NDVA Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE AND VETERANS AFFAIRS

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE ET DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Tuesday, November 3, 1998

• 1547

[English]

The Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien (London—Fanshawe, Lib.)): I'll call the meeting of the SCONDVA to order, please. Colleagues, we will deal with the requested briefing on Kosovo first. Following that, we will look at organizational matters encompassing future priorities and future work of the committee, and any other business.

In welcoming the witnesses, I have explained to them that I unfortunately have to excuse myself in about five minutes for a media interview on the committee report that we tabled last week in the House. I thought it was important to accept these requests whenever and wherever possible in order to talk to the media on behalf of the committee, given the importance of that report. I had a tough choice to make, and I'll have to obviously come up to speed later on in regard to the briefing.

So I welcome the witnesses, and I offer my apologies, but I will have to leave the room for about a half an hour. One of my colleagues will continue to chair the committee, and I'll be back at about 4.30 p.m. But I do appreciate your attendance.

Who's going to lead off? Could you introduce yourself and your colleagues? Thanks a lot.

Dr. Kenneth J. Calder (Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy), Department of National Defence): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm Ken Calder. I'm the assistant deputy minister for policy in the Department of National Defence. With me are Mr. James Wright, from Foreign Affairs, and his colleague, Mr. Charles Court. Also with me is the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, General Henault.

If you agree, Mr. Chairman, I'll start off with a very brief set of opening remarks. I would then turn it over to Mr. Wright to deal with the foreign policy aspects of the issue, and then to General Henault, who will take us into more of the military details.

The Chairman: That's fine, Mr. Calder. Thank you, and we're in your hands.

Dr. Kenneth Calder: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I must say it is a pleasure to be back in front of this committee again.

• 1550

I think we all know the current situation in Kosovo is the product of an explosive combination of deeply rooted national identities, modern nationalism, and conflicting claims to a small piece of territory in the Balkans. The violence of the last eight months is due to Serbia asserting its sovereignty over the province while being confronted by a resident ethnic Albanian population that claims the right to self-determination.

[Translation]

Why are the events in Kosovo so important to Canada? First of all, because allowing the conflict to continue in this region would have posed a serious threat to regional stability. Secondly, and more importantly, the battles in Kosovo were threatening to cause a disaster of human proportions. The coming of winter, the lack of proper shelter and food and of course, the failure on the part of Belgrade to guarantee that international NGOs would be allowed to assist the population, all combined to spell an unavoidable catastrophe.

From March to September, the international community focused on this issue intensely. During the summer, NATO exercises in Macedonia and air defence exercises over Albania were conducted to warn Belgrade of the need to find a peaceful solution to this conflict.

The search for a solution lead to the adoption of resolution 1199 by the UN Security Council on September 23, 1998. The resolution sets out the terms for bringing about a resolution to the conflict in Kosovo. At the same time, NATO did not rule out the possibility of using force to ensure compliance with this resolution and sought authorization to go this route.

It is important to stress the following point.

[English]

The October 12 agreement that U.S. special envoy Richard Holbrooke negotiated with Milosevic was achieved because of NATO's threat to use force if necessary.

If I can now turn to what has been agreed upon, the commitments that President Milosevic has made meet the goals of the international community as set forth in UN Security Council Resolution 1199. First, the fighting in Kosovo must cease. Second, Serbian security forces must be drawn down to the level that existed prior to the outbreak of fighting in March. Third, Yugoslav authorities must enter into a meaningful dialogue with the Kosovar leadership. Fourth, in order to prevent a humanitarian disaster, Belgrade is required to facilitate the return of all displaced persons and to permit international relief agencies in Kosovo. Fifth, Yugoslav authorities are required to cooperate with the international criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. And sixth, Belgrade is to implement fully the agreements reached with NATO and the OSCE concerning verification.

The verification regime that Milosevic has accepted is quit robust. NATO, in fact, is already conducting aerial verification over Kosovo, and General Henault will get into greater detail on that in his remarks.

The OSCE will deploy a 2,000-strong unarmed verification mission to the province to act as a watchdog for the international community. Its main purpose is to ensure compliance of all the parties in Kosovo with the UN Security Council resolution, in particular the ceasefire and the withdrawal of Serb security units. The mission will include both military and civilian officials, and planning is under way for Canadian participation. DND is considering sending five Canadian Forces members to Vienna as part of the mission planning cell and a further five to work in the operational headquarters in Kosovo. We are also looking at an additional 15 military observers for the main body of that mission. Additionally, NATO is undertaking planning for an extraction force that could evacuate the OSCE mission in the event of an emergency. And finally, I would say NATO remains ready, with forces in place, to use force on this issue should that prove necessary.

With that, I would turn to Mr. Wright.

Mr. James R. (Jim) Wright (Director General, Central, East and South Europe Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

• 1555

[Translation]

From the outset, Canada has been committed to helping resolve this conflict for humanitarian reasons. Canada has supported the efforts of the UN High Commission for Refugees, of UNICEF and of the Red Cross to ease the suffering of displaced persons. At the same time, Canada has encouraged the UN Security Council and NATO to act resolutely.

Pressure from the international community and in particular the real threat of armed NATO intervention led to the signing of major accords with Yugoslavia during Mr. Holbrooke's trip to Belgrade on October 12. These accords provide for the development of a political process which would ultimately result in Kosovo gaining significant autonomy within the federal Republic of Yugoslavia, for stringent monitoring mechanisms, including a strong OSCE presence on the ground and the presence of NATO air forces over Kosovo.

These accords are very important. They set out the conditions for the return of refugees and displaced persons, for the delivery of humanitarian aid and for the establishment of a political dialogue, all of this combined with the active commitment on the part of the international community.

[English]

Thanks to the NATO threat, the resolve of the UN Security Council, and the support of the OSCE, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has shown in recent weeks a level of compliance that has been unknown in the past. The authorities of Yugoslavia have been moved to respect the ceasefire. They have withdrawn most of the military and police forces not usually based in Kosovo. The Yugoslav government has also agreed to a dialogue with the Kosovars and has made important unilateral concessions, including the return of a status of autonomy for Kosovo, commune-based policing, the creation of an assembly, and OSCE-supervised elections within a period of nine months.

Much still remains to be done by the Yugoslav government to ensure the return of displaced persons and full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Our priority in the coming months will be to ensure that the steps taken by the Yugoslav authorities are made irreversible and verifiable. We do not want a temporary lull that will be followed by a new Serbian offensive as soon as international attention has moved away from the issue.

The Albanian Kosovars also have a responsibility to ensure the success of the peace agreement in Kosovo. We hope future elections will produce the kind of leadership—one with credibility and democratic credentials—that will be capable of uniting the Albanian Kosovars and of engaging in good-faith negotiations with Belgrade.

Dr. Calder has already touched upon the significance of the NATO threat. The extension of the activation orders from NATO means that NATO will maintain its military assets in-theatre, and those assets will be available for operations to ensure compliance by the Yugoslav government.

With respect to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, on October 25 the permanent council of the OSCE agreed to establish the Kosovo verification mission, KVM. The KVM has been in the planning stages since the announcement of the Holbrooke agreement. This mission should be operational toward the end of November and completely deployed by January 1999.

The Kosovo diplomatic observer mission, which you will see referred to as KDOM, will continue in its current role until the Kosovo verification mission is fully operational. Canada currently has three individuals who are already active on the ground in the Kosovo diplomatic observer mission. Planning for further Canadian participation is fully under way among the relevant departments in Ottawa: Foreign Affairs, Department of National Defence, RCMP and CIDA.

Foreign Affairs is also working in very close coordination with a Canadian NGO called CANADEM to identify qualified civilian verifiers who will be offered to the OSCE in Vienna. Through CIDA, the Canadian government will contribute $3 million to fund civilian verifiers. In the first place, Canada is recruiting individuals with some military and police experience to respond to the needs of the mission, which will be heavy on the military police side. The OSCE will select from among the candidates Canada suggests, but may not have positions for all candidates.

