NDVA Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE AND VETERANS AFFAIRS

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE ET DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Tuesday, April 27, 1999

• 1517

[English]

The Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien (London—Fanshawe, Lib.)): I'd like to call to order the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs. I want to welcome General Henault, Mr. Wright, and the other officials from the Departments of National Defence and Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

The first order of business, of course, is the briefing on the situation in Kosovo.

I understand there's a request, I believe from various officials, that we not hold the briefing on Thursday. Is that right, Mr. Clerk?

The Clerk of the Committee: Yes.

The Chairman: I understand human resources are getting pretty stretched. So I'll put that forward now. Unless I hear otherwise from the members, it would not be our intention to hold a briefing on Thursday.

I would note that officially this is a SCONDVA meeting, but we're welcoming those members of the foreign affairs committee who are still in Ottawa. A number of those members are travelling this week.

Mr. Turp, you have a question?

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp (Beauharnois—Salaberry, BQ): Mr. Chairman, I don't quite understand this. The Minister of Foreign Affairs undertook to brief committee members and other parliamentarians twice a week, for 30 to 45 minutes. There's no justification for cancelling the second briefing session this week. I realize that Mr. Wright, General Henault and the others have a busy schedule, but parliamentarians are entitled to be well informed, as the Prime Minister stated once again this afternoon. I hope, and I know I'm not alone in thinking this, that we have this second briefing repeatedly promised to us.

[English]

The Chairman: I understand that concern. It just came to my attention this morning that this request was being made, and that's why I wanted to air it here for all colleagues.

Maybe I can go to the relevant witnesses who can speak to this. Is there someone who can speak to the difficulty of holding the Thursday briefing? Mr. Wright, perhaps, or General—

• 1520

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: May I say something? This appears even more important, in light of the announcement today of further major commitments. Parliamentarians need to be kept well informed.

[English]

The Chairman: I think that's a given. I think the desire of the members to have the briefings is a given on all sides. I just want to give the staff an opportunity to see, from their point of view, what the problem is.

Mr. Wright.

Mr. Jim Wright (Director General for Central, East and South Europe, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): This week, Mr. Chairman, is an extremely busy week, not only in terms of appearances before various committees and preparing ministers to appear before various committees, but we are also doing our very best to prepare Mr. Axworthy in terms of the important mission he's about to undertake to Moscow, to Skopje, Macedonia, to Athens, and to Cairo. We want to make sure the minister is as fully prepared as possible. The minister leaves on Wednesday. He arrives in Moscow on Thursday. We are trying to devote as many resources to those preparations as well, to ensure that the minister makes as strong an impression as he can on his Moscow interlocutors.

The Chairman: I think we understand your problem.

There are a couple of other questions. I just want to ask, though, from the chair, is it not possible that other of your officials could appear if you gentlemen and lady are personally tied up? We obviously understand the demands on your time. Are there other officials who could appear and try to give us a briefing?

Mr. Jim Wright: I know one of the individuals who was here last week, Mr. Dhavernas, unfortunately has had to go into the hospital, frankly from overwork, stress. Some of the individuals who participate in these briefings are travelling with the minister.

We're doing our best to try to respond to all the different demands. We respect enormously the importance of this particular group and are trying to pass on to you as much information as we can. I guess our problem simply is that there are only so many hours in the day. We're already working close to about 18 to 20 hours a day. It's becoming hard to accommodate all of the different demands that are being placed on us.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Wright.

I'm going to go to the other members. I would just note, though, that the SCONDVA committee is in here at 4 p.m. for a meeting that has to start at 4 p.m., so I don't want to use up today's briefing time. Let's get a couple more members on comments and then we'll make some kind of decision.

Mr. Robinson, and then Mr. Price.

Mr. Svend J. Robinson (Burnaby—Douglas, NDP): Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the difficulties of the witnesses, but I just want to reinforce the point that Mr. Turp made. This is the only forum of accountability to Parliament. I don't think we're asking too much to ask that we have that accountability for 45 minutes twice a week, particularly when there have been some significant new developments.

I understand that the minister has to be briefed. He will be leaving on Wednesday. There is a department that is quite capable of briefing him. With great respect to our witnesses, we were given an undertaking that this would happen, and I expect it to be honoured.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Mr. Price.

Mr. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, PC): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I agree totally. The only thing I could say where we might be a little bit more flexible, particularly on the defence side, is maybe since we're talking about the possibility of an embargo, or something like that, we could look Thursday, just for that particular day, at the naval aspect of it. Maybe they could free up somebody from that side.

The Chairman: A more limited briefing or a more focused briefing.

