NDVA Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE AND VETERANS AFFAIRS

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE ET DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Wednesday, March 31, 1999

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[English]

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham (Toronto Centre—Rosedale, Lib.)): I'd like to call to order this joint meeting of the defence committee and the foreign affairs and international trade committee of the House.

I have to ask the members of the press to withdraw now that the gavel has been dropped, but as you know, this will be on television.

Members, this is an extraordinarily important meeting. I'd like to begin by thanking Ministers Axworthy, Eggleton, and Marleau for coming. I know that some of the ministers interrupted other important activities to be with us today.

As co-chairs, we've decided that we'd like to lay down some rules of engagement, if we may, since there are so many of us. I understand the ministers are going to be here until 1 o'clock. Madame Marleau must leave by 12 o'clock, so if anybody has questions of Madame Marleau, you might want to ask her first.

We're going to keep members' questions to five minutes each, and we're going to alternate between members of the foreign affairs committee and members of the defence committee. If the ministers could keep their introductory remarks to around 10 minutes each, that way I think we can accommodate everybody.

Pat.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien (London—Fanshawe, Lib.)): Thank you very much, Bill.

I too welcome the three ministers here today during what is a very busy time for them. I'd also like to welcome Chief of Defence Staff General Baril and Deputy Chief of Defence Staff General Henault here today.

I think all Canadians, or most Canadians, have been very closely watching the flow of information through the media, and I just want to commend all ministers involved. The daily briefings through the media have been quite informative, and that's the feedback I've had from my constituents to date. I just thought I would share that by way of opening comment.

As my co-chair, Mr. Graham, has said, we want to make sure members from both committees have full opportunity, so in fairness, we'll do five-minute rounds. Some senators have joined us and are certainly welcome, but we'd obviously like to exhaust the questions from members of both committees, and if time permits, we would then possibly entertain questions from senators.

With that, I'll turn it back to Mr. Graham and we can begin.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Thank you.

Minister Axworthy, are you going to lead off?

Hon. Lloyd Axworthy (Minister of Foreign Affairs): Thank you, Bill.

Let me add that I'm joined by Mr. Jim Wright, who is our director general of European affairs, and Paul Heinbecker, who is the assistant deputy minister for global security.

Let me begin by thanking the members of both committees for returning from their ridings during this break period to deal with this most serious of humanitarian crises that's taking place in Kosovo. We're all here because we recognize the magnitude and urgency of the crisis, and we also need to provide an exchange of views about the developments as they take place on a daily basis.

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It's important to recognize that the standing committee has long been involved in issues related to the Balkans. It has travelled to Bosnia on many occasions and debated and made recommendations to the government, and it has provided a number of important statements.

I feel strongly that it is crucial for parliamentarians, particularly members of these committees, to be majorly engaged throughout our involvement in this matter, and we will do everything in our power to ensure a full exchange and relationship between members of Parliament and what is happening in the theatre of activity.

I think most Canadians are aware that Kosovo is important to them. For 10 years now we have witnessed in the Balkans a series of actions and attitudes that frankly we thought and hoped belonged to another age and another time. The events there have been happening in the heart of Europe, a continent where most Canadians find roots and where we have vital interests in terms of our security and in the economic, cultural, and human fields.

Since 1991, when the dissolution of Yugoslavia accelerated, the regime of President Milosevic has been involved in waging wars in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia. In Bosnia in particular, we intervened militarily to stop a campaign of ethnic cleansing accompanied by massive summary executions, rapes, and the destruction of entire communities, in violation of all norms of civilized behaviour. In Kosovo the Yugoslav regime has engaged in a campaign of brutal repression ever since it unilaterally stripped the province of its autonomy and abolished its local institutions in 1989 and 1990.

[Translation]

In 1998, a growing number of Albanians departed from their pacifist resistance tactics and began a violent campaign against these repressive measures. This was seen by the Yugoslav regime as a justification to enter into a massive and disproportionate campaign of destruction against Albanian citizens of all sexes and ages, including summary executions, destruction of villages and arbitrary detentions.

[English]

I think members of this committee recognize that Canada has long championed the promotion of the international human security regime to protect civilians—one where human rights are respected, where regional conflicts are resolved through negotiation and confidence-building, and where war criminals are not allowed to act with impunity. We are also working very hard to consolidate the multilateral system that was created to make the world better through evolving standards of international law and new rules of behaviour in institutions such as the UN, the OSCE, and NATO.

The problem of Kosovo presents a challenge to all these important principles. Our preference has always been for a diplomatic solution to the problem in Kosovo, and the diplomatic track has been given every possible chance to succeed. You all remember the numerous diplomatic missions sent to Belgrade; the UN Security Council resolutions, all violated by the Milosevic government; the creation of a major OSCE verification mission; and the Rambouillet conference, which ultimately failed because of the consistent intransigence displayed by President Milosevic.

Only when these efforts had been exhausted did the allies resort to military action. It was then clear that the FRY was preparing for a military offensive of a scale unseen so far in Kosovo.

So now we are into the eighth day of the NATO operation, and let me remind you that its objective is to make the Yugoslav government end the savage repression of its own people, by degrading the military machine that supports this brutality, and to prompt Belgrade to sign the peace agreement, giving significant autonomy to Kosovo. The longer Milosevic resists, the more the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's infrastructure of repression will be progressively destroyed. Unfortunately this takes more than a few days.

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[Translation]

In recent days, we have seen an increasing number of reports of a growing humanitarian disaster in Kosovo. Yugoslav security forces and paramilitary organizations are reported to be carrying out a campaign of terror and expelling large numbers of Kosovars.

[English]

They are intensifying their crackdown on opposition figures, and we have growing evidence that they may be implicated in summary executions and other atrocities against civilians.

I spoke yesterday with the High Commissioner for Refugees, Mrs. Ogata. She estimates that the number of people displaced by the Kosovo conflict now exceeds 560,000. I should say that those numbers change hourly. In fact in Macedonia the present flow is almost 1,000 per hour coming across the border. An estimated 275,000 others are displaced within Kosovo itself. However, with the ethnic cleansing now being carried out by the Yugoslav forces, it really is not possible to make an informed guess. There's just too much confusion.

The UNHCR has established a Kosovo cell in Skopje, which continues to monitor the situation, but communication is very difficult. It's estimated that over 200,000 persons have found refuge in neighbouring countries, including 83,000 in Albania; 25,000 in the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia; 45,000 in Montenegro; 15,000 in Bosnia; and 30,000 in Serbia. The vast majority of these are Serbs, also fleeing the conflict in Kosovo. A disturbing trend in recent days is the appearance of large groups of refugees, nearly all women, children, and the elderly, with very few men of military age.

This massive flow of refugees is the most dramatic we've seen since the Second World War. It has implications that reach far beyond the plight of the refugees themselves. Neighbouring countries such as Macedonia and Albania are under tremendous economic pressure as a result of the incoming waves of people seeking refuge. Without adequate support, this pressure threatens to destabilize the countries themselves, and by doing so, the entire region.

I'm therefore discussing with my colleagues ways in which we might alleviate the burden on countries in the region, for example by deferring their obligations to the IMF—and I've had discussions with the Minister of Finance on that area—and by emphasizing our support for the security of their borders, so that the progress each has made on democratization will not be lost.

I should indicate in parentheses that the North Atlantic Council has met directly with representatives of the Albanian and Macedonian governments and has provided those guarantees under the Partnership for Peace program that is part of the NATO structure.

Together with our allies, we are dealing with this humanitarian disaster with a three-pronged approach. We are stepping up the military intervention, which Mr. Eggleton will speak to, and which is now really the only obstacle in the way to continued ethnic cleansing. We are increasing our humanitarian assistance, as Madame Marleau will speak to. And we are supporting the critical work of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.

Before giving you the details about these specific actions, let me answer what I think is an unfounded criticism that has been widely conveyed. It is said that NATO action is the cause of the current deterioration of the humanitarian situation. This criticism in fact has no basis in reality. Ethnic cleansing by the Yugoslav authorities has been going on for months. We've seen well-documented evidence of forced expulsions, destructions of villages, and massacres by security forces in 1998 and in early 1999.

The total number of displaced persons and refugees, as I said, has reached over 560,000. However, 470,000 of those people were already displaced before NATO began its air strikes—a clear sign that it is Milosevic's reign of terror and his grand design, and not NATO action, that is the cause of this crisis.

The threat by NATO of using force led in October 1998 to the acceptance of a ceasefire, limitations on the deployment of security forces in Kosovo, and the creation of the Kosovo verification mission. For a while thereafter, violence originating with the army and the police diminished in the presence of hundreds of international verifiers.

However, in the first months of 1999 the situation progressively deteriorated. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was increasingly in breach of its obligations. NATO threats were ignored as security forces harassed international verifiers and built up their military deployment far beyond the limits agreed to in writing between the FRY and the OSCE, and far beyond what any defensive posture could have justified. There is clear evidence that the Yugoslavs were preparing for a massive spring offensive.

On March 20 the OSCE was forced to evacuate the verification mission in view of the collapse of the ceasefire and the threat to the mission members, which had gone beyond acceptable levels. With the departure of the verification mission, the Yugoslav forces dramatically stepped up their offences.

This all happened before NATO began its military intervention. NATO responded to this advanced form of ethnic cleansing; it did not provoke it.

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I'd also like to address a concern I know several members have raised in the past regarding the lack of Security Council authorization for the specific action in Kosovo. Let me state clearly that our preference would have been to go into Kosovo backed by a strong council resolution. However, it's clear that certain members of the council would have vetoed such a resolution.

This was made clear last week, when the Russians introduced a resolution condemning NATO's action—a resolution that was soundly defeated by a vote of 12 to 3. If one could eliminate the veto for a minute, one would basically have the same majority supporting a resolution providing the mandate for Kosovo action. Faced with such deep divisions in the council, there was no option but for NATO to take action on its own to mitigate the humanitarian disaster that was beginning to unfold and to enforce the international community's demands, as outlined in previous Security Council resolutions 1199 and 1203.

It is important to point out to members that if one looks at the various mandates contained in the Geneva Conventions and the genocide convention, one will see that these are also being directly contravened by the present forces of Mr. Milosevic in Kosovo.

