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STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE AND VETERANS AFFAIRS

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE ET DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Tuesday, June 8, 1999

• 1520

[English]

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien (London—Fanshawe, Lib.)): I would now like to call to order the joint meeting of the standing committees on foreign affairs and national defence.

I'd like to welcome again Mr. Wright, General Henault, and their staff as well.

We welcome you again and express our gratitude to you for the amount of time you've given to the members on these briefings. I'd invite you now to make some opening remarks.

Mr. Wright, are you going to begin?

Mr. Jim Wright (Director General for Central, East and South Europe, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Let me report first on the results of the G-8 foreign ministers' meeting that has concluded today in Cologne, Germany. G-8 foreign ministers have agreed on a draft UN Security Council resolution to facilitate an end to the crisis in Kosovo. This hopefully clears the way for a ceasefire and an end to the violence.

It offers the chance for lasting peace to take root and for refugees to return home in safety and in dignity. It commits to a political process for Kosovo's future that would give substantial autonomy and self-government to Kosovo within Yugoslavia. This is what the international community has been insisting on as the only way to bring an end to the crisis in this region.

The Security Council resolution is fully consistent with NATO's five conditions. It flows from the G-8 principles. It is based on and consolidates the Chernomyrdin-Ahtisaari agreement adopted in Belgrade by the Serbian Parliament and the Yugoslav government. In fact the Petersburg principles and the Chernomyrdin-Ahtisaari agreement have been attached as two annexes of the draft resolution.

[Translation]

The resolution authorizes the establishment and deployment of an international peacekeeping force and of a civilian mission. It also sets out the terms and conditions for implementing the peace plan.

[English]

Canada appreciates the collegial work of its G-8 partners. In particular Russia played an important role through its influence with the Yugoslav leadership.

[Translation]

Today, the draft resolution was sent off to New York. We urge our partners on the UN Security Council to examine this G-8 sponsored resolution and to adopt it without delay.

[English]

At the same time, the text of the resolution has been sent to Macedonia, where the military-to-military talks between NATO and Yugoslavia are taking place. The technical document they are discussing, which sets out in detail the modalities of the Serb forces' withdrawal from Kosovo, is being harmonized with the text of the Security Council resolution.

[Translation]

Today, the Security Council will be holding an emergency meeting to discuss the draft resolution.

[English]

In rapid succession, the following events should take place: the NATO-Yugoslav military document will be signed; a verified withdrawal of Serbian forces will begin; NATO will then suspend its air campaign; the G-8-sponsored Security Council resolution will then be adopted; and the deployment of an international peacekeeping force, with NATO at its core, and a civilian mission will then begin.

[Translation]

Clearly, this option became viable only after Yugoslav leaders recognized that the international community was determined to oppose President Milosevic's campaign of terror and deportation.

[English]

The key elements of the draft resolution include:

—the reaffirmation of Yugoslav territorial integrity;

[Translation]

—a reaffirmation of the commitment to substantial autonomy for Kosovo;

[English]

—an enforcement capacity, as the resolution is to be adopted by the Security Council, acting under chapter VII of the UN charter;

—a demand to Yugoslavia for an end to the violence and repression in Kosovo and the verifiable withdrawal of all Serb forces according to a rapid timetable;

—a decision to deploy, under UN auspices, the international peacekeeping force and the international civilian mission;

• 1525

—a request that the UN Secretary-General appoint a special representative to control the implementation of the civilian presence and to coordinate with the international peacekeeping force to ensure that both missions are mutually supportive and working toward the same goals;

[Translation]

—an authorization for member states and concerned international organizations to establish the international peacekeeping force in Kosovo, along with all of the powers needed to ensure that the objectives of the resolution are met;

[English]

—a decision that the international peacekeeping force is to include substantial NATO participation under unified command and control; and

—an authorization for the international peacekeeping force to use all necessary measures to fulfil its responsibilities.

The role of the international civilian mission will be to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy and self-government. Interim administration will provide Kosovo's transitional administration during the period in which Kosovo's provisional self-governing institutions are to be developed.

[Translation]

A key function of the international civilian mission will be to facilitate the political process, as set out in the Rambouillet accords, with respect to the future status of Kosovo.

[English]

The resolution also clearly calls upon the KLA and other armed Kosovar Albanian groups to immediately end all offensive actions and to comply with the requirements for demilitarization.

At Canada's insistence, the resolution also calls once again upon all concerned to cooperate fully with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in fulfilling its mandate to prosecute indicted war criminals. It also mandates the international security force to ensure the protection and freedom of movement of international organizations, which would include of course the tribunal.

Finally, the resolution calls upon the international community to contribute to reconstruction efforts. In this respect, this Thursday Foreign Minister Axworthy will participate in an international conference to establish a stability pact for southeastern Europe. This pact is intended to promote the integration of countries in the region into European and Euro-Atlantic structures. It will also help in the coordination of reconstruction efforts for the area.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my opening remarks.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, Mr. Wright.

General Henault, do you have any comments?

Lieutenant-General Raymond R. Henault (Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, Department of National Defence): Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon,

[Translation]

good afternoon.

[English]

As you're well aware, this past week has been mixed with both hope and disappointment. We're probably back on the hope curve again in trying to seek a resolution to the Kosovo crisis.

In the meantime, the air campaign has continued, and I think you've seen that there have been escalations and de-escalations in the air campaign as the diplomatic process has proceeded. That same movement downstream in harmony, if you like, is continuing with the air campaign. I'll describe our efforts in the next few minutes.

I also would like to outline our Canadian involvement in the overall NATO efforts to date and where we think we're going, and briefly describe the military technical agreement with which NATO is seeking Yugoslav concurrence. With the G-8 announcements recently, that should be much closer to the actual case.

In terms of the NATO military situation, today is day 76 of the air campaign. NATO aircraft continue to fly strike missions as well as close air support and combat air patrol missions. The strike missions are specifically against strategic and tactical targets, again with the emphasis on VJ, that is, Serb and special police forces deployed in Kosovo.

[Translation]

The Serbs remain active in Kosovo, as you will have noted from the media reports, particularly along the Albanian border where they have been attempting to cut off UCK supply routes.

