JURI Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE AND LEGAL AFFAIRS

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE LA JUSTICE ET DES QUESTIONS JURIDIQUES

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Tuesday, November 4, 1997

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[English]

The Chair (Ms. Shaughnessy Cohen (Windsor—St. Clair, Lib.)): Order, please.

I want to welcome back all of those who are experienced in this committee and who were members of the committee before, and welcome all of the new members as well.

Before we start, let me say that I'm mindful we have not done our organizational motions for this committee yet. I've spoken to many of you about just getting through this today, while dealing with those motions that might be contentious a bit later.

We have two witnesses today. In addition to that, we have confirmed other witnesses who would like to come tomorrow afternoon, including the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, and the Criminal Lawyers' Association of Ontario, from Toronto. That would mean we would be doing clause-by-clause study after those two witnesses tomorrow.

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I'm sure there are comments on the process here. In terms of confirming those witnesses, however, does any committee member have a problem with doing that?

Mr. Chuck Strahl (Fraser Valley, Ref.): I have a point of order. I'm sure there will be comments. Even in the brief that we do have from the Canadian Police Association, I see that even they comment on the process we're entering into here. As they say in here, we've created a crisis-like atmosphere. In fact, they go so far as to say:

By agreeing to this unnecessarily expedited procedure we cannot help but note that MPs are themselves contributing to the alarming emasculation of Parliament as an institution.

—by agreeing to the process we're entering into here today.

I know, Madam Chair, that you are not responsible for this, because you've been handed this plate to deal with. But in the strongest possible terms, I have to say for the record that this is not the first time this has happened. We have done everything we can to try to help the committee do its work. We withdrew speakers on Friday, as you know. We didn't put this to a vote, as you know. We encouraged the committee to meet as soon as possible in order to get the witnesses as soon as possible. But when we are given this at short notice by the department, by the minister, to deal with when we cannot even move important witnesses on all sides of this issue to come and give testimony, we cannot help but feel that our rights as members of Parliament are being infringed.

My hat is off to those people who were able to come on a day's notice. But really, Madam Chair, it is an affront to Parliament and to this committee to ask us to ram through like a sausage an important bill that involves constitutional change, that will be charter challenged, and that involves victims, lawyers, and the whole gamut of the justice department. We just feel this process is so seriously flawed that we're not convinced we can give it the proper hearing it deserves in the short time you have allotted, unless more witnesses can come on this incredibly short notice. Witnesses have given notice to us that they would be pleased to come. In fact, they would like to come here to share their expertise, but they just cannot possibly come on one or two days' notice.

I don't want to belabour the point, except to say to the chair that I'm not sure who is the guardian of this process, but it is so flawed that the Reform Party is more than uncomfortable. If we weren't going into an out-of-Ottawa week next week, we would absolutely not agree to it. We're unclear on whether or not we should even proceed through the House by this self-imposed Friday deadline. We're unclear as to whether or not we're going to be able to hear enough witnesses to satisfy our questions, and I think the questions of others on the committee, about the issues that should be raised in order to obtain expert opinion.

So again, I'm certainly not blaming you, Shaughnessy—

The Chair: No, I appreciate that.

Mr. Chuck Strahl: —but the process is just a sham. It's just a shame, too, that members of this committee are being treated like this. They've had this ruling since May, and only now, on the eve, in the crisis moment, do we find out that we have to deal with it but can't call the witnesses that you yourself have put on the list. It's just a shame, and it's a sham, and it shouldn't be allowed. If I was a full member of the committee, the minister would be getting a whole earful about this, because it's just wrong in every way possible.

The Chair: I think she can hear you.

Mr. Chuck Strahl: I imagine she can. It's bad, and it's poor process.

The Chair: Thank you for your comments, but can I assume the you are still participating in the process?

Mr. Chuck Strahl: Well, I'm still here so far.

The Chair: I know the parliamentary secretary wishes to address the issue, but can I just say something as an editorial comment? Assuming that you're consenting to the Association of Chiefs of Police and the Criminal Lawyers' Association appearing tomorrow, with the Canadian Police Association and with the Victims Resource Centre, as well as the expertise of the department and the expertise that is available on this committee as well—it's quite an enhanced committee in terms of the personal resources of the members this time—I would suggest that we may not be hearing everyone, but we certainly are getting a good balance. I have to say I'm particularly pleased that the Criminal Lawyers' Association is coming, for that very reason.

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Ms. Bakopanos is next.

Ms. Eleni Bakopanos (Ahuntsic, Lib.): Not to cause a debate—the debate took place in the House of Commons—but we did agree that it is a very limited time. If there had been other witnesses.... Of course, the chair did say that everyone who had asked to appear before the committee had been given that opportunity. As members of this committee, none of us would not be willing to sit through the whole process.

The deadline was imposed on us. The point was made in the House of Commons during debate that extensive consultations did take place. That's why it took so long. As you also pointed out in the House, it is a complicated issue. It is an issue that has consequences in terms of future decisions in the courts. We agree that there should be changes. All parties agree that there should be changes in terms of this piece of legislation. We should move forward.

Giving us another week or so when there are six witnesses we are trying to accommodate, whom the chair is trying to accommodate, I don't think would change the outcome of the agreement we had in the House.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Muise.

Mr. Mark Muise (West Nova, PC): I guess it would be a good time to bring up the issue of asking the minister for an extension of time. It's been done once before and there is a precedent; the committee could do that. I would respectfully request that you consider that.

The Chair: We can ask the minister to address that in her remarks.

Mr. Ramsay.

Mr. Jack Ramsay (Crowfoot, Ref.): I'm very concerned that we do not have coming to this committee to testify on this bill a constitutional expert or someone who is recognized as an authority on the charter, because it is a charter question here and there are—

The Chair: Can I tell you that the person coming from the Criminal Lawyers' Association is Irwin Koziebrocki. In my view anyway, as a former lawyer from Ontario, he's a leading expert on the charter. So that may be of assistance to you.

Mr. Jack Ramsay: If that's the case, that will alleviate one of my concerns.

In response to what the parliamentary secretary has stated, you cannot expect witnesses who are given notice of a day and a half to prepare a credible response to a bill like this and appear before a standing committee of the House of Commons. You can't expect them to shift their schedule to allow for that and still come forward with a credible response to this bill. That is the problem.

We've had these witnesses before our committee before and they've never been reluctant to attend. If I was contacted with notice of only a day and a half and my schedule would have to be changed in order to do the research necessary to bring forth something worth while to this committee, I would be very reluctant to do so.

It's a matter of timing. We can't get away from that. It's a matter of scheduling. As Mr. Strahl said, it's not the committee chair's fault; it lies, first of all, with the fact that there was not an intervention by the justice minister. It came from B.C. and there wasn't the priority placed on the department to move this bill forward as soon as they realized it had to be moved through.

Surely, if work had been done by May or the middle of May, or even June, this bill would have been here and we wouldn't be rushed; we wouldn't have the problem we've been faced with. So we're going to get four witnesses out of the ten we hurriedly put together and said would be an acceptable minimum, and that's unacceptable.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Ramsay.

Derek Lee.

Mr. Derek Lee (Scarborough—Rouge River, Lib.): Thank you, Madam Chair.

I was a little bit uncomfortable earlier with the possibility that we might have clause-by-clause reading on this today in this committee, because I do believe it needs some sober thought, some attention to detail, and I didn't think a four-hour window was very much.

On the broader issue of the clock running, we're all here today, Madam Chair, because we're going to embark on this process. None of us around this table agreed to the clock; we weren't there when the clock began. The six months was proposed by the judicial and administrative parts of our government—the justice department. Who spoke for Parliament when that was negotiated?

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The Chair: Well, I think—

Mr. Derek Lee: No, I didn't finish, Madam Chair. I want the officials from Justice to hear this.

Hon. Anne McLellan (Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, Lib.): I was listening.

Mr. Derek Lee: Who spoke for Parliament when the six months was proposed? The answer is nobody. Parliament was dissolved at that time, as I understand it.

So maybe in the process, in the coming months, we can give some attention to signalling to the court and to the justice department just how much time Parliament would need, with a good time clock that would work in the future when these charter issues and stays of judgments come up. That's an issue we may want to address in the future.

The Chair: That's a helpful suggestion.

I'm going to assume, unless I hear to the contrary, that we can go ahead and confirm these witnesses, because I'd like to give that instruction for tomorrow. All right, it's done.

Our first witness, then, is the Minister of Justice. Welcome, minister.

Ms. Anne McLellan: Thank you very much. It's a pleasure to be here. It's a pleasure to meet members of the committee for the first time in the context of this committee and your membership hereon.

I understand the concerns under which some members are operating, and I do want to clarify a little bit of the factual record before I begin my formal remarks.

In response to what Mr. Ramsay said about the British Columbia Attorney General, for those of you who aren't aware, of course, Feeney came out of the province of British Columbia. We were in constant communication with the Attorney General of British Columbia. We intervened with the B.C. Attorney General to seek the stay.

In fact, we were a full, active, complete partner, and therefore any suggestion that we were somehow dragging our feet in relation to our partnership or relationship or support of the B.C. Attorney General in seeking the stay is simply, I believe, with all due respect, unfounded. I think Mr. Ramsay would find the Attorney General of British Columbia and his officials confirming that fact. We've been very supportive with them throughout, and both have acted, along with other provinces, to ensure that the stay was sought with all due and reasonable haste before the court.

For those of you, again, who don't know, Feeney came down on May 22, and we were before the Supreme Court of Canada in June, with our provincial counterparts, seeking a stay of this decision, to do today what we are here to do, which is to consider a legislative response to a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada that has created some considerable concern, especially for the policing community in this country.

The other thing I would say is that I think virtually all key stakeholders have been consulted in relation to this matter. The policing community...the Canadian Police Association will be heard from. I'm not suggesting they agree with everything here, but certainly I think they would agree that they were consulted throughout this process. The chiefs of police were consulted. In fact, we were making changes to this legislation right up until the last minute to accommodate the concerns of the policing community and others, the provincial attorneys general who have a very key stake in this.

So I do apologize to all members for the fact that we're asking you to consider this legislation in a short timeframe, but I would say that they are unusual circumstances and ones in which I do believe we have taken every opportunity to consult with key stakeholders who, on a daily basis, have to respond to difficult circumstances in the field.

As I have alluded to already, on May 22 the Supreme Court rendered its decision in R. v. Feeney. By a 5 to 4 majority, the court held that in light of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the police are required to obtain a prior judicial authorization or warrant before they enter a dwelling house for the purposes of arresting a person they believe will be found therein.

In so doing, the court overturned one of its earlier decisions in R. v. Landry, which held that a warrant to enter was not required where the police had reasonable grounds to arrest a person and had reasonable grounds to believe the person was within the particular premises, so long as the arresting officer gave notice at the time of entry of his or her presence, authority, and purpose for entry.

It is important to note, however, that the Supreme Court did specifically recognize the need to permit the police to enter a dwelling for the purpose of arresting a person, without a warrant to enter, when the police are in hot pursuit. The court affirmed that, and I quote:

In cases of hot pursuit, the privacy interest must give way to the interest of society in ensuring adequate police protection.

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As I have mentioned, on June 27, the Supreme Court of Canada granted a six-month stay of the Feeney ruling to permit Parliament to enact remedial legislation. That stay obviously expires on November 22.

In developing this legislation, my officials have conducted consultations with Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, the Canadian Police Association, from whom you will hear later this afternoon, the RCMP, the Canadian Bar Association, the Barreau du Québec, and officials in the ministries of the provincial attorneys general regarding the issues arising from the Feeney decision.

It was time well spent to produce what we believe is a good bill, and today I have come here to seek your support for Bill C-16.

The proposed legislative package is designed to meet the interests of the law enforcement community by providing them with clear and effective procedures to seek the authority they require to enter a dwelling to arrest a person with or without an arrest warrant. At the same time, the legislation ensures that Canadians continue to enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy in their homes.

Some people might wonder why the government did not simply return to the police the entry and arrest powers they had prior to Feeney. Considering that the court's judgment in Feeney was based on constitutional grounds, it would not be possible to enact legislation purporting to codify the former common law after the Supreme Court had found that it violated the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

In looking at the written brief of the Canadian Police Association, they may have some more to say about that this afternoon and on some of the more general concerns they have about the role of the judiciary.