However, we have not abandoned our attempts to engage the Security Council on the question of Kosovo. Much water separates us from the Russians on this issue, but we do agree that there is a humanitarian crisis in the region.

I will be travelling to New York tomorrow, where I will meet with Kofi Annan and several members of the council to discuss action the council might take to address the dire humanitarian situation in the region. In the meantime, NATO is concentrating its efforts on the Yugoslav machine of repression, and I will leave it up to Minister Eggleton to speak to those. Also, Madame Marleau will talk to you about the humanitarian effort being made by CIDA.

One further area that is part of the Canadian strategy is to provide continued support to the International Criminal Tribunal and to repeat our warnings to the Yugoslav authorities that they will be held accountable for the crimes that are taking place in Kosovo. Senior officials in my department called in the Yugoslav ambassador to deliver a strong message. I have spoken to Judge Arbour, offering support and suggesting we will do everything possible to have the OSCE take some account of this matter and see what can be done, particularly in Albania and Macedonia.

It's important to deal with the question of whether there can be some resolution. Prime Minister Primakov has attempted to broker an agreement. Regrettably, what President Milosevic offered to Mr. Primakov was completely inadequate for further diplomacy.

It remains our position that for NATO to reconsider its current approach to the Kosovo crisis, Mr. Milosevic would need to stop the killing, oppression, and ethnic cleansing that is currently under way; withdraw all security forces and create an environment where Kosovar Albanians are able to return to their rightful homes; and finally, agree to negotiate a peace agreement based on the Rambouillet text or framework. These conditions provide the basis for a durable political solution.

We are faced with a complex situation. The three-pronged approach I've outlined and that my colleagues will elaborate on—military action, humanitarian assistance, and the judicial track, with an openness to considering diplomatic avenues—we believe is the most effective manner at present to come to some resolution on this issue.

However, Kosovo has been a flashpoint for 10 years now, and the roots of the problems go far back in history. We cannot expect an immediate and perfect solution, but we are determined to keep up our efforts.

Finally, Messrs. Chair, I would like to praise the work of the Canadians who have been playing an extremely important role in the Balkans. Canadians have performed admirably in Bosnia, and still do, on the peacekeeping missions, where they are assisted by a number of aid workers, who provide humanitarian relief and work on rebuilding democratic institutions and bringing peace to that country.

Canadians have participated in the OSCE, in election supervision and as verifiers in Kosovo. We are proud of the courage and dedication of our men and women who are currently participating in the NATO mission. And I am pleased that members of every party in the House have stood up and supported our troops in our attempts to resolve this humanitarian crisis. We can be proud of Canada's role in this very serious situation.

Thank you, Chairs.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, Minister Axworthy.

I'm pleased now, as the chair of SCONDVA, to turn to Minister Eggleton.

We welcome your opening remarks, Minister. Thank you.

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Hon. Arthur C. Eggleton (Minister of National Defence): Thank you very much, chairs and chers membres du comité.

I'm glad to have the opportunity this morning to discuss with you the very serious situation in Kosovo and the actions being taken by NATO, of course Canada being a part of them. I know members of both committees are quite familiar with the issues at hand, as Parliament has debated the situation in Kosovo on two occasions.

This matter has been before the House. First, on October 7 last, all parties agreed that Canada should join our NATO allies in air operations if they proved necessary. The very kind of operation that we're into was first discussed on that occasion. Then on February 17 we debated Kosovo with respect to peacekeeping forces; this was when we were hopeful that a peace agreement would be signed at Rambouillet and that our involvement would consist of a peacekeeping force.

[Translation]

As such, we confirmed the participation of up to 800 CF personnel in a future international peace mission.

[English]

In addition, both of your standing committees have held briefings on the developments in Kosovo, as of course you are doing again today.

Regrettably, of course, it has become necessary to begin the air campaign that the House first debated last October 7. This was not an easy decision. It took some period of time. Every effort to reach a diplomatic solution was followed, but the interests we seek to preserve and protect for the people of this region are significant.

The objective of NATO's air campaign is to diminish the capacity of the Yugoslav forces to attack and inflict atrocities against the people of Kosovo, and to bring that government back to the negotiating table. Our military operations are intended to avert an even greater humanitarian catastrophe and prevent the prospect of wider regional insecurity and instability.

I also want to make it clear that, as my colleague has said, the humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo is not the result of NATO's air operations. Some 470,000 people were displaced from their homes even before this air campaign began. That kind of ethnic cleansing program has been going on for a long period of time, and of course we've seen it in other parts of Yugoslavia in past.

[Translation]

Milosevic had prepared his campaign long ago.

[English]

In fact intensified repression by the Yugoslav forces was one of the principal reasons behind our decision to begin the air operations.

It is also important to stress that our actions are not against the people of Yugoslavia, not against the Serbian population. Our actions are directed against Milosevic and his regime. Our quarrel is with an oppressive regime that has no regard for the basic human rights of the people of Kosovo. Our military operations are carefully planned to strike at military police, paramilitary targets, and their supporting infrastructure.

As you know, from the beginning, six Canadian CF-18s have been involved in the air operations over Yugoslavia. This involves some 130 personnel who are stationed in Aviano, Italy, from where the missions take off every day. We also, however, have 95 personnel involved in the NATO AWACS mission. This is the early warning system of AWACS, and we have personnel who are part of these flights, these sorties, that come out of the AWACS personnel into Yugoslavia.

Co-Chairs, we can indicate to you that our people are serving with dedication. They are top professional people. They are well trained to carry on the missions to which they are assigned.

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The operations, as you know, began a week ago today. At that point in time the purpose was principally to diminish the Yugoslavs' air defence system—their ability to attack our planes in missions over their country—to reduce the threats to NATO pilots. This will take time to accomplish, given the difficult weather conditions that have prevailed since the beginning of this operation.

On Saturday, however, as a result of progress against the air defence targets to that point in time and in response to an intensified offensive against the Kosovar people, NATO decided to also undertake operations against the forces in Kosovo carrying out these atrocities. These air operations are intended to attack Yugoslav military forces and reduce their ability to harm the Kosovars.

There is an understandable desire and an understandable impatience on everyone's part that the violence against the Kosovars be stopped just as quickly as it possibly can.

[Translation]

We all wish to see an end to the present hostilities, as quickly as possible.

[English]

Our military aim is achievable, but it is important to recognize that it will take time for the air campaign to run its course. You will have heard over the last few days that other NATO allies have increased their contributions of aircraft. The United States has sent B-1 bombers and a number of other support aircraft. The United Kingdom is in the process of deploying additional Harriers and Tornado fighter bombers. And the Dutch have announced that they will replace their current F-16 aircraft with a more modern version.

This augmentation does not mean the air campaign has suffered a setback or that it is not proceeding as we had anticipated. It simply means NATO wants to hit the Yugoslav forces harder and faster, because of their stepped-up campaign against the Kosovar population. That requires more aircraft.

As I announced yesterday, Canada has agreed, after a request from the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, to provide an additional six CF-18s, bringing the number of CF-18 jet fighter aircraft to 12. This announcement was made after receiving that official request.

We felt this was a contribution Canada should make for two important reasons. First of all, it sends to Mr. Milosevic a strong message of our resolve, our determination, to prevent him from taking a free hand in Kosovo, certainly not without consequences. It also supports the NATO effort to strike at the Yugoslav forces harder and faster.

As well, the Canadian Forces will assist, I'm pleased to say, in flying humanitarian aid to the thousands of Kosovars who have been flooding over the borders at Macedonia and at Albania—who have been forced there because of the brutal onslaught being inflicted against them. We are working literally around the clock to prepare airlifts of supplies as quickly as we possibly can, and doing so in conjunction with our colleague, the Honourable Diane Marleau, who is responsible for the Canadian International Development Agency, which will spearhead much of this effort.

As I have said on each occasion I have spoken about the air operations over Yugoslavia, there are of course risks to NATO pilots, including Canadians. But our CF-18 pilots—and I've talked with their commander in Aviano on a couple of occasions—are well trained, they're highly motivated, and they understand the importance of what they're doing. They're flying an excellent aircraft equipped with the right weaponry for this kind of task.

They are nonetheless flying into harm's way, and their dedication and courage and that of their families back home here should be acknowledged publicly, and I do so.

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I should also note that precautionary measures have been taken to improve the security of our 1,300 troops in the SFOR mission in Bosnia. The NATO no-fly mission over Bosnia continues to provide protection for our troops, as it has over the last three years. That was demonstrated very recently with the downing of two Yugoslav jet fighters a few days ago as they attempted to cross the border into Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The question of introducing ground troops has drawn considerable attention in the last day or so. I want to re-emphasize our position, the position of all of the NATO countries—all 19 of them—on this issue. There are no plans to send ground troops to Kosovo while hostilities continue. NATO is prepared, and in fact anxious, to deploy ground troops in support of a peace agreement, and Canada would participate in that force. Indeed our air campaign is intended to bring about the conditions where such a force could then be deployed.

In conclusion, members of the committee, I want to focus on something fundamental to our past and present discussions on Kosovo. We have all been watching horrible events. I think we're very distressed by what we're hearing from the refugees as they pour over the border, and as the horrible events have unfolded over the last few days and much time prior to that.

Last October, during the parliamentary debate on Kosovo, there was strong consensus that Canada should be prepared to act. We agreed as parliamentarians that inaction would be morally indefensible. Well, since last Wednesday, when air operations began, we have been putting the moral convictions of the government, the Parliament of Canada, and Canadians into action, and we must not lose sight of that. We must not lose sight of our resolve in this matter.

[Translation]

We must act together with our allies to put an end to this great human tragedy.

[English]

In doing so, we have once against asked the men and women of the Canadian Forces to be instruments of our resolve. They have taken up a just cause on our behalf. I ask all Canadians to understand the importance of the task that has been given to these fine, dedicated men and women. Give them your full support as they stand up for what we as Canadians believe is important to protect and preserve.

Thank you very much.

[Translation]

Thank you very much.

[English]

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, Minister Eggleton.

Now we're going to hear from Minister Marleau with some opening remarks, and then we'll go to a round of questions.

