NDVA Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE AND VETERANS AFFAIRS

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE ET DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Thursday, May 27, 1999

• 0900

[English]

The Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien (London—Fanshawe, Lib.)): We'll call to order the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs for our 9 a.m. meeting with Project Ploughshares. Mr. Ernie Regehr, director of Project Ploughshares, is with us this morning. Welcome to you, Mr. Regehr.

This is a continuation of our study on procurement, so we're not looking at whether or not the government should procure weapons, but we're looking at how to more effectively procure the military equipment our forces need and to more effectively and efficiently—the two words I think we would use—procure such equipment. So we're pleased to have your thoughts in that regard this morning.

I welcome you to make your opening remarks, and then we'll have some questions. I'm sure we'll have other members joining us. We've tried assiduously to get members on time here, but this seems to be a very difficult thing to do. I have to go back to some of my schoolteacher strategies for those who don't get here on time.

Anyway, I welcome you to start your comments.

Mr. Ernie Regehr (Director, Project Ploughshares): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It's a pleasure to be here and I appreciate the committee's kindness in listening to what we have to say.

I want to focus on procurement issues, as you've suggested, and I want to address five basic policy issues that we think have important implications for the procurement process and for military procurement. The first is an issue that I'll take just a bit more time on, and that has been raised, I know, by other witnesses in your process. That's the more fundamental issue of the defence policy and the roles the procured equipment are intended to support. And then the other four policies I'll go through a little bit more quickly.

You have received a copy of our brief and so I won't go through that whole document but make some comments in relation to it. In that brief, we've referred to what might be regarded as an emerging norm of humanitarian duties beyond borders. That emerging international norm is based on the basic principles of human security. Human security, in turn, refers to the obligations of states and the international community to seek the safety and well-being of persons, wherever they are, whether they're within the boundaries of your own state or elsewhere, the point being that sovereignty no longer is, or ought not to be, regarded as a legitimate barrier to access the vulnerable people in peril. In other words, there's a duty to protect vulnerable civilians, especially when they are abused by their own government, which should be protecting them.

We point out that this means primarily non-military intervention. The primary duty of states is to provide the resources and assistance to troubled societies in order to help them build the social, political, and economic conditions that are conducive to a stable peace—what is usually called preventive peace-building, I suppose. I'll later make the point that peace-building must become a much higher priority, with greater resources devoted to it.

But, of course, there are also military roles relevant to carrying out human security obligations beyond national borders. The military role is to protect the vulnerable and to enforce international adherence to international standards of human rights and humanitarian protection.

When states fail to provide for the protection of their citizens, either through a lack of capacity or by deliberate policy, they are in effect in need of external aid to the civil authority. Military intervention, or aid of that kind to the civil authorities in troubled states, raises two very fundamental questions, as you know. The first question is the one of who decides when you intervene, when to cross the boundaries of sovereign states. The second, and the one that I think is more relevant to this committee, is what are the appropriate and effective means of carrying out those roles?

• 0905

I don't think we're here to discuss that former question of who decides, but really the latter is the relevant one to the defence procurement question. The current tragic events in Yugoslavia and those earlier in Rwanda, Somalia, Iraq—these all illustrate that the international community has much work to do to develop effective approaches to military support to human security objectives.

Because there is much work to do in the international community, there is also much work to do in Canada to bring clarity to the Canadian defence policy priorities. This question of the appropriate approach connects directly to an unresolved question regarding Canadian defence policy. The white paper of 1994 called for multi-purpose combat-capable forces for air, land, and sea operations. Yet there is not now, nor will there be in the foreseeable future, the resources available to actually mount such effective forces.

Others have argued, and we would include ourselves in that part of the spectrum, that Canada should instead specialize in forces focused on peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention, with capacity to operate in low-intensity combat environments. The 1994 white paper sought to resolve this basic question, but in fact it did not resolve it. Hence we believe there is an urgent need, prior to any further major equipment acquisitions by the Department of National Defence, to review Canada's overall defence policy and posture.

Therefore, we recommend that special attention should be given to examining potential Canadian defence policies in the context of the human securities doctrine articulated by the Department of Foreign Affairs. We believe fundamentally there is a disjuncture between the 1994 white paper and the policies the Department of National Defence is still inclined to pursue, and the new doctrines of human security and peace-building that are coming out of the Department of Foreign Affairs.

The second policy issue relates to the level of resources. How much is enough, is the question. Of course, that's a political question to which there is no objective answer. There's isn't any right answer or wrong answer. It depends on a mix of factors—the level of political will available to provide the resources, the competing demands within any society for resources and other needs, and assessment of the assumed threats and needs internationally and of the roles appropriate to the Canadian Forces there.

Historically, Canada has answered that question of how much is enough with some restraint, assuming always that Canada has an international role to play, but recognizing that Canada is not a major military player on the world stage and that Canada can in fact make important contributions to international peace and security by other means, including peacekeeping.

The current levels of military spending—as we've tried to point out and argue in the brief and with the graphs, the figures provided—are in fact consistent with that historic approach. That's one of the reasons there's an important need for a defence policy review, to identify credible roles within the existing resources available.

We want to draw your attention to the need for adequate levels of non-military security spending. Canada has traditionally understood that development is essential to peace and stability. Peace-building frameworks only strengthen that commitment, but ironically, precisely at the time when peace-building and human security concerns have been most forcefully articulated as key to advancing international peace and security, funding for development and for those approaches has been in precipitous decline.

• 0910

In the 1990s, development spending has been cut by fully one-third. It's down now to roughly 0.3% of GNP despite a formal commitment to a target of 0.7% of GNP.

Much has been made of the soft-power reliance on hard-power military capability, but in fact Canadian influence in zones of conflict is much more directly related to the levels of our development in economic commitments to those regions than to our military combat capabilities. Hence, we recommend that there be much greater emphasis on funding non-military contributions to the pursuit of human security. Canada needs to develop a formal plan by which it's going to meet its formal commitment of reaching 0.7% of GNP for ODA and for peace-building activities.

The third policy area I want to draw your attention to briefly is related to Canada-U.S. defence trade. As you know and have already heard testimony on in this committee, the Canadian military industry is heavily integrated with that of the U.S. industry. Canadian firms, frequently under foreign ownership, build components for U.S.-designed and -built systems. There are many examples of world product mandates that Canadian firms acquire through offsets, and so the Canadian industry is heavily dependent upon access to the American market. That access to that market has always been viewed as being in the interests of the United States and its defence policy as well.

But that's a situation that appears to be changing. The United States is no longer as committed to military industrial integration with Canada as it once was. That's reflected in the changes in the international traffic in arms regulations that your committee has already addressed, and it appears that Canada really is going to be treated like all the other allies of the United States when it comes to military trade.

We argue that this really represents an opportunity for Canada to bring its relationship to the United States up to international standards, and we recommend that Canada should require export permits for military sales to the United States in the same way as it requires export permits for military sales to all its other allies and to all countries anywhere in the world.

The Chairman: I'm sorry to interrupt you. I think it's probably important to state right now for the record, though, that the Canadian government and defence industry doesn't necessarily accept the latest moves in the U.S. to eliminate our favoured status, if you will, in the defence equipment industry. So I wouldn't want it to be not said that there are actions being taken to try to challenge that right now, just to balance that.

Mr. Ernie Regehr: I thank you for that. I realize that and I realize there isn't universal glee in Canada over those moves, although we are suggesting that Canada ought to look on those moves more favourably than it is at the moment.

There are two important reasons for that. One is that the export permit requirement is not an act of hostility, it's an act of responsibility and an act of transparency. The Canadian disclosure of military exports is hampered by the absence of an export permit system with the United States. The way in which the Canadian government maintains records is through the obligation of companies who export commodities to report those exports based upon the permits that authorize them to make the exports. Without those permits required for exports to the United States, there is no instrument by which to report exports to the United States, and the Canadian annual report on military exports now in fact does not include military trade with the United States because it does not have an effective and formal capacity to monitor that trade. It also relates to issues of end-use requirements.

• 0915

The next point—and I just have a couple more; I'll make the points briefly—relates to the export dependence more generally of the Canadian military industry. That industry has always been highly export dependent. In the procurement process, military manufacturing capacity has been acquired in Canada by a deliberate policy of successive federal governments, and that military capacity has been acquired on the basis of what is perceived to be the export potential for the goods that are first acquired and needed by the Canadian Armed Forces. Then we develop the capacity to build those commodities here, and then the long-term viability of those industries depends upon exporting them internationally. The light-armoured vehicles in London are a very good example of that, where export sales of considerable magnitude have been made to the United States and Saudi Arabia.

The ADATS system was another system that was developed in Canada explicitly acknowledging that the viability of the venture depended upon access to a huge international market, an access that never in fact developed. There are other subsystems and components in a similar capacity. Pratt & Whitney aircraft engines are, for example.

It has never been easy to sell in the international military market and it's not getting any easier. The market in fact is changing considerably. As we have shown in the brief and the figures that we have shown, Canadian military sales to the United States are dramatically down. They are one-quarter of what they were in the mid-1980s. Sales to Europe are down almost as dramatically from the $400 million level now to the $150 million level. Third world military sales from Canada have always fluctuated. They've been high the last little while, but primarily because of the major LAV sale to Saudi Arabia. In particular, I think the dependence on sales to the third world is growing, and that has grave implications for export control provisions relating to human rights standards and to sales to countries engaged in conflict.