Mr. David Price: Yes, but of course that still wouldn't touch on the foreign affairs side.

The Chairman: All right.

Mr. Proud.

Mr. George Proud (Hillsborough, Lib.): Are you saying this is just for this Thursday? We will go back to two days a week next week?

Mr. Jim Wright: Minister Axworthy was absolutely sincere when he made his commitment at the outset to this process, and there's no intention of backtracking on that.

I'm not travelling with the minister this week. I'll make every effort to be here on Thursday to assist. I think we simply wanted to signal that we are getting pulled in a lot of different directions at the same time. We're trying to ensure that we respect this particular chamber and that we are responding to the demands of the ministers as well.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr. Wright.

I think we'll leave it this way then. The members clearly want to try to have that briefing on Thursday. It will remain scheduled as it was. All we can ask is that the relevant departments do their utmost to have whatever officials are available to accommodate us at that time. We will certainly share with the relevant ministers—I'm sure they're well aware themselves already, but we'll reinforce just how overburdened some of you people are personally, and some of your staff as well.

• 1525

Mr. Pratt.

Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.): I just wanted to probe you, Mr. Chair, as to whether or not you were going to take Mr. Price up on his suggestion that the briefing on Thursday be a bit more focused on the naval side, which would perhaps accomplish both of our ends quite nicely in terms of having the briefing, but having it focused in a particular area, and freeing up some of the other staff. I think it was a good suggestion.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: I wouldn't want this to deprive us of the presence of Jim Wright, if he's available, as he seems to be, if only for a brief period of time.

[English]

The Chairman: Mr. Price's idea is fine by me. I don't want to pre-empt the thoughts of the other committee members who are looking for the fullest briefing. If we can come to a consensus that we can have a little more targeted briefing...if it helps staff to be a little more targeted or focused for one particular session. If that's agreeable to everyone, let's proceed in that fashion.

If we might proceed then with today's briefing, we have 35 minutes. We want to respect the rule that I know we have, which is to try to have any questions be limited to a minute and any answers be limited to a minute. We now have two committees meeting jointly, so I'll try to ask members to be very respectful of that rule so we can get some questions in, because we must end at 4 o'clock sharp.

Who is going to begin? Okay, Mr. Wright.

Mr. Jim Wright: Very briefly, Mr. Chairman, I'd first like to touch on the results of the NATO Washington summit and secondly on Minister Axworthy's forthcoming visit to Moscow.

With respect to the NATO summit, alliance leaders expressed solidarity and strong determination to carry on with the operation against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and to intensify NATO operations until our objectives are met.

[Translation]

The heads of state and government of the alliance have reaffirmed their solidarity and determination to continue with the air strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and also to step up their missions until NATO objectives are realized.

[English]

NATO reiterated the five conditions Milosevic must meet in order to bring the bombing to a halt. The alliance is unwaivering in its commitment to these five conditions. Allies also agree to intensify the implementation of economic sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This will address in particular the flow of petroleum, oil, and lubricants, which are crucial to the operations of the Yugoslav military. To this end, the European Union is implementing an embargo on petroleum products and NATO is planning for possible naval operations to restrict the flow of oil into Yugoslavia.

With respect to the seven front-line states surrounding Kosovo, NATO heads of state and government also met with representatives from these countries. That includes Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, and Slovenia. These states have serious concerns regarding their security and the impact of the crisis on their economies. At the summit meeting NATO leaders assured the front-line states that the alliance would respond to any threat posed by Yugoslavia as a result of their cooperation with NATO forces.

The alliance also recognized that some front-line states, and that includes in particular Macedonia and Albania, are in serious need of economic and financial assistance if they are to sustain the current crisis. International financial institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank, will need to show understanding and immediate support. This is especially true in the case of Macedonia, and we had an excellent meeting with the minister of foreign affairs and the minister of defence in Washington at the summit.

Allied leaders in Washington also indicated that NATO's commitment to advancing the development of southeastern Europe and to bringing stability and security to the entire region is a priority. The alliance recognizes that in order to do this, NATO allies and partners will need to offer political, military, and economic support to the countries of the region as part of a comprehensive strategy.

• 1530

In the House of Commons today the Prime Minister stated very clearly that Canada is actively engaged on two fronts in the Kosovo crisis: the military and the diplomatic. Planning is proceeding, as you know, for Minister Axworthy's trip to Moscow, to Skopje in Macedonia, to Athens, and to Cairo. His key meeting in Moscow will be with Foreign Minister Ivanov. They will discuss how to try to convince President Milosevic to accept the international community's five conditions. Russia's engagement is essential to allow the UN Security Council to play its role in the search for peace.