At the other end of the spectrum, some people could argue that any time the police want to arrest someone who they have located in a dwelling house, they should first be obliged to obtain a warrant for that person's arrest accompanied by an authorization to enter the dwelling. This would mean that the police would have to formally charge the person before obtaining an authorization to enter.

It is my opinion that such a requirement would end up unduly hampering the work of the police and be particularly problematic in the provinces of New Brunswick, Quebec, and British Columbia, where the crown must approve the charges the police propose to lay before an arrest warrant is sought.

We should now briefly turn our attention to the contents of the legislative package. At the heart of the proposed package is the creation of a new warrant. If Bill C-16 is passed by Parliament, it will allow the police to obtain a judicial authorization for the purpose of arresting someone without having to charge that person with the offence for which he or she is to be arrested.

Under proposed section 529.1, the peace officer who does not have a warrant for the arrest of the person, but under the provision of section 495 of the Criminal Code can arrest the person without an arrest warrant, may request a judge or justice to issue a warrant to enter a specific dwelling where the person to be arrested is or will be found. If satisfied that these conditions exist, the judge or justice may issue the warrant to enter. Similarly, if an arrest warrant has already been issued, the peace officer will be able to obtain that same authorization in order to enter the dwelling for the purpose of effecting the arrest. However, in the case of a peace officer who obtains an arrest warrant, it will be possible to seek from the judge or justice ahead of time an authorization to enter the dwelling.

The new proposed subsection 529(1) of the Criminal Code will have the effect of permitting the inclusion of an authorization to enter a described dwelling on an arrest warrant if, at the time the warrant is issued, the judge or justice is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested is or will be found in that dwelling.

This provision would likely be used under two different circumstances: first, at the close of a police investigation when the police approach a justice of the peace for an arrest warrant and they can satisfy the justice that the person is or will be found within a specific dwelling house; and second, if an accused person fails to appear in court as required for a preliminary inquiry or trial and they can satisfy the justice that the person is or will be found within a specific dwelling house.

In addition, Bill C-16 seeks to maximize the flexibility of the justice system as it contains a provision that will allow peace officers to utilize the existing telewarrant scheme of the Criminal Code to seek a warrant to enter by a telephone or other means of telecommunication when it would not be convenient for them to appear personally.

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The law requires that the police get a judicial authorization before they enter a dwelling house, and we must try to afford law enforcement officers all of the means available through the use of technology in order to ensure they discharge adequately that constitutional duty without jeopardizing the safety of Canadians or rendering their already difficult task impossible.

This will be particularly useful to law enforcement officers in remote locations and will generally help save the police valuable time. It could also contribute to the protection of society, as the police could take suspects into custody more quickly.

In other words, the proposed amendments will provide law enforcement personnel with as much flexibility as possible under the current charter requirements to obtain a judicial authorization to enter a dwelling.

I just want to say a few words about exigent circumstances, and these are an exception to the need for an authorization to enter. It will not always be possible or advisable for the police to obtain prior judicial authorization to enter a dwelling for the purposes of arrest or apprehension. In Feeney, the Supreme Court of Canada acknowledges this fact and reaffirms the common-law power of entry in situations of hot pursuit.

The bill does not deal with hot pursuit, as it is already recognized as part of our law. The question of what other situations would justify an exemption from the requirement of prior judicial authorization was left open by the majority decision of the court.

The legislative proposal therefore contains—and I think this is an important point—a non-exhaustive definition of certain exigent circumstances under which entry into a dwelling for the purposes of arrest or apprehension would be allowed in the absence of prior judicial authorization. Entry without an authorization or warrant to enter would be allowed where the police have reasonable grounds to suspect that entry into the dwelling is necessary to prevent imminent bodily harm or death. Entry without an authorization or warrant to enter would likewise be allowed where the police have reasonable grounds to believe that evidence relating to the commission of an indictable offence is present in the dwelling and where that entry is necessary to prevent the imminent destruction of such evidence.

The legislative package before you also contains an amendment to the Interpretation Act in order to extend the scheme set out in the Criminal Code to those arrests or apprehensions made pursuant to other federal statutes. The legislative package also contains a preamble setting out the purpose of the legislation and clarifying that the legislation is not intended to restrict police powers of entry pursuant to other statutes or the common law.

The provincial attorneys general, the RCMP, the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, the Canadian Association of Police, and the Canadian Bar Association were all consulted in the preparation of the legislation, and I again want to thank them for their participation and co-operation.

Given the constitutional limitations set out in Feeney and in other Supreme Court decisions concerning privacy rights, I believe this legislation represents a satisfactory compromise in an attempt to allow the police to do their difficult job without infringing on the Charter of Rights and Freedoms of Canadians.

With that, I conclude my opening comments.

Let me introduce, from my department, Yvan Roy, who will be more than willing, along with myself, to answer questions you might have in relation to this legislation, either as a matter of general policy or more specifically.

The Chair: Minister, can I just ask whether you have a time limitation?

Ms. Anne McLellan: I am going to have to leave probably no later than 4.15 p.m., since I have another committee meeting that is being held up for me.

The Chair: I have two members who want to ask questions so far. I'll start with Mr. Ramsay from the Reform Party for five minutes.

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Mr. Mark Muise: On a point of order, Madam Chairman, I was just wondering if you could explain how much time each party will have. I don't believe that has been determined.

The Chair: No, our committee has not sorted that out yet, Mr. Muise, but I intend to start with five-minute rounds for each party, and then we'll duke it out after that. Okay?

Mr. Mark Muise: All right, thank you.

The Chair: Mr. Ramsay.

Mr. Jack Ramsay: I'll ask two questions, and if there's any time left, my colleague would like to ask a question too, Madam Chair.

The Chair: Sure.

Mr. Jack Ramsay: Madam Minister, I'd like to thank you for coming and making your presentation to us this afternoon.

I would like to refer you to something you touched upon, proposed paragraph 529.3(2)(b). What is there to suggest that this proposed paragraph is constitutional, that it was not in fact struck down by the Feeney decision? What is there to make us feel confident that this proposed paragraph, which allows the police to enter a dwelling house without a warrant, simply based upon the fact that they believe that evidence regarding an indictable offence may be destroyed...?

I ask that question because it seems the Feeney decision simply ruled out that justification for entering a dwelling house.

Ms. Anne McLellan: Mr. Roy is going to respond to that directly, but let me say that clearly we had to strike a balance. One has to be respectful of the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Feeney; one has to respect the Charter of Rights and Freedoms; one has to respect the privacy rights of Canadians; one has to respect the right of Canadians to feel safe and secure; and one has to protect, to the largest extent possible, the ability of law enforcement officers to do their job.

As you know, Mr. Ramsay, a considerable balancing of interests and values has to take place here, and we believe we have done the best job possible within the constraints of the Supreme Court decision.

Mr. Jack Ramsay: But is it constitutional?

Ms. Anne McLellan: It is our belief that it is, and Mr. Roy is going to explain in detail to you why we believe it is. But, Mr. Ramsay, if you are asking for a 100% guarantee here today that if this proposed paragraph were challenged by an accused person, it would be upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada, no, because that's not the nature of our system.

In fact one cannot give that kind of guarantee and one would be a fool to do so. One then usurps the ability of the courts, at whatever level, to do their job.

Mr. Jack Ramsay: Would you say that about the entire bill then?

Ms. Anne McLellan: No. What I am telling you is we believe we have struck the right balance, and we believe the Supreme Court will agree with us and uphold this legislation because we have struck the right balance between important values. But if you want from me a guarantee that the court will uphold this legislation, I will not do that. No one would do that.

Mr. Jack Ramsay: Could I ask the second question?

Ms. Anne McLellan: Do you want to hear from Mr. Roy as to...?

Mr. Jack Ramsay: Yes, but I'd like to ask my second question.

Because this decision by the Supreme Court of Canada causes any person in authority to look at the new demands before they enter a dwelling place, have you or your departmental officials looked at the broader consequences of the decision, in that under many federal statutes as well as provincial statutes, officers, inspectors, and so on have the authority to enter dwelling houses? Does the Feeney decision impact upon their authority to do so?

Ms. Anne McLellan: Yes, and in fact we carried on broad consultations with all affected federal colleagues and departments.

You're quite right to point out that a wide variety of statutes are implicated by the Feeney decision; that was one of the concerns when Feeney came down. Therefore, over the summer, extensive consultations were carried on with all departments of the federal government where statutes were implicated by Feeney. I believe we also carried on similar discussions with our provincial counterparts.

Mr. Yvan Roy (Senior General Counsel, Department of Justice): Yes.

Mr. Jack Ramsay: Does it mean amendments to all of these statutes with regard to authority to enter a dwelling house?

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Ms. Anne McLellan: If you accept the package before you, there is an amendment to the Interpretation Act, and that amendment to the Interpretation Act extends the legislative scheme set out here in the Criminal Code to arrests and apprehensions made pursuant to other federal statutes.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Ramsay.

Mr. Roy, did you want to add to those answers?

Mr. Yvon Roy: With pleasure, Madam Chairperson.

With respect to exigent circumstances, four of the nine members of the court state clearly—and that is the minority—that in exigent circumstances it should be possible for the state to go into a dwelling house for the purpose of arresting someone. It is stated clearly.

As for the majority, I will refer you to paragraph 51 of the reasons of the majority, written by Mr. Justice Sopinka. Paragraph 51 is found at page 158 of Canadian Criminal Cases, which is the codification I have here of the Feeney decision. The majority says, “an exception to this rule”—the rule that you require a warrant or an authorization to enter—“occurs where there is a case of hot pursuit”.

That gives me an opportunity to tell you there is nothing in this bill here that talks about hot pursuit. This is already understood in common law as being part of our law. So when the police are acting in hot pursuit, if they're chasing someone and that someone goes into a dwelling house, they can go in and arrest without a warrant. The nine justices of the Supreme Court agree on this.

The following sentence is:

Whether or not there is an exception for exigent circumstances generally has not been fully addressed by this Court, nor does it need to be decided in the present case given my view that exigent circumstances did not exist when the arrest was made.

This is therefore an opportunity for Parliament to speak on the issue of exigent circumstances, to say, we are the elected members; we are the ones who can speak on this, and we are telling the courts that we, as parliamentarians, understand there are some circumstances where it is reasonable for the state to intervene without having to wait for a warrant to be obtained.

What are those circumstances? There are two stated in this piece of legislation. The first one is that harm is going to be caused to someone; the bodily integrity of someone is going to be jeopardized. Parliament would be saying they believe it is right for the state to intervene in those circumstances.

The second one is that it's imminent, it's going to happen very soon, that the individuals we are trying to arrest are going to destroy evidence. It brings the administration of justice into disrepute if that happens, and Parliament has a chance to say that in those circumstances, this is reasonable, and therefore the state, the police, law enforcement, should be allowed to do this.

These are the two circumstances on which Parliament will be expressing itself. We think, as Justice lawyers, that this is a reasonable limit, and that in a free and democratic society it is appropriate that this be done.

This bill is also saying that if there are other exigent circumstances that can and should be considered, we will let the common law develop.

So Parliament will be addressing those two circumstances, and then if there are others on a case-by-case basis, the courts will have to pronounce themselves.

We think, Mr. Ramsay, that when Parliament speaks—and this has been said by the Supreme Court on numerous occasions—a measure of deference is owed to Parliament in those circumstances. That's an opportunity given by the Minister of Justice and by the government in putting this clause in Bill C-16.

Your second question had to do with whether that applies in other pieces of legislation. The answer given by the minister is absolutely in accordance with what you have in the legislation, but I want to add a little something.

You spoke in terms of inspections. This is not what this is all about. We are talking here about giving the power to the state to go and arrest someone. There are reasons to believe that person has committed a crime. We're not talking about inspection powers here.

Mr. Jack Ramsay: It's authority to enter a dwelling house that I'm talking about, for whatever purpose.

Mr. Yvon Roy: Yes. The authorization given here is for the purpose of arresting someone. We're not talking about inspection. Let's not confuse the two, I'm suggesting.

Mr. Jack Ramsay: But the authority to enter a dwelling house is what I wanted you to address.

The Chair: Mr. Ramsay, that's what he's doing.

Ms. Anne McLellan: That's an important point to clarify. I thought everybody here understood what we're talking about.

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Feeney dealt with a very limited range of circumstances that involved warrants of arrest, the right to enter, and the circumstances in which you will enter a dwelling house to arrest a suspect. That is all this legislation deals with.

The Chair: Mr. Bellehumeur.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur (Berthier—Montcalm, BQ): I want to say that it is true you have consulted with the provincial attorneys general. But maybe they would have appreciated a follow-up to their comments.

