NDVA Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE AND VETERANS AFFAIRS

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE ET DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Tuesday, May 11, 1999

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[English]

The Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien (London—Fanshawe, Lib.)): I would now like to call to order this meeting of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs. I'd ask those who have business with the committee to come forward, and I'd ask those who don't have business and aren't going to sit in to excuse themselves. We would like to begin. Thank you.

I would like to welcome our witnesses. You will recall, colleagues, that Mr. Hunter was here before, as well as General Cameron, for a very interesting session, which at that time unfortunately was interrupted by some bells. I've explained to our witnesses that we don't anticipate any interruptions, but indeed, when the minister himself was here, we had an unanticipated interruption. So I would hope the bells don't start to go and the lights don't start to flash, but you really can never be totally sure of that when the House is in session. But I think we'll be all right today.

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So let me welcome you, gentlemen, and turn it over to you at this time to make your opening remarks, and then we'll have questions from the members.

Brigadier-General (Ret.) Peter Cameron (Reserves 2000): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm Brigadier-General Peter Cameron. I was here last December. My colleague, Peter Hunter, was also, and my colleague, Lieutenant-Colonel John Selkirk, as well.

I'd like to also introduce the resource people we have with us: Brigadier-General Ernie Beno and Brigadier-General Don Pryer. They will be available to help answer questions if you ask any we can't answer.

I'd like to make an opening statement, if I could, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Yes, please do, Brigadier-General.

BGen Peter Cameron: Just as a reminder, Reserves 2000 is a coalition of Canadians representing the communities of the country from St. John's, Newfoundland to Victoria, B.C., all of whom are concerned with the security and defence of Canada, both now and in the future. Among its constituents, Reserves 2000 includes honorary appointments from reserve and militia units across Canada, responsible citizens from all walks of life, and distinguished recently retired professional officers from Canada's regular armed forces.

The aim of Reserves 2000 is to ensure the perpetuation and contribution of Canada's reserves and militia as a viable, important, and cost-effective component of the Canadian Forces in the context of present and future challenges. While our aim and activities encompass all of Canada's reserve forces, our current work is focused on our country's army reserve, or militia, since its future role and structure is presently being examined in some depth by senior planners and other interested citizens across the country. It is therefore on behalf of the militia that we appear before you today.

We are greatly concerned over recent initiatives being developed by senior officials and defence planners at DND that would re-roll virtually every militia unit in the country from combat to service support. To make myself clear by example, I mean the provision of decontamination units, possibly postal units, bridging, medical, third-line support functions, and so on. There is also an initiative to reduce the total number of units from its present number of about 133 to 94.

Such initiatives, if adopted, would effectively destroy the militia's primary role of providing the mobilization base in times of emergency. Moreover, they would be prohibitively expensive to achieve, require a five- to seven-year timeframe to implement, and inevitably lead to the total demise of the militia. We are here to deal with a viable alternative to that proposal.

We last appeared before you December 8, 1998. At that time we presented the first of our four strategic-level papers, entitled Canada's Army of the Future—A New Concept. We left that with you for your detailed examination, and I should add that copies of this paper were also sent to each member of Parliament, including cabinet ministers and the Prime Minister.

The paper reflects our fundamental belief that Canada needs and deserves a vision and plan for an army of the future that can meet the defence and security needs of the country, a plan that would provide a fundamental understanding and raison d'être for the army to the people of Canada, while at the same time providing inspiration and a sense of purpose and meaning to the service volunteered by our young men and women who serve in the regular and reserve components of the army—a plan that, in short, would meet Canada's needs in peace, emergencies, and war.

In our paper we concluded that such an army of the future needed what in military parlance is called a mobilization plan. As businessmen, we might call this a strategic plan or a long-range plan. What is important, whatever the nomenclature, is that such a plan be prepared in final and comprehensive form, since no such plan presently exists.

Included in the Reserves 2000 paper was the first step in the preparation process: a mobilization concept for the army of the future. The concept is essential and it's achievable. With the militia as the key to the concept, it is also affordable, because of the inherent cost-effectiveness of the militia.

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The document contains the principles, fundamentals, planning, process, and framework model for a viable mobilization concept. This concept reflects our strongly held view that Canada's army of the future must have a planned capability equivalent to an army corps at stage three of the government's mobilization framework. The militia will form the base on which the expansion to army corps level will be achieved, trained by a highly professional, combat-capable, multipurpose regular army, which would also provide the government the ability to meet short-notice national and/or international demands.

As we stated in this first paper, once adopted, this concept will set the tone for the doctrine, training, procurement policies, human resource planning, professional development, structures, command and control, leadership, and civil relations for Canada's army of the future.

The response to our first paper from across the country was overwhelmingly positive. All respondents encouraged us to proceed with the development of the three remaining papers in our strategic-level series.

The second of these papers was sent to you early in March, entitled Canada's Army of the Future— Militia Component Staffing and Funding. This paper shows that in order to meet the requirement of stages two and three of mobilization, the militia must increase in strength from 18,500 to 45,000 over a five-year period.

As dramatic as this growth may appear, the militia staffing budget will still be less than 3.5% of the total defence budget, while providing 69% of the soldiers in the land force. As businessmen, we know that as we proceed toward this level, economies of scale and the elimination of redundant or unnecessary functions will be found. Thus the additional cost of the increase to the 45,000-person militia, although not high in real dollar terms, will be significantly less than a straight-line projection would indicate.

The third paper in our four-paper strategic-level series is entitled Canada's Army of the Future— Militia Component Structure. It was forwarded to you last week. The paper proposes a structure for the militia that ensures that each stage of mobilization can be met as the country requires. In it we have defined the number, size, and types of units that will be required as we move through the stages of mobilization. We also define the number, size, and types of formations required—in military terms, of course, brigades, divisions, or corps.

We note that additional units will be required to meet the requirements of stage three of mobilization and that certain units may have to be re-rolled in the process. But once again, the militia is shown as the key, the base upon which the expansion from stage two through three of mobilization can be achieved at the most economical cost.

The fourth and final strategic-level paper in our series is on your desks as we speak. This paper, entitled Canada's Army of the Future—Leadership and Militia Command and Control, speaks to leadership issues. Since you have not yet had an opportunity to go through it, my colleague and fellow co-chair, Colonel Peter Hunter, will now take the next few minutes to summarize its basic content for you.

Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret.) Peter W. Hunter (Co-Chair, Reserves 2000): Thank you.

Mr. Chairman and committee members, General Cameron has just commented that you have before you the fourth in a series of four documents. That is not the case, because it is deep in translation as we speak, and we are delayed slightly. We will send it to you as soon as the translation is complete. However, I don't think that will in any way deter our proceeding with what we have to say. I would like to speak on the paper, which, as General Cameron has said, is on leadership and militia command and control.

A strong and potent military must be well led if it is to be effective. Historically, Canada, although not a militaristic nation, has produced exceptional military leaders. This is because our people possess integrity, courage, principles, responsibility, and fairness, to mention only a few of the characteristics essential to unquestioned leadership. These are the characteristics obligatory in those who are to lead, particularly where human life is concerned.

Reserves 2000 deeply respects the need for quality leadership in all walks of life. The military is no exception. In truth, it may be where leadership counts the most. It is for this reason we place such emphasis on the subject in this final submission in our four-paper series, Canada's Army of the Future.

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In this work, we address leadership doctrine, training, and selection. The thrust of course is to ensure Canada's soldiers are led by the most knowledgeable, competent, and trustworthy people available and that these people have been given every opportunity to hone their inherent and acquired skills to make them the best anywhere.