[Translation]

In Moscow, Ministers Axworthy and Ivanov will discuss ways of getting President Milosevic to agree to the five conditions set out by the international community. If the Security Council is to play a role in the peace process, then it's critical that Russia be on side.

[English]

Under the current circumstances, it goes without saying that the peace process is at a very sensitive stage. The only way it can move forward is through quiet diplomacy. Minister Axworthy will also wish to discuss how Canada and Russia can work together to address the immediate humanitarian crisis, both within Kosovo and in the region, ideally through the adoption of a UN Security Council resolution.

That concludes my opening statement, Mr. Chairman. I've brought with me documentation in English and French, a full set of documentation from the NATO summit, which I can leave with the clerk.

The Chairman: Very good. Thank you, Mr. Wright.

General Henault, did you have some opening comments as well, sir?

Lieutenant General Raymond R. Henault (Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, Department of National Defence): Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman, and if I can indulge you, I do have a few comments that actually reflect the current state of the campaign as reflected both in NATO documents and also by SACEUR this morning. It will give you a better feel for how things are going. It might take me a few extra minutes, but I think it might be worthwhile.

The Chairman: We'd appreciate that. Thank you.

LGen Raymond Henault: Clearly, with well over 3,000 strike missions or over 12,000 missions that have actually been flown at this point in time, Operation Allied Force has increasingly degraded the infrastructure and the field forces of the Yugoslavian military. It has been concluded to date that in general terms NATO has and maintains air superiority over the Yugoslavian air space. I'll talk a little bit about statistics in a few moments.

The air defence forces are essentially ineffective both day and night. Although there are firings of weapons, missile systems, and so on, they are not achieving any success and not hitting any aircraft.

[Translation]

Forces, particularly those in Kosovo, have been severely hampered by the destruction of the industrial infrastructure and maintenance facilities. Oil supplies and movements have been interrupted.

[English]

The Kosovo battlefield is becoming increasingly isolated, of course, by the road destruction, bridge destructions, and the inability of resupply and sustainment to take place as a result of all the bombing. In particular, bridges and rail links are degrading their capability quite considerably.

In the integrated air defence system, I can note for you that the Yugoslavian air force has not been a very potent force from the outset. We saw five of their aircraft shot down at the very beginning of the operation. NATO has destroyed over 50% of their front-line fighters, their MIG-29 fighters—I reported this to you last time—and approximately 30% of their less capable aircraft. What that actually represents is over 70 aircraft now destroyed in the Yugoslav republic.

[Translation]

NATO forces are continuing to target air fields. Most have sustained severe damage. However, the Yugoslav forces recover quickly and generally speaking, 24 or 48 hours after the strikes, the air fields, or at least a portion of them, are back in use.

[English]

This is something that's been practised by NATO air forces as well as other air forces. Obviously this is battle damage repair. The Yugoslavs are obviously very good at it. They're good at it in terms of redundant systems, communications, and so on. They have the same redundant capability with their air fields.

I won't say very much about the surface-to-air missile systems, although I will tell you that we have destroyed, through NATO air forces, approximately 40% of their SA-3 or SAM-3 weapons, which are a lesser capability than the SAM-6, and the SAM-6s have had about 25% of their capability now destroyed.

• 1535

The mobility of these sites, of course, is to the advantage of the Yugoslavs. They move them around very quickly, and that makes targeting very difficult. However, as we see firings, and firings that are ineffective in most cases and almost random, it is clear to us that they are burning out some of their supplies, and their resupply is certainly not assured.

A Canadian CF-18 was engaged by a surface-to-air missile last night. In fact he had to break off his run last night because of evasive action that was required on his part. This is not the first time, but this is one of the first instances where we've actually had to take evasive action that has not allowed him to actually go to his target.

In terms of command and control, we are degrading the command-and-control and communications system. It is moderately damaged at this point in time. That includes a number of facilities, which include radio relay systems, reporting posts, television stations, as we've reported and talked about in a number of fora at this point in time, and the radio relay capability that their back-up military systems and others have available to them in the country.

Just as a general point, I would say that the Yugoslavs are obviously very capable of this type of operation; that is, degraded operations. They have dug underground in those cases a lot of their facilities, their command-and-control capability, and their oil and lubricants as well. So it is very difficult to get at some of this.

[Translation]

Lastly, lines of communication have been affected only moderately thus far. By lines of communication, I don't mean transmission lines, but rather roads and rail lines and resupply and support infrastructures.