As far as the Quebec government is concerned, you have indeed communicated with them. They did make a series of comments including one on which they would have liked a more comprehensive analysis for all warrants. They also made some clarifications, but I understand that after these consultations, they didn't get any response. Moreover, Mr. Roy, I am the one who gave them a copy of Bill C-16 that you had distributed to us the morning it was tabled. They might have appreciated a closer follow-up since they cooperated with the department.

They also understand the urgency of the situation that might have developed partly because of the officials or something else. I'm not blaming it all on you, Mr. Roy, because I know you are not alone in this. However, we have been sitting since September, so I think that we could have started consideration of Bill C-16 earlier.

Having said this, we do not fully approve of this bill but I think the attorneys general, at least the Quebec attorney general, will be able to live with it. Personally, I share the concerns of the Reform Party about proposed section 529.3.

You have answered some questions. I see a door has been left open by using the term "notamment" in the French text. As for the English text, I'm not familiar enough with the English language to know whether the meaning is the same. But in the French, the terms "notamment urgence" leave the door wide open to judicial interpretation.

When you add the words "notamment urgence", you make the provision wider than if you use the terms "reasonable grounds to suspect" or "reasonable grounds to believe". By combining "notamment" and "motifs raisonnables de croire", don't you think that there could be abuses? If so, could the courts use the terms to give the provision a wider meaning by saying that Parliament has added the words "notamment urgence" and that they find certain circumstances to be exigent in a particular case?

I would like to hear comments from the minister first and then from Mr. Roy.

[English]

Ms. Anne McLellan: First, in relation to your question on the question of urgency, you asked, urgent from whose perspective? I think urgent first of all from the policing community, in the sense that after the Supreme Court of Canada decision some confusion was created in terms of the circumstances in which a warrant of arrest was required to enter a dwelling house. So I think there was urgency to clarify this issue from the point of view of effective law enforcement and investigation in this country.

I think also there was urgency on the part of Canadians, in the sense that they wanted some clarification and comfort provided on the issues both of their right to privacy and in what circumstances that right existed, and the right of Canadians to safety and security in their communities and homes.

From my point of view, that's why this was urgent after the decision in R. v. Feeney came down. That's why there was a necessity for us to act, and act through the consultations we carried on.

In terms of possible differences between the French and English sections of 529.3(2), I'll ask Yvan to comment on that and the other aspects of Mr. Bellehumeur's question.

[Translation]

Mr. Yvan Roy: Mr. Bellehumeur, you are quite right in saying that the word "notamment" is significant in proposed subsection 529.3(2). This is exactly what I was saying in response to Mr. Ramsay's question.

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I mean, Parliament is called upon by this provision to speak on the issue, to provide guidance to the courts by saying, "In cases provided for in paragraph (a) and (b) of this subsection, this is deemed to be exigent circumstances by Parliament." The purpose of this provision is not to prevent common law from developing beyond these two situations referred to in Bill C-16.

Let me ask you to look at the preamble on the first page. It says:

Whereas the Parliament of Canada declares that nothing in this Act is intended to limit or restrict the circumstances under which peace officers may be justified in entering a dwelling-house for the purposes of arrest or apprehension in the absence of prior judicial authorization, under this or any other Act or law, including the common law;

This part of the preamble is affirmed by the enactment in proposed subsection 529.3(2) that says that Parliament has spoken on those two types of circumstances, "notamment".

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: When officers are faced with a new set of circumstances, will they be asked whether they have reasonable grounds to suspect or to believe that these are exigent circumstances and that they are justified in entering the dwelling?

For example, you learn that they have reasonable grounds to suspect that an individual is about to leave the country with evidence establishing a fraud committed in Canada. Would those be reasonable grounds to suspect or to believe under the meaning of the bill?

Mr. Yvan Roy: In a case such as this, Mr. Bellehumeur, I would say that there are no exigent circumstances in this case. Officers have no grounds to enter this dwelling-house for the purpose of arresting this individual. There's no risk of evidence being destroyed or of bodily harm...

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: When someone intends to leave Canada with evidence establishing a fraud, this is not enough? Should we not try to avoid the imminent loss or destruction of this evidence?

Mr. Yvan Roy: No. But be careful. I'm not saying that police is not allowed to arrest him. I'm simply saying that they are not allowed to enter the dwelling-house to apprehend him on those grounds only.

If you know when the guy is going to come out, you have two choices: either you go get the judicial authorizations referred to in the legislation or you wait for him to come out, and once he is on public property, you arrest him. There is no problem with this latter option, absolutely none.

But your question is more specific and I want to go back to it. You're asking what will be the standard of proof generally applicable to exigent circumstances. I think that the applicable standard will be "reasonable grounds to believe" and that it will have to be determined whether there are exigent circumstances.

You are right in noting that there are two different standards in the bill you have before you; there is one for bodily harm and another one for destruction of evidence. The standard for bodily harm is only to have suspicions and it is indeed lower than "reasonable grounds to believe". However, we are of the opinion that this standard can be justified in a free and democratic society. It is the advice we gave the minister and she accepted it.

For example, we cannot tolerate that in a case of domestic violence, police is not allowed to act because we cannot be sure that violence will happen. We must be able to have the state respond when there is reasonable suspicion, that is when the suspicion can be demonstrated. Otherwise, in our opinion, the legislation would be found to be totally unfair.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Bellehumeur. I'm aware that your colleague has a question, but I'm going now to Mr. Muise.

Mr. Mark Muise: Thank you.

With regard to my first question to the minister, in order for the police to do their jobs properly, the justices of the peace will have to be basically available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. How will the minister ensure that the proper resources are allocated to make this happen?

Ms. Anne McLellan: The question of resources is important but in essence reflects no change in the existing circumstances, because of course the question of those resources, whether before or after Feeney, is a matter for provincial attorneys general. They are responsible for the administration of justice in the provinces. That's one of the reasons why, obviously, we have consulted very closely with the provinces in relation to this legislation.

• 1615

Telewarrants are not new, by any means. They've existed for well over 10 years or so in this country. I should think there will be an expansion of telewarrants due to this legislation. There will probably be an increase or an expansion of resources needed to ensure that police are able to access warrants in a timely and efficient fashion.

We are confident, working with our provincial colleagues, that those resources will be available. But I would be misleading you if I did not tell you that clearly resources are an issue, and within our system of criminal justice in this country the administration of justice is a matter for the provinces.

Mr. Mark Muise: I have one supplementary question and then a second question.

Minister, how much money would you allow or allocate for this? Would you make any funds available?

Ms. Anne McLellan: We're not allocating any additional resources for the implementation of this legislation.

This is not due to a policy change. We work with the provinces very closely, and if we were to change a federal policy as a matter of legislative will of the government, thereby increasing costs for a province or provinces in the administration of justice, we would obviously be very concerned and obligated to consider any increase in resource implications for the province. This is a legislative response not dictated by federal government policy but by the Supreme Court of Canada.

Mr. Mark Muise: Okay.

Based on the discussions and questions that have come from around the table about granting time, I would respectfully ask the minister to allow for an extension of the stay so that we can properly debate and hear witnesses to this, considering that there has already been a precedent set and that this has already taken place once. I would respectfully ask that this be done, Minister.

The Chair: Did you want to comment?

Ms. Anne McLellan: I realize we are asking a lot from committee members, but we would ask that the committee seriously consider dealing with this legislation in an expeditious fashion, especially in light of the fact that I believe almost all key stakeholders have been consulted and have worked with the federal Department of Justice and provincial AGs for the past four months. In fact, changes were being made in this legislation, up until it was introduced on the floor of the House, to accommodate some of those groups, especially from the policing community, to make it better legislation.

So I would ask that the committee deal with the matter expeditiously. Of course, it is possible but not desirable for us to return to the Supreme Court and ask for an extension of the stay. You're quite right that there is at least one precedent for that, the case of R. v. Swain, a charter case where the Supreme Court did grant an extension to a stay of their judgment. But clearly I would seek the indulgence of the committee and ask that you see if you're able to deal with this in an expeditious fashion rather than have to return to the Supreme Court.

The Chair: Mr. Muise, you have about 15 seconds.

Mr. Mark Muise: Madam Chair, I fully understand the Minister's comment. What I'm asking for is not that we delay the process indefinitely but that the committee be given ample time to do its proper job.

The Chair: Thank you. Then we can discuss that amongst ourselves.

We've just been signalled that you have 10 more minutes, Minister.

Mr. Lee.

Mr. Derek Lee: Thank you.

Madam Minister, the Feeney decision punched a bit of a hole in the common-law net we use to catch criminals. Do you think this legislation repairs the hole completely? In my view, it doesn't. Is there still a gap there?

Ms. Anne McLellan: I don't think there's any question—and here I'm trying to be completely respectful of the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada—that R. v. Feeney came as a considerable shock to the policing community, and attorneys general, both federal and provincial. That is why we acted, quite truthfully, very quickly to get our act together with all the key stakeholders to try to, as you say, repair some substantial part of the net, as you put it, in relation to the whole question of warrants of arrest and when they are required or not required.

• 1620

We have to be respectful of the decision of the Supreme Court in Feeney and we have to be respectful of what they said in terms of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the balance they struck between privacy interests—and none of us around this table would want to undermine the privacy interests of Canadians—and the rights of Canadians to feel safe and secure in their homes. We believe this is a fair, just, and efficient compromise—or balance, if you like—between those interests. Obviously there are now circumstances where law enforcement officers will have to get warrants to enter a dwelling house for the purposes of arrest, but they didn't before; that's quite clear. That is now the basic rule, but we have also provided exceptions to that which we think help strike that balance in terms of effective policing.

Mr. Derek Lee: I gather you're saying that we haven't filled the gap yet. There's still a—

Ms. Anne McLellan: I think what we've done is the best we can.

Mr. Derek Lee: But the answer is no, we're not there.

I have a scenario that I mentioned in the House. You have someone who has not been identified by name but is recognized by the victim of either a rape or an armed robbery who spots the perpetrator two weeks later. The perpetrator enters a dwelling house and the victim goes to the police and tells them he's in that house. The policeman says, “Okay, let's go get him.” The policeman checks his how-to-do-it book, which they all have to carry around now because the law's getting so complicated, and finds out that he can't do it. He can't get a warrant under this legislation because he can't identify the perpetrator. There is no apparent hot pursuit and it's two weeks after the crime—there's been no discussion here about fresh pursuit—so the policeman has to wait outside the house.

Let's say the perpetrator has entered his brother-in-law's house legally, so you have a Mexican stand-off for two or three weeks or three months while you wait for the perpetrator. You're not even sure who he is.

Have I got it right when I say that the policeman and the victim together standing outside this house are incapable of making an arrest of the perpetrator because of the Feeney decision?

Mr. Yvan Roy: I will try to offer a couple of comments on this that hopefully will help give you an answer.

Mr. Derek Lee: A simple yes or no is what I'm looking for.

Ms. Anne McLellan: It's never that simple, Derek.

Mr. Yvan Roy: The legislation provides that you don't need to identify the person, but as long as the person is identifiable—i.e., you need to give the justice of the peace, who will issue the authorization for you to enter, sufficient information to identify that person, but not by name. You can describe the person and then it will be clear for the police who it is they are trying to arrest in that dwelling house. I guess that's the answer to your question.

I'll go one step further and quote to you a decision of the United States Supreme Court in a case called Payton v. New York, because I think it applies to our context. Let me read this one part to you. It's going to take me 30 seconds. I think you will see where the courts are going with this:

The parties have argued at some length about the practical consequences of the warrant requirement as a precondition to a felony arrest in the home. In the absence of any evidence that effective law enforcement has suffered in those States that already have such a requirement, we are inclined to view such arguments with skepticism.

The kicker comes here:

More fundamentally, however, such arguments of policy must give way to a constitutional command that we consider to be unequivocal.

Quite frankly, we take the view that there is no choice. The Supreme Court of Canada has said, “You need to have a warrant to enter those premises absent hot pursuit and, we think, exigent circumstances.” We have gone as far as we thought possible by saying not only do you have to identify the person, but if he or she is identifiable, you can obtain your warrant.

Mr. Derek Lee: Okay, so pre-Feeney we could arrest the guy in my scenario. Post-Feeney we cannot and we stand there looking stupid.

Now I have one other question. I take it that's—

Ms. Anne McLellan: If he's identifiable?