Please, when you have a moment and when you have received the document, read our submission carefully. We believe you will agree that the modus operandi we have advocated for leader development will generate talented and professional officers and non-commissioned officers, male and female, capable of directing and guiding our soldiers so that they too will continue to be the best in the world, safe in the knowledge that their leaders are caring, professional, and worthy of their trust.

Our recommendation specifically is therefore that a concerted effort be made to change the leadership culture of the army to incorporate mobilization into every activity and to establish and implement practices in peacetime or war that follow the principles of leadership selection, training, and education discussed in our paper.

The paper goes on to examine militia management—or, in military jargon, command and control—of its resources, both human and other, the aim being the best possible performance by Canada's militia. Two major recommendations in this area evolve: first, that there be a separate and distinct militia chain of command; and second, that full budgetary control of the funds dedicated to the militia be in the hands of the militia chain of command.

Finally the paper addresses the issue of oversight of the militia. To ensure its well-being, the militia requires monitoring by a body outside the Department of National Defence. Formalized and continuing methods of audit, feedback, consultation, and remedial direction are necessary in order for government policy regarding the militia to be implemented.

It is the firm recommendation of Reserves 2000 that an oversight body apart from the Department of National Defence be established to monitor the affairs of the militia on a continuing basis. Ideally this body could be in place in time to oversee the completion of the current reserve restructuring. A suggestion: the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs is the logical choice for this role, since SCONDVA represents all the communities of Canada, as does the militia.

Reserves 2000 and its many supporters across Canada unanimously and strongly believe that any course of action that departs materially from our proposal for the restructuring of the militia component of the Canadian army will lead to its demise as a vital and significant national institution in Canada and that we will have failed in the protection of a sacred trust.

As General Cameron has reported to you, this is the final paper in the four-part strategic portion of Reserves 2000's submission to this committee. To follow are four papers that are more technical and tactical in nature. They will deal with training, equipping, recruiting, and retaining soldiers, as well as administrative matters within the militia. In combination, the eight papers are the equivalent of the work of a government-appointed commission, but of course do not carry the attendant price tag for the taxpayers.

BGen Peter Cameron: Mr. Chairman, I'd like just a few more minutes to summarize, if I may.

We have suggested that the most feasible and appropriate structural framework ought to be based on a corps model at stage three of the mobilization process. That model possesses all the capabilities for wartime deployment in whole or in part, and it possesses all the capabilities necessary for coping with peacetime emergencies in whole or in part. You might want to know then why we believe the corps model within a mobilization framework is the most appropriate organization forum for our army of the future.

First, as I have said, there is today no comprehensive mobilization framework, nor is today's organization suitable for expansion in stages three and four of mobilization, as required by the 1994 defence white paper.

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Second, our proposed model would provide specific missions and tasks for each individual unit in the corps, both regular and reserve. Such specificity is not present in today's organization. The advantages in terms of value for the training dollar expended, best use of scarce training time and equipment, materiel procurement, and unit morale would be enormous.

Third, it meets the requirements of the nation equally for the defence of Canada, for the defence of North America, or for participation in international security or peacekeeping operations. It is flexible enough for units and formations to be tasked to national or international emergencies, in whole or in part, as circumstances demand.

Finally, you might well ask how much it will cost. The answer is, initially, very little more than the army is presently spending. If we want to achieve the full requirements of the model immediately, then there must of necessity be increased funding, as we have shown in our second paper. How much? That depends on how quickly we want our army to completely man, equip, and train to achieve completed corps model status—that of course balanced against our ability to pay the cost involved. The model proposed provides the flexibility needed in an era of variable defence budgets.

It is our position that the corps model concept itself is the most important component, no matter that Canada cannot today fully man the framework proposed. If the present budget only permits, for example, 47% manning—and I picked that number out of the air—does that mean the concept should be abandoned? No. It simply means that over the next few years, our defence dollars should go towards the gradual increase in manning, equipping, and training of our army of the future to the highest possible level of the corps model permitted by the budget. The model is sacrosanct. It is the ideal, the achievement to which our army defence dollars must be dedicated.

It is our position as businessmen that along the way, economies of scale will be realized, which will mean more dollars can be devoted to achieving the requirement of the corps model. More and more of today's defence dollars can and must be redeployed from less appropriate or unnecessary activities. The rate at which this is achieved may vary from year to year as defence budgets wax and wane, but if the ideal remains in clear focus, there is no doubt that it can be achieved. Attaining the full requirements of the corps model would also remain the ultimate goal.

In conclusion, gentlemen, we are asking this committee's endorsement of the concept, principles, framework, model, and plans we have presented to you over the past few months. We ask that you recognize that the key to a meaningful, effective army mobilization concept is a focused, vibrant, robust, and flexible militia, coupled with a highly trained, proficient, combat-capable, mobile regular force. This will provide Canada with the ability to meet short-notice national and international demands and also provide the expertise, doctrine, and support needed to train the militia to serve as a base for all four stages of mobilization.

Mr. Chairman, we also ask that consideration be given to a more appropriate level of funding for the army of the future to help kick-start the proposals we've made. It is our opinion that given the restricted budgets that seem to be contemplated over the next few years, the key to a viable army of the future will be found in maintaining, indeed expanding, a cost-effective militia, and in training and equipping it. This can be accomplished at reasonable cost when compared with the cost of training and equipping the regular component.

That way, Canada also benefits from maintaining one of the only truly national institutions remaining in our country today, an institution that provides citizenship training to its young men and women from coast to coast—young men and women who have a sense of national identity and purpose and who have acquired or will acquire valuable life skills during militia and cadet service.

Finally we ask that you provide political direction to the Department of National Defence to expedite planning for the army of the future along the lines we have outlined for you. Reserves 2000 will fully support your initiative.

We have restricted our comments today to allow adequate time for questions and discussion regarding our four strategic papers. We now encourage a thorough discussion and review of what we have provided you. Our team is here to deal with any issues you would like to raise.

Mr. Chairman, that is our presentation.

The Chairman: Thank you, General Cameron and Colonel Hunter. I think it would be useful if we might have either of you take a moment or two more and put your mandate in context.

I'll just tell my colleagues on the committee that I had the pleasure of meeting with both Colonel Hunter and General Cameron last week in my riding office.

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We have some new members here, so it would be useful if you would take a minute or two and review your mandate and how you got into the project you're doing in such a detailed way. I think it would be useful for the committee to hear the context before we go to our questions.

Would one of you mind doing that?

BGen Peter Cameron: Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Actually, how Reserves 2000 was born really arose from a proposal about five years ago, put forward by the Department of National Defence, in which there were seven options, each one of which, if I may say, was almost worse than the last. But the net effect of all of them was to reduce the size of Canada's militia from a total of—I'll use a round figure—140 units to about 70 units. The reaction to these proposals was unanimously angry and universal.

Reserves 2000 was put together to argue the case, representing all of the communities of Canada, for not reducing the militia at all, but if the Department of National Defence wished, to embark on a process of judging and evaluating all 140 units on a series of six criteria, which were agreed to by departmental planners and members of the reserve community. This process is drawing to a close now, so we are facing—sometime toward the end of this year is the actual deadline—the need to come out with a restructured militia, and of course the debate is intense as to what that restructured militia should look like.

What we have presented to you over this series of four papers is our view of what a restructured militia should look like. The key to it is that you can restructure the militia all you like, but you have to have a use for it. The use is provided by the mobilization plan so that every unit.... If it's an infantry unit, is it mechanized or is it light? If it's an armoured unit, is it recce or is it a heavy armoured unit? And so on through all of the various types of units.

What our plan does is give purpose and meaning to the life of every militia unit. It will have its own mission, its own task, its objectives to train for, and it will fit into a mobilization concept that can be expanded in times of emergency or war, or left alone in periods that are more quiet.

