NDVA Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE AND VETERANS AFFAIRS

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE ET DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Tuesday, February 9, 1999

• 1536

[English]

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham (Toronto Centre—Rosedale, Lib.)): I'd like to call to order this joint committee meeting of the defence committee and the foreign affairs committee.

On behalf of the foreign affairs committee members, I'd like to congratulate the defence committee members on their trip to Germany.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien (London—Fanshawe, Lib.): It was very educational, Mr. Chair.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): We're glad to see you back.

I'd like to welcome Mr. Heinbecker and Mr. Jim Wright from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Lieutenant-General Henault and Captain Robertson from the Department of National Defence.

Thank you for coming, gentlemen.

Who is going to lead off with a statement? Mr. Heinbecker?

Mr. Paul Heinbecker (Assistant Deputy Minister, Global and Security Policy, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): Yes, thank you very much. Merci.

I have a relatively brief statement, and Lieutenant-General Henault also has a relatively brief statement, if that's okay with members of the committees.

First I'll do a little bit of recapitulation. In October, following the threat of a military action by NATO, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia agreed to comply with UN Security Council resolutions 1160 and 1199, which demanded a cessation of the Yugoslav offensive, a significant drawdown of security forces, and action to allow the return of displaced persons.

An agreement was also reached on the creation of a Kosovo verification mission by the OSCE, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and on a political process involving the negotiation of significant autonomy for Kosovo.

The political process sputtered—I think that's the best way of putting it—and after a period of respite, violence began again in December 1998. Since December, violence has caused the displacement of about 45,000 people. It was becoming evident in January that if nothing was done, another humanitarian crisis was going to be at hand.

[Translation]

On January 16, in Racak, it was discovered that 45 ethnic Albanians had been massacred. The authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia responded with contempt and defiance to the condemnation of the international community and to the call for an inquiry by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.

The Yugoslavs refused to authorize the Chief Prosecutor of the Tribunal, Louise Arbour, to conduct an investigation. This situation has merely strengthened the solidarity and determination of the international community.

On January 29, the ministers of foreign affairs of the contact group of countries, Germany, the United States, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and Russia, demanded that the parties end hostilities and summoned them to participate in political negotiations in Rambouillet, France. This process was supported by the UN Security Council, which issued a presidential statement the same day announcing unconditional support for the Rambouillet conference.

[English]

The Rambouillet process was also endorsed by NATO. The next day, January 30, NATO issued a final warning to the two parties in the Kosovo conflict, calling upon them to comply with the demands of the contact group and to fulfil their obligations under relevant UN Security Council resolutions.

At the same time, the North Atlantic Council agreed to reactivate the activation orders, or ACTORDS, for air operations that had been initially issued on 13 October and indefinitely extended on 27 October 1998.

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As was the case in October, NATO now stands ready to use force to compel the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to comply with the requirements of the UN Security Council and with its commitments to NATO and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. As was also the case last October, Canada is prepared to participate in the air operations should they become necessary.

The contact group proposal and NATO's credible threat of force have had an obvious impact on the parties and have finally brought them to the negotiating table. This positive development has reduced the likelihood that NATO will have to act on its threat to use air power.

NATO has remained actively engaged in Kosovo since last October. In accordance with an agreement reached between the Yugoslav government and NATO, unarmed alliance surveillance aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles have been conducting flights over Kosovo. The information gathered through the air verification mission has been provided to the OSCE's verifiers on the ground, the KVM.

As well, NATO has acted to ensure the security of the OSCE Kosovo verification mission through the establishment of a military extraction force, which is deployed in the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia. The force of some 2,400 personnel has the capability to evacuate groups of OSCE verifiers in emergency situations. According to my notes—and General Henault may have a different number—currently 62 Canadian Forces personnel are serving with the extraction force.

[Translation]

Negotiations started in Rambouillet on February 6 between the Serbs and the Albanians, with the assistance of international negotiators from the United States, the European Union and Russia. The parties were given seven days, renewable for another seven days, to reach an agreement.

The Rambouillet process is based upon a group of non- negotiable principles and on a detailed general agreement concerning the provisional status of Kosovo for a three-year period. These principles call for an immediate end to hostilities, broad autonomy for Kosovo, an executive legislative assembly headed by a president, a Kosovar judicial system, a democratic system, elections under the auspices of the OSCE within nine months of the signing of the agreement, respect of the rights of all persons and ethnic groups, and the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, with Kosovo remaining within the country.

This process will be difficult. The points of view of both sides are very polarized, and there is a very limited level of good will. Nevertheless, we believe that the parties are beginning to understand that there will be no winners in case of prolonged violence.

The ministers of foreign affairs of France and the United Kingdom were to attend the conference today in order to express the urgency felt by the international community with respect to the situation.

[English]

It is expected that any peace settlement will involve significant engagement from the international community. An international organization, possibly NATO or the UN, may be called to deploy a peacekeeping ground force to Kosovo to support the implementation of an agreement. The international community may also be engaged in the implementation of the civilian aspects of the agreement, as it has been in Bosnia. The OSCE may be asked to perform some of the duties that have been a responsibility of the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia. It is likely that the KVM, or the Kosovo verification mission, would provide the core of such a mission.

At this early stage in the negotiations, it is difficult to say with certainty whether or not a NATO force similar to that currently deployed in Bosnia will be called upon to implement the military aspects of the final agreement. NATO is planning for this possibility. It is estimated that approximately 25,000 to 30,000 troops would be required for this type of operation. Given Canada's well-established capabilities and extensive experience in the Balkans, we can be expected to be asked to participate.

Thank you.

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The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Mr. Heinbecker, how many troops did you say?

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: According to my notes, 25,000 to 30,000.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): That's what I thought you said.

General Henault, s'il vous plaît.

Lieutenant-General Raymond R. Henault (Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, Department of National Defence): Good afternoon, Mr. Graham, Mr. O'Brien, and committee members.

[Translation]

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.

[English]

Before I start, I would draw your attention to some fact sheets and handouts we've provided for you that will help you follow along if you like, especially for the locations I will talk about, which may not be familiar to everyone.

[Translation]

We have fact sheets that will give you an overview concerning the CF personnel already deployed. We have already indicated the regional centres for the Kosovo Verification Mission, and the places where CF personnel are deployed. We do not have this information, at the present time, for Foreign Affairs personnel.

[English]

There also are two charts, one in English, one in French, on the kinds of distances you might see between the location of our F-18s at Aviano and air operations over Kosovo.

Finally, there's a recap of the missions that are currently described in Kosovo as OSCE, NATO, and other missions, and the Canadian Forces' current involvement.

I'd like to start with an overview of the Canadian Forces' involvement in Kosovo. Mr. Heinbecker has covered some of it, but I'll give you a little more of the detail.

Canadian Forces personnel are participating in the OSCE-led mission in Kosovo as well as NATO missions in support of the OSCE mission. As such, Canadian Forces personnel are deployed to Kosovo; the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia, or FYROM, as I will refer to it; and both Aviano and Vicenza, Italy, which you'll find on your charts there.

The Canadian Forces also continue to provide approximately 1,300 personnel to our mission in Bosnia, with ongoing missions throughout the multinational division southwest, on the northwestern edge of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Translation]

As Mr. Heinbecker said, 23 CF members are currently assigned to verification tasks as part of the Kosovo Verification Mission. The mission will be expanded to reach its authorized level of about 2,000 verifiers. It exists to ensure that the Serbs comply with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, as Mr. Heinbecker previously stated.

[English]

All of the verifiers are unarmed, whether they're civilian or military, and participate in daily patrols with other international members of the OSCE-led mission. The mission has its headquarters in Pristina, Kosovo, which again will show up on your map; that's the capital of the province. The mission conducts its activities from five regional centres located throughout Kosovo itself, and again, they're shown.

We have a Canadian general officer, Brigadier-General Maisonneuve, who's in Kosovo and has been there for quite some time already. He's in charge of one of the regional centres and in fact was involved in the establishment of the first regional centre, which is the one he currently commands. General Maisonneuve is also the acting deputy head of mission on occasion, working directly for the Brit two-star who's the head of mission in the location, Ambassador Walker.

The remainder of Canadian Forces personnel are distributed throughout Kosovo, as you see, again, on your maps.

[Translation]

Allow me now to describe the support missions to the KVM. In addition to the OSCE mission, we are participating in three NATO support missions. We have been deployed to allow the international community to monitor and respond to incidents in the Kosovo province. CF personnel and resources have been assigned to each of the three missions that I shall describe.

