NDVA Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE AND VETERANS AFFAIRS

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE ET DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Tuesday, April 21, 1998

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[English]

The Chairman (Mr. Robert Bertrand (Pontiac—Gatineau—Labelle, Lib.): Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, and a special welcome to General Dallaire. It's always a pleasure to welcome you to our committee.

I understand you have slides and a few things for your presentation. As you are aware, we allow between 15 and 20 minutes and then we go to question period from the members. If that's agreeable to everyone, we can start right away.

General.

[Translation]

Lieutenant-General Roméo Dallaire (Assistant Deputy Minister (Personnel), Department of National Defence): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me to appear this afternoon. I realize that you have just returned from a trip to Petawawa.

This afternoon, I would like to try and give you a very personal perspective on the involvement of our military personnel in operations and of our concerns in that area. I will also be presenting a three-minute video, as well as some slides. I will do my best to be disciplined and keep my presentation as brief as possible.

You have been given a copy of a statement which is certainly available for you to peruse, but given the broad issues you are reviewing, I would like to speak to the Committee today, not as a staff officer with the Canadian Armed Forces, but rather as an army general, soldier, and father who I hope has some credibility with Committee members, both from an operational and family standpoint.

[English]

I wish to address this committee as a soldier and speak to you from the heart. I wish to seek that indulgence from you based on two elements: one, my own background, be it family and the like; and secondly, from my professional experiences in the military.

I am the son of a professional soldier, a warrant officer, who married a Dutch girl at the end of the Second World War. We landed here in Canada in 1946, off one of those war bride, Red Cross ships, and subsequently my father was posted to the garrison at Quebec City and to Montreal.

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In the post-war era, since demobilization, we've lived in tar-paper shacks, which my father and his buddies built up to make reasonable residences. My dad held down two jobs for a number of years as he tried to make a decent or reasonable living for his wife and three kids. He is a veteran of the Second World War and had a very small disability pension. My father-in-law commanded his regiment in the Second World War and subsequently he was also a professional soldier. My two sons are both in the military and they are now the fourth generation in uniform.

So, ladies and gentlemen, the military to me is not a passing opportunity for a job; it is a way of life. It is a way of life for me and my wife, and it has been a way of life in our family since I can remember. I even think my first diapers were probably khaki.

The second component of why I feel I can speak to you from the heart as a soldier is from my professional experiences. As many of my colleagues in uniform have done over the last months in different forums, and will I believe for another month of so...we have our baggage of experiences. I have commanded every level in the army except the army. I have commanded in peace and garrison in Canada and overseas. I commanded a platoon in the 1970 October Crisis, and for a young French Canadian officer just out of military college, to have to carry weapons with the possibility of having to use them against fellow Canadians was a significant event in my life. Right there, within a year of becoming an officer, I was ultimately tested in my loyalty to this nation and its flag and what it stands for. That loyalty has never wavered.

I have commanded troops in war. I have commanded them in genocide and humanitarian catastrophes. I have seen them die, slaughtered. I have smelt death. I myself went through a number of significant incidents, despite which, by the grace of God or pure luck, I am able to sit here today facing you—maybe with no physical limitations to doing my duty, but I would contend that I still have post-traumatic symptoms for which I have sought and still seek medical support.

I say these things to you, as many of my colleagues in uniform have done over the last months, because I believe to express myself humanly to you is critical. In my heart and in my soul I believe this committee is on a historic path in this nation. It is my opinion that there has not been an assessment, such as is going on now, of the link between the military and its national society since, I would say, Mackenzie King decided to commit us to war in World War II, in which the nation and its military created a significant marriage that brought it to its successful conclusion at the end of World War II.

I say you are on a historic path because you will be articulating to those in the uniform and to the nation what it is worth to serve this nation in uniform. According to the terms of reference, which we have been able to glean and understand, and certainly from les cris du coeur, from those in uniform and their families, in a historic gesture you will be called upon, through your authority as members of Parliament, to articulate what it means in value to this nation, what it is worth to serve, to be sacrificed, and to potentially die for this flag in this nation. That articulation in itself is historic and has not been uttered in fact since World War II, when the nation was at war and therefore committed its resources and its capabilities to that.

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The nation in 1943, 1944, and particularly in 1945, as it looked at demobilization, also committed itself to taking care of those veterans coming back by constructing housing and creating jobs in the postal service and so on, to employ, re-employ, and support those who risked their lives and survived physically, and with all the mental stresses, the horrors of World War II.

We find ourselves, ladies and gentlemen, at a time when we have nearly as many veterans in uniform today in the modern era operations as we did who served in Korea, estimating about 20,000 today and about 25,000 in Korea. I say modern-day veterans for that is in fact what many feel they are.

I was asked to speak of support to operations, and as such I believe it is crucial that you also grasp, if I may be so impertinent to state, the nature of operations in the modern era, that is to say, operations since the end of the Cold War that are different from the classic warfare of an army in Europe with all its amenities, families, and infrastructure.

It is an era where the army, navy, and air force are being committed in operations where the national security is not at risk, the country is at peace, the government is at peace, and even National Defence Headquarters is at peace. But the troops are in war zones, and those bullets, the killing and smell of war, are just as real there as they were in World War II, World War I, or Korea.

To give you a flavour, permit me to show a very short clip on the nature of some of the operations of the modern era, and I hope I have the technological skills to do this.

[Editor's Note: Video presentation]

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LGen Roméo Dallaire: I sit here today before you, four years to the day after the United Nations, due to the apathy of the international community, ordered me to pull my troops out of Rwanda.

It is with great hope and aspirations that we will not see apathy for the demands and the crying out by members of the Canadian Forces and their families for the recognition by their nation of the nature of warfare in the modern era.

When we went to Korea, the military was in an ascendancy that hit its high-water mark in 1958 with about 150,000 troops. Those veterans came back to a military that had Second World War veterans and resources that were expanding beyond our wildest dreams. We went into a 40-year period of peacetime Cold War soldiering, with all the amenities and structures and a not bad way of life, culturally and socially, of service in Germany in NATO.

Then, all of a sudden, the classic warfare situation of that timeframe switched in 1989, when the enemy disappeared on us. We then stumbled into the nineties, starting with the Oka crisis, moving through the Gulf War, and to a series of humanitarian peacekeeping operations—operations other than war—in which the Canadian military saw horror, ruthlessness, and brutality that none of us could even fathom existing on the face of this earth.

With the exception of those who saw the concentration camps of World War II, none of them smelled, tasted, lived with, and were faced with the moral complexities of meeting these complex humanitarian, political, and security or military operations we've been living through and will continue to live through in the next period of time, as many of those nations are trying to grasp the complexities of democracy and true independence as they move into the next millennium.

I recall a statement from my mother-in-law upon my return from Rwanda after 14 months overseas, of which nearly 4 months was in outright war. She said to me that although my father-in-law had been gone for nearly six years in World War II and had commanded his regiment, with casualties and so on and the trials and tribulations of that, she would never have been able to survive what my family survived, for in World War II families lived by extension through a very limited media and also through the limitations on the media of lead information on the war zone. Those directly affected by lost ones lived that experience very intensely. However, in the modern era of communications, media and transparency, my family lived those four months of war just as I did. They may not have had the smell or the deprivations of food, water, and medical supplies, but they lived the fatigue and the sights. For every day I was in that war, they spent every moment of the day swinging from one TV and radio channel to the other, waiting for the next media report that I had been either killed, captured, injured, slaughtered or whatever.

The families are living our missions with us. This is not a separate exercise. This is a totally new dimension to rear-party garrison support, care of our people, and conditions under which they are to continue to serve. I would contend that accusations that the leadership structures have not been sensitive or capable of handling this new dimension are generally true, for we stumbled into this era ourselves, and some of us have lived enough of it to realize its impact.

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Two of my three children have had psychological support. I wonder if my wife shouldn't get some help these days, the way we're doing things.