• 1600

The OSCE has indicated to us that they also need people with a variety of skills, particularly human rights, humanitarian aid, and elections experience. The precise configuration of the needed skills will become clearer in the planning process. The OSCE is assuming a staggered deployment in Kosovo, which means that all verifiers do not need to be in place immediately. We will shortly be sending lists to Vienna, which is the headquarters of the OSCE, of prospective Canadian candidates for early consideration by them.

With respect to the security of the OSCE mission, an assessment team from Vienna recently visited Kosovo. It indicated to Canadian officials last week that the OSCE is guardedly reasonably optimistic regarding the security situation in Kosovo. OSCE personnel had an unhindered freedom of movement and good cooperation from local authorities in all areas of Kosovo. The risks that have been identified, such as banditry and land mine danger, are present in most peace support operations, including those in which the OSCE and the UN have unarmed personnel operating.

The primary assumption of the Kosovo verification mission is that both FRY and Kosovo parties accept the presence of the verification mission. The attitude of Yugoslav forces to the OSCE assessment team visit supports such an assumption. While the violence in Kosovo has been considerable, a large part of the region's infrastructure and the general economy remain intact and available to support the mission.

The main pillar of the mission's security is the responsibility of the Yugoslav government to protect it. This responsibility has been reiterated in successive UN resolutions and agreements between Belgrade, NATO, and OSCE. NATO will hold Belgrade accountable.

On the humanitarian side, according to the latest figures of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR, almost 300,000 people are displaced by the conflict in Kosovo. About 200,000 of those are displaced within Kosovo, while 60,000 are internally displaced in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, mainly Montenegro. There are 2,000 refugees in Albania.

Recent reports indicate that there may already be a significant number of returns taking place because of the confidence-building measures that have been introduced over the past three weeks. The vast majority of those displaced are already without adequate food or shelter, with up to 10,000 people in Kosovo living in the open.

In an effort to contribute to national relief efforts, the Canadian government, through CIDA, has to date committed $3.18 million by providing basic necessities such as food, water, shelter, and medical supplies to the World Food Programme, Red Cross, UNICEF, UNHCR, and CARE.

I think it's also important to remember that with respect to Canadian foreign policy, for many years now we have maintained a very steadfast approach in our relations with the government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. As early as 1996, when Mr. Axworthy, as foreign affairs minister, first visited Belgrade, we made it clear then to Yugoslav leaders that only improvements in the situation in Kosovo would lead to the integration of FRY in the international community and the development of improved relations with Canada. This remains the case today. Our priority right now is to ensure Yugoslavia's compliance with UN resolutions and a return of autonomy to Kosovo.

Thank you very much.

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.)): Thank you, Mr. Wright.

Lieutenant-General Raymond R. Henault (Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, Department of National Defence): Mr. Chairman, good afternoon. Thank you again for this opportunity to brief you.

I have brought some maps that I think will be useful to you in following along with some of the names and specific areas that we might be talking about this afternoon. It's just to orient you on the area of operations themselves.

The situation on the ground has been well covered for you by both Dr. Calder and Mr. Wright, so I won't go into all of the detailed background. I would note, though, as mentioned by Mr. Wright, that the situation on the ground certainly has been improving recently. The progress we have seen is reassuring from the Yugoslavian army and internal security point of view in achieving what we consider to be a reasonable level of compliance at this point.

The verification, I might add, of the Kosovo Liberation Army activities and their compliance and so on will remain a challenge, as at the moment there is no current agreement in place for the disclosure and cantonment of weapons, which we will have to cover off. There has been some difficulty, of course, again as mentioned, in finding someone to speak for the Kosovars overall.

• 1605

Also, I might add that the Kosovo Liberation Army has carried out some attacks in the last two weeks or so. The Serbian restraint in response to these attacks, however, has been relatively calm. They have been reacting very reasonably and have assured us that there is a reasonable level of security at this point in the country itself.

[Translation]

As for the threat Canadians will face on the ground in Kosovo, this will depend to a large extent on the prevailing political and military climate in Yugoslavia and Kosovo, as we have already indicated.

The only time that Canadians could find themselves targets is during NATO air strikes, or

[English]

targets of opportunity, if you like.

The primary threat, as already mentioned, is mainly from banditry and land mines, as well as unexploded devices of many kinds. Of course, there also will remain a threat from the Kosovo Liberation Army that will be up to and including violent action, although we would assume this would not be the case.

There are also criminal gangs based on local clans. We have no idea what their reactions might be, but they certainly do operate with impunity in certain parts of Kosovo. Therefore, we will be very vigilant in that particular respect.

There is of course always a possibility that individual or isolated acts of criminality could occur that could put Canadians in danger, but those are the types of incidents you can't foresee. Land mines and improvised explosive devices—IEDs is what we call them—are relatively widespread in Kosovo. There have been mine strikes over the last little while.

In fact, those in our verifier group—there were two men, one of whom was military and the other was a Foreign Affairs member—were travelling in Kosovo just recently and had a mine strike against their vehicle. Thankfully, it was an armoured vehicle. While the vehicle itself was destroyed in the mine strike, the Canadian military and Foreign Affairs members were not injured at all. The translator on board had some injuries to his wrist, but that was the extent of the injuries.

So the mine strike likelihood is there. Certainly a mine strike is more likely when you're off proven routes. We will look at that very carefully before we actually authorize off-route types of activity.

In summary, the situation in Kosovo is not like that which you may remember or perhaps have read about in terms of incidents in Bosnia in 1995, when we did have some hostage-taking incidents. The risk from our point of view and from everything we have been led to believe so far of widespread hostage-taking is limited. The primary and significant risks, however, will remain from potential and isolated acts of violence, booby traps, and of course mines.

Although there is a threat,

[Translation]

And as we see it, these operations always pose a threat to Canadians,

[English]

we do assess the risk as tolerable or acceptable at this point in time.

Now to deal with those threats, perhaps I can provide just a few bits of information that will give you a sense for the kind of mission we have under consideration that might be undertaken by our Canadians.

The agreement brokered by Ambassador Holbrooke—this is something that I know you're very familiar with, as it was touched upon here—was confirmed by the UN Security Council Resolution 1203. It says that Yugoslavia does assume the responsibility for the security of the verifiers, which was mentioned by Mr. Wright. The OSCE itself is developing an evacuation plan, and NATO is developing an extraction plan, which is fairly well advanced in its preparation now.

By the terms of the agreement, this will be an unarmed mission. The OSCE has indicated the desire to maintain a relatively non-military posture, if you like, in this case. Therefore, the verifiers, whether they be military or civilian, will be in civilian attire, which will likely be something like a white smock with UN markings on it and a blue UN baseball cap. It will be something of that nature. It will be something very distinctive, but not a military uniform.

[Translation]

Unarmed observer missions like this are not a first. Our Canadians have faced similar dangers in the past. Canada has participated in a number of unarmed observer missions over the years and we are currently committed to seven missions of this nature. In three of these cases, observers do not wear a uniform,

• 1610

[English]

that is they are not wearing military uniforms.

A mitigating factor in this particular mission is that unlike the UN mission in Bosnia several years ago—the UNPROFOR mission or UN protection force that first went into Bosnia—there is the presence of many nations, including the U.S. and Russia. In fact, on the observation mission itself, Russia is already involved and conceivably could be involved in the air verification mission as well.

While the air verification portion of the mission cannot assure any particular security on the ground or prevent acts of isolated violence, it will provide early warning of large-scale changes in troop movements, concentrations of all kinds, and changes particularly in the Serbian military posture.

[Translation]

Finally, Yugoslavia has a vested interest in seeing that this arrangement works out. That is our position. This was certainly not the case with Bosnia in 1995.

[English]

Moving to training, all of our CF verifiers are standing by to deploy. We have 15 at the moment who are identified and are on standby and ready to go over at a moment's notice. They have already undergone three weeks of generic training in what we traditionally do in terms of the UN military observer training.

That training includes a number of items, including law of armed conflict training, legal issues related to the use of force, mine awareness training, preventative medicine, cultural awareness, and stress management. There's a list of about 15 items we necessarily cover before observers or verifiers of this sort are deployed on a mission.