Mr. Yvan Roy: Is he identifiable?

• 1625

Mr. Derek Lee: Yes, white male, eyeglasses, brown suit. Is that okay?

I'm sorry, I've just identified....

Mr. Yvan Roy: I don't want to be arrested on that basis!

Mr. Derek Lee: In terms of the distinction between arrests and gathering evidence, have we covered the scenario where if the arrest happens to go offside, for whatever technical reason the court chooses to find in a future review of a particular case...have we covered the problem of the evidence obtained after the dwelling is entered? Do we need something extra in these amendments to say that even though the poor police officer goes offside technically because of one of these scenarios that he or she couldn't have envisaged, the evidence gathered after entry is still legal evidence? Do you understand what I'm getting at? Have we covered that with this legislation? If we haven't, why haven't we?

Mr. Yvan Roy: If I understand your question, you're referring basically to subsection 24(2) of the charter.

Mr. Derek Lee: I'm talking about the blood on Feeney's shirt.

Mr. Yvan Roy: You're talking about the exclusionary rule that is mandated by the Constitution. Unless you are suggesting that there be an amendment to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms—and I know some people have made that suggestion—I think you have to go with how the law has developed on subsection 24(2), and the latest cases are Feeney, Stillman, cases of that nature that have developed a test.

Mr. Derek Lee: Mr. Roy, the exclusionary rules are not in the charter, as I understand it; they are the evolution of the charter rules from the court. We make the rules. We make the law here in Parliament. We don't make the charter. So if the exclusionary rules are an extrapolation of the charter, why can't we make inclusionary rules here that we believe are charter compatible? Why would we walk away from the field just because the court has decided they want to develop a set of exclusionary rules? Why don't we do some inclusionary rules to cover off the scenario I just put to you.

Ms. Anne McLellan: In fact, Mr. Lee, I think what we are doing is what you've just suggested, which is that we are developing rules in this context. The Charter of Rights and Freedoms, subsection 24(2), talks about the exclusion of evidence in circumstances where the administration of justice is brought into disrepute. This is something that none of us, whether you're Parliament or a minister of the crown, can change unilaterally, because we need to use the amending formula, which would involve seven provinces plus the Parliament representing 50% of all Canadians. The rule of subsection 24(2) is quite plain.

If what you're asking me is has the Supreme Court of Canada and have lower courts interpreted, as they have every other section of the charter, subsection 24(2) as it relates to the exclusion of evidence in circumstances where you would exclude because not to do so would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, yes, we have a growing body of jurisprudence in relation to that very issue. But what we are trying to do here is, within the context of subsection 24(2) of the charter...we as parliamentarians are exercising our parliamentary right to define those—at least to provide guidance to the courts—in terms of those circumstances where we think evidence would not be excluded and there would be no reason to call into question the arrest of a suspect or the acquiring, I suppose, of evidence, under 429.3(2)(b) without a warrant.

The Chair: Thanks, Mr. Lee. Thank you, Minister.

Mr. Roy, are you available to stay a little while longer.

Mr. Yvan Roy: Absolutely.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau (Charlesbourg, BQ): On a point of order. We have been told from the beginning that one of the reasons why we must expedite our consideration of this bill is because the Supreme Court of Canada has agreed to a six-month suspension only. For such an important debate, it's a shame that the minister is giving us only one hour of her time when we are dealing with a fairly delicate balancing of human rights and powers of the state. I think it is very shameful that she can stay only one hour. I thought it was important to say it for the record.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you for your comment.

Ms. Anne McLellan: Mr. Roy will be able to stay and answer questions in terms of the thinking, not only of our department but the provincial attorneys general who worked with us on this. You will hear from others this afternoon and tomorrow on their thinking about this legislation.

• 1630

I'm sorry I'm not able to stay longer with you this afternoon, but I hope I have made clear, in my usual forthright if somewhat wordy fashion, why we have asked you to pursue the legislative amendments that appear before you today. From our point of view the policy rationale is clear.

I am not one to pretend important questions are not raised by what is here, but at the end of the day this is about striking the appropriate balance in a democracy where one has an entrenched bill of rights, where one has a Supreme Court of Canada, and where one has a Parliament. We all have our role to play, and I'm asking this committee and the Parliament of Canada to play a very important role in helping define the circumstances in which our law enforcement officers need warrants or don't need warrants to carry out the administration of justice effectively as it relates to their aspect of our justice system.

That's all I will say at this point, other than that Mr. Roy and perhaps others of my Justice officials will be more than happy to answer any questions you have about specific applications or details.

I thank Mr. Lee for his question, because it was a very interesting and good example of the kinds of specific situations where important issues can be raised.

The Chair: Thank you, Minister.

Ms. Anne McLellan: I know I will be back here often, so we'll get to know each other very well over the next months and years. Thank you very much.

The Chair: Mr. Forseth.

Mr. Paul Forseth (New Westminster—Coquitlam—Burnaby, Ref.): Let's look specifically at some scenarios of behaviour at the door. What kind of police behaviour is contemplated at the door or at the point of entry? What about the requirement to announce, as required? Sometimes announcing the police presence and what they want to do is a danger. From the mere fact that they speak they might get shot at or something like that. Also, there is the issue of forcible entry. So I want you to describe what the anticipated procedure is, to describe how it would work, the behaviour at the door, and to distinguish between behaviour that would succeed legally and behaviour that would cause a later legal failure.

Mr. Yvon Roy: The committee members will perhaps want to refer to what would become section 529.4 of the Criminal Code if this bill is passed. That's the proposed section that seeks to codify what would be the rules applicable in the circumstances presented by Mr. Forseth.

Basically the rule in our law has been in the past, and will continue to be, that the police, before they go into a dwelling house for the purpose of arresting someone, must announce their presence and give the people who are in the room sufficient time to react and open the door. Then, if things do not happen the way they are supposed to happen in those circumstances, they can force their way into the dwelling house.

However, as you have pointed out, Mr. Forseth, there must be circumstances where this is simply not appropriate. What we generally have in mind when we're thinking about this is that those who are in the dwelling house are perhaps waiting for the police with shotguns and other firearms or other weapons. If they are told in advance the police are coming, they will obviously take things into their own hands.

What is being proposed in this piece of legislation is that it be possible to obtain from the justice of the peace at the time you are obtaining your warrant the authorization to go to the dwelling house and not announce yourself. The law would say here are the three circumstances in which you can ask for something like this. One is that bodily harm is going to be caused to the peace officers. This is generally what we had in mind when we were talking about something like this.

• 1635

The legislation would go two steps further than that. It would also say that if by announcing themselves the police would cause someone in the premises to be hurt, then they can get that authorization.

The third possibility is if we tell the person, “This is the police”, the first thing they are going to do is go inside and destroy the evidence. That would be another reason why the police would be obtaining the authorization to go without announcing themselves in advance.

There is also, in a third subsection in that very same section we are talking about, the possibility for the police not to announce themselves when they are acting in exigent circumstances. That goes without saying. This has to be provided for, and it is provided for in the legislation.

In those cases the police are entitled by law—Parliament will have spoken—to go in and not announce their presence. In other circumstances the announcement requirement still stands and it would be for the police to say, “Police”, and then give adequate time for the people inside to react and open the door, basically.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: Again about proposed section 529.3, I share the concerns of my hon. friend Jack Ramsay. I'm seriously questioning the validity of subsection (2)(b), but I want to go back to subsection (2)(a) and the meaning of the word "notamment" in the French text. I was under the impression that one of the effects of Feeney was that police had felt hampered in their work because they didn't know what was legal and what was not anymore. They were in a black hole, to borrow a well-known expression from another politician.

But after reading subsection 529.3(2), I'm not certain that this will clarify things for officers. Let me explain. By using the term "notamment", we mean that there are those two types of circumstances where you can enter without a warrant. However, in my humble opinion, we are giving too much discretion to police officers who will decide that what they are facing comes under "notamment". So, there are the two sets of exigent circumstances referred to in the bill, but there might be other cases where you could wonder whether they are exigent circumstances or not. This leaves wide discretion to a peace officer and raises a lot of quite important issues.

Even if there is a judicial review afterwards... You mentioned letting common law develop, but it will be after the fact. So, there is a distinct possibility of human rights violations and that some people's rights will be abused because we will not have specified what exigent circumstances are and we will have left law enforcement officers in the dark.

I would like to have some explanations.

Mr. Yvan Roy: Thank you for your question. The Justice minister really had three options on the question of exigent circumstances.

First, we could decide not to refer to any exigent circumstances at all in the legislation and let common law develop on this issue, since the majority in Feeney would probably agree to affirm cases where the courts had made the appropriate decision in our opinion. This is one option.

The option at the other end of the scale is to try and give as comprehensive a definition as possible of exigent circumstances. This is one of the things we did in the four months it took to develop the bill. We did research on all common-law countries and even on continental Europe to find out how things worked in those jurisdictions and we did not find—maybe we didn't look in the right places, but I think we did our work properly—one single jurisdiction where exigent circumstances were defined conclusively. In fact, the common law talks about exigent circumstances but it never defines what they are.

So, those are the two ends of the scale: either draw up a comprehensive definition, and we were unable to do it, or not define them at all. After discussions with law enforcement representatives, attorneys general and bar associations, we realized that it was advisable for Parliament to speak on some circumstances that Members of Parliament thought were exigent circumstances.

• 1640

We have been told more or less, "Say so; if there are any circumstances that happen and that should be mentioned, tell us."

That is how we came to consider some special circumstances. We examined three situations basically. First, harm to people; second, destruction of evidence; and third, destruction of property in a general sense, that is not necessarily evidence. Remember that when you have the term "evidence" in a legal text, it is used in the legal sense.

Let's say a guy is at home and smashes his TV set in a fit of rage; is it enough to allow police to come in and arrest people inside the home? We came to the conclusion that it was not.

We did keep two exceptions that you will find in the bill. First, is it acceptable, is it reasonable in a free and democratic society, to let people get hurt because police is not allowed to enter before obtaining a warrant? The answer is no. Second, you will find destruction of the evidence in there but with quite a high standard of proof, that is you must have reasonable grounds to believe that there will be imminent destruction of the evidence. We thought that Parliament could show its will by saying that it is appropriate in a free and democratic society while—and that's the beauty of it—permitting the common law to evolve in worthy cases.

This means that in some cases, the court will tell the police, "You acted in a way that was not appropriate because there were no exigent circumstances." In other cases, the court might say, "Yes, you did the right thing."

Should common law be frozen? The Department of Justice thinks it should not. We must let common law develop while recognizing that Parliament has to state its will in certain circumstances.

Mr. Richard Marceau: If I may once again...

[English]

The Chair: I'm sorry, Mr. Marceau, your time is up.

Mr. MacKay, do you have a question?

Mr. Peter MacKay (Pictou—Antigonish—Guysborough, PC): I do.

The Chair: Three minutes.

Mr. Peter MacKay: My question relates to proposed section 529.3, specifically with respect to a cross-reference to the Interpretation Act in terms of a multi-dwelling-house, where you would be going to a justice of the peace saying that, for example, you have reason to believe the person you are seeking the warrant for may be residing at this address, or this address, or this address. I know the singular can be interpreted to mean the plural, but that seems rather vague in the wording in this section.

I also have a question with respect specifically to the expiration of these warrants under these existing sections.

Mr. Yvon Roy: To answer your first question, it is definitely our view that the singular includes the plural. It seems to me that it's one of two things in those circumstances. Either the police will ask a justice of the peace to issue numerous warrants or you'll have one document that says what places you can go.

I have little doubt that both are perfectly appropriate. In my very humble view, both should be maintained by the tribunals—and we have to be careful here—as long as, with respect to each of those dwelling-houses, the standard required by law has been achieved. It cannot be a fishing expedition where you have a warrant that says, for example, we should have the right to go into every house in that village.

I think in those circumstances, the police—the state, generally speaking—would run into deep trouble. It would be unconstitutional.

But if the police have grounds to believe that the person is going to go to such-and-such a place—they know, for instance, Yvan Roy goes to see his mother every Saturday afternoon—they should be able to get the warrant to arrest Yvan Roy with the intended authorization to go and arrest him in his mother's house.

They should, in those circumstances, also be able to have a warrant that says not only his mother's house but also his house, where it's known he's living. The condition then on the basis of the legislation is that the police, when they are executing the warrant, must have reason to believe Yvan Roy is at the premises at that time.

Your other question was...?