So we therefore have recommended that the Canadian procurement policy avoid using procurement to acquire military manufacturing capacity in Canada that will be dependent upon military exports; and that at the same time Canada should in fact be strengthening its military export control system, with greater emphasis on restrictions on human rights violator countries, countries engaged in internal armed conflict; and that we ought to look seriously at the international codes of conduct that are being developed. The European Union and Canada have expressed support for that and the Nobel laureates have advanced a much more stringent code of conduct that is being promoted.

Finally, the last point is a caution about dual-use equipment. There is a trend, which this committee has also heard testimony on, towards military forces increasingly acquiring commercial off-the-shelf military equipment. It's a lot cheaper. It's reliable in non-combat roles. But one of the implications of that, or one of the relevant factors there, is that such commercial commitment is not controlled for export even when destined for military end-users. Canadian commercial helicopters have been sold to military end-users, to military forces in Colombia, for example. Canadian-built Pratt & Whitney engines, which are commercial engines, have gone into very many military transport and training aircraft. None of those exports, even though they go to military end-users, currently require export permits under the military export control regime.

• 0920

So the final recommendation is that the military export control guidelines need to be amended so that the export controls relate to the end-user rather than to the characteristics or designation of a product being either military or non-military. In other words, if it's a commercial helicopter that is going to an armed force, it ought to be subject to the same export control regulations that other commodities going to those armed forces require.

I thank you very much for your attention.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Regehr, very much for your presentation.

We'll start a round of questions now, a seven-minute round starting with Mr. Goldring of the Reform Party.

Mr. Peter Goldring (Edmonton East, Ref.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and thank you, Mr. Regehr, for your presentation.

You're indicating in your talk that you're seeking to have military export levels lowered, yet I'm looking at these charts that are in front of me, and these charts would indicate that Canada's military exports have been dropping and they have been dropping for some years now. I think it's understood, due to the problems we've had in recent international conflicts, that it's been difficult for Canada to field military troops. For example, the frigates attending the Gulf War had to stop for armament on their way to it. When we're sending troops to the present conflict, too, there's some discussion of how rapidly we can deploy. Sending 800 troops to that situation seems to be an effort on its own, and there's some concern that if this were to be increased to 2,000 troops or 3,000 troops there would be more problems.

My point is that Canada has been demilitarizing since the Second World War. In the Second World War its contribution was an incredible percentage, and in fact Canada's contribution probably kept England alive until the tide of the war turned in 1943 with the Battle of the Atlantic. Do you not feel that we should be contributing in the world as a full partner in conflicts, and that in order to do so we have to have proper equipment?

Mr. Ernie Regehr: Certainly we feel strongly that Canada has an international obligation beyond its borders to contribute to international peace and security. In most of the conflicts that occur now, the fundamental roots and sources of the conflicts are social and economic conditions that are not sustainable, and those need to be addressed on an urgent priority. We also acknowledged in the brief that there are military roles that can help in the pursuit of this human security, but that there is not clarity within Canadian policy or within international policy about how those roles are most effectively carried out.

Mr. Peter Goldring: But how can we predetermine roles for Canadian military? If we go back to the Second World War, how would they pre-declare a role for the Canadian involvement in that to being a navy of 100,000 people and a merchant navy of 20,000 people? How do you predetermine that role? And then we take the role in the Gulf War. History has shown that it's very difficult to predetermine a selective role for Canada. And we can go back to the First World War, to the fantastic battle that the Canadian troops won at Vimy Ridge. Each one of these roles is decidedly different, and yet each one was come upon with little chance to decide. How do you predetermine a role for Canada's military?

Mr. Ernie Regehr: In fact, we have been predetermining those roles all along. By the equipment you acquire, you decide that you're going to have the capacity to participate in some conflicts in particular ways. For example, by the absence, as your committee has heard, of updated tanks and the capacity to airlift those to zones of conflict, there is a predetermination that this is not the way in which Canada is going to participate.

I'd point out one other thing, which is that I wouldn't see strong parallels between the World War Two roles and the roles that Canada is likely to play in current conflicts that exist overseas, whether they're in Rwanda or Somalia. The parallels are not strong.

• 0925

Mr. Peter Goldring: Additionally, you had mentioned guaranteeing human security. We have a responsibility to guarantee domestic human security as well. It will involve an unknown combination of materials and equipment to be able to guarantee security in this nation too. So wouldn't it follow that you can't say Canadians should be prototypical peacekeepers, that the Canadian military must have a capability to have strike force and international capabilities? It has been proven historically in some countries that this same heavy-duty strike equipment may be used internally to defend the security. Should we not also have that?

Mr. Ernie Regehr: I think the reality is that Canada is going to have a limited military capability.

Mr. Peter Goldring: Historically it has not had a limited military. If we go through to the War of 1812, or the Plains of Abraham, or go through to the First World War and the Korean War, Canada has historically been front-line military; so it's had not limited capabilities but front-line military capabilities. I think historically too, internationally, sometimes that front-line equipment is used at home.

Mr. Ernie Regehr: I think the fundamental decision that is facing Canada is do we develop a full combat capability in all of the armed forces that has a minimal capacity, or do we specialize and have a more robust capacity in a particular kind of activity? I think that's the fundamental debate.

I think that if you look at the current context of international conflict, which is all but really one war, really two wars now—Eritrea and Ethiopia and clashes between Pakistan and India—they are all internal wars in which Canada and the international community is not going to get involved in major combat equipment. Where the need is, and where Canadian activity overseas has responded to that need, has been fundamentally in the area of peacekeeping and monitoring. The decision we face is do we focus on this activity, which is more likely to be called upon, and do that well and effectively, or do we focus on creating a more minimal capability of high-intensity combat in all of the three services, which is less likely to be contacted on.

The Chairman: Mr. Goldring, we'll try to come back to you.

Without editorializing from the chair, it's well known that Canada's contribution in the two wars was disproportionally high considering our population. So I think your point is well taken, that history is history and our contribution in the two wars was enormous for the size of the countries, but I think after the war we were into a different era. I think Mr. Regehr is speaking to after the war, and that's a different reality.

[Translation]

Mr. Lebel, you have seven minutes.

Mr. Ghislain Lebel (Chambly, PQ): I have no questions for the time being.

The Chairman: Fine.

[English]

Then over to Mr. Richardson for seven minutes on this side, and then Mr. Bertrand.

Mr. John Richardson (Perth—Middlesex, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I welcome you, Mr. Regehr, for your presentation.

To try to put us into the time constant at present and look a bit to the future, we're driven by two things. We're driven by our alliance partners in NATO and we're driven by our membership in the United Nations. One is a full-fledged political organization, and the other is a universal organization of the major countries and smaller countries of the world to come in common cause to maintain peace.

What you've seen in Canada over the past time has been driven by two things. We're in the Kosovo conflict in the Balkans because of our membership in the military alliance of NATO. We cannot negate our membership. We cannot negate our commitment. When we participate, we participate the best we can. We're involved in the air, on the land, and on the sea. That commitment has been fulfilled. It stretched us to our limits to do it, because it recognizes that we have downsized considerably since the pause for peace in Europe, and the former enemies are now our partners.

• 0930

The situation extends further. When you do belong to two major organizations, the dues are not just annual dues. They are there to try to maintain to the best of our ability a defence budget and a defence capability to meet the commitments. We cannot say we're going to send out lightly armed infantry soldiers without tanks, armoured personnel carriers, attack helicopters, etc., if that is the mix for that kind of warfare. So when you come and ask us to pick at the smorgasbord where the fare is the lightest, you're asking us not to fully participate. I don't think that's a very fair position to put Canada in, because it would show us as not being full partners and not living up to the commitment to both NATO and the UN.

I don't know how you reconcile that with some of the statements you've made here about less heavy equipment and less involvement when you're in the high-intensity warfare situation. You're an absolute sitting duck if you don't go with that. So we have to measure the lives of our soldiers, sailors, and airmen and give them the equipment that will help them survive on the battlefield.

The Chairman: Did you want a response?

Mr. John Richardson: Yes. I'm asking why he would come up with this light equipment arrangement recommendation when in fact we wouldn't be living up to our commitments.

Mr. Ernie Regehr: The question is, how do we live up to our commitments? Every state has to make judgments about what is the best way to do that. I don't think our topic here is Kosovo, but if our objective is humanitarian and human security, you at least have to be open to the question of what degree of success the way in which we have responded to that has had, through what we consider to be carrying out our commitments, in providing for the security and well-being of the people to whose aid we have come. I know that conflict isn't over yet, but I think the international community will be doing some fairly extensive re-examination and self-examination about what in fact is the best way to come to the aid of communities in desperate peril, as they are in that situation. They will ask themselves whether the way in which the response was handled this time is in fact the best way to come to the aid of those communities. I don't think you or I or the international community has the answer about what the best way is, but I think the minimal thing we have to do is learn from experience, and this experience ought to be a teacher.

I think Canada simply needs to make some decisions about where and how it's going to fulfil its international commitments. I think there's more than one way of doing that. Canada has gone a long way in articulating the position that fundamental to the high levels of armed conflict in the international community today are the social, political, and economic conditions, and the proliferation of arms. Those are all serious contributing factors, and that's part of the priority response to bringing international peace and security. In addition to that, we have understood that in certain circumstances peacekeeping operations, even in not fully permissive environments, are also part of our contribution, so we have an obligation to provide the kind of equipment and training that helps us to do that effectively.