[English]

Over 1,000 NATO aircraft still remain committed to the overall operation. While there was an apparent reduction in the number of air strikes over the last several days and particularly over the last few days, the number of strikes has again gone back up in anticipation of some intransigence, if you like, on the part of the Serbs. But it will now, in my view, start to reduce again in order not to jeopardize the ongoing peace efforts.

• 1530

In addition to the G-8 work Mr. Wright has already described, and of course the work that's now going to be undertaken by the UN Security Council in developing the resolution, you will have seen media reports over the past weekend as well covering the talks and meetings between Lieutenant-General Jackson—who is the commander of the Kosovo force and also the commander of the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps—and Yugoslav, Serb, and special police units and representatives.

The meetings have been somewhat unsuccessful at the start in gaining Yugoslav agreement to the technicalities of the withdrawal from Kosovo. Even though they have been somewhat up and down, as I mentioned previously, those talks have continued. Although they have broken off at the senior level, they have continued at the staff level, at the technical level, between the representatives of General Jackson, specifically his chief of staff, and Serb military authorities. As these talks have continued at that level, they have been designed primarily to work out some of the additional details of the military technical agreement.

An updated technical agreement was developed in concert with the G-8 document, and that updated agreement has now been forwarded to General Jackson as well as to the Serb authorities. We're hoping to see a resumption of talks at the very senior levels over the next very short while. We're not sure whether it will happen today or over the course of this evening and tomorrow morning, but we certainly are anticipating some rapid movement in that respect.

The purpose of the technical agreement is to lay out the details of the withdrawal from Kosovo of Serb and special police forces, to establish a durable cessation of hostilities, and to lead ultimately to a ceasefire. As already mentioned by Mr. Wright, the current version would have the Yugoslavs conduct a phased withdrawal of their forces from Kosovo to Serbia, with a predetermined timetable and using NATO-established exit routes. Those exit routes are very familiar to us, because they are the same routes that have been used for humanitarian convoys to date. They emanate primarily out of Pristina to the southeast, southwest, and south, and then there are several other routes that go up to the north from Pristina into Serbia. To my understanding, there are additional routes that go into Montenegro, but primarily routes into Serbia would be the exit routes for the Serbs.

The technical agreement will also lay out the responsibilities for marking and clearing minefields, marking booby traps and obstacles, and so on, and ultimately the responsibilities for mine-clearing.

[Translation]

The arrival of KFOR, or NATO forces, and of the international community in Kosovo will be synchronized, as much as possible, with the phased withdrawal of Yugoslav forces. This sequence of events was also the focus of rather intense talks between both parties.

[English]

The FRY forces are required to withdraw, including all FRY personnel and organizations with a military capability, to include regular army and naval forces, armed civilian groups, associated paramilitary groups, air forces, national guard, border police, army reserves, and so on.

Turning to Canada's ongoing contribution, at last count there were 2,253 Canadian Forces members deployed on missions in the Balkans region overall, including a little over 1,300 in Bosnia, primarily in support of Op Palladium—that is, our Canadian contingent in SFOR, the stabilization force.

Currently 314 are located in Italy in support of Op Echo, primarily F-18 operations in support of the air campaign.

We have 305 Canadian Forces men and women on board the HMCS Athabaskan as part of the Standing Naval Force Atlantic, the commander being Commodore David Morse. His flagship, the HMCS Athabaskan, and its crew are supporting his activities in the Adriatic.

And we have the daily increase in KFOR commitments in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. It currently stands at 262 personnel, with an additional 350 en route now by 747 to Greece to assist in the offloading of the vessel and so on.

As well, we have our ongoing commitment to the Albanian force. That primarily is staff officers in the headquarters in Albania.

• 1535

[Translation]

Our CF-18s stationed in Aviano continue to fly combined air patrol and air combat missions. The reduced intensity of NATO air strikes in the past week has meant a significant reduction in the number of missions flown by our aircraft. However, the number of missions flown today is up by approximately 16. We don't have the exact figures yet, but we do know that our aircraft continue to provide air support and will continue to do so until they are ordered to leave Italy.

[English]

In terms of Op Kinetic, the deployment of our 800-strong contingent to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as part of the international peace implementation force, which we're all very well aware of, remains pretty much on schedule. In fact it has been accelerated to ensure we are on the ground and capable of operating as soon as and if the peace implementation agreement is reached. We're all very hopeful that that agreement will be reached in the next very short while.

That contingent, as I mentioned earlier, will go primarily on the first flight into Greece. We're expecting that they will go into Thessaloniki. They will participate in the offloading of our ship, which should be docking later on today and should start to unload as early as tomorrow, again with the concurrence of Greek authorities and assuming they will give us that authority.

The road movement up to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will take place very quickly after that. We will then be doing all of the in-theatre harmonization of our own command and control capabilities with the U.K. Armoured Brigade. We will be testing and ensuring that our weapons on the Cougars, for example, are zeroed out and re-calibrated.

We will be doing a very small required reassembly for our helicopters that are going into theatre. I might add that the helicopters did not have to be dismantled in this case, because the roll-on, roll-off capability only required that we fold the blades, ensure that they were well protected, and then roll them onto the ship and roll them off. So those helicopters will be very quickly available.

As soon as possible, we're hoping by 13 June, the contingent commander in Macedonia, Colonel Ward, will be able to declare operational readiness of our contingent, and therefore we'll be very capable of operating in the first instance of the entry into Kosovo.

I will make one last point before handing it over to General Maisonneuve. The peace implementation force will have a number of tasks, but primarily their responsibilities will be to implement a ceasefire and the peace settlement in accordance with the UN Security Council resolution; to create the secure and stable environment we've talked of repeatedly for the Kosovar refugees to return to their homes, as well as the internally displaced persons within Kosovo; to establish the environment required for the NGOs to operate in the fashion they need to to ensure the safe return of all Kosovars; to provide humanitarian assistance, and we know there will be a certain number of tasks in that respect, which will also be part of our mandate as we go into theatre; and to assist in conducting the public security functions that will lead to the arrival of the international organizations we know will follow us into Kosovo ultimately.