However, we can't continue this way. We are mortgaging our future by these experiences of the recent past. What of that?

Perhaps I can draw your attention to the overheads.

Those who serve overseas are serving in scenarios in which there are no more rules. Those who are conducting those catastrophes of a humanitarian nature are not playing by the rules. We must play by the rules. By playing by the rules, we will take casualties, and we will continue to sustain casualties, but contrary to World War II, we're sustaining casualties and doing those duties with the full knowledge that the nation is not at security risk. That in itself has an impact on how we react to those who are being committed and to those who return, be it in a body bag, be it missing limbs, or be it coming back without all the grey cells lined up any more.

That's a difficult task for the nation to recognize. It's a difficult task for its leaders to recognize. It's a difficult task to articulate to those who haven't smelled it, tasted it, lived it, and survived it, be it members themselves or their families. What of it?

Until the nineties we anticipated a stress level throughout the career of an individual. The blue dotted line gives a sort of feel for it. It was peacetime soldiering with the risks of war, of course, and the odd incident of significance—the Congo, Cyprus in 1974, the October Crisis—that did raise significant stress and concern. Generally, though, a family would work through a 35-year career with, yes, some stresses augmenting during the experience because of constant moves, the kids changing, the pressures of different jobs, a different place to live and so on, but it was an experience that made it part of being in the military. It was the family evolving within that milieu, and the way of life tended to recognize that type of situation.

However, when we moved into the nineties, at the same time of the fiscal constraints we found ourselves in, it was a totally different scenario from the fifties. We also found ourselves in an increased tempo of operations and in an unprecedented nature of those operations. The stress levels went off the chart.

People would be committed for the six-month missions. There was the stress before leaving, the stress during, and the stress post. Then they would evolve in whatever timeframe, some of them not quite twelve months, to find themselves launched again, the member and his or her family, into another mission.

What's happened is that we did not build a system to ensure that the initial stresses of such complex and demanding operations did not in themselves go off the chart, and second, that we bring them back down to be ready for the next one. How do we bring them down to a level that this was stressful, but the family can gain from that experience, that it is part of their way of life but it is a manageable component and with a bit of time, it soothes, and then they're ready for another one?

So it wasn't surprising that people packed it in, families woke up, and in the extreme, what other personal impacts were there on individuals?

[Translation]

So what do we do about this? What kind of scenario do we want to work towards?

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Of course, when we are involved in these operations, the stress level goes up. When people put their life and their loved ones at risk, it is natural for the entire family to feel the effects of that stress. But we can no longer allow that stress to control us. We have to find ways, not to minimize but rather to control that stress, and to support families and members when they come back, so that they can go back to having normal lives. We shouldn't be saying to them: “You're back now, so take some leave and look after your problems.” We have to create the conditions that will allow families and military personnel to lead a normal life again. They may be enriched by their experience and ready to start all over again after a reasonable period of time. So, this is an evolving curve.

When we look at available programs, we see that there are a great many of them, but have all those programs been restructured and refocussed in order to meet modern needs?

[English]

As for this soft side of human resources, did all those components that were there to support those in operations and their families kick in? Did they all have the priority? Did they all in a complementary or synergistic way in fact keep the families and individuals under a level of stress, control, and commitment that would permit them to continue to serve?

I would contend from personal experience and also from enough knowledge of the people who were involved that we have not succeeded in that arena, be it through just the policies—these were not necessarily adapted—that conflict with others, the resource base, or simply our acknowledgement of the changing nature of serving this country in a modern era.

I will conclude, if I may, Mr. Chairman, with the statement that we entered a new era. Some would say, as I have said before, that we stumbled into it. It's an era in which wearing the uniform and being committed to operations will not get easier. There are complex, high-stress missions. There's a high pay-off in the reward of being able to help the altruistic perspective of the humanity that needs a nation like us to be present.

But there is a cost of serving this flag. This flag for me, right from the October Crisis up to today, is more than for simply adorning buildings, parks, or whatever other infrastructure. It's something I have committed my life to. I have risked my life. My family has been committed to it.

This committee is assessing, looking, recognizing, or hearing such that to serve that flag and this nation, there has been an enormous cost. You in the historic setting that you have established here for your mission are going to try to identify and articulate what it's worth to those who wear that uniform and serve this flag. What's it worth to do that duty? You will write a chapter in political military affairs in this nation that I believe will be there for decades. So I cannot understate the enormous amount of attention by and perspective of the outcomes of this committee.

I have no problems being accused of being a senior leader in the military and being insensitive, of having lost perspective, of lost priorities, or even of, as some would say, careerism. I am serene in what I have done, and I perceive that I have had enough field time and experiences to stand the test of any one-on-one by any of my subordinates. However, if we have been found wanting, if the troops have felt that the resources and the care they need has been found wanting—and you have heard that from them and you hear it from me—then we cannot survive a result of this committee that will not bring orientation and solution to this very significant element of service to this nation in uniform.

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[Translation]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, General, for your comments. We will now move to questions, starting with Mr. Hanger.

Mr. Hanger.

[English]

Mr. Art Hanger (Calgary Northeast, Ref.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for your presentation, General. I have to say I'm a bit confused. I would have to ask you, first of all, if you have brought this to show it to the troops out there in Petawawa or Edmonton or some other base.

LGen Roméo Dallaire: I have. This is not scientific data. This is a field soldier's gut feeling and analysis of speaking to all those with whom he has served, both overseas and back in Canada. It is my watering or breaking it down into something that I can grasp, into something from which I believe I can then move processes and solutions for the members of the forces through my duties now.

So I haven't gone out personally with that graph. I have had a team that has gone around speaking of the human dimension, the quality of life, over the last year, but it has been very technical. It's been this project, that project, this is done, that's not done, that sort of thing.

Mr. Art Hanger: This committee has travelled across the country and has, of course, spoken to a lot of soldiers and officers. At least part of the information that I've received is that the leadership in the military is wanting. You say you're serene in your feelings about any accusation made against the leadership. I couldn't be serene and sit here listening to what we've heard out there in the field. The housing that many of the troops are living in is a pile of junk, the equipment is aged and rotting away, the pay is disgraceful, and the list can go on and on.

I'll read you out a memo that was sent to me by one of the soldiers:

It may interest you to know that the Canadian Forces Housing Agency has announced an increase for PMQ rents for this year. The increase is 6%, which coincidentally is 50% of the 3.2% raise just announced by the defense minister. It is also double the amount charged by civilian rental agents in this local area. I feel so safe knowing that the current government is taking such good care of its already over worked and under paid soldiers. Don't get me wrong. I appreciate the pay increase, I am just wondering how the Housing Agency can justify a rent increase that is double the local average, and unless I am misinformed, is double the ceiling set for rent increases in Ontario.

Well, we saw some of that housing today in Petawawa. We didn't see very much of it, but it is substandard. In effect, probably most of it should be condemned.

Now, I couldn't sit here serenely, General, knowing that this kind of garbage is going on in the military in this country when you sit there after having been promoted into that position to look after the personnel.

You spoke of what it was like to grow up in the military years back, about how you and your family had to live in substandard housing, in tar-paper shacks, and were wanting most of your life. Well, if that has left such an imprint on you, why hasn't something been done? You're in a position to do something about it now, obviously, and you were even before you were promoted. Why were you promoted?

LGen Roméo Dallaire: Well, I am going to respond to you directly, sir—

Mr. Art Hanger: I hope so.

LGen Roméo Dallaire: —on your interpretation of my statement, to start with.

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My serenity comes from the fact that I fought, I have survived, I have lived with people dying under my command, and I have served this nation with that commitment. From that position of serenity, of having lived that, tasted it, survived it—and I'm not too sure to what extent my survival has been—I am serene in my recognition of the hurt, the suffering, the screaming that those people out there in uniform and their families are going through, because I live it.

There was a great amount of restraint on my part to not invite my wife to sit beside me here today and let her tell you the story as the wife of a commander in an operational theatre. She would also express the stresses and strains and the demands, just like the rest of them, in these complex eras in which we find ourselves.