[Translation]

The Hon Diane Marleau (Minister for International Cooperation and Minister responsible for the Francophonie, Lib.): Thank you.

Dear colleagues, as you can imagine, we are deeply concerned by the situation in Kosovo. Some 25 percent of the population has been displaced. This accounts for almost 600,000 people. Of those, half are refugees. We know that the number is increasing hourly.

We've all seen the images on television. We know half the refugees are under the age of 18. Some 85 percent of the adult refugees are women. There is also a significant number of elderly. Indeed, this is mainly the sort of people we see. You do not see many middle-aged men. You see young people and elderly people.

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimates one third of the current refugees have fled Kosovo since March 24 one third in just one week. As you can see, more help is urgently needed.

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The UNCHR has increased its capacity to receive refugees, working with authorities in Macedonia and Albania. We continue to hope and ask that the borders remain open. We are no strangers to this region. Our involvement in Kosovo goes back over two years. Yesterday's $10-million announcement builds on previous contributions.

[English]

Yesterday's $10 million announcement builds on previous contributions of both humanitarian assistance, which was in the neighbourhood of $3.18 million, and earlier peace-building efforts of close to $4 million.

A number of prominent international organizations, such as the UNHCR and the International Committee of the Red Cross, are already at work in the region. They're in the process of reinforcing their presence on the ground. They are providing the critical delivery and coordination capacity needed in this kind of emergency. We're working very closely with them so that our assistance can contribute most effectively to the larger international effort.

Yesterday in Geneva, the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees announced its updated assessment of the requirements. This is a solid beginning, but as you can all appreciate, these needs are fluid and subject to constant revision. We're working carefully from their assessment to determine the most appropriate assistance from Canada.

We already know we'll be providing a combination of cash and supplies, to be sent on our military's humanitarian flight to the region. We're currently making arrangements, and a flight is expected to leave within the next 48 to 72 hours. This flight will carry 30,000 pounds of relief supplies—such things as blankets, tarps, tents, and basic medical supplies.

Of the $10 million announced yesterday, we currently expect $5 million to be provided through the UNHCR, with the balance being provided through international organizations, such as the Red Cross and UNICEF, as well as Canadian partners, such as NGOs working in the region. In addition, we are in direct contact with the World Food Programme, and we're prepared to quickly make available food supplies based on their needs assessment. We will be working with Canadian NGOs, such as CARE Canada, World Vision, Médecins sans frontières, and the Canadian Red Cross, who can play a constructive role in this emergency. I intend to consult with such Canadian organizations as soon as possible.

We will continue to monitor the situation through a variety of channels. To this end, I will be sending a senior official to a high-level meeting called by Madame Ogata on April 6 in Geneva. We're going to continue monitoring and ensuring that proper food supplies get to those who need it the most, as well as any other commodities we have available here in Canada.

Thank you.

[Translation]

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Thank you, Madame Marleau. We shall now move on to the question period. I am allowing members five minutes each because there are a lot of people on the list. It is absolutely essential to keep the limit to five minutes.

[English]

Do you want to start?

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Sure. Thank you, Mr. Graham.

Thank you, all three ministers.

We will be following our normal rules. We have two committees meeting, and Mr. Graham and I are going to make sure all members get a fair opportunity to pose their questions. We will start with the Reform Party critic for five minutes.

Mr. Hanger.

Mr. Art Hanger (Calgary Northeast, Ref.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to start off by saying I support NATO's present actions. I and my party strongly support Canada playing an active role in this Kosovo conflict.

My first question goes to the foreign affairs minister.

Prior to taking any decision to commit further Canadian Forces to the conflict in Yugoslavia, will you assure us that you will permit a free debate and free vote in Parliament on the matter?

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Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: We are still working under the mandate Parliament established last October in terms of the specific air action we're now engaged in. The Prime Minister has made quite clear that if there were to be any further commitment beyond that mandate, it would be brought back to Parliament, and we certainly stand by that.

Mr. Art Hanger: Just so that we are clear, Mr. Minister, that it isn't going to be decided by committee but rather will hit the floor of the House. That would be a good assurance.

My next question is to the defence minister.

Mr. Minister, you've been closing down the lines of communication between the military and the press. In other words, many Canadians are not really informed about precisely what our pilots and our troops are doing over in Yugoslavia. In contrast, if you look at Britain, for instance, they've been releasing video footage of their bombs hitting targets. The Americans have been taking members of the press up in B-52 bombing runs. They've been keeping their citizens very much aware of how and what their troops are doing.

So my question is, why is Canada hiding our operations from the Canadian public? Are you actually afraid of reprisals here in Canada from maybe ethnic Serb populations in our country? Why are we acting so timid in this regard?

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: Well, we're not acting timid. We're providing the information we can within the NATO guidelines. I hope the other countries within NATO are doing the same thing. We certainly are.

We're also bearing in mind our operational security. We're in an armed conflict situation. It's a very serious situation. We want to make sure we're not divulging information that gives comfort to the other side or that can in any way jeopardize the safety and security of our Canadian Forces personnel. I'm sure the honourable member wouldn't want us to do anything that would jeopardize their safety and security.

Mr. Art Hanger: Certainly, Mr. Minister, I wouldn't want to jeopardize their security or safety. I'm talking about informing the Canadian public as to how our troops are actually doing. Why should we want to keep certain kinds of information away from the public when, say, the American public have the opportunity and privilege of enjoying it, as do the British and others?

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: We are providing what information we can within the parameters of safety and security for our personnel and the NATO guidelines.

You want to know about how our people are doing? I'll tell you. They're doing very well. They are exercising these missions with top professional capacity and with great pride in being Canadians and being involved in this humanitarian mission.

We'll provide just as much information as we can. I understand that maybe the Americans and the British have provided information about some of their non-combat aircraft. We're not in possession of similar kinds of aircraft, so there couldn't be a similar situation. But with respect to the aircraft that are there, the jet fighters that are there, we are following NATO guidelines, we are following safety and security measures, and we'll provide just as much information just as fast as we can to best inform the Canadian public about what our troops are doing.

Mr. Art Hanger: Perhaps, Mr. Minister, we'll have to continue watching CNN.

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: I don't think you have to. You can watch Canadian channels. They'll tell you.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Everybody knows, of course, this isn't being carried on CNN.

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: Mr. Co-Chair, there are also our daily technical briefings. You might recognize General Henault, because he's on television every day at 1 o'clock giving technical briefings, together with staff, as to what is happening.

We'll continue to provide as much information as we possibly can.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): I'm sorry, Mr. Hanger. That's five minutes.

[Translation]

I now give the floor to Mr. Turp.

Mr. Daniel Turp (Beauharnois—Salaberry, BQ): To begin with, on behalf of the Bloc Québécois, I would like to reiterate our support for the NATO intervention in which Canada is taking part, and for the military operations under way, and I further want to mention our appreciation of what Canadian and Quebec soldiers are doing in the theatre of operations. However, we would like to see greater freedom of expression.

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Minister of Foreign Affairs Axworthy, you appear to be concerned about keeping the public informed about what is going on there, and it would be very interesting to allow the pilots and others to have more latitude to inform the public of what is happening in the theatre of operations.

The Bloc Québécois has two major concerns, and I would like to ask you questions about these two concerns. It appears to us that President Milosevic and his Serbian security forces have genocidal intentions. It is more than atrocities, barbarism and the ethnic cleansing of which the Minister of Defence spoke, in view of the accelerated pace. Earlier, you used military gobbledygook when you spoke about "ground troops". You told us that you had no plan to send ground troops. Under what conditions should there be land operations? If there is genocide or attempted genocide, would you feel that there should be land operations? That is our first concern.

Our second concern is more the bailiwick of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. It is the role of the UN and the Security Council. You said, Minister Axworthy, that you wanted to consolidate the international security system and that you had become the champion of an international security order. Canada has been a member of the Security Council for a few months now, but you have not supported the Security Council except perhaps to say that there might be a veto. How can you expect the Security Council to be credible, and for the United Nations to be credible, when everything you have said at the Security Council appears to give credit to the idea that the UN is powerless? Might you have considered, or could you have considered, having the United Nations General Assembly intervene under the Acheson resolution, with which you are familiar, and which has been used in earlier conflicts and could be used now to get the United Nations involved and taking action?

Those are our two concerns. Our main concern is that genocide may be under way. When we speak of Rwanda now, we know that Canadian Army generals felt that we might have been able to do something before it was too late. That is our main concern and we would like to hear what the government has to say about this.

[English]

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): I would remind the two ministers that the questioner has just left one minute for you both to answer the questions.

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: Okay, I'll take 30 seconds.

On the question of ground troops, I think I've responded to that. We will send in ground troops only under the conditions of a peacekeeping mission, if a peace agreement is signed.

To send ground troops there under current conditions would be highly risky for one thing, but secondly, quite aside from that, it would take weeks and months to be able to assemble that kind of force. Our effort at this point in time is in the air campaign.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Mr. Axworthy.

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: I'll maybe take 35 seconds, Chairman.

First, there are many ways in which the United Nations can be strengthened to deal with these new kinds of conflicts that are targeted against civilians. A clear example is the initiative we took in developing the International Criminal Court as a new United Nations-based institution that will provide individual accountability.

Even in the Security Council, a number of initiatives are presently under way, particularly as we look at activities in Africa, in Sierra Leone—in fact Mr. Pratt, who's my special envoy, just returned from that area—and other areas to see how we can mobilize support to the United Nations for a more effective reaction.

But in the specific case of Kosovo, because of the specific politics of some of the permanent members, they've used their veto to cancel the possibility of getting a resolution mandate supporting a chapter VII activity.

The debate that went into NATO, going back several months, was this. When that blockage is put forward, when that barrier is erected, is it up to other international organizations to meet the same kinds of mandates set out in the United Nations charter, in the Geneva Convention, and in the genocide convention, to provide a way of responding to those attacks upon vulnerable civilians?

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That debate was resolved. Having gone through the horrendous experience of Bosnia and having witnessed what took place in Rwanda, it was decided that it was up to the international community, through NATO, to provide an effective response, which is what we're doing.

