Meredith: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I listened to what you provided the committee with, and I appreciate the references you shared with the committee of places around the world where they have had referendums on secession. If I understood you correctly, the majority of them, although they had much higher representation, were using a simple majority as the decision-making factor.

In Canada we have had two referendums in the province of Quebec on secession, both of them with the understanding that a simple majority was all that was required. As a matter of fact, in the last referendum it was a simple majority from the “no” side that determined that Quebec would not be allowed to negotiate separation. So a simple majority was accepted.

If you feel that a simple majority is not the way to go, what level of acceptance of the people of Quebec or any other province is sufficient?

[Translation]

Mr. Jean-Pierre Derriennic: l would really need to give an extensive answer to that question. When you organize a referendum and you know that the YES vote will be greater than 70 per cent, as in Latvia, or more than 90 per cent, as in Slovenia and other places, why fight about the level of qualified majority? There is obviously no point in doing that, just as there is no point in enforcing a speed limit on bicycle paths, because you know that no one will be able to exceed the speed limit. The fact that in referendums held elsewhere, governments didn't bother setting qualified majorities does not prove that there is no need to do so in a situation such as the one here in Canada, where a small majority is likely. That is my answer to your first point.

On your second point, I would say that the referendums we have had here in Canada were not referendums decided by means of a simple majority. In 1980, we had a purely advisory referendum, that would only have resulted in an actual decision following negotiations, an agreement and a new referendum. It's possible the issue of what majority was needed in the second referendum would have arisen, because that referendum would have been decisive. In the first referendum, that was not an issue. The Charlottetown referendum in 1990 was not one decided by simple majority. It's clear that had there been a majority across Canada, but not in all the provinces, we would have had a major problem. It was a multiple majority referendum at the very least, and certainly not a decisive one. The provincial legislatures were required to vote on it subsequently. If support for constitutional reform had been very weak in one province or another, it is unlikely that the constitutional reforms reflected in the Charlottetown Accord would have been adopted. It was not a referendum where things could be decided through a majority voice. In 1995, for the first time, despite a Quebec statute providing for advisory referendums only, the Government of Quebec said that the referendum would be a decisive one. The term "decision" was consistently used, which would effectively have amounted to Quebeckers giving the government a blank cheque, given that there were to be subsequent negotiations, although there might not have been any. This gave the Quebec government, based on its own vision, the right to proclaim independence one day, without having consulted the people of Quebec a second time. That is the difference between 1995 and 1980.

In the 1995 referendum, the idea that the issue could be decided by a simple majority was challenged in many different circles. At the time, I myself challenged the idea in papers that were made public, the Prime Minister of Canada challenged it in the House of Commons and the question was put to a court in Quebec. So, it is not accurate to say that in 1995, there was a consensus on the notion that this referendum could be decided by a simple majority.

• 1350

[English]

The Chair: Do you have any questions, Madam Meredith?

Ms. Val Meredith: If the government agrees that the question is clear, if it's accepted by the people of Quebec, the Government of Canada, and the people of Canada that the question is clear, and if a majority of the people of the province of Quebec choose to negotiate to leave Canada—if the question is clear and has been determined to be such—how can the Government of Canada and the people of Canada ignore the wishes of the majority of the people in a province?

[Translation]

Mr. Jean-Pierre Derriennic: I don't think they will ignore them, Ms. Meredith. What has seemed very clear to me in Canada for some time now is that if there is a clear will on the part of Quebec to become independent, although that will result in a great many practical problems, there will certainly be a determination on both sides to resolve those practical problems.

It would be terrible if that will in Quebec were so weakly expressed as to be unconvincing to other Canadians and even Quebeckers. It would be terrible if a majority of them were to vote in favour of independence, but with such a small margin that once negotiations were actually underway, support for independence eroded during the negotiation period. Three or six months later, people would know that a majority of Quebeckers were no longer in favour of independence. If that occurred, the many practical problems—administrative, financial and otherwise—associated with independence would be insurmountable.

The logic behind an advisory referendum is that such an exercise gives a government the political strength to bring about reform. That was the purpose of the Charlottetown referendum; it was supposed to provide sufficient political strength to the reform initiative to make it extremely difficult for various legislatures to block it subsequently, something that was not achieved in the case of the 1992 reform, but which would certainly have to be the goal in any referendum on Quebec independence.

The Chair: Mr. Turp, please.

Mr. Daniel Turp: First of all, I would like to thank Mr. Derriennic for his presentation and for his interesting theories, which we have had an opportunity in recent years and months to become familiar with. I believe you are making a very useful contribution to this debate. My colleague, the Member for Verchères—Les Patriotes, who is a former student of yours and whose Master's thesis you directed, as I recall, certainly learned a great deal from you. I'm sure that contributions such as yours will prove extremely useful to the Committee as it carries out its work.

I have a question for you. Knowing the rigour you bring to everything you do, you have most certainly read Bill C-20. Do you feel that it is perfect as it is?

Mr. Jean-Pierre Derriennic: No.

Mr. Daniel Turp: In your view, how could it be improved or amended? Where is it lacking and how could it be improved?

Mr. Jean-Pierre Derriennic: I can't really say. I believe it is a useful piece of legislation, for the reasons I cited earlier. Do you have any suggestions to make by way of improvement? If you do, I would certainly give you my views on those suggestions. Although I know it isn't perfect, for the simple reason that nothing is ever perfect, I do not have any improvements to suggest at this time.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Witnesses can help the Committee by suggesting improvements to a bill, particularly if you yourself admit that it isn't perfect and could be improved. Is there no improvement you could suggest?

Mr. Jean-Pierre Derriennic: I haven't given that matter any thought.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Then perhaps I could talk about something that greatly concerns us in the Bloc Québécois, as well as many Quebeckers, whatever their political leanings.

