FAIT Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

COMITÉ PERMANENT DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES ET DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Wednesday, October 28, 1998

• 1535

[English]

The Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham (Toronto Centre—Rosedale, Lib.)): I'd like to call the meeting to order.

Members, you'll recall that this meeting was convened at the request of members who were interested in being brought up to date on the present situation in Kosovo. I want to thank Mr. Heinbecker, who's the assistant deputy minister, and Patricia Fortier, Charles Court, Jim Wright, and Guy Archambault for coming before us today to discuss this.

I understand, Mr. Heinbecker, you'd be willing to make an opening statement, and then maybe we could open it to questions from members. We have until 5 o'clock, so we have an hour and a half, but if we finish before that, I'm sure that won't bother anybody.

Mr. Paul Heinbecker (Assistant Deputy Minister, Global and Security Policy, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): Thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen.

[Translation]

Ever since the beginning, the underlying reasons for Canada's involvement in this matter have been linked to our human concerns. Canada supported the effort of the United Nations High Commissioner's Office for refugees, of UNICEF and the Red Cross to relieve the suffering of displaced persons. At the same time, Canada encouraged the UN Security Council as well as NATO to act in a resolute fashion.

International pressure and primarily the believable threat of a NATO powerful action made it possible to arrive at significant agreements from the Yugoslav people when Mr. Holbrooke visited Belgrade on October 12th. These agreements include the development of a political process resulting in a major autonomy for Kosovo within the Yugoslav Federal Republic and a sound verification mechanism involving a powerful OSCE presence on the ground and an aircraft overhead presence in Kosovo.

Although it was a difficult process, the United Nation Security Council also played a significant role in adopting resolutions nos. 1160, 1199 and 1203.

Resolution 1203, carried on October 24th, endorses the Belgrade agreements and allows the international community to take steps to protect the verification mission. It therefore provides an adequate starting point for a Canadian participation to the OSCE verification mission.

[English]

Thanks to the NATO threat, the former Republic of Yugoslavia has shown in recent weeks a level of compliance that had been unknown in the past. The FRY authorities have been moved to respect the ceasefire; they have withdrawn most of the military and police forces not usually based in Kosovo. They also agreed to a dialogue with the Kosovars and made unilateral concessions, including the return of a status of autonomy for Kosovo, canton-based policing, the creation of an assembly, and OSCE-supervised elections within nine months.

Much still has to be done by the former Republic of Yugoslavia to ensure the return of displaced persons and full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Our priority in the coming months will be to ensure that the steps taken by the FRY will be made irreversible and verifiable. We are all conscious of the necessity not to have a temporary lull followed by a new Serbian offensive as soon as international attention has turned away from the issue.

The Albanian Kosovars will also have a responsibility to help ensure the success of the peace agreement. We hope that future elections will produce the kind of leadership, with credibility and democratic credentials, that will be capable of uniting the Kosovars and engaging in good-faith negotiations.

• 1540

Yesterday the North Atlantic Council agreed to the indefinite extension of the activation orders for NATO air action. This measure was taken to maintain pressure on the parties to adhere to full and sustained compliance with the UN Security Council resolutions and the agreements signed between the FRY, NATO, and the OSCE.

With the extension of the activation orders, NATO will maintain its military assets in theatre and available for operations to ensure compliance. NATO will undertake air exercises outside Yugoslav airspace in order to demonstrate its capability and its resolve.

NATO is beginning its air verification mission over Kosovo using U.S. U-2 aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles. Other U.S. and British aircraft will also participate in the verification mission, and the possibility exists that other NATO partners and also Russia may participate. The six Canadian CF-18s based in Italy will remain available for NATO operations, although they will probably not participate in the verification mission.

NATO is also undertaking planning for an extraction force that could evacuate the OSCE verification mission in an emergency. Although planning is ongoing, it appears likely that some forward elements of a NATO force would be deployed to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

On 25 October the Permanent Council of the OSCE, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, agreed to establish the Kosovo verification mission, which has since been in the planning stages. Planning for Canadian participation is now fully under way among the foreign affairs department, DND, RCMP, and CIDA. We are working in close coordination with CANADEM in order to identify qualified civilian verifiers for the OSCE mission.

Canada will contribute up to $3 million to fund civilian verifiers. Some of the verifiers we supply will be civilians, some will be military, and some will likely be police. DND has offered to send five Canadian Forces members to Vienna as part of the mission planning cell, which is located in Vienna, and is prepared to offer a further five to work in operational headquarters in Kosovo. They are also prepared to offer up to 15 military observers.

Currently we have three personnel assigned to the Kosovo diplomatic observer mission, KDOM. One foreign service officer and one Canadian Forces officer are already in Kosovo, and a second Canadian Forces officer is deploying there today. In the coming days, the KDOM will be integrated into the OSCE mission. The Canadian Forces attaché in Belgrade and his assistant are also actively engaged.

The OSCE assessment team that recently visited Kosovo indicated to Canadian officials last week that the OSCE is relatively optimistic regarding the security situation in Kosovo. OSCE personnel had unhindered freedom of movement and good cooperation from local officials in all areas of Kosovo.

The risks that have been identified, such as banditry and landmine danger, are present in most other peace support operations, including those in which the OSCE and the UN have unarmed personnel operating.

The primary assumption of the Kosovo verification mission is that both the FRY and the Kosovar parties will accept the presence of the verification mission.

While the violence in Kosovo has been considerable, a large part of the region's infrastructure and the general economy remain intact and available to support the mission. The main pillar of the mission's security will be the responsibility of the Yugoslav government to enforce. This responsibility has been reiterated in successive UN resolutions and agreements between Belgrade, NATO, and the OSCE, and NATO will hold Belgrade accountable.

On the humanitarian front, Canada has to date committed $3.18 million to international humanitarian relief efforts by providing for such basic necessities as food, water, shelter, and medical supplies. We are working with UNICEF, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the World Food Programme, Red Cross, and CARE Canada.

• 1545

Mr. Chairman, if you agree, that will serve as an opening statement. My colleagues and I are willing and, we hope, able to answer the committee's questions.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr. Heinbecker.

Mr. Mills.

Mr. Bob Mills (Red Deer, Ref.): I have quite a few questions that I would like to ask.

The first one is an extension of what I asked the minister today. Of course all of us can't help but think back to the early 1990s, when we were in Bosnia. We had verifiers and observers there, and 55 Canadians were actually taken captive. All of us of course remember the television images that we saw here of Patrick Rechner.