• 0935

The Chairman: There's one minute left. Are you through, Mr. Richardson? I'll give the minute to Mr. Bertrand if you're done.

Mr. John Richardson: I would just like to come back to the point that some of the things Mr. Regehr brings to our attention here on the defence committee are really fundamental items that should be put before the foreign affairs committee.

The Chairman: Thank you.

We have time for a quick question. Mr. Bertrand is next.

Mrs. Judi Longfield (Whitby—Ajax, Lib.): Just a point of interest—

The Chairman: Mr. Bertrand is next, though, Ms. Longfield. I'm sorry. I'm just trying to respect the order of speakers.

Mrs. Judi Longfield: Okay. I just wanted to—

Mr. Robert Bertrand (Pontiac—Gatineau—Labelle, Lib.): How much time do I have, one minute?

The Chairman: You have time for one question. We'll come back. You'll have lots of chances.

Mr. Robert Bertrand: In your brief you presented before the committee this morning you say: “The white paper does, however, call for the maintenance of multi-purpose, combat capable...forces...”. You seem to think this is not the way to go.

This committee has been to Bosnia on a number of occasions, and I've been to Haiti. I'm just wondering if our troops wouldn't have been so well trained. My personal feeling is that we would have had more people killed over there. I'm just wondering if we wouldn't be trading off their safety in favour of just setting them in the one direction. I don't know if you understand what I mean.

The Chairman: Please make it a short response, Mr. Regehr. We'll come back to the other members.

Mr. Ernie Regehr: I'm not sure that I disagree with the point, and that is that Canadian troops obviously need to be effectively trained and equipped to go into the environments to which they are sent. But by definition it's going to be possible to send Canadian troops into some environments and not into other environments. Every country in the world has to make those kinds of predetermined judgments as to where we are most likely to need to make a contribution. Let's focus on equipping ourselves for making that contribution.

The Chairman: Thank you.

We will have time for another round, so we'll try to get all members' questions in. But it's now Mr. Earle's turn for seven minutes.

Mr. Gordon Earle (Halifax West, NDP): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Richardson mentioned that some of the issues you presented in your paper should be presented to the foreign affairs committee. I do agree that there is a crossover. These things aren't easily separated, because what we want our military to do quite often will depend upon what our foreign affairs policy is, and also our foreign affairs policy quite often will be dictated by how strong our military is or is not. So I think there is a crossover, and I think the issues you've raised here are quite valid to be raised here.

In that regard, looking at your comments on the defence white paper, you mention that it's not a sufficient guide to the roles and capabilities and that we need a thorough review of the Canadian defence policy. Do you mean that when we review that policy, we have to look at the principles of where we want to go in terms of Canada's approach to what our military should be involved in and that is tied very closely to our whole view of foreign affairs and how much we do or do not intercede in the affairs of another nation and the human rights issues you describe? Is that what you're talking about, that has to be built more into the policy because it's not really covered in the policy?

Mr. Ernie Regehr: Exactly. I understand that foreign policy is to govern our defence roles internationally. As you know, the Department of Foreign Affairs and the minister have articulated a very clear set of obligations and principles around the themes of human security and peace-building. I think it's important that the Department of National Defence grab hold of that human security agenda and sort out what the likely military contributions are. What are the ways in which armed forces can make military contributions to the pursuit of human security?

• 0940

I think the 1994 white paper has not addressed that issue. We are obviously indicating here a direction in which we think such a review ought to go and might properly conclude with, but I think that takes a whole lot more work and attention than has been given to it so far.

For example, I know that levels of ODA spending is a matter for foreign policy; it's not a matter for defence. But a defence committee needs to recognize that it's in competition for scarce resources and, if the central objective is human security, as it's articulated, to recognize also that part of the contribution to those security objectives is through development spending. Part of those contributions is through military capability. Then the question is what are the appropriate military capabilities?

Mr. Gordon Earle: So would you see that whole issue as being tied in, for example, with the question of military exports? It was pointed out that military exports have been going down. I notice them going down with respect to the U.S. and with respect to Europe, but they've been going up with respect to third world countries. So would that issue tie in with what you're talking about when you talk about human security and having a sense of direction as to where we want to go on that?

Mr. Ernie Regehr: Yes, absolutely. The proliferation of arms has been identified as one of the most fundamental threats to human security internationally, so it needs to be controlled, and it's not logical to pursue a policy of increased control while you are pursuing a procurement policy of increased dependence upon export sales. So that's why the military export control issue is very much related to the procurement question.

You folks are much more informed on this than I am, but I think it's probably safe to say that when the ADATS equipment was acquired, there was a military need identified for air defence and anti-tank systems. But there was also a very strong sense that there was huge international market for this equipment, and if we establish the capability of building that in Canada, we're going to be able to export these things all over the place. That's an example in which I think export industrial interests affected procurement policy extensively, which in turn had an impact on defence policy.

So these issues are related. We need to pursue restraint in export, and that has implications for the way in which we procure equipment here.

Mr. Gordon Earle: Finally, on your recommendation concerning dual-purpose equipment and controlling that, you recommend that Canada's military export regulations apply to all operational equipment transferred to military end-users. It would seem to me that might be a difficult one to police or to control. Do you always know when the equipment is being sent out that it's going to end up with a military end-user? Is there a problem in that regard?

Mr. Ernie Regehr: I think the end-use control is very important, and that applies to all, even military equipment for which there are export permits, for which you need to be able to control the end use.

We have in Canada, and other countries have as well, made explicit sales of civilian helicopters, explicitly to armed forces, without an export permit being required. I don't think that's an acceptable system, particularly when we're into an era where that is probably going to be increasingly the case, that armed forces acquire commercial equipment for military operational equipment. So that equipment ought to be controlled as well.

Mr. Gordon Earle: It's clearly defined that it's the end-user.

Mr. Ernie Regehr: Yes.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Earle. I agree with both you and Mr. Richardson. While those are valid points, we're really here and the particular issue for us is to study the procurement of equipment for our Canadian Forces. Although you raise a valid point, it's perhaps in another context.

• 0945

Now it's Mrs. Wayne's turn, if she has some questions.

Mrs. Wayne, you have seven minutes.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC): I have only one question. It's to Project Ploughshares. I believe they feel we should be only involved towards peacekeeping and humanitarian interventions.

Is that how Project Ploughshares sees things, sir?

Mr. Ernie Regehr: If we're in a situation in which there are limited resources for the development of the Canadian Armed Forces for activity beyond Canada's borders, then what we need to look at is what the contexts are in which Canada is most likely going to be called upon to make a contribution. In the last 20 or 30 years, those contributions have been most prominently in the area of peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention, and we ought to focus on building up that capacity.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I have one other statement. At the present time, even here in Canada, we are in need of helicopters and we don't really have them. Once again, just two weeks ago, a Sea King had to make an emergency landing. So we don't have that.

We have a lot of capability when it comes to building ships in our country, and we are not in a position to even compete for contracts for building them, and so on.

So for our own forces here, there is a great need for us to expand the defence budget in order to meet the needs of what is required, not only here in Canada but to meet the other needs as well.

Mr. Ernie Regehr: I agree with you in the sense that I think there is very productive overlap between Canada's domestic defence needs and Canada's roles in peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention in that similar kinds of equipment are needed. Search and rescue helicopters have relevance for intervention in domestic crises in other countries just as they do in our own country. I think those are the kinds of complementary obligations that we ought to exploit when we're pursuing defence procurement.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mrs. Wayne.

We'll now start a second round of questions, with Mr. Goldring again, for five minutes.

Mr. Peter Goldring: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

If I understand your thesis, you're concerned mainly for the economics of the military and if there is economical capability for military. Maybe I could ask some questions more directly on the type of military hardware that we are using and have used internationally. Would it be your premise, then, that you would not support the purchasing of equipment such as the CF-18s, armoured carriers, and frigates?

Your report suggests that we shouldn't be involved or we should work in other areas of peacekeeping. Would you think that type of equipment and hardware would be conducive to world peacekeeping efforts? Would you be supportive of maintaining, or if we were looking at new purchasing of equipment such as that, would you be supportive of it, or would you not?

The Chairman: Before you answer, I want to say that these five-minute sessions go very quickly, so I'm going to ask you to try to give us a crisp answer.

Mr. Ernie Regehr: Okay, thank you.

I think you have to make distinctions there. I think the frigates have been used in monitoring embargos, and so that capacity and long-range shipping capacity can be supportive of peacekeeping operations. Armoured vehicles that bring protection to Canadian Forces operating in dangerous environments are important and Canada should be acquiring them.

I think F-18s do not make a major contribution to peacekeeping capabilities. You can't protect vulnerable people from 20,000 feet in the air. Heavy-combat tanks are not the kind of thing that Canada is going to quickly transport into a monitoring situation in Rwanda, and so forth.

• 0950

So I think it's those kinds of distinctions, and we would be toward the light-armoured vehicles.... A longer-range airlift capacity, for example, may be something that should be considered.