I don't know if that quite answers your question, Chairman, but that's how it began.

The Chairman: I think it does.

I'll just make one more point, and then we'll go to questions. I just want members to be aware of this. It's my understanding that you met with then Minister Collenette, who endorsed the work you're doing. You're a group of volunteers who have done some very extensive work, as we can all see, and this represents your final report. Is there not a November 1999 timeline that you're to report by? Can you explain that?

BGen Peter Cameron: Yes. The November 1999 timeline, Chairman, is the end of the period of evaluation to which I referred in my earlier remarks. At that time the defence department and all interested parties will have to agree on some form of restructured militia.

And yes, you are correct; it was Minister Collenette with whom we first worked and who mandated the process. It was supported by his successor, Minister Young, and by the present minister, all of whom were aware of the work we were doing and approved of it.

The Chairman: Thank you.

BGen Peter Cameron: And yes, we are all volunteers. We don't get paid.

The Chairman: That's right. Thank you.

Finally then, you've come up with your final product now, and your specific request to SCONDVA is to endorse it, to recommend it to the minister?

BGen Peter Cameron: Mr. Chairman, your endorsation would be like manna from heaven. Yes, that is what we would like you to do.

As my colleague Peter Hunter said, four smaller, more technical papers are to follow, but the central core of what we're talking about you now have.

The Chairman: Okay. Thank you very much. I just wanted to flesh out the full context for members.

Now we can go to the first round of questions. We'll start with Mr. Hart with the Reform Party for seven minutes.

Mr. Jim Hart (Okanagan—Coquihalla, Ref.): Thank you very much.

It's good to see you again, Colonel, and General, it's good to have you here. Thank you very much for your reports.

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I was just wondering if you could clarify one thing right off the top. We talked a lot about the militia here. There's not a lot as far as the air force reserve and the naval reserve are concerned. Is that because, in your opinion, they're in fairly good operational condition right now?

LCol Peter Hunter: Mr. Hart, the reason for that is that the naval reserves have a very clearly defined and workable role in coastal defence and several other lesser responsibilities, which are functioning quite nicely and with which they are very happy. The air force reserve is in a similar situation. Some assignments have been given to them—air transport and some helicopter work—and they have the appropriate equipment and are quite happy with those assignments.

The problem area at the present time is the army reserve, or the militia, and that is why we're focusing our attention on that at the moment. But our interest is in all reserves.

Mr. Jim Hart: So in no way would your proposal take anything away from either of the budgets of the naval reserve or the air reserve?

LCol Peter Hunter: It would not be our intention at all.

Mr. Jim Hart: It wouldn't affect it at all. Good.

I'm wondering if we can move then to the situation we're in right now with the war in Kosovo. Does this strengthen your position, or do you view this as a strengthening of your position, on the need to have an updated mobilization plan? Indeed, can you tell us if our current mobilization plan is inadequate to meet an extended or sustained deployment overseas?

Lieutenant-Colonel John A. Selkirk (Co-Chair, Reserves 2000): Mr. Hart, an answer to that would be as follows. We are concerned that the current plans of the Department of National Defence really only go as far as the early stages of mobilization. The technical term would be “augmentation”, which is more individuals to go and do individual replacing or filling in for the regular soldiers who may not be there.

At this particular moment, with the militia the size it is, I believe it is capable of sustaining perhaps what General Henault was talking about today, that deployment to Kosovo, and perhaps maintaining a simultaneous deployment to Bosnia.

Our concern, however, is that with the militia the size it now is, if we go beyond where I think we are today, which is stage one, to stage two, we begin to become incapable of providing enough soldiers to do more than possibly those two rather minimal deployments overseas, plus sustainment should there be casualties in that theatre, or to look after problems here in Canada, such as the ice storm last year, floods in the Red River, and so on.

Unfortunately it is our opinion that the size of the total Canadian army is so small that we cannot do much beyond what is happening today. Our plan would provide a sufficient resource to look after unforeseen contingencies.

Mr. Jim Hart: Just to clarify where we are now, are we in a stage one mobilization plan now?

LCol John Selkirk: In my personal opinion, yes, and we have been for a good number of years.

Mr. Jim Hart: Okay.

Are we able to meet our 1994 white paper goal of deploying and sustaining a brigade group plus a battalion group overseas within 90 days, under our current structure?

BGen Peter Cameron: I would venture this as an opinion only, and please treat it as that. We might be able to get a brigade on the ground plus a battalion group, but I can't imagine that we would have sufficient resources to sustain it. I wouldn't even be sure that we could put a real, super-trained, fully operational brigade there. I think we'd have to supplement from here and there.

It's not a question I'm really qualified to answer, but that's my opinion. I invite my colleagues to comment.

LCol Peter Hunter: A brigade is some 6,000 or 7,000 people. A battle group is perhaps 1,200 or 1,400 people. So in total that would come very close to 10,000 actually on the ground in whatever theatre they might be sent to.

Sustainment requires more than the number on the ground. With a regular army of about 20,000 operational-type soldiers and a militia of something less than that, we would be very hard pressed to first of all put those soldiers on the ground, and secondly to support them.

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Mr. Jim Hart: Right. I would think it would be hard to come up with any more than the 800 we've already committed to that operation. On April 28 though, the Chief of Defence Staff stated that Canada could send 20,000 troops overseas if it had to. Do you think that's an accurate figure? I just don't know where we could get those kinds of numbers.

BGen Peter Cameron: Well, if the Chief of the Defence Staff made that comment—and I'm not suggesting he didn't—he would be thinking of all three services, I assume. I cannot speak for the navy and the air force; I'm just not sufficiently grounded in their statistics. But I think it would be a stretch.

Mr. Jim Hart: Yes.

Your mobilization plan, as laid out in the Reserves 2000 document you presented last year, is very ambitious. It calls for a corps headquarters, four divisions, and several independent brigades. You talked a little bit about it, but could we try to pin down a little bit more the anticipated cost of this mobilization concept?

LCol Peter Hunter: Mr. Hart, first of all, the mobilization plan we put forward says those troops should be in skeletal form, not in fleshed-out form. So all the personnel who would normally people organizations of that size would not be on the ground at this point in time.

The other part of your question is the cost. To advance the reserves from the current establishment of roughly 18,000 to the 45,000 we think it should be, in our view, would cost approximately $50 million a year over and above the present budget over the next five years. In other words, it would be a five-year program to achieve that number. That would take us to an ultimate budget for the militia, for pay, allowances, and operating and maintenance, which are jargon terms, of a total of $385 million. As General Cameron has already said, that would be 3.5% of the DND budget to produce 69% of the soldiers.

Mr. Jim Hart: Thank you.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Hart.

[Translation]

You have seven minutes, Mr. Lebel.

Mr. Ghislain Lebel (Chambly, BQ): I won't need that much time. There is only one point that interests me.

You spoke of a parallel chain of command, or of two distinct chains of command, namely the regular forces and the reserve forces. You mention this somewhere in your paper.

When Mr. Bertrand, the former chair of our committee, and myself traveled throughout Bosnia, reserve members were integrated into the regular forces. If we were to see a repeat of the Bosnian experience, how would things proceed on the ground, given the dual chain of command?

[English]

LCol John Selkirk: Monsieur Lebel, the simple answer to that is, in the field, that would not be the case. We would provide the soldiers from Canada to go to the field, where there would be a single chain of command. That's the only way it could work.

Our proposal for two chains of command is for Canada and to ensure the militia has control of its own destiny to maintain its vitality here in Canada, not on deployment.

[Translation]

Mr. Ghislain Lebel: I have another question. You stated that augmenting the reserves to 45,000 members would cost approximately $380 million and represent 3.5 per cent of the total defence budget.