[English]

I would say as well that in terms of POL resources, just for a measure, if you like, on your part, NATO has estimated that approximately one-third of their military reserves of oil, petrol, and lubricants have now been destroyed.

We've also been asked for, and you've already pointed out a desire for, a little more information on maritime interdiction operations or visit-and-search-type operations, as we've talked about. This is all part and parcel of what the supreme allied commander is doing in terms of looking at the full range of options available to NATO to restrict the flow of oil into Yugoslavia. We have not yet seen all of the options that are available to NATO, and of course NATO, in the fullness of the 19 nations of the North Atlantic Council, will be discussing this in the very few days ahead of us.

It will be a broader strategy, I have no doubt, to limit that oil, but maritime operations do of course form one part of that strategy and one that's been very prominent here in the last few days.

NATO has also had limited success in disrupting both the Serbian and military and special police forces' operational capability inside Kosovo, as I think you are well aware. The question was asked of me at the last briefing what percentage we thought had been destroyed of those types of vehicles, heavy vehicles. The current assessments we have from NATO are that about 10% to 20% of those armoured vehicles, heavy vehicles, have been destroyed, still leaving approximately 300 tanks and 100 heavy artillery pieces in the region. I would note for you some caution, though, in those numbers because we have no way of verifying exactly how many have been destroyed. This is what is reported—that 10% to 20%. How many have been destroyed inside storage buildings, inside assembly areas that are under cover, it is impossible for us to estimate at this point in time without forces on the ground.

[Translation]

Finally, weather conditions are improving. We believe the air campaign will continue to intensify and to be even more successful than it has been. Apache attack helicopters are now in place and will be pressed into service very shortly against the ground forces.

[English]

In terms of Canada's contribution, we continue to be scheduled for somewhere in the neighbourhood of 12 to 16 sorties per day—today was a 14-sortie day—in a combination of combat air patrol, delivery of precision and non-precision munitions, and escort duties.

The additional six F-18s that are committed to this operation will depart for Aviano later on this week. Tomorrow or the day after is the planned departure date from Cold Lake. There is a combination of aircraft from Cold Lake and Bagotville that will join each other in Goose Bay and do the transatlantic crossing. When all is said and done, we will have a total of 18 aircraft in theatre, presumably by the end of this week, by May 1 or 2.

[Translation]

Our fighter aircraft continue to target army barracks, oil and lubricant refineries, radio transmission towers, command posts, weapons storage facilities and armoured vehicles.

• 1540

[English]

I would also note for you, as the Prime Minister has announced—and I know you're only too aware, having been in the House—that the CF will now be deploying forward its contingent of peacekeepers. This is approximately 800 persons, men and women of the Canadian Forces, who are deploying to join the British brigade, which is part of the allied rapid reaction corps and part of what we now call the NATO force in FYROM. They will start deploying very quickly.

Our only limiting factor, I would note to you, because I know you're interested in this, is obtaining a ship, and the ship can take as much as three weeks to get into port. But it's a very hit and miss issue, in that if a ship is available, we may have it in a few days.

Nonetheless, we have committed to the British forces and to NATO that we will have that force operational in theatre within 60 days. That is very much consistent with what the allied force has in terms of our sequencing into theatre and also our ability to support enabling force activity.

My last point is on the humanitarian front. We still remain at 72 hours' notice to move to assist in any large-scale refugee movements into Canada. At the present time, we have not seen those large numbers. I do know there are refugee movements into Canada at this point.

[Translation]

Currently, in terms of refugee movements into Canada—and Foreign Affairs spokespersons can give you additional information—these are primarily individuals wishing to join family members. I don't have the exact figures, but I know that there are currently fewer than 1,000 scheduled to come, and certainly not 5,000, as announced earlier.

That concludes my presentation, Mr. Chairman.

[English]

The Chairman: Thank you very much, General Henault and Mr. Wright.

Let's go now to brief questions of one minute, please. Try to have a succinct answer, if possible, and we will get in as many members as possible, starting with Mr. Hart.

Mr. Jim Hart (Okanagan—Coquihalla, Ref.): Thank you very much, gentlemen, for being here. I'll try to be quick.

General, maybe you can pass along our congratulations to the air force pilots and the ground crew in Aviano who are performing these missions.

I did want to ask you a couple of questions with respect to the peacekeepers that have been announced today. One of them you've already covered off with the 60 days. I was wondering, in the event that they have to be removed from theatre quickly, would it also take 60 days to get them out if that were required? If so, isn't that a rather long time?