• 1355

In the case of a potential conflict between the National Assembly and the House of Commons, if the National Assembly were to decide that both the question and the majority were clear, and the House of Commons determined subsequently, pursuant to this bill, based on the opinion of the legislatures and the Senate, and any relevant views—perhaps the words “any relevant views” are not very clear—that there was not a clear majority, who would prevail? Where does the sovereignty of a people reside in the final analysis? Can the House of Commons act as the final arbiter become a court of cassation for the National Assembly and the people of Quebec?

Mr. Jean-Pierre Derriennic: You raised a classic question with respect to constitutional law as a whole, and not just the issue we are discussing. You know as well as I do that in a federation, no government is sovereign: that according to the logic of a federation, sovereignty is shared, meaning that people have to learn to work together without ever asking themselves who has the last word. Logically, no one ever has the last word in a federal system.

What would happen if the kind of deadlock you described were to occur? Well, it would depend on the substance of each assembly's position.

In our parliamentary system, if an election resulted in a House of Commons where three different political parties had an almost equal number of seats, how would you form a government? Well, we'd say that a coalition had to be formed between at least two parties. If they refused to talk and reach an agreement, who would have the last word? There is no answer to that question. The people would tell them that they were irresponsible and that they had to form a government.

Perhaps the Governor General would find a legal way of dissolving the House of Commons and triggering a new election; perhaps voters would elect a Parliament with a different composition. If they reelected a Parliament with the same composition and the parties were still unable to agree, who would have the last word? In our political system, no one has the last word. The rule is that at some point, there must be agreement.

I believe that in a country such as ours, in order to determine who is right and who is wrong, the people, in their wisdom, should judge for themselves the value or justification of the arguments made by the National Assembly—which would claim that the resolve is clear—and by the House of Commons, which would say that the result is not clear in its view. What is the value of those arguments, as far as their substance is concerned? That is what would make it possible to break the deadlock in the final analysis. Just as in my parliamentary example earlier, it would probably be broken by the people: another referendum would be called or an election would be triggered—either provincial or federal—confirming the assembly's position with the electorate, and either it would carry far greater weight in the debate or would show that the assembly was wrong since its interpretation did not jibe with that of the voters. We would be facing a crisis that could only be resolved through the same type of negotiation needed for crises within our parliamentary systems, as we know them.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Nystrom.

[Translation]

Mr. Lorne Nystrom: Mr. Derriennic, I'd like to welcome you to the Committee this afternoon. I am from Saskatchewan.

[English]

I have a question for you. You were talking a lot about the balancing of rights in terms of this constitutional issue and the clarity bill. One question I get in Saskatchewan sometimes, because we have a lot of aboriginal people, is, in your vision, are the aboriginal people receiving a prominent enough role in terms of being consulted if we get into the question of determining the clarity of the question and the clarity of the majority?

Some aboriginal people have argued that they should have a higher degree of consultation on the bill. After all, the Parliament has to consult the Senate, and the Senate is not even elected; they don't represent anyone except the person who appoints them to the Senate, so here's a non-elected body that has a lot of input.

Aboriginal leadership today is elected in a fairly sophisticated way in most of the provinces. Do you think they're receiving a high enough profile and recognition in terms of how the bill is drafted?

[Translation]

There are a lot of Aboriginal people in Saskatchewan, as you know; there are also some in Quebec. So this is a very important issue for me and, I hope, for you as well.

• 1400

Mr. Jean-Pierre Derriennic: I'm going to give you two somewhat contradictory answers.

First of all, for both historical and legal reasons, the Aboriginal people of Canada have somewhat special status in Canada. That cannot be ignored in any discussions on Quebec independence. We have to pay very close attention to the views of their representatives.

I remember reading an excellent document in 1995 prepared by the Quebec Grand Council of the Crees, under the direction of Matthew Coon Come, called Sovereign... Anyway, it was a collection of analytical and legal papers on....

Mr. Lorne Nystrom: Sovereign Injustice.

Mr. Jean-Pierre Derriennic: Yes, Sovereign Injustice. It was a remarkable piece of work. So, when Aboriginal leaders get involved in the debate, we certainly have a duty to hear them out. That's the first part of my answer.

Secondly, the main players in this peaceful conflict pitting those who want Quebec to remain in Canada against those who want it to get out should be very careful not to make the Aboriginal people a sort of spearhead in this conflict, for many different reasons: first of all, because there are fewer of them, and also because they are poor. Aboriginal people are a more vulnerable group within our society, and I think it would be very wrong both morally and politically to use them as a pawn or push them to the front lines of this conflict.

In my view, our attitude towards the Aboriginal people must reflect those two concerns.

The Chair: Mr. Dubé.

[English]

Mr. Jean Dubé: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for appearing today.

Now, just briefly, in regard to a question from one of our colleagues, you mentioned that this bill was not perfect, and I would certainly like it to be when we're talking about these types of questions. Do you not think that in part of this bill, where it says that other views will be considered....? Do you believe that the views of the provinces are important, the views of the provinces that are part of this country?

[Translation]

Mr. Jean-Pierre Derriennic: Yes, of course.

[English]

Mr. Jean Dubé: So it would be a way to improve this bill...?

[Translation]

Mr. Jean-Pierre Derriennic: What would?

Mr. Jean Dubé: Providing for greater consultation with the provinces. I'm referring here to the other views to be considered.

Mr. Jean-Pierre Derriennic: Yes.

Mr. Jean Dubé: Don't you think the provinces of Canada should be consulted to a far greater extent when we're talking about Canada's Constitution?

Mr. Jean-Pierre Derriennic: Yes. Perhaps they will be.

Mr. Jean Dubé: Thank you.

As regards the issue of a clear majority, I am still having a lot of problems with this. We have our experience of the last referendum. Mr. Parizeau already had his letter ready, because he thought he would win the referendum. As I see it, he probably wasn't completely certain, but the majority needed was supposed to be 50 per cent plus one. So, we all know that as far as the sovereignists are concerned, 50 per cent is enough. Do you think we should be setting out clearly in a bill such as this what constitutes a clear majority? Is it 50 per cent plus one, 60 per cent, 65 per cent? The bill is not clear on that. People will still be wondering about this after it has been passed. Do you think we should spell out a percentage that would constitute a clear majority?