Mr. Peter Goldring: But in international peacekeeping efforts, who's going to do the dirty work? Is Canada going to be participating in, putting forward its share of its world responsibility, or shall we leave the dirty work to somebody else to do? If we decide as a group, as NATO or United Nations, would it not be reasonable and fair to expect that Canada, if it's sitting at the table, should participate in the field? In other words, who's going to do the dirty work? Who would you think should be doing it?

Mr. Ernie Regehr: Well, there are two responses to that question. One is that Canada will always be...I mean, we will select the things we do. It's not possible that a country the size of Canada is going to be able to participate in everything. There will always be a prior selection—

Mr. Peter Goldring: What would our world partners think of Canada as a participator at the table selectively keeping its hands clean? Is it fair and reasonable in an international situation?

Mr. Ernie Regehr: I don't know what the “hands clean” comment means, but Canada has always been at the table selectively, the U.K. has been at the table selectively, every country in the world is at the table selectively. You participate in some activities, you don't participate in others. It's our responsibility to decide the kind of participation we are going to make.

The other thing is that what you called the dirty work sometimes is dirty work and not so effective. We need to be much more open to re-examining whether the kind of full-combat capability or full-combat activity that we're pursuing in fact meets the human security and international security objectives that we are pursuing.

Mr. Peter Goldring: Then how do we square that with the other participants? How do we say we want to engage and we want to be considered a partner and standing shoulder to shoulder with the other nations, and say we will participate except here and except there? Who should be having that heavy responsibility when we do need the heavy-duty equipment to be utilized? Who should be, and why should we not be participating in that?

Mr. Ernie Regehr: Well, how many of NATO's 19 countries are participating in Kosovo? Are the ones not participating lesser allies by virtue of that?

All countries will decide when you participate; it's your sovereign responsibility to make that decision. And it's your responsibility to configure your forces in such a way that you believe you're going to make the best contribution most effectively in those cases that are most likely to come up. That means, for any country with limited resources, selecting, making a decision.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Goldring.

Now with our rules we go to the government side, and I've got Mr. Bertrand, then Mr. Pratt, then Mr. Richardson, in that order.

Mrs. Judi Longfield: Mr. Chair, could I have a point of clarification?

The Chairman: Okay, Mrs. Longfield.

Mrs. Judi Longfield: The tables you've presented—what's the source? You've been very clear in your footnotes, but not in this.

Mr. Ernie Regehr: Right, okay. On Canadian military spending?

Mrs. Judi Longfield: On all the charts. There are a couple where you have sources as the Department of Foreign Affairs, Canadian Commercial Corporation, but on the first one you just simply said it's a DND budget. Whose document is this?

Mr. Ernie Regehr: I can give you the table. It's the report on plans and priorities of DND, March 1998, and then earlier editions of the annual estimates.

The Chairman: Thank you for that point of clarification.

And now, Mr. Bertrand, five minutes.

Mr. Robert Bertrand: In one of your fact sheets, you say that Canadian military exports to third world countries has increased over the last few years. Just to clarify it in my mind, what is it that we export to third world countries? And to which countries?

• 0955

Mr. Ernie Regehr: A major part of this large growth in the 1990s in exports to the third world is the sale of light-armoured vehicles to Saudi Arabia, but we sell military commodities, components and subsystems to a wide range of countries.

The Department of Foreign Affairs' annual report lists them all in detail. I don't have that report here. By the way, these figures are all taken from the annual report of the Department of Foreign Affairs.

The Chairman: Okay. Mr. Pratt.

Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.): Thanks, Mr. Chair. I'll be fairly quick, hopefully.

Mr. Regehr, do you believe in the concept of collective security? I didn't have the opportunity to get your opening comments because I was at another committee. Do you believe that's an important concept in terms of maintaining world peace?

Mr. Ernie Regehr: Yes. Cooperative security is what Mr. Clark called it; common security is what some are calling it.

Mr. David Pratt: As a result of that, do you believe Canada should be a full participant in NATO? You can't talk the talk unless you've walked the walk.

Mr. Ernie Regehr: No, I'm sorry there. I think NATO is not the primary instrument in the post-Cold War world through which Canada should be exercising its collective security obligations.

Mr. David Pratt: Okay, so you feel Canada should be out of NATO then?

Mr. Ernie Regehr: I think that when Canada—

The Chairman: That's a fairly straightforward question—yes or no? I don't have a problem with that either.

Mr. Ernie Regehr: It's not quite as straightforward, because I think NATO should decrease in international importance. As for whether Canada should unilaterally withdraw from NATO at this particular time, I think that would just lead to a very non-productive debate, but I think the importance of NATO needs to decline and I think we're witnessing the decline of the importance of NATO. Regional security organizations in Europe, western Africa, east Africa, southern Africa—those are the kinds of organizations that are going to become increasingly important in maintaining regional stability.

Mr. David Pratt: What is NATO, if not a regional security organization?

Mr. Ernie Regehr: I think there is an important distinction between a defence alliance and a regional security organization. A defence alliance is a cooperation by a certain number of states oriented toward defending themselves against an external enemy. Regional security organization is the cooperation among states designed to maintain security and stability within that region.

Mr. David Pratt: I don't disagree with that, but I think, and I would appreciate your comments on this, that as a G-7 country Canada has responsibilities. You mentioned that not all of NATO was involved in Kosovo, but as a G-7 country with a population of 30 million people, one of the founders of NATO, one of the key participants in the foundation of the United Nations, Canada has a responsibility over and above what countries like Luxembourg and Denmark and Spain and Portugal might have under the circumstances. Would you not agree with that?

Mr. Ernie Regehr: Absolutely, which is why, by the way, I think it's close to scandalous that we have allowed ODA to fall to 0.3% of GNP.

Mr. David Pratt: That is one point I would probably agree with you on, one of probably very few points I would agree with you on in this particular discussion.

I have one final question. I came from Sierra Leone a couple of months ago and did a report on the situation there in terms of this human security issue. One of the things that struck me was that we're leaving a regional security organization, in this particular case ECOMOG, to try to do a job, a human security job, where hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians are affected, and they don't have the necessary military equipment to do the job there. We don't have, unfortunately, the military assistance that we could provide to them to do the job, to protect innocent civilians. How do you respond to that sort of situation?

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Mr. Ernie Regehr: I agree with that. I travel a lot to east Africa and to Sudan and I've witnessed those very same kinds of activities in Sudan. However, you have to recognize that the fundamental lack there is not a lack of military capability but a lack of social, political and economic capability. But I think there are roles there for military forces to bring protection to people and to bring stability into the society. But there again, you're not going to do it with CF-18s.

Mr. David Pratt: But you can't do it without heavier equipment, though, obviously.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Pratt. We can continue with more questions, but it's now Mr. Lebel's turn.

[Translation]

Mr. Lebel.

Mr. Ghislain Lebel: You said that our exports on the North American market were in constant decline. When Canada buys military materiel, must it do business exclusively with the USA? You talked about sales to Third World countries and countries other than the USA. Do some international agreements mean that we're captive clients of the Americans?

[English]

Mr. Ernie Regehr: No, we're not at all captive clients of the Americans. Canada is free to buy its military equipment from anywhere it wants, from South Africa and Brazil if it wants, and they have appropriate capabilities. However, during the Cold War years and through defence production sharing arrangements, there was the strong implication, though not legislated requirement, and the trade-off was that Canada would have access to the U.S. military market for subsystems and components, but that it in turn would purchase major systems from the United States, and that trade would remain in rough balance over the years. It didn't remain in rough balance, but that was the view of a cooperative defence industrial base.

[Translation]

Mr. Ghislain Lebel: When you said that hadn't happened, I presumed that Canada was still in a deficit position within the context of that agreement.

[English]

Mr. Ernie Regehr: No. In fact, Canada...I've forgotten now precisely, but there were certainly periods in which Canada exported more, was in a surplus position. What it is right now I'm not certain, and part of the problem is that Canada no longer maintains official records of the defence production sharing arrangement trade between Canada and the United States.

[Translation]

Mr. Ghislain Lebel: You talked about increased control of Canadian exports to the American market. I didn't quite understand the objective. I suppose such information could also be very useful to our economic partners and that they aren't always favourable to us, necessarily. In any case, I have problems understanding why we should have regulations and do a strict accounting for exports. Finally, isn't that actually a requirement the Americans might have?

[English]

Mr. Ernie Regehr: Well, no. The Americans, as I understand it, are increasingly inquiring that the sales from the United States to Canada are going to require export permits. And we are are saying that Canadian exports to the United States should be treated the same way that Canadian exports to Germany and the United Kingdom are treated, in that exporters are required to have permits. I think the implication is that anybody who applies for a permit is pretty much going to get it. It's not that it's going to be a more highly restrictive trade.

The main reason we were advocating export permits to the United States, to treat it the same way as other allies are treated, is for transparency reasons, that Canada has a system of disclosure of exports based upon permits granted. Companies are required by law to report on the basis of export permits. There are no export permits required to the United States, so exports are not disclosed. As a result, Canada can report on export sales to India and the U.K., but it cannot report publicly on export sales to the United States, which is the main customer. We ought to have the capacity to do that.

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In fact, there was one incident where a small number of armoured vehicles went to the United States and were not reported. They didn't become part of Canada's annual report to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. Also, it would help Canada comply with its obligations under the OAS firearms convention to report to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms if there were an export permit system to the United States.

The Chairman: Merci, Mr. Lebel.

Mr. Richardson.