How can we be sure that's not going to happen again, and how are we going to get these people out if in fact it becomes— How fast can we get them out? You can't just go in there when a guy has a machine gun at his head and say, “We're going to extract him.” That's the first question.

The other is relating to infrastructure. Again referring to Bosnia, the infrastructure was pretty much non-existent in terms of power, heat, rail lines, roads, hospitals, schools, etc. Their infrastructure was so damaged and so much repair had to be done. What stage is Kosovo in? Is it worse or the same? How easy is it to move back to those villages?

The other thing is, from the Serbs' position, the big problem is that if they move out, the Kosovars simply move back in, and you've done nothing. Nothing has changed. You still have the same problems you had before. I wonder how these verifiers— What will be their mandate to change that situation—in other words, to stabilize the situation? How can they do that when there is such hatred and such long-built-up hostility between the two sides?

That's probably enough for now.

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: Thank you very much. I'll try to answer, and I'll also call on my colleagues to fill in those things that I might not cover.

On the question of security, nobody can give an absolute assurance of security to people who are going to Kosovo, any more than we could have in Bosnia or other areas where we have sent people. That's for sure. Having said that, two or three things lead us and others—

I must say that virtually all of the allies and a number of others have announced that they will also send people. The Dutch will be sending people. The Germans announced today in their first cabinet meeting, I think, that they would send 100 or 200 verifiers. The British will send people. The Americans already have people there and on the ground, which is a significant thing. That's unlike the situation in Bosnia in the early 1990s, where there were no Americans, as I recall at least, on the ground.

The Chairman: Mr. Heinbecker, did you say the Americans are going to send observers?

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: Yes. They're already there.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: So in addition to that, you have the NATO overflight capability to monitor what's going on and to see the movement of heavy equipment and that sort of thing, which is pretty effective. It's obviously possible to slip people in and out on buses and taxis, but it's not so easy to move tanks and heavy equipment around without it being noticed. So there's that aspect.

So to some extent, there's an early warning dimension. If things start getting bad, we'll be able to see it and, I hope, react to it.

NATO planning is going ahead for this extraction force. Obviously that's a difficult issue, but nevertheless that is under way at NATO headquarters. As for whether it will ever come to be used, we all hope not, and we recognize the difficulties inherent in it.

• 1550

We've talked to people, and generally speaking, the OSCE advance mission and some of the other people on the ground as well as our own people think that the risks are real but that they are, in the scheme of these things, tolerable.

As for the infrastructure, I defer to people who know more about infrastructure than I do.

Mr. Jim Wright (Director General for Central, East, and South Europe, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): On the question of infrastructure, I'd say we're not dealing with the scale of problems we had in the war in Bosnia. We're dealing with a conflict that went on for a much shorter period of time than was the case in Bosnia.

In Bosnia, you're absolutely right, there was extensive damage to all aspects of the infrastructure, so you were rebuilding a society there. In the case of Kosovo, a lot of the victimization that took place was burning and looting of homes, as opposed to necessarily the kind of infrastructure damage to hydroelectricity and hospitals that we saw in the major cities in Bosnia. A lot of the damage has been to villages in the countryside, not necessarily to major city centres. The relief effort that is under way will be largely focused on trying to ensure that proper housing and accommodation is made available to those who have lost their homes.

The other difference from Bosnia with respect to Kosovo is that the majority of the displaced people in fact want to go home. In the case of Bosnia you were dealing with an extended war with ethnic cleansing, and people were very much afraid of returning to their homes. The hope is that with the OSCE verification team on the ground, the NATO verification team in the air, compliance on the part of the Serbian authorities, cooperation from the Kosovar Albanians, and a ceasefire holding, the confidence level will be in place on the ground to ensure that the displaced people who want to return to their homes can do so. So in that sense there is a significant difference from what was in place in the case of Bosnia.

There has been damage to a lot of homes; there's no question about it. That will be a major effort on the part of the international relief effort by organizations such as the UNHCR and the International Red Cross.

Mr. Bob Mills: The problem is that some of us sat here three or four years ago and discussed this same issue this same way and were given the same assurances, and of course then we started seeing hostages and it all fell apart. I can recall sitting in this room talking about the extraction, asking how we would ever get our people—and we're talking about armed soldiers—out of Bosnia, how we could extract them. So I find it quite difficult to understand how we could extract unarmed, maybe civilian, verifiers. It concerns me quite a bit.

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: I can't give you a complete assurance on that score, but what I can say is that we do expect that there would be some warning and that we would be able to have some time to react. We won't leave people sitting there unprotected in a mindless sort of way. If we see things getting worse, we'll obviously respond to that.

For example, it's not an apt comparison, but with our embassy in Belgrade, when we saw the direction we were heading in, we gradually reduced the level of staff until we had all but one or two people. Of course, whether we can do that quite so smoothly, with people spread around, is another story. But we do believe the situation won't go from the state it's in now to the kind of thing you were talking about from one day to the next.

Obviously it requires us to be vigilant. To the extent that this helps, of course we won't be the only people who will be in the same situation. Virtually everybody will be.

Mr. Jim Wright: Russia.

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: The Russians and maybe the Greeks.

The Chairman: Just reading the agreement, it provides that the FRY government hereby guarantees the safety and security of the verification people, which presumably is substantially different from what prevailed in Bosnia, where they were the enemy. Presumably everybody is supposed to be on the side of these people, except— I suppose you might try to get the KLA to sign on to some of this stuff too, but that might be a little more complicated.

• 1555

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: The Yugoslavs have an interest in trying to make this work. You can ask yourself why they have finally come to the degree of compliance they've come to. The reason is that they were facing a very dangerous threat. That threat hasn't gone away.

Also, I'm not sure I remember the details perfectly clearly, but in Bosnia there was always some confusion between NATO in the air or the U.S. in the air and the UN on the ground. I don't think we would be dealing with quite the same sort of thing.

Mr. Bob Mills: Mr. Chairman, if I could just briefly respond to that, my concern is that these guys who are looking at what happens—“these guys” being Milosevic and the others—have to see the problems within NATO and within the UN in terms of coming to resolutions. I know that when this was to be discussed at the OSCE, they couldn't proceed, because there wasn't a resolution from the UN yet. Now of course we have that resolution from the UN, but it didn't come easy.

If I'm one of those people out there and I see this indecision, I'm going to bide my time—and Milosevic is very good at that, and I'm sure some of the others are as well. I'm just going to play those divisions, and they're going to get tired of maintaining their military and air surveillance. I can wait, because my hatred goes much deeper than just yesterday.