Mr. Jean-Pierre Derriennic: I believe specifying a percentage in the legislation would have more drawbacks than it would advantages, first of all because the problem of statistical errors associated with large numbers that I referred to earlier is not solved by a qualified majority. If you set it at 60 per cent, you still have the same problem: do we make it 59.99 per cent or 60.01 per cent if there are spoiled or challenged ballots? So, a qualified majority does not solve all the problems. That's the first part of my answer.

• 1405

The second part of my answer is that for a qualified majority to be effective, it would have to be accepted by the two main partners, our two governments. If they did that, I would be delighted, because it would mean that they have an ability to cooperate—something that is absolutely vital for Quebeckers. There is nothing more worrisome for us than to see two governments expressing opposite views in that respect. One of the two governments—the Quebec government—claims it has the right to decide this on its own and doesn't need to agree with the other government. But it would be far better if they were able to agree. So, if they could agree on a figure for a qualified majority, I would be very pleased initially.

However, I would also be extremely worried because I think they would set it too low. Without being able to demonstrate this, I see no reason why independence for Quebec should be feasible with far smaller majorities than we've seen elsewhere. In other countries, in more than half of all cases, the majority exceeded 90 per cent. But if I say I want to set it at that level, no one will ever go along with it. It's always more than 70 per cent. No one can really know at what level popular support is strong enough to surmount the difficulties associated with independence. I believe everyone, including the federal government, is underestimating the problems associated with independence.

Drawing a comparison with other countries, it seems to me secession problems are linked to three factors.

First of all, there is the fact that the populations are mixed in the territory that wishes to separate. It's far more complicated in Bosnia-Herzegovina than in Slovenia for that very reason. We may not be Bosnia-Herzegovina, but our population is far more mixed than is the case in Slovenia. That's the first fact.

The second factor is the complexity of the administrative machinery that has to be separated and dismembered. We live in a welfare state. We have an extremely pervasive administration which is more complex than those in any other countries where this was attempted. There are practical problems with respect to the status of public servants, who will be responsible for air navigation, and who will do this or that. These extremely complex problems will be difficult to resolve, more difficult that we think. That is the one abiding feature of government programs: we always discover along the way that things are a lot more complicated than we thought. Whether we're regulating firearms all across Canada or reorganizing workforce training in Quebec, we always discover additional problems along the way.

The third issue—and here I may surprise a lot of people—is that I believe the reasoning of a great many people, including the federal government, is that democracy should make things easier. Yet I believe it's exactly the opposite. It was easier to separate states when governments were absolute monarchies or authoritarian regimes. The Czechoslovakian example is a clear demonstration of that. To separate the Czechoslovak Republic from Slovakia, the two governments orchestrated the whole operation behind people's backs, without consulting the population. That's why they were able to carry it off so quickly and with such a simple process. In my view, however, no one in Canada would accept a process such as the one used in Czechoslovakia. Democracy is not intended to simplify the lives of politicians. On the contrary, it complicates things for them. This decision will of course be more difficult to make because Canada and Quebec are democracies, and more difficult to implement than it was in the other cases we are aware of, which never had well established democracies.

[English]

The Chair: We're way over time, I'm afraid, Monsieur Dubé.

Mr. Jean Dubé: Thirty seconds?

The Chair: No. You were to have five minutes, and you've had over seven.

There are no questions on the Liberal side?

Monsieur Ménard.

• 1410

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: I have two short questions. There are two aspects of your argument—I use that term because it gives me a chance to flatter you a little—that I really liked, especially just how contemporary a phenomenon is sovereignty. You cited a number of examples following the fall of the Berlin wall. It's complicated, but it is possible. If the USSR and its republics managed, other multinational states can do the same. But there were other things that you said I didn't like quite as much. Of course, that's what democracy is all about.

What I'm having trouble understanding with respect to the substance of your argument is that you seem to describe a Canadian federation where domination does not exist. So I started thinking. Supposing this was 1982 and you and I were in a similar situation as now. You are sitting at the witness table, I am a Member of Parliament, and I put the following question to you: if it is the people who decide within the federal federation, and domination and hegemony don't exist, how is it that I, as a Francophone living in North America, find myself in a situation where my National Assembly, which did not sign the 1982 Constitution, is forced to abide by it? That's my first question. How do you explain the fact that despite a lack of domination in your view, the 1982 situation, which you are certainly familiar with, remains unresolved?

That's my second question. I wanted to ask both questions one after the other so that I wouldn't have to come back.

The Chair: In the interests of time, perhaps we could begin by hearing the first answer. If it is fairly long, you won't have time for a second question.

Mr. Réal Ménard: As you can see, the interests of time are not the interests of the people.

Mr. Jean-Pierre Derriennic: Since this is rather a broad question, I'm afraid to give you the lengthy answer I would normally give as an academic. In 1982, I was not a Canadian citizen and was not required to give my opinion with respect to the 1982 patriation of the Constitution. If my opinion had been sought, I would have suggested it not be carried out in that fashion, neither with respect to the content of the reform or the procedure used to undertake that reform. But I have observed one thing: that Constitution is now applied throughout Canada, including in Quebec, including by the Government of Quebec, which has regularly, in its own legislation, invoked the notwithstanding clause, which is a 1982 invention, and invokes article 43 of the Constitution with respect to the requirement to obtain the consent of the legislature before changing the borders of a province which, if I'm not mistaken, is also a 1982 gain. The constitutional reform process used for the Meech Lake Accord was the one put in place in 1982 for changes to school boards.

The fact that a rule happens to be a rule we don't really like, the fact that a rule was adopted using what we see as a questionable process, and the fact that a rule is recognized within society and must therefore be followed are three separate issues. I note that the Constitution of Canada is being applied today, including in Quebec. The primary authorities in Quebec are behaving like people...