Mr. John Richardson: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like to roll back to the theme that what has driven Canadian defence policy is collective security over the years, from World War I on. It's a collective security that has generally resulted from countries with like minds and values coming together in some form of contract to come to each other's aid if invaded—or in the case of World War II, the invasion of France and the lowlands by Germany.

This triggered the causes to come to the aid of those countries that were being overrun by the Italian and German axis. Now we've gone past that. During the Korean War, we were initially an expeditionary force under the guise and support of the UN. Then we went into the Gulf War and all kinds of small wars around the world, generally for just causes, to show other countries they couldn't take war in their hands to take other people's properties and overrun their countries.

The collective security situation has given us reasonable stability over the years. These are all countries that are democratically elected and profess that quality through their governments. Now we are into a situation where you suggest that these people may be a big problem for us. You want us to go into other countries, break away from traditional allies, put all our money into a pot, and go offshore looking for causes to support, when we really have a major commitment in NATO. When we are focused there, it is our first priority.

I don't know how you came upon your thinking to have our country make that major shift, download our hardware, and go off as we did in Rwanda, Burundi and Somalia, where we were lightly equipped and overrun by the numbers of people we were supposed to be helping.

I don't get your logic. I think you're moved by good motives and your heart is in the right place. But certainly, as a major state in the world, you're asking us to make a major move away from our allies, and I don't think that's going to fly.

Mr. Ernie Regehr: The Canadian Armed Forces were not overrun in Somalia by virtue of light armament. I'm not sure what you mean by that. That's not what happened in Somalia. I don't know of any place where Canadian Forces went in and, because they were inadequately equipped, were overrun.

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Mr. David Pratt: Croatia. That's a good example of a fairly recent—

Mr. Ernie Regehr: Thank you. That's one place. That hasn't happened in Africa. I don't know where you're going with the notion that this is a breakaway from traditional allies.

What I don't understand, from your point of view, is what you understand is the distinction between collective defence and mutual defence. I assume you support the expansion of NATO. There is a mutual security organization in Europe. Why is it not possible to be a participant in a mutual security endeavour in Europe that pays attention to the mutual security of the members of the organization? What's the problem with that? What we're advocating here is not a Canadian withdrawal from the world; it's Canadian participation in the world—and effective participation.

Lord knows you don't have to look very far for causes. There are many areas of the world where there is huge instability. The international community needs to sort out a means and capacity to participate constructively in bringing some stability to those parts of the world, whether it's west Africa, east Africa or Kosovo.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Richardson.

The time is up here. I don't want to editorialize from the chair. I don't think I am by saying there was a fairly direct question put to you, Mr. Regehr, with all due respect, about our continued participation in NATO. I found your answer a bit tortuous at best. It seemed to suggest a withdrawal from NATO.

If you want to briefly clarify that for the record, I think it would be important. But your answer was rather roundabout and tortuous and seemed to suggest a withdrawal from NATO.

Do you have a clear statement on that?

Mr. Ernie Regehr: I think collective security operations need to move away from defence alliances and toward mutual security organizations. To that extent, the security responsibility for Europe needs to move from NATO to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Canada is a participant in that, and that's where the long-term durability of security in Europe will reside.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Before I go to the next question, I'll just share a fact with you from SCONDVA's trip to Germany in January, in which a number of colleagues here participated. The military and political leaders of Germany and other European nations have made it very clear to a number of us personally that they strongly feel Canada must maintain its participation in NATO. I'm not looking for a response; I'm just sharing that fact with you.

Now I will go to the next speaker, Mr. Earle.

Mr. Gordon Earle: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

First, Mr. Regehr doesn't necessarily need my defence or anybody else's defence—he's doing quite well in responding—but I feel I have to raise this point, Mr. Chair. I think it's quite inappropriate—

The Chairman: Point of order?

Mr. Gordon Earle: Yes. It's a point of order. It leads into my comment. I think it's inappropriate for you, as chair, to put the witness in the position where he has to give a yes-or-no answer to any question. Witnesses should be allowed the latitude to answer as they see fit and clarify as they see fit. I don't think the chair should come in with a biased approach, or an approach that puts forth a position. I'm starting to get the feeling the chair has a position on the issue of NATO.

The Chairman: No problem. I take your point, but I would respond this way. I know you want a response. You made a valid point. It is my job as chair to make sure the witness answers the question he or she is asked.

Mr. Gordon Earle: Yes, and he did.

The Chairman: This witness requested to appear and knows the parameters of what this committee is talking at. I've allowed the witness quite a bit of latitude on issues that frankly did not deal directly with the Canadian procurement of equipment. I think you'd have to concede, and I think Mr. Regehr would concede, I've allowed him quite a bit of latitude. But where we're talking about a very specific question and a very direct question is put to him, I think I have a job as chair to try to assist the questioner to get a direct answer to a direct question.

I take your point, and I don't want you to use up all your five minutes.

Mr. Gordon Earle: I won't use up all my five minutes.

The Chairman: You're working on it.

Mr. Gordon Earle: I must beg to differ a bit.

The Chairman: All right.

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Mr. Gordon Earle: The witness did answer the question. If the questioner is not satisfied with the answer, then he can pursue a supplementary. But I do not feel it's the chair's role to say to the witness that it's a very clear question and yes or no will answer it. I don't think that's appropriate.

The Chairman: I hear your point and we'll agree to disagree.

Mr. Gordon Earle: Right. We'll move on and I'll make my comments.

There's been a lot of discussion with respect to NATO and the point has been raised that as Canadians we should be full partners in NATO. I think some people are missing the point that being a partner doesn't necessarily mean that everybody does the same thing. A partnership is a partnership because some people have specific strengths in one area, so they support people who are weak in other areas; those people who are weak in other areas support the people who are strong.

Canada has always had a very important role in terms of peace-making and in terms of diplomacy, witness Lester Pearson's role in the Suez Canal and the Uniting for Peace resolution and so forth. We've always had a very specific role that was quite different from the strong, aggressive military role that the U.S. has played. It doesn't mean we are not equal partners because one is more aggressive than the other in a given area of concern. So I think we have to get that on the table and be very clear about it.

I want to ask Mr. Regehr if, when he talks about the review of the defence white paper and looking at the roles and capabilities, he in fact means that we have to examine our role, say, even within NATO and perhaps our role within the UN as being relevant to determining the kind of military we're going to have and the procurement process and what we will procure in light of that. Is that what you're getting at in this review of the white paper?

Mr. Ernie Regehr: Yes, precisely that. Canada will always have limited military capabilities. We need to be selective about where we exercise them, what the contribution is we are going to make, where it is going to be most effective, and where the requirements are the most likely to be.

It's not only me; there have been other witnesses before this committee on procurement talking about basic defence policy issues and arguing, as I read the testimony of Professor Bland and the chap from Jane's. Both made strong points in this committee that Canada lacks an adequate defence policy to guide this procurement. We need to get that attended to and under control before we proceed with extensive procurement activities. I think it's very important to look at the mechanics of the procurement, the trees, but you also need to have a little bit of a look at the forest. And I think that's where there is division within Canada.

Mr. Richardson said that my comments don't reflect the Canadian mainstream. The Canadian mainstream is divided on this very question. The Canada 21 group of prominent Canadians came up with a very different vision for Canadian defence policy than is reflected in the current defence white paper. It's not that the white paper represents the mainstream and all others are marginal; there's a lack of consensus in Canada. Canada will never find the political will and political support for major military procurement as long as there is that lack of consensus and a feeling that the Canadian defence policy doesn't reflect Canadian consensus.

So I think there is an urgent requirement, and what I'm putting before the committee is that we need to balance the concern that I hear expressed around this committee about collective security in Europe with concern for human security beyond Europe and NATO, where the real wars are taking place, where additional real wars to the one in Europe are taking place.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Regehr, and thank you, Mr. Earle.

I think that's exactly why your request to appear was granted. I think it's very important that we have this debate, but there are some parameters I have to try to enforce as well.

We now go to Mr. Pratt.

Mr. David Pratt: You're talking about the real wars. Let's get back to Sierra Leone for a few minutes, where there is very definitely a real war going on. That's not to say there isn't a real war going on in Kosovo; I think there is there as well.

But in Sierra Leone you have a situation where a group of rebels—it's essentially an economic war—are trying to control and have control of a diamond area. They're buying arms from eastern European countries on the international market, they have displaced over a million people, hundreds of thousands are in refugee camps, and the situation is such that the ECOMOG group, the western African peacemaking group that's in there, is in desperate need of support. The United States has provided support in terms of logistical support to ECOMOG. The British are providing both lethal and non-lethal assistance. Canada has not provided a lot, in the big scheme of things.

• 1020

There is a view that from a military and humanitarian standpoint, you have to have control of the ground before you can get aid to the people who are in greatest need, because we don't know what's going on inside Sierra Leone. The government only really has control of the Freetown peninsula. So under that set of circumstances, would you agree that Canada should be providing some measure of lethal and non-lethal aid to the ECOMOG forces so that they can get aid to the people who are in greatest need? There are people starving there.

Mr. Ernie Regehr: Basically, yes. I defer to you on the details of the situation in Sierra Leone, and the kind of contribution that's going to be effective versus the kind of contribution that will just draw people into a prolonged counter-insurgency war. I think the military objectives that you're supporting there need to be clear. So if there are clear military objectives of assisting ECOMOG in creating safe havens, or controlling access to key resource areas like the diamond mines and so forth, building a parameter around those and preserving them for the public good, then yes, I think the situations there are so extraordinary, that's where the urgent need for international assistance comes in.