When I see that lack of will— Again, we have Canadians on the ground. If there is that uncertainty, I'm worried about how fast we can make decisions.

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: In all the circumstances of the past couple of weeks, we actually made decisions relatively quickly. It wasn't from one day to the next, but it didn't take all that long. Once we decided we had to act, parliamentary debate, cabinet meetings, and all of that stuff took place in most NATO countries, and we were in a position to decide within about a week from the time we decided to proceed.

As I said, we are unlikely to start from zero. We already have the air assets and some other assets in place there. We have the agreement with the Yugoslavs and we have the capacity. We don't have to build up that capacity to act. It's not a perfect answer to your question, but the situation is better than what we've been looking at in other places.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Mr. Turp.

Mr. Daniel Turp (Beauharnois—Salaberry, BQ): I should like first to thank the Department of Foreign Affairs officials for agreeing to appear before us without delay, in particular Mr. Wright, the personnel representative who was abroad yesterday. I very much appreciate your coming here this afternoon to address this matter.

With regard to your last comment, I think that Canada and the other NATO countries have been too slow to respond. I will always remember the concern expressed this summer by Mr. Axworthy during an interview with Le Devoir. He said that it was unacceptable and that the international community had not reacted fast enough. From August to October, four months have elapsed. I found that a little long especially since we were aware of the Kosovo problem for a long time. I cannot quite agree that we proceeded swiftly or fast enough. Things could have moved along quicker if there had been a will to threaten with action. Today everyone talks about the threat and everyone is in favour of it because it paved the way to the agreement with Milosevic.

I have a few more specific questions. What does mean, in the present circumstances, substantive compliance? This is what we were told yesterday. What does that mean technically, precisely? How many troops have been shipped out? How many are left? Is it a fact that we are back to the situation previous to February 1998, I believe? That's my first question.

• 1600

My second question has to do with a concern I have, as does Mr. Mills, concerning the security of the Canadian members to the mission. Is the extraction force you are referring to the one we seem able to set up under paragraph 9 of the Security Council resolution?

[English]

“The OSCE is considering arrangements to be implemented in cooperation with other organizations”.

[Translation]

Is it precisely that? Does the term "other organizations" mean NATO and an extraction force? If such is the case, what kind of agreement do we have with Yugoslavia to arrange for an evacuation through NATO? Have we set up technical means because an evacuation is a very technical operation? Has the Yugoslav government agreed that NATO aircrafts and personnel will land on the Kosovo territory to set up an evacuation? That was my second question.

My third question deals with the other matter we talk very little about, namely negotiations for a political settlement over Kosovo's autonomy. It seems to me that we should press on because November 2nd is the deadline for

[English]

“a framework for a political settlement”.

[Translation]

I wonder if Mr. Wright could tell us what is the status of the discussions. Is this deadline realistic or will it be pushed forward?

My last question, Mr. Chairman, has to do with the investigations, if any, by the International Criminal Tribunal concerning the action of the former Yugoslavia in Kosovo. Have we really done anything in terms of investigation and will charges be laid in the medium or long term in the case of Kosovo?

[English]

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: Perhaps I didn't explain myself quite well enough. I might be the last one, actually, to say that the international community reacted quickly enough. I didn't mean to imply that. What I meant to imply is that once the decision was made to react, it went relatively quickly.

We're in a situation where the NATO members have reached a substantial degree of consensus on the need to act and on the need to maintain the ability to act militarily. It is true that any air operation would require another approval of the NATO Council. It's not a blank cheque that's been written to be used whenever. But the organization is probably capable of reacting more quickly in these circumstances.

Would we have liked them to have reacted sooner? We certainly would have. And we did press the UN and members of the Security Council to take their responsibilities and acquit them, to stand up and be counted. We found it difficult when they were not able to do that, and we've had this debate about the legal basis.

But we do think that the new UN resolution is an advance on previous resolutions. It takes us a bit further. It's not as clear as we'd like it to be, and the Russians and the Chinese abstained on it—it would be better if they had voted for it—but nevertheless it does imply that action might be necessary. It's put in a passive sense, as I recall.

On substantial compliance, I think I'll defer. Charles, can you help us on that?

Mr. Charles Court (Deputy Director, NATO, North American and Euro-Atlantic Security and Defence Relations Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): Sure.

The Chairman: We want a lawyer's answer.

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: No, no, it's not.

Mr. Charles Court: No, I hope it will be a clear and succinct answer. You never know once it starts.

Voices: Oh, oh!

Mr. Charles Court: In February, the alliance estimated that about 11,000 Yugoslav army troops were normally stationed in Kosovo-Metohija, as part of the normal garrison. The Yugoslavs have a very big army. We estimated very generally that by about 21 October, that number had in fact come down to 10,000 soldiers, of which about one-third were actually in the field. Compliance meant that those soldiers either would be deployed along the border for normal border security operations, or would be back in their bases.

• 1605

When the supreme commander of allied forces in Europe and the chairman of the military committee went to Belgrade last weekend, they had very precise information about what units were out and needed to move back, and those units did in fact move back. The exceptions were three what they call company size—about 200 or so—units that stayed to maintain security along the main lines of communication, and that was considered acceptable.

Those units that were pre-conflict in Kosovo are there; they're in their cantonments. Those that were brought in were removed. In fact the bulk of those had been removed before last weekend.

The other problem was the ministry of internal affairs police forces, which also had heavy weapons. They were the big compliance problem. About 20 or 21 October, there were still over 4,000 more of their forces, their people, in Kosovo than had been deployed prior to the conflict. They always had a very large number there. Compliance for them meant taking out the forces not normally in Kosovo, taking out heavy weapons, and breaking down reinforced observation points that had been built up in towns and along roads, which interfered with the freedom of movement of people.

Last Monday, more than 4,000 of those troops were observed to leave. That's an estimate; they didn't go past a checkpoint and get counted off. Their heavy weapons were re-cantoned, with a very few minor exceptions, which seem to have been taken care of. And they were breaking down the observation posts, which were reinforced with sandbags and that sort of thing. They were breaking those down and essentially had withdrawn from the countryside.

The objective there was to remove this threatening presence that inhibited the people from returning to their areas. That has almost totally been implemented. Probably a few people are in places where they shouldn't be, but that's a fairly precise estimate of that.

When the NATO team was in Belgrade on the weekend, they had a set of seven or eight points that had to be implemented. Those were implemented under the verification of the Kosovo diplomatic monitors, who were already in place, and have been verified since by means of reconnaissance and other checks.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Are there any more special units in Kosovo—those special units, special police forces, or whatever they're called?