Mr. Réal Ménard: But by force.

Mr. Jean-Pierre Derriennic: No, not by force.

Mr. Réal Ménard: Could I ask a second question, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: No, I'm afraid not. Our 45 minutes are already up.

Mr. Daniel Turp: The Conservatives got seven minutes.

The Chair: Yes, but you yourself had six and a half minutes, Mr. Turp. It's perfectly fair.

An hon. member: Thirty seconds.

The Chair: It's a lot more than that. We have to move on to the next witness.

Professor, thank you very much for appearing before the Committee this afternoon. We very much appreciated your input. You and Mr. Ménard can continue your discussion....

We will suspend proceedings for a few moments, until the next witnesses arrive.

• 1415

• 1418

[English]

The Chair: Order, please. Perhaps we could get going in order to complete our afternoon.

[Translation]

We will now hear from the group Pro-Démocratie, represented by Mr. André Tremblay, a law professor at the University of Montreal, and Mr. Gérald Larose, visiting professor with the School of Social Work at UQAM.

Welcome, gentlemen. We are very pleased to have you with us this afternoon. You will have 10 minutes to make your presentation, after which we will have a total of 35 minutes for questions or comments from Committee members. Please proceed, Mr. Larose.

Mr. Gérald Larose (Pro-Démocratie): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My name is Gérald Larose and I am a visiting professor at the University of Quebec in Montreal, the former President of the Confederation of National Trade Unions and, today, a spokesperson for the group “Pro-Démocratie”, which is asking that Bill C-20 be withdrawn. I am accompanied by Mr. André Tremblay, a constitutional lawyer, who was a senior advisor to Robert Bourassa and currently teaches at the University of Montreal.

First of all, allow me to admonish the Committee for the conditions it set for our appearance here today. We were asked to appear as witnesses at the last moment, and under conditions such that the subject before us, one of the utmost importance for a people, is treated as though it were a simple matter of plumbing which can tolerate no delay. We don't want to spend the whole night talking about it, we were told. What is worse, the government preferred not to organize a real debate, come and meet with the people who are directly affected and ensure that there could be a clear debate on these issues.

• 1420

It's true of course that Ottawa has gotten used to acting unilaterally, denying justice, negating people's rights and repeatedly flouting standards of ethics. We will never get used to that. On the contrary, we will continue to denounce it. Even if we have to travel on a Friday afternoon, and submit to these kinds of conditions, we will do so. That is our first message.

Our second message is that after 1982, after tens of millions of dollars were spent on referendum debates in 1980, 1982 and 1985, after the unilateralism of the social union, after all of these breaches of fair play and ethics, we are here to denounce this latest example of strong-arm tactics and request that this Bill be withdrawn. Through Bill C-20, the federal government is attempting to take charge and subordinate the people of Quebec, who constitute a perfectly independent authority on the matters.

I will turn it over now to the co-chair of our group “Pro-Démocratie”, André Tremblay, to present our main comments regarding our rejection of Bill C-20.

Mr. André Tremblay (Pro-Démocratie): Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen members of the Committee, this bill represents an apparent exercise in democracy. But in Quebec, we don't need any advice from federal authorities about democracy, particularly when they totally disregard democratic rules, and go so far as to buy elections in the manner of Duplessis, with transitional job programs that are currently the subject of debate in the House of Commons.

As Quebeckers, we reject this so-called lesson in democracy from a government whose dubious electoral behaviour smacks of things it's best not to revisit.

You are proposing this legislation. Well, we say nyet. We say no to the bill. We say no to something we see as totally undemocratic, that resembles a kind of War Measures Act, the purpose of which is to trample under foot our collective right to decide our future for ourselves.

If that is the government's way of offering national reconciliation or showing openness to our demands, if that is plan A or plan B, then we have no choice but to say no.

• 1425

This bill is completely out of place. It is directed against the Quebec state, against its democratic institutions, and it is designed to destroy our ability to exercise our right to decide for ourselves our collective future.

Unfortunately, this legislation bears a close resemblance to previous laws or exercises that we would have liked to forget. It takes us back to the period before 1943, that we thought was long gone, and to the period of federal colonialism, during which the federal authorities disallowed provincial statutes because, it would seem, they violated principles of fair legislation. , Well, we say no and nyet to this kind of exercise.

It is also totally unacceptable for the rest of Canada to be arbitrarily overseeing matters such as the question and the required majority and imposing a form of supervision that we don't need. Nor can we accept the idea that the federal government would give more weight to a NO vote than to a YES vote. We cannot accept this attempt on the part of the federal government to violate the fundamental principle that all votes are equal.

Nor can we accept this kind of straight jacket, that forces us to choose between the status quo and absolute secession, which doesn't exist anywhere else. There must and can be something else, and I believe the federal government will be judged harshly one day for an exercise that threatens and stifles democracy in Quebec.

Quebec doesn't need this kind of exercise, offering a democratic deficit. Quebec is comfortable with its current democratic balance. Quebec is comfortable with its institutions. It is comfortable with the respect it shows for the authority and prerogative of the National Assembly. It is comfortable with the concept of the rule of law. And it is very comfortable with the fundamental principle that all votes are equal.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would say it may be too late for the federal government to backtrack. That is my fear. Yet there would be nothing threatening about making a gesture to bring about national reconciliation between the two founding peoples of this country.

The Chair: Are there any questions or comments?

Ms. Meredith, you have the floor.

[English]

Ms. Val Meredith: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you for appearing before the committee.

Many provinces are as concerned as you seem to be with the federal intrusion in jurisdictions that some would argue don't belong to them, and using the largesse they have access to to buy their way into provinces. But the Supreme Court did indicate that Quebec, after a clear question with a clear majority, would have to negotiate with the federal government and the provinces, or that a negotiation with the federal government and the provinces would be required. Do you support the decision of the Supreme Court that negotiations with all of Canada, not just the federal government and Quebec, would be required?