Mr. Peter MacKay: It would tie into that—your example of having multiple dwellings listed on a single warrant. If you exercised it in one case—if the police went to your mother's house but it turned out that you were at your ex-wife's house or your friend's house, but they also knew that you frequented those—are you saying you would have to go back to get judicial authorization again in order to exercise the warrant?

• 1645

Mr. Yvan Roy: I have been arrested, therefore the warrant has been spent?

Mr. Peter MacKay: No, you weren't there.

Mr. Yvan Roy: I wasn't there.

Mr. Peter MacKay: No, I went to that address, but you had slipped out the back door. So now I want to go to one of these other named dwelling-houses.

Mr. Jack Ramsay: Can you go back to that house?

Mr. Yvan Roy: I think your authorization is still valid. There is no doubt in my mind. I think your warrant is going to expire the day you arrest that person. As it is right now with warrants for arrest, the warrant is still outstanding. As you well know given your past experience with the law as a crown prosecutor, we have warrants that remain outstanding for years.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Okay, so this is what is meant here.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. MacKay.

Mr. Martin, did you have any questions? No?

Okay, I'm going to have to move on to the next witnesses now, from the Canadian Police Association.

Mr. Jack Ramsay: Madam Chair, I have a point of order. I move that the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights requests that the Minister of Justice ask the Supreme Court of Canada to extend the six-month period of suspension to allow the committee sufficient time to fully examine Bill C-16.

The Chair: Thank you.

An hon. member: I second.

Mr. Peter MacKay: I would second that motion, too.

The Chair: I think we have lots of seconds available on that.

Ms. Eleni Bakopanos: All of that side.

The Chair: Is there any discussion of the motion?

Ms. Eleni Bakopanos: Could we ask for the vote.

The Chair: Keep in mind that you're preventing witnesses from being heard.

Ms. Eleni Bakopanos: That's right, which is contrary to their argument earlier, Madam Chair.

Mr. Jack Ramsay: I'd just like to state that our concern about the bill has been placed on the record. That's the motivation for the motion. That's all I have to say about it, Madam Chair.

The Chair: Ms. Bakopanos, you had something to say on this.

Ms. Eleni Bakopanos: No, I asked for the vote.

An hon. member: But there was a comment over here.

Mr. Garry Breitkreuz (Yorkton—Melville, Ref.): I had something to say, but I think we can probably get to the vote. It's not like the issue is going to be dead tomorrow either, so....

The Chair: That's right.

Ms. Eleni Bakopanos: Madam Chair, may I ask a question on a point of order?

The Chair: Yes.

Ms. Eleni Bakopanos: Does this committee have a rule concerning motions that are brought forward? Has there been prior notice?

The Chair: This committee doesn't have that rule right now, but this committee may have that rule later.

Ms. Eleni Bakopanos: I realize that, but considering that this committee does not have such a rule—and I didn't know the answer to that—which rules apply?

The Chair: The rules of the House apply.

[Translation]

Ms. Eleni Bakopanos: We must be given at least some indication or something in writing.

[English]

Mr. Richard Marceau: It's not our fault. We didn't ask for it.

The Chair: Let's get a grip. We don't need to go nuts here. Let's just hear what we have to say.

Mr. Lee.

Mr. Derek Lee: Going back over a number of years, it's my recollection that we've always been on a 48-hour rule. In any event, this is the wild west right now because be haven't gone through the procedural organization completely.

I would have thought that we could better deal with this tomorrow, after we've heard witnesses and have had a chance to hear the incoming, by phone, by letter, by fax and by e-mail, in our offices. We'd then have a better picture of whether or not we need more time.

I might have moved to table this until tomorrow; that's one option we have here. Or with the consent of the mover, we could just put it off until tomorrow, when we see where we are. If the mover wishes to have it disposed of right now, I suppose we could do that, but it doesn't advance the.... Tomorrow we would have a better perspective from which to deal with it, in my view.

The Chair: Mr. Ramsay.

Mr. Jack Ramsay: I don't see any problem with that, except that I think the handwriting is on the wall in terms of the witnesses who are available to appear on such notice. I would therefore prefer to have the vote on this motion decided now, because I don't think it's going to make any difference if we put it off for 24 hours. It's not going to give our list of witnesses who are not willing to attend time to get their act in gear and attend.

• 1650

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Ramsay.

Ms. Bakopanos.

Ms. Eleni Bakopanos: I just want to be clear that the opposition understands that if we vote on this motion, it's not to come up again. We're not going to deal with this every time we sit. This motion will be dealt with on the floor. All opposition members then agree that this is the motion we're going to agree on and we're not going to come back tomorrow or the day after and ask for the same motion.

The Chair: I think we'll reach tomorrow when we come to it. We'll deal with it then.

Ms. Eleni Bakopanos: If we want to waste more time—

The Chair: I'll call the question. Do you want a voice vote?

Mr. Derek Lee: Yes.

(Motion negatived: nays 8; yeas 6)

The Chair: I thought I was going to exercise a new-found power today, but....

We have the Canadian Police Association. Neal Jessop is the president; Scott Newark is the executive officer. Mr. Jessop is from Windsor. We're very fond of Windsor, it being the centre of the universe.

Do you want to start, Staff Sergeant?

Mr. Neal Jessop (President, Canadian Police Association): Thank you, Madam Chair.

I'd just like to advise you that I'm not really here. This is my clone. I'm currently in the middle of a murder trial in Windsor, under subpoena.

The Chair: We didn't see you.

Mr. Neal Jessop: That's the situation we're in here.

For those of you who know me and who know Mr. Newark, this will probably bore you, but this is my sixth year as president of the Canadian Police Association. We represent 42,000 Canadian police officers across Canada.

• 1655

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: Concerning the witnesses, I suppose it is because they didn't have enough time, but I find it very annoying that witnesses show up with documents in English only, especially the Canadian Police Association. I think that even on short notice such an organization should present a brief that...

This is not the first time you appear before this committee, sir. Anyway, I know I have seen you before. As for the other gentleman, this is the first time I meet him. We are always being told—in the four years I have been an M.P.—that we can work in both official languages in this big and beautiful country of ours. People from the RCMP, the Police Association and other similar organizations come to see us, Bloc Québécois members, to tell us how good and nice we are, but when it comes to presenting a brief in both official languages, we from the Bloc Québécois are totally ignored.

Today, I will only mention it for the record, but next time, I think you will see the Bloc members get up and leave because we too can show disrespect to people.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Bellehumeur.

[Translation]

Mr. Scott Newark (Executive Officer, Canadian Police Association): Mr. Bellehumeur, I'm sorry...

[English]

The Chair: You just have to give me a chance to recognize you. Okay?

Before he addresses it, did anyone else care to comment on that?

Mr. Derek Lee: On that issue?

The Chair: Yes.

Mr. Derek Lee: If I could comment, by recollection again, the committee has always accepted submissions in either official language, but often national associations and groups provide their documents and submissions in writing in both official languages. In this case I'm going to guess that the single-language submission today is purely a function of the time constraints, which we've already been addressing here, regrettably. I suppose the submission could have come in in French, and then the rest of us who don't work usually in French would be complaining that we didn't get it in English. That's my take on this. Hopefully, we'll get the witnesses.

The Chair: Did you want to address that, Mr. Newark?

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: You don't see the opposite happening too often, Mr. Lee. We sat through the 35th Parliament and it didn't happen very often that briefs were presented in French only.

Mr. Derek Lee: All right.

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: They are in English 99.9999% of the time.

Mr. Derek Lee: Okay.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you. I'm sure we'll all take that for future reference.

Mr. Jessop.

Mr. Neal Jessop: Mr. Bellehumeur can rest assured that he will receive his documents in French, but this document was completed just last night by Mr. Newark and was not even in my hands, as the president, until this morning. So we do apologize. You will receive your documents in French.

We knew that this session would be translated.

Madam Chair, as I was saying, this is my sixth year as the president of the Canadian Police Association, representing 42,000 Canadian police officers, and I have the distinct pleasure of serving as a detective sergeant in the major crime squad in Windsor.

It may be helpful to you for me to give you the practical aspects of this particular piece of legislation, which I will do.

Very frankly, I have something to say to you at the end of Mr. Newark's presentation, which I would ask be next, which may disturb you to some extent, which may bring me very close to disfavour at the Supreme Court by some of its members, but it's something that I have to say to you on behalf of all Canadian police officers.

There is one other thing I want to say to you before I turn this over to Mr. Newark. Let there be no question—and I wish this to go on the record and be very well known—that in relation to this piece of legislation, I, Mr. Newark, and members of our staff at the Canadian Police Association were in close contact with Justice, sometimes on a daily basis, and our views, thanks to the justice department and to the Minister of Justice, and to all of you, are well known in this brief. This brief, in our view, in certain areas does not go far enough. Mr. Newark will describe to you where we believe it does not go far enough, and I would like to talk to you just for a few moments after he's finished about the situation we were put in because of the Supreme Court.

• 1700

We want it on record that this co-operative situation did exist. It existed to the benefit of Canadians, I think, because it's something we had to do to repair a very serious wound to the justice system surprisingly inflicted upon us by the Supreme Court, which is not something that should happen but did happen. As a result we came together, in my view, to do what had to be done.

I would ask if, at the pleasure of the members, you would listen to Mr. Newark's areas in which we feel this legislation may not go far enough.

The Chair: Go ahead.

Mr. Scott Newark: At the outset I would just echo what Mr. Lee said in relation to deficiency in the brief. I certainly agree you have a complaint. I would just suggest that the major focus of your complaint should be the people who decided on this timeframe. We retain full-time translating staff because we also appreciate the appropriateness, as a national organization, that the material we issue should be in both languages. So I take the remark, sir, but I think it's more properly directed somewhere else.

On what Neal mentioned about the consultation—and you heard it from the minister and from the official, Mr. Roy—it's absolutely true. Frankly, we have had nothing but the closest consultation on this bill, as close as on anything else. It has been timely and helpful and real consultation, I suggest, not the kind where you sometimes see where there's a bill and you get to see it. On this one, I guarantee you personally, there has been an interchange of ideas.

You heard the list of impressive people who have been consulted. It seems to me there is one problem, though. There's one group of people who weren't consulted and who haven't been given adequate time for consultation, and they are far more important than the Canadian Police Association, the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, and the various other organizations, including the bar associations—and that's you. This process is denying the elected legislative branch of government the opportunity to probe and to ask questions and to do the same thing as started in this committee hearing and as I did in my exchanges back and forth.

I offer it as an observation. The process, frankly, is not something we have any control over.

I think people are aware this is not the first time this has occurred. The problem in the Feeney case, which I suspect Neal is going to mention to you, is with the judicial branch of government intruding into what has hitherto been the legislative function. Make no mistake, the Feeney case is about a balancing of legitimate societal principles: the principle of privacy and the principle of the public interest in apprehending people who have warrants and recognizing that in Canada in the 1990s most people don't live in trees, therefore we have to have a process to be able to go in and get them. That balancing of principles, with respect, we would suggest is appropriately a political decision and done best by people who are elected.

However, as I understand it, time is short. I'll leave that and get to some of the points specifically within the bill. I want to touch on a couple. The first is in relation to the point that was raised about the failure to define what we would have suggested as fresh pursuit.

By the way, I'm going to refer to it later on in connection with Mr. Lee's remarks. Fortunately I was able to figure out how to merge documents on the computer. It took half an hour to be able to do it.

You'll see in the midst of our brief actual draft legislation. This was one of the beginning points in our discussions with the department. We actually drafted what we thought the bill should look like. So I may make reference from time to time to things in here where we say in fact you could define something and you could do it in a certain way. Fresh pursuit, rather than hot pursuit, because we suspected it to be broader, is one of those areas.

If I took the argument correctly from the department, when they were asked for the reason why exigent circumstances were being defined, it was because this was a hitherto undefined concept. The court had basically left the door open and it was necessary to do that. And we agree it's necessary.

It is regrettable that the common law tradition is not particularly being followed by the Supreme Court any more. This particular court has a very clear history of rejecting the previous common law as to what criminal procedure and practice were and instead deciding itself what it should be. The Feeney case is but one of the latest in that reality. Frankly, I think that's too bad, because I think the genius of our system was its ability to evolve.

