NDVA Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE AND VETERANS AFFAIRS

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE ET DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Tuesday, March 10, 1998

• 1537

[English]

The Chairman (Mr. Robert Bertrand (Pontiac—Gatineau—Labelle, Lib.)): I'd like to welcome Major-General Clive Addy to our committee. We're missing a few people, but I gather they will be showing up in a little while. What we usually do, Major-General, is give you 10 to 15 minutes for your presentation, and then we go to question period. If that's to your satisfaction, we can start right away.

I understand that Lieutenant-General Kinsman will be in at 4.15 or 4.30 p.m., so we can continue with him after.

The floor is all yours, sir.

Major-General Clive Addy (National Chairman, Federation of Military and United Services Institutes of Canada): Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, I am the national president of the Federation of Military and United Services Institutes of Canada, which represents about 10,000 to 12,000 members across Canada in 29 various institutes. I've asked to appear before you to explain what I think is the view of most of our members with respect to the socio-economic challenges facing our Canadian forces.

I know that on your trips through the west you had the opportunity to talk to Gerry Frewen, who is the Victoria United Services Institute chairman. He made a couple of points and I think he brought up quite a few statistics to you and tabled quite a few numbers. It's far from my intention to go through or into those various numbers. I think you've been thoroughly briefed, if not saturated with numbers, by various people in your various tours.

[Translation]

You have travelled all across Western Canada and especially throughout areas of Quebec. The testimony I read on the electronic network lead me to believe that you have been given quite a lot of numbers. My purpose today is not to talk about numbers, but rather to address some issues of serious concern to me.

[English]

If I can bring you back to when the study was first launched, there was a certain aspect that was requested of you, I believe, and it was the social contract of the government and the people of Canada with its Canadian forces. It's on this particular domain that I wish to focus.

On launching this study the commander of the army at the time identified five themes, and they were reiterated in documents on December 11. The first involved fair compensation and the last the quest for a reasonable quality of life for service members and their families. I'm sure that's where most of the statistics have been geared at this particular time. However, my aim is to address the less pecuniary but, in my view, most important three elements in the middle, of which I hope you heard at least something. Those are giving our soldiers, sailors, and airmen the tools to do the job; a reasonable work expectation; and recognition and understanding for the job they do.

• 1540

[Translation]

In the last century, Alfred de Vigny wrote a little book called Servitude et Grandeur militaires. I would strongly encourage you to read his book. It touches on themes of military life that are still relevant today. Among other things, he says that any argument in support of fair pay is only valid if the society the soldier serves by performing his professional duties sees the merit of his work.

I believe this gives us a great deal to think about and improve. I am one of those who believe that you have to prove your value and that the pay you receive is a function of your value or merit. What we need to do in Canada is publicly recognize the value of that service, without being encumbered by pressure groups, unionism and all the other forms of pressure we are so familiar with nowadays.

[English]

For this reason, I thought it was important for me—and I will get into my own military background—just to refresh you on what I would call modern military leaders, and I have chosen two of them. I have chosen Major-General Patrick Cordingley, who commanded the 7th brigade in the Desert Storm operation. It's a British brigade. The reason I've chosen his book is because it depicts the modern man, and how he reflects, and the modern general. He's not a beast. He's not a fool. He's a very capable person.

Just before the war began, and having trained and honed his brigade to the highest level, he wrote in his now-published book, In the Eye of the Storm, that:

Over a leisurely coffee in my room I read...that Tarik Aziz, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, and Mr. James Baker...had agreed to talks. Perhaps they would find a way out of this mess

—he thought—

There was no way I, or any thinking man in the brigade, would have wished for any other solution but a negotiated one. There was no vainglory amongst us, no lust for war.

These are the words and the reflections of a man who had now just spent close to a year getting ready to go to battle, and like all good things, he recognizes that he only wants to use his weapon if it's absolutely required.

The other one is much more pertinent to this particular committee, and I would like to quote from General Freddie Franks, Jr., who is the commander of VII U.S. Corps. The British general Patrick Cordingley, who I just mentioned, worked for him in his corp. He commanded about half a million troops in the desert overall, and he was the victor in that conflict. He's a respected and valuable friend of Canadians. I was under his command as a brigade commander in Germany. He was an amputee. He had one leg and had served with only one leg since the rank of major.

Tom Clancy, more recognized for his mysteries and The Hunt for Red October than for historical books, did write one about the Desert Storm, and it's called Into the Storm. He quotes General Freddie Franks, Jr., as follows:

Following the Vietnam war there was an attempt to make the Army more acceptable

—public relations—

with the motto: “The Army Wants to Join You!”

It was not that the (Army) did not need new ideas to make service life more attractive or that its culture did not need adjustment. It was just that those adjustments had to be made while simultaneously maintaining the good order and discipline necessary for the exacting duties of soldiers in combat.

He also mentions and underlines that “You can't have a `touchy-feely' Army.”

Franks also liked to quote Rommel, who said:

The best form of welfare for the troops is first-class training.

If you can pause and reflect about this particular gentleman and about the previous one, Patrick Cordingley, I would like to just go through some of my experiences so you know who and what I am beyond my written biography.

I spent 11 years training Canadian soldiers in NATO. I commanded everything from a squadron in Germany to an armoured regiment to the brigade over there. During the Gulf War I was the chief of staff of Canadian Forces Europe, responsible for the planning and the deployment of the air squadrons to the gulf. I was also responsible for deploying the first series of observers to Yugoslavia. Some of you might not remember that, but before we sent contingents over there we sent bare-boned Canadian people to sit on various hills and look at what was going on. These were not UN observers, Canadian observers or NATO observers. They went with the European community.

• 1545

Just as an aside on this one, they were told to wear white clothes and we gave them white clothes. We went into the quartermaster stores here and got out our winter gear of parka cover-overs, which are thin white things, and mukluks. We gave them to our Canadian observers over there. They were commanded from here in Canada and not from Canadian Forces Europe and we didn't have enough money to buy them white jackets. It's a mentality thing. This is just one example.

I also deployed the first contingent to the former Yugoslavia. It's probably, and hopefully, the only contingent Canada will ever deploy by rail. They left Europe. When we went to see what they were doing, we got an order from both the UN and our own National Defence headquarters saying our infantry soldiers would carry no more than nine rounds of personal weapon ammunition going into a theatre where everybody had seen Vukovar, tanks, and everything else on television, because“that was the order in the UN operation order”. Needless to say, a friend of mine, Lewis MacKenzie, and I decided that was one order we could do well to ignore, and we did.

We ignored other things. We ignored the fact that they told us not to bring TOW vehicles there. Without them we would never have gotten from Sarajevo to the airport.

I had experience in Somalia, and not good experience. I was one of the six members of the military board of inquiry that went over there. So I have a lot of detailed knowledge of what went on in Somalia. I'm fully aware of the fact that we didn't give our soldiers fresh food for six months. I think it was a good admiral out on the west coast who pointed out to you that we wouldn't treat Clifford Olson like that, and I would like to reiterate and underline the same comment.

I also commanded the western area until 1996. On it were five bases with approximately 10,000 regular and reserve troops. I was responsible at the time for closing several of those bases, adjusting to the new large base concept, and at the same time trying to adjust people's expectations in a world that was changing much more quickly than they could adjust to.

That's my experience in over 35 years in the forces. I have all sorts of war stories to go with each one of those titles, if you're interested. But I think my concern today is to really look at what our government says we do, what our government and our forces actually do, and what is bothering our troops down in the trenches.

I won't reiterate Canadian policy. It's the 1994 white paper. Besides that, there are little spins going around that we are really a peacemaking and peacekeeping nation. Others are saying we should just focus on assistance to civil authorities. Others think we should go to a Canada 21 or gendarmerie posture. Others say we should not be part of an international mine policy. Others say we should be partially part of it and others say we should not be part of it at all.

Our soldiers are a bit confused about what the expectation of our government is. They're a bit confused about what the expectation of their leadership is. They're a bit confused because they have been told we will get leaner, meaner, better, and so on, and all they've seen is themselves getting leaner, busier, and not necessarily better. They're getting a little perturbed about that.

The most important thing, as far as I'm concerned, is to have a clear and national commitment to address the well-being of our service members. To do so, it must be consistent with a well supported role for the armed forces. The resources for our soldiers must be accorded for them to train and to be prepared for any type of operation with whatever special training that would require.

• 1550

Intelligent commitment means constant support and interest in those who serve and also in those who have served.

Bruce Henwood served with me in Germany as a lieutenant flown over from Canada when I was a commanding officer over there. I know in detail what happened to Bruce Henwood.

I know Warrant Officer Martineau personally. The good sergeant who lost three fingers at Gustafsen Lake is a personal friend of mine.

All of those things are atrocious. I can tell you that as a two-star general sitting out in western Canada, I was incapable of changing what was happening, and that's the absolutely frightful thing.

I don't know if any members around this table have been asked what a medical patients holding list is. Has anybody addressed what that means? Has that wonderful acronym, MPHL, been brought to your attention, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman: No.

MGen Clive Addy: MPHL means when you're wounded, hurt or otherwise ill and unable, they put you on MPHL. If you're lucky, you go on MPHL close to your base or your unit. If you're not, you go somewhere else.

It is a list that is regulated from Ottawa and delegated to a base commander. If you ask anybody who has ever been on a medical patients holding list if anybody ever visited them or asked them what was going on with them, they'd tell you no. Yet, if you look at it, it looks like a really neat process.