In light of this observation, if our minister were a businessman, wouldn't he be more inclined to recommend augmenting the regular forces to 65,000 members? These would then account for almost 100% of current ground troops and for 5% or 6% of the total defence budget. In other words, are you suggesting that our army move toward one made up primarily of militia soldiers?

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[English]

LCol John Selkirk: I'm not sure I totally understand your question. Our point is that it costs a good deal less to produce one militia soldier than to produce one regular soldier. That is not to say the standards of training are the same. There are a lot of differences, obviously.

We do not believe the whole army should be militia, nor do we believe it should be totally full-time. A mixture is best. Our proposal is that we would have 45,000 reserve and approximately 20,000 regulars in the army alone. I'm not talking about the total force, which continues to be 60,000 or so, in all the Canadian Forces, full-time.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Thank you.

[English]

BGen Peter Cameron: Mr. Chairman, might I rectify a wrong I committed at the beginning of the reading?

The Chairman: Sure.

BGen Peter Cameron: May I introduce you to Brigadier-General Pierre Boucher, who is also with us today from Quebec? I'm sorry. When I was looking around at my colleagues, he was just out my sight range.

The Chairman: Not at all.

Welcome to you, sir.

BGen Peter Cameron: Out of sight doesn't mean out of mind.

The Chairman: Thank you very much.

We'll go to the majority side. You have seven minutes, Mr. Proud. Then I have Mr. Richardson, Mr. Jordan, and Monsieur Bertrand. We have another round.

Mr. Proud.

Mr. George Proud (Hillsborough, Lib.): Thank you very much, Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, for coming here today and appearing before us again.

Going back to the $385 million you mentioned to previous questioners, $385 million is indeed a significant increase. You say it's 3.5%. Are you suggesting this come out of the budget of DND, or are you suggesting new money be found for this?

BGen Peter Cameron: Mr. Proud, we're not suggesting where it should come from. It might well be that if I were looking at the budget of DND, I might see a way of saving from our present expenditures some of that money. I might also see that the budget was pretty much rounded up as it should be, and then I might have to ask for some new money.

All we're saying is that's what you'd need. It's not a huge amount in finite terms, and certainly not as a percentage of the defence budget. It is to provide a cost-effective increase.

So I couldn't say where it would come, but—

Mr. George Proud: Some of us around this table have been looking for increases in this defence budget for several years, and it's not easy to come by, I can assure you. That's why I was asking where you were—

BGen Peter Cameron: Reserves 2000 would be glad to help.

Voices: Oh, oh!

Mr. George Proud: If your recommendations come to life, where you suggest that the militia must change from 18,000 to 45,000, have you looked at recruitment issues? If you have, what have you seen? Is this realistic?

BGen Peter Cameron: Mr. Proud, we have looked at that, and indeed one of our subsequent papers will be on recruitment and retention, both of which are very much related. Recruitment has been a problem, not because there are not people across Canada interested in the reserves, but because our recruiting process needs some substantial revision, and also the ability to pay new recruits has to be there, or else of course the whole exercise is redundant. But yes, we believe that over a five-year timeframe, the ability to add the number of people necessary to get to 45,000 is quite realistic.

Mr. George Proud: One of your major deductions points toward the militia having a separate and distinct chain of command. I wonder if you could elaborate on this, because we had asked that the reserve force be like the regular force. Are you not in favour of this?

LCol John Selkirk: Mr. Proud, all of us have commanded militia units. All of us are honorary colonels in the militia. A tremendous number of day-to-day problems exist in trying to make the militia work.

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We have tried in the past stronger militia chains of command. I believe one of your colleagues had the privilege to command all of the militia soldiers in Ontario as a militia brigadier-general, General Richardson.

That is a feasible way of doing business, and I think it is the opinion of most of us in Reserves 2000 that it is a more desirable way of doing business. We saw a stronger and healthier militia with that arrangement.

We feel the key to a healthy and vibrant militia is control of your own destiny, and in particular control of your own budget, because the thing that will keep the soldiers coming back is assurances that a certain amount of money is available for pay within a particular period of time, be it a month or a year or whatever.

One of the great difficulties at the moment is that the militia pay budget is a tap that can be turned on and off. We believe the militia has suffered to some degree in recent years because of uncertainties among the soldiers as to how much money they were actually going to make. We would prefer to see an arrangement where there was total control over that vital aspect of the militia.

Mr. George Proud: Are there still problems with the pay? Are they still having the problems with the pay in the militia? That's been going on forever. Has it gotten any better? Can I ask that question?

LCol Peter Hunter: Well, it may be somewhat improved, but it certainly isn't right. There are still a lot of problems with it.

I would like to add a comment, if I may, Mr. Proud, to what Colonel Selkirk has said. With a separate chain of command for the militia, you would have within the system strong advocates for the militia side of the equation. Without that, sometimes that doesn't happen and decisions are made without a full voice from the militia community.

Mr. George Proud: Again, going back to the change from 18,000 to 45,000, what are your opinions—have they changed or are they same—on the time off that these people might need for situations such as we're facing today in Bosnia and Kosovo?

We went out in 1994 looking at the defence policy, and one of the things I thought everybody would be in favour of was that there be legislation or some means to allow people to have time off to be members to do six months in various.... That wasn't accepted by anybody, really. It wasn't accepted by you people, I don't think. It certainly wasn't accepted by the liaison group. The only place we found any support for it at all really was in Alberta. So I wonder if I could get your opinions on that.

BGen Peter Cameron: Mr. Proud, I certainly think Reserves 2000 would have supported enabling legislation, so I'd just like to make sure you don't think it was us who got in the way.

I thought your question, though, related more to the amount of training time available.

Mr. George Proud: Yes.

BGen Peter Cameron: In our proposal, in costing what it took to produce 45,000 trained people, we were not assuming any more training than is presently being made available—that is, baseline, 35 days a year for each militiaman.

The question of time off for overseas assignments is a difficult one, and I suppose it's difficult for any government of any political stripe. We live in the hope that someday, some way, that type of enabling legislation will be passed. There is no question that if it were, the militia would be the beneficiary of it.

As far as summer training is concerned, a concerted effort is being made by.... I'm not quite sure I have the name of the organization right, but it's something like the employers' support council.

A voice: Canadian Forces Liaison—

BGen Peter Cameron: The Canadian Forces Liaison Council. Thank you.

• 1705

According to the last briefing they had that I went to, they have contacted 30,000 employers across the country asking for time off for the militia soldiers of the country, asking that these soldiers not have that counted against their vacation time, and asking that they be paid by their civilian employer, or at least the equivalent of what they would get from their military service.

So we have taken some positive steps, but they're little ones.

As for the enabling legislation that you speak of, I won't say it's a dream, but it's a hope that one day we might do such a thing, as other countries do.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Proud.

Mr. Earle.

Mr. Gordon Earle (Halifax West, NDP): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I just want to go back to the numbers. I'm a bit confused on the numbers; I'm learning as I go along. My understanding is that we have roughly 60,000 people in the military overall. Is that right?

BGen Peter Cameron: That's the regular force—army, navy, and air force.

Mr. Gordon Earle: Right. And in terms of reserves, we have approximately how many?

LCol Peter Hunter: We have 30,000—navy, army, and air force.

Mr. Gordon Earle: And of those, you're saying about 18,000 are militia, army?

A witness: Yes.

Mr. Gordon Earle: And over a five-year period, you want to take that 18,000 to 45,000. Is there any thought of increasing the navy and air force component over a five-year period as well?

BGen Peter Cameron: That has not been a part of our deliberations, Mr. Earle. As we told you, though we do have the interests of all three service reserves as part of our concern, the problem is much more intense with the militia, so what we're talking about today is the militia component of the army only.