My serenity comes not from having done my job in my staff functions. It doesn't come from my competence or incompetence in handling this town, handling the procedures, the different departments, the processes in which I will be able to respond to the needs. It comes from the fact that I am une âme soeur. I am, I live, I taste those emotions, those sufferings, and those constraints as those who have served with me and some who have survived with me over the last ten years.

So I'm in my new job, and you're absolutely right. I've been spending the last year on subjects of quality of life. There have been elements that have advanced. However, we've not been able to grasp the holistic component of what has happened to us in this era. It's sort of like the troops have a thousand cuts, and we've been slapping them with a thousand bandaids. Even if you have a thousand bandaids, it doesn't make you feel better. It stopped the bleeding.

How do we make them feel better? What is the holistic solution in order to meet their reasonable, fair demands to serve this nation and to conduct the sacrifices they're doing. That's the essence of my job.

Mr. Art Hanger: Rather than have your wife there, General, I would rather see one of the corporals' wives we've just talked to today sitting in that seat, telling her story about what it's like to raise kids in a PMQ that is ready to collapse down around their ears.

LGen Roméo Dallaire: You're absolutely right.

Mr. Art Hanger: General, I have to ask you, when was the last time you went to the bases and talked with the troops in a large number, asking them exactly what they feel is happening to them by their leaders in the military and by the politicians?

LGen Roméo Dallaire: I'm very glad you asked that, sir, because I just finished commanding the Quebec area, and I have visited every one of my bases. I've lived in the PMQs. In fact, I've just finally bought myself a house in Quebec City. I've lived in those PMQs, and I've seen the soldiers living...

I've also participated historically in making those trade-offs as base commander in Valcartier, between putting money into infrastructure, the workplace, for the weapons systems, and so on, and the maintenance areas and all, or putting money into the PMQs. I have found myself putting the money into the weapons systems and not into the PMQs. I've done that. Many of my colleagues have done that. We didn't repair the PMQs. With the money we had, we repaired the shops to maintain the weapons systems that we needed to do our jobs.

Where were the trade-offs? We've done that for years. Is that one of the reasons our PMQs are in the state they are today? I would say more than likely.

When I was director of army requirements in the late eighties, as we worked our way through the infamous 1987 white paper, which in fact was subsequently emasculated by the budgetary cuts on it, I was part of the operational requirements staff who would argue for buildings and infrastructure, jetties and hangars, and so on, for the operational equipment, but would say: “We don't have the money to build a gym or a pool in the PMQR. We don't have the money to re-invest in an arena or anything like that, because we barely have enough to handle the operational side.”

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I did that too. You're absolutely right.

Mr. Art Hanger: Now you're in a position to do something about it. What are you going to do about the housing?

LGen Roméo Dallaire: That is a major problem? Is it housing? Is it accommodation? It's PMQs. It's living downtown. It's single servicemen's and servicewomen's quarters and single persons living downtown—

Mr. Art Hanger: I know what the problem is, but what are you going to do about it? What's your plan?

LGen Roméo Dallaire: You're asking me to tell you what I am currently discussing with the chief of defence staff, with the deputy minister and, I suspect, in the near term, with the minister, and I contend that it would be inappropriate for me to give that to you.

Mr. Art Hanger: You can't even give us a hint so that they can go back to the troops and they might feel a little—

LGen Roméo Dallaire: We have to set a national standard. That's what I'll give you as the hint.

People who serve throughout this country, who are called upon to move and so on, must work from a national standard, for they are part of a national institution. When we go off to Rwanda or Bosnia or somewhere, we're not there representing Ontario or B.C.; we're representing this one nation. We can't go over there with the idea that those who are left behind—God knows what happens to us—could ultimately be living on the poverty line. That does not inspire troops to put their lives on the line.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Hanger.

Monsieur Lebel.

[Translation]

Mr. Ghislain Lebel (Chambly, BQ): Good afternoon, General Dallaire.

LGen Roméo Dallaire: Good afternoon.

Mr. Ghislain Lebel: I want to commend you on your presentation. I don't know your wife, but I do know your sister and your mother, who live in my riding.

LGen Roméo Dallaire: My goodness! You're right!

Mr. Ghislain Lebel: When you had your back to the wall in Rwanda, your sister called me one day to ask me whether Mr. Bouchard, who was Official Opposition Leader at the time, could question the Prime Minister about this with a view to having some assistance sent over.

LGen Roméo Dallaire: I'll have to talk to her about that.

Mr. Ghislain Lebel: I just want to say that you are bang on. It is absolutely true that members' wives are terribly stressed out, as well as families in general, including your own. I have just come back from a trip with my fellow politicians from the other parties. That is certainly the impression we were left with in the field.

You congratulate our Committee, but there are not many in the military these days who hold a more senior position than you do. I may not be well informed, but it is my impression that there are only two or three people at most who are above you in the chain of command. Indeed, you are so high up that you can practically talk to the Heavenly Father himself. How is it that you have so much faith in our Committee? Since men and women were saying to us as recently as this morning that they really don't expect much to come of these visits. That's what they're saying, and we really can't provide much reassurance in terms of what this will lead to. Politically, it is always best to say that you have high hopes, but there is no guarantee that the Heavenly Father, whom I referred to earlier, will be listening. You, however, are in a position to speak, if not directly, at least through a third party—to either God the Father himself, or God the Son—or at least to some member of his entourage.

I certainly agree with you, General, that all is not well within the military at this time and that the situation is particularly bad when it comes to morale. A number of things need to be clarified. Is the low morale problem a direct result of working conditions, compensation and things like that? I am not in a position to say, because I just don't know. In that area, I have to rely on you to give me the facts.

Committee members would like to be able to point the wagon in the same direction as you are moving, but I believe you are the man to get right up in front and steer that wagon.

That leads me to my question, General. When you need helicopters, planes and submarines, people sit up and pay attention and those orders tend to be filled fairly quickly. Should you not now consider slowing down a bit as far as equipment is concerned and possibly moving in a different direction? I know that is a difficult decision, because it doesn't look good. Not having wheel covers or letting soldiers wear plain old helmets doesn't look good. But don't you think we should now consider giving soldiers more money and human resources? In other words, is there not a need to focus on human resources, rather than on new equipment, which is constantly becoming more sophisticated?

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LGen Roméo Dallaire: Well, I don't know whether I am in a position to speak to the Heavenly Father, but I can at least talk to someone who is close to the Pope. But you're absolutely right. If I appear before you today and express the thoughts I did earlier with respect to the Committee's mandate, it is not because I want to pass myself off as some sort of Pontius Pilate, as far as my responsibilities towards the Canadian Armed Forces are concerned. If that were the case, I would take off my uniform and find another job. I would write a book about Rwanda rather than continuing to serve.

Having said that, you are asking me—and rightly so—whether the current situation is one of balance in terms of the resources made available to the Department to meet the needs of the Armed Forces, so that they, in turn, can do the work you want them to do.

In that respect, I cannot deny that working on issues like benefits with the Treasury Board or trying to get a better understanding of the pension plan or the accommodations program is certainly not as sexy as buying tanks, airplanes or submarines.

You mustn't forget that we were not trained to sit in offices here in Ottawa doing paperwork and shuffling files. I was trained to command and to fight on whatever mission the country chooses to send me. So, there is certainly some learning required and some information that must be gathered and analyzed if we want to resolve complex issues such as those currently being reviewed by decision-makers in Ottawa.

Certainly, we do need to strike a balance between equipment, operations, training and human resources; and then there is also the matter of quality of life. Does such a balance currently exist? And would current resources be adequate to meet requirements, if we were able to achieve that kind of balance? Do you think that we will have qualified, competent soldiers with good morale if they are given outdated equipment and know that if they're sent on a mission with that equipment, they could well die?