[Translation]

Mr. Gérald Larose: I would remind you that all of the proposals made by Quebec involved an offer of negotiations with Canada. It is the federal government that said it would never negotiate. The Supreme Court is now forcing the federal government to negotiate. So to get around the obligation imposed by the Supreme Court, what does Stéphane do? He drafts Bill C-20, which includes several provisions intended to allow the federal government to get around the obligation to negotiate imposed on it by the Supreme Court.

• 1430

In fact, this is a deceitful, shrewd piece of legislation. This is a new trick on the part of the federal government to escape the obligation the Supreme Court has laid out for it.

[English]

Ms. Val Meredith: But you misunderstood the intent of my question. This is not just about Quebec and the federal government. This is about Canada. There are other provinces and there are other people in Canada who don't live in the province of Quebec. It was my understanding of that Supreme Court decision that there was a recognition that if a province wanted to secede from the country, it was not their decision and theirs alone to be made, but within a discussion of the other members of the family of Canada. I'm asking if you respect that position of the Supreme Court that recognizes the right of other provinces to enter into the debate. Should they not be considered in dealing with this legislation?

[Translation]

Mr. Gérald Larose: Let's be clear. If there was a reference to the Supreme Court, it was not because Alberta had any thoughts of become independent. The reason for the reference to the Supreme Court was the fact that this question has been on the table in Quebec for a number of years. So, if the formal obligation affects all of the provinces, that is simply the result of a legal fiction. The political reality is that Quebec put this issue on the table.

Now, with respect to your question about whether the opinion of other provinces should be taken into consideration, my response would be that that is an issue for Canada to decide. It is up to the rest of Canada to determine how it wants to organize its own life. And Quebeckers have no intention of interfering in that, just as we are asking the rest of Canada not to interfere in our affairs.

The Chair: You have the floor, Mr. Turp.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

On behalf of the Bloc Québécois, I would like to welcome our two guests and particularly my former professor. I was a student of Mr. Tremblay's.

I also want to say that Professor Tremblay tried to bring me into the Quebec Liberal Party fold at one point, because he is a federalist, but without success. I think it's important to point out that Pro-Démocratie's membership is not exclusively sovereignist: they are democrats and they believe that Bill C-20 is an attack on democracy in Quebec.

I have two questions for you.

Mr. Larose, we often hear it said in Parliament, by the Prime Minister, Mr. Dion or others, that Quebeckers did not understand the question in 1995, and that they didn't know what they were voting on. They didn't know that if they voted yes, Quebec would become a sovereign country. I would interested in your views on that.

And I would like to put the same question I asked a number of witnesses to the constitutional expert, Professor Tremblay, about the possibility of a potential conflict between the National Assembly and the House of Commons with respect to the clarity of the question and the majority, a conflict that would arise if the National Assembly claimed the majority and question were clear, while the House of Commons was of the opposite view.

If such a conflict arose, who would have the final say? Doesn't our experience with the practice of federalism suggest that the House of Commons would make the final determination, just as it did in 1982 when it imposed the Constitution in Quebec?

Mr. André Tremblay: I heard the question when you put it to the other witness. That is a hypothetical question that a politician should always refuse to answer.

• 1435

Mr. Turp, my position, like that of “Pro-Démocratie” is clear: we are asking for the bill to be withdrawn. We are of the view that this legislation is inappropriate and undemocratic. “Pro- Démocratie”s position is this: consistent with international instruments which you are certainly aware of, we are of the view that it is up to the people of Quebec alone to decide on their collective future. This is a matter that falls exclusively within its purview. The House of Commons has no business setting itself up as some sort of ultimate authority as to the relevance and clarity of the question. This kind of arbitrariness on the part of the House of Commons is totally out of place. It is up to the people to decide and up to the National Assembly, exercising its rightful prerogative, to decide. It did so in 1980 and again in 1985. Our customs and practices as regards elections and referendums are sound enough that we should, as adult democrats, be able to make our own choice.

Mr. Gérald Larose: As regards the clarity of the question, it is both my view and the view of “Pro-Démocratie” that all of the previous exercises were carried out in the utmost clarity. When there is a turn-out of 94 per cent, it seems to me that is an indication that the issue that was debated was an important one that was worth taking a close look at.

To say that the question was unclear is to insult people's intelligence and demonstrate your own arrogance; it's tantamount to believing that if you disagree, everybody should disagree and if they don't disagree, it's because they are a bunch of cretins. That's nonsense.

In the last referendum, how many Quebeckers voted no to the question because they believed Jean Chrétien when he told them he was going to make the necessary changes, both administratively and constitutionally? It wasn't because Jean Chrétien hadn't given a clear speech. It was a clear speech, and they decided he was right. Unfortunately, he fooled them.

When Pierre Elliott Trudeau said: “We'll put our seats on the line”, Brian Mulroney and Claude Ryan, who were sitting next to him believed him. How many Quebeckers also believed him and voted no? Clarity had nothing to do with it. The speech was clear, but they were fooled.

The question with respect to clarity is really this: what they want is a simple, indeed simplistic question, which at the same time is a deceptive question. They don't want the people to talk about a complex issue—because it is a complex issue—namely restructuring the relationship between two peoples. But the people of Quebec will continue to ask this complex question. The Quebec people want to breathe, live and grow while still maintaining an excellent relationship with other peoples, including Canada. That is the question that will be asked. It has always been clear and it will be just as clear the next time around.

The Chair: Mr. Cotler.

Mr. Irwin Cotler: I have a couple of questions for my colleague, André Tremblay. André, you said with respect to the Supreme Court ruling on secession: “It has to be taken seriously by politicians. After all, the Supreme Court is telling them what they have to do.” Mr. Bouchard himself said that the Supreme Court ruling had constitutional status.