Mr. Charles Court: Yes. I think on Monday about 200 of those were still there. These are the kinds of groups that are still not in complete compliance, but there has been very substantial compliance. There are bound to be a couple of people there who shouldn't be, but—

Mr. Daniel Turp: So when there's only substantial compliance, does that mean it's because 200 special police forces are there? Is that what it really means?

Mr. Charles Court: That's what I believe it really means, yes.

Mr. Jim Wright: Perhaps I can just pick up on some of the other questions Mr. Turp asked.

First of all, with respect to the discussions between Belgrade and Pristina, you're absolutely right; that's a fundamental part of the package that Mr. Holbrooke was negotiating with Mr. Milosevic.

The deadline you mentioned, November 2, was the public commitment made by President Milosevic with respect to a framework for a political settlement to try to settle the problem over autonomy of Kosovo. We are not there yet. The deadline of November 2 is approaching very quickly. The Americans are in the lead in the negotiations on behalf of the international community. Ambassador Christopher Hill is the American ambassador in Skopje, Macedonia.

We have been very supportive of this diplomatic process right from the very beginning. One of the reasons Minister Axworthy sent me to Belgrade was to speak not only to the Yugoslav authorities but also to the Kosovar leadership, which we did. I spoke to Dr. Rugova.

• 1610

It takes two to arrive at an understanding in terms of future autonomy for Kosovo, but this is a fundamental aspect of the settlement process. The ceasefire is very important, as are the facilitation of international relief organizations, the presence of the verifiers on the ground, and NATO air verification. These are all important elements, but if there is not a political settlement to underpin all of this, then the crisis that Mr. Mills and Mr. Turp have referred to will simply continue.

Important unilateral concessions were made by Mr. Milosevic as part of his negotiations with Mr. Holbrooke. They included restoring an autonomy status to Kosovo, the exact nature of that autonomous status to be negotiated; delegating significant powers to the community level, and that includes creation of communal police, an issue that was extremely important to the Kosovar community; letting Kosovars form a new provincial assembly after elections supervised by the OSCE within a period of nine months; and providing amnesty for activities relating to the conflict, except for crimes against humanity and against international law. That's the package that Ambassador Hill, on behalf of the international community, is negotiating as we speak with Pristina and with Belgrade.

One of the difficulties the international community has faced is that the Kosovar community does not necessarily always speak with one voice, and that was evident when I was speaking with Dr. Rugova when I was in Belgrade. That is something we are all trying to overcome. We're hoping that with the international presence on the ground in Kosovo, the end of the fighting will go ahead and create the political conditions and the confidence-building necessary to allow this political process to take hold.

Mr. Turp also made reference to the question of the International Criminal Tribunal. There can be no peace without justice. Louise Arbour, the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal, has indicated that she is taking a delegation to Kosovo in the course of the next two weeks and intends to fulfil her legal mandate, given to her by the United Nations, to go ahead and investigate possible crimes against humanity in Kosovo.

This has been a sticking point in the past. It's one of the issues of compliance under UN Security Council resolution 1199. Canada has made the case to President Milosevic, as have others repeatedly, that he has no choice; he has to comply with this resolution. We expect him to go ahead and do so, but there have been differences of view in the past.

The Serbs allege an anti-Serb bias on the part of the International Criminal Court. We have always made the case to the Yugoslav authorities that the only bias the International Court has is a bias for the truth, and that it is in their interest to allow the chief prosecutor and her investigators to come in and do the work that the international community has mandated them to do, and take that responsibility off the shoulders of one side or another in this conflict. So we are watching that process and supporting Louise Arbour and her court as much as we can.

The Chairman: Mr. Reed, then Mr. Robinson, then Mr. Bachand, then Madame Beaumier.

Mr. Julian Reed (Halton, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, I would like to extend sincerest congratulations for the role all of you have played in what is a very Herculean task, which you are still in the middle of. It seems now, through experience, in looking at it from the outside—which we do as citizens—that a pattern is emerging. It has been gained through experience, and it has allowed the process to be a little faster and a little more effective than it has been in the past. It would seem that some of the pieces are falling into place.

• 1615

But as citizens, we watched particularly the United Nations in what appeared to be just utter dithering on this subject. Even though we got to Milosevic in a shorter period of time than in the Bosnia situation, there still appears to be a very ad hoc process at the United Nations.

It brings a question to my mind. As the processes develop and as we find ourselves in situations where we're going to face this again somewhere else in the world, is there any way that the decision to take action and the resolution process can be speeded up? Because what we witnessed is just utter human tragedy, when people are forced to live in the bush and we have winter setting in there and so on. It's very hard on the rest of the world, because now we're beginning to assume responsibility for these things. A hundred years ago we didn't. We didn't even know they were taking place.

So do you see any way, looking into the future, that processes can be streamlined at all and perhaps pre-planned?

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: I can make several points in answer to that. It goes back to the fundamental issue of the five members of the Security Council who are there permanently and who have a veto. When they want to act quickly, as they did, if you recall, in the Zaire crisis— There was to be a multinational force. We put together a chapter VII resolution, involving up to 15,000 soldiers authorized by the UN, against the will of the receiving countries, Rwanda and Zaire. It took us very little time.

When you get a situation where one of the so-called P-5, permanent five, disagrees or is outside the international consensus, it's much more difficult. That's just a fact of life. The Russians took a particular view of this conflict. It was a view that was not shared by anybody else in Europe, but nevertheless they took it, and that led to the process you described as dithering. At the end of the day, there was an unwillingness on the part of all the Security Council members to face up to this issue, and to some extent perhaps a differing interpretation of what it was all about.

All I can promise is that when we're on the Security Council, we will do whatever we can to help make the place more accountable.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Abolish the veto.

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: We'll start with abolishing the veto.

Voices: Oh, oh!

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: I find it odd that in this day and age, when democracy is the governance system of choice more and more around the world and when we're talking more and more about accountability, the permanent five are becoming ever more isolated. They meet behind closed doors. They meet without the other members of the Security Council present. It has become a problem, and that's one of the things we're going to try to work on. I wouldn't want to be held to an output, but we're going to try to do something with it.

Mr. Julian Reed: Well, you are to be congratulated, all of you, for the role you've played and for the Canadians who are there and those who will go in on the ground as observers. We wish you all well. Whatever we can do as a committee to try to come to grips with this omnipresent problem, I think we're all willing to put our heads together as much as possible. Thanks.

A voice: You can be a verifier.

An hon. member: Yes, and report back to us.

Mr. Julian Reed: Well, if you'll go as security.

Voices: Oh, oh!