Mr. Gordon Earle: So when you talk about an oversight body separate and apart from DND, you're also thinking of that just in terms of the militia, or are you thinking that oversight body would also oversee the navy and air force reserves?

BGen Peter Cameron: It is our view that the primary need is in terms of the militia—that is, the army reserve—but frankly, our suggestion makes equal sense for the other two services too. We haven't consulted with the other services about this, but we believe they would find it equally important for a body outside the Department of National Defence to keep their interests at heart.

Mr. Gordon Earle: And what kinds of things do you foresee that oversight body looking at? Would it be budget or numbers? What would be the role of that oversight body?

BGen Peter Cameron: I would answer that simply by saying the oversight body's responsibility would be to see that government policy vis-à-vis the reserves, be it army or army, navy, and air force, was in fact being followed. I wouldn't presume to suggest how this group might carry out that function, but perhaps they could do regular reviews each quarter. I don't know.

We frankly were vitally interested in seeing that this might be a possibility, because this country is a series of regions, as we all know, and the militia represents the communities of those regions, and you gentlemen and ladies represent those communities too and would have presumably a community of interest there. I've used “community” too many times, but you follow what I'm saying.

Voices: Oh, oh!

Mr. Gordon Earle: What's the age range for people in the reserves? What's the lower end?

BGen Peter Cameron: I think 17 and a half is the minimum age, and 55 is CRA.

Mr. Gordon Earle: Okay.

Perhaps your papers handle the rest of this, but an issue has been raised that people are called up from the reserve to go on a mission, but there's no guarantee that when they get back, their job will be maintained for them. So they could end up going on a mission on behalf of the country and coming back to find themselves without a job. Was that issue addressed by your papers or by your studies?

BGen Peter Cameron: We have not addressed that issue. We are aware of it. That relates to the issue Mr. Proud raised. The enabling legislation I talked about, that we all hope one day might actually appear, would address that issue and require people returning from a service assignment overseas or a national emergency in Winnipeg to be able to come back to the job they left, at full pay and without loss of seniority.

• 1710

Mr. Gordon Earle: Lastly, in terms of coordination between the reserves and the regular forces, how would you see that coming about if you had a separate oversight body for the militia? How would you see the two coordinating?

BGen Peter Cameron: I've been talking so much, I'll let one of my colleagues answer.

LCol John Selkirk: Certainly we haven't studied the problems the regular force may have. I don't know whether they need an oversight body.

Our opinion is that the militia at least, of the three reserve components, requires a body outside the Department of National Defence to periodically review its health and what is happening, and to report outside the chain of command on this national organization known as the militia.

Mr. Gordon Earle: The reason I asked that is I get the feeling from the way you phrase your recommendation that you don't quite feel the Department of National Defence would look after the interests of the militia, so that's why you are recommending the oversight body, separate and apart from National Defence.

BGen Peter Cameron: Mr. Earle, that is a very perceptive comment and true. But let me put it this way. In times such as these, of particularly tight—and in the case of DND, diminishing—budgets, a naturally existing friction, which there has always been in my long service as a reserve officer, gets exacerbated a bit. No doubt each side of that argument looks to its own, and if there is room to buy, beg, borrow, or steal a few extra dollars, then an attempt might be made to do it.

The militia chain of command, if it existed, would at least put it on equal footing with the other component of the army and at least allow it to make a case for what it believed was good for it, just the same as....

Of course, as you know now and as would certainly be the case in an emergency or a disaster or a war, the two bodies then come together, and they're commanded appropriately by regular officers.

But you put your finger on a nerve there.

Mr. Gordon Earle: Yes, and the reason I asked about the oversight body and so forth is it would seem to me there would have to be a working together. You couldn't have one part of the military having a resentment toward the other part because the other part is perceived as being treated differently, with a special oversight committee looking after its interest, and perhaps there's no one looking after “the other interests”. These people have to work side by side in national emergencies or in real conflict.

So I was wondering how that coordination would come about if one is treated—

The Chairman: I think we'll have to take that as a rhetorical comment, because Mr. Earle is out of time now. So we'll go to Mr. Price, and maybe you'll have an opportunity to work that in in another answer.

Mr. Price.

Mr. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, PC): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I can guarantee he will.

Voices: Oh, oh!

Mr. David Price: Thank you for being here, gentlemen. It's very timely that you are here, particularly in my case. On Saturday night, I happened to attend a mess dinner at my own regiment, and the rumour mill was just going wild about everything that's going on.

Of course within a rumour mill, there are fact and fiction both, and a lot of what I do hear seems to be completely different from what you're proposing. That's the even scarier part, because in general I like what you do have on paper there. There was a lot of talk too that a lot of these units could start disappearing by mid-summer. That I don't know about.

Reserves 2000 sits on the commission for restructuring that was set up. Guidelines were set up to consult with NDHQ, and I'm wondering, since we have this little friction problem between reserves and the regular, what kind of cooperation you have had dealing with that.

• 1715

LCol Peter Hunter: Minister Collenette originally, with General Baril and General Leach, set up what they called the command consultative working group and a number of other consultative working groups throughout the system, in order to discuss the restructure of the reserves and how it should proceed. That process was endorsed by Minister Young when he was minister and is continuing to be endorsed by Minister Eggleton.

I think what you heard at your mess and what has evolved is that the consultative working process was performing quite well and was in place for over two years, but a few weeks ago it seemed to break down and get off the rails, because from within NDHQ somewhere, a whole new approach to what we were discussing appeared, without any consultation whatsoever, and has caused the upset you have heard about right across Canada. And the upset is extreme, I can tell you, because what was put forward had never been heard anywhere before; it was brand-new. So the consultative process seemed to be a non-consultative process.

Mr. David Price: One of the key things you mentioned, postal service, they were talking about.

BGen Peter Cameron: I should amend that. I think one postal platoon is identified there.

Mr. David Price: Yes, but everybody was thinking, “It'll be us.”

You also mentioned in your presentation, General, the cut in the combat arms from 133 to 94. What types are we looking at that are going to be removed, and how many of these combat service support units would be created?

BGen Peter Cameron: Well, I'm going from memory, and I ask my colleagues to refresh it if I go wrong, but this proposal—and it is a proposal, and General Leach has identified it as a proposal, though nevertheless it's one that's being widely talked about, both in regular force chain of command circles and in the militia—saw, if I'm not mistaken, 51 infantry units reduced to 20. How many armoured?

LCol Peter Hunter: Seventeen armoured units went to 10, and it was about the same for—

BGen Peter Cameron: The engineer units were cut in half.

Oh, John has the paper here; good. Here are the real facts.

LCol John Selkirk: This proposal would have reduced the infantry from 51 to 20 units, the armoured from 17 to 10, artillery from 20 to 11, and the field engineer regiments from 12 to 8.

As for additions, I'm not sure I can do the mathematics or the arithmetic here, because a number of existing service battalions, which are what are called close support service battalions, would be eliminated, yet third-line service support would be increased.

The overall effect of this would be to take the militia from I believe about a 75% combat arms organization to about a 30% combat arms organization.

Mr. David Price: Okay.

You folks have been doing this consultative process over a period of time now, and as you say, we have no idea of where this came from. Just all of a sudden, out of the blue, we end up with a completely different, or seemingly different, plan.

A key point in here now is they're talking about reducing units. Is that reducing manpower also, or are they increasing the numbers within the units?

BGen Peter Cameron: My recollection of those numbers—and I think you have them there, John—is that basic manpower doesn't change really; it's about flat. But in the number of units—and this is total to total—there is a reduction from 134 to 93.

Sorry; there was a first part to the question, and you were going to answer.