I would remind you of the discussions that took place in 1992-93, when there was a great deal of criticism of the fact that we sent troops to Bosnia with outdated equipment. The question now is: are the people using those vehicles motivated and well-prepared, and do they feel good enough about their current circumstances to use those vehicles? Are we taking good enough care of our people so that they can make the best possible use of the equipment they are given to carry out their mission? You are absolutely right about the need for such a balance. I am part of a small group of decision-makers within the Armed Forces that will be looking closely at that balance and trying to determine, in relation to the issues, whether even once that balance has been achieved, there are enough resources to carry out the work expected of us. I think that will be a very worthwhile debate.

The Chairman: Thank you. Mr. O'Reilly.

[English]

Mr. John O'Reilly (Victoria—Haliburton, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Lieutenant-General Dallaire, thank you very much for attending and going through this exercise with us.

I recognize the frustration of some of the members of the committee. This is my second go-round. I was on the defence committee in the last Parliament. My question is, how much more do we have to hear and how much more do we have to learn before we put a report together?

I haven't travelled around as much with the committee this time as I did in the past, but I did go to Beaumont Hamel in Vimy in Belgium for the burial of the crew of the Halifax bomber, and I met with members in Halifax, Goose Bay, and Trenton and a lot of people in the legions in places like Millbrook, Minden, Haliburton, and Lindsay. I did training as a cadet and as a reservist in Borden and Petawawa, which doesn't qualify me for anything, by the way. They've put away that gun I was trained on.

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But I know from talking to the members that it is more than just money. It's an issue that is bigger than money. I guess my initial question to you would be, what is it, in your mind? What more and why?

I also questioned some of the people we've had here, particularly the retired officers. Their conscience kicks in as soon as they get their first pension cheque, and they say, “Why didn't we do more when we were in? Why didn't we address some of the problems? While we were in service, why did we not help the morale of the military?”

Most of them know what the problem is, but nobody seemed to attack the answers, and a lot of the people I talked to in the military, particularly in the lower ranks...when you're in Goose Bay and you look at the quarters the members live in, the only brick bungalows are the ones the officers live in. They're the only ones that are really properly cared for and have the grass cut and all of that.

It's a deep-rooted problem, I think, of complex regulations that maybe fit the Civil War and maybe even fit the Korean War, but I don't think they fit today's society. I don't think they fit what we're trying to accomplish as peacekeepers and as the military.

So number one is morale, but it isn't money. Money's a good thing; don't get me wrong. But I think money and benefits are number two, probably housing is number three, and number four might be the instability that can come from governments, regulations, and other things.

There's a common problem, and that is morale. I would like you to explain for me what you think this committee should recommend that would help morale. You're there to make a change. You're in a position to make a change, and many people who have been at that table were in a position to make that change and didn't do anything. At least, they admit they didn't do anything or they wish they had done more.

So no matter where we go, whether it's, as I said, talking to people who work in Trenton or Petawawa, or Borden or any of those Ontario bases, or Goose Bay, which has probably the lowest morale right now because of the changes that are being made...what is it?

LGen Roméo Dallaire: We're talking about human beings. We're not talking about trucks, aircraft, tanks, or ships.

We went through about two years of an analysis, which culminated on June 5, 1987, of what was called at the time the capability commitment gap. It was based on a term coined, I believe, by the minister at the time, called “rust-out”. We spent years building a white paper based on the facts that boilers in ships were blowing up, that aircraft were unsafe to be flown, and we couldn't even put trucks on civilian roads because they—the trucks—were too dangerous. We built the whole complex of analysis in order to meet that equipment assessment.

It is my opinion that as we moved into the nineties, into the tempo of operations, into the enormous complexity of these operations, into a timeframe of enormous fiscal constraint by the nation of which we are a part, we had an incredible clash between the human dimension of service and in fact the resource base that sustains that human dimension. It can be articulated as numbers of people so that you can keep these missions going and how you take care of these people.

So it is not surprising in any way, shape or form that we found ourselves with both the casualties and these experiences and the stresses and strains on the people...to find that the human side has taken an awful beating.

• 1630

Are we at, in the human dimension, rust-out? Are we at a state where the human side of the military, as we had perceived the equipment side was in the eighties, is in a scenario of rust-out, in a scenario of fundamental requirement of reinjection of resources and alignment of priorities of effort to sustain those who are serving, and to in fact attract others?

I would contend, from where I'm sitting, and from my personal experiences, that, yes, we are at that point, and that the expression through the morale is in fact that cri de coeur from soldiers, sailors, airmen, and their families, who are saying, hey, that equilibrium, that demand, has now gone beyond a reasonable, tolerable, expected level for our service to be continued, and there is a fundamental requirement for reassessment.

That means realigning current resources, redefining policies and premises under which we take care of our people. It is not just a whole series of 150 things—you know, add a day of leave here, give a couple more bucks there on postings or something like that—but an ensemble.

What is that ensemble? What is that atmosphere? What are the parameters of putting that atmosphere that people will feel better, feel cared for, feel wanted, and feel that they can commit themselves without the nagging concern that if they become a casualty, or if their families have problems behind, things won't work out well?

That is the crux. That is what has come to the forefront of the debate with regard to the intimate discussion of the senior leadership. If it's perceived that this assessment has been long in the making, that the realignment of either resources or priorities is long in the making, then I cannot negate the impatience of those towards the leadership in getting on with it and the impatience or concern that in fact resources will be put to it.

Mr. John O'Reilly: Mr. Chairman, I asked all those questions and I got all those questions back. That's fine.

In my maiden speech in 1994, when we were sending out peacekeepers, I asked three questions: Do they have the equipment? Are they well-enough trained? Is the command adequate to deal with the problems? I'm still asking those questions.

I guess I could now ask them of you.

LGen Roméo Dallaire: I have no doubts at all about the command. That's due to the experience that has been gained, over the last years in particular, and its ability to adapt to meet these demanding missions.

Equipment deficiencies persist. They will always be there and will be wholly dependent on resource allocation. It is what risk assessment is permitted by both the military leadership and the political authorities in committing troops with whatever that kit is and the capability of that kit to meet the mission.

With regard to training, it is an area of concern. We instituted a policy some years ago that has as a statement “train to need”. One could look at that pejoratively and say, well, that's only doing the minimum versus maybe trying to be efficient. What happened to the statement “train to win”?

• 1635

I am in agreement with a concern in regard to whether or not enough resources are also given to permit the full training experience and a spectrum of experience for the soldiers, with the equipment they have and the numbers they have, in order to meet these new missions.

I'm not washing my hands of your questions. I don't have whatever millions of bucks so I can say right now it's there, I don't have a Treasury Board agreement in my hand, I don't have a new policy statement in my hand, and I don't have a contractor standing there with a big contract to rebuild all that stuff. I don't have that. I just don't have it. And no matter how much I sit here with you and say I need it, I don't have it.

In so saying, one of the fundamental assessments is how do I get it? Who's going to give me that? And how am I working that through the system?

Mr. John O'Reilly: Thank you very much. I'm through, by the way. I don't want you to be insulted, because—

LGen Roméo Dallaire: I'm not at all.

Mr. John O'Reilly: I have to go to another meeting. So when I get up and leave, it isn't anything you said.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

LGen Roméo Dallaire: Oh, that's okay. It's your prerogative, sir.

The Chairman: Mr. Price.

Mr. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, PC): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, you made an interesting statement about the families living the mission with us. From our travels across the country, this comes out very clearly. In fact the families are living really the horrors of war here, but a different horror.

From what we're seeing—and I'll refer mostly to just what we've seen today in Petawawa, and it's common right across the country—it seems that anybody who's injured physically, if it's overseas, no problem; they're really well taken care of. But the people who come back with psychological problems—and these psychological problems don't show up immediately, as you can attest to; they come out as time goes on—they're not being taken care of.