I guess one of my pleas, when you make your recommendations on this, is that whenever you treat people or you want to deal with people, you have to put a name and a face to the person to whom they are responsible and who is responsible for seeing them. In our armed forces, it's your wing commander, it's your unit commander, and it's the captain of your ship. If you're wounded, they should still be the office of primary interest in your well-being.

If it takes money and permission to give to the captain or the unit commander, do so. He cares. He will look after those people. The guy third removed and fourth desk on the fourteenth floor here in the building across from where I work has no interest; it's another alphabetical name.

I think you should be thinking about what is the process we have and how do you analyse the process. It's very simple. If you were lying on that bed and somebody said, here is who is looking after you on MPHL, would you want to make sure you knew the face, the phone number, and who you would be dealing with? You're darn right you would.

I think you heard a presentation on closure in respect of Warrant Officer Martineau and in respect of Bruce Henwood, and the lack of closure is because of the impersonality. It's because no one who is capable of doing something and who knows the person is given the responsibility to do so directly so that the person knows who he's talking to.

That, in essence, is what I think is required. Based on my experience with full-time and part-time soldiers, I recommend strongly that the most important matter to flow from the deliberations before you must be a renewal of the bond of trust and respect for the profession of arms by the Government of Canada, which we serve. I feel this will be seen, and only seen, when the Canadian Forces is equipped and able to train and to fight, and when vocal support is publicly expressed by government leadership beyond the Department of National Defence. If this is done, proper treatment will follow. If not, your guess is as good as mine, Mr. Chairman.

If I might reiterate a couple of things you might wish to reflect on—and I'm sorry, John, but I'm going to reiterate one of my pet peeves, the Somalia medal.

The Somalia medal, to me, when I was serving, was a win-win situation that the government turned into a lose-lose situation, for two reasons: it did not understand the soldiers; and it did not understand the kind of effect giving a medal to the large majority who deserved it early would have had on the rest of the Canadian population to calm them. They could have overcome the five minutes of puffle in the newspaper.

They also are very vulnerable at this particular time because the treatment of those people who were wounded, whose names I've already mentioned and whose circumstances you know very well, could and will hit the press again.

• 1555

I might reiterate to you that these are a very few people. These are small operations that we have. We can't handle, haven't been able to handle, and haven't shown much competence in handling the very few we have had.

For that, we are guilty. I'm guilty because I wore the uniform when they were wounded and I couldn't do anything about it. That's so for those who are wearing the uniform today.

They need help. They should be helped. Please have a recommendation that's pertinent, then we'll help them. If I can underline that other comment I made before, the way to help them is to make sure that anyone who is wounded is dealt with by someone he knows and trusts, preferably from his own unit, not from the so-called system. Those are the dangers.

I don't think any amount of fiscal juggling can replace the need for trust and understanding that our soldiers sadly need. We've all seen the newspaper. I think it was the Ottawa Citizen of yesterday. I've seen the testimony you received. If you can actually come up with something that will translate meaningfully into a contract of trust between the Government of Canada and our soldiers, then I think you will have achieved a great deal.

But it's not there. It's not general officers who, at this stage in the world, can protect their soldiers from a lot of things that are happening.

There are a lot of things going on. I think there were some cruel remarks made by my good admiral friend about the parentage of politicians, or something to that nature. At any rate, I think what he attempted to say was quite valid. It was that the Canadian Forces are beyond partisan politics. They are beyond the local economic benefits they provide to a local community. They are an institution of Canada. They are a very strange institution in which you ask of your sons and daughters to put their lives in harm's way. You can't just dispatch them and forget them. You certainly can't forget them if they've been hurt.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Those are my opening remarks.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Major-General.

We now go to question period. We will start off with the Reform Party. Mr. Hanger, you have ten minutes.

Mr. Art Hanger (Calgary Northeast, Ref.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I apologize to the committee for walking in late. We were tied up in the House and had to settle something there.

I was interested in your comments, Major-General. I sense this whole area of frustration in you. When you were in the military, some of the changes were taking place. It didn't seem like the lines, obviously, were well defined as to where the military was going to be going. I have to say that I couldn't see through this maze, in my short time being involved in this portfolio. I couldn't see exactly the lines being drawn.

You made reference to the white paper of 1994. I think all of this has a significant play on the people who are serving. It may not be directly related to the social contract, if you will, but it certainly has a major role to play in the mindset of the military personnel: what is my mandate? It may even be, am I going to have a job? I sense that frustration even as we go around this tour.

If the 1994 white paper is going to play a key role here, how far have you seen the recommendations within that white paper being brought to bear in shaping what's left of the military now?

MGen Clive Addy: Without getting into a debate on all three envelopes—these are personnel, equipment, and operations and maintenance—let me just say that one of the embarrassing aspects of it, from my perspective, is that the 1994 white paper promised and attempted to do a lot.

A lot of things that it achieved are good. It retained the general combat capability. It closed a series of bases, some of which I was personally against, but that's part of life. I can't be for everything that happens.

• 1600

I think one of the aspects you must bear in mind as a general deduction is that we've gone from somewhere close to $13 billion down to $9.2 billion. I don't think the amount of money that's dedicated to defence in the white paper in 1994 is enough to fund that which is said it will fund. That's the basic bottom line.

However, the sad part is the ones who suffer in all of this are the soldiers, the ones who are made to pay. It's on the soldier's back, the pay and benefits of the soldier. It's on his ability to have his own organization in his own community when he's away. PMQs and the other benefits that were part of the lifestyle of the military that I knew well are disappearing and changing and switching. But they're changing at a rate where he doesn't feel comfortable, and all he sees are things going down.

You've been briefed on the pay freeze and the increases to PMQ rents. I'm not going to get into that, but it's another example of the type of thing where the generalship is powerless. The white paper.... The money is going down in this, and you're saving money for Canada, but the government is charging you more for rent. Who's helping who here? The soldier doesn't understand that, nor do I expect him to.

I think $9.2 billion is not enough to fund the 1994 white paper. I think the 1994 white paper is right, but I don't think it's right to have that dichotomy and make the soldier pay. That's my response to your question, Mr. Hanger.

Mr. Art Hanger: Thank you.

There also seemed to be a change when it came to an expression by many of the military personnel about complaints they would have that were normally addressed by the rank structure, and probably the immediate rank structure. That seems to be missing now.

They don't seem to have that advocate for defence, even when it comes to, say, moving from one base to another. They run into problems with damage; they run into problems with missing goods. There is no one there to come to their defence and say, look, Mr. Mover, you messed up here. They have to fend for themselves, even though they're on a DND train, if you will.

Now it seems, with all the other frustrations, they are kind of left in limbo to look after their own well-being, in spite of the fact that in the past it was clearly a Defence problem.

I don't see that as a positive thing to really bolster up the troops. I don't see how one can look at the support budget by cutting it in half from $13 million to $6 million that was designated to the military personnel, and yet that has been going on for some time.

In your time in the military, had that matter ever been addressed, and was there not any concern then expressed about what kind of damage that was going to do, as far as impacting on the rank and file?

MGen Clive Addy: I'll answer your question in two ways, if I might, Mr. Hanger.

The first one was the interest of the hierarchy or the leadership in the personal problems and assistance to the individual soldier, sailor, and airwoman or airman. That is a leadership problem, and if the tendency is that there is less and less attention paid to the moving of your own soldiers, that's a serious problem.

I was always very flattered in my career that my bosses worried about me and were concerned that I had moved okay and the family was all right, that we'd been from point A to point B and everything was all right. It was one of the benefits of the military system. If the testimony you're receiving indicates there has been a failing in that, I would be very concerned about that. That is part of the ethic of looking after your subordinates before you look after yourself, and if that's eroding, we have a real problem on our hands.

On the other side, you're asking me about the funding for personnel support from $13 million to $6 million, or something of that nature. I'm aware of the figures. I'm aware of the promises, that making larger bases would make it easier for us to spend less money and get just as much service, and so on. I think there is a certain logic to that, but I think in all things human there are margins of error that you learn after you've done it.

The dictate two years ago that $6 million would be just right is perhaps wrong at this time. Maybe a recommendation from this particular committee could adjust that particular amount to something more reasonable, but I can assure you it isn't enough right now. The indications we've had, and I'm sure you have from the testimony, and what I've drawn off the web, certainly indicate to me that there is potential here to have another look at whether $6 million is enough or whether we didn't cut too deeply in that particular aspect.

• 1605

Mr. Art Hanger: It has come up several times, and probably one of the most expressed concerns was the fact that military personnel had to fend for themselves. There was no one there on the base to go to bat for them any more. It seemed like his or her position was cut free on a cost-saving venture and it was “work it out yourself”. So that was one thing, and I was just kind of curious about how that fit into what you had seen or experienced when you were there.

The sergeant who lost his hand—

MGen Clive Addy: Sergeant Schlueter.

Mr. Art Hanger: Yes. He came into my office and explained the circumstance of using what I think was a trip flare that he was attempting to set to protect the equipment.

MGen Clive Addy: It was an RCMP flare that had been issued to the RCMP, which he was assisting the RCMP with. It was also a flare that should not have been issued because there had been a technical restriction on them for years.

Mr. Art Hanger: Flawed.

MGen Clive Addy: That's right. And he blew his hand off. There was a big to-do about whether he was following the rules of engagement at the time.

Mr. Art Hanger: That seems to be what the issue centres around. According to—

MGen Clive Addy: But I was the commander there—I'm sorry; I don't want to interrupt.

Mr. Art Hanger: That's okay.

MGen Clive Addy: I was the commander there and it was well within the terms of reference of what I had given that man to do. I don't understand to this day why this has not been acknowledged. Nobody's asked me.