The first mission is called Operation Echo,

[English]

in other words, in English, Op Echo. This mission has been in place since June 1998. Canada has had six C.F-18s and approximately 130 members of the Canadian Forces, primarily air force, deployed to Aviano and Vicenza, Italy, conducting fighter operations.

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In addition to their normal SFOR duties—that is, flying patrols over Bosnia-Herzegovina and other missions they do in support of the Dayton accords—the six aircraft are committed to possible offensive air operations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Participation in those particular operations, if we were called upon to participate with NATO forces, could include tasks ranging from protection of NATO territory—in other words, the coastline of Italy, or whichever other coastline they would be called upon to defend—to the use by the F-18s of air-to-ground munitions against military targets.

Our CF-18s are in fact flying missions on a daily basis in support of our potential air operations and in support of any of the missions that might be called for us, which include missions you may have already heard of, including the limited air response, phased air operations, and others.

The next mission I'll mention is the NATO Kosovo air verification mission. Again, Mr. Heinbecker has referred to this one already. The NATO KVM resulted from last October's agreement between NATO and President Milosevic, as we've described earlier. It allows NATO to operate non-combatant reconnaissance aircraft, such as the U-2, or unmanned aerial vehicles—that is, pilotless vehicles—over Kosovo to verify compliance by all parties with the relevant Security Council resolutions.

To give you a feel for what type of aircraft they're using, the U-2 aircraft can be used at low level, but mainly it's a high-level reconnaissance aircraft, which you will perhaps remember more commonly as the one piloted by Gary Francis Powers when he was shot down over Russia back in the 1960s, I believe it was. So it's that type of aircraft that are doing much of the overflights.

The Canadian Forces have contributed eight personnel to that particular air verification mission, and they are located in the mission headquarters, which is located in the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia, in a location called Kumanovo. I don't think it shows on your maps, but it's just to the north of Skopje, which is in fact on the map of the former Macedonia.

[Translation]

In addition, six CF-18 aircraft are based at Aviano to provide offensive air support if necessary for search and rescue operations, in case it becomes necessary to save pilots who might be shot down over Kosovo or who might crash for mechanical or other reasons.

The third mission is

[English]

Op Joint Guarantor. In recognition of the vulnerability of the unarmed OSCE verifiers—again I reaffirm that all of the verifiers in Kosovo are unarmed—NATO has stationed a force in the FYROM, in the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia, to extract verifiers in the event that they are taken hostage, for example, or if they are caught in hostilities between the two parties. This approximately 2,000-strong extraction force, again located in the FYROM, consists of troops from several nations, which include France, Germany, the U.K., Italy, and also the Netherlands.

The force itself is garrisoned, if you wish to call it that, near Skopje, and again it shows up on your maps. In fact you'll find that on the map of regional centres that you have in your handout.

[Translation]

Up to the present time, Canada has provided some six CF members to support the Extraction Force that I have just mentioned, in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Most of our contribution consists of construction engineers: 46 are presently assigned to improving the physical infrastructure, namely the barracks in which the majority of the troops are stationed in the country.

[English]

In addition, we have 10 members of a medical unit who are providing support to the multinational operation and would operate in concert with any multinational medical extraction, or in fact supporting any medical emergency of any kind.

[Translation]

Finally, five staff officers are employed at the Op Joint Guarantor force headquarters.

[English]

As you can see, we're involved, at least to a reasonable degree, in each one of these particular missions.

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Our six F-18 aircraft in Aviano were also part of the extraction mission, but only for a very specific portion of the mission. They could be tasked, as I mentioned earlier, to provide air cover, close air support, or any kind of cover that would be required in support of combat search-and-rescue operations, again, in the event of the downing of a pilot, for whatever reasons.

[Translation]

I will conclude by stating the options for the forces in Kosovo. In fact, Mr. Heinbecker has already stated them.

In the case of an agreement between the parties at Rambouillet—we are still waiting for information—that would allow a ground force to enter Kosovo to supervise the implementation of the agreement, NATO has already started preliminary verifications, that is preliminary staffing for the various options that might possibly be provided.

[English]

Canada of course anticipates that it may be asked to participate with Canadian Forces personnel and equipment. We're examining possible contributions at the moment.

[Translation]

This is the end of my presentation, ladies and gentlemen.

[English]

We're now open to questions, as you see fit.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Thank you very much, General Henault.

Mr. Mills.

Mr. Bob Mills (Red Deer, Ref.): I have a few questions that probably Mr. Heinbecker might clarify.

I'm not sure of what our exact position is or what NATO's exact position is. Are we talking about the autonomy of Kosovo, the independence of Kosovo, the status quo of Kosovo, or are we talking about that big-stick approach we used in Bosnia, where Canada is in a holding pattern with really no long-term plan in mind and no long-term solution to a very difficult problem? That would be my first question: What exactly is our goal?

Secondly, what sort of potential escalation...? If you start bombing Kosovo or if you go right into Yugoslavia, into Belgrade or something, what is the potential then of that escalating to Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, etc.? It would seem to me that you have the real problem of refugees and the real problem of potential retaliation and broadening in a very volatile place.

Thirdly, you mentioned the removal of the verifiers and the extraction force. That's easy to say, but again, experience of 1991-92 says if hostages are taken, extraction is not very darn easy, no matter how good that force is.

Could you address those, please?

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: With your permission, Mr. Wright will speak to the status of Kosovo first.

Mr. Jim Wright (Director General for Central, East, and South Europe, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): Mr. Mills, the hope and expectation of the Rambouillet process is that we will see a return to the substantial autonomy that Kosovo enjoyed in the 1970s and 1980s. This was autonomy that was conferred upon Kosovo in the Yugoslav Constitution of 1974, and it was taken away by Mr. Milosevic in 1989-90. Autonomy was enjoyed in the areas of education, health care, culture, right across the board.

The hope and expectation of the international community—and Mr. Heinbecker referred to this in his opening comments—was autonomy in the form of a legislative assembly, an executive led by a president, a judicial system in Kosovo, local police, OSCE-supervised elections within nine months that would go ahead and put in place all of these legislative and executive facilities, and also respect for rights of all individuals and all ethnic groups. But at the same time, a fundamental position of the international community, not just Canada, has been respect for Yugoslavia's territorial integrity.

• 1600

So we're not talking about the independence of Kosovo. I know there are people on the delegation from the Kosovar community, some from the KLA, the Kosovo Liberation Army, who are advocating that, but that's not the position of the international community. We feel very strongly that this must be autonomy within Yugoslavia.

That's a matter that frankly is under discussion right now by the parties with the international community in Rambouillet, so we can't give you more details than what we've provided you right now. But there certainly is no plan on the part of the international community—and this has been made clear repeatedly to the leadership in Belgrade and to the leadership in Pristina... Neither the United Nations nor the OSCE nor NATO nor the contact group—no one—is advocating independence of Kosovo. We think that would be destabilizing for the community.

We've invested an enormous amount in Balkans security in the former Yugoslavia, in Bosnia, where we still have something in the order of 1,200 troops. We've made a significant investment, and we're not going to see that investment allowed to unravel. So the attempt will be to deliver to Kosovo the kind of autonomy they enjoyed in the 1970s and 1980s, before it was taken away from them.

This is an interim agreement for three years. Part of the discussions in Rambouillet will be about what would be the nature of the process after three years for the people of Kosovo and the people of Yugoslavia to revisit this situation. Again, that's a subject for discussion in Rambouillet and we don't have details on that, but the plan is an interim commitment by all parties to substantial autonomy for Kosovo, elections within nine months, and in three years' time there would be a review by all parties of the understanding to see whether or not they wanted to make further adjustments.

Mr. Bob Mills: That sounds great, but there's such emotion about independence. They believe in their independence. It's hard to believe they'd give that up.

Mr. Jim Wright: Views are terribly polarized on this, on both sides. You hear equally strong positions being taken by the Serb side in terms of an insistence that Kosovo remain a province within Serbia, that you not extend to Kosovo the kind of autonomy it enjoyed in the 1970s.

The tragedy of this crisis is that in the mid-1990s, when it was clear that this crisis was building, Mr. Milosevic had an opportunity in the mid-1990s to go ahead and deal exclusively with moderate Kosovar leaders, including Dr. Rugova. The international community pleaded with Mr. Milosevic to go ahead and implement the kinds of understandings he had promised to implement. For example, an education agreement had been negotiated faithfully between Pristina and Belgrade.