In addition, they will come into Ottawa at least two days prior to deploying to the theatre of operations for mission-specific training, in this case. They are trained generically, as I mentioned, for other missions and therefore will require a little bit of upgrade training, if you want to call it that, or at least the specific training I mentioned. This will include mission background on our latest intelligence on Kosovo—and we are very focused in our intelligence organization on Kosovo itself—additional mine awareness training specific to the country, cultural sensitivity and language training, where we can, hostage procedures, and a number of other items.

In view of the fact that they will be unarmed, which again I note is not something unusual in these types of missions, the verifiers will have to adopt, nonetheless, some precautionary measures. They will include careful selection of patrol areas and isolated and mined areas. Some of those are marked, but many are not. They will travel in groups in a multinational context. That's the way the current KDOM or observation mission operates. They will need good communications within the verifier chain and also back at their headquarters. Of course, we train them and we give them the advice they need to maintain proper vigilance and what we in the military like to call situational awareness.

[Translation]

We are currently outfitting observers with the equipment they need, that is civilian clothing and civilian-style bulletproof vests.

[English]

Those basically are bullet proof vests. They are wearable under smocks. They are very light weight but very effective bullet proof vests.

[Translation]

The OSCE is currently reviewing the matter of the vehicles assigned to the mission. Currently, it estimates that it will need approximately 600 vehicles to carry out this mission and for support purposes. As we already said, there are some risks involved and all vehicles will not necessarily be armoured or able to withstand land mines. Hopefully, unarmoured vehicles will be used only on safe roads.

[English]

We've talked a little about the Kosovo verification mission. There are two verification missions, by the way. One is a land mission and the other is an air mission. There are items, if you wish to cover them further after the briefing, we can talk about with DFAIT on the actual diplomatic portion of the mission.

• 1615

We're planning to provide up to about 15 verifiers to the actual mission in Kosovo, plus up to five staff officers to the headquarters in Vienna. We're working relatively diligently at that at the moment because we consider the deployment of our staff officers to those headquarters as very important, not only to the overall mission but also to ensure for ourselves we have all of the information necessary to prepare our staff for deployment, as well as being participants. We're also looking at providing staff officers to the headquarters organization being established in Pristina, Kosovo, which you'll note on the map is up in the northeast portion of the country and is the capital of Kosovo.

We will likely also be asked to provide headquarters staff officers for the air verification mission that has a headquarters just north of Skopje, which is in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and is being established at this time.

As mentioned, we currently have two military observers with the KDOM plus the Foreign Affairs member. It's expected that the KDOM will ultimately be integrated into the overall verification mission.

Our estimation is that the mission will last up to one year, with the potential for an extension to two years. The cost to DND, which is in addition to the costs that were mentioned by Mr. Wright, are estimated to be in the neighbourhood of $1.4 million incremental for each six-month period we participate in the mission. That's for the roughly 25 individuals I mentioned to you earlier.

With the open-ended extension of the limited air response and the phased air operation, NATO is continuing to maintain military capability in the region and pressure on the parties to achieve compliance.

[Translation]

Six Canadian CF-18s are based in Aviano, Italy. They are engaged in NATO air offensive operations in support of the Dayton accords and will be assigned to the Kosovo mission, if necessary. We plan to use them during this mission for limited air operations and phased air operations.

We also plan to use them in Kosovo for search and rescue operations, if necessary.

[English]

In the event we require combat search and rescue in Kosovo, we have been asked to consider the use of our aircraft to support those operations.

The aim of the air verification mission is to monitor compliance with the UN Security Council Resolution 1199 we mentioned earlier. That mission is now under way. A number of aircraft have already been used on that particular mission. They are unarmed, non-combat surveillance aircraft such as U-2s, if you know that type of aircraft—it is the type of aircraft that was flown by Gary Powers when he was shot down over Russia many years ago—and a number of unmanned surveillance aircraft are being provided by a number of countries. A number of countries are participating. I won't go into the details, but the possibility also exists for another NATO partner country, Russia, to be involved in the air verification mission.

The deployment of our staff officers to the NATO headquarters in Skopje is important if we get involved in the mission, in that it is very critical from our point of view to be able to provide at least some measure of influence and to make sure we have the proper coordination done in the event we are involved in a search and rescue mission.

Those staff officers could be employed not only in the headquarters in the former Macedonia but in other combined air operation centres that are relatively mobile and could be located in Hungary and other countries as necessary. We also expect there will be liaison cells established in Belgrade and possibly within Pristina in support of the air mission itself.

[Translation]

As I mentioned earlier, Yugoslavia will assume responsibility for the safety and evacuation of observers, in accordance with the agreement brokered by Ambassador Holbrooke.

All OSCE observers will be evacuated, regardless of nationality. The same goes for NG0 and humanitarian aid workers in Kosovo.

• 1620

[English]

The reasons for extraction could be many. I won't speculate on them at the moment, but they could include a breakdown in compliance, isolated incidents, renewed hostilities, and a number of other things. The potential scale of extraction, therefore—and that's what the plan is being developed upon—is anything from the rescue of small parties through to the extraction of the entire verification mission.

I reiterate it is important to remember that the NATO extraction plans assume that Yugoslavia will be compliant and will not obstruct an extraction operation. It will not necessarily assist an extraction operation, but will have no obstruction role to play in that particular operation.

Several concepts are under study by NATO. The military committee is looking at all of the avenues. We think they've come up with some fairly reasonable extraction concepts, and they are now in the process of asking participating nations, or nations like ours, to help them actually develop the plan.

That basically covers the military portion of the Kosovo mission and the current plan for our own CF involvement, potentially, in the mission itself. Of course, we're already engaged on the ground, and we expect we could possibly be engaged more intimately and in the air as well.

[Translation]

Thank you for your attention. I will be happy to answer your questions, as will my colleagues. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[English]

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. David Pratt): Thank you, Lieutenant-General Henault, Dr. Calder, and Mr. Wright for the information provided.

Mr. Hanger, do you have any questions?

Mr. Art Hanger (Calgary Northeast, Ref.): Yes. Thank you, and thank you, gentlemen, for coming. It's always good to hear such an in-depth description in such a short time on Canada's role. I always find it very interesting, to say the least.

I'm curious, though. You talked about extraction, and obviously there's a high level of threat, to some degree or another, of hostilities breaking out or there wouldn't be that concentration on the extraction plan. What is actually going to take place? My understanding is there will be no U.S. combat units involved in any of this business; it will strictly be other NATO partners probably. But how will that actually come together?

LGen Raymond Henault: At the moment the military committee is actually considering, and hopefully approving, a number of options that have been presented for an extraction course based on European countries', as opposed to U.S., involvement, although the U.S. would likely be involved to some degree with communications, logistics, and other types of support mechanisms. But I think we're going to find that countries like France, the U.K., and Germany will be very anxious to provide the core of the extraction force and will likely locate it very close to Kosovo, in a neighbouring country like the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, to provide a fairly short notice capability for extraction if it were required.

Mr. Art Hanger: So really, Canada doesn't have the capability to be part of that extraction force. I would assume there will be attack helicopters or whatever is necessary to move in quickly to do whatever they have to do quickly and then get out. We don't have that kind of equipment.

LGen Raymond Henault: No, we don't, but if we are asked to provide an element for the extraction force on a rotational basis, which is the likely scenario, where one particular European country provides the core of the extraction force and then asks other participating countries to be involved on a periodic or rotational basis, we will look at that as part of our potential contribution to the operation.

We don't know about that as yet, and in terms of short-notice extraction and so on, we would not want to do that from Canada; we would have to deploy. But our current commitment is primarily to provide verifiers, headquarters staff, and ultimately the potential use of our CF-18s in support of search and rescue ops. That doesn't mean we can't do it; it only means we haven't been asked to do it yet.

Dr. Kenneth Calder: If I may just add, NATO military authorities are in the process of planning for that operation at the moment and the requests have not yet gone out. For example, we have not yet received a request for a contribution because the planning isn't at that stage yet. Were we requested to—and we probably will be at some point in time—we would obviously consider if and how we would make a contribution.