Mr. Art Hanger: It's interesting that you would say that, because I brought up this very point to another serving general. He immediately went to the defence of the decision that was made not to support him any further, saying that what he did was not within the requirements of what he was ordered to do, that he had stepped well outside the bounds of what he was required to do and—

MGen Clive Addy: Mr. Hanger, if someone said that, I believe they're wrong.

Mr. Art Hanger: Okay.

MGen Clive Addy: I believe they're wrong, and if there's a way to correct that I would certainly assist in correcting it in any way that I possibly could.

Mr. Art Hanger: All right. I will be in contact with you.

The Chairman: Your ten minutes are up.

[Translation]

Ms. Venne.

Ms. Pierrette Venne (Saint-Bruno—Saint-Hubert, BQ): As you can see, I won't be able to talk to you for long, but I do have one question for you. We have all received reports on the concept of a social contract. The authors of those reports reviewed a variety of options with respect to the potential nature of this social contract. Most of them say that such a contract already exists, but that it is an informal contract, meaning that it is unwritten. Indeed, Gen Baril and LGen Leach both stated that and repeated it recently.

Since there is already an unwritten social contract, what difference would it make to have a written one? And don't you think that if there were a written contract or social charter with the military setting out a series of fine principles, it might be perceived by members of the Canadian Forces, and particularly the rank and file, as kind of a smoke screen intended to pull the wool over their eyes rather than establish a new relationship with the government?

MGen Clive Addy: This contract not only exists between the military and the government, but also between the military and the nation as a whole. Other countries that practice conscription also have contracts. With all due respect to my dear friends, Gen Baril and LGen Leach, I would point out that we also had an unwritten code of ethics for a long time. But they recently realized that it might be a good idea to write down some of those principles, to be certain that we are all on the same wavelengths. I'm sorry, but once in a while, it's appropriate to have something you believe in; to be able to think about it, write it down and get it straight in your own mind, whatever people who don't understand the need for that may think. That would be my answer, Ms. Venne.

Ms. Pierrette Venne: Thank you.

Last fall, the media had a field day with the performance bonuses paid to generals.

• 1610

Recently, the Union of National Defence Employees spoke out against the problem of double-dipping among certain senior ranking officers who left the Canadian Forces to take a civilian position in the federal public service. One example that comes to mind is VAdm Murray, who recently left the Canadian Forces to take an Assistant Deputy Minister position with the Department of Fisheries. In addition to his ADM salary, estimated at $130,000, VAdm Murray received severance pay of $80,000 and is currently receiving an annual pension of $80,000.

Under the circumstances, do you not think rank and file members might be somewhat cynical about any kind of formal social contract, when the clear impression being left is that the senior ranks of the military establishment are rolling in money?

MGen Clive Addy: I believe your question has to do with perception. I think it's absolutely true that rank and file members see that as unfair. In fact, in my view, one of the worst contracts we signed was when we tried to draw a parallel between our salaries and procedures and those of the public service.

The rule that you have described applies equally to the public service. I'm sorry, but I am in a position to do exactly the same thing. The rules that were enforced at the time allowed a member of the Forces, whatever his rank, to accumulate leave until the time of his departure. I can assure you that in the case of Adm Murray, whatever action was taken was not intended to afford a monetary advantage. If you look at the way his career progressed, you will see that he really did not have much opportunity to take leave, Ms. Venne. It wasn't because he had a long-term financial plan that he had decided not to take leave back when he was a captain, major or lieutenant-colonel.

That regulation has since been changed, as you probably know, to avoid that perception. I asked myself whether it was fair to ask him to return the $80,000 to the government because of that perception. My answer was no. He earned that money and he paid dearly for it. He didn't take any leave and his superiors took advantage of him. So, let him have his $80,000, if you don't mind. And the lowest ranking soldier can now avail himself of exactly the same rule with respect to leave.

Ms. Pierrette Venne: With respect to...

MGen Clive Addy: I believe the exact same rule applies to them now.

Ms. Pierrette Venne: However, when it comes to performance bonuses, you can't say it is only a matter of perception. The fact is that generals are receiving these bonuses.

MGen Clive Addy: Ms. Venne, the other ranks include a number of levels and increments that allow people to move up and receive the equivalent of these bonuses. The bonuses the generals are now receiving are identical to the ones given in the public service. It's this constant comparison with the public service that leads to these anomalies. If we were dealt with separately from the public service and were given a contract that ensured we would be treated appropriately, perhaps that would be the solution to this problem.

Ms. Pierrette Venne: In any case, I just want to say that we've already had a number of meetings with military personnel and I have indeed advocated on a number of occasions that the military be completely separate from the public service. So, in that respect, I certainly agree with you.

MGen Clive Addy: Good.

Ms. Pierrette Venne: Those were my only questions.

MGen Clive Addy: Thank you very much, Ms. Venne.

[English]

The Chairman: Mr. Proud.

Mr. George Proud (Hillsborough, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Addy, it's good to see you here today. I've seen you here on many occasions when you were in the military.

I've asked these questions many times before. I was interested in your comments today on things that we as a committee should be finding out and doing, and the government should be doing.

I hear over and over again these stories of people who were injured and have not been able to get relief and compensation. I had the occasion to deal with one individual who was hurt in Somalia, and I went through the whole thing with him.

I find this a terrible thing. I find it terrible on the military's part, and I find it terrible on the government's part if that's who is holding up the thing.

• 1615

I want to ask you about when you were a serving two-star, and other two-stars, three-stars, and one-stars were there. With respect to all these terrible things we're hearing about today, could you and those people not have been able to remedy them to some degree at that time, when they happened?

The other issue I hear so many times about is not being able to buy uniforms, not being able to buy clothes. In your time there the budget was around $12 billion or $11 billion. It has come down now to $9.2 billion, which I don't agree is enough either. In fact, I was one of the ones during the defence review who recommended that the Government of Canada put 1.5% of the GDP into the defence budget, which would give you a pretty good budget. Other countries have different types of figures. It would give you a realistic budget.

When we hear of these things—and equipment; we've seen a lack of good equipment, a lack of uniforms. Do you believe that with the type of money that was there, if it had been utilized to the best of everybody's ability, they couldn't buy these uniforms for these people? There couldn't have been the right equipment for these people? I find that hard to believe when I read all the things we hear about the military. The upper echelons of the military have had some bad knocks over the last number of years. I find it hard to believe that this couldn't have been done better.

I'll be the first one to say that governments over the years should have done better with it. The buck has to stop somewhere. Somebody has to take some of the responsibility for this and see that these things are done.

From your perspective as a retired person, when you were there, can you say that the people there today can change these things and make them...the questions I've referred to? Can they do something to stop this, to put it in perspective, to give these soldiers on the ground the clothes they need, the food they need, the things they need? There has to...especially the injured people. I find this atrocious in this day and age. If you'd been hurt in a factory today, you'd be on compensation. Jesus Christ, I find this hard to believe, that this type of thing is happening in our military today, that we're allowing it to happen, and that you people, and the people who followed, are allowing it to happen.

MGen Clive Addy: Your point is well taken, and you're absolutely right, the buck does stop here. The frustrating part is, yes, I am probably guilty.

But I tried. Damn it, I tried. I tried with Schlueter, and I tried with the ones before.

The thing that really got me was in Yugoslavia, when we sent that first series of observers there. Let me tell you what the policy was. We were supposed to send somewhere in the realm of 30 observers, half from Foreign Affairs and half from the military. By the time they had to send someone, they were all military, of course, because apparently there was not enough quality accommodation there or something for the other group.

Our own group that we sent there ended up with, as I said.... If you saw these wind jackets you put over your winter warfare thing, that's what we gave them. Why did we give them those? Why couldn't we buy them white jackets? So says the colonel, chief of staff, Canadian Forces Europe: get them white jackets. So says the structure back here: they're not entitled to them. So says the chief of staff to the commander CFE: sir, can we get them white jackets? Oh, yes we can. So he goes out and tries it, and he can't. Isn't that silly?

Mr. George Proud: So where does it stop? What was the roadblock?

MGen Clive Addy: I don't know. Somebody has to go out and buy these things. I don't know.

Mr. George Proud: Well, where is the roadblock?

MGen Clive Addy: At that particular time I would suggest that I knew very well where the roadblock was. The roadblock was in something they called the chief of staff, joint operations, and authorizing the logistics J4 to make money available to do this. That was what was required.

Mr. George Proud: But you will agree that with the money—

MGen Clive Addy: But that's just an example.

Mr. George Proud: Yes, I know, but you will agree that with the money that's in the budget, even though it's allocated, there would have been money there to do those things?

MGen Clive Addy: Yes. There would have been money to do a lot of the things we've done.

The treatment of the soldier is something quite different. That doesn't cost that much money, as far as I'm concerned. It does cost money if he is pensioned and you want to do it—yes, it does. You reap more by doing it properly than you do by spending it on an individual who served so well. This is the frightening thing.

Mr. George Proud: I want to put this on the record: I really think we on this committee have to be able to take more of an oversight authority.

I ask the general another question. I'm going to make a recommendation later today on something else that I am sure.... I'm going to make a recommendation that this committee ask that we have the authority to do this. I am sure that those very people in the military will be the ones who will put a roadblock in our way to stop us from doing this.

• 1620

I've been on this committee for almost nine years. Perhaps I've been on it too long, but it always frustrates me. If we bring up an idea that we should be doing certain things, we should be doing oversight on certain projects on there, that's not the job for you people. From what I've listened to sitting around this table for the last while, I believe this is something we have to do.