LCol Peter Hunter: You asked where it came from. It was presented by General Leach, but we don't believe it was entirely his work. But we would only be speculating if we guessed where it came from beyond him.

Mr. David Price: In your report you said Atlantic Canada would lose one of its two brigades. Naturally you said it would be best to have them. Particularly, one brigade would end up with 21 units taking care of all four provinces, spread all around. Could you comment on how impractical that would be?

• 1720

BGen Peter Cameron: You said it.

Mr. David Price: Well, I just want it to be on the record, because it sounds so ridiculous.

BGen Peter Cameron: From the command and control aspect, that's a huge area. We have constantly advocated....

We've had no formal discussions of that particular aspect, but certainly in the command consultative working group and, we understand, at the area working group in eastern Canada, they discussed it. We believed actually that the departmental people had agreed there would be a “brigade plus”, as they refer to it, minimum. We have always suggested it should be two brigades. A brigade plus might be a brigade and a task force, a battle group, or something.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Price.

Thank you, General.

We now go to a second round of questions, starting again with the opposition side and Mr. Hart for five minutes now.

Mr. Jim Hart: To follow up on Mr. Price's comments, one of the other things the report suggested was that there be amalgamation of the militia units. That probably wouldn't be practical, because the beauty of a militia unit is that it's in a community, and the people who train are in that community. The likelihood of them travelling some distance to get to a new militia unit probably isn't very feasible at all.

I want to explore some more the question of the skeletal form you're suggesting. I'm pretty much sold on the numbers—I think you're accurate there—but I'm concerned about the skeletal form you talk about. Because of the technology and the type of battlefield we face today, is it reasonable to assume that we would just be able to put that skeleton in place; that during mobilization, new equipment could be moved in; and that you would be able to train people and bring them up to speed? It seems to me that would take an awful lot of time.

LCol John Selkirk: Indeed, Mr. Hart, I think the problems would be absolutely tremendous, which is why we are advocating doing something today instead of waiting until the crisis to try to patch it all together.

A number of innovative steps could be taken with adequate planning time. For example, in our first paper we talked about searching out among our allies what sort of equipment they have that may be surplus to their needs, whether we could borrow, and whether we could send people to train on the equipment in those countries. There's the whole aspect of new technology and new learning techniques, such as distance learning and battlefield simulation.

We feel that indeed an awful lot can be done. Yet regrettably, we don't seem to be doing anything. Now is the time to start.

Mr. Jim Hart: This is more of an observation. I know Reserves 2000 is made up of honorary colonels. I was wondering if you could tell me—and I think I know the answer to this—how many honorary colonels there are in the Senate. I don't think there are any in the House of Commons. I think the last one was Roy MacLaren.

When you're faced with a Parliament that has very little military experience, and in particular when we're faced with a situation where we've had declining budgets, why on earth wouldn't organizations such as yours be going after promoters of the reserve and the militia? Maybe we could have Honorary Colonel Proud and Honorary Colonel O'Reilly over there do some real fighting on behalf of the militia.

It just seems to me there's a lack of people with military information and a real drive to try to get the military perspective, in particular the militia perspective, to the cabinet table.

BGen Peter Cameron: Mr. Hart, let me try to answer that, and then I invite my colleagues to chime in too.

It must be remembered that mandated by Minister Collenette was this working group process, which drew in members of the reserve community from all across the country, to work on a restructured militia based on six criteria that we and they developed between us. There was not a need at that point to become involved with the eventual structure of the militia, because no one knew how that process was going to end up.

• 1725

As this has become more clear, particularly in the last few weeks, but I would say more realistically over the past year, we may well be calling you and your colleagues in the House, and also in the Senate.

And to answer your question, I think it's about six or seven honourees.

By the way, if I could just make one correction, Reserves 2000 isn't only honorary colonels and honorary lieutenant-colonels. We also enjoy a membership from very many distinguished Canadians, some of whom themselves are honorary colonels as well. Also, we are assisted by some very distinguished former professional officers from the Canadian Armed Forces, as I think I mentioned in my opening remarks.

I guess the short answer to your question is this. If this proposal currently being debated should ever become more than that, we would be calling on all of our friends to take a hard look at this before agreeing.

The Chairman: Thank you again, Mr. Hart.

Now we go to Mr. Richardson for five minutes.

Mr. John Richardson (Perth—Middlesex, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Again, I'd like to extend a welcome to the members who are here in support of the Reserves 2000 presentation that we received earlier in our development here.

Looking at the defence white paper is what guides us, basically; that's the government's policy on defence. Under mobilization, there's a fair amount of preamble, and it reinforces the total force concept. I often wonder now, looking at how we operate. There is some teamwork at that level, but it's not as much of a team as you'd think, because of the specialized nature of the operations they're designated to undertake.

I'm not trying to go back and redo the history, but we've had the history, and it just seems to be a methodology by which one can reduce both the regular and the reserve forces by having everyone in place in the type of organization we have at the moment. They're all dedicated professionals.

I'd like to get to one or two things. The white paper says:

This, together with the new mobilization concept and renewed emphasis on multilateral operations in support of global stability, will dictate a number of force structure adjustments.

It goes on to say the government will need an expanded land force with 3,000 additional soldiers, which have been added. Then it goes on:

The Reserves are a national institution and provide a vital link between the Canadian Forces and local communities. Their primary role will be the augmentation, sustainment, and support of deployed forces.

That's not an unusual role, but if we're talking about a war and supporting a small regular army or navy or air force, it will take its toll, because we're not going to be able to sustain the raison d'être for the reserves when we're told that the number of units located across Canada will be reduced considerably, if that is the reality. I can only go by the suggestions made out of National Defence headquarters recently that this will be in place.

The First World War, the Second World War, and the Korean War were wars fought by the militia. I put in the Korean War because the Second World War veterans who joined militia units in large numbers after the war also signed up, because they were trained and ready, to go to Korea as well. So we see that those wars were essentially citizen soldier wars.

Today the regular force is bigger than the reserve. That wasn't the case in the three previous wars. So there's a different kind of balance of power in place here.

• 1730

I personally believe there should be strong training cadres in every area, and the emphasis should be on individual training for the roles to which the regiments would be potentially assigned. I just want to ask you this question. Why are we not emphasizing strong individual training programs for non-commissioned and commissioned members of the reserves to prepare them for the kind of expansion that would go?

This group here saw a unit in Bosnia in 1994—

The Chairman: Mr. Richardson, I don't want to object, but you're well over four minutes already.

Mr. John Richardson: Okay.

The Chairman: So if we're going to—

Mr. John Richardson: I'll just ask the question.

An hon. member: Yes, in the time you'd build a grandfather clock.

Mr. John Richardson: Would you agree that the regular forces should designate a training program and skill levels that they should all meet, and not be booted out of the reserves once they reach that skill level because they've bumped onto a ceiling that was artificially set for the reserves?

The Chairman: Could we have a brief answer to that, please?

LCol Peter Hunter: Certainly we agree with you that individual training, particularly of officers and non-commissioned members, is essential. They are indeed the core around which you build if you have to expand for mobilization. So I would support very much what you have said about that particular issue. I'm not sure that answers your question, but certainly you have to train the people as individuals before you can do collective training.

BGen Peter Cameron: I think I picked up another part of your question, Mr. Richardson, which had to do with the training cadres.

When we were younger men, we did have the luxury of benefiting from such training cadres, which were located in the regular force, specifically in the regular force unit close to where we lived. I would certainly support a return to that concept.

I don't know whether the regular force is over-tasked to the point where this really isn't possible now, or whether there are maybe too few units to provide these training cadres, but the fact that they are needed is an absolute given in our paper. We are saying the regular force's responsibility will be, among other things, to train the reserves in the country.