While I'm agreeing with you in basic principle, as we said in the brief, I think the international community has a great deal of work to do in sorting out what the most effective means of intervening are in those situations. I think the Pearson centre in Canada is making an important contribution in exploring those things, and others are as well. I think you're dead on. That's where the priority attention needs to be, and Canada needs to be prepared to make a contribution to the pursuit of security.

Mr. David Pratt: Now, in terms of pursuing just a little bit further the type of equipment those folks need in Sierra Leone, obviously they could use transport vehicles to get their troops from point A to point B, because we're talking about a very basic level of military capability when we're talking about the Nigerians, the Ghanaians, and the Guineans in Sierra Leone in ECOMOG. It's also very clear to me and to any of the military observers who have looked at the situation that if you want a speedy conclusion to the conflict, you don't match the rebels on a one-to-one basis in terms of the equipment they have, you have to have some level of technological and fire-power superiority. In this case, you need things like light-armoured vehicles, tanks, and attack helicopters in order to bring that conflict to a conclusion as quickly as possible so that people can go back to their homes, resume their lives, and rebuild the education system and the economy.

So am I hearing the director of Project Ploughshares saying we should be exporting equipment, providing military assistance—lethal and non-lethal aid—to ECOMOG forces in Sierra Leone? Is that what I'm hearing you say? That's what I'm picking up here. I think if you said that, if you answered my question in the affirmative, I think you'd be dead on. I think it would be the morally right position to take under the circumstances.

The Chairman: Please be succinct, Mr. Regehr, because we've got other questioners.

Mr. Ernie Regehr: The context is very important. One is that you have to understand that the fundamental problem in Sierra Leone, I think you'll agree, is not a military problem.

Mr. David Pratt: It is right now.

Mr. Ernie Regehr: You need to attend military responses with the whole range of other diplomatic and economic responses. Second, the faith in the efficiency of higher levels of technology has been shattered many times. It is being shattered today in Kosovo, and it's been shattered in many other contexts. So the notion that there is...I mean, I would draw back when you say we need to get in there for a quick military solution. Too often it's turned out that the quick military solution isn't so quick and isn't a solution. But having made those cautions, I say the international community needs to have the capacity to come to the assistance of regional organizations that are trying to bring stability into a conflict like that, and that includes military capability.

• 1025

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Pratt.

Next would be Mrs. Wayne. You don't have any further questions?

Then our last questioner will be Mrs. Longfield, and I'll remind colleagues we have some important business to do at ten-thirty for a few minutes.

Mrs. Judi Longfield: Just briefly, in reference to your submission, in section 2.8 you talk about per capita spending per soldier and you reference Canada's budget of $22,800 per soldier as compared to Germany and Italy, and we fare fairly well.

I want to go back to our peacekeeping role in Bosnia. Is it your belief, or are you undertaking any studies...? Do we have the equipment we need to protect our military personnel there and to allow them to do what they're in there doing in what has been seen as Canada's traditional role of peacekeeper?

Mr. Ernie Regehr: I'm not really qualified to address that directly. I'm not aware that the Canadian military leaders have made a major issue of the lack of appropriate equipment there. I may be wrong about that, but I think we need to listen to that testimony carefully and respond. I agree with you that when we're sending Canadian Forces into peacekeeping assignments that are dangerous, they need to be appropriately equipped.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Mr. Regehr, I want to thank you very much for appearing today and sharing some very important feelings and opinions that I think, as we've all heard, are held by many Canadians, and to some extent by some of us as well. I think you've contributed to our overall look at an important topic. We've allowed you some latitude, because I felt it was warranted, and just so that you're clear on this, any time I sought to focus an answer, or a question for that matter, it was to assist the discussion. So I appreciate very much your being here today. Thank you.

Mr. Ernie Regehr: I appreciate your help and appreciate being here as well. Thank you.

The Chairman: Thank you very much.

Now, in excusing Mr. Regehr, the agenda says “in camera”. I'm ruling from the chair that there's no necessity to go in camera for our discussion. I'm open to different points of view on that, but I don't see the need to go in camera. We're simply going to look at the timeline of the committee, how we'll proceed with the conclusion of the merchant mariner issue. My preference, from a municipal background, is to not go in camera where at all possible. So I don't think it's necessary.

Seeing there's no disagreement to that, we'll continue in public session.

We have the following points, then, colleagues. I wanted to discuss, as a committee, Mrs. Wayne's proposed motion, our timeline to wrap up our discussion of the merchant marine possible compensation issue, and the report back from staff on that.

So let me start with Mrs. Wayne's proposed motion. There was some confusion around this, and now maybe I understand why a previous witness had thought this committee had agreed to Mrs. Wayne's motion—and I corrected that at that time. When I saw the minutes, I saw that they incorrectly reflected that, in fact, and Mr. Dupuis has clarified the matter.

What we did do, of course, was agree to receive and table Mrs. Wayne's motion, and then to hold the hearings that we've now concluded. We agreed to bring Mrs. Wayne's motion back at the appropriate time. But it actually read that we had agreed to the motion, and that was a pretty important mistake that was made in the minutes. So I can assure you that's been rectified and clarified by the clerk who's taking care of the official record there.

• 1030

So we have the proposed motion of Mrs. Wayne, which I asked to be put before you today. It's not going to be voted on today, obviously, because we don't even have our report back. I just wanted to put it in front of us for consideration of what we will look at when we get the report back from staff. That's the first point to make.

The second thing is to look at our timeline for next week. I've had several members on both sides indicate a real problem with late next week. Rather than have very few regular members of the committee present, I've told the clerk to cancel the meeting, which goes against my nature, frankly. I don't like to see meetings cancelled. As you'll recall, we haven't had one cancelled since I've been the chair. I think most chairs feel that way. But a number of members on both sides have indicated a real problem with the latter part of next week. So rather than have a whole bunch of substitutes here who don't know what we've been doing, which I think would be fruitless, we won't meet next Thursday. We will meet as usual on Tuesday.

What we would do is get back from staff the report on the merchant marine, having carried out the directives, whatever they are going to be, which we'll discuss in a minute. We would deal with Mrs. Wayne's motion. Let's face it, we have to make a decision one way or another on this issue. We'd make the decision on June 8. I would table the committee's report in the House on June 9. According to what we're all hearing around here, that could be the final day of the House. I think we want to wrap this up before we break for the summer.

On Tuesday, June 1, the meeting's going to be entirely on Kosovo. The normal briefing at 3.15 p.m. will continue as a joint briefing. Mr. Graham and his delegation will be back, and he has asked for time to present a verbal report at the joint briefing. I think that's obviously something we would want to do. It will probably take at least a half an hour. Mr. Robinson will be back from his journey, and knowing Mr. Robinson, he will certainly want to engage in the debate and discussion, as he should. So being realistic, we made a decision that we would go from 3.15 p.m. to 5.30 p.m. on Kosovo. That's going to be a Kosovo day.

Mr. Bob Wood (Nipissing, Lib.): I have a point of order. Is that Tuesday, Mr. Chair?

The Chairman: Yes, that's Tuesday, June 1.

Then at 5.30 p.m., if Defence still has something it wanted to meet with staff on vis-à-vis the report, we could do that, but I think we could probably give them their directives this morning.

So that's to put on the table where we're going before the recess or the summer adjournment, whatever the right term is.

Bob.

Mr. Bob Wood: Basically, Mr. Chairman, you're saying that we're not going to meet at all next week.

The Chairman: No, I'm saying we're going to meet on Tuesday for our joint briefing on Kosovo.

Mr. Bob Wood: That's right. But I meant that as far as the merchant navy is concerned, we're not going to meet on Thursday. Is that your plan?

The Chairman: We're not going to meet on Thursday. If we need some time on the merchant marine, we could tack it on at the end of the briefing on Kosovo on Tuesday. That's what I'm saying. But we may not need it.

Mr. Bob Wood: I just want it to be clear. All right.

The Chairman: That's the timeline. Are there any comments or questions about that? Peter.

Mr. Peter Goldring: We were going to get a comparison list of the merchant navies of England, the United States, Australia, and Norway. In order to have that for the report, is there any update on when that's coming through?

The Chairman: Did anyone hear back from Mr. Nicholson? Mr. Wood.

Mr. Bob Wood: Just to refresh my memory, Peter, I remember you asking about it, but we did get some stuff from the minister on how other countries had treated their merchant navy people. I know you asked for something, but I don't know if that is what we gave you last week when the deputy minister was here.

The Chairman: The deputy minister was here, and you requested further information.

Mr. Peter Goldring: It was very specific. We had information here comparing the merchant navy with the armed forces, and I told him that it would make it much clearer for us in the final report if that were extended to comparing in the same fashion the merchant navies of England, the United States, Norway, and Australia, I believe, so that we could have comparable information on how the merchant navies have been treated internationally as well as domestically.

• 1035

The Chairman: We'll get the clerk to check with Mr. Nicholson. He noted the request on Tuesday when he was here, so we're going to endeavour.... As I indicated, I told him the timeline, so he knows. At least they can get it to the researchers for part of the report and to us as well.