The other issue is with rules of engagement. I asked the question in the House today with respect to rules of engagement for the peacekeepers, if they would be drafted here in Canada, and if they could be supplied to members of this committee and certainly to the House in general. How exactly does that work? Are there NATO rules of engagement and Canadian rules of engagement? Maybe you could respond.

LGen Raymond Henault: In terms of withdrawal from theatre, the 60 days, I might add, is a compendium of movement time from the western area, which is where the forces are currently located, to the port of Montreal, or whichever other port is most available to us. Then there is the transit time across the Atlantic into the Mediterranean and obviously into a port of entry, which is likely going to be in Greece. We still have yet to confirm that. So much of that 60 days is actually movement time.

If we were called upon to extract the force from the region, it would extract from the immediate area in fairly short order. I could not give you an exact number of days because it would depend on the actual situation. For example, they would probably withdraw from FYROM and in the space of one week they would be in either Greece or some other location. They would then have to wait for the availability of shipping or aircraft movements and so on to get them out of the theatre. So I wouldn't use that as the same benchmark as withdrawing them from the force. Again, that would all have to be done by the NATO commanders.

In terms of rules of engagement, we always work with rules of engagement that are developed for us in a NATO context or working in a NATO operation. The rules of engagement are initially developed by NATO. Those rules of engagement are forwarded to us. They're reviewed by both DND and Foreign Affairs. The rules of engagement then have Canadian amplifications to them, depending on whether or not there are Canadian items of law that have to be injected into the rules of engagement. In most cases, they may be somewhat more restrictive, but they're certainly not at odds with the NATO rules of engagement.

Ultimately, the minister has delegated the responsibility for publishing rules of engagement to the chief of defence, who eventually signs a set of rules of engagement, which actually govern the use of force by a force in theatre. Those are normally confidential. You would have to address the issue with the Minister of National Defence in terms of releasing them to this committee, but certainly at his call we would be only too happy to provide them for you.

• 1545

Mr. Jim Hart: Thank you.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Hart.

M. Laurin.

[Translation]

Mr. René Laurin (Joliette, BQ): Mr. Chairman, considering the large number of sorties, almost 6,000 to date, I'm surprised NATO hasn't made more progress destroying select targets. Is it that the missiles being used aren't powerful enough to completely destroy the target during the initial strike, or is it that targets are only being partially hit? Which is it? Radio and television stations had to be bombed twice before they were destroyed.

Secondly, we know that our CF-18s are equipped with radar- guided missile systems. However, they are not equipped with systems to detect missiles launched against them while in flight. Therefore, they have to be escorted by US aircraft equipped with such systems.

I've been told that this situation is very unsettling for our pilots and places them at a disadvantage. Would you care to comment on this report?

LGen Henault: The total number of sorties is not necessarily an indication of success. The air offensive is carefully planned. As we mentioned, the first stage involves neutralizing anti-air systems, command and control systems, airports and air fields. Then we move on to increasingly strategic targets, which very often must be hit twice. For example runways can be repaired in approximately 48 hours. Therefore, they need to be hit a second time. That's one of the factors we need to bear in mind.

Targeting often means staging a second strike. Perhaps we didn't make a direct hit the first time. While our strikes are highly accurate, a hit, for example on Serbian headquarters, may not necessarily take out the transmission antenna, because the prime target may have been the building itself.

It all depends on the selected strike point. Some targets must be struck repeatedly. Our weapons systems are highly sophisticated and geared to specific targets.

In terms of our CF-18s and their self-defence systems, it's true that these aircraft have radars and missile warning systems on board. They are also equipped with anti-missile and chaff launching systems to counter strikes by radar-guided missiles. Phosphorescent dispensers are used to send missiles off course.

Chase aircraft try to take out anti-aircraft systems to give pilots a chance to focus on the strike target. It's too much for pilots to have to concentrate on hitting their target while at the same time, fighting off missiles and anti-aircraft systems.

Our CF-18s are well equipped with all of the systems you mentioned.

Mr. René Laurin: Are they really?

LGen Henault: Yes.

Mr. René Laurin: They can detect a missile that has been fired at them?

LGen Henault: Yes, absolutely.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Laurin.

Mr. Turp.

Mr. Daniel Turp: I have two questions for Jim Wright concerning developments on the foreign affairs front.

What is your take today on the apparent failure of the mission by US Under Secretary Talbott? As I understand it, Mr. Chernomyrdin told him that all NATO air strikes had to stop before talks could be initiated with Belgrade. NATO, however, has repeatedly rejected this condition.

Deputy Premier Draskovic, who often appears these days on television, also seems to have backtracked. He now claims that Mr. Milosevic never agreed to consider the deployment of a UN-led peacekeeping force. How are we to interpret today's statement?