That completes my presentation for today, Mr. Chairman. I would now offer you a brief update from General Maisonneuve, who will talk of his experiences with the KVM, the Kosovo verification mission, and also with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. We will then be open of course to all of your questions.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, General.

General Maisonneuve, welcome and thank you.

Brigadier-General J.O.M. Maisonneuve (Director, Land Force Readiness, Department of National Defence; Leader, Kosovo Verification Mission): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Translation]

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. It is a pleasure for me to share with you today my experiences while on assignment with the OSCE. I began my assignment in Vienna and was later assigned to Kosovo where I remained for three months, until our withdrawal on March 20 prior to the start of the air strikes. I subsequently had the opportunity to continue helping the Kosovars when I was deployed to Albania where I provided assistance to the refugees.

[English]

Let me get straight to the lessons I learned on this six-month tour.

First of all, Canada continues to make real and worthwhile contributions on the world stage through our participation in organizations such as the OSCE. All the Canadians, both military and civilian, who I saw operate were highly thought of and performed admirably under difficult circumstances. Our contributions are always much greater than our proportional representation.

• 1540

The OSCE, despite its small size, is able to very well organize and run missions such as the Kosovo verification mission. Again, this is a regional organization that can add value in strife-torn areas of Europe.

While in Kosovo, our mission provided much help in keeping the situation stable. In spite of the difficult situation on the ground, we saved many lives. We returned a semblance of normalcy to the daily existence of Kosovars of every ethnicity, and best of all, we provided hope for the ordinary people.

The obstacles we encountered were many: obfuscation by the Serb and Albanian communities, provocations by both sides, non-compliance with the terms of the agreement of 16 October 1998, and generally the creation of an atmosphere of terror by the Serb authorities. We reinstituted the ceasefire many times, but we also had to be witnesses to attacks and massacres, often on defenceless people.

For example, on 8 January the KLA ambushed a convoy of Serb police and killed three policemen. A week later, the massacre of 45 ethnic Albanians took place in Racak. Both events were in my area, and my people and I had to deal with these events.

We were frustrated to be pulled out of Kosovo on 20 March, just before the bombing, but we understood the decision. The situation on the ground had become untenable, and the parties were operating without any regard to the agreement. They were provoking each other, and it was becoming more and more difficult for us to operate. In this case, the risk-versus-benefit equation was firmly on the risk side.

[Translation]

I then took part in an OSCE mission assigned to help the Albanian government deal with the flood of refugees streaming over the border from Kosovo. Our small contingent performed some essential services. It traveled throughout the country, coordinating the humanitarian effort and interviewing refugees about cases of human rights violations perpetrated by Serb officials.

I don't have to tell you that some of the stories we heard were enough to make our hair stand on end. When I left Albania three weeks ago, this country, the poorest in Europe, was sheltering over 400,000 refugees. Albania has demonstrated amazing fortitude in the face of this catastrophe, especially when we compare it to its neighbouring country.

The international community, including Canada, is working very hard to help Albania weather the crisis. Long-term plans have already been drawn up to address all possible contingencies. Many issues must now be considered, including the process for allowing refugees to return to Kosovo and receive humanitarian aid on site, as well as appropriate security measures.

Hopefully, the agreement that will be reached will lead to a successful resolution of this crisis. However, the international peacekeeping force will undoubtedly face a difficult, and complex situation. They will have to use every available means to carry out their duties as safely as possible.

[English]

My experience in Kosovo and Albania was the most challenging and rewarding to date in my career. What I mostly will remember are the people: first, the Kosovars, and when I say Kosovars, I use the word in the large sense to describe the people of Kosovo of all ethnic backgrounds; secondly, my military and civilian verifiers of more than 20 nations, people who were dedicated to making a difference in the lives of the people of Kosovo; and finally, I'll also remember the people of Albania, who had the magnanimity to accept more than half of the 450,000 refugees amongst families.

I thank you for giving me this opportunity to speak to you today.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you very much, General, for sharing those firsthand reflections of what must have been a very difficult experience.

Are there other comments before we go to questions? Mr. Bassett, please.

[Translation]

Mr. Charles Bassett (Vice-President, Central and Eastern Europe Branch, Canadian International Development Agency): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The fact that G-8 ministers have given their support to the UN Security Council draft resolution bodes well for the resolution of the crisis, for a cease-fire and for an end to the violence. There is now a real possibility for lasting peace and a chance for the refugees to return home safely and with dignity.

• 1545

[English]

Our planning, however, continues to be based on two different scenarios. The first will embody repatriation, resettlement, and reconstruction, but secondly there's a general recognition that there will be a refugee presence in the neighbouring countries beyond the eventual signature of the peace accords, with some additional humanitarian support to returnees once they return home after that.

In this regard, Albania is a particular concern for us, because in the last month, the three international donor meetings for Albania, Macedonia, and Bosnia managed to raise $1 billion for Bosnia and $500 million for Macedonia, but failed to raise $50 million for Albania. As the general said, it's the poorest country in Europe and it's taken the largest number of refugees. We're very concerned about its ability to cope with the conditions.

The repatriation of the refugees and the return of the displaced will be an immense undertaking. It will require great international support and must be done in a highly organized fashion, with refugee safety and dignity utmost in mind.

The UN agencies are aware that spontaneous repatriation could well result in chaos. The UNHCR is chairing discussions tomorrow in Geneva to lay the groundwork for repatriation. Canada will be actively engaged in those deliberations. The UNHCR is stepping up its preparations for repatriation of Kosovar refugees, including dispatching a repatriation planning team to the region.

While planning for repatriation and reconstruction, we cannot assume the refugees will be able to return soon. Refugee returns and the return of the internally displaced will depend upon a conducive environment in Kosovo, including security and minimal living conditions. It is likely that safe corridors will have to be cleared through recently laid minefields as well as through unexploded ordnance before refugees can return. Ensuring safe returns will include mine action activities, such as awareness and clearance.

Most of the refugees and the internally displaced persons will return to burned out, demolished, or looted homes and to a shattered economy. Houses and entire villages will have to be rebuilt and interim shelter provided for the foreseeable future.