An hon. member: I will. I'll drive a CF-18.

The Chairman: You can have my gavel.

I just want to assure our guests that when we have disagreements in this committee, they are in-principle disagreements, and they're never dithering, whereas in the Security Council, of course we know it's just dithering that goes on.

Voices: Oh, oh!

• 1620

Mr. Robinson.

Mr. Svend J. Robinson (Burnaby—Douglas, NDP): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too want to thank the witnesses for appearing, particularly on such short notice. A number of the questions I wanted to ask have been addressed by my colleagues, but there are some issues I wanted to pursue.

In many respects, at the heart of this conflict of course is the fundamental question of the status of the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, particularly the post-1989 status of the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. Without a serious resolution of their concerns about their status, obviously this thing will continue to fester.

So I want to come back to Mr. Turp's point, because it's not clear to me just what concrete steps are in place to deal with these issues. We may be able to have a verification mission on the ground, and I welcome that, but what concrete steps are being taken by the OSCE in particular to attempt to arrive at some specific timetables for improving the status of the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo?

As well, we've heard from almost all of the OSCE nations that they don't support independence for Kosovo. We know the overwhelming majority of the people of Kosovo, including Rugova and others, in fact do support independence, if the polls that have been taken are any indication. Do you believe we are in a position to move to respond to what I would regard as the very legitimate concerns of the ethnic Albanians about their status in Kosovo?

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: I'll begin the answer and call on my colleagues to respond further.

In the agreement that is to be negotiated, the 1989 autonomy— Well, I'm not sure. It wouldn't be the exact standing of 1989, but autonomy is to be re-established within the Yugoslav Serb federation.

Secondly, there is to be community-based policing, which will function on a canton basis. Because there are nine Kosovars to one Serb, there will be a very large representation of Kosovars in the daily security and policing situation there.

The third thing is that an assembly is to established and a vote held, I believe under OSCE auspices. Is that correct?

A witness: Yes.

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: Okay. So all of these things are provided for, provided that the situation continues to unfold as we'd like to see it unfold.

Mr. Svend Robinson: But that's an agreement between the OSCE and Milosevic.

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: No.

Mr. Jim Wright: No, this is an agreement, Mr. Robinson, that's being negotiated by the Americans right now as a follow-on to the Holbrooke mission. The one element of the Holbrooke mission that was left unfinished was the political agreement between Belgrade and Pristina on the autonomy for Kosovo. Those negotiations are continuing right now, so in fact the agreement is going to be between Belgrade and Pristina, although it will be blessed and facilitated by the international community.

Those discussions are taking place right now. Mr. Heinbecker described some of the elements. We already discussed a little bit some of the other elements that are part of this package.

The two deadlines that I'm aware of are, one, the commitment, the undertaking, by President Milosevic to have this framework for a political agreement in place by November 2.

A voice: A framework for the negotiation of—

Mr. Jim Wright: Yes, a framework for the negotiation of a political agreement by November 2.

• 1625

Obviously some time has gone by since that undertaking was made. One of the difficulties that Ambassador Hill has had and continues to have is getting full cooperation from the Albanian Kosovars and trying to ensure they are speaking with one voice. One of the difficulties Dr. Rugova has had—and Dr. Rugova has always represented the moderate influence within Kosovo—is that for his stand, he was never supported by President Milosevic.

For a number of years prior to this conflict, we pleaded with Belgrade, saying that if Belgrade did not start to cooperate seriously with Dr. Rugova— President Milosevic agreed to an education agreement I think in 1996, yet Belgrade had done nothing to actually try to implement that agreement, which offered certain autonomy on the education front to the Kosovar Albanian community. Because of that position on the part of Belgrade, there was a rise in extremism, Dr. Rugova was isolated, and we've ended up with splits on the Kosovar side.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Can I interrupt you, because of the time?

The Chairman: Could I just interrupt, so we can get one thing clear? When you say Belgrade and Pristina, who is Pristina? Is it Mr. Rugova?

Mr. Svend Robinson: That is exactly the point I wanted to make.

The Chairman: Okay.

Mr. Svend Robinson: The concern is this. They're not going to have a framework in place by November 2. I hope so, but I doubt it. If this deadline comes and goes, and then Milosevic continues the game that he is a master of—buying time and spinning things out—the frustration on the ground in Kosovo obviously is going to be palpable.

You're going to have a verification team there. You're going to have the KLA saying, “Look, we're being jerked around here. They're not serious about our fundamental concerns of respect for 90% of the people of this territory, who are ethnic Albanians.” They're not just going to sit back and say, “Well, shucks. I guess we gotta wait while this framework agreement is negotiated.” I'm concerned about what happens then.

Mr. Jim Wright: Well, you certainly are justified in being skeptical of President Milosevic's intentions. All too often we've seen undertakings not respected in the past. In this instance we are more confident in the sense that the threat that looms over President Milosevic is as serious as it can be.

The unilateral undertakings he has made to Mr. Holbrooke, to Ambassador Hill, and to the international community in terms of concessions to the Kosovar community are real. Those need to be translated into an actual agreement between the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, President Milosevic, and the Kosovar community.

As for who represents the Kosovar community right now, that's a good question. Dr. Rugova is certainly one of the leaders. There are other elements there as well. It's difficult to find just who is speaking on behalf of the KLA, the Kosovo Liberation Army. But every effort is being made by the international community to ensure that the momentum generated by the United Nations Security Council resolutions, by the NATO activation orders, and by Mr. Holbrooke's negotiated package is not lost. There is an earnestness with a view to trying to come to an understanding on the future autonomy of Kosovo, because everyone recognizes that unless that issue is dealt with quickly, all of the other efforts to build confidence will be for naught.

Mr. Svend Robinson: I have two other brief questions.

Following on the last question, should these negotiations go nowhere, should they just break down, should Milosevic not be prepared to at least move to the pre-1989 position, has Canada any position with respect to the right of the people of Kosovo to self-determination, as it now stands?

Mr. Daniel Turp: I'm listening.

Voices: Oh, oh!

Mr. Svend Robinson: That's my first question. Then the second question is with respect to the humanitarian needs Mr. Reed alluded to. We know winter is coming. The situation on the ground is devastating. There is widespread destruction of homes. In many cases people are returning to villages that have just been shattered.

You mentioned $3.1 million. Is Canada prepared to review on an ongoing basis its contribution and perhaps extend it? It seems to me that, again, on compassionate grounds and given what's been taking place so far, the international community is going to have to come up with a lot more support for those folks if they're going to be able to get through a very difficult time.