• 1550

There's been another important development as well. It appears the Pentagon is seriously considering invading Serbia and taking drastic action, such as arresting Slobodan Milosevic and bringing him up on charges before the International War Crimes Tribunal.

[English]

Mr. Jim Wright: Thank you very much.

With respect to some of the recent comments by Mr. Draskovic, the Deputy Prime Minister of Yugoslavia.... Certainly I would hope Mr. Milosevic would be listening to some of his own leadership talking about the fact that Mr. Milosevic is leading his country, his people, into a level of destruction and despair that we hope will result in the Yugoslav people, on their own account, questioning the wisdom of the leadership being provided by Mr. Milosevic.

Mr. Draskovic represents a different political party from Mr. Milosevic, but he does sit in a position of importance in the government. We hope his comments today, criticizing the direction in which Mr. Milosevic is going, are listened to by Mr. Milosevic, and we hope they're listened to by the people of Yugoslavia as well.

In terms of the mission of Mr. Talbott, the Deputy Secretary of State, we have very preliminary information on that visit. Mr. Talbott is going to Brussels to fully brief the NATO Council, I believe tomorrow, and will be in a better position, frankly, to react to some of the public comments perhaps associated with that visit to Moscow. We know there were a number of very important meetings today, I believe with Mr. Ivanov, possibly with Mr. Primakov and Mr. Chernomyrdin. We don't have all the details on this yet.

One of the difficulties we always face in these sets of circumstances is that everybody is working very hard on the diplomatic track to see whether or not we can come up with a peace process that will find favour in Moscow. That is extremely important. That's the reason why Mr. Axworthy is going. We want to see whether or not we can take the five conditions that have been established by the international community, endorsed by the Secretary General of the United Nations.... We'd like to see whether or not we can package that in a way that finds acceptance with the Russians, that sets out a peace process that could be enshrined in a UN Security Council resolution. That's the objective. It's going to take some time, it's going to take some patience, and it's going to take quiet diplomacy.

So I can't give you a full briefing on the results of Mr. Talbott's mission because we don't have all the details on that yet.

With respect to the comments you're referring to with respect to the Pentagon, I am not familiar with the source of this information. In respect of an invasion of Serbia, the NATO plan is the NATO plan. The NATO plan calls for a peacekeeping mission. The Prime Minister announced today predeployment of peacekeepers who would enter Yugoslavia at such time as there is an agreed peace process.

In terms of an invasion, a non-permissive combat situation, we are not there yet. NATO made very clear what its commitment was, and that is to an air campaign, an intensified air campaign. Military planners in NATO were sent away to examine possible options in terms of ground forces, but no decisions on this were taken by leaders. There was limited discussion of this. The commitment of leaders was very much to the air campaign and the intensification of the air campaign. But NATO planners were asked to go away and study options and report back through the supreme allied commander to NATO. There was absolutely no decision taken on that front whatsoever. The commitment for now and for the immediate future is to the air campaign, and an intensified air campaign.

• 1555

On the question of Milosevic, should he be arrested, should he be indicted by the International Criminal Court in The Hague—he has a lot to answer for, there's no question in our mind. But we are not the judge and jury. The Government of Canada has made it very clear from the outset that we are prepared to provide all information that comes into our possession to the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague, to Madame Louise Arbour, the chief prosecutor. It is the job of Louise Arbour and her court to follow the evidence wherever it goes, and she has made it very clear that she will follow the evidence right to the very top of the regime, and that could very well include Mr. Milosevic.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Turp.

Mr. Robinson, then Mr. Pratt.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have four brief questions.

The Chairman: We have four minutes left, so be very brief.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Last week I raised the issue of getting humanitarian aid to refugees in Kosovo. I wonder if you could report back on what is happening on that front.

Secondly, naval blockade or embargo, what is the position you take with respect to Russian tankers that do not wish to be visited and searched?

Third, why are we bombing a TV and radio station? In Belgrade I understand there may be transmitters. Why not bomb transmitters instead of the station?

Fourth, on the 800 troops that are being predeployed, what will their role be in FYROM before there is a peace agreement? Would these troops be in a position to be deployed in a non-permissive environment if NATO called on them to do so?

The Chairman: I will the ask the officials to give real quick answers. I am going to get to Mr. Pratt's question and I've got three minutes to do it.

Mr. Wright.

Mr. Jim Wright: On the question of humanitarian aid into Kosovo, it's a very difficult issue. The Greeks had some success using their Médecins Sans Frontières NGO.