Let's talk about the report, then. In my view as chair, I think we've had a lot of evidence, a lot of witnesses, some of the testimony conflicting. Whether you agree with them or not, I thought the deputy minister helped to put a lot of clarifications on the table about the facts in terms of what has been done by other nations and so on, and by Canada for that matter.

Given the timeline, I don't anticipate some huge voluminous report like our SCONDVA report. I imagine we'd have a five-, six- or seven-page report just summarizing the evidence we've heard, the requests that are on the table, laying out some options we might pursue from the staff's perspective. It's not their judgment to tell us which one; that's our political decision to make.

Is the staff clear? Does what I just said resonate with you?

Mr. Wolf Koerner (Committee Researcher): Yes. If not, we'll figure it out.

The Chairman: Does either of you have questions for the committee on what we're looking for?

Mr. Wolf Koerner: I don't think so. We did a report in 1992 that addressed some of the issues already. On Mrs. Wayne's motion, I think some of those things have been settled. The committee will have to decide the retroactivity question and what not, and that'll be an option in there. Given the testimony, we're pretty familiar with what went on, so I think we can put together a short report quickly.

The only problem is with the timeline. If we're going to consider it on the eighth and you want to table it on the ninth, there's a problem with translation if changes are to be made.

The Chairman: Okay.

Mr. Wolf Koerner: That's going to be a bit tight.

The Chairman: Changes in the report?

Mr. Wolf Koerner: Yes.

The Chairman: That's well noted.

Let me go to Mrs. Wayne and then Mr. Bertrand.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: With regard to the motion, this is all being referred to staff. Staff is going to address the motion, then bring it back addressing what's in my motion. Is that when we vote on it?

The Chairman: No, staff is not going to address your motion. Staff will give us a report based on all the testimony we've heard. The day we have the report, your motion is going to come off the table.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Okay. As the staff person just stated, since March, when we put them under the War Veterans Allowance Act, probably all of the areas that I had in the motion, with the exception of the one-time payment in lieu of benefits afforded to the veterans, have been covered now. There's only that one.

The Chairman: What you could do then, Mrs. Wayne, given that some time has passed—as you say, some things have happened—is restate your motion. You could reframe your motion, and when we bring this off the table you could submit your new, reworded motion, and that's what we'd deal with on the right day.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Today?

The Chairman: No. That would be June 8. You see, first we have to get the report back from the staff indicating the summary of the—

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I would like to see that we deal with everything that's there on June 8. They can deal with the motion as it is right now, which is that they receive a one-time payment in lieu of benefits afforded to other veterans of World War II. All the others have been addressed, and that comes back on June 8, and then we have it all.

The Chairman: That's exactly what I'm saying. That's exactly what we're going to do.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Okay. All right.

The Chairman: You just give us a brief verbal wording of your motion. That takes it right to the heart of the matter. You're going to get a one-time payment or you're not.

All right. I have Mr. Bertrand now, and then Mrs. Longfield.

[Translation]

Mr. Robert Bertrand: Mr. Chairman, I'd like to come back to the suggestion made by our researcher concerning the possibility of a meeting on June 8 rather than Monday, June 7. This extra day could allow the translators to finish their work.

[English]

The Chairman: Sure. A special meeting on June 7, yes. That's no problem for me.

Mr. Bertrand has put forward a suggestion that we have a special meeting on Monday, June 7, at 3.30 p.m., allowing—

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I'm booked on June 7. That's the election in New Brunswick, and I'm on a political panel to see how well we're doing that night.

• 1040

Mr. Bob Wood: I support Mrs. Wayne on that, because I'm going to be out of town as well.

An hon. member: If Mrs. Wayne stays home, the Liberals might do better in New Brunswick.

The Chairman: All right, so there's a problem with June 7.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Yes, there is a problem with that. I'm sorry.

The Chairman: Let me hear from our clerk. He has a suggestion. Mr. Dupuis.

The Clerk of the Committee: What about a meeting over lunch on Tuesday?

The Chairman: A meeting over lunch on Tuesday to look at the report. Would that allow enough time if we had any changes? I don't anticipate a lot of changes, but we have to allow for the possibility. All right, a sandwich lunch meeting on Tuesday. Is that agreeable?

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: No problem.

The Chairman: And that will allow enough time until.... June 8. What time? From noon to 2 p.m., sandwich lunch—

Mr. Robert Bertrand: Beer.

The Chairman: Beer on Bob Bertrand, if it's Guinness. Okay.

Mrs. Longfield.

Mrs. Judi Longfield: I wouldn't mind seeing some figures that talk about how many of our uniformed veterans actually took advantage of the post-secondary education training, the land, that kind of thing, the housing grants, the land grants—

The Chairman: That should be easy.

Mrs. Judi Longfield: —so that we have some figures here. The merchant navy vets were talking about how far behind uniformed veterans they were. I'd like to see how many uniformed veterans actually were able to participate in those programs.

The Chairman: That should be easy material to get, I think.

Mr. Peter Goldring: There was a number on that report.

An hon. member: Yes, there was.

Mrs. Judi Longfield: I would like to see it included.

The Chairman: Let's take any other matters from any members that they would like to see the research staff address themselves to, as Judi just did there.

Mr. Peter Goldring: It was mentioned for retroactivity. I think that possibly the better description would be ex gratia. If we keep going back into retroactivity as a reference point for it, it might prove to be problematic. But if it were viewed as a provision to give an ex gratia or one-time payment, rather than calling it retroactivity—

The Chairman: In the motion, you're talking about.

Mr. Peter Goldring: In the motion or in the reporting itself.

The Chairman: Well, in the reporting I think the term has to be “retroactivity” because that's what it is. If you're going to go back in time, the right word is “retroactivity”. If you're going to make a one-time payment, then you can use either term. But in terms of looking back and what other countries reached back and tried to do something, it is retroactivity.

Are the researchers comfortable with the point Mr. Goldring is making there?

Mr. Wolf Koerner: Yes.

Mr. Peter Goldring: Retroactivity could possibly be payment plus interest, and they're not asking for that. They're asking for a one-time payment, an ex gratia payment along the lines of other settlements too, that aren't tying any responsibility to it at all. It's just—

The Chairman: But what hits me, Peter.... I don't know about the rest, but I put this in one of my householders saying what we've been hearing in some of my committee work. We've literally heard—and it troubles me—requests of proposed amounts from $5,000 to $200,000. I thought Bill Riddell was a little off the wall with a $200,000 request, but he said it several times. He was here and said it. So we've had requests of anywhere from $5,000 per sailor up to $200,000. That's quite a range, you know. Somebody thinks we're all wealthy people here. I'm still trying to find out where this money is I'm supposed to have.

Mrs. Wayne.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I would like it if staff would put in the report exactly what the Hong Kong vets have received and any other of the groups that have come before, and decisions that have been made—just exactly what kind of agreement was reached there and so on. Is that okay?

The Chairman: Do you mean in the report?

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Yes, please.

The Chairman: Bob.

Mr. Bob Wood: I think that's a valid request, but I think I would also like to see some of Mr. Chadderton's remarks on how many other groups are looking for compensation. He mentioned eight or nine. He mentioned some numbers. I think all that stuff should be in the report.

• 1045

The Chairman: Okay, so a section on, if we make a favourable decision, what that could lead to in terms of other groups who have already indicated in testimony they would be coming forward.

Mr. Bob Wood: Yes, something like that. I know the research staff has all of that, but there were just some things that maybe should be put in.

The Chairman: I think that's fair. We saw Cliff that day counting off with his fingers—I don't forget—eight groups. I think the legion spoke, too, to the fact that it would have—

Mr. Bob Wood: That goes to what Mr. Goldring was saying.

The Chairman: Yes.

Mr. Bob Wood: There's a number of vets who didn't take advantage of some of the programs that were available to them.

The Chairman: All right. So there's a request to have that context.

Mr. Earle.

Mr. Gordon Earle: I'm a little concerned with that, and I guess it would depend upon how it's presented, but it's one thing to write a report and present it in the way that it almost focuses you to a conclusion. That can be done. If we focus too much upon a perception of what may happen, we can rule out the possibility of doing something positive because of the way it's worded. So I think we have to be very careful with that. Even though Mr. Chadderton may have indicated some other groups, I think it was stressed quite clearly by you, Mr. Chair, that we were there to look at the merchant seaman issue and not these other issues.

So I think if we start mixing the other issues in with the report, we're going to start producing unnecessary fear on the part of the government that if they grant something here, they're going to automatically have to respond to everything else. That's been said in the committee, it's been discussed. I think we should keep our report factual to the merchant marine situation and focus on that.

The Chairman: All right. Let's keep the discussion now on that point for a minute.

On Mr. Earle's point and Mr. Wood's point, which is whether or not the report should include a section on groups who may then come forward if there's a positive decision here, Mr. Goldring, and then Mr. Lebel.

Mr. Peter Goldring: Thank you.

I think it's fair to look at past comparables, because there was a hearing and there was a decision made on the basis of all the evidence before it. I think it would be unfair to put in other elements that no hearing has been made on, no decision, and we don't know of all the parameters and factors that affect it. So I think it's comparable and fair to look at the past ones, because there was a decision made—and how was the decision made? But to say all of these others that have been mentioned.... Quite frankly, I've looked at a few of them and I don't think they have the strength of conviction of this particular one that's in front of us now. Of course, it would be unfair to prejudge it or try to judge it here before it's even had a hearing.