Unfortunately Mr. Milosevic never followed through on any of those commitments, and the net result was a rise in extremism, and all of a sudden, from out of nowhere, the rise of the KLA. So there was an opportunity to avoid this kind of crisis, but Mr. Milosevic chose another route.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Mr. Mills asked two other questions, but there are only two and a half minutes left for the answers.

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: Okay.

On the question of escalation and whether this could spread to Albania, Montenegro, or the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia, and the potential for refugees and so on, whether triggered or not by NATO action, obviously there is a potential for refugees, for sure.

It's important to go back and review how we got here. We got into the position of issuing this threat because there was a cycle of violence and the Serbs were effectively causing a great deal of human suffering. I'm not sure what number we have now for people who have been displaced, but it's certainly in the several hundreds of thousands, including 45,000 as late as this past month.

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The NATO countries took the decision to utter that threat because they had to break that cycle of violence and they had to get people to take the negotiating process more seriously. So that's what we've done. To be credible, the threat has to be a real one and not just simply uttered.

For the extraction question, General Henault will respond.

LGen Raymond Henault: Sir, I would just mention that one of the portions of the agreement that allowed the verifiers to go into Kosovo was a relative assurance from the Yugoslav forces that they would provide for their security, freedom of movement, and so on in what we call a permissive environment, therefore—one in which the threat to them should be very low if not very, very low. In fact that's one of the reasons they went in unarmed of course.

Nonetheless an extraction force was put in place in the event that there were small-scale hostage-takings or situations, as I mentioned earlier, in which they were caught between warring factions or between two belligerents, if you like. It could handle small-scale extractions, but certainly the force is not designed to handle a widespread extraction of verifiers in the country, and at the moment we have no reason to believe that would be the case.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Thank you.

Mr. Turp.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp (Beauharnois—Salaberry, BQ): Mr. Chairman, I would fist like to ask our colleagues from Foreign Affairs a question, and then I will have a question for you, Mr. Henault.

With respect to autonomy, the October 16, 1998 agreement provided that the Yugoslav government should negotiate autonomy. Although this is now being discussed at Rambouillet, I would like to have your assessment of the negotiation that took place or did not take place on the issue of autonomy, to get an idea of the good will of the Yugoslav authorities in the process leading up to Rambouillet.

On the question of autonomy, allow me to make a comment. The Reform member referred to the desire for independence of certain Kosovars, a majority of the Kosovars, but the most difficult question will be to see whether the negotiators accept that there be a referendum, after three years, that will permit the Kosovars to choose their political status, including independence. I would like the officials from the Department of Foreign Affairs to comment on this.

Still on this question, could you distribute the ten basic principles to the committee members? Have you obtained a copy of the ten principles that are to underlie the negotiation? If yes, I would appreciate receiving a copy of this document.

Mr. Henault, it would seem that the other members of the contact group have already promised a certain number of military personnel. There is talk of 6,000 to 8,000 for the United Kingdom, 5,000 for France, 3,000 for Germany, 4,000 for the Americans and 2,500 for the Italians. Do we have any idea yet of the number of CF personnel who might participate in this operation? You said a while ago that it would be desirable to send ground troops to ensure the implementation of the peace agreement that is being negotiated. Will there be an air element? Will NATO be able to continue to fly over the territory and have the authority to carry out aerial surveillance, as it seems to be doing at the present time?

My last question may be for all four of you. Should NATO be a signatory to the peace agreement?

[English]

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: Mr. Wright will start and then we will chip in.

Mr. Jim Wright: On the question of autonomy for Kosovo and the commitment from the Serb authorities to negotiate as of October 16, if that process had been successful, we probably wouldn't be where we are today.

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There was a lot of hope, when Mr. Holbrooke had completed his mission, that the political process would be well launched. We heard words of encouragement, at least initially, from Belgrade about their willingness to entertain some elements of an autonomy package.

I have to say that first of all we have not been a direct party in the negotiation process for the political talks between Belgrade and Pristina. These have been led by the Americans, the EU negotiator, and the Russians. We talked fairly regularly to our colleagues to receive briefings from them as to how it was going, but it was an extremely discouraging process.

It was obvious to all of us that in the absence of a political agreement, a peace agreement, the undertakings that were entered into with NATO and with the OSCE in the fall weren't going to mean anything, because the root of the problem was the dispute over autonomy between Kosovo and Belgrade.

There were problems of bad faith on both sides. The Kosovar community, in fact coming into the discussions in Rambouillet, remained deeply divided. It was extremely difficult, in the fall months and during winter, to determine exactly who was speaking on behalf of the Kosovar community, because of these conflicting views.

So the best answer I can give you is that despite strong leadership provided by the international community—by the Americans, by the European Union, and by the Russians—the autonomy discussions really did not progress very far at all.

The ultimate decision was taken by the contact group to present to both sides an ultimatum to come to Rambouillet and put in front of them a document to stimulate discussion. There was a credible threat of NATO action to try to focus the minds on both sides. We remain hopeful that this is going to do what three or four months of negotiations by the international community was not able to achieve.

In terms of documentation that we can share with the committee, we have received limited documentation in confidence from some of our colleagues who are directly involved in the process right now. It's preliminary documentation. I suspect it has been overtaken by events on the ground in Rambouillet. The formula that was used in Dayton is being used in Rambouillet as well. The doors are closed and maximum pressure is being brought to bear on all the parties, with a view to coming to a very quick solution.

We're not in a position to go ahead and share with the committee the limited documentation that we've received in confidence, because it's just that: it's very much material in confidence. I suspect in important respects it's been overtaken by events on the ground in Rambouillet.

What we can give to the committee, which will give you some sense of the scale of the problem we're dealing with right now, are seven brief reports. One is from the UN Secretary General to the Security Council, dated January 30, on Kosovo. Next is a report on Kosovo put out by the OSCE on February 1. Then there's the contact group statement, issued in London on January 29; the NATO statement issued on January 30, the ultimatum; a statement on Kosovo issued by Ministers Axworthy and Eggleton on January 30, in support of the contact group; and two statements on Kosovo issued by the UN Security Council presidency, one dated January 29 and the next dated February 3.

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[Translation]

LGen Raymond Henault: From the military point of view, the only figure that we have at the present time is an overall figure of 25,000 to 30,000. This seems to be the figure that NATO has proposed as being essential to carry out a ground mission.

We still have not received the statement of requirements that would tell us how many troops are being asked of a country like Canada. We still don't have the figures. We are looking at what would be possible from our point of view. Without the Rambouillet decision, as my colleagues from Foreign Affairs have said, there is an indication of the troop level that would eventually be placed on the ground. We still cannot determine, from our point of view, the number of members that we would contribute or provide, based upon the government decision with respect to such a mission.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Do you have an approximate idea of the number of troops that would be necessary? Is it in thousands? In any case, it is not 8,000 as is the case for the British.

LGen Raymond Henault: No. I think that I can say that for the British and the Americans, these are still general figures. For them, these are the numbers they could support on a long-term or prolonged basis. This number may be based on their evaluation of the theatre, or in Europe.

We have not wanted to speculate on those figures because we still do not have a specific indication about the duration of the mission. Will it last one year, two years, three years or longer? Will that require comprehensive support from us, etc.?

[English]

I don't want to look as though I'm dodging the question, but I really can't give you any details yet, because we still have not yet been able to nail down what we think might be a reasonable contribution at this point.

[Translation]

We are continuing to assess the situation and will discuss it with the Minister. We will propose options to him. It will all depend upon the Rambouillet process and, subsequently, the NATO process and the statement of requirements.

Mr. Daniel Turp: And air troops?

LGen Raymond Henault: Ah yes, air troops.

Mr. Daniel Turp: That was my second question.

The Chairman: You have already had 11 minutes, and there are other questions.

[English]

Mr. Robinson.

Mr. Svend J. Robinson (Burnaby—Douglas, NDP): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like to thank the witnesses for their assistance to both committees this afternoon. I have four questions.

I didn't hear an answer to the question Mr. Turp asked with respect to Canada's position on the issue of an ultimate referendum by the people of Kosovo. Mr. Wright, I believe, mentioned the possibility of elections within nine months of a Rambouillet settlement. It's certainly not beyond the realm of possibility that a party that is committed to independence for Kosovo may very well win a majority of seats in that election and seek then in turn, at some point, perhaps at the end of three years, to hold a referendum on the issue of independence.