One of the issues Mr. Axworthy wants to discuss with Ivanov is possible cooperation, possibly in the form of a UN Security Council resolution in New York, non-politicized, not condemning anyone, but simply saying we have a serious problem on the ground with respect to refugees. We're seeing what can be done on that front. So we're looking at it. And there was discussion at some length on the question of internally displaced people by leaders in Washington.

On question number two, the naval embargo—not blockade but naval embargo—it is being looked at by NATO as we speak. The NATO military planners will be reporting back to the supreme allied commander, who will be raising the issue in the North Atlantic Council later this week—I think toward the end of this week at the earliest. The issue of Russian tankers could come up in due course. I fully expect Mr. Axworthy will want to discuss this directly with Mr. Ivanov in Moscow.

The Prime Minister has made it very clear that we have no intention of going ahead and provoking the Russians on this issue. We are looking at options, military, political, and legal, and the advice that comes out of NATO, and we are of course discussing it very carefully with our legal advisers at the Departments of National Defence and Foreign Affairs. But we're not there yet.

Why TV and radio? Because President Milosevic is using these facilities as part of his communications network to his defence authorities. NATO made that very clear.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Do they have to kill journalists? Why not take out the transmission towers?

Mr. Jim Wright: The bombing attack by NATO was done at nighttime. It was done with the very best of effort to reduce civilian casualties, but the fact of the matter is that these are part of the instruments of Slobodan Milosevic's war machine and propaganda machine, and they are a legitimate target for NATO.

I'll turn the last question over to the general.

LGen Raymond Henault: I would just add on the TV stations that all elements of the broadcast and transmission system are being targeted, not only the TV stations, but also the transmitters, relay stations, and so on. So it's part of a package, like the air campaign itself.

In terms of troops in FYROM, our troops will be integrated into the British brigade, as I've said to you before. The troops will assist in the force protection of the actual British brigade, as part and parcel of brigade-level troops. They will also be doing humanitarian work where possible or where requested by the commander of the NATO force or the British brigade. And they need to integrate into that brigade to be able to operate effectively and efficiently at the outset of operations.

There is an integration process that has to go on. It's a multinational brigade. There is a training bill that goes along with doing operations, and you have to be properly trained and properly integrated before you can do operations properly. That's what we're hoping to do: get them in there and get them trained. When it's time to do the peacekeeping mission, we'll be ready to go at the outset.

• 1600

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Robinson.

Mr. Pratt, one quick question and one quick answer, and then the last question goes to Mr. Price.

Mr. David Pratt: Mr. Chair, presumably I'm going to have at least as much time as Mr. Robinson had.

The Chairman: I'll give you one minute. Those are the rules. Go ahead.

Mr. David Pratt: I have four questions. Maybe—

The Chairman: That's the trick here, I think. We've learned quickly at SCONDVA.

Mr. David Pratt: First of all, General, this committee has had a fair bit of exposure to the Clothe the Soldier Program. I'm just wondering if our soldiers are going to be equipped with some of the latest in terms of environmental protection from the elements in terms of their work in theatre.

You mentioned that a lot of the MIG-29 capability of the Yugoslav air force has been degraded. I'm just wondering what has happened to those other planes. During the Iraq war, of course, Saddam Hussein evacuated a lot of his planes out of the country. I'm wondering if Milosevic has done the same thing, or are they in hardened shelters or protected areas? What has become of the other MIG-29s?

I'm also curious as to whether or not the air force has established evidence of any more sophisticated armour in the theatre. I'm thinking of perhaps more sophisticated Russian armour in terms of the T-80 battle tank that the Russians have developed over the last number of years.

Finally, is our country using any other country's transport capacity to get our troops in theatre?

The Chairman: As briefly as possible, please, gentlemen.

LGen Raymond Henault: I can tell you that the Clothe the Soldier Program is well underway and has been providing the latest up-to-date clothing to our soldiers as they deploy into Bosnia, not only into this operation. So I can assure you that the best possible clothing will be provided, and also the best possible equipment is being provided in the form of the Coyote and the Griffin helicopter, with all the equipment that goes with that. So I'm very confident in that.

In terms of the MIG-29s, we don't know if they've flown any out of the country. Certainly that may have happened. We don't know that, but I remind you that there are several underground locations that the Yugoslavs have dug over the years, so they could very well be hidden there in some cases. I bring back to the table again, though, the fact that 50% of his MIG-29s, which are his front-line fighters, have been destroyed, so we've actually gotten rid of a fair number of them already.