It's not the most satisfactory. As I said in my remarks, we would have preferred the United Nations council, but the reality is Russia said it would veto any action and stop it. We're hoping to strengthen the capacity of the UN in a number of other areas so that it can begin to apply itself effectively to the new kinds of risks that individual human beings face around the world today.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, Minister Axworthy.

Pursuant to our rules, I'm going to go to the next questioner, the parliamentary secretary for national defence, Mr. Bertrand, for five minutes, please.

[Translation]

Mr. Robert Bertrand (Pontiac—Gatineau—Labelle, Lib.): I have two questions this morning. The first is for Mr. Eggleton.

Mister Minister, what kind of contact do you have, and how often, with the other NATO military leaders?

[English]

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: I have been touching base daily with our ambassador in Brussels, who informs me of the contacts he has with the heads of the mission in Brussels and the daily discussions at the North Atlantic Council, which are occurring with the permanent representatives. Our ambassador, David Wright, has been reporting regularly to both me and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of course.

I have also been in contact with both Mr. Robertson in the United Kingdom and Mr. Cohen, the Secretary of Defense in the United States. I expect to touch base again later today with Mr. Robertson in the U.K.

So I am keeping up to date on the concerns and opinions of the leaders of the other NATO countries, to determine how they see the mission proceeding. By and large they tell me they believe it is proceeding well in helping to meet the objectives we have set forward.

We are all hopeful, as we've expressed in these conversations, that the mission can bring the Yugoslav government back to the negotiating table as quickly as possible. We have all agreed that in fact the campaign needs to be intensified, because of the great threat to the people in Kosovo.

[Translation]

Mr. Robert Bertrand: Thank you very much.

My second question is for General Baril. I would like to know, General, what measures you have taken to protect our troops in Bosnia, Italy or elsewhere.

General Maurice Baril (Chief of the Defence Staff, Department of National Defence): Protecting our troops in its various missions in Italy or Bosnia is based on an assessment of the threat by the country that is hosting us or by our military troops.

In Bosnia, our troops are in contact with the Bosnian Serbs. We have taken appropriate measures within the command of the division to which we belong. We have deployed reserves and have indirect and direct fire capability to respond if there are changes in the Serbian population's attitude.

The threat comes not only from within the Bosnian Serb territories. It may also be multidirectional, whether from Sarajevo or elsewhere. Thus the security level has been increased considerably.

In Aviano, there has not yet been a threat evaluation. Security measures were taken. Additional security measures were taken at our bases in Canada.

[English]

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Mr. Robinson.

Mr. Svend J. Robinson (Burnaby—Douglas, NDP): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have two or three questions.

The Minister of National Defence and the Minister of Foreign Affairs have both stated that the objective of this exercise is to diminish the capacity of the Yugoslav army to inflict suffering and ethnic cleansing on the Kosovar Albanians. As we have witnessed, to our horror, in fact the level of ethnic cleansing has accelerated in Kosovo over the course of the past week, since the bombing started.

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The brutal reality is that Milosevic is winning the war on the ground. He is achieving his objectives on the ground in Kosovo. He is driving out, relentlessly, violently, in a genocidal way, Kosovar Albanians from Kosovo on the ground. He's sustaining the attacks on military installations from the air, and the level of brutality and ethnic cleansing has accelerated.

In light of this stark reality, I want to ask how the ministers respond to a couple of suggestions. One, in light of this reality on the ground and the fact that the fundamental objective of protecting the Kosovar Albanians, at least to this point, has tragically not been met, how does the government respond to the suggestion of the Government of Italy that we call at this point on Milosevic to withdraw his troops from Kosovo and end the ethnic cleansing, and accompany this by a cessation in bombing? The suggestion is that in fact the bombing stop, that there be a pause, while there is an attempt to go back to the negotiation table and arrive at a solution that will end the exodus of refugees.

Specifically as well, I want to ask whether, as part of that negotiation, the Government of Canada is prepared to consider, instead of a NATO peacekeeping force, as is proposed and envisaged by Rambouillet, a force made up of OSCE members, in particular including Russian troops. This may help to facilitate a solution that broadens it beyond NATO and moves into the OSCE.

I want to ask as well something that follows up on Mr. Turp's question. Should this fail—should an attempt to once again peacefully resolve this issue fail—and should the horror of ethnic cleansing continue and accelerate, is the Government of Canada prepared to consider, as General Lewis MacKenzie and others have recommended, a limited ground intervention to create a safe haven in Kosovo? This wouldn't be a direct engagement, but to create a safe haven to at least prevent the mass exodus of Kosovar Albanians.

And finally, just what are the current political objectives of this campaign? We know the Rambouillet accord is effectively dead as a result of what has taken place. The Unites States' State Department spokesperson has said the objective is somewhere between autonomy and independence for Kosovo. Just what is it that is now the political objective? What will it take to in fact arrive at a peaceful solution to this conflict?

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): You only have a brief amount of time for answers.

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: Well, Mr. Chairman, first I'd say to Mr. Robinson that it's a little early to throw in the flag. Mr. Milosevic hasn't won yet. It's too early to declare winners or losers.

As we cautioned in our opening statements, this is a campaign that can't be done through a quick fix. It does take some time. The Minister of National Defence has indicated that a shift in the military strategies is now taking place.

So I wouldn't be quite so quick to declare Mr. Milosevic the victor. The fact is that his strategy, his views, and his efforts to develop his greater Serbia vision go back a long time. He was clearly putting that in place in early October. The military action was a response to that, to try to put some barrier, some alternate, in the way. We need to give it some time to see if it can work.

As for the diplomatic side, I made it clear in my statement that we want to pursue any form of resolution that is reasonable and effective. We saw what happened yesterday, when Prime Minister Primakov, who was a close ally of the Serbs over a period of time, attempted to broker some kind of deal. He came back with what can only be described as a cruel joke for the Kosovars, basically saying, “We may talk if you stop bombing.” There was no guarantee of their safety, no guarantee that their rights would be protected, no guarantee that their return would be granted a degree of legitimacy, no effort to find a resolution to the matter.

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So at this point in time I think it's fair to say that any negotiation has to be based on some fundamental principles, and if you're continuing to murder people and expel people, and you say you may want to talk along the way, I don't think that is a particularly effective formula for negotiation.

Mr. Svend Robinson: What about the OSCE?

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: In this case the OSCE has already provided a very valuable service to the verification mission. But it was demonstrated, beginning in early January, that having unarmed monitors was proving ineffective—that the Serbs, the police, and the army were going around them. Not only were they harassing them, but they were engaging in a wide variety of acts of aggression against their own people, because the OSCE monitors did not have the capacity to respond.

As we found out through the Dayton Accords, when we went through that horrendous experience under the United Nations.... We had personnel on the ground in Bosnia, but they did not have a rule of engagement that would allow them to enforce the peace agreement. It had to be converted into SFOR, which in fact has now brought a degree of stability and peace to Bosnia. So if we can reach that stage....

But you need to have that backed up, because frankly, the way Mr. Milosevic works, unless you have the capacity to enforce, he will not live up to his obligations. That's been a clear pattern over the past 10 years.

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: I understand the member's frustration and I share it, as we watch the tens of thousands of people streaming over the border and bringing their horror stories with them. I can only tell you we are moving as fast as we can to carry out our air campaign to diminish the capability of the Yugoslav government to carry on that ethnic cleansing against those people. We are moving as fast as we possibly can to try to achieve that goal.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, Ministers.

Your time is up, Mr. Robinson. Thank you.

The next question goes to the defence member for the Progressive Conservatives, Mr. Price, for five minutes, please.

Mr. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, PC): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, I'd just like to say that the Progressive Conservative Party commends the work of our Canadian Forces. They're doing a good job under very difficult conditions.

This morning U.S. General Wesley Clark said that we never thought that through air power we could stop these killings on the ground. It's not possible. You can't stop paramilitaries going house to house with supersonic aircraft flying overhead and dropping bombs.

Minister Eggleton, you mentioned that the goals of the action are to take out the military targets and to prevent genocide. Who's judging these goals, how are they going to be attained, and how long do we wait for these goals to be attained before we modify?

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: It has never been suggested that we could stop people from going house to house, the individuals with their individual weaponry, by means of an air campaign. The purpose of the air campaign is to diminish the capacity for them to do that.

We are hitting supply facilities, ammunition facilities, tanks, other armoured facilities—in fact whatever hit we can conduct—on these resources that are enabling them to carry out the ethnic cleansing. We are focused on reducing their capacity.

Reducing their capacity doesn't mean you can stop every individual with the air campaign. I wish we could. But reducing their capacity is the objective here, and to hit sufficiently at the Yugoslav military, paramilitary, and police forces to eventually get this matter back to the negotiating table.

Mr. David Price: But who's monitoring? Who's monitoring that we're reaching our goals, or that we're not reaching those goals, which is what some of the talk is now?

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: The NATO military of course are doing that. They get reports from the sorties that are going out. There have been visuals and reports on television every day, from Brussels, from our own defence headquarters and others, to give an indication of what the missions in fact are accomplishing.

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One thing that has also been made very clear—and I would reiterate this—is that, as impatient and frustrated as we are about the refugee problem and the horror stories coming out of Kosovo, it is not something we can do in just a few days. This air campaign is taking some period of time, but I can tell you it is being evaluated as we go.

One of the reasons we stepped up the air campaign was the reports of the atrocities on the ground in Kosovo.

Mr. David Price: But the problem is we don't seem to have any solid take on the reports. We don't have media in there; they've been pushed out. We don't really have people in there, do we? That's the question.

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: We don't have people in on the ground in Kosovo, but reports do come out. They're unconfirmed in many cases, but that's as a result of the conditions that exist. Milosevic, remember, has turfed out the international media, and he himself does not provide a free media.

Mr. David Price: That's right, but how will we know when we reach our goal?

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: Mr. Price, let me add that the NATO council is convened on a daily basis, and sometimes twice a day. It receives reports directly from military assessments and from national capitals as to what their judgments and assessments are. The NATO ambassadors are asked to then report back or to make decisions about shifting or changing it from the political point of view and making those assessments.

In addition, as Mr. Bertrand asked about, all of us are in daily contact with our counterparts. I have talked to virtually all my counterpart ministers, as well as NATO officials and Security Council members, just to maintain a constant, ongoing assessment of what is happening and how the objectives are being met. So there is that political accountability, as it goes along with the military side.