The reports out of Kosovo have also pointed to destroyed livestock. We know this year's agricultural season has already been lost, and therefore the need for food aid will continue until the fall of the year 2000 and maybe beyond that.

Winterization also remains a key objective. The UNHCR has issued a winterization strategy, and we anticipate a request for funds within days, to which we will respond in a positive fashion. The UNHCR strategy includes transferring winterization activities to Kosovo if repatriation begins in the near future.

In a very short time, Canada and the international community have effectively worked together and have accomplished much to ease the suffering of the victims of this latest Balkan conflict. Much more of course lies ahead of us, and we must respond quickly and assist the Kosovars in rebuilding their homes and lives and securing a lasting peace and stability for the region.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, Mr. Bassett.

Madame Corneau, you have nothing to add? Okay. Thank you very much.

Colleagues, the meeting is scheduled to go until 4 o'clock. We've had some more extensive and very important comments as an introduction, so we will have to extend the meeting beyond 4 o'clock. We're going to try to wrap up, however, at 4.30. A number of other colleagues have other commitments, as do some of the staff.

To facilitate that, I'm going to ask the members' cooperation in asking one or two succinct questions in their minute, and I'm going to ask the staff to try to similarly respond in that one minute. We can't have and won't have members going on with 15 questions requiring a 20-minute answer. We have a long list here, and we want to allow as many colleagues as possible to have their opportunity.

We'll start with Mr. Turp.

• 1550

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp (Beauharnois—Salaberry, BQ): First off, I'd like to thank once again all of the individuals who have taken part in these briefings from the outset. You will no doubt recall that we held our first briefing in this very room nearly 75 days ago when three ministers appeared before the committee while the House was in recess.

The news we are hearing today is good and we can only hope that the Security Council will adopt this much anticipated resolution.

I have three questions, Mr. Chairman, the first of which concerns the air strikes and China. Exactly when will the air strikes cease, according to the G-8 plan and the UN Security Council draft resolution? Are you still concerned that China might exercise its veto right? What steps have Mr. Ahtisaari and the others taken to ensure that this won't happen at the 11th hour?

My second question concerns the transitional administration. According to the text agreed to today by the G-8...

[English]

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Mr. Turp, you're already over a minute. Can we just get the first question answered and then come back to you for follow-up questions?

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: May I finish with my second question, Mr. Chairman, then I will wait for an answer?

The Joint Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Certainly.

Mr. Daniel Turp: With respect to the transitional administration, I note that the text of the resolution stipulates that the transitional administration will provide for substantial autonomy and self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords. This seems somewhat different from previous texts. Could you explain to me the role that the Rambouillet accords will play in the process of instituting a government in Kosovo?

[English]

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Mr. Wright, we have two questions. Can you answer the first one fairly briefly and try to deal with the second?

Mr. Jim Wright: It's two and a half questions, but I'll do my very best.

With respect to China, we are speaking with the Chinese leadership. I believe the Finnish President, Mr. Ahtisaari, is on his way to Beijing to brief the Chinese leadership on the peace plan that was brokered by the troika of Mr. Chernomyrdin, Mr. Ahtisaari, and Mr. Talbott, and also to brief the Chinese leadership on the UN Security Council resolution.

We remain confident that China will not block the Security Council resolution when the time comes. They have indicated that they want to see a bombing suspension before the voting in the Security Council takes place. The sequence I described earlier allows that to have happened, so we remain confident that China will support.

With respect to when the strikes will cease, NATO has been very clear in this respect. We are waiting for a verified, demonstrable commencement of withdrawal. NATO is not going to impede that withdrawal. That's exactly what the international community has been waiting for.

Our expectation is that the military-to-military agreement will be signed shortly. I can't be precise, because I can't speak on behalf of the Yugoslav authorities, but the expectation is that the G-8 agreement on the draft resolution will allow the military-to-military talks to proceed. Once that military-to-military agreement has been signed, the withdrawal will start. It will be verified quickly by NATO, and NATO will then agree to a bombing pause.

My expectation is that if withdrawal begins in the morning, suspension by NATO could happen and should happen on the same day. I can't be more precise in terms of the period of time. It is conceivable that you could see the start of the withdrawal, the suspension of NATO bombing, and the approval of the Security Council resolution all on the same day.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, Mr. Wright.

Mr. Turp, thank you.

Mr. Proud.

Mr. George Proud (Hillsborough, Lib.): My question was the same as Mr. Turp's second question, if you could just let Mr. Wright follow up on that one, vis-à-vis the administration.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): All right.

Mr. Wright, you have Mr. Proud's minute now.

Voices: Oh, oh!

Mr. Jim Wright: On Mr. Turp's third question—

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Mr. Turp is effective at getting in multiple questions.

Mr. George Proud: That's my first question, though.

• 1555

Mr. Jim Wright: The Security Council resolution says the main responsibility of the civilian presence will include promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, taking full account of annex 2 to the Security Council resolution—and annex 2 of the Security Council resolution is the Chernomyrdin-Ahtisaari peace plan—and of the Rambouillet accords.

The short answer to the members is that the international community will be drawing as many lessons as possible from the very good work that was done with the Rambouillet accords and applying as much as we can to the future political settlement in the case of Kosovo. But beyond that, I'm afraid I can't be precise, because there is not precision at this stage.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you very much.

Mr. Mills.

Mr. Bob Mills (Red Deer, Ref.): Thank you.

We're all concerned about the safety of our peacekeepers when they first go in, with the mines, the poisoned wells, and unhappy KLA. The idea of disarming the KLA seems to me a pretty difficult task, considering that their culture is a gun culture. They are given one when they're 13 years old. Disarming them might be something like disarming some of my constituents in western Canada. It will be as ineffective, I think. So that's one thing.

Also, Milosevic, Arkan, and people like that have been charged with war crimes, and I think it's going to be a little difficult, as our forces move in, not to want to bring about arrests and due justice there.

Finally, I know this is just a guess and people are speculating about this and asking the question. What are the plans for repatriating the refugees in Canada, the U.S., and places like that? Will they be given an option? I expect the people in the camps will leave fairly quickly, but for the people in Australia or wherever, that's just not quite so easy. I wonder what you think about that.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, Mr. Mills.