In particular the ones who don't even get looked at are the spouses, the psychological problems they have to live with. When the soldier is deployed, there doesn't seem to be a great deal of problem. In a lot of bases, the spouse is fairly well taken care of, but is dropped totally as soon as the other half gets back, and they both have to deal with these problems. We're seeing this as a really serious problem, and yet there is supposedly a structure in place to take care of it. It's not working.

You said the command has a very high ability, and they do, and we've heard that across, but that ability is in the arena. There again we're seeing a command failure on the bases back home.

Let me give an example of one we heard just yesterday. There's a problem on the base at Petawawa of a stress added to families in the francophone population on the base, of which there are 14 serving members. There are, though, 1,100-plus bilingual members. What doesn't show up is that of these bilingual members, you have unilingual families in there, which amount to 350 to 400 families. They have no services. Because there are only 14 serving unilingual members, these families have no services. When their member is deployed, they have no services, and it just adds again to the stress, both pre and post.

I wonder if you could comment on what kind of structure you have in mind to try to solve this problem, because obviously it's one that is close to your heart.

LGen Roméo Dallaire: If I take the bilingual situation, it's endemic of how we're solving things. There was a significant complaint from French Canadian families in Moose Jaw a couple of years ago, two at the most, I think.

Mr. David Price: We did actually hear something. That's why I was over there.

LGen Roméo Dallaire: Oh, you heard that.

So, from that expression of need, we looked at it, looked at the laws, and said oh, there's a certain chapter 7 or something where it says yes, we can and should be providing bilingual services to the families. We had never applied that part. We had applied the part to the members, in going to the counter and stuff like that.

• 1640

So in response to that, we instituted—and the policy is only half a year or three-quarters of a year old—a policy of saying amenities and services for the families must be provided in both languages when that requirement is there.

This policy of bilingualism has been in since 1968. How is it that when we're solving it, we seem to be solving a problem because it becomes a problem? Why are we solving the morale problem because we have all of a sudden all this hurt out there? How come we can't be proactive on this? How come we can't be anticipatory? How come our policies, our rules, our instruments of management, and the structures of the department and the CF cannot smell this stuff coming and be reactive in a proactive way, if I can say that?

Well, that's a lot of the essence of why we find ourselves here. Every time the chain of command, upon which the lives of the soldiers in the field are totally dependent... How is it that that chain of command, when it comes in garrison, finds itself at times emasculated in its ability to respond to the needs of their subordinates? Is that chain of command the instrument to be able to solve these problems? Do we have the authority to make some of these decisions in the chain of command on the bases, in the groups, in the commands, and in NDHQ?

If the chain of command continues to take the hits it's taking in garrison, it can have a significant impact on the confidence of the subordinates in the chain of command and operations. So how do you then realign the solving of the garrison problems? That is the essence of your question. I would contend that right now we do not seem to have that instrument of solving, in a proactive way, these problems. We'll react to crises, and we may overreact or underreact, but every time we have a crisis and we react to it, it is another bit of erosion of the confidence of the troops in the leadership.

So we have to get ahead of this exercise to regain the initiative. That is one of the strategic debates and discussions that have to go on amongst us with our colleagues from other departments and our civilian counterparts within the department. How in hell do we solve that component of it?

To be very specific on what you were mentioning about the post-traumatic stress and helping the families—and in fact you see my slide there—when we go in these operational theatres, it can take sometimes up to two years, and I know of a case of a Gulf War officer for whom it took nearly six years, for the adrenalin and the drawer inside the mind to open up and let out what has been hidden and stuffed away because we don't want to face it.

When this faced me with my family, I looked at the programs we had of supporting people when they come back for a couple of months. Colonel McLellan will be with me next week when we speak of care of our injured. We looked at creating a capability of handling not only the regular force member, but even more, the reservist, wherever he or she is, in being reactive to their needs a couple of years down the road.

But what about the families? You know, we didn't even think about that. It wasn't even on the map of our concerns of post-traumatic stress syndrome support. Even though the processes we did institute, after a couple of years of these experiences, are recognized by other nations as being avant-garde, we hadn't included the families.

Mr. David Price: And yet they are supported during deployment.

LGen Roméo Dallaire: And that is exactly the dimension in which we found ourselves. We were saying, hey, families are not just sitting back in Canada and waiting for the husband to come back. They are monitoring, and they're monitoring in a reactive way, every move we make over there, because the transparency and availability of media make it so.

• 1645

Mr. David Price: But the problem is that the structure set up to handle them during deployment can't handle them when they come back. It has to be a totally different structure, because the structure during deployment is their friends. It's done on a completely different group, a group that tends to fade away once they get back.

LGen Roméo Dallaire: Well, that's interesting, because in the fifties and sixties those military communities never faded away. They were always there. As we moved into the modern era and a different set of parameters, into a way of life in which we had more people living downtown, the base life was even being pooh-poohed for awhile as not being viable in terms of whether or not we should even stay in that sort of thing. We saw that disappear in a way, so now we create things. For example, we created the Military Family Resource Centre. It should be there, at all times responsive, but does it have all the skill sets needed to meet this demanding challenge?

We're in an unusual set of circumstances. I won't just talk about the clash between the fiscal constraints and the fact that we have that operational tempo in demands.

We are now living with about 20,000 servicemen and -women who are veterans today. We haven't lived with that for many years. We had a lot of veterans up into the sixties, and then they retired and became part of the extended family of the military. In the nineties, we picked up this whole bunch.

How do you handle the expectations of veterans? What is different, and why would it be different? What are their expectations as compared to peacetime soldiering and what we have lived with previous to that? Well, we're stumbling into that stuff. We really are. At times, we are absolutely catching ourselves by surprise at what is in fact the analyses, the new sensitivities, that are being expressed by the members and their families in order to continue to serve in uniform after having been tested with the unlimited liability test.

Mr. David Price: Well, we've been through quite a few years...sorry, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: We will now go to the five-minute rounds.

Mr. Hanger, you have five minutes.

Mr. Art Hanger: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, when a colleague across the way asked you a question about just dealing with certain resources to help out the members, you stated that we're talking about human beings. You then proceeded to talk about the rusting-out problem of equipment and this clash between that human dimension and the equipment needs. I guess that's going to be forever an ongoing scenario, to say the least, but here you have now a very clear indication that a major problem has developed. From what I can tell from speaking with all of the military personnel that we have over the last several weeks and months, it's causing a serious division between the leadership in the military and the rank and file—maybe even non-commissioned officers to some degree, and maybe they're caught in between.

It's not just the media that's created this perception. I can't blame just them for doing that. As some are willing to point out, there is a problem that exists, and there seems to be almost a desire on the part of the military leadership not to address it in a very open fashion. I might point out that the exception, the first ray of light, is the fact that this committee may be wandering through this maze right now and is actually gaining some attention.

Like none other I can see, you have an opportunity to correct it, but in just listening to you speaking and trying to answer some of the questions put to you, it doesn't even seem like you have a plan. It seems like you're devoid of any plan as to how you're going to correct this mess out there.

• 1650

Given that, I'm almost of the impression that you want this to happen with our military personnel to discourage them, run them into the ground, and make them quit because the numbers are too high. It's as if you have to get those numbers down to a point where the magic number of 60,000 is going to be reached.

Now, if that is the case, then my perception is wrong. Tell me why this situation isn't being fixed. If it's right, it's a lousy way of doing business.

LGen Roméo Dallaire: If your statement—it's as incredibly Machiavellian as I could ever imagine—is a statement to set me up to give you a response of the current inner workings going on between the DM, the CDS, the senior leadership, and the minister in regard to resolving that, then I consider that to be a pretty unfair set of circumstances to put me in.

If you want to ask a question like that, then I would strongly recommend that you ask that of the minister. But in my personal opinion, I have absolutely no doubt in the mandate that the CDS has given to me. The first priority of ADM(Per), and possibly because of me or not, I don't know—my mandate is to bring closure in solving the quality of life of the serving members of the Canadian Forces and their families.

Mr. Art Hanger: And what is your plan?