• 1440

In an interview with a National Post reporter, Joseph Facal gave the official position of the Quebec government on the Supreme Court Reference. He said that Quebec was in no way bound by the ruling. How do you reconcile Mr. Facal's assertion with your own comments and those of Mr. Bouchard regarding the Supreme Court ruling?

Mr. André Tremblay: Mr. Chairman, could I ask the member for a clarification? Is he quoting from material I have written for my courses at the University of Montreal?

Mr. Irwin Cotler: No, I was quoting a reference I read. If I'm mistaken, please say so.

Mr. André Tremblay: Could you please repeat your question?

Mr. Irwin Cotler: In reference to the Supreme Court ruling on secession, you said: “It must be taken seriously by politicians. After all, the Supreme Court is telling them what they have to do.” Those comments lead me to believe that you feel the Supreme Court ruling is legally authoritative.

Mr. André Tremblay: Mr. Chairman, I am ready to accept that the comments attributed to me are accurate. Based on that assumption, I'll answer the question.

I respect the ruling handed down by the Supreme Court of Canada. It is an authoritative ruling, like all its other rulings and advice, but it must also be read and understood in the light of the recent comments made by the Chief Justice of Canada. As you probably know, Mr. Chairman, the Chief Justice himself said, only 10 days ago, that this ruling did not bind governments and had a purely advisory status. That is exactly what Mr. Lamer said, and he was absolutely right.

At the same time, there are two factors that must be considered, Mr. Cotler. The first one is that from a legal standpoint, the Supreme Court ruling is an advisory opinion that does not bind governments. However, because of its authority in other potential legal debates, this ruling would be followed by the Supreme Court. That is the first point.

The second point is that what Mr. Facal said about Mr. Lamer's comments is correct.

Mr. Irwin Cotler: We have the comments....

Mr. André Tremblay: Yes. That's right, but it makes no difference. They are consistent with the comments made subsequently by Mr. Lamer. Even though the Supreme Court ruling is not strictly speaking a ruling, you know as well as I do that if there were actual legal proceedings, the Supreme Court would inevitably tend to rely on its advisory opinion. I think that is the appropriate answer to your question.

The Chair: Mr. Cotler.

Mr. Irwin Cotler: Allow me to put a second question to you. Mr. Tremblay, you wrote, and I hope I am quoting you accurately: “The Helsinki Final Act gives Quebec the right to secede.”

Before I get to my main question, could you briefly summarize the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act as they relate to the right to self-determination?

Mr. André Tremblay: Mr. Chairman, I have to say I didn't write that. I never wrote anything of the kind. A different Mr. Tremblay must be the author, probably the one who teaches at Laval University.

• 1445

Mr. Irwin Cotler: Those are your own words, and I even have a paper here that I could read to you.

Mr. André Tremblay: Please provide it to me because I don't recognize those quotes. Consequently, I can't comment on them.

Mr. Irwin Cotler: Perhaps I could quote from the statement and you can tell me whether you agree or not.

...all peoples always enjoy the right to freely determine, when they wish and as they wish, their internal and external political status, without outside interference, and to pursue as they see fit their political, economic, social and cultural development.

Mr. André Tremblay: Once again, Mr. Chairman, for the purposes of the question I am prepared to accept that I made such an assertion. If I did write that, I wrote it with respect to the International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights, which I am more familiar with. I am prepared to defend the idea that the people of Quebec qualify, within the meaning of international instruments, for the purposes of freely determining their collective, constitutional, civil and political future.

The Chair: Your five minutes are up.

Ms. Meredith, do you have another question?

[English]

Ms. Val Meredith: Yes, thank you.

Mr. Larose, I want to respond to your response to my first question. I want to put before you that Quebec seems to be very willing to accept financial support from Alberta and British Columbia through the equalization payments, but I got the impression that you feel that British Columbia and Alberta should not be consulted on any issues that concern Quebec, particularly these issues. I get the feeling from you that you don't think the citizens and the people of British Columbia and Alberta should be the least bit concerned about the people of Quebec.

[Translation]

Mr. Gérald Larose: On the contrary, they should be concerned. They should be mobilizing and taking part in a complete overhaul of federalism, if they believe in it. But British Columbia and Alberta have no business interfering in Quebec's process. I never said that those provinces should not be taking an interest in this. I said that I recognize they are involved as regards reorganizing Canada. And they have every right to be. A mechanism should be put in place to get the information out so that any concerns can be properly considered, especially since one of the three peoples has made the decision to take a different path. I'm not denying the right of Albertans or British Columbians to take an interest in these issues. However, I don't recognize that right as regards Quebec's jurisdiction.

[English]

Ms. Val Meredith: So you don't feel that the other provinces should be the least bit concerned about the issues of borders, of partition, of taking a share of the debt, of any of those kinds of issues that would come out of a decision of any province, not just Quebec? If British Columbia decided to leave, those kinds of issues would be on the table, and you don't feel that all players, all partners in this Confederation, should be involved in that discussion...?

[Translation]

Mr. Gérald Larose: I would repeat that reorganizing Canada is Canada's responsibility; that British Columbia and Alberta are provinces, administrative entities within the federation; that Quebec considers itself a people, the administrative unit of which corresponds to a provincial state; but that Quebec is more than a province; that Quebeckers are in fact a people that enjoy the right to self-determination.

• 1450

I'm not sure the same rights apply to the other provinces. I don't believe they've ever been claimed, at least not on the basis of British Columbians having the characteristics of a nation. I've never heard that. Nor have I ever heard the idea that Manitobans constitute a people. I think there is a major difference there. If people want to overhaul their administrative system, they can do so. But I don't think the Quebec National Assembly should interfere in that process.

The Chair: Mr. Proulx.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: Mr. Larose, I'm a little surprised to hear you say that Prime Minister Chrétien didn't deliver anything after 1995. You may recall that the House adopted Bill C-110 on a veto for the regions. I know the Bloc Québécois voted against that bill, but I think you're going too far when you say that nothing was done.