I want to ask a very specific question to follow up on the question of Mr. Turp. What is Canada's position specifically with respect to the right of the people of Kosovo to determine their own future, up to and including the possibility of independence? Do we accept that they have the right that others in that region have, including Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia, Slovakia, and a number of others, to determine their own future, including the possibility of independence? What's Canada's position on that?

The second question I suppose would go to Mr. Heinbecker or to General Henault.

I wonder if you could elaborate a bit on the military threat that NATO is in fact raising should there be a breakdown, should there not be satisfactory movement from the Yugoslavian government.

Obviously this is not a Security Council-supported initiative; it's a NATO-supported initiative. You've spoken about offensive air operations and about the possibility that Canada might be involved in air-to-ground operations.

What is the threat? And although it's difficult to talk about guarantees in this context, what guarantees do we have that these kinds of air operations will in fact move the Yugoslav government and Milosevic, particularly if there's no follow-up on the ground?

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Third, I wonder if you could indicate if there's been any movement by Milosevic and the Yugoslav government with respect to cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. The absolute contempt that has been shown so far to Madame Arbour and the work of the commission certainly has many of us troubled, given the allegations of crimes against humanity. Has there been any movement at all and do we know if this is part of the agenda at Rambouillet?

Finally, what role is Canada playing in assisting to provide resources to respond to the desperate plight of refugees in that area? There are thousands of refugees. The situation is critical. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees is attempting to respond. Are we putting resources in to assist in that very difficult situation as well?

Those are my questions.

LGen Raymond Henault: Mr. Robinson, I think you asked about the military threat.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): It makes Balkan politics look simple.

LGen Raymond Henault: I'll just mention what is the military threat at the moment, and that will lead into what Mr. Heinbecker, I think, will tell you from that point on.

The threat as we currently see it in the region is primarily the instability in the region and the fighting we've seen recently. We've seen changes throughout last spring and now through the winter period, and now the threat of increasing hostility seems to be coming from—

Mr. Svend Robinson: No, what's NATO threatening? What's the nature of NATO's threat to Milosevic? I understand the threat.

LGen Raymond Henault: I'm sorry. Yes, now I understand your question. Excuse me.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): You used the term “credible”, and we want to know what is credible in this context.

LGen Raymond Henault: I could perhaps summarize that using the concept of operations, if you like, for the limited air response and the phased air operations.

The limited air response assumes there will be a strike on military targets. We have no idea what the targets would be at the moment, but if we look at an air campaign and the way an air campaign is developed, the initial parts of an air campaign—which are what limited air response really talks about—would be things such as communications nodes, surface-to-air missile systems, weapons or ammunition depots, and things of that nature. Those are the kinds of things that would normally be in the initial air campaign or in the initial strikes that would be done.

In the limited air response, the initial strikes are intended to be primarily cruise missile-type strikes or standoff missiles that are fired from outside Kosovo airspace, if you wish, or Yugoslav airspace. At that point, Canadians would be involved in protecting territorial boundaries such as Italy's, for example, and protecting sovereignty—what we call CAP operations, or combat air patrol. That's the limited air response, which is one element of the activation orders.

The phased air operations go through a series of phases that get a little bit more precise at that stage of the game. Phase 0, which is what we are in at the moment and in which Canadians are currently participating, is really reconnaissance operations; build-up of forces in the region, which has already been done; and increasing their readiness and shortening their time to actually carry out operations. They're currently sitting at 48 hours' notice to operations, if that were necessary.

In those phased air operations, when we went to phase 1, for example, phase 1 would then be a little bit more precise, with strikes using things such as Maverick missiles, which are either laser-guided or TV-guided missiles using manned aircraft. It could also include using cruise missiles, but would start to focus a little bit more now on using the manned aircraft overflying the territory of either Yugoslavia or Serbia.

Once we get into phases 2, 3, and 4, which are increasing levels of capability, if you like, for striking, in fact we're not signed up for those yet. Certainly Canada and the Canadian Forces would have to come back to government before we got engaged in the follow-on phases. In fact the North Atlantic Council would request that we do that anyway, because we haven't signed up to that degree.

So the threat is primarily cruise missiles in the first instance and then precision-guided munitions in the second instance, if that helps you.

• 1625

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: I apologize for going to the military question first. I realized that I had turned the page, and your first question was on the bottom of the previous page.

On the question of the referendum, at one level it's a hypothetical question, and in that sense we're always reluctant to answer hypothetical questions, particularly as it's going to be three years out.

You're right to say there is a strong view among the Kosovar representatives there that they want to have independence. It's also true that, as I said earlier when we talked about the principles they had accepted in going to the negotiations at Rambouillet, one of the principles they accepted was that there would be a large degree of autonomy and that the state of Kosovo would remain part of the former Republic of Yugoslavia. In some sense that's probably where some of the negotiation is going to take place, with the Serbs insisting on the one principle and the Kosovars insisting on the other.

As for what we would do in those circumstances, as I said, that's a hypothetical question. I don't think we have actually taken a formal position on that, but I imagine we would draw some guidance from our own Supreme Court decision on that.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: You should send them the notice from the Supreme Court.

[English]

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Do the judges know they have a trip ahead of them?

Voices: Oh, oh!

Mr. Jim Wright: Mr. Robinson made reference to Slovenia and Croatia. That's a slightly different set of circumstances, in the sense that basically we were confronted with a different reality then. It was not a question of the Canadian government or the international community promoting the independence of those countries. De facto we were dealing with a different reality then.

So we'll have to see what is negotiated on the ground at Rambouillet, what sort of understanding is reached between Belgrade and Pristina on what happens in three years' time, and the international community will have to deal with this when the time comes.

On the issue of humanitarian assistance and the Canadian contribution, my understanding is that at the present time we're looking at about 300,000 people who have been displaced because of the conflict in Kosovo. That's according to figures from the UNHCR. That includes about 210,000 within Kosovo. As we indicated earlier, as a result of the violence in December and January, that in itself caused a displacement of about 45,000 people.

Canada's humanitarian assistance to Kosovo in 1998 was about $4 million, and that was money given to UNICEF, the High Commissioner for Refugees, the World Food Programme, the Red Cross, and CARE Canada. An appeal has recently been launched by the UNHCR looking for something in the order of about $60 million for Kosovo, and this is being looked at urgently by the Canadian government to see how we can contribute appropriately to that process.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Excuse me, Mr. Robinson. We're well over the time; I'm sorry.

But he did ask about the International Criminal Court, and you didn't answer that. Can you give us a 20-second answer on the International Criminal Court?

Mr. Jim Wright: The answer is they're not cooperating, quite simply. Despite all the pressure from the international community and Canada, the Yugoslav authorities refuse to acknowledge their international obligations under and respond positively to UN Security Council resolutions. They are not cooperating with the chief prosecutor. We agree 100% with your concerns in this respect. It's unacceptable.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Thank you.

Mr. Price.

Mr. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, PC): Thank you.

We just came back from the NATO Subcommittee on Defence in Washington last week, and we had a briefing at the State Department. They were talking on the same day that Madeleine Albright came out and said 2,000 to 4,000 troops, possibly.

• 1630

They were quite clear that those 2,000 to 4,000 are, if at all possible, zero, and if 2,000 to 4,000 troops went in, it would be on a very short term—and they're talking about a couple of months—just to say they show.

As far as Canadian involvement is concerned, they said zero. They wouldn't be asking Canadians, because they're trying to get the message across that it is a European conflict and it's time the Europeans started taking care of their conflicts as far as ground troops go. We're not talking about support. Canadians would be asked to do certain supports.

Also, you mentioned 25,000 to 30,000. Were you talking about troops on the ground, or was that support also?

LGen Raymond Henault: That would be all-inclusive, Mr. Price, in any indications I've seen so far, in any paperwork I've seen so far.

By the way, we haven't seen those figures you mentioned. We haven't been made aware of the American intent in that respect, so I can't really comment on that. But there are two elements that lead to that.

One, I would assume there would be, and there are at least indications of, what we call an enabling force, which would go in there very quickly after the Rambouillet agreement, if in fact that type of agreement were reached. That would then be followed up with perhaps a longer-term force. It depends on—

Mr. David Price: They're of course looking at the long term. They say this operation will end up being like Bosnia. It's long-term, but they think it's Europeans who should be on the ground there.

The other thing that's kind of a question mark that I'm wondering about is if things do get worse and the Russians get involved and lift their weapons embargo, what are we prepared to do at that point? What are your feelings on that?