LGen Roméo Dallaire: I have a five-point plan that is going to be presented over the next couple of weeks. Until I present that to the minister, I think it would be pretty inappropriate for me to articulate it right here.

Mr. Art Hanger: I look forward to seeing what your plan is. I know that the troops in this Canadian military will certainly greet it, if it is on target, with a positive response.

LGen Roméo Dallaire: But I'll tell you something, if I may, sir. Mr. Hanger, it doesn't come cheap.

Mr. Art Hanger: What does that mean?

LGen Roméo Dallaire: You don't build a plan without resources. You certainly don't implement the plan without resources.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Hanger.

Mr. Wood.

Mr. Bob Wood (Nipissing, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, in March 1997, you appeared before this committee. You stated that a post-deployment follow-up program was to be implemented by fall 1997. This program would track individuals returning from operations to ensure that the physical and psychological needs of the individual and his or her family were being met.

You briefly mentioned post-operational responsibilities during your remarks today. I was wondering if you could expand on those remarks and tell us how the follow-up program is proceeding.

LGen Roméo Dallaire: Not well, sir. The program has been articulated. The demands for what it would need to advance with regard to the families and individuals have been framed. There will now be an assessment of the resources for full implementation.

We have done some, but it has been on a case-by-case basis and not as a full-fledged, complete program. Colonel McLellan is with me, and I beg you to defer, if I can request that of you. Next week, when I come back with the care of our injured program, we will be able to articulate the full spectrum of what that program is.

As it stands now, yes, we did the analysis and the program. Yes, we saw what's needed. Yes, we have helped individual cases and so on. But has that been totally disseminated and used throughout? I would say not yet, no.

Mr. Bob Wood: General, one of the first points you made regarding stress as it relates to the support of operations was that often there are a number of different programs and policies that have been implemented over the years to deal with these issues.

Now, this has led obviously to a complex and incoherent system of support. Your solution, as we saw today, was to initiate the operational distresser study, which was to gather information and work toward solutions.

Forgive me a bit, but I think many of my colleagues will agree that we on the committee are getting a bit tired of hearing that the solution to these issues is to study the problem some more. That said, I think many of the recommendations you made in your brief today have merit. But I want to be clear on what will happen to your operational distressers report.

• 1655

As assistant deputy minister responsible for personnel, is it up to you to solve these programs, or are you asking this committee to recommend the implementation of these changes?

To use your own words at the end of your speech, all of us here are responsible for implementing changes to improve support to operations, but who is accountable for the entire process? Is it us, is it you, is it the deputy minister, or the minister?

LGen Roméo Dallaire: Ultimately what happens in a ministry, of course, has ministerial responsibility and accountability. The policies that are articulated are brought forward through the process of defence management, in different committees that are going forward, and are also argued and debated and articulated in front of central agencies of government, for approval to in fact be able to implement, because having the money doesn't necessarily mean we have the authority to spend it. If we so wish, there are processes with Treasury Board and other agencies that have to be gone through in order to get these programs approved.

We've discovered that behind a number of the policies—if I may use the term “policies”—or programs of compensation benefits, there aren't many strategic policy thoughts as such. The operational distresser one has about twenty different programs in there. It's sort of like the housing one; we have 15 to 20 different programs in there.

The question is, what's the aim of the exercise we wish to pursue, and what are those policies or programs that are needed, with the resources to do them, that are going to achieve what we need today and not what we needed then?

We have found R and R policies that conflict with the operational need. We have found tour lengths that conflict with the rotational capabilities of the forces. We find even a booze policy conflicting with what we do with amenities for the troops in the field, in some places simply outright vacuums.

We go to the housing side of it. Do we want our military people to build equity over the years or do we want them in housing? Why do we have houses divided up amongst all ranks? Why aren't all the PMQs only for up to sergeant and lieutenants and captains?

What is the basis of the continuity of these policies, and what do you do to adjust them?

That's the essence of my work and the work of the people who are with me. As the staff who are involved in this process have suffered, like many others, the fiscal and structural cuts that we've gone through at the same time as we've had this increased demand—we are found to be wanting in producing those answers.

It is not an aim to conduct more studies. In fact, it's trying to ensure that we're grasping all those points that are out there.

As an example, the army, navy, and air force produced their quality of life studies. When I was deputy commander of the army, I launched the army quality of life study in 1995. They produced about 200 recommendations of all types. Some can be handled within the army, some need Canadian Forces decisions, and others need outright outside agency authorities.

Your visits around have produced no less than 300 items. In fact, we're closer to 400 items of dissatisfaction.

Mr. Art Hanger: General, may I interrupt there? We haven't even sent our report in yet.

LGen Roméo Dallaire: We're just listening, like you're doing. We're listening and saying, oh, there's another point they're raising. We've picked up 300 to 400 points, raised by the people just as they're expressing themselves to you, and I already have 200 from the quality of life series.

I have some that conflict outright with others. Some people want this; other people want that. The two of them are fighting each other in policy points.

• 1700

My job is to stop the conflict on stuff and bring logic to it. I am behind the eight ball right now to produce those results and bring a semblance of logic to them so that people who are expecting this type of amenity or benefit can get it without me having to say, by introducing that one I am eliminating this one for another group that is expecting something else because of a policy base, be it national, regional, or purely through the bureaucratic authority processes of Treasury Board or other agencies.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr. Wood.

Mr. Pratt.

Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, General Dallaire, for coming before us today. I found your comments very interesting, and I certainly appreciate the depth of your experiences as a member of the Canadian Forces.

You talked earlier about rust-out, how it's affecting the equipment, and how it can be compared as well to the rust-out of the people. Based on my experiences, in terms of going around to the various bases, it seems to be less like rust-out and more like an open wound as far as the soldiers, sailors, and airmen we have run into are concerned.

In response to a question from Mr. Hanger, you mentioned you are working on a five-point plan that you expect to be before the minister fairly shortly. I'm just curious, and I know some of my colleagues are as well, why you wouldn't wait for the results of the report we will be producing. In terms of the time line we're on right now, it will be some time in the fall. Why wouldn't you wait for that rather than go at it on a piecemeal basis, in my opinion?

LGen Roméo Dallaire: I hope I'm not leaving you with that impression. The first thing is, just as I sat here and was questioned, quite appropriately, by this committee on what exactly I'm doing about what's going on out there, I believe it is only responsible on my part and my colleagues' part to work on concurrent activity.

That is to say, your committee, in its work, is a critical factor in the evolution of the military, its ability to serve this nation, and the continued desire to serve this nation as it has in the past with a reasonable set of parameters of reward or recognition. At the same time, that does not permit me, as ADM Personnel, to simply wait for the report, take the report, and implement it. I should be held accountable if I am not already also looking at the results of the previous studies, which we're also accused of doing a lot of, grasping the themes from them and attempting to bring forward those elements that I believe should be brought to the attention of the highest authorities for their assessment. That's what I'm doing now.

Mr. David Pratt: I wouldn't suggest you should be sitting on your hands, and I don't propose that our report will be the report to end all reports on this matter. But just in terms of the logical approach, I would think it would be best to wait until the parliamentary committee has finished its work and then try to pull all of the recommendations from the various reports together in a coherent manner before any plan of action is taken.

Obviously, at the same time we want to see some things done that can be done quickly. But as far as the big picture is concerned in terms of salary, housing, etc., I think we'd like to see a more focused approach—at least I would as a member of this committee.

Let me switch gears here and return again to the issue Mr. Hanger raised on the whole business of staff officers losing touch with the rank and file. One of the things we've heard is that because the staff officers haven't been in the field—and I think you are an exception to that because you've been close to some action fairly recently, so I certainly wouldn't put you in that category—there's a feeling on some of the bases we've been to that people in Ottawa are so removed from the day-to-day experiences of the soldiers in the field that that they don't have a good grasp of what's happening on the ground.

• 1705

In terms of your comments with respect to the tempo of operations, there seems to be no appreciation in Ottawa of the stresses being put on families and careers, etc.