General, are you going to begin?

LGen Raymond Henault: Perhaps I could lead off.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Please do.

LGen Raymond Henault: The intent is to demilitarize the KLA, as opposed to disarming them, which constitutes the removal of all of their heavy weapons, personal weapons, and so on. A certain amount of flexibility will be applied to the demilitarization concept.

I'll let Mr. Wright handle the second question, but in terms of the refugees here in Canada, they will continue to be harboured by us at military installations for as long as required. We are already seeing some movement of refugees from certain sites here in the Ontario region in particular into Quebec. For example, as late as today, if I remember correctly, 85 or so Kosovar refugees from Kingston were moved into Quebec, into more permanent accommodation. There is the expectation that more will be moving.

But the understanding we have from CIC is that CIC will ultimately enable the return of the Kosovar refugees, those who wish to return to Kosovo, in a somewhat different flow from how they came into Canada. It will be done more deliberately, through a normal refugee movement through the normal airport and de-immigration processes. In the meantime, we remain happy to do whatever we can to help them.

I'll turn it over to Mr. Wright.

Mr. Jim Wright: Thank you very much.

I'd like to pick up on one of the general's points, demilitarization. I hope people do understand the difference between demilitarization and disarming. We are talking about the disbanding of the KLA. The political leadership of the KLA have committed to demilitarization. They have committed to allowing Serb forces to withdraw, not trying to impede that withdrawal. They have also committed to becoming part of the political process within Kosovo.

• 1600

Having said that, we also recognize, Mr. Mills, that there are a lot of small arms in Kosovo right now and that this is going to pose risks for peacekeepers. That's why the United Nations is proposing that the authorities for the international security force be such that they can properly defend themselves and defend the international community that will be on the ground in Kosovo, working to bring peace and stability to the area.

Secondly, with respect to war crimes, Mr. Milosevic, and Mr. Arkan, I would say the mandate for the international security and civilian presence in Yugoslavia relates exclusively to Kosovo—exclusively.

I would draw a parallel with how NATO operates in Bosnia with respect to indictees. When the stabilization force in Bosnia comes across indicted war criminals in the course of its regular responsibilities, and when an arrest can be effected that is not going to run the risk of creating security problems for the general public, NATO takes a leadership role in apprehending war criminals. A Bosnian Serb was apprehended the other day. In fact NATO has been enormously successful in the past year in apprehending indicted war criminals.

But we are talking about a limited mandate in Kosovo. So in order for NATO to be able to pick up a Milosevic or an Arkan, they need to be walking down the street in Pristina, and I have my doubts.

The final question was on refugees. The international community will have to take our lead from the UNHCR on this, and the UNHCR will take their lead from the international security force on the ground in Kosovo. That security force will have to determine when the situation has stabilized, when a lot of the ordnance and landmines that are in place right now have been taken care of, and when it's safe for refugees to start to return.

When the UNHCR gives that signal, I'm sure the first groups to go back will be from neighbouring countries, but as for the citizenship and immigration department—who are not here, but I have discussed this with them—the indication is they would be communicating with refugees in Canada to give them the option. As Madame Robillard has stated in the past, the Canadian government would facilitate their return to Kosovo if they wished to do so. This is on a voluntary basis, and it will be entirely up to the refugees to decide whether they want to return.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, Mr. Wright.

Mr. Hanger for one minute, please.

Mr. Art Hanger (Calgary Northeast, Ref.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Henault, did I hear you correctly? Is it Canada's intention to attach our military men and women to the United Kingdom Armoured Brigade? Was that your statement?

LGen Raymond Henault: Yes. We are deploying to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to become part of, in cooperation and consultation with NATO, the 4 U.K. Armoured Brigade.

I would only add two things to that. One is that we always deploy a Canadian commander with our troops, because we've retained command of our troops in any NATO operation, or any UN operation for that matter. In this case, the CDS is the commander of deployed troops, and he retains that command through the national contingent commander, who is Colonel Ward. I know you've seen him on television over the last little bit. Once the forces are operationally ready for employment, as we call it, and once Colonel Ward has declared them operationally ready, we will then transfer them under operational control of 4 U.K. Armoured Brigade, under the brigade commander.

Mr. Art Hanger: What will their terms of engagement be, and will they be part of an initial sweep into the Kosovo area, given and considering that there will probably be some renegade groups running about, as well as paramilitary groups in the area?

LGen Raymond Henault: The first entry of forces into Kosovo will be determined by the commander of the ARRC, General Jackson, who is currently the commander of KFOR as well. I don't have at the moment his operational plan, since that plan is evolving as time goes on, although I do know where the entry routes are and the basic sequence of events.

• 1605

Assuming that all works as we think it will and our forces are ready for employment as quickly as possible, it is conceivable that our recce squadron, which will arrive on the ground today, start the reception of their own vehicles, and move up to their training area, their integration area—which will only take a couple of days at an accelerated rate—would be amongst the first elements to go into Kosovo.

Mr. Art Hanger: And their terms of engagement?

LGen Raymond Henault: They will be the same rules of engagement as the NATO rules endorsed by us and with Canadian amplifications, and those have already been issued by the CDS.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Hanger.

Mr. Earle.

[Translation]

Mr. Gordon Earle (Halifax West, NDP): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have only two questions.

[English]

First, is it possible for us to have a copy of each of the presentations that were made today? I noticed you were reading from notes. It helps me, because my note-taking is not as good as it used to be when I was in university.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham (Toronto Centre—Rosedale, Lib.)): How did you do in university, Mr. Earle?

Voices: Oh, oh!

Mr. Gordon Earle: Quite well, thank you.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Can we borrow your notes?

Mr. Gordon Earle: They were good then, but my writing went downhill.

[Translation]

My second question is for Mr. Bassett.

[English]

You talked about repatriation, resettlement, and reconstruction. I'm wondering if any consideration is being given to doing environmental testing as people go back into that area—testing of waters and testing of the environment to determine whether or not there's any concern as a result of the fallout that may have taken place from the various bombs.