• 1625

Mr. Jim Wright: Perhaps I could just add one or two words. I certainly understand the nature of the concern, Mr. Hanger. When we spoke last week to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, this issue was discussed at some length as well. Obviously, there is a risk there. We are dealing with a country that has faced real civil strife and conflict for an extended period of time. If we're looking at the situation we faced in Bosnia, especially during the period of time of UNPROFOR, it's also important to recognize some of the differences that are in place this time.

We have very clear agreements negotiated between the Yugoslav authorities and NATO and the OSCE. These have all been clearly locked into a series of UN Security Council resolutions. We also have this time the active engagement of the Russian authorities in this, and that includes their full participation in the OSCE verification mission on the ground.

That does not mean there isn't the risk of something going wrong here. Obviously, the best way to proceed here is with careful planning, training, and by exercising prudence on all parties concerned, and that includes NATO putting together an appropriate extraction force. Our real hope is that the political process that is mapped out in front of us ensures that the risk is manageable under all of the following circumstances: the series of agreements, the UN Security Council resolution, the very clear threat that NATO has at its disposal with assets kept in the theatre, coupled with, frankly, the clear interest on the part of the two parties in question to abide by the agreement. So while we're preparing for circumstances that might be encountered, we're reasonably optimistic, based on what we've seen so far, that this will not arise.

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. David Pratt): We are going to Mr. Proud now.

Mr. George Proud (Hillsborough, Lib.): Just to follow up on what Mr. Hanger was saying about the extraction force, when you say that so far the European countries would be involved in this primarily, is this a predetermined exercise to see if this will work without the use of the other side of the Atlantic in the NATO operation? Would this be a trial case, or is it just the way it happens to be?

LGen Raymond Henault: I would say it's an agreement amongst the NATO partners to do it this way. That would be my assessment. The Americans are involved, of course, in the theatre of operations. They form the bulk of the diplomatic observer mission and they do have naval forces, air forces, marine corps forces, and so on, in the Adriatic. So they do have a very large involvement. Of course, they are heavily engaged in Bosnia, as we are.

So I don't think there's any hidden motive in this particular case. It's just a recognition by the NATO nations of their responsibility, of their proximity to the area of operations, and of their ability to rotate troops a little more simply than perhaps the Americans or we might be able to do.

Dr. Kenneth Calder: Perhaps I could just add to that. NATO has not yet made a decision, but when they do decide it will not be any sort of experiment; it will be what in NATO's best judgment is necessary and can be done. It's very important to underline that there will be a significant element of Americans in Kosovo. We're looking at something like about 400 Americans in the observer force in Kosovo itself, so the Americans will be as much at risk as anybody else. And there are significant American forces in the area of the Adriatic, which we would assume are going to be available for that mission. So it is not as if the Americans are not there. They are very much there.

Mr. George Proud: Going back to the beginning of your presentation, General, one of the things you mentioned was the Kosovo Liberation Army. Listening to you, it would almost seem that now they seem to be the people we have to be concerned about rather than Mr. Milosevic. That gives me reason to be concerned, because I would suspect either one of them would be very capable of taking hostages or starting the flare-ups again if they were to take place.

• 1630

Is the main problem the liberation army, or are there still other factors involved with Mr. Milosevic? I don't think he has really thrown in the towel, for all intents and purposes.

LGen Raymond Henault: I don't think we would diminish the importance of making sure we know what Milosevic's intentions are, but I would defer to Mr. Wright to answer that question.

You're absolutely right. The KLA is on the ground and very local. Mr. Milosevic, though, has a track record that we certainly are very conscious of.

Mr. Jim Wright: It takes two to tango, and very clearly in the agreements that have been negotiated thus far, it's going to be extremely important that the Kosovar Albanian leadership also play their role in terms of abiding by the various agreements that are out there.

One issue that we didn't discuss in any great detail is in fact one of the most important aspects of the process that's under way right now. Those are the negotiations between Belgrade, between Mr. Milosevic and the Kosovar Albanian leadership concerning the future autonomy for Kosovo. Our hope remains very much that some of the unilateral concessions that have been offered thus far by Mr. Milosevic will be taken up by the Kosovar Albanian leadership. I'm referring to the opportunity for policing to be done at a community level within Kosovo, the opportunity for a parliament in Kosovo, the opportunity for elections in the course of the next nine months that would be supervised by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. In addition, I'm referring to autonomy for Kosovo in the areas of health care, education, and culture, which are all areas where Kosovo previously had enjoyed considerable autonomy that was taken away in 1989 by Mr. Milosevic.

Getting back to the KLA, our hope remains that if significant autonomy is negotiated, if a deal is being worked on, as we speak now, by the international community with both Pristina and with Belgrade, this will underpin the kind of political engagement by the Kosovar Albanian leadership, including the KLA.

What we have to in fact remember is that the conflict that arose last spring in large part was a result of three or four years of fruitless efforts on the part of the Kosovar Albanian leadership to negotiate exactly this kind of autonomy with Belgrade.

The leader of the Kosovar Albanian people, a gentleman by the name of Dr. Rugova, had negotiated in good faith a number of agreements with Belgrade. President Milosevic unfortunately did not see fit to follow through on any of those agreements. The net result was a rise in extremism in Kosovo and the upsurge of the Kosovo Liberation Army.

Our hope is that with some political settlements out there between Belgrade and Pristina, the Kosovo Liberation Army will throw its weight behind the leadership of the Kosovar Albanian people and efforts will be directed toward the kind of autonomy being negotiated right now.

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. David Pratt): Art.

Mr. Art Hanger: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Going right back to the very beginning, to the decision for Canada to become part of this whole process in Kosovo, how can you define Canada's interests here? All we have to do is bounce over to Bosnia and we are looking at 17 dead soldiers and 100 wounded, and we're really looking at perhaps similar possibilities here. Is it worth it, in a sense, for us to get involved?

• 1635

Mr. Jim Wright: My answer is absolutely, yes. And I think the answer of the Canadian government is absolutely, yes.

You're absolutely right, Mr. Hanger—and I know we travelled together in Bosnia last year. We saw the Canadian troops in action on the ground and we saw the very good work they were doing there. We have been in the former Yugoslavia since the early 1990s. We've paid a terrible price. We've lost a number of Canadian soldiers in the process, and it's been very costly for the Canadian government. But we've done so to preserve regional stability in a corner of Europe that in the past has been a flashpoint for global conflict. And we do not want to see that repeated again.

The efforts that are under way right now in Kosovo reflect the fact that if Canada, and countries like Canada, do not go in and try to preserve stability in that region, the Kosovo conflict will spill over into other parts of Yugoslavia. It will spill over into the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, into Albania, and into Bosnia. And it will disrupt the Dayton peace process, which was so carefully negotiated by the international community.

So while these are difficult circumstances and the investment Canada is making is a very serious one, I think the answer is that for the sake of regional stability, European security, and transatlantic security solidarity, Canada has an important role to play and should be there.

Mr. Art Hanger: You use the term “community policing”, which when we think about it in North America, conjures up certain ideas in one's mind. But they certainly don't apply to what anyone over there may think about community policing and what it's all about. I did have the opportunity, when we were over in Bosnia— which was very revealing when it came to learning the intricacies of justice, if you will. Many of those people cry out for justice and never see it and never have, but they remember the past and the atrocities that have been committed, from one generation to the next even. They seek some sort of retribution constantly from their government. When it comes to using police forces to maintain law and order, it just doesn't work in any real sense. It certainly can be spotted there, but culturally and historically, that isn't what those communities really understand. Certainly the concept isn't grand.

I guess I question the whole process of the policing concept as we know it being imposed upon them, when really they don't want it and don't participate.

Mr. Jim Wright: In fact, the people of Kosovo are looking for that degree of autonomy from Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and that's part of the package that's being negotiated right now between Belgrade and Pristina with the help of the international community. We're looking at a package that we hope will include a form of autonomy for Kosovo in a range of different areas: judicial, policing, local parliamentary assembly, education, and culture. And there are other dimensions of this as well.