But we have to go back to that very important point: the second phase of the campaign has really just begun over the last 36 to 48 hours, and because of some bad weather, it hasn't been fully implemented. That's why I cautioned Mr. Robinson not to rush to judgment too quickly until we see what the impact of that is.

And as I've said, depending on the will of this committee, we'll continue to report back to members of the committee to give you our assessments of where we're at.

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: Our goal will be met when we get the ethnic cleansing stopped and when we get the Yugoslav government back to the negotiating table to sign a peace agreement.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Thank you, Ministers.

Mr. Stinson, sir.

Mr. Darrel Stinson (Okanagan—Shuswap, Ref.): Thank you.

First of all I do want to state my party's support for the current NATO military action taking place in Yugoslavia.

Having said that, we've heard now that we are going to add six more CF-18s over there. I would like to know if these aircraft will be equipped with the same military capabilities as the first six.

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: Yes.

Mr. Darrel Stinson: Okay.

If the air campaign does not work, if it's not successful in achieving the results you desire, what timeframe are you going to place on that? What is your plan? What is your timeframe for that to take place?

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: There is no end date; there is only an end state. The end state is reaching our objectives. As I said earlier, our objectives are to stop the ethnic cleansing and to get the Yugoslav government back to the negotiating table and work out a peace agreement.

Mr. Darrel Stinson: If that air campaign does not work, what is your next step from there?

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: I don't think we should be speculating on it not working. We should show resolve to make it work to the best of our ability, and that's exactly what we're doing. We've put in additional resources and we've stepped up our activity with those additional resources, because of our concern for the plight of the people of Kosovo.

Mr. Darrel Stinson: The public hears this phrase, “ethnic cleansing”. I want to know from you.... We know the atrocities that are going on over there—

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Mr. Stinson, might I interrupt on a point of order? There's some confusion. Excuse me.

Page 2 was missing from Minister Axworthy's notes for his remarks, which were distributed. I'm informed that page is being passed around now. So if you're wondering what this page is that you're getting, it's the missing page 2 from the minister's remarks. His verbal presentation was quite full, but here's the page that was missing.

I'll go back to you now, Mr. Stinson.

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Mr. Darrel Stinson: Thank you.

The public out there hears everything about this ethnic cleansing. We know about the atrocities going on there. There's an abundance of evidence of what's going on over there. I want to know what the government's definition of “ethnic cleansing” is. Are you trying to be politically correct out there? What is your definition of “ethnic cleansing”?

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: Well, this is terminology that we've seen developed as a result of what's been going on in Yugoslavia for a number of years, of the kind of situation that has been inflicted on the people there by Slobodan Milosevic. He appears to want to have the Serbian population to have control over Yugoslavia and has oppressed, in the case of Kosovo, the people of ethnic Albanian origin, who are the majority of the people there.

In terms of ethnic cleansing, quite aside from whatever definition you might come to by reading a dictionary, there is in fact what we've experienced in Kosovo and in other areas of Yugoslavia. It has resulted in many thousands upon thousands of innocent men, women, and children being harassed, hurt, killed, displaced from their homes, and watching their homes and their villages being burned. Even before the air campaign started, over 470,000 people were displaced from their homes in Kosovo. That is part of his ethnic cleansing campaign.

That is unacceptable to the international community. It's unacceptable to Canadians and Canadian values. I believe Canadians do not want us to stand idly by and watch him perpetrate this evil—this premeditated, calculated evil called ethnic cleansing—against the people of Kosovo. That's why we're taking the action we're taking, both in terms of the military effort and in terms of the humanitarian effort for the refugees.

Mr. Darrel Stinson: Thank you.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Mr. Hanger, you have about a minute.

Mr. Art Hanger: I have a question for Mr. Axworthy.

During the Gulf War debate, sir, you argued that Canada's role should be limited to one of diplomacy, not one of military action. In fact you're quoted as saying, “For us to become a combatant,”—that is, Canada—“for us to be on the front lines, will destroy and eliminate the ability of Canada to play that kind of role.”

Now, Mr. Minister, you're advocating taking strong action against Yugoslavia. In fact in a recent interview, you, as minister, indicated that you were annoyed that the western powers have known since October that Milosevic was building a large force and had done nothing about it. So my question to you is, why aren't our allies listening to Canada or to the foreign affairs minister? Where has all our influence gone?

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: I'm not sure how the premise falls into the question, but let me just say we have been a very active voice, both at the United Nations and in the NATO council, in dealing with the problem of Kosovo. Very early on we identified this as a part of the same sequence of events in the Milosevic grand design and that we would ignore Kosovo at our peril.

Beginning at the United Nations when we became members of the council, we did everything possible to ensure that it was brought to the attention of the council to see how much consensus could be found. In the NATO council, we also said it was important that we try to find a resolution on the Kosovo issue. As someone said, it should have probably been incorporated as part of the Dayton Accords, but that's former history.

Our voice has been listened to, because we are now taking tough action on the defence of humanitarian principles. That's perhaps one thing, Mr. Hanger, that your party hasn't quite understood. We have been putting forward a very explicit agenda for Canada's foreign policy, which is called human security, the defence of individuals, the defence of civilians. It is establishing a different standard and set of rules of law. If at times it takes effective enforcement action to bring that about, we are clearly supportive of that, although we would certainly prefer to have it resolved by diplomatic or peaceful means.

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The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, Minister Axworthy.

As co-chairs, we would like to remind you that we're alternating between defence committee and foreign affairs committee members. If your name is on the list, we remind you that we're certainly going to try to accommodate all members, but we're trying to blend the two committees. We're certainly getting some interesting questions.

With that, I'd like to go to the next Liberal defence member, Mr. O'Reilly, for five minutes, please.

Mr. John O'Reilly (Haliburton—Victoria—Brock, Lib.): Thank you very much, Co-Chairs.

Thank you, Ministers, for attending. Our phones and faxes are pretty busy in the ridings, so I want to cover some of the questions people are asking me.

The first one Madame Marleau touched on just briefly. Can people contribute by going to the Red Cross in order to reach the population and make sure things will be done? Is that the number one agency for donations?

Ms. Carolyn McAskie (Vice-President, Multilateral Branch, Canadian International Development Agency): If I may, I will answer on behalf of Madame Marleau.

We are in contact with the Red Cross about obtaining supplies to ship to the region. The Red Cross, I understand, will also be collecting, as they usually do in response to any kind of humanitarian emergency. They are always collecting funds for these things. Canadians who wish to contribute would be most welcome to send money to the Red Cross.

I would suggest that in your dealings with your constituents, you might want to ask them, before they send goods rather than cash, to ascertain the utility of those goods. Out of the kindness of Canadians' hearts, they often want to send a lot of things they feel would be useful, whereas in fact we try to rely on the Red Cross's own contacts on the ground in the region to find out exactly what the priority requirements are.

Certainly cash contributions to the Red Cross are very welcome. They will notify at a later date whether they will be collecting goods as well.

Mr. John O'Reilly: Thank you.

The second part of that is, can you clear up whether it is $3.8 million, $4 million, or $10 million that Canada is involved in for the CIDA contribution? There are three or four numbers out there. If it is $10 million, how does that fit into the total package of other countries in that relief effort?

Ms. Carolyn McAskie: In terms of the Canadian contribution, the minister mentioned three figures this morning. The $3.18 million is funds we dispersed in the region on humanitarian efforts prior to the current crisis. This is funding to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, to UNICEF, to the World Food Programme, to the Red Cross, and through CARE Canada. Those amounts total $3.18 million.

The second figure she mentioned, of close to $4 million, is actually $3.85 million, which is through the peace-building fund. Of that, $3 million is the fund that went to the Canadian contribution to the Kosovo verification mission, i.e. the Canadian observers who joined the OSCE mission. All of that money has not been spent, because of course a lot of them are now being pulled out and are coming home, but that money is still available and will be applied to the mission when circumstances allow it to be remounted. In addition, $850,000 went to the civilian police arrangement. That's the $3.85 million.

The moneys the minister announced yesterday are an additional $10 million, and the final decision on how that will be allocated is being made in cooperation with our partners on the ground. Fully $5 million will go immediately to the UNHCR, the High Commissioner for Refugees, and the other $5 million will be divided up amongst UNICEF, Canadian NGOs, and the Red Cross, including the purchases the minister mentioned would be loaded onto the defence plane. Those will come out of the second half of that $10 million.

Mr. John O'Reilly: Thank you very much.

My next question involves military matters. Bombing in the Second World War and in Vietnam and so forth has never been the final solution or the end of the plan. In fact troops on the ground are what decides who wins or loses. So I just wondered what the overall exit plan was in concert with that. If we're not going in with troops on the ground, is there an exit plan?

And my last question—I know I won't have more time, because the chairman is going to cut me off here—is about the accuracy of the press reports. The CNN American propaganda seems to override everything. We seem to have CBC on the back shelf, with CNN taking the lead and CFTO being the only source in Canada that is reliable for Canadian content. This is what I'm asked by people who are watching television. We're not all subject to everything, but....

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The other military question is about the six additional CF-18s. Where exactly are they going—if that can be revealed? Will the addition of those CF-18s reduce the risk from high to low?

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: Well, the additional—

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): No plugs for any television programs.

Voices: Oh, oh!

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: Oh, so I can't tell you that I thought CTV News 1 had the information at the start of it, before CNN did? I can't tell you that? Okay, I won't tell you that.

In terms of the exit plan, the exit plan is indeed the framework of the Rambouillet talks, the peace agreement, because after this conflict is over, there will be the question of the refugees returning, the question of how Kosovo is governed in future, and the question of the autonomy of the province. A lot of questions will need to be answered, and troops are going to be necessary in peacekeeping, peace enforcement, on the ground. That has always been envisioned through the Rambouillet process. That really is the exit plan from the current military conflict.

In terms of the six additional CF-18s, we expect that they'll be stationed in Aviano with our other CF-18s. It only makes sense to keep them all together in one location. I must say, though, that the airfield at Aviano is packed with NATO allies' planes and support personnel. But every effort is being made now with the Italian government to work in our additional CF-18s and personnel at that location.