In terms of armour, most of the equipment they have in theatre is Russian or at least of former Soviet extraction. I'm not aware of the upgraded armour you're talking about, though. That's something I have not seen in reports to date.

In terms of transport, it will be a combination of commercial transport for the roll-on, roll-off ships, for example, unless we can get military assistance from the U. S., which has exactly that kind of shipment capability—roll on, roll off—and we will use that as a first premise and the commercial as the second premise. We will probably have a combination of commercial and military air transport to take people and some of the smaller equipment over. So it's a combination of all of those.

Mr. David Pratt: Thank you.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Pratt.

With everyone's indulgence, Mr. Price has a quick question and Mr. Crête wants a quick question.

Mr. David Price: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll try to make it as quick as possible.

We're looking at a large recce group going in, obviously. They're going to be doing a lot of recce along the border. Are they going to be ready to respond to a situation of incursion at the border?

LGen Raymond Henault: That's quite hypothetical, so it's very difficult to answer that. But I would say they will not operate inside the buffer zone, which has already been established, which is a five-kilometre buffer zone. The intent at the moment—-

Mr. David Price: They wouldn't operate interior to that zone? That zone is completely clean?

LGen Raymond Henault: None of the NATO forces are allowed inside the buffer zone, to my knowledge.

Mr. David Price: Even recce?

LGen Raymond Henault: Mr. Wright may know more than I do about that particular one.

Mr. Jim Wright: That's at the request of the Macedonians.

LGen Raymond Henault: I will state also that the intent for them to do reconnaissance is primarily designed to do reconnaissance once they go into the peacekeeping operation. They will integrate into the British brigade and develop and refine the procedures that are required. There's no intent for them to be doing patrolling up and down the border before the peace agreement is reached, at least not at this point in time, so I don't see any possibility of what you're talking about. But they will defend themselves if they're attacked at any time they're in the former Macedonia.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Price.

Mr. Crête, très brièvement, s'il vous plaît.

• 1605

[Translation]

Mr. Paul Crête (Kamouraska—Rivière-du-Loup—Témiscouata—Les Basques, BQ): Could someone give me a brief overview of the refugee situation and tell me whether conditions have improved any for them? Ms. Corneau updated their situation for us last week. Is there anything new to report on this front and what is the extent of Canada's financial commitment to the relief effort?

[English]

Mr. Charles Bassett (Vice-President, Central and Eastern Europe Branch, Canadian International Development Agency): Mr. Chairman, we are currently up to total disbursements of $52 million that have been announced to date.

[Translation]

Last week Minister Marleau announced a further $30 million in financial aid. How this money is to be spent is now being decided. It will be shared by groups working on site, including the UNHCR, UNICEF and Canadian NGOs such as CARE Canada and the CECI. They will be the recipients of these funds.

[English]

The Chairman: Thank you.

A very final question to Mr. Earle. Very briefly, please, Mr. Earle.

Mr. Gordon Earle (Halifax West, NDP): Thank you.

You mentioned that over 70 aircraft, I believe, have now been destroyed in Yugoslavia. Can you tell us the situation with respect to the pilots of those aircraft?

I heard an Apache helicopter had crashed. Is there any truth in that? Was there any injury or death in that situation?

LGen Raymond Henault: To take the second question first, there was a crash of an Apache last night in former Macedonia. It was a crash during a training mission. It was not related to any kind of combat action. I don't know the actual circumstances of the crash. The crew were injured, but they survived and they're in the field hospital now and are recovering.

In terms of damage to aircraft, your question was related to the numbers themselves?

Mr. Gordon Earle: Were there any pilots associated with that, or were these just stationary aircraft?

LGen Raymond Henault: We do know there were two MIG-29s that were inside Bosnian territory, for example. We have not seen evidence of the pilots. They were not in the wreckage, obviously, and they are nowhere to be found. So either they've been extracted themselves or they were rescued in the same kind of context as the F-117 pilot was.

In terms of actual casualties, I don't know the answer to that in that we aren't getting casualty reports from the Serbs. But many of those aircraft were also destroyed on the ground. So there's a combination of the two. There were probably some casualties, but I can't give you numbers.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr. Earle.

General Henault, Mr. Wright, all the officials, thank you very much. We know the kinds of hours you have to be putting in, and we appreciate the work you're doing.

We are going to go ahead with the scheduled briefing on Thursday. I would just ask you to do the very best you can with whatever officials to accommodate the members. It will be a joint meeting of SCONDVA and SCOFAIT.

Thank you very much again.

LGen Raymond Henault: It's our pleasure.

The Chairman: This meeting is adjourned.