• 1630

Those are the two questions.

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: I'll try a couple of answers, at some considerable risk.

Voices: Oh, oh!

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: First of all, on the last question, I think it is fair to say this is an issue for the government to decide. It's a policy question that they will no doubt keep under review. But then it becomes a question of what the priority of that is, together with all the other priorities they have to deal with.

On the larger question, obviously we want to see this issue between the Kosovars and the Serbs solved in a way that satisfies both of them. We think it's still possible. Getting into hypothetical questions about what will happen if it doesn't work is something I was taught in diplomatic school never to do. But I would make the observation that there is no comparison between the situation of minorities in the former Yugoslavia and minorities in Canada.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Mr. Bachand.

Mr. André Bachand (Richmond—Arthabaska, PC): Thank you very much for coming here today. I want to congratulate you for the work you have done but I also want to convey my disappointment.

[English]

The Chairman: Monsieur Bachand, Madame Beaumier says she has to leave. Do you mind if she goes ahead of you?

Or are you going to leave anyway?

Mr. André Bachand: Where does she what to go? Maybe I can go with her.

Voices: Oh, oh!

The Chairman: Do you want me to strike you off the list?

Ms. Colleen Beaumier (Brampton West—Mississauga, Lib.): Actually, I just wanted a couple of things clarified, if you don't mind.

Who is policing the situation in Kosovo right now? Are we sending soldiers? Are we sending civilians? How many soldiers are going to be there? How many civilians are going to be there? To me this looks a lot like an election observation mission. The difference is that if there are unfair election practices, after it's over, the world can say they do not recognize this government, because there have been all of these practices that are against democracy.

What do we do? It's very nice to have all of these little stations with these observers. Are you telling me we're going to be sending Canadians there, and not just Canadians, but Americans and everyone are going to have to stand there and watch these atrocities occur? And if and when they report them, so what? This looks very nice, but it looks somewhat like an election observation mission to me. I'm wondering how you believe this can be effective.

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: The idea of NATO intervention in the first place was to stop that from happening. That was why we got ourselves to the point of deciding that we were ready to carry out air operations against the Yugoslav assets. That threat still remains there. Yes, there will be observer teams. They will all be in mufti. Some will be military; some will be human rights specialists; some will be police. Their job is to observe and also, by their presence, to deter the kind of thing you're talking about.

If it became evident that the Yugoslav military were carrying out these kinds of atrocities, as we have seen in the past with the Yugoslav police, and if they were unwilling to stop, that would require NATO to act. That's why the activation order—the order for NATO to be ready to attack and to carry out air operations against the former Yugoslavia—remains in place. That hasn't been removed.

Also, if you look at the UN Security Council resolution, it does indicate in one of the clauses that in the event of emergency, the UN affirms that action may be needed to ensure the safety and freedom of movement of the verifiers.

• 1635

It's not a perfect situation. It's not a perfect deal. I'm sure if any one of us had our druthers, there's some aspect of it we might change, but it's the deal we have. The humanitarian situation there requires us to do the best we can to make it work.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: And will they be helping people to re-establish themselves in their homes?

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: Absolutely. One of the key elements—and it is already under way—is that international humanitarian organizations such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the Red Cross, CARE, and other organizations do have access already and are assisting people. That is part of the reason they're coming back out of the hills.

The number of people who are now without shelter is thought to be 10,000. We were talking about 50,000 not very long ago. So the situation is improving.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: Thank you.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Bachand, for relinquishing the floor to her.

Mr. André Bachand: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am going to state again that I thank you very much for being here today, your presence is much appreciated. I would like to emphasize the remarkable work that you are doing. However, I was anxious to hear you tell us about the basis for a solution and to hear the minister and the Government of Canada make a statement on what was happening in Kosovo. That took a long time. I know that you were busy working but it certainly took a long time before the Canadian government's position in regard to Kosovo was made known. A lot of time and a lot of lives.

This is my first question. When did Canada actively get involved with regard to Kosovo?

Secondly, according to your information, are there still people dying on the ground? In that case is it once again the Liberation Army which is involved? Are the Serbs or the Albanians responsible? What is the situation at the moment with regard to loss of lives in Kosovo? When does Canada intend to send its participants to the verification mission? Is the United Nations Organization or the European Organization going to take a position? You answered that question earlier Mr. Wright. You seem to say that, at the end of the line there would be a discussion in Belgrade between the Federal Republic and Kosovo but that it wasn't clear that everyone agreed on a definition of autonomy. Are we talking about the 1974 autonomy status? Are we talking about total sovereignty? If Canada intends to suggest this type of autonomy will it be the 1974 autonomy status, with the changes that took place before 1989? Are we talking about what has been happening since the end of the war in Bosnia with regard to Montenegro, for instance? It would be interesting to have your views on this matter.

Mr. Daniel Turp: We would have to have a Supreme Court decision.

Mr. André Bachand: Yes of course. It would certainly say that the people have the right to secede.

Several questions have been raised but I would like an answer to the first ones. I know that it isn't easy. I would like to have perhaps a comment on the first questions I asked you with regard to Canada's role. I am convinced that Canada, now that it sits on the United Nations Security Council, will have a stronger voice and a more credible one at the international level. It is difficult to be heard when you are a backbencher. I hope that Canada, with its new mandate on the Security Council, in case of regional conflicts—we talk about regional conflict but there is no such thing. A regional conflict is perhaps what happens in a riding between Mrs. Tremblay and Mrs. Laframboise, but at the international level, regional conflicts quickly always develop in world conflicts.

[English]

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: Again, I'll lead off and ask Jim to follow up.

When did Canada actively get involved? We've been actively involved, to a greater or lesser extent, since we've been involved in the Balkans and Bosnia. We have always known that the Kosovo issue could explode and that it could be terrible, and we certainly have been warning against that, as have others.

• 1640

I myself have participated in meetings of the G-8. Certainly that subject was covered by the G-8 summit earlier this year. We brought about sanctions against the Yugoslav government. I think they were promulgated at the beginning of June of this year, or somewhere around that time, which put us ahead of everybody else, by the way.

[Translation]

Mr. André Bachand: Yes, but we are talking about sanction against the Serbs; you are talking about last June. But these sanctions were delayed several times, in April and in May, not necessarily by Canada but the nations of the world. For example, sanctions regarding investments were postponed four or five times I believe. It was said that Milosevic was the greatest spin doctor when it came to buying time and I think that's true. For at least a month, or a month and a half, sanctions on investments were delayed. At the military level, it is the second time that we postpone intervention and there will certainly be a third and a fourth time.