That maybe took up one part of your question.

The Chairman: Thank you very much.

Now we have to go to Mr. Earle.

Mr. Gordon Earle: Thanks.

I have just one quick question. Would you foresee this increase in size over five years, up to 45,000, involving such things as perhaps reactivating units that have been deactivated, such as, say, the Halifax Rifles? Would that be a part of this plan?

BGen Peter Cameron: I don't want to dominate the answering here, but I can give a short answer. In fact our paper actually suggests that approximately 35 additional units would be required as we moved through the growth stages over each of the five years. It would seem to me only sense to take what's already on the supplementary order of battle, start there at least, before we create any new ones that don't exist yet. It's logical.

Again, we are presenting a model and a concept here. We will be happy to work with our regular force counterparts to develop that model. I really can't speak for them, but I think it would be absurd not to consider reactivating units such as your unit.

Would anyone else like to comment?

LCol Peter Hunter: I'd just say that Colonel Amy would certainly be very pleased to hear you say that.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Mr. Bertrand.

Mr. Robert Bertrand (Pontiac—Gatineau—Labelle, Lib.): Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, I'd like to start off by saying how important the reserves are. They're an important pillar in the Canadian Forces, and they play a very wide variety of roles, whether it be at home or abroad.

John was mentioning just a couple of minutes ago that when we were in Bosnia, we saw what kind of work these people did, as well as back home, during the Saguenay floods and during the ice storm. We even had some in my riding come and help out the different municipalities that needed help with brush-clearing. So they're a very important part of the Canadian Forces when they are called upon.

• 1735

Again, John mentioned the white paper. If I remember correctly, it suggested that we increase it from 18,000 to something like 23,000. But you gentlemen are suggesting that we double that and go up to 45,000. I'm just trying to justify the need for that kind of number in today's environment. I'm wondering if you gentlemen would care to comment on that.

LCol Peter Hunter: We're basing our thinking on a lot of material provided from a variety of sources, ranging from NATO to DND to the U.S. and so on, and the white paper of course as the basis. These data tend to suggest that you need a substantial number of people in support of the actual fighting soldiers, and we just do not have them.

Also, our own Department of National Defence says each mission the Canadian Forces participates in should be a minimum of 20% reservists. They also say it takes five reservists to replace one regular. By that I mean there have to be five reservists there in order to get one at any given time to go on a call-out mission.

All of those factors, when they're brought together and you work the arithmetic through, suggest that you have to have a militia of something in the order of 45,000.

That's a pretty circuitous answer to your question, but it is not just a number we picked out of the air. It's a very thoroughly researched and carefully studied situation to produce that number. It could vary up or down slightly on more intensive study, but that's an approximately correct number in order to do the job the white paper calls for.

BGen Peter Cameron: If any of the fundamental assumptions changed—for example, if the ratio changed and it didn't take five reservists to produce one soldier, but only four—then of course we would need proportionately less than the 45,000. It's a number arrived at by looking at Canadian Forces departmental material and working the numbers, as any planner must do.

LCol Peter Hunter: And it goes to Mr. Proud's point that without legislation, you can't just send out an order, as it were, for x number of reservists to show up. They can't get off work or they have other problems in their lives that preclude them from appearing on call. But if legislation were in place, then that situation would change.

The Chairman: I'm going to ask for shorter answers and questions, because these five-minute segments really go fast.

Mr. Bertrand.

Mr. Robert Bertrand: I have not a question but more of a comment on the document that was talked about around the table a while ago, the one that suggested the amalgamation of different units in the Maritimes. If memory serves me correctly, that document is just a working paper; it's nothing official. The minister has the final word on whatever is decided, does he not?

BGen Peter Cameron: The minister certainly has the final word. I don't think I know the document you're talking about. There have been discussions that I—

Mr. Robert Bertrand: I'm sorry, but I think David was—

Mr. David Price: Oh, I referred to the numbers you had suggested and the document Colonel Selkirk has there.

A voice: Oh, okay.

The Chairman: Okay then? Did you get your answer, Mr. Bertrand?

Mr. Robert Bertrand: I certainly did.

The Chairman: Okay, thank you. So we'll go to Mr. Price.

Mr. David Price: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll make it a nice short one.

• 1740

In the militia component structure, the third volume, you talk a lot about the units in communities, adding units, and keeping the units that are there already. If I take an example, in my own area, we have three units there now. It's not very clear in here. Would that become one unit, or would those three units remain? We're talking about one town, basically the city of Sherbrooke. We have an infantry, an armoured corps, and a medical.

LCol John Selkirk: Certainly we would not propose to reduce one unit that is now existing in the Canadian militia. Indeed we feel at least 34 or 35 more would be required in order to form this base so that we can get to stage three of mobilization.

Mr. David Price: That's a message that isn't clear in here, because I've had comments from others saying, “Well, I think they might be talking about amalgamating groups to form one unit—yes, to make a community unit, but they would be taking away some units that are already there.” So that's a piece of the message you should probably....

LCol John Selkirk: We'll certainly look at that.

A witness: We'll work on that, yes.

Mr. David Price: Thank you.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Price.

Now Mr. Jordan has some questions.

Mr. Joe Jordan (Leeds—Grenville, Lib.): I'll be very quick. I want to thank the members for sticking around past 5.30. Again, with the issue that we're running out of time, I'm heartened by the fact that the committee sees these as important things.

Mr. Hart talked about the fact that we need to keep a military perspective, but there's also—at the risk of using the word “community” again—a community perspective to this. In my community, the militia unit is a source of part-time employment. I've been on other committees where we talk at great length about how we can get jobs for young people. Well, we have jobs for young people in the militia. Also, a certain amount of technical and life skills training goes on in the militia. That's outside the argument you make very strongly within the military, but there are benefits to these militia units in communities over and above that, and we have to keep that in mind.

You talk about re-profiling or re-rolling. Postal service and delivery is important, but I'll tell you something: after 23 days without power during the ice storm, the last thing we were concerned about was whether the mail was being delivered. We used the militia to check homes, and the order they brought to that chaos was indispensable in the community, in terms of their experience in dealing with emergency situations.

I have a final point there. People have to understand what a slap in the face it will be if you close a militia unit. If you close the Brockville Rifles in eastern Ontario, in my community, I don't think I can emphasize enough what the message is going to be to the veterans and the people in that community. So when the bureaucrats sit down and try to crunch numbers, they need to take that into consideration. And by all means, let's reactivate the ones we have closed, because those decisions were made in a vacuum.

My final point is this. I'm concerned when we talk about some of the statements and the fact that General Leach has come out with some recommendations that are out in left field compared to the level of discussion that was going on prior to them. That concerns me.

What concerns me is that in government, and I think even more in the military, a certain inertia is going on. Based on some of the white paper discussions and the unit viability assessments that have gone on, I'm afraid these things might just come to pass unless somebody throws their body in front of them. Your group has, and hopefully the defence committee can get a handle on this.

One of the things I see that troubles me is that the rules change. When they start assessing the viability of units, they look at unit strength. When they put those rules in place, correct me if I'm wrong, but you couldn't transfer to the regular forces. When I talk to my local militia commander, he says they have to pay for special training for members of their reserves, and those skills are transferable to the regular forces now. So as soon as they pay the money out of their budget to train someone, why wouldn't a young person then go to the regular forces?

A voice: Yes, quite so.

Mr. Joe Jordan: Then they get turned around and get evaluated on unit strength, on which they don't fare very well, because those people have left, and nowhere does the militia get credit for that. It's rather absurd.

So I would challenge the committee to make sure, when people argue that the reserves aren't effective, that we're looking at the situation, because it's a self-fulfilling prophecy. The regular forces can turn around and say these units don't have the strength, but they don't have the strength because of the way the rules have been changed.