And there was one other point we did hear. In the long term, with the high birth rate for the Kosovar Albanians, they say by the year 2015, they will outnumber the Serbs in all of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. So they'll be in a position very soon to outvote them totally. If they want to be independent, they'll be able to do it on that basis. Have we considered any of this?

A voice: We'll give the birth rate question to Mr. Heinbecker.

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: It sounds like an American question.

The Vice-Co-Chairman (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.)): You don't have to comment on the birth rate.

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: I don't think I'm going to comment on that.

On the question of the size of the force, who leads it, and those kinds of issues, two or three points are worth bearing in mind. The first one is there's no decision on any force at all yet. Certainly the Serbs' opening position is, “No, never.” That's why in the October agreement you have the OSCE-led verification mission, and the most they were willing to swallow at that time was the air verification mission, unarmed as well. So it is not a certainty that there are going to be military forces.

Second, on the question of relative American participation and European participation, you'll recall that's what we used to hear about Bosnia. I'm not sure I believe it now any more than I believed it then, because certainly people will make the argument that this kind of operation works best when the Americans are present, especially when they're present on the ground.

If they were in, it would be very difficult as a practical matter... This is speculation, which I probably shouldn't do, but it's not easy to get out ahead of all of your partners once you get in, because the others will all take the view that it's all in together and all out together.

The Americans are perhaps selling a position to us, but I'm not sure yet that this is the final position.

Mr. David Price: We heard it at three different places. At the State Department, that was the story they were going with, and the Congressional Advisory Group and the Army War College staff were saying the same thing. They all had the same picture: “It's time for the Europeans to take care of the Europeans. We're going to be there in support, yes—we're part of NATO and it's going to be a NATO operation—but not on the ground. It's time for us to be off the ground.” Their feeling is that's the way North America should be looking at it—in other words, Canada and the States.

LGen Raymond Henault: My only comment in that respect would be that the F-18s are already in Italy, and certainly if we were—

Mr. David Price: Yes, they're considered support.

LGen Raymond Henault: That's right, and if we were asked to participate in any kind of air mission, as we talked about a little bit earlier, with respect to that type of air cover or close air support in the event of an extraction or something of that nature—which we already are involved in, by the way—we would certainly consider that and bring it forward to government.

• 1635

That's a very positive way to look at it, as opposed to the ground side.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Mr. Heinbecker.

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: I'd make one further comment. The thing to watch for, when you come to the question of whether the Americans are going to participate and at what level, is whether they're prepared to have a foreign commander commanding a NATO operation. So far they have been reluctant to do that, and the others will be reluctant to have an American commander without American participation.

Mr. David Price: Of course they say their overall commander for Europe is American.

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: Yes. What the President said is that no decision had been reached; they are discussing it with Congress and the allies.

Mr. John Cannis (Scarborough Centre, Lib.): Should we believe them on all matters?

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: On matters of church and state, we should believe them.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Mr. Heinbecker, are Congress and the allies mutually exclusive?

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: At this stage that's almost certainly the case.

Mr. Jim Wright: The other point to bear in mind in terms of the Bosnia experience is that we are talking about a NATO-led mission in Bosnia, where you have significant contributions from central and east European countries, including Russia, which is one of the reasons the mission in Bosnia is as effective as it is.

Mr. David Price: But we have the other side of the coin, with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the Russians behind them.

Mr. Jim Wright: Don't discount the helpful role the Russians can play and have been playing in the negotiations leading up to Rambouillet. They've come a long way in the negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina and on issues such as the International Criminal Court at the Hague. They're playing a more helpful role than I think some people might appreciate.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Thank you.

Mr. Cannis.

Mr. John Cannis: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know we're pressed for time. I'm just going to make some general statements and ask some questions in there, and whomever on the panel may respond.

I read in the paper yesterday—and I've been following the issue as best I could through the papers and the media—that General MacKenzie, now retired, made a comment with respect to his experience while over in that region. I remember that in 1994, I believe it was, he was here and gave the committee a briefing, and he described the circumstances then. He said we have the Serbs killing the Croats, the Croats killing the Serbs, the Muslims killing so-and-so, the Croats killing themselves, and the Serbs doing it themselves and blaming somebody else. It was a horrendous situation.

I believe now similar circumstances are unfolding. I'm not saying who is right and who is wrong.

To get this group to the talks right now... From what I understand, there's dissension between the Kosovars over who wants what. Certain groups are going over to negotiate on others' behalf, etc. I'm uncomfortable with that aspect, because you could have the group there to agree on this interim agreement of three years, and the spinoff group all of a sudden continues this exercise of theirs to no avail. How do we overcome that?

I think, Mr. Heinbecker, you indicated that one way NATO has endorsed implementing their policy or their resolutions is to use force to achieve compliance. I believe in that. We had Mary Robinson here before the Christmas break, and she said her role is to devise means and ways to implement resolutions, etc. That's been really one of our biggest problems.

I believe that's the way to go, but I believe we're setting a dangerous precedent here, should we embark on this program. Give me your view on it, because this is one example. We've had other horrible situations, whether they be in Rwanda or Algeria, what's going on in the slave trade, the Basque region, or the problem France is facing.

Are you telling us today that we're going to set a benchmark here? In any troubled area... We might get the crazy Texans who want independence tomorrow, or Louisiana might wake up one day and say they want independence.

• 1640

Are we saying that through this program of using force to achieve compliance, for any spot on the globe, we're going to send the troops in and say we don't care about Clinton—maybe he's too busy smoking cigars or what have you, as my colleague said—and say we're going to come in and stop this uprising through arrests? Is that what we're saying? Could you clarify that for me?

When the referendum question comes up—and you said it's a hypothetical question—I think we're also treading on thin ice by promoting something like this and raising people's expectations. Three years down the road, when they ask for a referendum—whatever the outcome, if it's one way or the other—if we were to try bringing them back to the table, don't you think we'd be facing a much more difficult task at that time? If we now have spinoff groups within the separatist group, how are we going to satisfy these people who aren't even permitted to travel out to sit around the table?

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Thank you, Mr. Cannis.

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: General Henault has a comment to make.

LGen Raymond Henault: I'm going to primarily defer to Mr. Heinbecker for this one, but I would make one point on Bosnia versus Kosovo. I think I can safely say they aren't the same. What we saw in Bosnia-Herzegovina—with, exactly as you mentioned, the Croatian-Bosnian, Bosnian-Croatian differences and so on—was a several-century build-up of hatred, killing, and ethnic cleansing.

I witnessed ethnic cleansing for the first time when I went to Bosnia last December and saw the effects of ethnic cleansing. I never saw the effect from a people point of view, but certainly I saw the damage and destruction of infrastructure, the virtual clearing out of the area using the methods they did, the mining that's gone on in the country, and so on.

It's really quite a different context from what you see in Kosovo, where, yes, there is fighting, but it isn't as deeply ingrained as it was in Bosnia. So I think there's still an opportunity for the international community to perhaps help in that respect.

What General MacKenzie was saying is in fact accurate. I have no doubt about that. But it's a different situation here, so we need to take it in that light as we develop the options ultimately.

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: Jim Wright will add to that commentary and I'll deal with the question about hot spots around the globe.

All I would say is that one of the things we have to guard against is moral equivalence in all of these questions.

Jim.

Mr. Jim Wright: Just to back up what the general was saying, in Bosnia you're also dealing with three groups, and in Kosovo you're dealing with two groups. Bear in mind that of a population of 2 million in Kosovo, 90% is Albanian. In that community right now, a majority are highly skeptical of the intentions of Belgrade, and rightly so.

The best defence against what you're worried about is to ensure that the autonomy being negotiated right now in Rambouillet is successfully implemented, that the institutions we are talking about—legislature, government, president, free and fair elections... We must ensure that the international community, the Serb government, and the Kosovar leadership follow through with this substantial autonomy and that we demonstrate to the people of Kosovo, of all different political stripes, that this can work.

The reason the KLA arose the way it did was that it was demonstrated to them that dialogue with Belgrade was meaningless; it was empty.

Mr. John Cannis: You're talking about a three-year fix, Mr. Wright.

Mr. Jim Wright: Yes.

Mr. John Cannis: The question is what do we do post-three years?