But I think one of the difficulties, for exactly the reasons you've outlined, history and the outrages that one side has done against the other— I mean, there's a very, very long sense of history in these countries, and the only way they're going to overcome it is if there can be a return to the kind of autonomy that existed successfully in Kosovo for many, many years prior to 1989.

• 1640

So I don't pretend to be an expert on policing, except that I know in this instance, that was one of the areas that was clearly identified by the Kosovo Albanian people as being an area where they no longer wanted to be subjugated by the forces of the Serbian internal police or the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. They wanted to be able to police some of these matters at a local level themselves.

The Chairman: Thank you. Our next questioner is Monsieur Bertrand, and then Mr. Wood.

Mr. Robert Bertrand (Pontiac—Gatineau—Labelle, Lib.): Thank you very much.

Mr. Wright, you said Canada would be sending roughly 15 observers.

Mr. Jim Wright: In fact, the figure that was quoted by my colleagues here was that from the Department of Defence, we may be looking at upwards of 25 in total. That is for both the Kosovo verification mission and the headquarters staff officers in Pristina and in Vienna.

In total, I think the figure that is being used publicly by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and I believe the Minister of National Defence is between 50 and 100 from Canada in total as part of the Kosovo verification exercise.

We have three people who are active now in the Kosovo diplomatic observer mission: two representatives from the defence department and one from the foreign affairs department. Our embassy on the ground in Belgrade is very active in the verification effort. Extensive lists of experts—former military personnel, former police with the RCMP, experts in the area of human rights, experts in the area of elections monitoring—have been compiled by an interdepartmental committee working with a Canadian NGO called CANADEM.

These lists have been put together and are in the process of being sent to Vienna to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. That's the organization responsible for pulling together the overall team. They will look at the skill sets we are offering them and decide which of these Canadians they want to use on their mission.

We're not necessarily assuming all of the names we submit will be accepted, but we've dealt with the OSCE in many of these instances before, and some of the individuals we are proposing have been on previous OSCE missions. So we're reasonably optimistic Canada will be able to make a significant contribution to the overall effort.

The guestimate, the figure the OSCE uses, is an unarmed force of about 2,000 people. And as I say, the figure that ministers in this government have used before is between 50 and 100, including the complement from the Department of National Defence.

Mr. Robert Bertrand: Are they told the dangers involved? Do they know what they're getting into?

Mr. Jim Wright: The day after the Holbrooke package was announced, the phones at the Department of Foreign Affairs and at the defence department started to ring with calls from experts, people who have participated in these types of exercises before. So I think there is a level of understanding and engagement on the part of these experts that the committee would find quite impressive.

Having said that, my colleagues here have talked about some of the training that will be offered in advance of sending any individuals over there, to ensure these people are brought up to date in terms of what to expect when they arrive on the ground. This will cover all of the concerns you would expect, including mine awareness, the political process on the ground, human rights, you name it.

The Chairman: Can I have a brief question and a brief answer?

[Translation]

Mr. Robert Bertrand: My question is for the general. I don't know whether I understood you correctly. Did you in fact say that the Serb Republic had been assigned responsibility for ensuring the safety of our observers?

Lt. Gen. Raymond Henault: I believe I said Yugoslavia.

Mr. Robert Bertrand: I see, Yugoslavia.

Lt. Gen. Raymond Henault: Yes, Yugoslavia.

Mr. Robert Bertrand: Then I must have misunderstood you. What about the evacuation force?

Lt. Gen. Raymond Henault: What about this force?

Mr. Robert Bertrand: Is it under NATO command?

Lt. Gen. Raymond Henault: The force will be commanded either by a NATO officer or by a French, British, German or other officer whose job it will be to respond to evacuation requests from the OSCE. The chain of command will stretch to the North Atlantic Military Committee.

• 1645

[English]

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Bertrand.

Next is Mr. Pratt.

Mr. David Pratt: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My questions are very brief and straightforward. How long is a tour of duty for the verifiers?

LGen Raymond Henault: For the military verifiers it's normally a six-month tour of duty. We bring them out after six months and rotate them at that point. We normally don't send them back in again for a period of 18 months to two years.

Mr. David Pratt: What about this group of a hundred? They're going to be the civilian verifiers. What sort of tour will they be facing?

Mr. Jim Wright: I think it will depend on the nature of the specialization that the individual brings to bear. The agreement that was negotiated between the OSCE, the Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe, and Belgrade is for one year. The mission has a formal mandate of one year, with the option that either party can go ahead and extend it as required.

We're well aware of the normal timeframes used by the military. I think we would want to retain some flexibility in terms of how long people would be on the ground. Obviously, we want to minimize turnover in the mission, but at the same time this is a difficult assignment. How long an individual will stay on the ground may, frankly, relate very directly to the kind of work he or she is doing, certainly in the preparation for elections in nine months' time. We may not put election observers in right away, but in due course they would go in and stay for upwards of six months, maybe longer.

I don't think we're approaching this with a view to having a fixed period of time for each Canadian representative going in on the civilian side.

Mr. David Pratt: What do we pay these people?

Mr. Jim Wright: We pay them in Canadian dollars. This is something that is being negotiated with the help of CIDA and through CARE Canada, which hires these individuals on contract. Frankly, I'm not aware of what the salary scales may be. I also know that there are living expenses that cover the cost of living on the ground in Kosovo that will be arranged by the OSCE. These people will be paid as the professionals they are, and they will be going because they are deeply committed to the process. They're not going to be going there for the money. By the same token, we will make sure they are responsibly rewarded for the very important services they are delivering.

Mr. David Pratt: Let me get this clear. You mentioned that they would be recruited through CARE Canada.

Mr. Jim Wright: Because these individuals are hired on contract, and given the way CIDA operates, basically we use an outside organization as the contracting organization. But the work is done by us in terms of determining who we are recommending to actually go and provide these services as part of the OSCE mission. CARE Canada just happens to be the organization that's being used as the contracting agency, that's all.

Mr. David Pratt: Thank you.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Pratt.

Mr. Proud and then Mr. Richardson.

Mr. George Proud: Thank you again, Mr. Chairman. I just want to say—it was brought up here a moment ago—what our role is and why we're there. I think we definitely should be there. I think it's Canada's commitment. It's something we have to do for our NATO commitment and also for our commitment to world peace. As small as we may be in numbers, I think we're well respected around the world. We do a pretty good job, and it's important that we play this role.

Having said that, I've read different articles on this peace arrangement in place now. Some people are rather critical of Mr. Holbrooke and the way he has arrived at this, not doing as much as probably could have been done. His critics would probably say he did this more for himself than for the people of Kosovo and the other countries.

• 1650

I just wonder what any of you feel. Do you feel this arrangement is now something that will work to the best interests of all those people—the Kosovars, the other people involved?

Mr. Jim Wright: It's the deal we have. I'm not sure, if any one of us was put in the position Mr. Holbrooke was in, that we necessarily could have done better. It's not perfect. It's not risk free, but none of these deals ever are risk free.

We are all making every effort to ensure that the agreements are locked into Security Council resolutions, that they're locked into verification forces on the ground and in the air, and that we're getting the right experts on the ground giving advice to the parties in question, trying to broker a political solution between the Serbs in Belgrade and the Kosovar Albanians in Pristina.

It's not perfect, but it's the deal we have and we're going to make it work.

Dr. Kenneth Calder: If I could just add to that, I think we were facing, on one hand, a humanitarian disaster in Kosovo if we did nothing or, in the absence of a deal, under many conditions we might be having NATO air strikes in Kosovo and elsewhere in Yugoslavia.

I think in facing those two alternatives, this was by far the preferable one. It certainly is not perfect, but then in these situations they seldom are. I think, as in most cases, this was the best of the possible alternatives we were looking at.

Mr. George Proud: Thank you.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Proud.

Mr. Richardson and then Mr. Hanger.