• 1705

Knowing that reality—the Supreme Court is going to do that—with respect, it doesn't make an awful lot of sense to then say we'll leave it to the courts to decide what “fresh pursuit” or “hot pursuit” is going to mean. If in fact we are regrettably going to have to abandon this approach and leave it to the courts to evolve, then as we are defining what “in exigent circumstances” means, with the greatest of respect, I think it's far advisable, not only from a practical point of view but also from a public confidence point of view, that the definition we use is the one that is arrived at by 301 elected representatives of Parliament instead of 5 unelected, unaccountable judges.

With respect, if it makes sense that you do it in “exigent circumstances”, it makes sense that you do it in “fresh pursuit” or “hot pursuit”. The department may tell you that if you define it you will narrow it down and it won't include something else. With the greatest respect, we don't agree. Again, look only at their position in which they say, for example, that “exigent circumstances includes the following”. You will see a draft definition of what “fresh pursuit” could mean in here. It would also leave that wide open. That again is the kind of question I would suggest you need to be looking at. It's whether or not this is really the proper function of the legislative branch of government.

One question I would urge you to ask of the minister or her staff if they come back is the effect in terms of retroactivity. We just want to be sure of the view of the minister and of Parliament. This will be important if this section does go ahead and there is some controversy or some, God forbid, uncertainty in the courts in deciding what the legislation is.

It's permissible for the courts to look to these hearings to ascertain what the intent of the legislature was. If we want to make sure that we are correct in what we believe to be the case, which is that anything prior to May 22—this was the pre-existing law before Feeney—then the result of the suspension is that anything after that date, until the time the bill is enacted, is the same thing. That's what the effect of Feeney is. I would suggest that this is something you should ask the minister to confirm.

We also have a major question in relation to the “prior announcement” sections. I want to just direct your attention to it, because quite frankly, I don't know the answer to the question. Last night in the airport in Montreal I was going back and forth over this, trying to figure it out.

These are the circumstances in proposed section 529.4, whereby, in effect, the police are not required to announce they're coming in. There are criteria in which it's set out why they don't have to do that. We take no exception to this. This was one of the areas where we think we made some progress.

What I would urge you to get the minister's view on is this. Take a situation whereby an officer is armed with one of these warrants and an authorization to enter a house. Then two weeks later, for example, they get information that says this person is at a specific residence. Then they go to effect the arrest, but the authorization does not include one of the exceptions by the judge that says you don't have to announce your presence. Except in this instance, the telephone call not only said that the guy was in the house, it also said he had a gun or knife.

We would respectfully suggest that this information should arm the police officer by the same criteria in the statute by saying that they reasonably believe this person was in a position of presenting danger to them or somebody else. That could be measured objectively by the court itself after the fact, but I don't think it's the intention in those circumstances—obviously fairly emergent circumstances—for the police officer to stop to try to get a telephone somewhere and explain this to get an authorization.

I don't think that's the intent of the legislation, but frankly, in my hurried discussion this afternoon with departmental officials...nobody is really sure. With respect, uncertainty in this area is not a very good thing, so I would urge you to pursue that point with them.

There's one thing we suggested that was not accepted by the department but that we believed was perfectly constitutionally sustainable. As the elected representatives of the people of Canada, the terms of the balance in a particular issue are such that for certain most serious offences, where those circumstances exist, we should decide that this is already ample justification to put right in the warrant—do it statutorily—the fact that the police can go into a residence to arrest that person. We don't require them to say that in fact they have to know what residence it is.

These circumstances are, for example, the apprehension of people for whom there are warrants out for their arrest, such as the scheduled offences, offences under the CCRA, the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, or even under criminality deportation in the Immigration Act.

• 1710

Here's the rationale for that. I'll use the example that I think Mr. Ramsay used at the briefing.

Say you have somebody convicted of murder, for example, who has escaped from prison. Literally, the way this is drafted right now, the police would have to go and tell the judge, for issuing a warrant, where they expect him to be. That's not particularly realistic.

Consider the public interest in those limited circumstances. You're talking about somebody who has actually already been convicted of the crime and actually violated another order, in effect, by escaping from prison. Surely the public interest in that sense outweighs potentially having to get a judicial stamp of approval to go into his hideout.

To make it even more absurd, if you think about it, how about somebody who is on parole for a very serious offence, such as murder? Say the condition of the parole that they've breached is from living at a specified residence, but they're not there any more. We would have to say that we would like to get a warrant for authorization to enter a residence, but we don't know where it is because he just left. This is not, I would suggest, something that makes a whole lot of sense.

We recommended that you should define the offences. You pick the ones that are the most important to justify that. We are absolutely confident that this is sustainable under section 1 of the charter. With respect, although obviously the department didn't agree with us, I have yet to see—I've asked for it—their legal analysis that says why that is so.

I urge you to ask the same questions. Let's see the legal analysis that says it's not permissible. With the greatest of respect, on the circumstances that I gave you, if that's not sustainable under section 1 of the charter, it's meaningless.

The minister made a reference in saying that there would be no federal funding available in relation to this because this was not a policy decision of the government; it was a reaction to the Supreme Court of Canada decision. With the greatest of respect, I don't believe that's correct. By not taking this statutory scheme, and instead by putting in this framework of these telephone applications, that is a policy decision. It's up to the federal government to decide which policy decision it wishes to choose. Having taken that choice, I would then suggest to you that it's incumbent on it to provide the dollars—there are going to be dollars needed—to back up the choice it makes.

Let me just assure you that if there is not—I believe one of the gentlemen over here made the point—a justice of the peace available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week on the other end of the telephone, this system will not work.

Again, the minister said that it really wasn't anything different, because the telewarrant system had already been in effect. That's true, but we have just added on 19,000—I'm just picking a number—more cases to have to deal with on a daily basis. In terms of the reality of the existing system right now, this morning, somebody from Vancouver described the telewarrant system as a joke in the sense of it not being available.

I was in New Brunswick yesterday. I was very much taken to task when I attempted to describe what the system was going to look like. Again, it simply didn't work when you needed to get somebody. There wasn't somebody available.

I would suggest that this is an area in which federal leadership, including financial leadership, is required. If that means an expenditure of dollars in the calendar year, or fiscal year 1998-99—it's my understanding that a couple of billion bucks are floating around for program spending—this would be a very wise investment in terms of public safety.

We also had this to recommend. I understand it to be outside the scope of the bill, but it's something I think you should appreciate. The Feeney case is unique in one sense, because it was literally a judicial ambush. The Crown was not notified that the court was actively considering striking down existing criminal procedure and, in effect, sections of the Criminal Code. As a result, they had no notification of it. They weren't able to go and argue.

We suggested an amendment to the Supreme Court Act to actually make it mandatory that if the court is considering doing something in issuing a decision, the effect of which is to strike down or modify existing federal law, then the Crown must be given notice of that fact. So at least you have the opportunity to go in and argue the case. That didn't happen here.

• 1715

With respect to your witnesses, I've already notified the Canadian Association of Crown Counsel. It's absolutely critical, I would urge—it's my bias and my background; I was a crown prosecutor—that you hear from these people, as well as the defence bar. I'm glad to hear there will be a constitutional expert from the defence bar. I hope there's one from the Crown coming as well.

The Chair: Just as an editorial comment, I might tell you that in the past the Canadian Association of Crown Counsel have not wanted to appear—

Mr. Scott Newark: I know.

The Chair: —because they don't like to conflict with the policy-makers in their individual departments. I would love to have the Canadian Association of Crown Counsel here on a regular basis, but they don't participate.

Mr. Scott Newark: As a brief aside, I was on the executive of the Alberta Crown Attorneys' Association and ran into the same perspective, which is sort of why I thought it might be an idea to move on. That's the whole point of having an association—that you get to have a voice independent of management.

I have encountered the same situation. I've written to them, sent them the material, and urged them to contact you to be able to testify.

The Chair: You probably know groups whose input would be more valuable on things like this.

Mr. Scott Newark: I have just a couple of other points, if I might. I hope you're getting the sense here that there are a lot questions here. There are some pretty practical things that maybe need some exploring and analysis as to why we can't do something.

Don't get me wrong. I think this is frankly a very good bill. It's just a question of whether it can be better, and whether therefore it needs to be better, and whether Parliament is appropriately discharging its responsibility by making those inquiries. Perhaps you can do it in a couple of days, and that would be great.

From my biased perspective, perhaps you could just take the amendments that we drafted in here, if you wanted to, but I don't expect that to be the case. And frankly I wouldn't recommend that you do that, because they should have review by people who are draftsmen, and far more skilled than I.

The Chair: We don't have any of those any more.

Mr. Scott Newark: Yes, I read about that.

In relation to the naming of the individuals, there is the possibility of modifying the words so that the warrant could be obtained for a person named or unnamed. I would suggest that the question I believe Mr. Lee asked in relation to that is very much in the right direction.

Given why we're here having this discussion, it doesn't seem to make a whole lot of sense to just have the response, “Well, we'll leave it up to the courts to decide”. With respect, you should decide what you think is the appropriate balancing of interests. If it is the intent of Parliament that that be so, then frankly you should direct the department or the people who do the drafting to draft your will, rather than leave it up to the court that, frankly, got us into this mess in the first place.

One final point I wanted to mention was in relation to Mr. Lee's point, again, about whether or not we didn't have the capacity to actually say that for example.... I think Mr. Lee referred to it as the policeman's how-to manual. It started out a couple of years ago about this thick, and it's now about this thick. We're thinking of perhaps suggesting that court of appeal judges go along with police officers all the time, so they can interpret to them.

Mr. Paul Forseth: Carry a book.

Mr. Scott Newark: However, it's a very good point, and one I would suggest that you can consider, given that this is a highly technical process, made necessary not exclusively because of Parliament's role but in reaction to the system we have with the Supreme Court. I'm quite certain my friend is going to address that.

There was an intention in Parliament to say that if somebody didn't do something exactly the way that is specified here, that should not of itself cause the evidence that's gathered—the blood on Feeney's shirt—to automatically be excluded as evidence. With respect, we think there is a way of doing that. It is drafted as an amendment in the brief.

Mr. Jack Ramsay: What page?

Mr. Scott Newark: I'm just looking for it now. It's on a couple of pages. If you look on page 13 of the brief, and this is in relation to exigent circumstances, it says:

Where a court determines that the provisions of subsection (2) have not been met that shall not, of itself, be grounds to exclude evidence otherwise lawfully obtained during the arrest.

That's actually there as well on page 11 in subsection (6) to that. It's that theme, if you will, that's there, that we have set up this reasonably technical framework, but that Parliament would express its will to the court in saying—not that we are going to redefine section 24 of the charter—but that if there is a violation of this section of itself, that should not be grounds to exclude the evidence. It doesn't mean that the court can't consider it. It just means that in and of itself, it should not result in the truth being excluded from evidence.

• 1720

I've had this discussion with the department, which, I think it's fair to say, doesn't agree with that position. With respect, those are the kinds of ideas that this case has raised and that, unfortunately, this rather short timeframe brings to your attention in this crowded space.

I wanted to keep this focused as much as I could on things that I urge you either to consider as amendments or to pose to the officials from the department as to why it can't be done. Because we believe it can, and the bill will be improved, frankly, as good as it already is.

Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Detective Sergeant Jessop.

I gave him a new rank.

Mr. Neal Jessop: Thank you.

Ladies and gentlemen, I've been sitting here listening to the presentation—I'm sure Mr. Sullivan will follow up on this—and we haven't talked about the Feeney case. I don't know how many of you have read about Feeney, but it would be clear to you all that there was no question as to who was responsible in this case for the death of the victim—the victim was beaten to death—where it happened, or under what circumstances it happened...the theft of a truck. It would be clear to you that Feeney was responsible. Think about that.

The chair and I are aware of another case in Windsor, where it was clear that two persons assassinated a person in a parking garage. Because of the law, not because of the investigation, they both walked away.

If you think about Feeney, five persons in the Supreme Court were willing to let a clear murder go unpunished, and to let the murderer walk away.

I'm elected as president of the Canadian Police Association. I'm a politician with 42,000 constituents. I trust that all of you are in about the same situation. Your constituents don't know much about Feeney, but the first thing they would say to you if they knew anything about Feeney, or if it was explained to them, would be, how did you let that happen? How did Feeney walk away from the people of Canada?

Isn't that correct? That's what ordinary people say when they read that article in the paper. How could they do that? How could they let a murderer walk away? But they did it. Five out of nine people said this was okay because Mr. Sopinka said about warrantless arrest that, in general, the privacy interest outweighs the interest of the police.