Mr. Jim Wright: The hope, sir, is that we implement effectively this substantive autonomy and that that in itself will demonstrate to the Kosovars that they can enjoy their identity, their culture, their language, their history, their own health care, and their own education system, and that it works. In three years' time we'll see. There will be another important period of transition that the Kosovars and the Serbs will have to address, but to speculate on that right now would be unhelpful.

Mr. John Cannis: I'll close with a statement. In early October Mr. Solana said it's good to sign agreements and resolutions, but we must enforce the resolutions in order for them to have any level of success. I don't remember his exact words; I can provide you with the quotation. So enforcement of compliance is really the key to it, and maybe that's what we should focus on.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

• 1645

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Thank you.

I have you next, Mr. Hart, but I wonder, sir... Madame Beaumier has to leave. We're going to five-minute sessions now, and we are going to be here until 5:15 p.m., so there's lots of time. If you don't mind, could she go ahead?

Ms. Colleen Beaumier (Brampton West—Mississauga, Lib.): I won't even take five minutes. I'm going to be terse and quick.

If we're asked for a larger number of troops, as we were in Bosnia, is the military prepared to put more into supports for these men when they come back? We know that if the United States isn't there, our soldiers experience horrific things—things we don't even talk about in public. I know also that we don't at this time have the facilities in place to deal with these problems.

We can all sit here and intellectualize and our ambassadors can go out there and talk about what a great reputation we have as Canadians, but there are no better ambassadors in this country than our soldiers when they're there, and they're being cheated when they come back here. I want to know what you're planning on doing about that. I don't want them subjected to this if we can't accommodate them.

LGen Raymond Henault: Your points are very well taken. The minister and the Chief of Defence Staff have been on record on a number of occasions recently about the importance of quality of life and of addressing a number of these issues concerning veterans, as we call them—those who have returned from operational theatres. Care of the injured is one of the pillars of our quality of life program. That in itself, in my view, is going to redress some of these issues that surfaced in the past, and I'm very confident that we're going to do that.

I can only say I applaud your point. It's very important for us to make sure that as our people return from these operational theatres, whether it's an airman, a navy person, or a member of the land force, we do provide them with the care and attention they need—indeed, with the physical care they need if they're injured while they're there or the mental care they need if they're injured psychologically. And we've seen that on a number of occasions now.

I can't give you a list of the issues we're covering off, but in the quality of life initiative, in which SCONDVA was of course directly involved, the application of quality of life we hope will redress some of those issues you're pointing out so well.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: Will we be going in if the U.S. is not there? When I was in Bosnia... Most of the reports that come of our peacekeeping mission in Bosnia say that without the United States there...

The United States would not stand back and allow their soldiers to be abused the way ours were, and not just ours, I'm sure. Will we be going in without the backing of the U.S.? Because they're not going to stand there with their hands in their pockets, and we can be successful just because they're there. Force doesn't have to be used.

LGen Raymond Henault: It's very difficult to answer your question in that respect at the moment, because we don't know what the force composition is going to be yet. But we do know we would be part of a coalition. Will that coalition include the Americans? Possibly. We don't know the answer to that.

Certainly it's been our experience that it's very useful, if not critical, for us to have American forces there with us, especially in the support aspect of things—strategic lift, logistics, and so on—to help the execution of our operation. But will we not go if the Americans are not there? I'm afraid I couldn't answer that at this stage of the game. It depends on who the lead country is going to be.

There are some lead countries that are very capable, such as the United Kingdom. The U.S. of course is there, but France and Germany are other nations that are very capable of doing and conducting operations in that operational theatre. We perhaps go back to the point that was made about the need for European leadership in some of these operations.

How will it take form? I don't know the answer to that, but your point is well taken.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: I would like to see Defence take the lead in making that decision, and not Foreign Affairs.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Mr. Chairman, could I just interject and follow on my colleague's comments?

First of all I will indicate to the witnesses and all of our colleagues here that Monsieur Bertrand and I had to leave for a rather important meeting on defence matters, so we ask for your indulgence. We're glad to be back for some of the discussion.

• 1650

The defence members will know and the general knows—and perhaps I can remind the members of the foreign affairs committee—that a major part of the defence report I tabled in October, the quality of life report, dealt with the whole issue of assisting our troops that come back from these very stressful missions.

Recently at Defence we had a viewing of a horrendous video that dealt with post-traumatic stress syndrome. It was aired publicly as well on CBC; some people may have seen that. This was a significant part of our report, as the general knows.

We indeed have a serious problem. Some of our troops are coming back having witnessed absolutely horrendous things, and it doesn't hit some of them until quite a bit of time has gone by. Indeed, whether it's a private or a general, we're seeing tremendous effects on both.

I would just indicate one other thing, Mr. Chairman. You mentioned the defence committee's trip to Germany, which was very educational. Our only regret was that we weren't able to have more of the opposition side come along, but they were certainly all welcome and invited.

It was very educational. The German leadership, both political and military, made it clear to us on a number of occasions that they felt they had to step up to the plate, as we would say on this side of the ocean, and do more with these problems in Europe. They specifically addressed Kosovo.

It's fine to talk about American participation, and I understand that, but I was very pleased to hear the Germans say they felt an onus to do much more than they have been doing. As Europeans, they ought to be able to solve themselves; that's basically what they were saying. It they can't solve it themselves, they're going to need help from Canada, the U.S., and others, but they felt they should be doing more. I just share that with the committee.

Mr. Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Thank you, Chairman.

Mr. Hart, sir.

Mr. Jim Hart (Okanagan—Coquihalla, Ref.): Thank you.

Because I'm on the defence committee, I'm going to pursue the issues regarding Canada's capability to participate in a mission. I know you've said you're examining the options, but I'd like to probe that a little bit more.

The Prime Minister, possibly prematurely, committed Canadian troops for any role in Kosovo. Subsequently the Minister of National Defence said he didn't see that Canada would be able to significantly increase their overseas operations. And you yourself, General, before SCONDVA on November 3, 1998, said that a company group or something of that nature—up to 400 personnel—was about the only thing Canada could contribute to further international operations.

Other countries have given some estimates as to what they can provide to this mission. It would seem to me that the Canadian government and the Department of National Defence in concert with Foreign Affairs should be able to give Canadians an answer to the question: How many troops could we provide, given that we are already committing a battalion to Bosnia? What is the number? How many troops could we provide to another peacekeeping mission?

LGen Raymond Henault: I wish I could give you an answer, Mr. Hart. I don't have an answer, I'm afraid. A lot of it will have to depend on the balance we're going to have to make between the missions that are currently ongoing.

As you've already identified, we have a mission ongoing in Bosnia at the moment. We have F-18s in Italy now. We have a number of standing commitments, such as Standing Naval Force Atlantic, Rapid Reaction Force Air, Immediate Reaction Force Land, and our NORAD commitments of course. We also have Op Abacus, or our response to year 2000; what we're going to do in that respect is going to have to be taken into consideration.

So I honestly don't have a number yet that I could give you. Certainly the options... The company group that you've talked about would have to be a building block upon which we would make a determination of what we could provide. The situation is not dramatically different from what it was back in November, so we have to take all that into consideration.

Again, the problem is that we don't have an indication yet of what we're going to be asked to provide. Until we get an indication of what forces might be requested of us, it's very difficult to speculate at this stage of the game on what kind of force numbers we would provide.

Mr. Jim Hart: But certainly if Canada has a military force, we must be able to say with some certainty exactly how many ground troops we could provide abroad, being able to sustain those people for a period of time. What is that number for the Canadian Armed Forces? Is it 1,300? Is it 2,000? Is it 3,000? Is it 5,000 troops?

• 1655

How many troops do we need in our army to maintain the 1,300 troops we have in Bosnia and respect that they can't rotate any more often than every 18 months? What are the numbers? Why is this such a secret from Canadians? Why can't they know how many ground troops the Canadian Armed Forces can provide in an international mission? There should be no secret to that. That's ridiculous.

LGen Raymond Henault: I must admit that if we look at the number that are deployed now, it's close to 2,000; it's 1,800 and change. It varies depending on whether a ship is abroad and that kind of thing.

When we look at those numbers, we basically triple them, because the numbers in theatre are balanced against those that have just come back, and you've mentioned the 18 months or 12 months that we try to put in between rotations.

Then we have another similar number that are already preparing for deployments on the rotation dates of the particular mission. So it is a considerably larger number than the 1,800 or 2,000 that you've talked about.

Behind all of that are the support elements that go with it, all the training organizations that go with what we have here in Canada, and the standing commitments we have to domestic operations, sovereignty operations, and so on and so forth. So you're quite right; there is a relative number that we can provide or can't provide.