Mr. John Richardson (Perth—Middlesex, Lib.): Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Just because it is a little different from what we've had in past operations, is OSCE the umbrella organization— It is the umbrella organization. They will be operating through them. I haven't heard of any other. I just picked that up. I thought it would be that.

If the OSCE is the lead operator then we would be working through their headquarters, etc.

A voice: That's right.

Mr. John Richardson: I was pleased by a number of things you did say. There could be tranquility in Kosovo if there isn't someone who wants to undermine the operation and try to have the Kosovan people and the Serbs who live in Kosovo—I guess they're all Serbs in Kosovo or Slavic— That mission is there just to stabilize and enforce those things Mr. Holbrooke negotiated.

We have the aim and the umbrella organization in place here, so we can talk in simple terms. We would be involved in this mission, as has been suggested by General Henault, and possibly there may be some involvement in search and rescue at some stage. I don't know the nature of that, but it takes all kinds of forms. We will have operational cells in Pristina and Belgrade. So we have all of the place holders now, except the action to be taken in place.

The total of 50 to 100—you mentioned 25 observers at one time, I think, or did I miss that? The potential of 25 observers—

LGen Raymond Henault: It's a potential of 25 Canadian Forces members plus the additional civilian observers, former diplomats, volunteers of all sorts.

Mr. John Richardson: I don't want to go away with the wrong impression. That's Canadian Forces personnel—25.

LGen Raymond Henault: In terms of the breakdown of the Canadian Forces personnel themselves, up to 15 or so, we estimate, will be observers, or verifiers, more correctly, and a total of 10 roughly will be spread between the headquarters in Vienna, Pristina potentially, in Kosovo, and the air verification mission headquarters in the former Republic of Macedonia.

• 1655

So 10 of them are staff officers and 15 of them are observers, basically. That does not count, of course, any CF-18 involvement, which would not be involved in overflight, surveillance, or any of that type of mission; it would only be in support of a search and rescue mission in the event that a member of an aircrew were forced to bail out because of a mechanical problem or that type of thing.

Mr. John Richardson: That's the role of the six that are in—

LGen Raymond Henault: Yes, and those six are in Aviano until December, conceivably. We'll look at how we can extend that if necessary. We are discussing that at the moment.

Mr. John Richardson: I wanted to be sure I had a clear picture of it. Thanks for the clarification.

LGen Raymond Henault: My pleasure.

Mr. Art Hanger: Mr. Chairman, the Kosovars want independence, and yet the agreement stresses autonomy. I'm kind of curious why NATO would be prepared to deal with the autonomy issue and not the independence. If you're looking over time—and all you have to do is go over a couple of borders there into Bosnia—you have a long-term situation on your hands. Why wouldn't there be more pressure placed on the parties for an independent state?

Mr. Jim Wright: It's a very good question, and if there were some representatives of the Kosovar Albanian community, they would give you their answer. Our answer, and I think the answer from most members of the international community—it's not just NATO and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe; it's the United Nations—the collective view is that Kosovo should enjoy the kind of meaningful autonomy it has enjoyed before, prior to 1989, but we don't favour independence for Kosovo. We've made this point repeatedly to the Kosovar Albanian leadership, and we, the international community, take this position given the destabilizing effect this would have on the region generally.

In due course, the Kosovar Albanian community will have to sort out its issues within their own community, within their country. But at the present time, the judgment of the international community is that given the impact that a move toward independence would have on an already unstable situation in Albania, a potentially unstable situation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and on the delicate peace process in Bosnia, independence simply is not a realistic option. This would be very unhelpful for regional stability, and so nobody in the international community has been promoting that issue, frankly.

Mr. Art Hanger: The fear is that with independence there is going to come, what, aggression that's going to extend beyond the borders of this—

Mr. Jim Wright: There's a significant Albanian population, Albanian minority, in Macedonia. There is a push from some within Macedonia for a greater Albania, and such a greater Albania would include parts of Macedonia and— well, it would include Albania and Kosovo.

At the same time, Mr. Hanger, if you were to feed that perception, that view held by some for a greater Albania, then likewise would you be feeding the interest on the part of some Serbs for a greater Serbia? That means taking the Republic of Srpska out of Bosnia and reconnecting it to Serbia. Would that also feed those in Croatia who are looking for greater Croatia, taking that part of the federation from Bosnia and adding that onto Croatia?

Unfortunately, it's a bit of a Rubik's cube. Perhaps that's not a good analogy, but once you start playing with this, it causes all sorts of knock-on effects. So the general view of the international community is that independence for Kosovo is simply not an option at the present time.

• 1700

Mr. Art Hanger: It's almost like a game of keeping everyone off balance, in a way, because nothing, at least in the short order, really gets resolved either. We're really looking at a long-term solution here again.

Mr. Jim Wright: We're hoping that if there is a good deal on autonomy for Kosovo it will respond to the widest majority of Kosovar Albanians and the situation will return largely to the situation that prevailed in the 1970s and 1980s, when Kosovo enjoyed an enormous amount of autonomy in Yugoslavia.

Mr. Art Hanger: I have a short question.

The Chairman: Sure, a brief one, please.

Mr. Art Hanger: To the general, is it the intention of the U.S. to get everything off the ground for them and just look after what's in the air? They have their network. When we were in the region last, it became very clear that there was a grid whereby very little happened without the Americans knowing it, whether it be through satellites or other installations. There's no doubt in my mind that this is as tight as anything over Bosnia or the region, and the Americans knew about anything that moved there.

But there seems to be a reluctance on the part of the American public for their troops to get really involved in anything that's going to show them being in a difficult situation. Are they planning on getting out of the game and just looking after the air and all these other multinational forces working the ground?

LGen Raymond Henault: No, I don't think so, Mr. Hanger. I think, yes, they are very focused on the air verification mission at the moment, and I think primarily that's because they do have a very strong involvement in the combined air operation centre located in Vicenza. Through the 5th Allied Tactical Air Force, which is part of the Com Air South or the Commander of Air South region, they control air activity over Bosnia and they control air activity over this region, if you like.

With the assets they have, including not only the ground-based radar systems and so on but also the airborne warning and control aircraft, the AWACS, the unmanned aircraft such as the Predator, and other types of unmanned air vehicles, they have a very intimate involvement in air operations. Of course, that is a focus for them at the moment, and you're quite right in that respect.

They are nonetheless still heavily involved in Bosnia, and their intent in terms of the observer mission itself or the KDOM—the extension of the KDOM, if you like—is to put up to 400 of those verifiers, who will be a combination of military and civilian verifiers, into Kosovo as well. I don't think they're actually pulling out of it; I think they are providing what we would consider to be a proportionate amount of support for this particular mission.

So yes, they have been vocal in saying they would like to have perhaps less involvement in some of these activities, but they nonetheless are very committed to this particular one in the numbers that I have given you.

The Chairman: Thank you, General.

Dr. Kenneth Calder: Could I just add a point?

The Chairman: Yes.

Dr. Kenneth Calder: The Americans are obviously quite prudent in putting troops in on the ground, but that's really a reasonable thing, and we should all be quite prudent, I think. Experience has shown that this type of operation, as shown in Bosnia, for example, doesn't work if you don't have Americans participating on the ground. It is a point that has been made to the Americans—I can't speak for all of them—probably by every one of their allies. It is certainly a point that has been made to the Americans by the Canadian government, and I think the Americans have heard their allies and I think they understand that their presence is required if these operations are going to actually be successful.

The Chairman: Thank you very much.

We have two more speakers, colleagues, before I go to the list. I would remind colleagues that we are expecting bells at 5.30 p.m. There is about five minutes of routine business that we need to clear up following the briefing, if we could try to leave time for that.

Mr. Bertrand and then Mr. Laurin.

Mr. Robert Bertrand: General, you were saying that this will cost us roughly $1.4 million in incremental costs every six months.

LGen Raymond Henault: That's correct.

[Translation]

That's correct, Mr. Bertrand.

[English]

Mr. Robert Bertrand: Dr. Calder, are we going to get that money back?