I expect our personnel at Aviano will go up from approximately 130 to about 200.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Mr. Axworthy.

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: If I could use Mr. O'Reilly's comments just for a plug, he does have a very serious point. This particular event, where Canadians are so deeply involved, does demonstrate the importance of having Canadian channels of information, communication and reporting.

I've noticed in the past year that decisions have been made—not at the working level, but at the management level—at a number of our media networks to shut down their international bureaus and their level of reporting. This particular event should be a demonstration of how important it is that we maintain a good and open sense of Canadian communication, because there are issues that are very vital to us and also very Canadian to us.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. O'Reilly.

[Translation]

Mr. Laurin of the Bloc Québécois, you have five minutes.

Mr. René Laurin (Joliette, BQ): Mister Minister, one of the questions that I am most often asked by citizens is the following: when are we going to take a different approach to put a stop to this crisis? At the moment, there are air strikes. While we are attacking Milosevic's warehouses, Milosevic has in his hands a weapon that he has been using every day to expel Albanians from Kosovo.

The Minister told us just now that there was no deadline, but how many people will have to be expelled from the country before another form of action is taken? We have reached 25 per cent. Is the maximum we are prepared to accept 50 per cent or 75 per cent? When are we going to take away from Milosevic the weapon he has to prevent him from continuing to wreak havoc?

If his trump card can allow him to do what he wants to do, then even if we destroy his stockpiles, the Albanians may be cleared out of their country within 15 days or a week. What is the deadline? There has to be one.

[English]

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: First let me repeat that the movement, the expulsion, and the harassment of people did not start on March 24. It started much earlier than that. It is deeply ingrained and goes to the point of view that President Milosevic and his government had about trying to establish a greater Serbia and going through the re-engineering of the population.

There were already over 400,000 displaced persons in Kosovo before the military action ever began. This is not an event that happened just in the last seven days.

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The question was how to stop it. What we saw clearly, beginning very early in the new year, was a buildup of close to 25,000 additional Serbian troops inside the borders. He was preparing for a spring offensive whether there was a military attack or not. That's why the decision was made to provide a military response to try to deter as much as we possibly could. As we've explained, it does take some time to do that. There is no quick fix.

I know that in today's electronic, wired world we like to have instant solutions, but unfortunately the kind of degradation that has been carried out in that region goes back over a long time and has very strong roots.

But at least we are taking a stand. We are doing something about it. It could end in the next 15 minutes, if Mr. Milosevic would pick up that phone and say, “I am agreeing to stop the intimidation of my own people. I am prepared to sit down, on the basis of a series of principles, to ensure basic rights of Kosovars, whose land it is, who lived there. We'll try to work out, whether it's through the Rambouillet framework or parts of it, an agreement that will allow some degree of decision-making in that area for their future.” Then we could stop and get on with the negotiation.

But right now there is no such indication. The tragedy was brought home very vividly yesterday when Mr. Primakov, after six hours of discussion with Mr. Milosevic, came back with basically a non-solution. There was no basis for negotiation. So we have to continue with what we're doing.

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: Let me just add that it is distressing to see what is happening to the people of Kosovo, and I can assure the honourable member, I can assure all of you, that we're doing as much as we can, as fast as we can, to relieve that pressure on them, to diminish the capacity of Milosevic and his henchmen to do what they're doing against the Kosovar people. He and his people who are inflicting this pain and this death on the people of Kosovo must be held accountable.

[Translation]

Mr. René Laurin: Mr. Chairman, because we seem uncertain about—

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Excuse me, Mr. Laurin.

Mr. René Laurin: Is my five minutes up already?

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Yes, indeed. You have had your five minutes.

[English]

Mr. Assadourian.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian (Brampton Centre, Lib.): Thank you very much. I have two questions.

First, I understand only 11 nations are participating in this Kosovo attack. The other eight are not. We are one of those 11 that are participating. Do you think, Mr. Minister, that in the future we will lose our ability to be impartial peacekeepers for conflicts? Will we be going all the way—there won't be peace in the area to keep, so it's going to be either total victory or nothing? That's my first question.

Also, as part of this question, how come the other eight are left out? Do you participate as you wish, or do you have a commitment and do your job as a member of NATO?

Second, I received a phone call from a constituent who asked me to ask you this question when I got the chance. Because the Security Council did not have a chance to debate this or to approve the attack on Kosovo, is it possible to interpret—maybe wrongly, but that's the question I was asked to ask you—that NATO lost the ability to be independent, that we became part of the U.S. foreign policy, too, in the world? If NATO is going to act on their own every time the UN doesn't agree with the U.S. or NATO, the UN is irrelevant.

Is the UN relevant to international security?

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: In regard to the question on the NATO countries involved in the air campaign action, to my knowledge, it's approximately 11 out of the 19, but let me emphasize that all 19 are solidly supporting this action. However, for example, small countries such as Luxembourg—or Iceland, which doesn't even have an armed forces—obviously are not contributing. Other countries, because of their concerns with their neighbours on the borders with Yugoslavia, are not participating directly in providing manpower and equipment for the air campaign, but they are solidly supporting the campaign at the NATO council meetings.

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I'm sorry, but I can't remember if there were other questions for me. I know you asked some questions that Mr. Axworthy will answer, but were there other military questions?

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: The second part of the question was, don't they have to participate in any activity NATO plans and agrees on? There is no obligation for it?

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: No. It's voluntary. They certainly subscribe to the objectives of NATO overall, and they're participants in it. In this particular mission, it's the decision of each country as to their participation, but the important thing here is that even though not all of them are providing assets and people for the air campaign, they are all solidly supporting the endeavour.

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: If I could just add a footnote, it's interesting to note that, for example, this is the first time Germany has actually engaged in this major kind of action as a member of NATO. So Germany felt the same strong compulsion that many others do. Such a horrendous tragedy was taking place that they overcame what had been a standing principle for really the last 40 or 50 years.

Sarkis, on your other point, let me put it this way. The Security Council and the charter were really designed at a time when wars were fought primarily across borders. They were aggressions of one country against another, and therefore the whole structure was designed to meet that threat to security.

In today's world, 90% of the wars are inside borders. They are caused internally. They are varieties of ethnic, cultural, and economic conflicts of warlords, hooligans, and governments that repress people. That's why they have fundamentally changed the nature of the security problem we face. The traditional one is still there, it still exists, but it is now being added to by a much different kind of security issue.

All of the international organizations—the UN, NATO—are wrestling with the most appropriate way to respond to this. That has been, as you well know, part of the major thrust of our own discussions and debates in Canadian foreign policy: to try to adjust and retool our own approach to take into account that 90% of the wars are internal and 90% of the victims are civilian.

In the First World War, 5% of the victims were civilians. Now 90% are, which has fundamentally changed the nature of the wars we're dealing with. Therefore we have to change the response. In this case, in my view, the Security Council has an enormously important role to play.

I think it can still, when it can work well, respond to these new kinds of conditions and establish new kinds of initiatives, but it is hampered by two things.

One, the veto is often exercised by some of the permanent members, not on a broad basis of collective security, but to meet their own specific domestic political objectives.

Two, the UN doesn't have any money. They're $1.7 billion in arrears. As a result, people are reluctant to put the Security Council into any kind of peace measure, because they know they can't pay for it. That has become a very serious handicap to Security Council operations, which is one reason we are asking for reform in those critical areas, to get the Security Council to recognize the changing nature of security and to get the bills paid so that it actually has the resources to respond to these issues.

The UN charter also recognizes the right of regional and international organizations to respond to security threats in their own region, which is what NATO is doing. Not only do we see this as a basis for the humanitarian issue—which is the kind of world we're living in—but it also clearly had major threats of instability in the entire European region, and it is a responsibility of NATO's to respond.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, Minister Axworthy.

The next question goes to Mr. Earle, the NDP defence critic.

Mr. Earle, five minutes, please.

[Translation]

Mr. Gordon Earle (Halifax West, NDP): Thank you Mr. Chairman.

[English]

I have four questions. I'll throw them all out quickly in the hope that I can get a response to each one.

First of all, it's been mentioned that the purpose of the bombing has been to try to bring parties to the table around the Rambouillet peace accord. As this conflict goes on, it seems highly unlikely that you're going to get these people who are being ethnically cleansed sitting down and living side by side peacefully with the people who are causing them the harm. Has any consideration been given to looking at the terms of that treaty again to see what might reasonably bring these sides closer together?

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Secondly, Canada has long been known for taking the initiative in peace movements and in peace efforts; witness the landmines project. What are we doing diplomatically in the way of negotiation to try to bring an end to this conflict? Or is our role simply that of participating in the bombing?

Thirdly, we've gone from six CF-18s to twelve. What is our limit, and what will be the next step if things do not get resolved?

And lastly, could we have a comment perhaps on the concept of a safe haven for refugees, which was mentioned by Mr. Robinson?

Thank you.

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: Well, Mr. Earle, whatever you call it, the Rambouillet framework did propose some very basic principles. One was that the intimidation and harassment of the citizens of Kosovo should cease and that military police force should not be used to repress their own citizens. Second, the autonomy that was taken away from Kosovo in 1989 should be restored. And third, there should be a form of approval or involvement of Kosovo citizens.

There was also to be an international presence in Kosovo itself to ensure that those principles would be enforced, because clearly what happened between October and January is that the verification mission, while it provided a very useful service, was being increasingly limited and in fact challenged in what it could do.

So whatever name you give it, those are still the principles. As I said in my opening remarks, they should be the basis for negotiation.

Are we undertaking activities? Yes. In addition to the work of the council, I have been literally constantly on the phone to foreign ministers, counterparts. The Prime Minister is speaking to his counterparts.

We're also talking actively to members of the Security Council. As I indicated, I'll be in New York tomorrow to meet with the secretary general, the new president of the council, and other members of the council to see what further actions we can take in response to the humanitarian issue, and see about the political measures.

We will not in any way reduce our effort to find a peaceful resolution as quickly as we can, but it has to go in company with the military action, because if we stopped that cold turkey, Milosevic would then say, as your colleague said, that he has won. That's why in this case the two have to go in parallel.

Mr. Gordon Earle: What about talking directly to Milosevic, as the Russians attempted to do?