You also say—and I find this surprising as well—that Stéphane Dion always refused to negotiate. I would just like to quote Minister Dion, who said in January of 1996:

If Quebec unfortunately voted with a strong majority on a clear question in favour of secession, I believe the rest of Canada would have the moral obligation to negotiate the division of the territory.

Mr. Larose, I'm curious about one thing. At the CNTU, what size majority is required to disaffiliate a union?

Mr. Gérald Larose: First I'll tell you what majority is required to form a union.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: Well, what I'm really interested in is disaffiliation.

Mr. Gérald Larose: To become disaffiliated, you first have to become affiliated. As far as I know, Quebec have never been affiliated with the federation. There was never any general assembly or referendum held for the purposes of becoming affiliated with the federation. So, within the meaning of the CNTU's constitution, this affiliation does not apply.

The process is as follows: what if Quebec decides to form a union? It is in exactly the same situation as a large Canadian union—because this is an actual case—into which Quebec members have been integrated by force of circumstance. If Quebeckers decide to form their own union, what do they have to do? Well, they have to sign cards and, once 35 per cent have signed, there is an obligation to hold a vote. If they get 50 per cent plus one, then they form a Quebec union that is completely separate from the Canadian one. That's how the process works.

I would add, my friend, that in Ontario, a labour relations board actually certified a union when only 38 per cent had voted in favour of forming a union, as I recall, given that the boss spent hundreds and even thousands of dollars applying moral and physical pressure to employees to prevent them from expressing themselves freely.

I'd say that the federal government's behaviour in 1980, 1982 and 1995 was very similar. If the YES side won with 50 per cent plus one under such conditions, that would be a huge moral majority. So, you can only disaffiliate when you are affiliated. The problem is we are not affiliated.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: I'll ask my question again, Mr. Chairman. What size majority is required for a union to disaffiliate itself from the CNTU? Let's go even further. Is it not 50 per cent plus one of dues-paying members? Dues-paying members are the equivalent of registered voters in an election. It's not necessarily voters that exercised their right to vote; rather, it is registered voters.

Mr. Gérald Larose: The Constitution of a number of unions who have become affiliated and have developed their own Constitution and by-laws includes a rule that can vary: in some cases, it's 60 per cent; in others, it is higher. The idea is to ensure that the process is carried out based on a majority of voters or members. But the rule varies, starting at 50 per cent plus one, because it's in the Constitution.

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In all cases, members can leave the CNTU with 50 per cent plus one, by either changing their Constitution or abiding by the rules they have set for themselves.

I repeat that the problem in Quebec's case is not one of disaffiliation, but rather of creating an independent entity. That requires 50 per cent plus one.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: Mr. Larose, when you talk about 50 per cent plus one as part of the normal process in a union, are you talking about 50 per cent plus one of voting members or registered members?

Mr. Gérald Larose: To form a union, in Quebec just like elsewhere in Canada, you need the support of 50 per cent plus one of the people, and of those 50 per cent plus one, you need an additional 50 per cent plus one. So, with 26 per cent support, people can form a union.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: Mr. Chairman, he is not answering my question. It's a simple question.

Mr. Gérald Larose: It's like Stéphane Dion. Stéphane Dion would like us to answer a question that we haven't asked.

The Chair: Order, please.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: Mr. Chairman, I've asked a simple question about disaffiliation.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

The Chair: Order, please.

Mr. Ménard, you have the floor.

Mr. Réal Ménard: Mr. Chairman, I wouldn't want Mr. Proulx to become indisposed. He has only recently been elected and he has to learn to control himself a little; he has his whole life ahead of him.

I would like to continue the discussion about 50 per cent plus one. This really seems to excite you.

You are people working in the field, people who are well aware of the constitutional reality and the way things work in large organizations. Clearly please, because this is a concern for the Committee, does the notion of a clear majority exclude the 50 per cent plus one formula? That's my first question. I address it to you.

Mr. Gérald Larose: No, it doesn't.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: Fifty percent plus one of what?

The Chair: Order.

Mr. Réal Ménard: Mr. Proulx, please! What's wrong with you today?

Mr. Gérald Larose: The participation rate was 94 per cent. People confined to bed came out to vote—indeed everyone went to vote and the participation rate was 94 per cent. On one side they spent $4 million in the process, and on the other, $38 million. What I can say is I won't let you bore me for too long trying to figure out whether 50 per cent plus one is enough.

Mr. Réal Ménard: Do you share that viewpoint, Mr. Tremblay?

Mr. André Tremblay: Yes, I do.

Mr. Réal Ménard: O.K. Do you not think the legislation before us is paradoxical in the sense that Mr. Dion said that it recognizes the prerogative of the National Assembly and its members to draft the question, and yet that question could be rejected if they decide they don't like it? In terms of constitutional law and current practices, could that not be likened to a veto of sort?

Mr. André Tremblay: Mr. Chairman, I said earlier that before 1943, the federal authorities regularly disallowed provincial statutes because they were not consistent with the principle of what was called fair legislation. We thought this kind of federal supervision was a thing of the past. With this bill, we see the government returning to practices in place before 1943. They are in the process of digging something up that we fortunately thought was dead and buried; but it's true that the federal government is returning to this notion that it should supervise the provinces' operations and control the National Assembly.

It is totally unacceptable for the House of Commons to try and control the internal workings of the National Assembly and decide that those internal workings don't suit it for reasons....

Mr. Réal Ménard: It's a precedent.

Mr. André Tremblay: Yes, it is a precedent. That has never been done. It was the practice previously in relation to bills that had been sanctioned by the provinces. Before 1943, the bills would arrive in Ottawa and the federal government could simply disallow them because they were not consistent with the principle of fair legislation.

Mr. Réal Ménard: So, Jean Charest is a worthy successor to Robert Bourassa in saying no to this legislation.

Mr. André Tremblay: Of course.