Mr. Art Hanger: I'm sorry to interrupt, Mr. Chairman. The problem that exists is that the bureaucrats are interfering with military decisions. That's the problem. If you separate that, you're going to solve a whole lot of that crap.

Mr. George Proud: I agree with you.

Mr. Bob Wood (Nipissing, Lib.): You're absolutely right, Art.

Mr. Art Hanger: Thank you.

MGen Clive Addy: If I might add to the question of putting the papers under the wounded man's nose, it's doing just that; it's getting the bureaucracy out of the treatment of our wounded, and it's important.

Mr. George Proud: Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Pratt, you have three minutes.

Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.): General, I read your recommendation, and I just want to go over it again:

I recommend strongly that the most important matter to flow from these deliberations must be a renewal of the bond of trust and respect for the profession of arms by the Government of Canada which it serves.

I agree with that statement and I think it does go to the heart of a lot of what we've heard over the last couple of months in terms of attempting to deal with this issue.

The one thing that struck me about some of the deliberations we have had is that what was coming back from the service members themselves was that the Canadian public really didn't have an appreciation or an understanding. The Government of Canada is nothing but a reflection of the Canadian public. Was the omission of the Canadian public intentional, or do you agree with the sentiment that we have to do more to educate the public as far as these issues are concerned?

MGen Clive Addy: I certainly would agree that we should do more to educate the public, but the government itself is responsible. It's the one that deploys people to various locations. The bond of trust has to be with the government and the people of Canada, but to the government on behalf of the people of Canada.

The Chairman: Mr. Proctor.

Mr. Dick Proctor (Palliser, NDP): Thank you.

I'd just like to go back to the little exchange that happened a couple of minutes ago and ask you, from your perspective, how you would separate out the decision-making to allow the military to make the decisions without the bureaucracy getting its hands and head in the way of that. In your experience, how do you think that could happen? What would be the best way?

MGen Clive Addy: I think the proper way is to give authority to commanders and commanding officers knowing full well that some day they may make a mistake and accepting the fact that people do make mistakes. There have been presidents of large companies, prime ministers, and, God forbid, ministers of departments who have made mistakes in the past. We have to live with that delegation.

The difficulty with the bureaucracy is that it doesn't tolerate mistakes. It will spend $10 million to save one. It will spend a whole bunch of money to oversee a little bit, and it tries to gather upon itself that kind of an authority.

To answer your question specifically at the unit level, if I were handling Warrant Officer Martineau's or Bruce Henwood's job, I would give the commanding officer of that unit the responsibility. I'd give him the authority to give a bit of cash, whatever it is, to help his family and to do it personally. He could hand him a cheque and say here, Bruce, go out and we'll buy you this and we can help you with this for a short period of time. I'm not talking $2,000; I'm saying give him $10,000 or $20,000 while he gets himself settled in with somebody he knows, not somebody who's artificial or apart. These people know one another.

It would be the same with Warrant Officer Martineau and his unit, the Lord Strathcona's Horse, and the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry with Sergeant Schlueter. His battalion commander had his hands tied. He couldn't sign a cheque for $10 to help Schlueter. It's stupid. These are the people who can order him to die, and when he's wounded they can't go out and sign a cheque for some extra money to see that his family is looked after. Does that make sense to you? I don't think it makes sense to anybody, but we have a structure that's made that way, and I'm sure it is much neater for the accountants to work that way. What I'm asking you is whether it is right for the people with whom they're dealing and who they lead.

• 1625

Mr. Bob Wood: Can I just ask you one question? Why can't you do that? You're a two-star, I believe. Why can't you do that?

MGen Clive Addy: Why can't I do what? Look after Schlueter?

Mr. Bob Wood: Write a cheque and make sure this guy is looked after when he's gone. We had a chance to talk to this gentleman. This guy lost both his legs. Nobody showed up. Nobody even gave him a handshake. That's something the military should be.... It's totally disgraceful.

MGen Clive Addy: Yes.

Mr. Bob Wood: Why can't you, as a two-star, have the authority to write this guy a cheque for $10,000 and let him go and do it, as you say, and show him some dignity? You're in charge.

MGen Clive Addy: I should have done that. I can tell you why I can't. There is no authority for me to do that. That's a fact.

Mr. Bob Wood: You're a two-star general.

MGen Clive Addy: I know.

Mr. Bob Wood: You have to have some authority. You have to have a slush fund. I don't care if you put $50,000 or $100,000—

MGen Clive Addy: Your assumption of me having a slush fund is laughable.

Mr. Bob Wood: I know other generals who have operations and maintenance—

MGen Clive Addy: It is laughable, sir.

Mr. Bob Wood: You can put that into anything and show some respect. He's one of your guys.

MGen Clive Addy: Sir, let me admit to you that if I had to do it again I would have done exactly what you've said. Let me tell you also that I don't have the slush fund that you think I have, or I didn't at that time, let me assure you. I doubt if the guys now have any.

Mr. Bob Wood: I don't even know if you have one now. Maybe that was the wrong term to use, but I'm saying there has to be something that allows you to do those things, whether it's personnel or anything. There has to be something there that allows you to take care of these people. Good God! We can't be that callous.

Mr. Art Hanger: It was a Liberal manifestation that brought this all about. Don't you ever forget that.

Mr. Bob Wood: There will be one that will fix it, and don't you forget that.

MGen Clive Addy: I might remind you again, sir, of the first part of my answer. Just so you know, had I to do it again, I would find the money. I am guilty.

Mr. Bob Wood: Good.

The Chairman: Thank you very much. That was quite an interesting exchange.

I think we'll ask Lieutenant-General Kinsman to come in front. Major-General Addy, if you could maybe hang around, I think Monsieur Benoît and Mr. Price, who had to leave, had questions for you. If you have time, if you could hang around, we have free time afterward.

While the general gets seated, we have a few motions, housekeeping duties. Number one is the adoption of the steering committee's report of yesterday. Everybody has copies. Is everybody in favour?

Mr. Art Hanger: Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question here? Why wasn't the other motion I submitted also placed on the report?

The Chairman: It wasn't agreed to. It's going to be voted on afterward.

Mr. Art Hanger: Okay. Are we talking about the report?

The Chairman: Yes, we're still on the report. Is it agreed?

(Motion agreed to)

The Chairman: Mr. Hanger's motion is next, and I will read it. It is moved by Mr. Hanger:

that the Committee undertake to review the procurement process and contract tendering relating to the search and rescue helicopter for the Canadian Armed Forces and report to the House prior to the 1998 summer recess.

Is there any debate?

Mr. Art Hanger: Yes, I would like to speak on behalf of my motion. I believe the issue is an important one to review, given the fact that there was some controversy over the delivery, over the selection. I believe there were even some accusations made by other contractors in reference to the procurement process. Those should be evaluated, and the contract itself should be reviewed by this committee for that purpose.

• 1630

Mr. Dick Proctor: I would certainly support the motion as it's presented. This is the kind of work this committee should be engaged in. It makes all kinds of sense, particularly in light of the debate we had in the first session of this Parliament. So I'm fully supportive of the motion in front of us.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Thank you very much.

Ms. Venne.

Ms. Pierrette Venne: I also support the motion, because the Bloc Québécois has always asked that the process through which National Defence awards contracts be a transparent one. So, I fully support this motion. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Mr. Pratt.

[English]

Mr. David Pratt: I have a question, Mr. Chair, and maybe you can answer or maybe you can't. Are you aware of any litigation that's being commenced by any of the...?

The Chairman: The other tenders? I haven't heard.

Mr. Art Hanger: I don't think there are any roadblocks to us, as a committee, examining this process. There have been some differences in the procurement arrangement, and I don't believe they're clear.

This is far from over. There will be another submission later on, again dealing with the same process. We should have it clear in our minds and examine it so the same questions don't arise the next time around.

The Chairman: Colleagues, the motion is on the floor. I will now ask for the vote.

Mr. Art Hanger: Could we have a recorded vote, Mr. Chairman, please?

The Chairman: Certainly.

(Motion negatived: nays 7; yeas 4)

Mr. George Proud: Mr. Chairman, could I just bring up something relating to this? I want to make a suggestion. The mover of the motion made a suggestion that there would be other things happening after this. I've said this many times, as have other members of this committee and former members of this committee.

In the process of selecting this equipment, I believe this committee should be part of that selection process. I believe it is a part we can play. I said when General Addy was at the table that I know a great roadblock is going to go up by certain people to stop us from doing this. But I believe, to get this thing out in the open—we talk about transparency—if this committee were to study this when we go, for instance, to the other helicopters for the ships, this committee should be part of the process that determines how it's carried through.

The Chairman: George, I gather this is a recommendation you will be making for our report.

Mr. George Proud: Yes.

The Chairman: Or otherwise.

Mr. George Proud: Yes.

Mr. Art Hanger: Mr. Chairman, the member's words are hollow in a way, because he has an excellent opportunity here right now to support the motion and for us to look at this thing once and for all. I know full well that there are many members on that side who have concerns over this tendering process as well. Yet here is their opportunity and they kowtow to whoever, I don't know. Is it an instruction from the minister?

Mr. George Proud: This is done. This procurement has gone ahead. This is done. The one I'm talking about is the one that's to come, the shipborne helicopters, or any other pieces of equipment. This committee should be part of the process that determines that.

The Chairman: Okay.

Mr. Art Hanger: Mr. Chairman, may I...?

The Chairman: One last.

Mr. Art Hanger: Mr. Clouthier sits over there. He has a helicopter plant in his riding and he was complaining about it.

And yet you sit there and say nothing. Here's your opportunity, Hec.