• 1705

Dr. Kenneth Calder: From whom would you suggest— This is not unlike a UN operation; this is we pay our own way. In other words, the incremental costs of the operation will be paid by the participating countries. In the case of the United Nations, of course, some of the incremental costs are normally reimbursed. This is as some of our other operations. Indeed, that is the case in Bosnia; NATO does not reimburse us.

Mr. Robert Bertrand: How about Foreign Affairs? They have lots of money.

Dr. Kenneth Calder: We would happily accept it if they were to offer it.

Mr. Robert Bertrand: We could make a very strong recommendation.

The Chairman: Thank you. Monsieur Laurin.

[Translation]

Mr. René Laurin (Joliette, BQ): Could you tell me if Canada's involvement in these operations is contingent upon the participation of other nations? What would it mean to Canada, strategically as well as politically, if it were to withdraw from this exercise? Would the consequences be significant, militarily speaking? I'm trying to get some sense of the importance of Canada's involvement in these operations.

I'd also like to have some idea of what life is like for Canadian soldiers in that region. Just recently, a report was released on the living conditions of our Canadian soldiers. Are they happy with their conditions over there? If they could make one request, what would it be? Do they have everything they need to defend themselves should hostilities break out again? Are they in a position to defend themselves? Do they have access to weapons, or must they rely on others for protection?

I realize that this is a lengthy question. Take your time answering.

Lt. Gen. Raymond Henault: I can answer the second part of your question, but I will ask Dr. Calder to tackle the first part of it.

Conditions are not yet assured because we still don't have a clear idea of where our people will be stationed or where observers will be sent.

In principle, five regions will be designated in the province of Kosovo as areas to be patrolled.. When we know exactly where our observers will be based, then perhaps we will have a better idea of the conditions they will encounter.

Our military attaché, Col. Armstrong, is currently in the country. No doubt you have heard that Col. Armstrong and his assistant have been overseeing the observer mission operations for several weeks now. They have already taken steps to find accommodation for observers and to make other arrangements for them. Presumably, they will be housed in hotels. We're not talking about five-star hotels, of course, but the observers themselves seem to think that these accommodations are reasonable.

As far as defending themselves, since our troops will not be armed, they will be relying on local forces and evacuation mission participants for protection. Simply put, their defence will be self-defence. Since they will not be armed, they will have to use their own hands to defend themselves. This is a specific mission requirement. Observers cannot carry weapons.

Does that answer your question regarding our troops, Mr. Laurin?

Mr. René Laurin: Yes.

Mr. Jim Wright: The first part of your question dealt specifically with the mission itself. This is a joint NATO and OSCE mission. Canada is a member of both organizations. I believe that government of Canada is sending a clear signal to these two organizations by participating in key missions.

[English]

Our sense is that it is right and responsible that Canada participate in these missions. We've played an important part in terms of Balkan security since the early 1990s. We would not want to see that investment in Bosnia unravel because of a side show in Kosovo.

• 1710

The judgment call was made by the Canadian government and I know this issue was debated in Parliament as well. It enjoyed strong support from all sides in Parliament that Canada should be there.

If a decision was taken by the Canadian government not to participate, the organizations would understand, but they would draw certain conclusions from that decision. These conclusions might relate to a lack of interest on the part of Canada in terms of the importance of Euro-Atlantic security co-operation and European security generally. I know the Canadian government continues to attach a very high priority to both of these issues. Anything is possible in this day and age, but it would be naive to assume that other countries would not draw conclusions.

The Chairman: Thank you very much. We'll go to Mr. Earle, then to Mr. Hanger for a last question. Then we'll go to our routine matters.

Mr. Earle.

Mr. Gordon Earle (Halifax West, NDP): Thank you.

You mentioned that the observers will not be armed and that they'll rely upon the protection of the local forces and an extraction plan. Then you talked a bit about self-defence. Were you talking actually about physical self-defence, karate, judo and that sort of thing?

LGen Raymond Henault: Yes.

Mr. Gordon Earle: You mentioned a training period for the observers. How long would someone be involved in the training period before they would be actually placed in the field?

LGen Raymond Henault: There is a training program that all of our observers undergo in Kingston, Ontario. It's generally about three weeks in length. It trains them in all the basics that I spoke to you about a little bit earlier. It does not train them in arm-to-arm combat, if you like, or hand-to-hand combat; that's not really part of it.

When I talk about self-defence I really talk about the fact that everyone has an inherent right to self-defence. In the case of this particular observer mission, for example, we have no rules of engagement. When we talk about rules of engagement, those are rules that allow us to use force under very specific conditions.

I know you've all heard about these particular rules of engagement. In this case there are no rules. You are allowed to defend yourself or defend another member of your force, for example, if he's in danger of being either injured or killed, but that is only what you are able to do with what you have local to you, whether it's a stick or your hands. And that's about as far as they can go in this particular case. It really is a show of faith in the security environment that they're operating in and a show of faith in the fact that they will be defended by the local police forces, the Yugoslav government forces and so on.

The Chairman: Thank you.

We'll have your last question, Mr. Hanger, and then we'll move on.

Mr. Art Hanger: Thank you.

Along the same lines, General, the unarmed verifiers run into some cranky Kosovars, and they're obviously going to be riding around in military equipment of some kind. Will that piece of military equipment have a gun on it?

LGen Raymond Henault: Not that I would know of. In essence, the vehicles are unarmed as well as the verifiers, so there is no intent to deploy weapons.

Mr. Art Hanger: So there's no chance of their having one of these new LAV III units to secret themselves in or be protected by if they run into a land mine?

LGen Raymond Henault: They do operate in most cases in armoured combat vehicles without any weaponry on board. In fact, the observers I talked to you about a little bit earlier who struck a land mine were in an armoured Suburban. It is like a Chevy Suburban vehicle, but it has armoured material around the gas tanks, around the underneath of the vehicle, around the sides and so on, so there is a degree of protection. Those vehicles are provided normally by Foreign Affairs or by other governments.

Mr. Jim Wright: There's a bit of a problem here for Mr. Bertrand.

Mr. Robert Bertrand: That's right. We need one more of these, given what happened in Kosovo.

• 1715

Mr. Art Hanger: Obviously there's going to be a protraction to the future because this matter is not going to be resolved tomorrow or even possibly in a year or two. What do you see as the extended commitment of military personnel coming out of this country?

LGen Raymond Henault: Do you mean in the length of time, Mr. Hanger?

Mr. Art Hanger: No, of Canadian Forces military personnel.

LGen Raymond Henault: I see it at about the level we're talking to you about now, somewhere in the neighbourhood of 25, and perhaps going upward slightly from that, depending on headquarters' requirements or indeed our involvement in the observer mission.

We do see it as the minimum of one year, as mentioned by Mr. Wright, with the possibility of it going beyond that to a second year. Anybody's guess would be the length of time it would go beyond that particular timeframe.

The observers we currently have to deploy will deploy for ostensibly a six-month period. We are already planning to train replacement observers or standby observers, as well as rotational observers. We are planning for at least a two-year commitment, from our point of view.

Mr. Art Hanger: Perhaps I may add one last comment. My understanding, then, is that the arrangement and the agreement as struck at this point in time will amount to only the unarmed verifiers within the country and not any other troops of any kind over this one- or two-year period of time, unless hostilities break out.

LGen Raymond Henault: I see your point. Yes, you're absolutely right.

The only way that would change is if in the statement of requirement for the extraction force, which we have not yet received, by the way, if we were asked to contribute troops on a periodic basis—a company group or something of that nature to support the UN extraction force—then we would have to take that into consideration. It may change the numbers, obviously, if that was the case. At the moment we have not yet been asked for that type of involvement.

Dr. Kenneth Calder: I have just one little point to add. The numbers are tentative; you should not be wedded to these numbers. They depend on some decisions.

The Chairman: There are certain exigencies that could change matters. Okay.

Gentlemen, thank you very much for sharing your expertise and providing this informative and interesting briefing. We appreciate it. We look forward to seeing you again. Thank you.

Colleagues, just before we adjourn, there are a couple of routine matters to discuss.