What have the police got to do with this? The police represent you. They should have put “the public” in there. Warrantless arrests in dwelling-houses are prohibited, in general. We all go nuts. We all say, well, what are we going to do about that? We can't have that.

Feeney could have run to the bathroom, washed up, taken a drink, burned his clothes, or if there was somebody else in his house after he murdered the first person, taken them hostage. It didn't happen in this case, but it could have.

That brings me to my point with you. Canadian police officers have had enough of this Supreme Court. Canadian police officers represent you.

[Translation]

A member: So does the Bloc Québécois...

[English]

The Chair: Order, please.

Mr. Neal Jessop: So I say to you that as people who are elected by those people, you should do the same thing the Americans do. The Americans examine the qualifications of their Supreme Court justices. If the mood of the public in America is one of conservatism, with a small “c”, and if the Senate and the House of Representatives elect a conservative with a small-“c” constituency, they appoint conservative judges. They sit that judge down in front of them and they want to know from them what morality they have, what their standards are, what they believe in, and if they are consistent with the government of the day. That gives them accountability.

• 1725

You've all watched the American courts move from the extreme left to the centre, and now probably to the right of centre. And all of this went to Politics 101 in university, and we all know what that is.

But the fact is that they represent the people who elected them, and they reflect that in the judges they appoint.

Isn't it time...? This has just been reinforced by a judge of the Supreme Court himself, Mr. Justice LaForest, who said, I've had enough of this, the next time you appoint a Supreme Court judge, bring him before the elected representatives of this country and find out what his or her principles are.

Five of nine judges reversed the law that has stood in this country for 130 years that said there's no sanctuary from lawful arrest in Canada. One person who wrote that majority decision said that all the rest of those Supreme Court judges that existed for 130 years were full of shit, that I'm right and they're wrong. Well, that's wrong, and I'm telling you it's time for you people to step up and say it's wrong.

Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you.

Let's just, as a matter of housekeeping, keep in mind that we have a vote. We'll have bells at 5.30 p.m. It's about 5.25 right now, and I know we have questions.

Detective Sergeant Jessop, I take it that you're going back to Windsor tonight.

Mr. Neal Jessop: Maybe, if I don't get locked up outside the door.

The Chair: There's nobody here to lock you up. Mr. Richardson might, but I don't think he's got powers of arrest yet.

I'm just trying to get some idea of the schedule here.

Mr. Neal Jessop: I have an eight o'clock flight.

The Chair: Okay.

Do you want to start questioning now until the bell?

Some hon. members: Yes.

The Chair: Okay. Let's start with five minutes then.

Mr. Ramsay.

Mr. Jack Ramsay: I'll get right into my area of concern that five minutes allows me to get into.

I read the Feeney case. I have also read at least the first page of your brief, and in it I find something very interesting. In the second last paragraph of page 1 you say:

Attending to the residence where Feeney resided, the police met Feeney's brother-in-law, who confirmed that Feeney had earlier stolen his vehicle and crashed it.

That was not contained within the judgment that I read. So it means that the arresting peace officer did have reasonable and probable grounds to believe that he had committed an indictable offence, the offence of theft. Therefore the entry into the dwelling was lawful.

Mr. Scott Newark: The irony is—and Madam Justice L'Heureux-Dubé puts it in her dissent—that what really happened, I think, is that the arresting constable got turned around when he was on the stand and literally said that he didn't have the grounds for arrest. Only Justice L'Heureux-Dubé recognized that and said that these people don't need to be appellate judges in the way they articulate what in fact was the situation there. The majority, however, of the court said, no, look, that's what the individual said, therefore these grounds did not exist.

The trial court was in the best position, obviously, to make that determination. The Court of Appeal of British Columbia all agreed. Unfortunately, the majority of the court did not. But as a matter just of fact, I don't think it's disputable.

Mr. Jack Ramsay: The point I'm making is that the RCMP, the arresting officer, under cross-examination, did admit that he felt that he did not have reasonable and probable grounds to arrest on the murder. But he certainly had reasonable, probable grounds to believe the man had committed an indictable offence in the theft of the car, and therefore he had the right to arrest on an indictable offence without a warrant.

• 1730

Okay. I see the bells are starting to ring. I'd like to mention this. For the minister to abandon the increased cost to provide 24-hour JP services I think is wrong. What does it mean? We're going to increase the cost, and if the money is not there, it's going to reduce the effectiveness of the police to deal with this new situation.

Of course, from a political point of view, it throws into a cocked hat the government's pledge to provide safe homes and safer streets.

I want to ask this question.

The Chair: I'm just going to hold you for a minute to see what we're going to do. I'd like to suspend, because we have to get back all the way to Centre Block. Is everybody agreeable to coming back to finish these witnesses this evening? Okay.

So we'll go to our vote and come straight back here. The clerk has spoken to Mr. Sullivan, and Mr. Sullivan will be our first witness tomorrow. He's agreed to accommodate us so Detective Sergeant Jessop can go back tonight.

Mr. Jack Ramsay: So we'll just deal with these witnesses?

The Chair: Yes, as soon as we come back, and then we're done. Okay? Thanks.

• 1731

• 1820

The Chair: Okay, we're back. It looks to me as though we've been gone 52 minutes and 5 seconds.

Mr. Ramsay, why don't you start? I think it's best if you repeat your questions and we'll just start the clock again.

Mr. Jack Ramsay: Okay. Thank you, Madam Chair.

With the attitude that was reflected in the Supreme Court's decision, I have concern about the possibility of proposed paragraph 529.3(2)(b) being struck down as well. The reason for that is it seems to me, at least to some extent, that the majority view of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Feeney case disregarded the collection of evidence as exigent circumstances, based upon their interpretation of the charter.

If that is the case, with that attitude, that feeling, that view, of the majority of the Supreme Court, I'd suggest this particular proposed paragraph doesn't have a hope of successfully withstanding a constitutional challenge. What's your view on that?

Mr. Scott Newark: There's one major difference, and somewhere in our brief there's a reference to this.

The Feeney case is a situation of the Supreme Court in effect commenting on what is a legislative vacuum. There was no definition of “exigent circumstances”. In fact there was no legislative framework involved for arrest without warrant in a dwelling-house, even though that issue had been raised, if you recall, in a case a number of years before. I forget the name of the case.

Mr. Derek Lee: Landry.

Mr. Scott Newark: The Supreme Court said, look, this is not something that's been defined by Parliament, so here's what we think some of the principles are.

Our analysis of the Feeney case and some of the earlier cases suggests that in fact the best way to look at this is as a trend, not in isolation. Where there is this absence of clear, legislative, expressed intent in the form of legislation, the Supreme Court is going to insert itself into both the legislative field and, quite frankly, the investigative field.

That will be a major difference in what is in proposed section 529.3 of the bill. For the first time we're actually defining it. For the first time Parliament is actually saying this is our view and this is what we define this to be as justifiable grounds for entry. That is quite a different situation from where the Supreme Court itself just says Parliament hasn't expressed its intent on this at all.

Mr. Jack Ramsay: But, with respect, that's not what this decision stated. It didn't state that we don't have to compare existing legislation with the Charter of Rights for the accused's interest in a dwelling-home. That's not what they're saying; that wasn't the case here.

They have struck down.... The rape shield was the last piece of legislation to go down, not at the hands of the Supreme Court but at the hands of the Alberta courts.

Sopinka says: “...it was not apparent that the safety of the police or the community was in such jeopardy that there were exigent circumstances...” He doesn't mention the evidence in relation to the exigent circumstances.

Mr. Scott Newark: Correct.

Mr. Jack Ramsay: So I draw from that that exigent circumstances in the gathering of evidence will not justify an entry into a dwelling-house without a warrant.

Mr. Scott Newark: I guess, Mr. Ramsay, with respect, the point is who's driving the train here? That is the approach that, frankly, many people take. You end up virtually inserting yourself into the position of guessing what a Supreme Court Justice would do, given a set of circumstances. That has produced, not only in this bill, but in a whole host of legislation....

If you went back over our briefs from the last three or four years, you'd hear the same thing. Rather than attempting to anticipate what the Supreme Court might or might not do, the person driving the train should be Parliament and Parliament should express that this is what it intends exigent circumstances to be.

• 1825

There are two points that I certainly agree with the minister about, although to different degrees. One is the fact that when Parliament legislates on something it should be given at least notice—I'm not sure I'd go all the way to deference—by the Supreme Court. Second, the absence of defining it leaves us pretty much back where we started.

As I read the Feeney case, I don't view Justice Sopinka's comments as being exclusive in that sense. The department has taken the approach that we think this is the way we can legislate to allow X, Y and Z, which we believe to be necessary, to occur. The benefit here is that for the first time we're actually defining it. Frankly, I just wish we'd go a whole lot further and apply the same logic on this to circumstances of hot pursuit or fresh pursuit, which we haven't done. We're still going to leave it up to the court. My best guess is we're in for a nasty surprise at some point in the future.

Mr. Jack Ramsay: The decision did touch on hot pursuit but it didn't touch on fresh pursuit. Of course, during the briefing by the officials, you were there when Stephen Bindman asked why you did not define hot pursuit so the police officers would know exactly where they stand with regard to that. They have not done that and they've left it open again.

I have one final question about this business of telewarrants. Apparently it's been around for 10 years. Do you know whether or not that process has ever been challenged?

Mr. Neal Jessop: I don't know. Scott would probably know more than I do. Telewarrants haven't been around in this province for 10 years, they've been around for about 10 days. In this province, which is probably one of the most populous provinces, the system of telewarrants did not exist. It was permitted in the Criminal Code but we never got to it. We didn't do it. They did it in Quebec and I think they did it in Alberta, if I'm not mistaken.

Mr. Scott Newark: Yes.

Mr. Neal Jessop: I'll give you a little information on this telewarrant system just so you won't be—

Mr. Jack Ramsay: We would appreciate your information, but would the telewarrant system in practice now successfully face a constitutional challenge?

Mr. Scott Newark: I can certainly answer that. I suggest it would. You're really talking about importing increased technology to deal with evidentiary requirements. Don't forget there is a check on the end of the process. I know you raised the concern about how the JP knows whether or not the person he's talking to is a police officer. That will become relevant when we're actually in a court proceeding, somebody has been arrested, there's an accused and there's a guy with a uniform giving evidence. I think the circle will be complete going that way. I don't see that as being the basis for it.

Don't forget these hearings are recorded and all of those kinds of safeguards are there. Although I suppose I agree with the minister about this, no one can guarantee what the Supreme Court may decide to do one particular day.

Mr. Jack Ramsay: Regardless of the legislation.

Mr. Scott Newark: That's true, but the alternative to that would be to pack up this place and just send everybody home, because if that's so, there would be no point in any form of responsible government any more and we'd just have the Supreme Court to tell us all what to do.

The Chair: I think we should just let the banks do it all.

Mr. Jack Ramsay: I think that was what perhaps Mr. Jessop was alluding to in his earlier comments.

That's all I have, Madam Chair. Thank you.

The Chair: Just kidding about the banks.

Mr. Forseth.

Mr. Paul Forseth: I wonder if you could explain your concerns about fresh pursuit versus hot pursuit in the law, and how this is related to the problem of this bill. The minister says the bill really doesn't deal with these issues, and by inference is saying the issue is not affected. But I think you are saying you don't agree with that, so I'd like you to flesh out your thoughts. How does the bill affect this whole notion of fresh and hot pursuit?

• 1830

Mr. Scott Newark: I believe the minister is correct in saying there is nothing in the bill that will affect hot pursuit. That is the phrase that was used by the Supreme Court of Canada. But with respect, that's the problem. I believe her position is logically inconsistent with an earlier position she put forward by defining “exigent circumstances”. If there's a reason to define “exigent circumstances”, which is to express Parliament's will on what this important law enforcement term means, then I fail to see the logic why that same criterion doesn't exist to define another important law enforcement reality, or concept, called “hot pursuit” or “fresh pursuit”; whatever you want to call it.

The notion that we will allow the common law to evolve.... Unfortunately, we haven't been doing very well in that regard. What happens is that the Supreme Court has a demonstrated tendency towards saying there's nothing here on what Parliament intends, therefore this is what it means; then we all come back and go, look, they've done it again.

As a policy question, I would just say you have the opportunity here. Define it.

Secondly, it's a hell of a lot easier for police officers, who already have to carry around a manual that's this thick on what the legal requirements are, to be able to deal with something that is defined than it is for them to carry around individual cases which tell them what a particular concept is.