Mr. Charles Bassett: Yes, there will be. Part of the establishment of minimal living conditions relates to the security of the physical surroundings, which involves mine clearance and clearance of ordnance. It is also related to the adequacy of the water supply. Has it been contaminated? It's also related to the conditions of the buildings, personal buildings as well as public buildings, and what public buildings can be used. It also relates to whether small business can start up again. Can the local shops open again so that the community becomes viable? The plan will cover all of those elements, yes.

Mr. Gordon Earle: Thank you.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Earle.

Mrs. Finestone for one minute, please.

Hon. Sheila Finestone (Mount Royal, Lib.): Thank you very much.

First of all, Co-Chairmen, again, I really regret that you're not broadcasting this hearing. The general public should have been... I said this last time and the time before. Our briefers have been outstanding.

This is not part of my minute, but it is part of our planning. I'm glad we're not planning the armed forces over there.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Maybe I can help you understand what happened. We were destined not to meet in this room. We came here because the room in which we were to meet caught fire, for reasons we have yet to ascertain, whether it was enemy action—

Mrs. Sheila Finestone: Could be.

Voices: Oh, oh!

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): —or just some form of hazard around here.

Anyway, we were driven from our original place to here, so they didn't have time to set this up. That's the reason.

Mrs. Sheila Finestone: Well, thank you very much for that clarification, but maybe next round we could have public transparency with respect to the Canadian democratic system.

My first question is for Mr. Wright.

I was curious. You said the mandate for Mr. Milosevic relates to the Kosovo incident only, and he'd have to be walking down the streets of Pristina. Are you saying he can only be picked up on the ground of Kosovo? I'd like clarification on that matter.

My second question is for you, General Maisonneuve. I listened to you, and really my heart went out, thinking about the number of emotional incidents you and your men have witnessed. I wondered what type of psycho-social support you have for troops who have witnessed murder and ethnic cleansing of this nature. Are they prepared, both over there and when they come back here?

And last but not least, I have a question for you, General Henault. I'm a little bit tired of hearing on the air and reading in the newspapers that we're pitiful, we don't have an armed forces, we're all responsible for these horrible cutbacks we've made, etc., etc. What is the number of Canadian troops vis-à-vis the other troops of the other NATO countries, and how pitiful are we? Are we really? I feel proud of our people, and I'm beginning to wonder just why we have all this negative, anti-democratic language, in my view, or lack of strong language in support of our people.

• 1610

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Negativity sells, unfortunately, but I won't answer for the General.

LGen Raymond Henault: I'll answer the third question first.

You answered the question for me, Mrs. Finestone. We do have good leadership in the Canadian Forces. We've gone through a downsizing and a restructuring that's relatively significant, but we have now started to balance the requirements against the people and against the dollars required. We now have a number of plans in place to take us out through what we call strategy 20-20, which takes us out 20 years into the future. We have very good defence planning guidances coming out now. Quite frankly, I think the Canadian Forces are more than capable of doing what's expected of them by the Canadian government.

The proof of the pudding is in what we've been doing in Italy, in particular over the last six or seven weeks now, and what we've done in terms of maintaining our operational capability in 18 other theatres of operations while we've also maintained a very credible Canadian presence in Italy in support of Op Allied Force, and now ultimately a deployment in support of peacekeeping operations in Kosovo.

I thank you for that confidence, Mrs. Finestone. I do think we have a good Canadian force that is quite capable of operating where it needs to be done.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): We agree.

Mr. Jim Wright: Perhaps I can answer the question on the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the indicted war criminal, Mr. Milosevic. It's a good question. My response related to specifically the mandate of NATO. However, in terms of how Mr. Milosevic could be turned over to the court in The Hague, of course a number of other options are out there, preferred options.

The first one is that Mr. Milosevic turns himself in and lives up to his obligation.

[Editor's Note: Inaudible]

Mrs. Sheila Finestone:

Voices: Oh, oh!

Mr. Jim Wright: I'd just remind the committee, though, that he has an obligation, under international law, to turn himself in to the court. If he refuses to meet that responsibility, then his government is obliged to turn him over to the court in The Hague.

Thirdly, if he travels outside Yugoslavia to any other country in the world, we have an obligation to immediately turn him over to a court in The Hague.

My initial response related uniquely to a set of circumstances with respect to the international security presence on the ground in Kosovo, in the event that he or any other indicted war criminal being harboured in Yugoslavia—and that includes Mr. Arkan, Radovan Karadzic, Mr. Mladic, and a number of others...

The Yugoslav government has refused to live up to its obligations under international law, despite the fact that three UN resolutions have been passed. This draft resolution, which is under way right now, further calls upon Yugoslavia to comply. We hope they do so, but—

Mrs. Sheila Finestone: It doesn't have to be on the streets of Kosovo.

Mr. Jim Wright: It does not have to be on the streets of Kosovo.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, Mr. Wright.

General Maisonneuve.

BGen J.O.M. Maisonneuve: Thank you very much.

You're right. In fact this was a very major concern of mine. My men and women in Kosovo, and then after that in Albania, who were in contact with the refugees, saw many horrible things. We saw murders, bodies found on the side of the road—every morning we would find bodies—non-attributable murders, massacres, and oppressed people who had to look down instead of looking at the authorities. Just to go get an ID card, they couldn't look up; they had to be submissive.

There was the pressure of our daily lives in Kosovo, as well as all the other killings we saw, people being beaten up by the police, and children living in squalor. Those were the things in Kosovo. After that, in Albania, we saw these thousands of refugees coming in, again in squalid conditions. It was a terrible, terrible sight.

On the ground during the mission, we had recourse to a clinical psychologist there. That was in fact organized by the OSCE on our behalf, after we asked for it. They were available; they came and did speak to us.

• 1615

In essence I made myself and my people, of the 22 nations that worked for me, avail ourselves of our Canadian Forces help. We've produced a video, an excellent one, which explains to the people the dangers of post-traumatic stress disorder. In this case, knowledge is the first defence—knowledge that you will be subject to this. You may have nightmares, sometimes recurring.

[Editor's Note: Inaudible]

Mrs. Sheila Finestone:

BGen J.O.M. Maisonneuve: Exactly. This video is very explicit in explaining that this happens to anybody, and some of our generals have had the problem since then, as we know.