• 1635

Mr. Hec Clouthier (Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, Lib.): Mr. Chair, may I have the floor, please?

The Chairman: Okay. Last comment.

Mr. Hec Clouthier: You're wrong, Mr. Hanger. I met with the Boeing people; I met with George Capern. I said, “George, after the briefing, if you have any difficulty whatsoever, bring it to me”. He said absolutely nothing. He said, “Everything was above board, Mr. Clouthier. We bid too high.”

The Chairman: Thank you for that clarification.

During the steering committee meeting yesterday, a few people asked about Bill C-25, the National Defence Act. Somebody was wondering when we were....

Mr. Bob Wood: I was.

The Chairman: You were? It's coming next week for second reading, possibly on Wednesday. That's the information I got.

Now we go to General Kinsman for his presentation.

[Translation]

LGen David Kinsman (Assistant Deputy Minister (Personnel), Department of National Defence): Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen.

[English]

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this committee a second time and to contribute to your deliberations on the socio-economic context of the men and women of the Canadian Forces.

Since I appeared before you on November 20, you have had the opportunity to visit several CF installations and to talk to literally thousands of Canadian Forces personnel and their loved ones. These visits have set a gruelling pace for you personally, but I know the time you have spent visiting and listening has been very much appreciated.

Over the next several weeks you will receive technical briefings from staff from National Defence headquarters, who will provide you with a greater level of detail in a variety of areas of interest. Their presentations will assist in answering the specific questions that I'm sure you have in these areas.

My purpose in being here today is to expand upon the notion of a social contract or charter, which was presented by the Minister of National Defence in his letter to you and which has been alluded to in virtually every presentation made to you in committee since. The requirement for and development of a social charter is a much more elusive target than is the discussion of current dissatisfactions and the potential resolution thereof. It is fundamental, however, to the sense of well-being and morale for every man and woman in the Canadian Forces.

In commenting recently upon the factors that affect military personnel and contribute to their ability to do the job, General Baril employed a quote by General Douglas MacArthur, who said, “Morale will quickly wither and die if soldiers come to believe themselves to be victims of indifference or injustice on the part of the government”.

This review by your committee goes a long way to dispelling any sense of indifference, but as some have asked you during your visits, how does that translate into a permanent commitment of support, both moral and tangible, to the men and women of the Canadian Forces and their families?

[Translation]

In my previous appearance before you, I mentioned that the Canadian Forces have not been entirely successful in defining a personnel policy framework or a minimum level of services and standards. Recognizing the importance of such a framework or charter, we reapplied our efforts last fall. This time, however, our approach has been somewhat different, inasmuch as we have solicited the input of five academics to provide an objective point of view from outside of the organization to assist us in the process. And, obviously, the mandate of SCONDVA in that regard constitutes a unique opportunity to develop a social charter that would truly represent the commitment of Canadians and their government towards the members of the Canadian Forces.

You will have the opportunity to hear and question two of the individuals who contributed to our internal process. To prepare you for those presentations and to convey the view of the Armed Forces Council on this subject is the aim of my brief presentation to you today.

• 1640

I should also point out that when I refer to the Armed Forces Council, I am talking about a senior military committee chaired by the Chief of the Defence Staff on which sit senior ranking generals.

[English]

There are two fundamental questions to the issue: what is a social charter and why is one necessary in the first place? I would like to address the second question first.

[Translation]

If the demands placed upon the members of the Canadian Forces and their families were exactly the same as those made of other Canadians, there would be no requirement for anything such as a social charter. Intuitively, however, we understand there is a distinctiveness to military service which requires acknowledgement in concept and in fact, if we wish to avoid the sense of indifference or injustice referred to by Gen MacArthur. The challenge, therefore, becomes one of understanding what those fundamental differences are and expressing them in such a manner as to convey a permanent sense of recognition and support.

[English]

The input received from our external contributors cautioned against implying uniqueness of military service where other Canadians are faced with the same circumstances. For example, it is not only members of the Canadian Forces who have to work long hours or who have to maintain a mobile lifestyle in order to be successful in their chosen profession. Equally, there are other professions where physical well-being is placed at risk on a frequent if not a daily basis.

That having been said, members of the Canadian Forces have much less choice than most other Canadians with respect to where they are to live and how frequently they will be uprooted and moved to another part of the country or the world, where standards and costs of living may differ. Nor are most other Canadians expected as part of their trade or profession to be separated from their loved ones for protracted periods of time, often in circumstances that present an ongoing risk to their health, physical well-being, and sometimes life. The latter, of course, refers to our unlimited liability to serve.

Most important of all, however, is the fact that service in the Canadian Forces implies a certain restriction to the freedoms that all other Canadians enjoy on an ongoing basis and that most are not prepared to give up for peacetime service to their country. The most important of these restrictions imposed by the National Defence Act are to the rights of personal expression and association.

One of the most fundamental responsibilities of the Canadian Forces and its members is to support the government of the day and its policies. An essential element of that support is neutrality, which in turn demands abstinence from comment on policy and association with organizations or ideals that take obvious stances for or against such policy.

Simply put, this means CF members are precluded by legislation from advocating or overtly associating with a position on government policy or on their own behalf, particularly if such advocacy were to run counter to current policies.

This clearly leaves military personnel at a distinct disadvantage unless it is clear to them that this limitation of their personal freedoms is recognized and compensated for through unwavering and fair support from the people of Canada and their government. Such support is easier to discern at some times than at others, depending upon circumstances.

This, in turn, points to the requirement for an anchor for ongoing support, be it a social charter or some similar statement of mutual obligation that recognizes the distinctive dimensions of military service.

[Translation]

Having discussed the "why", let me now discuss briefly the "what" dimension. Our discussions of the past months have envisioned a spectrum of "whats", from a simple implied moral contract by Canadians to a standalone formal statement to a specific formal statement by the government on behalf of all Canadians, accompanied by tangible undertakings to give visible support to such a statement. From the outset of SCONDVA's deliberations, there has been a very large level of expectation developing within the ranks of the Canadian Forces that this review is the only and final means by which their concerns can be properly aired and addressed in a national forum.

• 1645

This expectation tends to understate the many substantial improvements that we have been able to implement, particularly since the lifting of the wage freeze, but perception is an important factor to consider and, as you have seen for yourselves, there is a strong sense on the part of many members that their basic requirements are not being met. In some notable cases, there is substance to their concerns. The Canadian Forces must be allowed to take care of its people.

[English]

From a Canadian Forces leadership perspective, the social charter should be of the formal statement variety, accompanied by consideration of and assistance in a couple of critical areas. We would perceive those areas to be threefold.

The first is the overall question of compensation and benefits and whether current or forecast levels and the methodology by which we arrive at those values addresses the unique nature of military service in an appropriate fashion.

The second concern has to do with the disparities in discretionary spending levels that result from employment in various geographical locations across the country.

The final concern is the means by which the Canadian Forces can assure provision of sustainable accommodation of an appropriate nature and standard.

[Translation]

All three of these issues will be the subject of subsequent technical briefings; therefore, it is not my intention to address them in detail at this time, other than to stress that we see these as being the three major concerns of our people. Certain elements of their concerns we are able to address internally, but fundamental change is not entirely within this Department's control, and is dependent upon assistance and support from other areas of government.

[English]

Once again, Mr. Chairman and members, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you and to present these views on behalf of the department and the Canadian Forces. I hope they will be of assistance to you. I'm more than happy to take your questions now.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Lieutenant General.

Mr. Benoit.

[English]

Mr. Leon E. Benoit (Lakeland, Ref.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good afternoon, General Kinsman. In your brief on page 7 you say that:

The most important of those restrictions imposed by the National Defence Act are to the rights to personal expression and association. One of the most fundamental responsibilities of the Canadian Forces and its members is to support the government of the day and its policies. An essential element of that support is neutrality which in turn demands abstinence from comment on policy and association with organizations or ideals which take obvious stances for and against such policy.

I'm just wondering, General Kinsman, how this might relate to members of the forces appearing before this committee and giving their testimony, which they have been doing across the country. Is there some way that what you say in this statement could impact on the testimony that has been given before the committee?

LGen David Kinsman: Not at all, Mr. Benoit. In fact, in this evolution of SCONDVA and the one in the spring, we have pointed out that from the perspective of the Canadian Forces, we're more than happy to have people see the committee to express their concerns, because we believe there's an interest by the minister, which the minister expressed to SCONDVA. It's important for SCONDVA to hear those views by the men and women of the Canadian Forces and their families, in order to understand those issues that are most on their minds out there.

Mr. Leon Benoit: So no matter what these people say, though, in their testimony—and I want to be very clear on this—

LGen David Kinsman: Yes.

Mr. Leon Benoit: —no matter what area they comment on or what comments they make, are you saying that in no way has any member of the forces put restrictions on them or sanctioned them later for what they have said?

LGen David Kinsman: The invitation was made by the Chief of Defence Staff when we understood SCONDVA—messages sent out both through the hard copy method of Canadian Forces general messages and verbally to the commanders. The Chief of Defence Staff indicated that he did not want any sanctions on anybody either during, before, or after, because that would not be in the spirit of what the committee and the testimony were about.

• 1650

Mr. Leon Benoit: So you're very confident that either through written form or verbally, nobody who testified before this committee has had any comments directed at them saying they shouldn't have done that, don't do it again. There's been nothing along that line at all.

LGen David Kinsman: That was certainly the intent. You've talked to a lot of people. I don't know whether you might anecdotally be able to bring up a conversation that I wouldn't be aware of, but I wish to assure you that to the best of knowledge, no, there haven't been any of those sanctions. Certainly there was no intention for there to be any sanctions.