The Chairman: Okay. Bob, we'll come back to you.

Mr. Lebel, on the point of whether we have this.

[Translation]

Mr. Ghislain Lebel: First, we'd have to agree that the payment of the retroactive amount serves to repair an injustice committed at the time. By granting the merchant marine sailors a retroactive lump sum, would we be correcting an injustice? If we answer yes to that question, then we shouldn't let our judgement be guided by what might happen in the future if other groups were to make such claims. If we admit an injustice was done to these people and that it must be corrected, then we shouldn't interfere with their rights. The impact of our recommendation on other groups is not a factor we should be taking into account.

[English]

The Chairman: All right, good point.

Mr. Wood.

Mr. Bob Wood: There was no malice in what I was saying. I was just bringing up the point that what we're going to do, regardless of what we do, will have a lot of effect on a lot of people. To be responsible, we have to realize that when we got into this thing...and I'm sure that, like me, the rest of the people on the panel didn't realize there were a lot of other groups involved; there's going to be a line-up and it's going to cost money.

The Chairman: Could I just say that as we all sat through it...? Whether it's in or whether it isn't, the fact of the matter is that the decision that's made—we all know because we all heard the testimony—is going to affect any other groups that come forward. In the reality of politics, we know it is. So I don't have a really strong view as to whether it needs to be in there. If you grant something to the merchant mariners, you know there are going to be other groups—and we all know that we're all going to be influenced by that. If we say no to the merchant mariners and these other groups, it's always going to be referred back to whether it's in the report or not.

So I don't feel strongly either way on it, but we'll get a few more.... Mrs. Wayne, and then Mr. Goldring, and then we'll have to make a decision.

Mrs. Wayne.

• 1050

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Well, I do feel very strongly about. I have great respect for Bob, but I have to say that in this case I think if that was added to it, if this committee did not agree that some form of compensation would be there, they would use that, and that's what would be public. This would raise a terrible, terrible view—not only to the merchant navy people but to everyone—that because of what we had over here with these other groups that might come forward and ask for this and ask for that, we said no to them.

No way should that be considered at this point in time—and I'm being honest and frank with you. No way should that be considered at this time. We should deal with this issue; then if any of those other groups want to come before us, they have the same rights as the merchant navy men do, and we should deal with them individually, one on one.

The Chairman: All right, this is an important point.

Okay, Bob.

Mr. Bob Wood: I don't have a problem with what Mrs. Wayne said, but on the other hand, she wants to put in the Hong Kong veterans. Is that fair?

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: That's because they already receive it, and they had their hearings.

Mr. Bob Wood: I don't think they had a hearing. I think there was just a decision by Foreign Affairs.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: If you wish to take it out, that's fine, we'll take it out. I'm not going to argue about that either. I'll take mine out, you take yours out, we'll deal with the merchant navy vets, and everything will be fine.

Mr. Bob Wood: Okay. We're going to expose ourselves here.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I have no problem at all.

The Chairman: Okay, let's hold that thought.

Peter.

Mr. Peter Goldring: I think we should remain fixated on what we're attempting to do. We're attempting to correct a wrong that has been out there for 50 years, a wrong that is well recognized by every single merchant seaman and his family, a wrong that is well recognized by every veteran organization in Canada, a wrong that's recognized by most Canadians. I think we have to remain fixated...that this wrong isn't going to go away. We have an opportunity to correct it. But we should be addressing the wrong—

The Chairman: So you don't want this in, right?

Mr. Peter Goldring: —not what might happen later.

The Chairman: Okay. I'm hearing from the opposition members unanimous concern about putting in this section. Are there any more thoughts on this side? We have to make a decision. Unless it's by consensus, I'll have to have a vote on it.

Mrs. Longfield.

Mrs. Judi Longfield: That information is on the record. It is part of what we will be looking at when we deliberate. I don't think it necessarily has to be in the report. I think that when we look at the report we're going to make our determination based on all the testimony we've heard, and if we have to include all of it, the report will be this high. So I tend to say, look, let's deal with the merchant navy vets—

The Chairman: Can we leave it out? I think I hear what you're saying, because when I make my decision—or when any one of us makes our decision—I'm not just going to be influenced by what's in the written report; I'm going to be influenced by everything I've heard from everybody. That's the reality. To pretend you're not going to be influenced by all the testimony is not reality.

So we're agreed we don't need it? Mr. Bertrand.

Mr. Robert Bertrand: I was going to add something else to what Bob Wood said. When Mr. Nicholson came and gave his briefing, the numbers that were thrown around...there were between 1,200 and 1,400 merchant seamen left. Now, according to him, there would be a lot more than that.

The Chairman: Potentially... [Editor's Note: Inaudible]

Mr. Robert Bertrand: And that's not including the spouses.

The Chairman: Right.

Mr. Robert Bertrand: Well, if everybody agrees not to....

The Chairman: We're just agreeing, I think, not to have the list that Mr. Chadderton rambled off and the list that the legion rambled off.

Mr. Robert Bertrand: Okay, fine.

The Chairman: But what Mr. Nicholson said is directly relevant to the decision of how much impact any decision could have financially. That's directly relevant.

Now, I'm going to give the research.... Are there any questions on what we want?

[Translation]

Mr. Ghislain Lebel: Yes, Mr. Chairman.

[English]

The Chairman: I didn't see your hand, Monsieur Lebel.

[Translation]

Mr. Ghislain Lebel: There seems to be a trend developing on the government side. If we reject the request of the merchant mariners because of costs that a favourable response might lead to, then we'll have to explain the reasons for our decision in the report.

[English]

The Chairman: No, that's not correct. The report is going to come from research, and it's going to be a summary of the evidence we heard, and it's going to lay out possible courses of action to be made by this political body, to recommend a course of action to the Government of Canada. The report is not going to have the decision in it; it's going to lay out possible things this committee could recommend to the Minister of National Defence.

• 1055

Mr. Bob Wood: Veterans Affairs.

The Chairman: Sorry, to Veterans Affairs.

Mr. Bob Wood: And he has 150 days to respond.

The Chairman: Yes, he has 150 days to respond, and the government will make its decision based on our committee recommendation.

[Translation]

Mr. Ghislain Lebel: Mr. Chairman, if our committee recommends that no compensation be granted the merchant seamen, then we must indicate why we have not favoured that solution. For example, we could say that we're afraid of the impact of such a decision, but then we would suffer the consequences.

[English]

The Chairman: Just so we're clear, when I table the report that the researchers give us, that we approve, it won't have what you're talking about. We'll be dealing with that report and with Mrs. Wayne's proposed motion. Mrs. Wayne will be putting a motion on that day that we make a one-time payment to the merchant marine.

Now, Elsie, you realize it will have to have a number attached to it too. You'll have to put your mind around that. We have had everything from $5,000 to $200,000 suggested.

So the motion, just so Mrs. Wayne can think it over, is going to have to have a dollar figure in there. But then the committee is going to say yes or no to that motion, period. That's all you do, and that is sent to the minister with the report from staff and the decision of the committee to agree to Mrs. Wayne's motion or not to agree. No long explanation accompanies that; that follows through other courses.

Mr. Lebel.

[Translation]

Mr. Ghislain Lebel: Mr. Chairman, I'd like to know what happened in the case of those Japanese who were interned during the last war. Was any compensation paid to the survivors of the deceased prisoners?

[English]

The Chairman: That has nothing to do with this issue.

[Translation]

Mr. Ghislain Lebel: Yes, it's the same principle of law and justice that applies.

[English]

The Chairman: It's not the subject of what these hearings have been about. We just had a discussion about the fact that we are going to focus our minds specifically on this.

[Translation]

Mr. Ghislain Lebel: Mr. Chairman, you just might be looking for trouble.

[English]

The Chairman: If we start bringing every other issue of possible injustice into the discussion of the merchant marine, we will not finish this in the life of this Parliament. We're going to focus on both sides, we agree. We have to focus our minds on June 8 to a decision on Mrs. Wayne's motion, which needs an exact dollar amount to be voted on. You can't vote on a sum of money without naming the sum of money. Then I'm going to table in the House the report of the committee, and the decision on Mrs. Wayne's motion will be taken, but it won't be part of the report.

Are we okay on that? Are we clear?

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I have just one question.

The Chairman: Yes, Mrs. Wayne.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: As you were saying, on Tuesday, June 1, it's Kosovo from 3:15 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.

The Chairman: Yes, to 5:30 p.m.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Because this is going now to committee and committee is bringing it back, that should be it.

The Chairman: I don't feel we need any more discussion.

Mr. Wood, as parliamentary secretary, do you feel there's any—

Mr. Bob Wood: No, I don't think so. I think it's now in the hands of the research staff, and it's up to them to bring back the report.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: That's right, for June 8.

Mr. Bob Wood: For June 8. That's how I look at it.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Okay. Thank you very much.

The Chairman: It will be tabled on June 9.

Before we break up, though, are there any questions from research? Last chance.

Ms. Corinne McDonald (Committee Researcher): To clarify, the committee has agreed then to not include references to either future or past compensation.

The Chairman: Right. We've agreed not to include references to possible future or past compensation. It's strictly the merchant marine. Is that clear? Okay.

The committee is adjourned. Thank you.