As well, on return, help is available within the Canadian Forces, and for the civilians deployed with the mission, I believe Foreign Affairs and CIDA have also made help available.

Both dealing with it on the ground and discussing it with your co-workers were important, and every time there was an incident, we made sure this happened.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you.

Thank you, Mrs. Finestone.

I can assure the members that we're trying to be very equitable with the time. It would be quite helpful, frankly, if the members would ask one or two questions, Mr. Turp, and not four or five, which inevitably leaves the staff to try to do their job and necessitates long answers.

Anyway, Mr. Price is going to set the proper tone with some succinct questions in a minute.

Mr. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, PC): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In the main points of the G-8 resolution it says demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army and other ethnic Albanian rebels is the task of the international force. It says that comes under chapter VII, which is really peacemaking, not peacekeeping.

Yesterday General Henry Shelton, the chair of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, said this meant the KLA soldiers would be taken out of uniform, their fighting units disabled, and their heavy weapons handed over. But he also said, “We never said that we were going to disarm the KLA.” This was backed up by the Deputy Secretary of Defense of the States.

It seems since Rambouillet we've talked only of total disarming, and now all of a sudden, in the last two days, we've done a complete turnaround. We're going to put our peacekeepers and peacemakers into a really dangerous position. It's even worse having the KLA out of uniform and armed, because we're not going to know who the enemy is. We're going to be caught between protecting Serbs on one side, who the KLA are probably going to be after... Sure, they say they're not going after them; they've promised that.

I'd like to have General Maisonneuve's feelings, since he was on the ground, so he can probably give us a better idea of the dangers there.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): General Maisonneuve, please.

BGen J.O.M. Maisonneuve: Thank you. I'll make it quick.

From my knowledge of the KLA, some will disarm and some will not. Some of the ones I spoke to personally routinely said, “If there's an agreement, I'm going fishing.” Others were out of control. There's no doubt you will have some of both those elements, and we will not know who they are until we actually get on the ground.

What that means is we must be protected. We must have the forces necessary to do what we need to do. We must have the right training. I have no doubt in my mind that the Canadian Forces will be capable of handling anything that comes up. It will be, though, a non-permissive environment initially. There will be some dangers. But some will definitely disarm.

The KLA now wants to be seen as behaving properly and belonging. As Jim said, they want to take part in the political process. If they're out of control... We always made them atone for their mistakes. Whenever they made a mistake, they used to say it was an out-of-control element. Well, you have to make them understand that if they have these out-of-control elements, they won't be able to take part and be considered capable of running a country, or an autonomous province.

There will be some of both. There's no doubt.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you very much.

Mr. Jim Wright: Could I just add one point? On the question of the terminology “demilitarization”, it's not simply a question of the last few days. The international community has been talking about demilitarization for a number of months now as the terminology that pertains to the KLA.

You're right that initially the international community was talking about disarming. The terminology now is “demilitarization”.

The general's point is dead right. The fact of the matter is, these people want to be part of the political solution. If they behave in a way inconsistent with the peace plan, the UN Security Council resolution, they write themselves out of a serious role to play in the political future of Kosovo.

• 1620

[Editor's Note: Inaudible]

Mr. David Price:

Mr. Jim Wright: Yes.

Mr. David Price: You yourself made it very clearly many times.

A voice: A couple of days ago.

Mr. Jim Wright: I believe the terminology I have been referring to since the G-8 principles were established on May 6 has been “demilitarization”, so it was not a couple of days ago.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you very much.

Mr. Graham.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Thank you. I have two quick questions.

Mr. Wright, is removal of the landmines a part of the settlement, and therefore will the Serbian authorities that planted the landmines be responsible for removing them?

Mr. Jim Wright: Yes.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): It is? I just want to make sure it's in the agreement and they will agree to it.

Mr. Jim Wright: I haven't seen the latest text of the military-to-military agreement, and the general may have more information on this, but the Chernomyrdin-Ahtisaari plan makes it very clear in fact that some of the few Serbian authorities allowed back in are those that will deal with the problem of landmines. They laid them; they know where they're located; they have a responsibility to take them out. That's the process we followed in Bosnia. That's the process we'll follow in Kosovo.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): But our experience in Bosnia was that in spite of all that good theory, there were a lot of them around, sitting on tops of doors in houses and all over the place. They were just dropped in by anybody, particularly those little ones.

Mr. Jim Wright: We hope. We don't know what we're dealing with on the ground until we actually get there, but we hope we're dealing with a professional armed forces that has kept proper records and will share those records with NATO. In the case of Bosnia, you're absolutely right; it was chaos.

LGen Raymond Henault: We already have a preliminary indication of where mines might be, but we don't have the precise locations yet.

Mr. Wright is absolutely right; a force, when it lays mines, will always record that. We don't know whether they've been marked or not. We suspect they may not all have been marked, but we do expect that they've been recorded, which will allow us to at least do the proper marking, go around the minefields, and establish a process for de-mining.

As for the de-mining, I would again support what Mr. Wright has said. De-mining is the responsibility of the miners, so the Serbs will be responsible for actual de-mining. We will assist in training if necessary and establishing the processes for de-mining, but it clearly lies with the Serbs to do the de-mining ultimately.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): And my question for Mr. Bassett is, why is Albania only receiving $50 million as opposed to Macedonia and the others? I would suspect it has something to do with fears that the money may not go to where it's supposed to go.

Mr. Charles Bassett: I think that fear is shared by Macedonia, Albania, and a number of other countries, Mr. Graham. That's a question I ended up asking myself at the end of the meeting. I think it's partly because Albania over recent years has not exactly been the west's favourite country.

But for the last 18 months, they have done absolutely everything required of them by the IMF, the EBRD, and the World Bank. They have met every target that has been laid down. In fact in coping with the refugee situation, they have still stayed within the terms of their own economic reconstruction program. So it was very difficult to figure out why there was not any support.

My conclusion is that most donors had already made their allocations to countries they were more familiar with and countries that had a track record of being recipients with them. When you're looking for more money in a tough situation, it's difficult to find additional funds for a new recipient.