I know that it's difficult. I didn't attend any courses on international diplomacy, but I do know that it is really difficult. Just regarding sanctions on investment, the decision was postponed several times. I am sorry if I interrupted you, but this is an example of a situation where normally, the world community should act very rapidly. We are not talking about planes, bombs or soldiers, that decision was postponed for weeks, even months. This is what's so concerning in this matter, we are not talking about bombs, but money.

Mr. Jim Wright: I quite understand your frustration, but we can say that trade between Canada and Yugoslavia is not very significant, especially since the war in Bosnia. However, we can say that Canadian policy towards Yugoslavia has been, for the past three or four years, quite consistent.

Mr. Axworthy visited Yugoslavia for the first time in March or April 1996 at the same time that he was visiting Bosnia. At that time he met with Mr. Milosevic and he said: "There is a problem here, in Kosovo; there is a human rights problem in Yugoslavia. If you pursue such policies, you can expect a very serious problem not only with Canada but also with the international community." Mr. Axworthy did state that our relations with Yugoslavia would not expand before the situation in Kosovo improves.

In March of this year, Mr. Axworthy announced several sanctions against Yugoslavia.

[English]

The Export Development Corporation suspended all consideration of export credits for the FRY until further notice, suspended discussions with Yugoslav Airlines concerning charter landing rights in Canada, and put on hold discussions of other bilateral agreements until further notice. Canada was months out in front of the international community on this.

Secondly, in June of this year, Mr. Axworthy, when participating in a G-8 meeting in London with the Russians—and Mr. Heinbecker and I were there—announced a further ban on investment in the Republic of Serbia and a freeze of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbian government assets in Canada.

Now, there are not significant assets here, so I don't want to pretend that these measures taken by the Canadian government were significant in terms of an economic blockade of Yugoslavia, but they were indicative of the fact that the position of the Canadian government on Kosovo and on Yugoslavia has been principled, not simply since the crisis of the past three or four months, but for years. The guiding principle here has been the human rights, in particular of the Kosovar Albanian majority in Kosovo, who had their autonomy taken away from them by President Milosevic in 1989.

• 1645

So I don't think the Canadian government's approach on the crisis in Kosovo has deviated. If anything, I would say Mr. Axworthy and the Prime Minister have been in the forefront of setting policy for the international community, who in many respects have been playing catch-up. We've been doing our very best within the multilateral institutions, especially the UN Security Council, where we've been trying to push the P-5 to do more, as well as within the OSCE and NATO. We've had some success.

Mr. Axworthy has also repeatedly tried to engage very actively former Foreign Minister Primakov and his successor, Mr. Ivanov, on the issue of Kosovo, recognizing that Kosovo was a difficult issue for the Russians and that in order to move this process forward more quickly— And you're right; it took longer than we wanted, but that's international diplomacy.

The track record of the Canadian government on the Kosovo issue has been clear, consistent, and strong.

Mr. André Bachand: What about the situation on the ground?

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: Yes, the situation on the ground was the second question. Do you want to take that, Charles? Are people still dying?

Mr. Charles Court: There's a de facto ceasefire that's been widely respected for the past two weeks. There are incidents between the Yugoslav forces and the UCK, but it's much less confrontational and dangerous than it was.

People are still dying. People step on mines that have been laid. This is regrettable. People are returning to their homes, as Mr. Heinbecker said. With the increase in the international presence and the gradual decrease in the presence of the Yugoslav police and army, the confidence of more people to return to areas and to find permanent shelter—those who don't have it—should increase.

The Chairman: Before we go to Mr. Patry, maybe I can ask a quick follow-up question on the banning of investment in Serbia. What was the legal basis for that act of the minister? You said it was by edict. Your French term was—

Mr. Daniel Turp: Was it the United Nations Act?

Mr. Jim Wright: I know a little bit about the act. The Special Economic Measures Act is what it's called.

The Chairman: So it was the Special Economic Measures Act?

Mr. Jim Wright: Yes. You can act under that so long as an organization of which Canada is a member calls for that kind of thing to be done. It doesn't require it to be the United Nations; in this case it was the G-8.

The Chairman: Okay. I wondered about that, because it used to be that you could only do it with a Security Council resolution.

Mr. Jim Wright: No. It's been made more broad.

The Chairman: It's now more liberal, if I can use that term.

Mr. Jim Wright: It's been made more liberal.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: There is now a second piece of legislation.

[English]

The Chairman: Thank you very much.

Monsieur Patry.

[Translation]

Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.): Thanks for appearing before this committee. We learn a lot listening to you. I should like to follow up on what Mr. Bachand said.

After reading the draft agreement on the verification mission, I am under the impression that this is a first process. I would like to look at the long term. I read this: “As the Kosovo's political autonomy will get settled and established—”.

Since there doesn't seem to be a consensus on Kosovo's side, as mentioned by Mr. Wright, because Dr. Rugova speaks for the moderates and that there is the KLA as well as other elements within Kosovo itself, could you tell me what kind of political autonomy Kosovo is going to attain? What are the people who will negotiate that autonomy? Is there now a timetable for that political autonomy?

[English]

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: One of the things we haven't said on this subject, which probably won't occur to people otherwise, is that not all of the Kosovars are in Kosovo. There are strong communities in Germany and in France, and I think also in Switzerland.

Certainly the German and the French governments have been trying to talk to these people to bring about a greater degree of harmony, because that's where the money is coming from that funds the independence movements. So some of that sort of thing is also taking place, which one hopes is having a beneficial effect.

• 1650

As for the particular groups to negotiate with, I think I'll defer to Jim, who's been there.

Mr. Jim Wright: All I can say is what I've indicated before, that there is a sincere effort on the part of the principal American negotiator, Ambassador Hill, to try to form a representative negotiating team on the part of the Kosovar Albanian community. Dr. Rugova is one of the leaders, the principal leader, of the community, but he is not universally recognized by the Kosovar Albanian community, so there has been an attempt to broaden that base, to bring in expertise from within the Albanian community.

I think there was a negotiating team of about 10 or 15 people, right, Guy?

Mr. Guy Archambault (Deputy Director, Balkans, Southern Europe Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): Yes, led by Mr. Agani.

Mr. Jim Wright: And in terms of the timeframe, all I can say is that we want to see these negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina under way as soon as possible. The commitment is for a parliamentary assembly within nine months. This would be as a result of elections that Mr. Milosevic has agreed to, elections that would be supervised by the OSCE. And there is an undertaking to delegate responsibility for local policing to the Kosovar community.