But my major concern about it is the internal inconsistency in the government's position, in that they have defined it and found ample reason to define it in one but not in another.

The Chair: Mr. MacKay.

Mr. Peter MacKay: I'm very much interested in your comments about the use of legal language, because I think that's something a lot of people do struggle with. Lawyers tend to try to stake their claim on the law by putting their own words in place, and I think judges do the same. I agree with much of what Mr. Jessop had to say about the level of frustration that's out there, expressed by a lot of police.

In that vein, do you feel putting further legal definitions forward in Parliament for “exigent circumstances” and other definitions handed down by the court...won't this only increase the volume of information police officers are going to have to digest? Should we be trying simplify it, perhaps, by going back to some of the more basic definitions, such as “reasonable and probable grounds”, and putting faith in what the police officers are doing in the exercise of their discretion on reasonable and probable grounds?

Mr. Scott Newark: That's a very good idea. The only problem with it is that the Supreme Court of Canada is around and will ultimately review the actions of the individual police officers. The problem is that they have expressed themselves in a fashion that has resulted in Parliament and four governments taking the extraordinary step of saying, please suspend the operation of your judgment, because you just turned law enforcement on its head. It's all well and good....

As I say, I think the genius of the common law was always in its ability to evolve, but regrettably, one of the major players in the process is throwing that out the window. There is a certain value in certainty, but.... If, Mr. MacKay, you could come up with something that would give that kind of clarity to police officers and still endow the discretion and still not run afoul of what we already know to be the Supreme Court's prescriptions, that would be great. My problem in attempting to do this is that it has not been the direction in this country in the last 10 years.

Mr. Peter MacKay: I see a trend that has been continued where the Supreme Court reacts or basically strikes down or creates a new body of law, Parliament then reacts to that, and the volumes and volumes of case law and legal definitions continue. Perhaps it should be more incumbent upon us as lawmakers to go back and try to simplify things rather than expand on an already complicated system. I know I'm speaking in very general, philosophical terms, but I think this is a theme Parliament should be aiming at, rather than simply reacting to what has happened in cases such as Feeney.

Mr. Scott Newark: Very candidly, I think a lot of people are going to look at even this bill, which we think is a reasonably good effort, and not be very satisfied.

On the example of Feeney, the difficulty is that the starting point for this is not before May of this year. It's the Feeney decision we have to start from. So I don't deny the cycle you're talking about, but given the fact that you have to react to it, assuming that the situation created by Feeney is untenable, it would be great if you can come up with something that is more generalized like that, but I'm not sure it's possible today.

• 1835

Mr. Neal Jessop: Every police officer who takes the oath today knows that particularly in serious cases but in every case where he or she takes the stand the conduct of the police will be tried first, and the conduct of the police will be tried on the basis of the established case law, which the officer may or may not know because of many factors, including our police education system in this country. But we go in knowing that. We go in knowing that we will go on trial first in relation to our conduct. And this will be the new rule; this will be the Feeney rule. If we don't match the Feeney rule, then everything that falls from that tree is forbidden fruit and none of the evidence will go in after that. That's a very onerous burden to put particularly on a young police officer who is not a lawyer and who never will be a lawyer but who simply came to his or her occupation because of a desire to do good.

Mr. Scott Newark: It's not only that. Not only is it that the police officers don't necessarily know what the individual rules are at the time, but the Supreme Court keeps changing the rules in the middle of the game. Don't forget, in Feeney there was an accepted practice of which the Supreme Court said, by the way, while we're here we're going to change all this. And that's not the first time. It adds a further complication to law enforcement that the ultimate arbiter and now lawmaker—perhaps not ultimate but one of the parties in lawmaking—has the capacity and the inclination towards changing the rules in the middle of the game.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Mr. Newark, I would even go farther. I have had judges ask me, is this section proclaimed; has this been proclaimed as yet in the Criminal Code? So it is changing that quickly.

The Chair: They're saying, are you sure that is the law?

Mr. Peter MacKay: Yes, that's right.

I was interested that in your brief you tied in a comment by Justice L'Heureux-Dubé. The quote was:

An officer's inability to articulate the legal terminology properly which granted the authority to enter should not invalidate a proper entry.

This dictum I think ties in again with the general theme about the fruit of a poison tree. I think the judges themselves—and I don't know how we bring this to fruition or try to effect a change in their thinking—this whole concept of an officer being put on trial is again part of the bigger problem that this decision highlights.

Mr. Scott Newark: There are two points we think would help in that.

If you look again on page 13, it's right above issue 5 where it says subsection (8). It is the point that I made back in reference to Mr. Lee, that if for example the court does determine that the technical procedures have not been followed—whether it is because of an inability to articulate it—this was a direction from Parliament that said that this in and of itself should not be grounds for the court to automatically exclude the evidence. That's one thing we think can be done.

The second thing we think could be done is, with respect, that it is about time the Supreme Court got notified that it too is required to follow the law. And there is the amendment I spoke of to the Supreme Court Act that says you have to at least give the other side the opportunity to respond. In law it is called audi alteram partem, if I remember. It is the most basic concept. It should apply to the Supreme Court as well.

Those are two things we think might go a long way towards, shall we say, causing the Supreme Court to recognize that Parliament is not prepared to simply pack its doors up and go home.

The Chair: It would make a nice private member's bill, and a private member, of course, wouldn't have to consult with them.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh.

The Chair: Thanks, Mr. MacKay. Mr. Lee, did you have a question?

Mr. Derek Lee: Yes, I have a question. I was pleased, and we were pleased, to hear that the law enforcement community and the Canadian Police Association did participate in the consultation leading to this bill. For the CPA, when did the consultation begin, do you recall?

Mr. Scott Newark: Yes, the initial consultation started as a result of a telephone call asking us for our input. The initial meeting, I believe, was on September 9, where there was a general discussion of principles as to what direction we were going to follow, analysis of the case itself, what we thought the case meant and where we should be going with it. Thereafter, there was a series of very specific back-and-forths, as the minister stated, literally right before it went to cabinet, as I understand it. There were at least a dozen meetings back and forth on specific points. I don't want to necessarily get into all the details, but some days there were multiple....

• 1840

In my judgment, and I've been doing this with governments for a little while, we have absolutely no grounds for any kind of complaint about consultation. It was superb.

As I said at the outset, though, I think the group that hasn't been consulted is the most important group, which is you, the members of Parliament.

Mr. Derek Lee: I'm just interested in that aspect, given the timelines that have developed.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

The Chair: Are there any other questions? Mr. Ramsay.

Mr. Jack Ramsay: This may be hard for you to estimate, but if you were originally contacted on September 9 for your input, at what stage was the development of the bill at that time? In other words, I'd like to know when they first began working on the bill.

Mr. Scott Newark: I can't answer that. I don't mean that I won't answer that; I mean I can't answer that. I don't have the knowledge to answer the question.

Mr. Jack Ramsay: Okay, that's fair.

Madame L'Heureux-Dubé said, in her judgment:

As...the actions of the police...did not breach the Charter, it is unnecessary for me to consider s. 24(2). Had it been necessary, however...considering the exigent circumstances and seriousness of the crime, excluding this evidence would clearly bring the administration of justices into disrepute, particularly since this result would likely preclude the appellant...being brought to justice.

That comes into direct conflict with the statement of the majority, which stated that: “In general, the individual's privacy interest in the dwelling-house outweighs the interest of the police”.

So we have Madame L'Heureux-Dubé saying the interest of society would prevail even if there was something untoward. We have the majority saying exactly the opposite. Neither one referred to section 1 of the charter and I'm wondering why not. Does section 1 not apply in this particular case?

Mr. Scott Newark: I think it highlights the point I tried to make earlier. I think had Her Majesty been given notice of what the majority was planning to do, somebody might have made the argument. I don't have my code with me, but as I pointed out to the department in one instance, in effect this judgment has struck down one of the sections in the Criminal Code that gave general direction to people to arrest, to execute the warrant.

If I had been the crown, I might have pointed out to their lordships that there is another way of looking at this and perhaps you should be considering section 1 grounds. That's why we think it's important enough—and I understand it's outside the focus of this bill and therefore outside an amendment. But something for this committee in particular, perhaps independent of legislation, to conduct its own hearings on is what kind of amendments to the Supreme Court Act might be appropriate in order to ensure that this kind of non-hearing doesn't take place in the future.

Mr. Jack Ramsay: It touches, of course, specifically on the point I made in the House when I spoke on this, and Mr. Jessop has spoken to it. In the Sopinka judgment, in general, the individual's privacy interest in the dwelling-house outweighs the interest of the police. But what is the interest of the police if it is not the interest of society, to enforce the law, to gather evidence, and so on?

Again, I go back to section 1 of the charter, which allows decisions to be made that would offset the right of the individual when the larger interest of society is at stake. I guess the point we're arriving at—this man is walking free in that community, perhaps because that's where his home was. If this judgment and what has happened here does not bring the administration of justice into disrepute in the minds of hundreds of thousands of Canadians, starting with the law enforcement officers, crown prosecutors, and those working in the justice system, I don't know what will. This is what Madame L'Heureux-Dubé said in her judgment, that this is what would happen if the interests of the killer had supremacy over the interests of society and our agents in society in order to protect society.

• 1845

From the viewpoint of the police, where are we going?

Mr. Neal Jessop: I think you're going exactly to your destination as I described it to you. You're in a situation where probably the Supreme Court, as it relates to certain criminal issues, has lost credibility with the Canadian public. The real problem is they don't appear to know it, and if they do know it they don't appear to care.

I'm relatively sure that Mr. Justice Sopinka knew about evidence that might be destroyed. He knew that bodily harm might occur. I have read his decisions. He certainly doesn't lack intelligence. If he made the decision that way and wrote it that way, does he not care about evidence? Does he not care about potential harm to family members inside the house? Did he not think about it?

Mr. Jack Ramsay: I'll end my comments with this last statement. In July, I think it was, of last year, an Angus Reid poll indicated that 52% of Canadians have little faith in the courts. Recently, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada asked a group of lawyers to defend decisions made by justices and judges. Perhaps the message is getting through.

Of course, we're going to support this bill. We don't like it being rushed through because we don't know exactly what's in it, in terms of the viewpoints of the players on both sides of the issue, but I decry the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada that brought this bill about and made it necessary.

Mr. Scott Newark: Mr. Ramsay, I wrote about the chief justice's speech calling for a jihad, or a response to a perceived jihad by the public, and on defence counsel and crown attorneys to come to the defence of courts. With respect, a lot of what we've touched on today has in some ways been hitherto undiscussed, the interplay between politics and the judiciary and lawmaking.

Chief Justice Lamer has entered the political process with those remarks. My sense is that what's happened because of an absence of parliamentary direction—and this is the point I was trying to make—is that this in fact has been going on for a long time. The kinds of issues that were involved in Feeney, the legitimate issues between privacy interests and the public interest in apprehension of people for whom there are warrants involved that balance and are, of necessity, political decisions that are best made in a free and democratic society—to use those words—by elected representatives. That is an issue that we are going to have to come to grips with that I think is only beginning to dawn on people.

I share very much Mr. Jessop's sense that I know he's been trying to convey to you. I suppose, philosophically, this is why people yearn for responsible government in the first place. This sense of a lack of accountability, responsibility, and control by people who exercise lawmaking authority over individuals is destructive of public confidence in the criminal justice system and, I suggest to you far more than that, the very legislative process itself. It is an issue that's going to have to be addressed, and addressed sooner than later. This bill is simply one little blip along the way, but it's why we felt it so important that these issues, which are not normally part of our presentations, be put forth on the record. It's about time somebody started saying these things.

• 1850

Finally—by the way, I was looking for the section—again for the record, I think it's appropriate. It's section 514 of the Criminal Code that the Feeney decision inferentially struck down. It says:

514. (1) A warrant in accordance with this Part may be executed by arresting the accused

(a) wherever he is found within the territorial jurisdiction of the justice

I don't think they even addressed their minds to the fact that what they were in effect doing was striking down section 514. I know that no crown attorney was given the opportunity to stand up to say this is what they were striking down, because the current rules of procedure let them do what they want.

Mr. Jack Ramsay: Thank you.

The Chair: Thanks. I think we're winding down here.

I'll say this on the record in order that you can't say you didn't have notice. This committee will be reviewing all of the law, technology, philosophy, and everything surrounding impaired driving, including blood alcohol levels. I'm sure you will have a lot to say about that.

Mr. Scott Newark: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, we're out of here. See you tomorrow.