As you would understand, it does go a little bit against the grain for people. Given what I said in my testimony, it is I think even within the military, to be perfectly honest.... At the beginning there might have been some trepidation. But no, to the best of my knowledge.... The sense I have—although I've not been there with you—given the attendance you've had at your hearings and the types of subjects that have been discussed and so on and so forth, is that by and large this spirit has been maintained and people felt comfortable in voicing their concerns and their opinions to you.

Mr. Leon Benoit: If I were to tell you that at these committee meetings—after the meetings, in private conversation—I've had people tell me they were directly warned not to speak, not to testify before the committee, would you be shocked by that? Do you think that's completely out of line with what is in reality going on here?

LGen David Kinsman: I think in response to that I would end up repeating myself, but let me do it very briefly. The intent of the Chief of Defence Staff, of the minister, and of the senior cadre of the Canadian Forces, was to allow people to express their concerns, their opinions, to this committee in candour. That was explicitly stated on a number of occasions, as I say, both verbally and in writing.

I wouldn't be able to comment on comments that had been passed to you off record.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Thank you, General.

The Chairman: I have one comment on this. If you are aware of individuals who have been told to be quiet or whatever, as chair I think I would like to be made aware of this. I would also like to have the names of these people, because I would like to look into it. We were assured when we started that there would be no recrimination.

Mr. Leon Benoit: What would you do, as a committee, if I did come up with names of people I talked to and they were willing to talk with you and me together and say they had been told very directly not to testify?

The Chairman: It would be my pleasure, Mr. Benoit, to meet with them personally.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Good. I want to get on to the next line of questioning, then.

The Chairman: You have an extra minute.

Mr. Leon Benoit: I want to ask a question regarding something General Addy said. He made comments about the importance of the personal contact between the commanding officer and an injured soldier, and the problems when that's filtered through the department. I'd like to ask you your feelings on that.

Do you believe it's being handled adequately now, that the process in place now works well, or should in fact the commanding officer be given direct authority to follow this right through until he or she are absolutely convinced that this soldier is being properly taken care of?

LGen David Kinsman: I had the opportunity, of course, to be here to listen to General Addy's reply. It crossed my mind when he was responding to the question that there are two dimensions to the care when we take of our people who are injured, whether it's in normal training or in special duty areas.

• 1655

One of them is entirely within the latitude of every leader within the Canadian Forces, and that is the personal touch—taking care of somebody who's been injured, making sure they are being cared for.

There have certainly been instances, some of them well documented, some of them in open sources, in which it apparently didn't happen.

Mr. Leon Benoit: General, are you familiar with a Mr. deJeager and his son, who had stomach cancer while he was on a ship? It was misdiagnosed to the point that by the time it was properly diagnosed, the person died of the cancer.

The father of that soldier approached you, Mr. Kinsman, asking you to go to his son and acknowledge that what had happened was wrong.

Are you aware of this situation?

LGen David Kinsman: I'm certainly aware of the case, yes.

Mr. Leon Benoit: What's your comment on that?

LGen David Kinsman: I think it would be difficult to give it in a short answer, because it was a complicated case. I was involved after the death of Mr. deJeager's son. I didn't have the opportunity to meet his son personally, but I was significantly involved in the capacity that I'm in now.

Frankly, with respect for Mr. deJeager, I don't think it would be appropriate to talk in this committee about the details of his son's case—at least I don't believe it would be.

Mr. deJeager had views on what had been done and what had not been done by the Canadian Forces. When the issue was brought to my attention, I had a full review done not only by the medical people but also by—

Mr. Leon Benoit: Mr. deJeager claims that you refused to even talk to him and talk to his son, that time after time you refused to meet with him.

LGen David Kinsman: Mr. deJeager's son had unfortunately died before I took over the particular position I'm in now.

We are talking strictly about the conversations I would have with Mr. deJeager. I spoke with Mr. deJeager on a couple of occasions.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Did you meet with him?

LGen David Kinsman: I was scheduled to meet with him. The day on which it was convenient for him to come to Ottawa, to my office, I was not here. Two members of my staff met with him, however.

Mr. Leon Benoit: You would think somebody who had suffered through that kind of thing would warrant enough attention—

The Chairman: Last question, Mr. Benoit.

Mr. Leon Benoit: —for you to make sure that you would meet with him and at least give him some kind of comfort after what had happened.

LGen David Kinsman: Two people, one from health care services and another who was acting in my capacity on the day Mr. deJeager came to my office, saw him and spoke with him at some length. Then Mr. deJeager, as you're probably well aware, departed very shortly thereafter for what I think was a round-the-world sailing trip. To the best of my knowledge, he has not been in Canada since September 1997.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Mr. Wood, please.

Mr. Bob Wood: I'll follow up on Mr. Benoit's question.

General, who should see them? Obviously, in your position you can't see everybody who gets sick or terminally or seriously ill, but who should be seeing them? Whose responsibility is it to see them? Is it the commanding officer's?

LGen David Kinsman: By “them”, are you referring to grieved relatives and immediate next of kin?

Mr. Bob Wood: Yes.

LGen David Kinsman: I believe in all situations it starts at a unit level and in most cases there is an obligation of the leadership in that unit to take the matter in hand.

I do freely admit some cases have not been handled particularly well for whatever reason. I'm not being judgmental here. I'm saying those are the facts.

In the largest part of cases, there are mechanisms. General Addy used personal anecdotes. Let me use one. I've been a squadron commander and a base commander in the air force. In both cases I've had the misfortune of people being killed in crashes while I was in command.

• 1700

The only alternative from my personal standpoint was to become personally involved with the family immediately thereafter and assume the role that I think was incumbent upon me as a leader of the squadron or leader of the base to keep the contact with the family, to provide assisting officers or whatever information was necessary so that the people understood, in a time of grief, what was happening to them, what was happening to their loved one who had died, and what the procedures would be.

Those are not things, Mr. Wood, that you necessarily write down and make a checklist of, saying now do this, do that. That's a responsibility of leadership.

Mr. Bob Wood: Okay.

On another topic, I regret that I was out of the country when you appeared before the committee before, but I've had a chance to review all the transcripts. I noted that you said in relation to the social contract that you would welcome, if I'm quoting you properly, “the development of a strategically orientated, broadly worded social contract”.

Now, I'm very interested in why you would prefer the definition to be broadly worded instead of specific and precise. Can you elaborate on that?

LGen David Kinsman: I can. This is not just my opinion, but those words were mine.

I believe if there is a precise statement that aims at specific policies or specific areas you as a committee see to be particularly problematic right now, assuming those are seen to be in the future, it puts a bit of a time limit on that statement, whereas a social charter or statement that is more broadly worded is of enduring support to say that the people of Canada recognize the efforts made by military people whether it be in operations overseas, during ice storms in eastern Ontario, or whatever. They are words of reassurance, if you will.

As you will note, that in and of itself probably won't meet expectations. Therefore, there are some things I believe the committee can do to assist in moving forward some of the issues I've mentioned here, issues such as the differences in discretionary pay, in the money in the pocket at the end of the month for people of the same rank doing the same job from one part of the country to the other.

Mr. Bob Wood: As I go through the material and listen to our witnesses, I keep hearing words such as “contract” and “collective agreement”. What I think we're trying to get at is what the obligation of the government is to the military personnel.

I guess I'm a bit uncomfortable trying to define the responsibilities of the government to the military, because we'll be telling them what we think our obligation is to them. We already define what their obligation is to us, and that's to act as defenders of our country at the risk of their loss of life. Now we are to define what we owe to them in return for that potential sacrifice.

Somehow it seems a bit lopsided to me. I would ask you, General, to comment on this dilemma. If this is a contract, shouldn't both sides, in particular the lower ranks, have more say in its definition?

LGen David Kinsman: To a certain extent, I believe, to get back to the original question that Mr. Benoit asked, the open forum that has been adopted and encouraged to give people from all ranks and their spouses and their families an opportunity to speak to you hopefully contributes their voice to the final conclusion that you as a committee come to with respect to how you want your report to read and what the results and recommendations of that report should be.

Mr. Bob Wood: I've got to get back to your statement here where it says the Canadian Forces must be allowed to take care of its people. That is very scary. After we hear of all the things that have happened and all the horror stories...as soon as somebody gets hurt or injured, people just walk away.

• 1705

You're asking that you be allowed to take care of these people. Obviously there is going to have to be a real change in attitude, General, from the top down. It either starts with you or it starts with two-star generals or whatever. It has to filter down to the commanding officers of the base or ships or whatever so that this is taken care of. The things we have heard of are terrible mishandlings of people's personal problems.

You're asking that the Canadian Forces be allowed to take care of its people. I tell you, I don't think there is one person on this committee who would say you can do it. There has to be a change in your attitude, the whole attitude of the armed forces from the top level down. You're asking us to allow you to take care of your people, and I bet everybody is saying, no, not a chance.

Mr. Art Hanger: I don't agree with you.

Mr. Bob Wood: But you're not the witness.

Mr. Art Hanger: Yes, but you included me in it.

Mr. Bob Wood: You can abstain if you want.

LGen David Kinsman: I go back to my point that there are two levels I'm addressing here. I have said, and I'll say again, that there is no doubt that on a certain level, which is the person-to-person basis, there has not been in all cases the proper handling of cases. I'm not asking for assistance in that particular regard. Within the military we understand that's something we continually have to work on and improve.