Mr. Réal Ménard: That is the advice you would have given Mr. Bourassa.

Mr. André Tremblay: Without a doubt.

Mr. Réal Ménard: Mr. Larose, who supports Bill C-20 in Quebec? What is the consensus on this legislation in Quebec? How is it perceived among politicians and Quebeckers in general?

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Mr. Gérald Larose: I work within the civil society. Have employers expressed their support for Bill C-20? I haven't heard them do that. We generally never agree. I don't think they have expressed their views on it. I'm trying to see whether there is at least one credible group in Quebec that supports Bill C-20. I can't think of any.

Mr. Réal Ménard: You follow current events.

Mr. Gérald Larose: Oh, yes! There is Bill Johnson's sect, financed to a large extent by federal funds. It's the only mystic existentialist type of group that supports Bill C-20.

Mr. Réal Ménard: I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Mr. Mills, you have the floor.

[English]

Mr. Dennis J. Mills (Broadview—Greenwood, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Tremblay, I represent a riding in downtown Toronto. You said something in your remarks that very much reflects the attitude of most of my constituents.

By the way, they support the bill.

Your words were, I believe, that rather than working on this bill we should be working on ideas for reconciliation. I wonder if you could maybe talk a little about that in terms of what some of your specific ideas on reconciliation would be.

[Translation]

Mr. André Tremblay: Well, I have always supported the federal option and I voted no in the 1980 and 1995 referendums. Mr. Mills, I voted once for the Parti Québécois in 1995, because there was not plan for federal renewal. Not a single gesture has been made. And it's the same thing internally, within the Quebec Liberal Party: there is no one reaching out to us or putting forward an option for renewal.

We nationalists who are not in favour of independence are now like the homeless. We would really like a government to respond to our calls for renewal of the Canadian federation. In a way, we would really like a government to heeds the calls of those who are asking for a complete overhaul of Canadian federalism.

My message to the Committee today can be summarized as the hostile refusal of plan B. What we are seeking is plan A, an approach based on outreach, reconciliation, discussion, and openness among partners, so that the founding peoples of Canada can finally find common ground.

[English]

Mr. Dennis Mills: Mr. Tremblay, many of us today celebrate the fact that it was 20 years ago today that Pierre Elliott Trudeau was given a new mandate of 74 out of 75 seats.

There are many of us who have been around here who feel that we have devolved a litany of powers to the Province of Quebec, powers that other provinces don't even have. Could you please give me a couple of specific ideas? When you say you want renewed federalism, could you give us a couple of specific ideas?

[Translation]

Mr. André Tremblay: It is not totally accurate to say that Quebec has powers that the others don't. The federal system is not asymmetrical in Canada; all the provinces are dealt with based on the inescapable dogma of the absolute equality of the provinces.

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As you know, Mr. Chairman, administrative agreements in the areas of immigration and employment were concluded, and these agreements are open and accessible to all the other provinces.

As for the powers Quebec is seeking, the easiest thing, Mr. Mills, would be for me to send you the book the Government of Quebec published two years ago, which again sets out Quebec's traditional demands. You'll see that it describes what previous governments have always demanded. It would take too much time now to list them, Mr. Chairman, but they have asked to be given the instruments they require to ensure the economic and social development of Quebec, and particularly the cultural sovereignty called for by Mr. Bourassa. Specifically, Mr. Mills, we would be very happy if the 1867 Constitution were abided by in full rather than being perverted on a daily basis through the exercise of unilateral powers by the federal government.

The 1867 division of powers would be appropriate. What is not appropriate is the perversion of that arrangement through the use of the unilateral instruments you are aware of, including the federal spending power.

[English]

The Chair: One brief question, Mr. Cotler, and that's it.

Mr. Irwin Cotler: I have a question for Mr. Tremblay.

You have mentioned today, and I would agree with you, that there is a right to self-determination under international law. I would even go and make it specific: that Quebec has a right to self-determination.

But as the Supreme Court of Canada put it, that right to self-determination does not include a right to secede, unless it is a situation of either a colonial or an oppressed people, something which Monsieur Bouchard has said he agrees with the Supreme Court on: that is not the case.

My question to you, though, on the matter of the right to self-determination, is this in particular: if all peoples have a right to self-determination—and, as you put it, it's there in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, with the caveat that I mentioned—should you not, as a matter of principle, reject otherwise the position of Premier Bouchard that Quebec's aboriginal peoples would not have the right to choose to remain with their territory in Canada following Quebec's independence? Wouldn't the right to self-determination apply equally to Quebec's aboriginal peoples to choose to stay within Canada after a vote, if there is a favourable one, on secession?

[Translation]

Mr. André Tremblay: Mr. Chairman, I am very comfortable with my previous position on broad recognition of the right to self- determination. The restrictions that may appear on first reading of the Supreme Court ruling are not material. Given that my acceptance is broad in terms of the people or groups who might wish to seek self-determination—and others around this table share that view—I believe that acceptance must be just as broad as regards the Aboriginal peoples. As I see it, it's a matter of principle: if self-determination is appropriate for the people of Quebec, I believe the First Nations throughout the federation can certainly claim the same right. I did not discuss this with Gerald. It's possible he doesn't share my view and would like to add something.

Mr. Gérald Larose: I just want to remind people that....

Mr. Irwin Cotler: This is your position in principle.

Mr. André Tremblay: Yes.

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Mr. Gérald Larose: The sovereignist movement has always said that it would certainly do no less than the rest of Canada for the Aboriginal people and, in my view, a reorganization of the Canadian federation should also be an opportunity to take whatever steps are necessary to emancipate First Nations all across Canada, rather than forcing them to live under the system of apartheid put in place under the Indian Act, as has been the case for such a long time.

The Chair: Mr. Tremblay and Mr. Larose, thank you very much for appearing this afternoon. We very much appreciate your input.

The meeting is adjourned until Monday morning at 9:30 a.m.