Getting to a question here, the issue I guess boils down to some of the people in positions of responsibility within our military. When the political leadership comes to them and says, “We think we should be in this deployment”, whether it's in Bosnia or Kosovo or wherever the next hot spot is going to be, under the current situation we have right now, when do you think the military leadership should finally say to the political leadership, look, we don't have the resources? We don't have the equipment. We don't have the personnel. We're taking our personnel up to the breaking point and in some cases beyond in terms of what we're expecting of them.

When do people in a position of military leadership say that to their political masters?

LGen Roméo Dallaire: May I answer both elements together—that is to say, the previous comments regarding the ongoing staffing—and very succinctly state that there are staff actions being taken to sort out a number of the projects or programs I mentioned? There are hundreds there.

Separate from that, the scale of the major programs of which I speak, and will be discussing in the weeks to come, cannot be resolved between now and the time your report is done because of the scale of them and the different authorities required, and simply the idea of advancing them. So when we look at the time lines of this stuff I would hope we will see a coming together and not a situation of being totally off on separate tracks. I think it will probably end up by being a positive result versus one that's conflicting.

We're not working in isolation. It's the same clientele, the same people, we're trying to meet out there and respond to.

With regard to the leadership speaking to the government about its ability to conduct the missions, the government has a military that meets its policy and meets the risk the government is prepared to accept with regard to its security and the capabilities its security forces are to have to accomplish those policies it has stated for itself. That means putting the resources it feels should go to it to meet the risk level it's ready to accept.

For us in uniform, who are ordered by our political masters to implement those policies—that is, conduct on the ground the missions given to us—it is our sworn duty to articulate to government, to our authorities, what the risks are on the ground. Because ultimately, when a soldier dies, I'm the one there. When the error is done in the field, I'm the one who's court-martialled. Ultimately, I stand by those decisions. I face the soldiers as my colleagues have, and will continue to do in the future.

If I extend your comment, does that mean that unless we have generals who are outright packing it in and withdrawing from their duties because they believe the government has not understood the limitations it has put on us and continues to give us missions we cannot accomplish responsibly...? If it is your assessment that we should be seeing that, I would contend that this is an assessment that is nearly Hollywoodesque, and that it is, in my estimation, of limited...of any consequence of officers simply withdrawing themselves from the problem and leaving it to another.

I've had a number of occasions to conduct that type of assessment in my command in Africa. I could have packed it in, deserted my troops, and left it to somebody else to sort out. How much effect do you think my leaving my post would have on the world stage? How many nanoseconds would it require to replace me and to continue with the mission?

• 1710

I am not one to put in doubt that the senior leadership here prior to me has gone forward to government and stated this case. What is critical is that our political masters remain the ultimate decision bodies of the missions they give to our troops and that the sovereign position by our governments not be given up to anybody else.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Mr. David Pratt: I do have a couple more questions, but I know my time is up.

The Chairman: Yes, I'll have to go to Monsieur Lebel.

[Translation]

Mr. Ghislain Lebel: I just want to be sure I understand. You came here to congratulate the Committee. You said that you are expecting a lot from it, from its recommendations and from its report, and it is not hard to see that you are seeking some support. If you are looking for support, either from the Committee or from politicians, would it be fair to conclude that your view is held by a minority, rather than a majority, of those members of the inner circle and that some members of that group—and I'm not asking you about your five points here—may well prefer to buy trucks and equipment again before focussing on human resources? Would you say that is a reasonable conclusion at this time?

LGen Roméo Dallaire: You are very subtle, Mr. Lebel. Am I asking for this Committee's support? Well, I was really just trying to give my perception of the Committee's role—a role I would describe as historic at this point in the development of the Canadian Armed Forces, and given their prospects for the future and the very human problems facing the military at this time.

Am I here to ask for your support? Well, I would say my real purpose in being here is to reassert the importance and significance of the Committee's work. It is perfectly natural for our subordinates to expect this Committee, which is made up of representatives of all the political parties in Canada and thus reflects the nation as a whole, to gather information about the situation that currently prevails in one of the nation's fundamental components, the Armed Forces.

As for my position in the inner circle or at the cardinals' table, since we are already knee-deep in Catholic theology here, it would be healthy for there to be a thorough debate of the issue of guns or butter. It would also make sense to debate the issue of what equipment is needed to do the job, the degree to which the troops want to do that job and their moral preparation in terms of putting their own lives on the line, while at the same time putting available equipment to the best possible use.

Between the two, you have a source of needed funding for training and equipment maintenance. When a well-paid soldier has nothing to do in garrison, it's a disaster. When a soldier is well paid, but has equipment that doesn't work properly and endangers his life, you also have a problem.

So what is the appropriate balance? Well, it is evolving. We are currently in a period of our military history where we have a generation of new veterans who have been through things we could never have conceived of, who see the many challenges facing them in the future and who do not feel good about their circumstances, given the support they've received. So it is up to us to respond.

Mr. Ghislain Lebel: Thank you, General.

[English]

The Chairman: Mr. Richardson.

Mr. John Richardson (Perth—Middlesex, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to our committee, General.

From monitoring the notes that come from our committee, you probably know some of the things we're hearing, and the themes are starting to become hardened.

• 1715

Today and last night I think the committee particularly met up with a base where the people were ready for an opportunity to demonstrate their concerns. Quite frankly, I can say a lot of it was not centred around money, although money was an issue for those who were below the rank of master corporal.

What shook me was something that was coming out of your section particularly, for people dealing with careers of master corporals up to chief warrant officers, class 1, and that was the directives given to people on postings. It was almost like they were told to take it or shove it, to get out—and the words I'm using are very soft—by people at National Defence Headquarters.

When a lady got up and was nervously shaking with tears in her eyes—and she was only one of many, but you'll probably read it in the notes that come through—I was never so shaken in my life. I had a high regard for career managers all my life, and for career managers at the level of lieutenant to lieutenant-colonel as well. Maybe they were under stress, but the answers they were giving were smart-alec answers, not the answers of professionals who were managing the careers of individuals who wanted to serve in the Canadian Forces.

When reasonable concern was put on the table—I can only say it sounded reasonable, and there weren't a lot—those people who brought it on the table and then explained it got standing ovations. This was more than the people who were standing up. That was reinforcement that it was a problem deeper than the three or four people who got up—and there were more than three or four.

So I just want to bring to your attention that there may be a problem of some professional orientation for those people again, because they never used to talk that way when they talked about your future or your posting. They listened calmly and made notes, would look at it and get back to you, but did not give a smart-alec, cut-off answer, a one-liner.

I think people join the Canadian Forces because they're proud to do it, but I think the most important thing is that they want it to be cared for and they want it to do a job. At the same time, they wanted to feel they were wanted and worthy of being cared for in times of need. That wasn't coming across. It was missing. The heart was missing.

I'm trying to be as frank as I can be with you, and anybody around the table who thinks I'm wrong can check me up on it, but it was there, and it was there in spades. We noticed it starting to build up in the last two or three. I don't know why it was there, but that crescendo was there. I don't know what you can say about that. I'm only telling you as clearly as I can that it was directed at career managers. I can't say they're all bad or they're all good, but obviously some are making it sound bad for them all. I don't—

LGen Roméo Dallaire: Mr. Richardson, career management today is not an experience of being able, with great satisfaction, to manage the evolution and development of individuals. It has become an enormously frustrating and stressful milieu in which a smaller force still has a lot of jobs, with whole new dimensions of more and more married couples in service, both of them; more and more special cases being articulated—single parents and things like this; and less and less cash. We used to invest a couple hundred million dollars a year in moving people. We've nearly cut that in half, and not because we've cut the forces in half. You could say it would be a certain proportional cut in there, but it's been cut by a resource crunch.

• 1720

As we're doing that, we are also articulating a philosophy of moving to more stable bases, bigger garrisons, fewer garrisons, and people potentially staying much longer in those garrisons than before. Have we brought that to fruition yet? No. Are we moving towards that? That is the aim. But there is an enormous amount of frustration from both ends. Does that permit people to lose the human aspect of how to take care of people? No, it doesn't.