It's a combination of all of those factors, but it still remains a very worrying situation for a country as poor as Albania.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, Mr. Graham.

Monsieur Bachand.

[Translation]

Mr. André Bachand (Richmond—Arthabaska, PC): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I wouldn't dare to ever question Mr. Wright, but I believe the date for the disarmament of the UCK is June 4.

• 1625

Mr. Wright indicated that if an agreement was reached on the withdrawal of Serb troops, then the bombings would stop, the Security Council would rapidly adopt a resolution, something that we would greatly appreciate, and the international force would move quickly into Kosovo.

Where exactly will most of our Canadian forces be positioned in Kosovo as part of the 4 U.K. Armoured Brigade? Some have speculated that we could find ourselves in an area heavily populated by Serbs, and where the risk of skirmishes could be higher. We need to know in order to prepare for this eventuality.

[English]

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): I'm sorry, but just before you begin, I must say we really do have a very strict 4.30 deadline, so I want to indicate that we will have to finish.

I'm sorry; I didn't want to pre-empt your answer.

LGen Raymond Henault: Not all, Mr. Chairman.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): We're ending at 4.30.

[Translation]

LGen Raymond Henault: Indications are that the U.K. Armoured Brigade and our forces will be deployed in a rectangular area, the centre of which is Pristina. While this is a fairly active zone, we must remember that any operation of this nature poses some risks. We feel that these risks are on par with those to which we are normally exposed under these kinds of circumstances. Our forces are well-equipped to deal with the situation. Your assessment of the ethnic makeup of this region is, admittedly, correct.

Mr. Jim Wright: I would just like to say that in Kosovo, the Serbs enjoy exactly the same rights as the Kosovars.

[English]

One of the priorities for the international civilian mission will be to ensure minority rights in Kosovo. It is an area of concern, and we will all have to work very hard to ensure that Kosovo remains multiethnic, as it was before.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you.

Thank you, Monsieur Bachand.

Last, we'll go very briefly to Mr. Turp, with a very brief answer, please.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Jim, the Rambouillet accord said the parties agree that NATO will establish and deploy KFOR—NATO. Will that be the case, or will it be the UN in this case?

Mr. Jim Wright: The security presence will be under the auspices of the United Nations and under the authority of NATO. It's an international security force.

The language in the peace plan that is annexed to this draft Security Council resolution talks about an international security presence with substantial NATO participation, to be deployed under unified command and control. In essence what this means is it will be an international security presence with NATO at its core, with command and control being administered by NATO, and NATO inviting other countries, as is the case in Bosnia, to participate.

In Bosnia, 40 countries participate, including Russia. NATO and the international community are encouraging others to contribute to this process. We'll see who else does contribute.

So it will be under the auspices, under the authorization, of the United Nations, but the organization will be NATO at its core. The model you see in place in Bosnia will be replicated in Kosovo.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you.

We'll have a final quick question from Mr. Hanger.

Mr. Art Hanger: General, whose extraction forces would be utilized should our troops get into trouble? And what will be the timeline to settle down those who may remain armed and refuse to leave the area, to clear the mines, and to provide the housing and food the refugees would need? What is the timeline? It seems it will be a long time before we actually get them right back into that region.

• 1630

LGen Raymond Henault: I don't have the extraction plans available to me yet, Mr. Hanger, so I'll have to wait until we see what the actual extraction modalities are. This force will be a very robust force, so extraction should not be a main concern at the initial stages of the operation. But ultimately one will be developed, I have no doubt, and certainly we can make that available when we see it.

In terms of refugee returns, we do anticipate that we'll be having to support refugees through to the winter months and beyond, because it will take time to get them back into the province, to establish the basic services required, and to start the rebuilding process. So yes, we're looking at the long term, and we fully expect from a NATO perspective that the peace implementation process will include support to refugees as long as it's required to get them back into their homes.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you.

Mr. Jim Wright: Could I add something, Mr. Chairman? We didn't get a chance to touch on this, but I'll leave the documentation with the clerk afterwards. Madame Marleau, the Minister for International Cooperation, and Minister Axworthy announced yesterday that Canada is going to be supporting a mission, led by the United Nations Mine Action Services, to assess impact of landmines on Kosovo. The details will be available with the clerk.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you.

I want to thank you, Mr. Wright, General Henault, General Maisonneuve, Mr. Bassett, and Madame Corneau, for your twice-weekly briefings and daily briefings at DND. We all see them. Frankly, I feel there's been quite a bit of access for members to ask our questions. I appreciate the extra effort our staff has made to come here twice a week.

I would indicate, on behalf of myself and my co-chair, Mr. Graham, that this will be the last briefing until the fall or until a special joint meeting that the chairs would call as major new developments might occur, or perhaps even partway through the summer as just an update, but that will unfold as it will. I want to thank all for participating.

I now turn the floor over to Mr. Graham for a moment.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Thank you very much.

Again, on behalf of the members of the foreign affairs committee, I'd like to very much thank Mr. Wright; General Henault; General Maisonneuve, who we used to have to listen to on radio instead of in person, so we're grateful to see him here and realize he's a real face; Mr. Bassett; and Madame Corneau for their very helpful briefings to all of us during the course of this year.

As the House rises, we hope the good news you're telling us about today, Mr. Wright, will actually come to pass. Our prayers are for the results of that.

Personally, I have a particular interest in this. As some of you may know, I have a son presently in Belgrade writing for the National Post, so the sooner the bombs stop dropping, the happier I'll be as an individual as well as a Canadian.

I'd like to finish with a bit of business on behalf of the foreign affairs committee, if I can keep our colleagues here for one second. By way of introduction, we just completed last night a study of the World Trade Organization. Mrs. Finestone has attended these meetings and came in, as I would have said, in first-year law school. She is leaving in third-year law school. So I am presenting her, on behalf of myself, a copy of my case book, Canadian Law and Practice of International Trade, authored by me and some others; and on behalf of Professor Turp, a copy of his book, which you may note is bigger, but it's only because the French language takes longer to say it.

Voices: Oh, oh!

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Mrs. Finestone, these are for you. We wish you well in your new career as an international lawyer.

Voices: Hear, hear!

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien): The meeting is adjourned.