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: I haven't decided to go to Belgrade yet, no, but we have an open channel. We still have diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The ambassador is still here. We have called him in on a number of areas to indicate our concerns and our interest. We will continue to keep that channel open.

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: I'll answer the two military questions.

First of all, as for going from six to twelve CF-18s and what's next, we don't anticipate at this point in time that there will be a request for additional aircraft. We do have additional CF-18s we could consider, but we'll await further developments before entertaining that matter.

With respect to the concept of a safe haven, as I indicated to you earlier, if we were to send in ground troops, we would need a very robust group of ground troops to help ensure a safe haven under these kinds of conditions. It would take some period of time, in very risky conditions, to put them in there.

We should also bear in mind that in the case of Bosnia, it didn't work. Srebrenica is a great example of that. People were held hostage tied to poles and ethnic cleansing was at its worst stage; absolute extermination was carried out. So so-called safe havens are not safe havens at all, as has been proven.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Thank you, Minister.

Mr. Pickard.

Mr. Jerry Pickard (Chatham—Kent Essex, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I also want to commend you and commend our troops for the job they're doing.

In the press we're getting very mixed messages. The suggestion very clearly is that we are putting air support into Kosovo, but in fact we're only half-committing, because we're not putting ground troops in. The suggestion is that we can never end this conflict, stop the ethnic cleansing, and complete the objectives we have here, your three objectives, without some ground troop commitment.

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I hear much of what Mr. Axworthy just said, but are there other reasons that ground troops have totally been wiped out from the initial start?

Secondly, as we go through the process, it seems to be an evolving process. I've heard as well that the military strategy can change from day to day. I'm assuming that our general and other people involved in the command of the joint chiefs from all countries are calling the decisions and making suggestions as to what direction we're taking.

How is that process carried out, how is it put in place, and to what extent do you see us committed to this war into the future? You're saying it's going to take a lot of time, and we all understand that, but do you have any objective as to where we're going and where we're going to end up in this conflict?

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: Well, certainly we hope we're going to end up with a peace agreement and with the Kosovar Albanian population being able to occupy their place in Kosovo. Our objectives in the air campaign are to get the negotiating back in process and to bring about a diplomatic, political solution to this and start to address those questions about the future of the people of Kosovo.

With respect to the processes of the NATO allies in consultation, this is happening daily in Brussels. All 19 countries have missions in Brussels. As I indicated to you earlier, our ambassador, David Wright, meets with the other ambassadors and Secretary General Solana on a daily basis, maybe even more if necessary, to talk about these issues.

We also have parallel structures for the military. Admiral King is our head military person there, and under the military committee, chaired by General Naumann of Germany, constant consultation is going on among those people so that the maximum amount of cooperation is engaged in.

As for ground troops, right from the beginning, the only discussion on ground troops in NATO, the only desire by the NATO allies.... And remember, a consensus has to be reached among what was 16 then and is 19 now. Consensus has definitely been reached with respect to ground troops following on a peace agreement. As I indicated previously, approximately 800 Canadians would participate in that. There has been no discussion at the NATO council, to my knowledge, of troops on the ground under the current kinds of conflict conditions.

As I've said previously, the effort of NATO is through the air campaign, and while it can't stop every individual act of ethnic cleansing on the ground, it's to diminish the capacity and the resources those people have to be able to carry out that kind of atrocity against the Kosovar people. We are continuing with that campaign effort. A lot more can be done to diminish their capacity.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): I'm sorry, Mr. Pickard, your time is up.

We'll go to Mr. Bachand.

[Translation]

Mr. André Bachand (Richmond—Arthabaska, PC): For a number of weeks now, people have been dying in Kosovo, and in Yugoslavia. There are people dying because of the Milosevic regime, and there are now people who are dying because of NATO's intervention.

A short while ago, we were speaking about definitions. I can tell you one thing: whether you want it or not, Canada is at war. It is very clear that Canada is at war. Canada is at war without Parliament ever having voted to give the government a mandate for a military intervention on this scale, whether it is justified or not. Parliament has never spoken. There have only been a few hours of debate, but Parliament has not decided. You are very well aware of this, but, with respect, allow me to remind you of it, Parliament speaks with votes, not with sterile debates.

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Do you believe that Parliament should vote on continuing the NATO intervention? That is my first question.

Secondly, we increasingly hear words about ethnic cleansing and massacres. We hear that Milosevic is becoming a terrorist, a criminal, and that he needs to be watched very closely. We are in the process of labelling him a criminal against humanity. We have heard you doing this since eleven o'clock this morning. However, in response to one question, you have said that the way out was "to bring back that government to the negotiating table." Thus you are prepared. Would you be prepared to negotiate with someone whom you feel is responsible, whether directly or indirectly, for crimes against humanity? Isn't that painting international diplomacy into a corner?

[English]

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: Let me respond first.

Since 1993, since we became the government, we have had a very clear policy of discussing with Parliament any form of overseas deployment of troops. The ultimate decision is a cabinet decision, but Parliament has always been engaged. It wasn't before, by the way. There were many periods when it was not, under the previous government.

Oh, yes, Mr. Price. I was there; I know. It was not involved.

Mr. André Bachand: I mean no disrespect to you, but because of the timing....

It would be quite easy to have a vote and discuss this, and inform parliamentarians and inform the Canadian people of what's happening. It's quite frustrating for us today to have a couple of minutes when Canada is involved in a mission to save people. We need to be informed. The best way you can use us is to bring back Parliament and have a vote and continue the discussion and information.

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: Well, Mr. Bachand, before I was interrupted, I wanted to point out that there was a four-hour debate in October. Every member of Parliament who wanted to use their full twenty minutes to express themselves had the opportunity to do so. At that point in time, all parties in the House gave a mandate for the kind of military action we're now engaged in. Nobody at that time said they would not support it. Everybody supported it.

If you're changing your position, that would be helpful to know. I did read the statement your leader put forward a week or so ago. I thought it indicated a very strong support. Perhaps you should talk to him about that.

But the fact is we have used Parliament on all occasions. We have used parliamentary briefings. We have been here for close to two hours. How one can say they haven't been given an opportunity for a full airing of all the questions over two hours, I don't know. I suppose you could try it for four hours and see if more could be done.

We will continue to do that. We have said also that if there is any further major change in the nature of our action, then we will again come back to Parliament, as we have done in all other deployments. That is the basic policy of this government, because we do think it's important to keep parliamentarians informed.

At the same time, we have also kept critics informed. You know yourself that when the actions were taken on the weekend, we immediately contacted the offices of every critic to bring them up to a full level of information and to find out what their inclination was. When the chairman indicated they wanted a committee meeting, we agreed.

So to suggest that somehow there isn't a parliamentary role is not correct.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, Monsieur Bachand.

Mr. André Bachand: I have a small point of order.

[Translation]

I would like to request the unanimous support of the members of the committee to make a motion by one o'clock requesting that the government recall the House as quickly as possible to discuss the issue of Kosovo. I would like to have the unanimous support of all members of Parliament. I think that it is in the interests of all members.

The participation of members of Parliament is important, and I believe that we should use this opportunity to ask the government to recall the House so that we can discuss the issue and be informed about it. I would therefore request the unanimous support of my colleagues so that we can table a motion before the end of the meeting, before 1:00 p.m., asking the government to recall the House as quickly as possible.

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The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Mr. Bachand, here is what I suggest to you. As you know, the rules of our Committee requires 48 hours' notice for such a motion, whereas the National Defence Committee requires 24 hours' notice. Hence, in principle, unanimous consent is necessary.

The ministers will be leaving in 10 minutes and there are still many members who would like to ask questions. The joint chairs therefore suggest that the Committee members remain after the ministers have left to discuss issues like the one you have raised. After the members have asked the ministers their questions, and the latter have left, we can then debate among ourselves what to do next.

[English]

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, Mr. Bachand.

Now to Mr. Peric for five minutes, please.

Mr. Janko Peric (Cambridge, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ministers and General, as we know, all this started in Kosovo, then Vojvodina, and then Montenegro, with the last of their elected members in the governments over ten years ago. Then it started in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia.

As you mentioned and as Mr. O'Reilly mentioned before, CNN is bringing the news, and I don't know how accurate that news is. My question to you is, to your knowledge, are there any civilian casualties in the territory of Serbia, not Kosovo, as a result of air attacks?

Second, we know that today's government in Podgorica does not side and agree with Milosevic's actions. If they decide to separate from Yugoslavia, are we going to be passive, as we have been so far?

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: Which country?

Mr. Janko Peric: Podgorica is in Montenegro.

And Mr. Axworthy, I don't know if you've had any discussions with the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, but to your knowledge, are we willing or ready to accept any refugees?

Those are my questions.

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: I'll take the first one.

I think we all know of CNN's reputation. They've not been able to get much direct information—in fact nobody from the west has been able to get much direct information—because of their removal. They were kicked out of Belgrade not too long ago. But obviously CNN brings an American perspective to it all.

However, the Canadian broadcasting entities are attempting to keep people up to date, and we in National Defence are attempting to do that. We have these technical briefings every day. I'd invite members to come to them or view them on television. They're on the internal television system and they're being carried live on CTV News 1. There's also the Internet. We have information on the Internet so that you can keep up through that means as well.

With respect to civilian casualties, I don't know about civilian casualties in Serbia and the Yugoslav republic. I can tell you that in the use of precision-guided munitions, every effort is made to hit military targets and to diminish any possibility of hitting civilian infrastructure or of civilians being killed or hurt in this endeavour.

In fact you'll hear that sometimes when our missions go into Yugoslav airspace, they come back without having released the weapons. That's if they can't positively identify the military target they're trying to hit. We want to make sure we reduce the possibility of what is called collateral damage, or hurting or killing civilians. Every effort is being made in that regard, and with the bad weather, there are a number of occasions when they can't release their weapons. That's the same not only for Canadians but for all of the allies.

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: On the other two questions, Janko, let me say first that you raise a very important point about the vulnerability of Montenegro. The democratically elected government of that region has clearly been a thorn in the side of Mr. Milosevic. He doesn't like democratically elected governments. He's made a number of efforts to upset or overturn them. This crisis might also be a flashpoint to undertake similar action against them.