It's one of the reasons why last year, when the cases of Major Henwood and of Martineau et al became known better, and in some cases to some of us for the first case, the acting Chief of Defence Staff at the time called for a review of all people who had been injured, either in special duty areas or subsequent to that, to extract what the stories were, where the system had gone wrong, and to find out ultimately what we can do to make that better. In some of those cases it's entirely in-house. It was simply people not following up on their troops through the system to make sure they were getting the treatment they want.

There are other areas, in a more macro sense, where we run into policies, rules, and so on, where we don't have the latitude to simply say—notwithstanding the fact that we would like to—I believe this individual merits $25,000 or $50,000; here you go. This gets back to General Addy's testimony about what you can do and what you can't do within your authorities with moneys that are available. Most of those stem from legislation and policies of the government.

Mr. Bob Wood: Just getting back to moneys, to my knowledge, every base has a slush fund they can do whatever they want with. They have an x amount of dollars they can do whatever with. It's at the discretion of the commanding officer, is it not?

LGen David Kinsman: From within certain—

Mr. Bob Wood: If they decide they want to use that money to buy somebody something that can improve his lifestyle, why can't they do it?

LGen David Kinsman: Notwithstanding the fact that they have the money, which they could under a single point operating budget concept take from operations and maintenance, let's say, for Sergeant So-and-So, who has been wounded and now is a paraplegic and needs a wheelchair, they could say, let's buy a wheelchair for him. They may have the money, but it gets back to a question of authorities to spend the money.

This is where people are going to say, all right, now you're starting to sound like a bureaucrat. But in the job I've had for the past two or three years in many cases I've been sympathetic to cases that came up, but I couldn't simply say go ahead and address this case by spending money or reversing the decision or whatever it is, because I have to work within policies. If the policies are wrong, this is where the two join. If the leadership at the local level here, or at whatever level, finds that the policies or those things that have a tendency to constrain are not fair, are not equitable, or whatever it is, then it's initially their responsibility to bring that to the attention of the people in their chain of command and ultimately to people at whatever level to say this simply isn't right. The policy most of the time might be correct and should be applied in the way it's written, but this is not the right way to do it.

• 1710

Frankly, in some cases people will say there's the policy and we can't do any more with that and they don't necessarily pursue it. I think that's the case on the other side. There are probably people in the field who take a look at staff like me and say, all those guys do is hang on policy and they won't allow any particular flexibility. Once again I suspect that may be true in some cases, but in other cases we work very hard, both inside the organization and with the people who are responsible for those policies, to look for exceptional treatment where we think it's merited.

The Chairman: Thank you very much.

Mr. Proctor.

Mr. Dick Proctor: How would you feel about military men and women being able to join an association or even, dare I say it, a trade union?

LGen David Kinsman: The comments I'll give here are entirely personal. They don't represent.... Let me preface my remarks by saying the concept of association or union or whatever it is of course means many different things to many different people. Within the military there are some people who believe we're at the point where that would be a preferable thing to do. There are others, myself included, who tend not to want to throw the baby out with the bath water. Perhaps that's from my conservative upbringing in Nova Scotia.

If there are things wrong or if there's discontent right now, is it because of the fact that we're not part of a union or an association or is it because of other factors? I think you have to clarify the other factors before you take the jump towards saying we absolutely have to be part of an association or a union.

Mr. Dick Proctor: From where I sit I could see this committee grappling with this issue and maybe coming up with a plan that will solve the problem perhaps now and for the next few years. Inevitably it will probably deteriorate, so some future committee in a decade from now will be sitting around here doing the same thing.

I think what we're talking about is essentially pay and rations. We can make the wording sound nicer and talk about a social charter or a social contract, but historically and in lots of other professions.... We have the Canadian Police Association, for example, meeting with various members of Parliament today. Trade unions do exist in a few Nordic military places, I think.

I guess my concern is that we might fix the problem today, but it won't stay fixed, whereas if you had a bargaining agent that was there to renew the contract every two or three years, you could begin to deal with some of these horrific problems we're hearing about.

LGen David Kinsman: There are some people who would agree entirely with you—people in uniform. One has to be careful not to take a quick snapshot of another system and assume it would work well for your own.

One of the ones I tend to prefer is that we're in a discussion about whether we should have a bargaining agent, a tribunal, or an agency of some sort that does the negotiation on our behalf. That's exactly what I was alluding to in my text here. If we as an organization can't go out and try to impose upon others what we think our value is and fight for the last 0.5% or whatever it is, then there are alternatives.

In the U.K. a number of years ago they established a tribunal-type system. I believe that's explained to a certain extent in the material you have or will receive. In fact that's one of the things we're trying to provide you with in a complete review of four or five countries' compensation and benefits. That's part of the issue. Since that tribunal was put in place in the U.K., our allies in the U.K. have gone from being very poorly paid with few benefits and so forth to something that would probably be the envy of a lot of people in the Canadian Forces right now.

• 1715

The point I always add is it may not have just been the tribunal. Take a look at when the tribunal was there and take the Falklands War and Prime Minister Thatcher and so on and so forth. There was a larger movement than just a tribunal behind the well-being of their military.

Mr. Dick Proctor: Thanks.

The Chairman: Mr. Price.

Mr. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, PC): I'm terribly sorry, Mr. Chairman, that I've been kind of drifting in and out. It's been one of those days.

I'm sorry, General Kinsman, that I didn't hear all of your presentation, but I had one question. Everything we're hearing tends to be negative all the time. We're always talking about our image on the outside, but I'd be interested in hearing what suggestions you have to improve our image on the inside of the military, because there's a big problem of our image right there.

LGen David Kinsman: That's an interesting question.

I believe that a certain amount of the negative image, if you will, or discontent or malaise—call it what you will—is a result of a culmination of things, as I see it. Once again, this is Dave Kinsman speaking; it's not necessarily a theory that would be approved by everybody in the department.

We've come through a particularly difficult period, and I don't think we have to re-emphasize that. Since 1989, so for nearly 10 years now, there's been a series of reductions, and people are uncertain as to exactly where that's going to end, enough of them that even when they thought they were getting to a level of stability, there was another dimension to it. So there's the uncertainty of that.

There is obviously the wage compensation benefit freeze, which basically for that period of time.... In the absence of anything else, at least if people are giving you more money in raises, you have a sense that they appreciate what you're doing. But that's not unique, obviously, to the Canadian Forces. That's been nationwide, and particularly within the public service.

Then there's the other dimension, of course, which has been three or four years of very difficult times from the standpoint of self-perception with respect to media and so on—the Somalia inquiry and Bakovici and so on and so forth.

It's not surprising, I don't believe, from our perspective. We knew, when Minister Young invited you last year and when Minister Eggleton invited you this year to take up this study, that the representations you were going to be getting would be predominantly negative, because that's fundamentally what the basic thesis of the thing is. We didn't expect that you were going to be overwhelmed with a lot of people coming up saying, “Life is great; thank you very much.”

Mr. David Price: But I'm just wondering, in the meantime.... We're moving along on this. We're talking about a year here before we get to a point where we have to report. In the meantime, things are still going downhill.

LGen David Kinsman: Well, in the meantime, we keep very busy trying to satisfy some of the things that are clearly concerning people.

One of the things we've had to make sure of, and which I've absolutely insisted upon, is that we not use your deliberations as a reason to go into cruise mode and not keep doing things.

From a compensation standpoint, we continue to work very hard to make sure we can increase the compensation of people, along with other people in the public service and elsewhere in Canada. We have, within the last year and a half, brought in a number of programs, which don't necessarily impact immediately upon the reg force members. You've had a tendency to see more of the regular force members than the reserve force members. We did a package over the last calendar year to improve the lot of our reservists—a very significant reserve get-well program.

We've had some fairly significant successes, and they have not been incidental, by the way. They have probably added somewhere between 200 and 250—

Mr. David Price: But they haven't been publicized that much.

LGen David Kinsman: Well, that continues to be the problem that dogs us, because from my perspective, I can put out, it would seem—and I don't mean to be bleeding in front of the committee—a tremendous amount of information about compensation increases or the reserve improvements we made—85% parity and a reserve force retirement gratuity and so on and so forth. First of all, you'd understand that because that doesn't touch 60,000 regular force folks, they're basically impervious to that. Some of them will know reservists and be happy with that.

• 1720

Communication of what we're doing and of what we're trying to do is an ongoing thing. As some of you will know, I'm almost at the end of my tenure in this particular job, but one thing that has become increasingly apparent to me is this. Not too long ago, we used to have a permanent group of people we called the Conditions of Service Board, which was a group of people who were intimately familiar with compensation, benefits, what we were working on for the future, and what we had just brought in within the last year. They travelled around the country on an ongoing basis to talk to people, to tell them what was happening and also to answer questions they had—the types of questions you've been receiving and that I get anytime I go out in the field.

We have done away with that as part of the reductions of people working in Ottawa. To me, in retrospect and without being critical of the people who made the decision, it just is hurting us tremendously, so I've worked to re-establish that, in conjunction with my colleague, the commander.

Mr. David Price: I guess I've been kind of hoping that when we get to the end of this period and this report we're working on, you'll be able to come back and say you've already implemented this and it's working its way down through.

LGen David Kinsman: I think your president might.... It was my impression last year, as you went through the testimony, that as you got into the technical briefings, the members of the committee received a fuller understanding of exactly what was being done, what had been done, and what was going to be done. In fact the comment that was made at the time I appeared before your committee in the spring was there's actually been a whole lot of stuff going on. It gets back to the same question: Why don't the people know about this?

Mr. David Price: Something positive, something we can....

LGen David Kinsman: We've undertaken a number of things. Whether they'll be successful.... We have a brand-new Canadian Forces newspaper, and we'll have a segment in each one that says, “Here's what affects you and here's what we're doing”.