Mr. Jim Hart: Let me approach this from a different angle. NATO has said 25,000 to 30,000 forces, troops. There has to be pre-deployment training. Does Canada have troops in pre-deployment training now, and if so, how many?

LGen Raymond Henault: No, we don't.

Mr. Jim Hart: How long would it take to put them through pre-deployment training for this NATO mission?

LGen Raymond Henault: It's going to be theatre-specific; there's no doubt about that. Pre-deployment training is commonly in the range of three or four weeks, depending on the actual training itself. It can go a little bit longer.

If people are trained already, they always have a basic combat capability, if you like. Our individual and collective training programs allow us to have people at certain levels, and we then specialize them for deployment into the theatres you've talked about. What we call theatre-specific training is then done on top of that.

So again, I can only highlight that what I would call the basic combat skills are there. Depending on what's required for a mission similar to the one in Kosovo, there would be a requirement for that type of training. I can only say it would probably be a matter of a few weeks, or perhaps a little bit more. We don't currently have a force identified, Mr. Hart.

Mr. Jim Hart: Finally, does Canada possess the airlift and sealift capability to sustain another force of the size that's currently in Bosnia? Do we have the airlift and sealift capability to get our troops in and to get them out?

LGen Raymond Henault: Certainly the airlift capacity is there. We re-prioritize as must to provide the sustainment airlift we need. In extremis, we contract out if required. For example, during the Central American deployment and re-deployment, there were requirements for continued sustainment to those theatres. But in general terms, yes, we can support our missions over there.

If another mission were to be deployed to a place like Kosovo, we could double up or at least try to optimize the airlift and air transport sustainment flights we sent over there. There are those factors that we put into the equation.

Mr. Jim Hart: The reason I asked that is the Chief of Defence Staff has said we have very limited airlift capability to get our troops in and out. My concern is for the troops on the ground. If they do end up in Kosovo, we want to be able to extract those troops ourselves and not leave it to other NATO allies, who are probably going to make sure their troops get out before ours do, if we leave it up to other countries.

LGen Raymond Henault: Yes, your point is taken. However, in an extraction mission, it doesn't necessarily mean you immediately have to extract them back to Canada. I would highlight that. It would be an in-theatre extraction initially, followed by a re-deployment, if you like, back to a safe location.

I can't answer that question, because again, it's somewhat speculative. But I would say we do have limitations in what we can do. Another battle group outside the country would stretch us, I would imagine. That's the kind of thing we have to look at as we go through the option analysis, which again, we haven't gone through in very much detail at all, given that we don't yet have the size of force or types of contributions that will give the kind of planning basis we need.

• 1700

I'm not answering your question very clearly, but I can't give you the answers without that kind of detail. We hope we're going to get that relatively soon. If the Rambouillet process is completed in a week or two from now, we'll have a lot more clarity on what we can provide or can't provide and what we would recommend to the government in terms of deploying forces, and we know that has to go through that recommendation and approval process.

We would be more than happy to come back to you at that stage of the game and give you the detail of what we're considering in terms of numbers. That would probably be more meaningful than what we're doing now.

Mr. Jim Hart: I think Canadians would be very appreciative of knowing those numbers.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Thank you very much, General.

Mr. Peric.

Remember, we're in five-minute mode here, members, and there are three people on the list, so we have just enough time to get everybody in.

Mr. Janko Peric (Cambridge, Lib.): Mr. Wright, in your statement you say the position of the international community is to keep Kosovo within Yugoslavia. Further on you mention that Milosevic has not followed through on his commitments so far. How can you trust that man? He never kept commitments for the last five, six, seven years. In Bosnia there were so many courts, and he never kept commitments. How can you be so optimistic that he's going to keep his commitments for the next three years?

And let's say he does. What's going to happen? Will the international community agree to have a referendum? Or will he eventually give up Kosovo for Republika Srpska, declare a referendum in Republika Srpska, and take that part as a greater Serbia?

Mr. Jim Wright: Is that all?

Voices: Oh, oh!

Mr. Jim Wright: I don't think anybody would use the word “trust” when talking about Mr. Milosevic. We share your deep skepticism, and that's one of the reasons the international community is approaching this issue the way it is.

If I sounded as though I were confident of the road ahead, I am confident in the sense that we feel as though this is the best approach, given the deck of cards we're playing with right now. He is the President. We're trying to work with him as best we can under the circumstances, but we're also very realistic about what we're up against.

The best formula for trying to hold him to these commitments will include the kinds of mechanisms that will be put in place in Rambouillet, as follow-on to the peace agreement that we hope is going to be signed in the course of the next two weeks. This is somewhat akin to what we have in Bosnia right now with the Office of the High Representative, where that particular office wields an enormous amount of authority in driving the civilian implementation process forward. Where the High Representative does not get cooperation from the parties in Bosnia, he has the authority to go ahead and enforce decisions.

I assume that on the ground in Yugoslavia, in Kosovo, there will be an international presence that will be helping to drive forward those key elements on the autonomy of Kosovo. Only with that can we ensure that we get compliance from all parties.

I don't want to suggest for one minute that Mr. Milosevic is the only person at blame here. There's lots of blame to go around in this particular conflict. But as the President, as the government, we hold him to a particular higher standard than others, and the international community will be holding him to that account on the basis of the agreements that are entered into at Rambouillet.

I'm realistic. I am hopeful. I wouldn't say I am overly confident.

Mr. Janko Peric: As we know, so far there is small cooperation with Mr. Milosevic. But let's say in three or four years he is replaced with Seselj, who is an even worse nationalist than Milosevic, or even Karadzic. How are we going to face them? How are we going to deal with them?

• 1705

Mr. Jim Wright: These are hypothetical questions. You're right; there are some difficult personalities in Yugoslav politics right now. Our hope is that in time the Yugoslav people will start to reach the appropriate conclusions in terms of their leadership and will exercise democracy.

Mr. Janko Peric: Can I stop you there and finish it off?

I contributed to helping one young individual come as a visitor from Belgrade to visit relatives in Cambridge, and the stories I heard... I asked that individual: Why didn't you elect somebody else? Well, it's not so easy. On election night, the Milosevic people come with 500 Deutschmarks under the table, and the whole so-called riding is owned by Milosevic.

I'm a little bit skeptical. People are suffering in Serbia, in Kosovo—poor people—but somehow the international community is tolerating this monster in the Balkans. For how long? Somehow we are powerless. Even according to General MacKenzie, we would have to bring 600,000 troops and whatnot. We know for a fact that Croatia freed 25% of their territory with 100,000 soldiers in three days, with minimum casualties. So what are we waiting for? How come we have left them to deal with Milosevic and his gang, to free poor people from suffering?

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Can you answer that fairly quickly, Mr. Wright? Because I have Madam Debien who is waiting and Mr. Pratt as well.

Mr. Jim Wright: It doesn't lend itself to a quick answer, but I think the answer for you is that the international community is doing the best it can under the circumstances. It recognizes the suffering of the Serbian people. Quality of life is not good. Sanctions have been in place for a long time. They are biting. We hope democracy will win out and the right-minded individuals in Yugoslavia will elect a government in the future that, frankly, is more responsive to their needs and more appealing to the international community than Mr. Milosevic is right now.

Mr. Janko Peric: Thank you.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): We're going to have to move on to Madam Debien.

[Translation]

Ms. Maud Debien (Laval East, BQ): My question is for one of you and follows the question Mr. Price asked you a while ago about Russia.

We know that Russia was strongly opposed to the NATO strikes against Serbia. We also know that, subsequently, there were a number of different interpretations of the NATO mission by Russia.

Mr. Wright told us a while ago that the position of Russia had changed a great deal since then. Here is my question. Should the Rambouillet negotiations fail, and I obviously hope they won't, what might Russia's position be? This is a hypothetical question. Will you answer me?

[English]

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: Well, to get the exact answer to that question, you'd have to have the Russian ambassador here.

There is no question that in terms of the contact group, the Russians have been very helpful. They haven't been perfectly helpful; there have been times when we wished things were otherwise. But they have helped to bring this process to Rambouillet. They've been active on that.

The question is, what happens if the Rambouillet process fails? Honestly, it's very hard to say what would happen. If it fails, it's important to ask because of whom and what happens next.

If it fails because the Kosovars break up into splinters and can't actually reach an agreement, it's hard to blame that on the Serbs. If it fails because another enormous atrocity is perpetrated in the course of the negotiations, that changes the outlook quite a bit in the other direction.