• 1255

It is a matter of real concern that's been addressed at the council. We ministers are talking about what can be done to try to reinforce the position of Montenegro.

It's important to note in particular that up to this point in time, they have accepted almost 45,000 refugees coming out of Kosovo, so there is also, as there are in other adjoining countries such as Macedonia and Albania, a real factor of instability, simply because of the huge pressure and demand of responding to that kind of crisis.

But it goes back and it fits the pattern. We know what this gentleman is up to and what he tries to do. Therefore Montenegro has to be clearly centre on our screen in terms of level of concern. I'm glad you raised it. We have made a very strong call that those borders be protected and that the Government of Montenegro be preserved, and that Milosevic not be allowed to attempt to overturn it.

On the question of immigration, from talking with Mrs. Ogata yesterday, it's quite clear that the priority right now, as Mr. Eggleton and Madame Marleau have said, is to get immediate aid to the hundreds of thousands of people who are in dire straits. Any resettlement would have to be a discussion topic of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. It would not be an individual decision by Canada itself. If there were some attempt to relieve pressures, that discussion would take place among the United Nations High Commissioner and its constituent members. It really is an international response.

Right now there is no intention of doing that, because, let's put it very clearly, the people who are being expelled want to go back home. It's their home. It's their place. They have as much right to be there as anybody else. If you start resettlement right away, then you are acknowledging that the ethnic cleansing attitude of Milosevic in fact has some currency.

There are areas where we can be of assistance, as we have been in the past—for example, by taking children or others who have certain disabilities and things of that kind—but that would be in full discussion with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, Minister Axworthy. I'm sorry, but time is up now.

We go now to Mr. Hanger for five minutes.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Just before you do, I'm wondering, Ministers, could we fit in another two questioners? Could you stay an extra five minutes?

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: Sure.

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: Sure.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Thank you.

Mr. Hanger, then Madame Beaumier.

Mr. Art Hanger: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like to get back to the subject of our troops over in Aviano. I realize there are some on the ground in Macedonia too, but in particular I want to talk about our troops in Aviano.

It wasn't too many years ago, in fact two or three, that a Canadian pilot won the Top Gun award, I understand, in a contest in the United States. That's quite an honour and obviously is a clear indication of how well our pilots are trained.

This is something the public has a high degree of interest in. If they were to be informed about just exactly how well our troops are performing.... I believe they are performing very well, given the fact that on that first run into Serbia they took out three of the targets they had been assigned to knock out. So my first question is just how effective are the pilots in hitting their targets?

I would also like to know how many precision-guided munitions and Maverick missiles have been used so far. My understanding is that all the Canadian Hornets are equipped with a rotary cannon. They're equipped with two versions of Sidewinder air-to-air missiles. They are also equipped with some Maverick air-to-ground missiles, and they're television-guided. Along with those items, I understand they also have the Nighthawk FLIR, which is an infrared camera.

Just how many missiles have been fired and hit their targets? And would the Minister of National Defence assure us and Canadians that these budget cutbacks we're facing will not be a factor in whether our pilots can do their job or not?

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: Well, I'm glad the honourable member has finally admitted that our pilots are well trained. He'll be happy to know that so are military personnel throughout the Canadian Forces.

He has quite correctly cited a number of pieces of equipment and capabilities that exist in our CF-18s, but I do not want to describe exactly what is on these planes at the time of their missions, for security reasons.

• 1300

Mr. Art Hanger: It's in the media already.

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: But you're talking about the capability.

Mr. Art Hanger: It's already in the press.

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: I'm sorry. If you think you already know this, I don't know why you're asking it. I don't want to get into specifics on each mission.

We're not into a scorecard situation here with respect to how many weapons have been released. We are there to carry out a mission to the best of the capability of these individuals, and they are top professionals and they are doing a very effective job in carrying out this mission.

I'll let the Chief of Defence Staff supplement that further.

Gen Maurice Baril: We are in a bombing strategy that demands that we use very accurate ammunition dropped from the air, from cruise to guided ammunition. Those are the ones we're using. I have issued very precise rules of engagement to our pilots deployed out there, and they will not release their ammunition unless they have identified the target they have been assigned to. If there is the slightest doubt, because of the danger of collateral damage, they will not release their bombs.

You'll understand that the pilot doesn't want to land and have to justify publicly whether he has released his bombs or not. When he doesn't release them, it's because his rules of engagement did not allow him to release them, because he didn't see precisely the target.

In previous conflicts, when you were going over a target, if you couldn't see it because of clouds, you'd drop it anyway and fly back home. We don't do that any more.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): I'm sorry, Mr. Hanger, your time is up.

Mr. Art Hanger: I have a point of order.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): What is your point of order?

Mr. Art Hanger: I'd just like to clarify a statement the minister made. At no time did I ever say our Canadian pilots are not well trained. In fact I'm going to counter by saying this government has cut back so much on our military that the pilots and all military personnel are having a difficult time doing the job.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Order. So far we've managed to get through this without engaging in politics, so why don't—

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: That's your job, isn't it? Isn't that what you're saying?

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): I'm going to pass it on to Madame Beaumier.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier (Brampton West—Mississauga, Lib.): You're saying no politics, right, Mr. Chair?

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): You're on, Madame Beaumier. You're going to bring calm reason to this.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: The Russian position is that this is an illegal war against a sovereign country and a grave threat to the security of the Russian federation. Russia's opposition to the actions of NATO up to this point has been passive. I'm wondering if the minister has reason to believe they will remain passive or if they will escalate their support to Yugoslavia to become more active in that area. And what are the implications for this triggering a larger conflict?

I'm going to ask my second question as well. The Canadian troops are basically—and we understand this—absorbed into the U.S., the British, and the French forces, but how do our generals interact with SAC in the decision-making process?

And third, the minister was talking about the casualties now being 80% civilians. It seems to me air strikes are only going to increase that further. I'd like you to respond to that.

Thank you.

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: On the first question, President Yeltsin in a statement issued yesterday indicated that Russia would have no direct military involvement. That was also a clear message of Mr. Primakov. He was trying to go there to see if any brokerage could take place, and it was a useful exercise to undertake. I would have wished for different results, but having Russia try to maintain its role as a channel of communication and contact is very valuable.

But there is no indication whatsoever, aside from some members of their own Parliament who sit on the fringes, that Russia has any intention of getting involved in the conflict. They will make their voices known, and we would hope we continue to have our close contacts with them.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: Thank you.

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: I'll take your third question, and your second question I'll turn over to General Baril to answer, about how the generals interact.

In terms of air strikes as they affect civilians, nowadays, with precision guided munitions, we can in fact zero in on the precise target. We have selected military targets, doing everything possible to keep it to military targets. There is no doubt, however, that there can be damage to civilian infrastructure as well as to civilian personnel. But every effort is made to cut down on that, and the fact that we have all the electronic equipment necessary for precision weaponry is helpful in that regard.

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But you know, to do otherwise would then put us in a position where Milosevic would be carrying out his ethnic cleansing campaign unchallenged. So it is the best answer we can give, and we're doing this just as quickly as we can and trying to keep it to those people and machinery inflicting the pain on the Kosovar people.

General Baril.

Gen Maurice Baril: I'll answer the question on how our decisions are being taken and how they're being transposed into the operations.

At the NATO headquarters in Brussels there is the military committee. A three-star flag officer is my personal representative, who I talk to every day, and is a permanent member of the military committee.

At SHAPE, the supreme allied headquarters in Mons, where the supreme allied commander operates, I have two general officers, and several officers are part of his headquarters. At one of the bases in Germany where we have AWACS operating, I have senior officers and up to about 95 people working in AWACS.

At Allied Forces South I have many senior officers who are integrated into the headquarters. I also have senior officers at 5th Allied Tactical Air Force.

So we are connected with a complete hierarchy of command and control. My Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, who is my head of operation here in Canada, has contact on a daily basis with the capital, which we work in cooperation with. And as you probably know, we do share a lot of information and intelligence on a minute-to-minute, real-time basis.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: So you feel we have a real participation in this decision-making process as well?

Gen Maurice Baril: Yes, we do.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: Good. Thank you.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you very much, Mrs. Beaumier.

As one of the co-chairs, I want to thank the three ministers, Generals Baril and Henault, and the foreign affairs staff for attending today.

Certainly to the members of both committees, for returning from your ridings on short notice, thank you very much for your participation.

After we excuse the ministers, we have another matter to deal with, so I'm going to turn it over now to my co-chair, Mr. Graham, to explain that.

Thank you very much, Ministers, for your time.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Thank you, Ministers.

Before you leave, Mr. Axworthy, I'd just like to leave a reflection with you. On doing some research for this hearing, I saw that Prince Bismarck said in 1888 something to the effect that if a war breaks out in Europe before the end of the century, it will be because of some crazy thing in the Balkans. It's extraordinarily depressing to think that we as Canadians are involved, as we go into the 21st century, in the same business that the Europeans hadn't been able to work out at the end of the last century.

But when we hear today from you, from Minister Eggleton, from General Baril, and from our humanitarian aid side—and I think all the members of the committee will agree with this—one of the encouraging things is that Canadians are participating in this in a very constructive way, on the military side, but also on the humanitarian side. I know that all members of our committees, both our committees, had the great privilege of going to Bosnia two years ago and visiting our troops there, and of seeing the quality and the professionalism of what they are able to contribute to bringing aid to people in these terrible circumstances.

So I just want to say, on behalf of members of both committees, we wish our troops and our men and women on the ground well in what they are bringing to aid in this terrible humanitarian tragedy that's unfolding, and we do hope we can bring it to a speedy close.

Thank you both very much.

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: Before the century, Mr. Chair.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Thank you, Minister.

Members, Mr. Bachand brought up a motion, so as the ministers go out, we won't break formally. Mr. Bachand's motion, because it does not have 24 hours' notice, would require unanimous consent.

Mr. Bachand, your notice was that we should recall Parliament during the break to debate the issue, as I understand.

Is there unanimous consent to this motion being debated at this time?

Some hon. members: No.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): No, okay. Well, we don't have unanimous consent, so in that case we will adjourn until the House is resumed.

Thank you very much, members.