When you argue for separate command of the militia, what we're really talking about are the budgets. We have to make sure there's fairness and equity in the budgets. And there's no free lunch. Right now the military is getting the benefit of the reserves as a feeder system, but they're not paying for it. In times of tight budgets, that friction, of course they're not going to want to rock the boat there.

• 1745

There's an onus on this committee to make sure we don't just accept some of these things at face value, because if you look closer, the cards are stacked against them. We say there are 18,000. The fact that they have 18,000 under these conditions speaks volumes about the value of the militia.

I'm very heartened that the committee is looking at this issue.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Jordan.

Is there a reaction from you gentlemen?

BGen Peter Cameron: Mr. Jordan, I'd like to offer you a membership in Reserves 2000.

LCol Peter Hunter: Would you like to be an honorary colonel?

Voices: Oh, oh!

The Chairman: Joe liked Mr. Hart's idea of the honorary colonel.

BGen Peter Cameron: Thank you, Mr. Jordan, seriously, for the well-thought-out series of points you made.

LCol Peter Hunter: I might comment that several really well-known and substantial regiments across Canada are suffering in the evaluation process for that very reason, and it's not fair.

The Chairman: I'd just recall for the members that this particular meeting starts at 4.15 p.m. because of the briefing. It's not my intention to shortchange this meeting in any way, so I envisage it going the full two hours if members still have questions. If we don't, then we'll wrap up early. So it's not that we shortchange the regular SCONDVA meeting because of the combined briefing, just so that no one feels unnecessarily rushed.

I'll go to this side now to see if there are any more questions. I don't see hands, but I do see Honorary Colonel O'Reilly has a question.

Voices: Oh, oh!

Mr. John O'Reilly (Haliburton—Victoria—Brock, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I just want to make a couple of points. One, we've dealt with so many reports and so many commissions and the white paper, and before the white paper I believe the disbandment of the Halifax Rifles was under the Suttie commission, if I remember rightly. Under that commission, 85 units were disbanded. Mine was disbanded under that also, the 45th Medium Royal Canadian Artillery. So if we're talking about reinstating the Halifax Rifles, we also have to reinstate the 45th Medium Royal Canadian Artillery.

LCol Peter Hunter: Maybe we'll make you an honorary colonel.

Voices: Oh, oh!

Mr. John O'Reilly: I have recently worked on the Juno Beach project, and we did receive $209,000 under the millennium funds that we worked on. So there are some things happening that are quite positive.

When you're talking about bringing up the strength, are you talking about reinstating militia units that have been disbanded across the country, or are you talking about strengthening the ones that are there? In my case, you'd have to drive to Oshawa or Peterborough from my community. As some of my comrades will know, we screamed and yelled when someone said they left a footprint in a community. George will remember that a footprint to me means they've left and that's all that's there. So don't use that word. But anyway, the question was, in adding to the strength, are you also reinstating units?

BGen Peter Cameron: Mr. Earle asked a similar question. We have not gone through the entire supplementary order of battle, and I wouldn't be able to tell you today how many units are on it. All I can offer is an opinion on the process of building toward the 45,000 number, or 40,000 or 50,000 or whatever the number is. It would make sense to me as a planner to first revive units with long-standing traditions, battle honours, and representation in communities, before creating any new units. That's an opinion. Clearly the working group charged with the responsibility of doing the building would have to do it, but I can't imagine anyone taking any other approach.

Please, any of my colleagues, comment.

LCol Peter Hunter: I would agree with what General Cameron has just said. We're talking about the addition of some 30-odd units. It would be logical to choose those that have existed in the past and bring them back to life.

You also asked about increasing the numbers in existing units, and that would certainly be part of the program.

Mr. John O'Reilly: Okay, thank you.

Mr. Chairman, just for the record, I am a member of the 14th Field Regiment—an honorary member, but not a colonel.

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A voice: I'll see if I can get your rank boosted up.

Voices: Oh, oh!

The Chairman: There's always tomorrow.

Are there other members with questions?

Mr. Hart.

Mr. Jim Hart: Something just occurred to me. I was wondering how supplemental reservists fit into the equation of your mobilization plan. Recently I looked at a document from the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, and they listed supplemental reservists as people we could call on. I think their total force number was somewhere around 144,000 for the Canadian Armed Forces. Boy, I thought that number was quite shocking. I don't know if the supplemental reservists we have.... I know I'm one of them, and I don't feel very combat-capable some days.

Voices: Oh, oh!

Mr. Jim Hart: So I was just wondering, how do they fit into the mobilization plan?

BGen Peter Cameron: Let me make an opening comment, Mr. Hart, and then I'll invite my colleagues to comment.

The supplementary reserve is an untapped, unused, and vital resource to our planning process. It has continued to exist as a list only. You yourself are a member, and I was until I passed the magic age. But it is the repository of immediate skills that would be available on mobilization, whether for national emergencies such as the Quebec ice storms or for overseas service in a call-out on a peacekeeping mission. It is a huge resource.

It is not being managed at the present time. That it's being maintained is encouraging to me. Clearly if we were to make full use of it, that list would have to be purged of people who are too long out of the service to be able to make a viable contribution, who have moved away from the country possibly, and so on. But I would guess that, once purged, that list would be invaluable to the Canadian army, either regular or reserve component, because these are people who have just finished and are current and ready and available.

John, I know you know a bit about it too.

LCol John Selkirk: I would make two additional comments.

For this list to be particularly useful, you need a mobilization plan, and you might even get as far as assigning people jobs on mobilization so that they could start to think forward and say, “Okay, if the balloon goes up, this is what I have to do.” That's at mobilization, and I would suggest that would not need to cut in necessarily until about stage three.

In addition to that, right now militia units across the country are suffering terribly from this lack of leadership to which Mr. Jordan alluded. We feel that with some flexibility on the part of the Canadian Forces, you could take people off the supplementary reserve list, put them on active militia service for short periods of time, and then put them back on the list again.

To do this today is practically impossible. The need is gone by the time you can get through the paperwork to make it happen. We need to have much more flexibility to do things like that. A simple solution to that would be to take the whole list across the country—which I don't think is as big as 144,000, but it could be—and assign them to the local militia units so that the Brockville Rifles would have the 50 guys who live in Leeds—Grenville, and that unit would manage them.

So there are some simple, commonsense, down-to-earth things that can be done that won't cost a penny.

Mr. Jim Hart: Thank you.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Hart.

Mr. Earle.

Mr. Gordon Earle: I have just a final comment. I'm not an honorary colonel or anything like that, but I do want it very clearly on the record that I support the reinstatement of the Halifax Rifles, and I hope that will take place during 1999 to help celebrate Halifax's 250th anniversary. There is a lot of history associated with that particular unit, and the people associated with it are very proud of that history and it does mean a lot to that community. So I just want that on the record.

The Chairman: Last chance; are there any questions from the members?

Mr. John O'Reilly: Do all the members have the white paper?

The Chairman: The defence white paper?

Mr. John O'Reilly: Yes.

The Chairman: Yes, they should have, I believe.

Mr. John O'Reilly: Okay.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, I want to thank you very much for being here again today. You've been here before.

Through you, I want to thank everyone involved in Reserves 2000, on behalf of SCONDVA, for the tremendous amount of work you've done as a group of very dedicated volunteers.

Some hon. members: Hear, hear!

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The Chairman: It speaks very highly of the calibre of people we have involved in the reserves of this country. I know I can speak for all of us on both sides of the table in thanking you very much, and all our reservists, through you. We're now seized with this issue, and we will do the best we can with it.

Thank you very much.

A witness: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: The meeting is adjourned.