But it's important to also understand that we are not part of the negotiating process. We don't have a negotiator on the team right now. While we're in close touch with the Americans, we have not been brought up to date, and we are not brought up to date, nor are others, on the day-to-day efforts on the part of Mr. Hill. We are informed as there are significant developments, but the lead negotiation has been left to Mr. Holbrooke and to Ambassador Hill.

Mr. Bernard Patry: Thank you.

[Translation]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Do you have other questions, Mr. Turp?

Mr. Daniel Turp: I have first a request. Mr. Mills and I accompanied Mr. Axworthy last week to Vienna, to the Permanent Council of the OSCE. We obtained a copy of the Milosevic-OSCE agreement, but we didn't get one on the NATO-Milosevic agreement. I would like you to forward a copy to the Chairman of this committee, with perhaps—

Mr. Wright, is there a document dealing with matters for a negotiation on autonomy? You have listed five points which could be negotiated. Are these subjects mentioned in a document or in a statement, and if so, could we get a copy of this document?

I should like to have an answer to my second question. Earlier I asked several questions. The last one dealt with NATO, the extraction force, on what that force could do in terms of evacuation and protection of the verifiers. Has Mr. Milosevic agreed that NATO play a part in the evacuation and protection of the verifiers as we speak, or is the matter still being negotiated?

Lastly, I should like to comment on the issues of autonomy, self-determination and all that. I understand your reluctance to answer the question asked by Mr. Robinson, but I have the impression that a basic ingredient to the political solution to this conflict would likely be not only an acceptance that Kosovo's autonomy be restored, but also that the Kosovars be granted the right to decide their own future. It seems to me that this will be one of the claims put forward, even by Mr. Rugova.

• 1655

This is not something which is unique to Kosovo and I'm not making any reference at all to the situation in Canada nor to Quebec. We are witnessing an occurrence quite similar to what's happening in East Timor where the negotiations on autonomy will also deal with the opportunity for the Timor people to hold a referendum on their political status, which could be something other than autonomy.

I would refer you to the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland where a people put an end to an armed situation to a claim of unification—in any case some of the North Ireland forces—in order to be simply granted the right to decide their future, whether it means reunification with the United Kingdom of a continuation of their status within the United Kingdom.

Obviously, there is a tendency to acknowledge the right of peoples to decide their future, I feel that will be the thrust of the true negotiation, the most difficult negotiation between Mr. Milosevic, Mr. Rugova and others and the international community.

Mr. André Bachand: —

[Editor's Note: Inaudible] —the Kosovars were not in a majority.

Mr. Daniel Turp: With regard to the second question—

Mr. André Bachand: This is different from the example you gave, Daniel.

Mr. Daniel Turp: With regard to the second question dealing with the extraction force, what is that exactly?

[English]

Mr. Jim Wright: Concerning the diplomatic process and whether we can share with you a document and an undertaking with respect to the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina, we have a copy of the unilateral statement that sets out the initial position of the Yugoslav government, which we're more than happy to go ahead and share with the committee. It provides a little bit more detail than what we've covered here and gives you a very clear sense of the initial approach being made by the Yugoslav government, which Ambassador Hill is working with right now.

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: And I have no doubt that we can make available the NATO agreement as well. I haven't actually seen it myself, but I'm sure it must be available.

Mr. Daniel Turp: I can't find it anywhere on the web, so that's why I'd like to have a copy.

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: We can do that.

On the question of the extraction force and whether it's foreseen in this agreement, it works on two levels.

First, in any case, the international community would ask for the cooperation of the Yugoslav authorities to remove people. If the Yugoslav authorities refused to allow that cooperation to take place, we'd pretty much be back to the status quo ante. Then the term “extraction force” would become more germane, because if the Yugoslav authorities didn't comply, then you would have to think about doing it the hard way.

Mr. Daniel Turp: But there's no agreement on anything like that now?

Mr. Charles Court: No, not on the extraction force per se. The agreements in general cover the responsibility of the Yugoslav government to assure the protection of the verifiers, and part of this would have to involve measures for their safety.

If you look at the situation on the ground, once the verifiers are deployed, there are probably three possible sources of threat to them. The one we focus on is the Yugoslav government army police. The second are the paramilitary groups that we know exist in Serbia and that we know have been active in Kosovo. And the third are the Kosovars themselves.

• 1700

The Yugoslavs have accepted this agreement. They have undertaken their responsibility to protect. They have in fact actively and professionally aided KDOM, the Kosovo diplomatic observer mission, when it's gotten into difficulties in the region over the past few months. So there's some hope that they will continue to do their duty.

The paramilitaries are heavily influenced by what the Yugoslav government does, but they're not completely controlled.

And the UCK, to use a term of convenience for the armed groups on the Kosovar side, are probably the ones who have the greatest stake in keeping the verifiers in.

So if you look at it, most likely you will have a fair degree of warning about a deteriorating situation, which means you can reduce your exposure. Secondly, if there are international verifiers present and the Yugoslavs decide to get nasty, they will probably want them to leave. And third, the party that wants NATO in is the Kosovars, who are the most likely to take steps to keep the international community there. It's a complicated picture.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: May I ask another question?

The Chairman: It is five o'clock and everyone is gone.

Mr. Daniel Turp: In the end, how many verifiers will there be? Mr. Axworthy stated that they would be between 50 and 100. Is it going to be more 50 or 100? What are your intentions in that regard?

[English]

Mr. Paul Heinbecker: The answer to that is we're still working on it. I think we've counted five military personnel for the Vienna headquarters, five for the Pristina headquarters, fifteen others, possibly five police, and I would say another substantial number of civilians. That takes you to fifty plus. We don't know for sure, partly because we also don't know for sure how much is needed.

The number 2,000 was, I suspect, a back-of-the-envelope ceiling of how many people were wanted. It may turn out that they don't actually need that many people to do that job. You do get into some difficult logistical things, such as where people are going to live, what kind of accommodation there is, how they're going to be fed, and all that sort of thing. You don't want to have more people there than you need, because of the difficulty of looking after them.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: That's true, we should stop. There are more civil servants around this table than members.

The Chairman: This is common with all diplomatic problems. After a while, the urgency disappears and so do the members.

[English]

Thank you very much for having come, gentlemen. We appreciate it. You've been very helpful, and I'm sure that if something urgent comes up, we can have the opportunity of your consultation again. We very much appreciate your taking the time to come and join us today.

Members, we are adjourned until tomorrow morning at 9 o'clock, when we'll be considering Bill C-35, the SIMA bill, in room 308 of the West Block.