First, Mr. Clerk, I assume that bound copies of the report tabled last week are available now for all members if they don't yet have one.

Call the clerk obviously for your requirements.

At the last meeting of the steering committee we discussed possible future topics. Let me just quickly review that list and see what other additional submissions there are from any members here who were not in attendance, either because they couldn't be or because they weren't on the steering committee.

We've agreed that veterans' issues will basically take centre stage for the next several meetings of the committee.

Mr. Earle has asked for consideration of a revival of the Halifax Rifles. He asked verbally for this and now he has asked in writing. Are we agreed that can go on the list?

Some hon. members: Agreed.

The Chairman: There's discussion of a briefing in Charlottetown, which Mr. Wood, the parliamentary secretary, mentioned.

Do you want to speak to that briefly, Bob?

Mr. Bob Wood (Nipissing, Lib.): Basically, there's no problem with that. The Minister of Veterans Affairs will be glad to host us. They're looking forward to it. I would leave it up to the clerk to find a suitable date when we can all go down for a day or a day and a half—whatever it takes.

The Chairman: I think that would be excellent.

Mr. Art Hanger: January 30 sounds fine.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

The Chairman: We have to seek some funding, but it's an excellent idea.

Several members raised the need for the RMA, the technology in modern equipment, the possibility of travelling. There's an arms show in the southern U.S. in the near future. We discussed the idea of having our research staff prepare a paper for us on where in particular the U.S. is heading in the new technology in military equipment.

Mr. Hanger raised the issue of funding for the Perley Hospital. We did agree to discuss that as a committee, but we felt it should be after November 10, which is the projected conclusion of the court proceeding under way.

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We agreed to discuss the status quo of reserves in this country and what the future holds there.

Also, the final point was a briefing from the Auditor General or on the Auditor General's report vis-à-vis the Canadian Forces.

So that was the list. Are there additional submissions now? We have the future of the reserves and the examination of the procurement process. I think that was raised last time as well. Also, how combat-capable is the Canadian Forces? Then there's the sustainability of equipment, training and cohesion, and the new technology I just mentioned. Are there other submissions from other members?

Mr. Earle, do you have anything in addition to your Rifles?

Mr. Gordon Earle: No, this is not another submission; this is with respect to the meeting coming up on Thursday, when the merchant mariners are coming. Shall I discuss that now?

The Chairman: Let's finalize the list and then we'll come back to it.

Is there anything else for the future consideration of this committee? Mr. Richardson.

Mr. John Richardson: You mentioned the merchant marine. I think we'd better be ready for the ferry command people who lost lives in large numbers flying airplanes back and forth to Europe.

The Chairman: That's on Thursday. We'll come to that.

Mr. John Richardson: They're coming on the back of the merchant mariners.

The Chairman: No, I don't think so.

Colleagues, if I could, I'd like to finalize the list for the future. We've already agreed to hear the merchant mariners on Thursday, Mr. Richardson.

Mr. John Richardson: I'm thinking about the future.

The Chairman: All right, we'll put them down.

Mr. John Richardson: The ferry command people will be up here.

The Chairman: But we'll wait to react to them.

Mr. John Richardson: Yes, we'll react. It will be a similar situation to the—

The Chairman: What I'm really trying to do now is get a list of submissions that you think we should put on the list for our consideration.

I have eight, so that's plenty.

Mr. Pratt.

Mr. David Pratt: I just wanted to make sure that Canadian Defence Industries Association was coming down.

The Chairman: We'll put down Canadian Defence Industries Association.

Mr. David Pratt: It's about the Canadian Defence Industries Association and their possible appearance before the committee.

The Chairman: It's just what their role is, how they interface with the Canadian Forces, and so on.

Mr. Hanger.

Mr. Art Hanger: Will there be a need to prioritize some of these issues?

The Chairman: I think so.

Mr. Art Hanger: I don't know if you're going to do that here and now.

The Chairman: I don't think we'll have time now.

Mr. Art Hanger: Could you maybe send us a list of everything you have?

The Chairman: Now that we have all submissions, the clerk will prepare a master list and send it out. Then at a meeting in the very near future, maybe Thursday, we can take a few minutes and prioritize that list. Is Thursday agreeable?

What about in the near future, Mr. Laurin?

[Translation]

Mr. René Laurin: Mr. Chairman, does our committees mandate allow us to call a company that may have been awarded a contract to testify? I'm thinking, for instance, about the company that was awarded the Cormorant helicopter contract. Could a company like this be called before the committee to explain how far along it is with the contract? Certain regions of the country were supposed to share in the economic spinoffs.

Does this come under our mandate? At some point, can we ask a company how far along it is in fulfilling the terms of the contract and how many millions of dollars have been invested in Ontario, Quebec or the Maritimes? When the contract was awarded, a number of promises were made.

Therefore, if you think this falls within our committee's purview, I would like an opportunity to put some questions to this company.

[English]

The Chairman: Is that okay on the Cormorant?

[Translation]

Mr. René Laurin: Yes.

[English]

The Chairman: Okay. It seems to me that it comes under the procurement process, which is part of our committee's mandate.

[Translation]

Mr. René Laurin: We will do it then.

[English]

The Chairman: So we'll put the Cormorant contract and an update from the contractor on the list.

Mr. Pratt.

Mr. David Pratt: Just on that point that Mr. Laurin raised, Mr. Chairman, I think what's important here as far as the procurement issue is concerned is the multi-departmental task group that was given responsibility for that. It seems to me that the people who should be questioned are not the people from Cormorant but the people from Industry, Public Works, Treasury Board, and National Defence who were part of the original decision. They could explain the government's rationale.

The Chairman: If it's agreed that we'll put the contract on our list, we'll call whichever witnesses are relevant and whom we have the authority to call. Is that agreed?

Mr. Hanger.

Mr. Art Hanger: As a matter of interest, there are a number of individuals on this committee who will also be going over to Edinburgh on the NATO parliamentary committee. I don't know who all is going. George—

The Chairman: George, are you going?

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Mr. Bob Wood: Just George, I think.

Mr. Art Hangar: I made contact with Senator Rompkey and also with Westland over the Cormorant, and it just so happens that they're testing these helicopters right outside of Edinburgh. They're more than willing to take the committee, and anyone else who is going along, on a good rundown and possibly even a flight on this helicopter.

That's presently before the chairman, and I believe he is contacting the defence minister right now to get this thing together.

The Chairman: Very good.

Okay. What we'll do is prepare a list. In the first few minutes of our meeting on Thursday, or at some point on Thursday, we'll look at prioritizing these, although we've agreed that the first priority for the next several meetings is veterans issues until we've removed that backlog. Is that agreeable?

Mr. George Proud: How many veterans groups have you asked to come?

The Chairman: Six at this point and there could be more.

Is there other new business of an organizational nature?

I'm sorry, Mr. Earle, you had a point.

Mr. Gordon Earle: I just wanted to mention, because I won't be here on Thursday, that there is a gentleman who is going to be here who is with the Merchant Navy Association. I realize there have been splits between the coalition and the association, but this gentleman is going to be at the meeting on Thursday. He wants to be invited to speak rather than have to ask to speak.

Mr. Bob Wood: What's his name?

Mr. Gordon Earle: Bill Riddell.

Mr. Bob Wood: I know him.

Mr. Gordon Earle: I'm simply proposing that the committee may want to invite him to give his views so that we have as wide a variety of views as possible to help with your deliberations on this.

Mr. Bob Wood: Is he a constituent of yours?

Mr. Gordon Earle: No, but he contacted the office. He lives here, I believe, and he plans to be at the meeting.

Mr. George Proud: Better get him next week because he'll be in Florida the week after.

The Chairman: Gordon, there is one problem with that. Either we call a witness, and we didn't call him specifically, or people submit a request in writing to the clerk. He hasn't done that yet. I'll endeavour to do my best as chairman to involve him, but we have to first give the floor to the people who have been waiting. I know Bill. We'll do our best to give him a few minutes.

Anything else, colleagues?

The meeting is adjourned.