Mr. David Price: Maybe you could buy ads in Esprit de Corps.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

Mr. David Price: Thank you.

The Chairman: We'll now go to the five-minute rounds. We have time for two to three questions maximum.

Mr. Hanger.

Mr. Art Hanger: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. David Pratt: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order, did you not have me down on that last round?

The Chairman: Yes, for 10 minutes, and then we'll go with the five minutes. As soon as Art is finished I'll go to you.

Mr. David Pratt: Okay.

Mr. Art Hanger: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I apologize to Mr. Wood for interrupting his last comment, but I wanted to make it clear that I was not part of your thinking. I believe there's a problem all right in dealing with the military on that issue you were talking about, and it's political, a manifestation of the Liberal government, and it has to be changed.

Mr. Bob Wood: It's non-partisan too.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

Mr. Art Hanger: Well, it's a political answer. There have to be some changes politically.

General, you had mentioned in your brief the Armed Forces Council. Is that a body that sets the plans forward on the operational side, the administrative side, and also the budgetary side as to how it's going to be spent and what is going to happen within the military overall?

LGen David Kinsman: Without necessarily agreeing to the exact words you use, the Armed Forces Council is the Chief of Defence Staff's senior advisory committee with respect to virtually anything that happens within the Canadian Forces. I'm talking about within uniform.

Mr. Art Hanger: Okay.

LGen David Kinsman: So we're talking about personnel policies, we're talking about the types of priorities we think are necessary for capital equipment expenditure, we're talking about the types of priorities for expenditures of operations and maintenance and so on.

But the thing that's important for you to understand, I think, is that it in and of itself does not have the expenditure authority. The expenditure authority actually is vested in the program management board. So you have the Armed Forces Council and the defence management committee, which then is the Armed Forces Council together with the deputy minister and the ADMs from the civilian side.

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Mr. Art Hanger: This is then, so to speak, the amalgamation of the bureaucracy with the military, is it not?

LGen David Kinsman: If you want to refer to it as that. That is the senior committee in the Department of National Defence to discuss those types of issues.

Mr. Art Hanger: The Armed Forces Council sees there's a problem, for instance, in dealing with injuries within the military. Rather than totally bear the load themselves or have it shuffled off to the side, they see that the best solution in dealing with those particular people is to give it to the base commanders and have the base commanders make the decision. Does the Armed Forces Council have the authority to delegate that kind of administration to a base commander?

LGen David Kinsman: In certain areas, they do.

Mr. Art Hanger: In that area?

LGen David Kinsman: Do you mean in the area of taking care of personnel?

Mr. Art Hanger: Yes.

LGen David Kinsman: Yes, in certain parts of taking care of people, they absolutely do.

Mr. Art Hanger: I guess I'm a little bit confused if the base commander has the authority to say here is an injured soldier, who was under my command when it happened, so I have the final say on what's going to happen.

LGen David Kinsman: No, I didn't mean to mislead you.

There are certain authorities of expenditure and accountability between the Armed Forces Council and individual unit commanders, be it base commanders or brigade commanders or whatever. Certain of those authorities will be vested in the individual base commander or brigade commander. Other authorities may not necessarily be vested in that individual.

Mr. Art Hanger: Is it a workable situation to permit a base commander to settle such concerns?

LGen David Kinsman: Once again, I believe in some cases the authorities are already there. If we were talking about specific cases, we might be talking about.... For example—

Mr. Art Hanger: Could we use General Addy's example of the sergeant who had his hands blown off by the trip flare?

LGen David Kinsman: A certain amount was done by the commander of the western area to assist that individual. In that particular case, there is a larger issue as to how the Canadian Forces take care of individuals who have been injured in-country in situations like that or in situations in preparation for operations overseas.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Hanger.

David.

Mr. David Pratt: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like to get back to the issue of the social contract. I'm inclined to quote that famous military philosopher, Stokely Carmichael, who said, “If you're going to talk the talk, you'd better walk the walk.” I'm concerned about the social contract in talking the talk, but not walking the walk.

It seems to me, as well, that building trust with the Canadian Forces is done by actions, not necessarily by words. In this particular case, given the problems we're dealing with—pay, housing, quality of life issues, equipment—these are big ticket items.

From that standpoint, would you not agree that the only way to solve the problem we're faced with is by fairly significant injections of funds into the defence budget? If we do that and if we do right by the members of the armed forces by dealing with those issues, it would seem to me at least that the whole issue of trying to codify a social charter becomes almost superfluous.

LGen David Kinsman: That's an interesting point of view. I'd prefer not to state my own preference or an organizational preference with respect to the influx of money. I think the assumption we have worked with up until the time your committee undertook its review—of course, there is always a difficult balance and this is part of the problem we have on a day-to-day and a month-to-month basis.

• 1730

Out of that budget that was referred to—let's say it's $9.5 billion or $10 billion—what portion of that will you spend on your people? What portion of that will you spend on equipment, either new equipment or the refurbishing of older equipment? What part will you spend on operations and maintenance to make sure the training you're doing and the operations you're carrying out meet the requirements of the defence white paper?

There's no doubt that some of the things we're talking about would cost more money, but in some cases, they wouldn't cost more money. I know that Mr. Richardson has a particular interest with regard to housing and accommodation. Some of the areas we're looking at would not necessarily cost us more money per se, but they would require a change to the way we are currently governed with respect to the latitude the Canadian Forces Housing Agency has with respect to the sale of property, revenue generation, and so on and so forth. So it might not necessarily involve or imply an infusion of money.

Mr. David Pratt: But at the same time—we've heard this time and time again—as far as morale issues go, it's tied to it.

I agree with the point about the housing. There are innovative ways to do these things, but ultimately, it would seem to me at least—I would hope you would agree—it's going to take more in the way of funds to provide our soldiers, airmen, and sailors what they need in terms of the equipment to do the job. We've seen equipment that's clearly substandard and that in some cases appears to have been bought for political purposes. But it was not bought by this government, mind you.

When it comes right down to it, in terms of the crunch and what we're dealing with here with respect to morale, there doesn't seem to be any way around it. It's going to take more money.

LGen David Kinsman: To redress certain issues.

Mr. David Pratt: Yes.

LGen David Kinsman: I would certainly agree with you on that. As for whether it's a question of an infusion of money or a realignment of moneys within the department because of this being a priority, I won't comment on that. Obviously, from where I sit, I end up being the individual on the white steed in a lot of cases in terms of bringing policies, whether they're compensation, benefits, allowances, or whatever it is, to the table.

I'm only half popular when I do that. On one hand, I brought something that appears to be worthwhile and I'll be seen as something positive by the men and women of the Canadian Forces. On the other hand, I have to, along with my colleagues, identify what the funding is for that.

Mr. David Pratt: You can talk about dealing with the morale and pay issues and all of that. In my own view, it's going to take a significant amount of money to live up to the commitments in the white paper. As a nation, this is going to require more money as well.

I'd like to set that aside for now.

Just going back again to the social contract issue, it seems to me that a social contract type of document, no matter how much you put into pay and housing and those other areas, could still become a bit of a lightning rod for discontent overall in the armed forces among people who would say that we still have problems in this area and we're not living up to the commitment in the social contract.

Right now, with a social contract that's not codified, that's ill-defined, for lack of a better phrase, there's at least a reasonable amount of “wiggle” room for people in your own situation, people who are senior officers. Once again, it comes back down to doing right by your people and not needing that sort of document.

I'd appreciate your comments on this. With respect to the academics who brought their views to bear on this issue, they seem, as in the CBC program, to be galloping off madly in all directions.

LGen David Kinsman: Yes, it's interesting. We didn't invite them to do that either.

The Chairman: Very quickly.

• 1735

LGen David Kinsman: Certainly. Clearly, with the members of your committee, with regard to the point that has just been brought up, the concept of a social contract and what form it takes and what it can do and whether it's enduring, and so on and so forth, is a bit of a nebulous concept to work with.

My purpose in talking to you today in presenting the ideas I did was fundamentally to make an appeal for the men and women of the Canadian Forces. This gets back to the question over on this side. I think there's a sense of, do Canadians really appreciate what we're doing? We've seen some indications of that, particularly in the last two or three years, with natural disasters. Do Canadians appreciate what we're doing offshore when we leave families and so on and so forth behind?

The point I was simply making was—you put your finger on it—that there are expectations out there now, so I think it becomes a very interesting dilemma as to whether or not you have something that's rather generic and gives you lots of wiggle room, or whether you actually have something that has something tangible on it as well, or whether it's a combination of both.

Mr. David Pratt: Mr. Chairman, could I have one last brief question?

The Chairman: You have 30 seconds.

Mr. David Pratt: The comment that has been made to me on a number of occasions has been that people don't go into peacekeeping operations, or in fact go to war, on the basis of social contracts; they go more than anything else to support the person beside them in their unit. When it comes right down to it, it's that camaraderie that's really the motivating factor. So how does the social contract fit into that?

LGen David Kinsman: I think you're quite right. At a unit level, I think there are a lot of people on a day-to-day basis who aren't debating social contract.

I think a social contract is a higher order of consideration and the type of thing that people like me are dealing with. So they know when I go to do negotiations with Treasury Board, or whatever it is, I'm speaking from a position of strength and not one of weakness.

Mr. David Pratt: Thank you.

The Chairman: General Kinsman, I want to thank you very much for your information this afternoon. It was quite an interesting session. I think Question Period this afternoon sort of spilled over into our committee room. Anyway, thank you very much.

The meeting is adjourned.