It is, however, indicative that the state of those who are working in that environment has to be looked at also. There is an enormous amount of frustration in that gang, but that doesn't excuse them from not being sensitive to those in the field. You're absolutely right.

It's interesting, the ones who are doing it are the same people in the field. I was in the field. I didn't get a lobotomy when I arrived here in Ottawa, even though some people think that happens to generals. It's the same thing with career managers. My RSM was posted here to Ottawa, became a career manager, and all of a sudden he was considered an idiot. No, it doesn't work that way.

However, the strains and stresses are far more in evidence now—you're absolutely right—for a variety of those parameters I've just articulated. The full implementation of these policies of longer terms in certain garrisons in bigger bases is of significance.

I often also use the example of the loss of Germany, in particular for the army and a little less so for the air force. Germany was l'apogée, the high point of one's career to serve, because it was an operational theatre, operational training, totally dedicated to the mission and with lots of kit. By the by, it was in Germany, there was an infrastructure of amenities there, and it was culturally rather rewarding for the families and individuals. The rate of exchange between the Deutschmark and the Canadian dollar wasn't bad at all either. That all disappeared. That opportunity of serving and having that cadeau, that opportunity there professionally, culturally for the family, isn't there any more. That has had a significant impact on the people as they look at where their employment is today.

But it's interesting that when we were in Germany and we were called out at two hours' notice to move from our garrisons there to be deployed, we never worried about our families. There was a whole infrastructure there dedicated to taking care of them, moving them back to Canada, and so on.

When the troops moved out of Kingston during the ice storm, with the troops in the theatre of operations, which they were, it was like being in Germany, wasn't it? The ice storm was in Kingston, just as it was in Montreal, and we deployed those troops out of Kingston. When dad had to leave the family in the cold and the ice and all the rest of it, with no electricity, what goes through the minds of those soldiers, sailors, and airmen serving and their wives? What structures do we have that kick in to cover for this? What structures did we have to kick in, in the Saguenay? What structures did we have to kick in for the battalion and the air element in Winnipeg? What structures kick in so that there is no moral dilemma on the part of the member, so that they can leave knowing full well it kicks in?

They did it, they worked at it, they did a lot of ad hoc stuff, and they responded in magnificent fashion in certain areas, but there was a lot of sweat and tears in sorting that out. We'd never done that before in Canada.

It was part of our way of taking care of our troops when we were in the theatre of operations in Germany; it was automatic. We spent all kinds of money on it. We have a situation in Canada and what do we do now? We say, okay, if it's happened three times, we'd better start really sorting this out. What are the structures needed to handle that type of scenario so troops can be deployed, without putting at risk their families and so they can do it with a sense of serenity that their families will be taken care of? That is the situation in which we find ourselves in some of those scenarios.

• 1725

The Chairman: Thank you, General. We have roughly five minutes left, and I know everybody has spoken, except Judi has wanted to ask a question for the last 15 or 20 minutes. I'll give the last five minutes to Judi.

Mrs. Judi Longfield (Whitby—Ajax, Lib.): Thank you. I appreciate it.

General, you said the one area you felt very strongly about is that we have good leadership at the top, that you are satisfied with the commanders. I'm going to ask you if you agree that a good leader should inspire, should support, and should generally be one who commands respect because he's earned respect?

Okay? You don't disagree.

LGen Roméo Dallaire: No. Absolutely.

Mrs. Judi Longfield: Okay.

Would a good leader say to someone on a regular basis, “If you don't like it, get out”? Would a good leader say, “If it doesn't suit your needs, be it kit, housing, whatever, tough”? Would a good leader say on a regular basis, “Look, if we wanted you to have a family we would have issued you one”? Would a good leader, when he's welcoming new people to his brigade say, “This is not question and answer; sit down, shut up, and listen”? Would a good leader, when confronted with a mother who has a sick child and who's asking for some sort of understanding that this is not a good time for a posting, say “Get it fixed”? Should she have to hear this when her child is sick?

This is the kind of thing we've been hearing, not just today, not just yesterday, but since I started with this committee, at every base, and I think I've been to 10 or 11. This is what we're hearing time and time again.

And that was mild. I can't use the language I've been hearing.

LGen Roméo Dallaire: Outright insensitivity by the commanders towards their people—that's what you're saying.

Mrs. Judi Longfield: Absolutely.

LGen Roméo Dallaire: And prevalent or—

Mrs. Judi Longfield: Prevalent. Everywhere. There isn't a base where I haven't heard all of those things, as has everyone sitting at this table.

LGen Roméo Dallaire: From both the officer and the NCO corps? All of the officers and the NCO corps?

Mrs. Judi Longfield: From the troops standing up. When they stand in front of us and shake, they've been told...they say, “This is my chance to say what I really want. This is my chance to tell you what I think.” These are the things they're telling us.

LGen Roméo Dallaire: They speak of leaders. They speak of their senior NCOs and so on.

Mrs. Judi Longfield: They speak of all levels.

LGen Roméo Dallaire: All levels.

Mrs. Judi Longfield: Again, in certain bases it's closer to the bottom or higher to the top, but it's there and it's there at all levels.

LGen Roméo Dallaire: Why would there be an expression that is so contrary to the mental premise of leadership, of care and support? Why would that be so prevalent, coming from the NCO and officer corps? What would the reasons be that push those people to revert to that state?

Mrs. Judi Longfield: I don't know.

LGen Roméo Dallaire: Because they're not all dummies.

Mrs. Judi Longfield: No. But I guess that's my question. That's what I want to know.

LGen Roméo Dallaire: Right.

Mrs. Judi Longfield: If this is coming as a surprise to you, then I'm a little upset that you may be bringing in five recommendations for change without having heard this. This is at the root of everything, as far as I'm concerned.

LGen Roméo Dallaire: When we're here in front of you next with care of our injured, you will see that I am not ignorant of the state. I have no—

Mrs. Judi Longfield: There was a father whose child had died and even the base chaplain didn't call to say, “Hey, I'm really sorry. What can I do to help?” He was told he was posted just two or three weeks after he had buried his child. We're hearing this. It's more than money, although just the lack of money certainly rubs salt in these wounds that are festering.

LGen Roméo Dallaire: The operational commanders, the NCOs and officers, who conduct these complex operations, are accomplished, I believe. They're experienced now and they continue, of course, to enhance themselves.

In your full assessments, what you're gathering is the complexity of the modern garrison way of life, what is hitting our people in garrison, and the ability of the leadership to respond to that and demonstrate care and concern in garrison, as you rightly articulate, and that it's not... What is causing them to act like that? What is causing those commanders, in garrison, to react that way? That is not their reaction in the field. And is it only them?

• 1730

I participated with General Baril in the burial of a private in a little town in Manitoba. He had been in the last week of his third tour. He was only 22 years old. There were no political masters there at all, not one. You sort of say there is a golden rule, leadership by example, and in any way, shape or form does that permit anyone to be able to pass on their responsibility and accountability?

But what really is the crux of your point is this: how do leaders in garrison, faced with those questions and problems, as you articulated, become callused like that? The same people they depend on in the theatre of operations and care for in the theatre of operations...and all of a sudden they have a different tune back home.

I take full note of that statement.

Mrs. Judi Longfield: Thank you.

[Translation]

The Chairman: General, I want to thank you for being with us this afternoon. I see you will be back next Tuesday.

LGen Roméo Dallaire: Yes.

The Chairman: I know that a number of Members would have liked to ask more questions. Unfortunately, we did not have as much time as we needed. I know that Mr. Hanger and Mr. Price, and possibly others, had other questions.

LGen Roméo Dallaire: They will be for the next time.

The Chairman: Yes, the next time being Tuesday. Thank you again, General.

LGen Roméo Dallaire: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: The meeting is adjourned.