The Russians have certainly taken the view consistently that there should be no use of force in this crisis. They have also taken the view, which is somewhat contradictory, that it's okay for there to be the threat of the use of force.

• 1710

They are a little caught up in that contradiction. They know they can't get Milosevic to do the things that need to be done without a physical threat. At the same time, for reasons of principle, they don't like the physical threat. So they're caught in the contradictions of that position.

As for what we would do in those circumstances, I guess we would have to weigh who caused the breakdown and where we saw things going, and then we'd have to decide what we'd do about it. But at the moment it's very hard to forecast that, except to say there is a NATO threat on the table. The NATO activation orders have been given, and there is the disposition to act if that situation requires it. And we would support it.

[Translation]

Ms. Maud Debien: In spite of the difference in interpretation of the NATO mission by Russia?

[English]

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: Yes, because we have made it clear. I have personally made it clear and I'm sure Mr. Wright has made it clear. It's been made clear in the NATO Permanent Joint Council, in Moscow, and in the contact group that if necessary, NATO will act. The conditions we have posed as being necessary have to do with humanitarian considerations and strategic considerations. If that's necessary, the Russians will then have to make their decision about what they do.

[Translation]

Ms. Maud Debien: Without coming back before the Security Council. Is that what you are telling us?

[English]

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: There's a distinction to be made in all of this between the activation order decision of last October, which was just reactivated, but it was actually in effect... Without putting too fine a point on it, what we were doing was trying to drive home to the Serbs that we really did mean it. We reissued the order that we had already issued and we shortened the time in which it could take place.

On the question of ground forces and peacekeeping forces, there are two distinctions there. I don't think anybody is talking about fighting their way into Kosovo with ground forces. If ground forces go, it has to be pursuant to an agreement between the two sides. If it is pursuant to an agreement between the two sides, then the question arises of whether the Security Council would want to bless it. I presume that our strong preference would be that it would. But that's separate from what might happen with the F-18s.

[Translation]

Ms. Maud Debien: Thank you.

[English]

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): I think we have time to go back for one more round. Mr. Pratt and then Mr. Turp.

Mr. David Pratt: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

What I'd like to understand a little bit better is how the mechanics of a troop deployment work between Foreign Affairs and the Department of National Defence. Is it the case that Foreign Affairs would go to Defence and say, “Our allies have indicated that this is the number of troops we are going to be requiring in order to fulfil our commitments”? Or does DND go to Foreign Affairs and say, “This is realistically how many troops we could provide under these circumstances”? How does that work?

As a second question on that, one of the things the defence committee discovered over the course of our hearings last year on the quality of life was that the organization was under strain, to say the least. DND has been under quite a strain over the last number of years on quality of life issues and other issues, such as equipment, etc. But there comes a time when there is a complete disconnect between our Foreign Affairs commitments and what we can realistically do.

My question in that regard is this. If we were to be asked for, let's say, a battle group for Kosovo, similar to the size of the one we have in Bosnia, clearly, as the minister has said and as General Baril has said, something would have to give. What sorts of operational effects would that have on the rest of the organization? I'm talking about things such as mothballing major assets in order to be able to fulfil our commitments.

• 1715

LGen Raymond Henault: Perhaps I can explain to you the force generation concept, and I'll try to do that as quickly as I can.

Once a mission is agreed upon and we have our military representatives in Europe, who are in fact co-located with our ambassadors...

I'm sure many of you are familiar with Ambassador Wright. Not this Wright, no.

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: David, his brother.

LGen Raymond Henault: That staff is in constant contact with the military committee and the North Atlantic Council, and as they start developing concepts, they start coordinating with our Foreign Affairs staffs in Canada and also networking with our policy staffs in NDHQ.

What they will start with is a concept of operations, which doesn't detail troop contributions or troop requirements. It goes out and says this is the concept under which we think an operation will be undertaken.

[Translation]

It is a concept of operations that will give us the broad outline of an operation such as the Kosovo mission or others.

[English]

The possible troop-contributing countries go back with a response saying they support the concept of operations or don't support it, and that goes through a cooperative and collaborative process between Foreign Affairs and DND. Once that concept of operations is then agreed upon and endorsed by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and his staff, the NATO committee, the military committee, the North Atlantic Council, and so on, then they will come back with what we call a force generation requirement or a force request.

We aren't at that stage yet. That's what we're waiting for: for them to come to us with a force request, which includes a force generation conference. We participate in that force generation conference and indicate what we think we might be able to provide, subsequent to or pursuant to national agreement or national concurrence from government.

Then the forces are balanced. Once the forces are balanced and the military and Foreign Affairs have an opportunity to go to government and request the people's concurrence with the contribution of those troops to a theatre, we go through another process, which includes a force request. We provide a force preparation, if you like. We respond to that and then formally commit forces after they've been agreed to by the country, and then they're injected into the operation in whichever form, size, and composition we have. It could be air, navy, or army. It could be all three for that matter.

That's the process we go through. It's a long process. They're trying to accelerate it, if in fact there is an agreement at Rambouillet. Again, that's the kind of thing you have to go through to actually come to a conclusion. It's very cooperative and collaborative throughout the process.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Can you be very brief? That's a 15-minute bell and I have three other questions to be asked.

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: I just want to to pick up on a point that I've heard a couple of times and let pass, but that I don't think I want to let pass completely.

We are very closely coordinated with DND, starting in our mission in NATO, but also in Ottawa. Any recommendation that would go to the government would go jointly signed. It's not the foreign affairs department imposing a demand on the defence department. It doesn't work that way.

And the idea that we might somehow be more willing to see our colleagues go off into dangerous places is really not the case.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Thank you. That's helpful.

[Translation]

Mr. Turp.

Mr. Daniel Turp: This is merely a request. If you are working well together, as you have stated, I would like you to work well with the parliamentarians who will be called upon to participate in a debate in the House of Commons, as Mr. Eggleton seems to have suggested. The Minister of Foreign Affairs no doubt also wants you to work well by allowing us to have valid information before the debate. Previous debates were carried out without our having any details of operations, the number of personnel that might be sent, without our having valid information. Two lines on a tick note are not enough to be able to participate in a debate and make a useful contribution in Parliament.

I would greatly appreciate, and I believe my colleagues in the House of Commons would agree, that you and the ministers provide us with valid documentation before the debate is held in the House.

[English]

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Madam Finestone, very quickly, please.

• 1720

Hon. Sheila Finestone (Mount Royal, Lib.): Thank you very much.

I would like first of all to ask you a question with respect to the observer status we have with the Council of Europe and the role they're playing. There is a call for refugee aid, funds, goods, and services to help the refugees of Kosovo. What is Canada doing, or are we involved in any way with that aspect of the needs of the refugees?

Secondly, our experience about refugee camps in most parts of the world is very unpleasant, and the refugees are at great risk. I noted in the briefing papers that the refugees continue to be at risk. Do we have a role to play there in any way, shape, or form?

Lastly, are there Canadian NGOs that were in Bosnia and are now working in that area?

And Jim, I want to know if you found out about the Battle of Kosovo of 789.

Mr. Jim Wright: Yes, I know all about that.

Mrs. Sheila Finestone: Oh, you do? You forgot to tell me.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): We don't have time to do that, unfortunately.

Mr. Jim Wright: No, we'll leave that one aside.

I mentioned briefly before that the Canadian government, through CIDA, is very actively involved in trying to help out with refugee relief. Last year CIDA spent somewhere in the order of $4 million in humanitarian relief for refugees of Kosovo. A call has gone out from the UNHCR.

I'm not sure; did you say the Council of Europe?

Mrs. Sheila Finestone: Our Council of Europe parliamentary assembly called for member states to step up donor funding, which is essential for the prevention of the humanitarian disaster.

Mr. Jim Wright: Normally we work in the context of call letters that come out from the international community, such as the International Red Cross, UNHCR, etc. I believe a call letter has come out from the UNHCR describing the circumstances in Kosovo. There's an appeal for $60 million. The Canadian government is looking at it right now.

There's no question that there is a problem in the sense that the Canadian government and CIDA are receiving a lot of requests like this to go ahead and help out in international crises. So this is not going to be easy for the Canadian government to respond to as meaningfully as we would like, but we're working at it right now. We will be helping out.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Thank you very much, gentlemen, for coming and helping us.

The meeting is adjourned. Thank you.