FAIT Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

COMITÉ PERMANENT DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES ET DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Thursday, June 11, 1998

• 1047

[Translation]

The Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham (Toronto-Centre—Rosedale, Lib.): We come back to our study of nuclear non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament. I am pleased to welcome to the committee professor Grand, who has come from Paris despite the strike at Air France. Mr. Grand, I don't know how you made it here without the help of Air France, but we won't ask.

I understand Mr. Grand is a professor at the École spéciale militaire de Paris.

Mr. Camille Grand (lecturer, École spéciale militaire de St-Cyr Coëtquidan; personal testimony): From St-Cyr Coëtquidan.

The Chairman: From St-Cyr. You know that we have heard Sir Michael Quinlan and Harold Mueller from Frankfort by satellite two weeks ago. You are therefore the third and last witness we will hear on nuclear non-proliferation. Welcome.

Mr. Camille Grand: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am honoured to be before this commission, especially to be part of this study, because I believe that it is essential that the debate on nuclear issues be as open and as democratic as possible and not be reserved to a small community of experts to which I belong. In my opinion, it is much more interesting when we open up to the outside world and when institutions such as parliaments become interested in such questions so that the debate does not become closed to a group of experts or officials or to a group of NGOs or universities. That has too often been the case in the past, but I think that now, when we are not in a confrontational situation, we can allow ourselves more openness and transparency in this area. Therefore I can only agree to the initiative of such a study today in Ottawa.

I would add, as is the custom, that I am speaking strictly as an individual and that I represent neither the French government nor any other French institution for which I work or have worked. It is important because there are significant differences between my opinions and those of the French government. I would not like you to be mistaken on this point. Finally, personally I am happy to be here even though the vagaries of airline strikes make the road to Canada go through New York, but it's still a chance to come here in any case.

I will therefore make my presentation quickly by stressing three key elements: first, the evolution of the role of nuclear weapons over the last 10 years, which appears to me to be quite important, and which has not been taken into account sufficiently; second, on their role and missions today, in fact on what is left of the role of nuclear weapons; finally, on the progress that can be made in the area of disarmament, especially in the area of the role, quite modestly from my point of view, that a country like Canada can play, knowing that that role will not be modest.

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My first observation is to note the extraordinary reduction in the role of nuclear weapons since the end of the cold war, at least in the strategies and arsenals of the major powers.

I will not remind you of the quantitative reductions by the United States and Russia since you know them very well. I understand that you have met with American colleagues who must have explained them to you in much greater detail than I could. I would also emphasize that these reductions also affected the European powers, therefore France and the United Kingdom. I believe that it is interesting to note that the countries that had only a few hundred nuclear weapons also agreed to important reductions.

For France, the order of magnitude is still of 30 per cent, from 500 nuclear warheads to less than 400 today, which gives you an idea of the remaining difference between Russia and the United States on the one hand and France and the United Kingdom on the other. It also gives an idea of the size of the reduction by a country like France, which has let go of an entire series of weapons that is being discussed by our American allies. For example, France no longer has any ground-to-ground missiles through a series of unilateral decisions. It deprived itself of such weapons, that people who work on de-alerting in Washington, such as Mr. Blair and Mr. Von Hippel, hope to see the United States abandon also.

In fact, today only China is not following this general reduction scenario for arsenals. I allow myself to underline this because it is not generally stated. In fact, China leads very much in speech in disarmament issues, but not in fact.

Second point in evolution: there is truly a crisis in the legitimacy of the nuclear field. Nuclear arms have been strongly associated with the cold war and their legitimacy has been challenged by a series of international events of a diplomatic and judicial nature. A brief recall: you have no doubt have had occasion to see these documents: the advisory opinion of the World Court, the report of the Canberra Commission, the various proposals of the non-aligned countries in the context of the Conference on Disarmament or the United Nations General Assembly for a quick elimination of all nuclear weapons and especially, in my opinion, the declaration of 1995, based on the principles and objectives of non-proliferation and disarmament, adopted at the Treaty on non-proliferation in New York, which, it seems to me, is the most important document in this area. All these elements have reduced the legitimacy and operating sphere of the nuclear field even though few of them have had a constricting judicial force for the nuclear powers.

We find the same thing in the political and strategic area with the end of the Soviet menace that was in great part responsible or justifying the nuclear programs of Occidental countries and vice-versa.

From a strictly military point of view, phenomena such as the revolution in military affairs, which are much discussed in the United States, tend to deligitimize the quality and the role of nuclear capability since conventional weapons would be able to replace nuclear ones in many missions.

To that, we can add that anti-nuclear sentiments in international public opinion and in the public opinion of various countries, which has increased significantly since Tchernobyl and that harms the legitimacy of the nuclear weapon, even though we can see a certain injustice in that, since we are confusing a civil nuclear problem with nuclear weapons themselves.

In parallel, the international community has adopted a certain number of measures and treaties that, since the beginning of the 90s, strategically position the role of the nuclear field in our endeavors. This framework is very strict, and it would have been very difficult to imagine, about 15 years ago, that the nuclear nations would accept such restrictions. It is the complete ban on nuclear tests, whatever their power. It is the interdiction on the production of fissile materials, which is, at this time, decreed by four of the five nuclear powers, but which could become a treaty, which I hope will be the case. It is also the assurances of security, given in 1995, that in some way constrains the strategy of the nuclear powers.

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Finally, the last element in the evolution of the nuclear field: the concepts have changed significantly. Today, the strategic positions are much less dependent on nuclear weapons than they were before, especially in the West. That is the case for the strategic position of NATO and the expression the last resort, which shows the incredible evolution of the role of nuclear weapons in the strategy of the Atlantic Alliance, which has moved from a very early use to a last recourse. We find this kind of evolution to varying degrees in the policies of western powers. It's more complicated in the cases of Russia and China, but we may have the opportunity to come back to this later in the debate.

Finally, it would be somewhat strange to conclude this overview without talking about nuclear proliferation, which has recently taken a worrisome turn recently with the Indian and Pakistani tests, and which allows us to say, as one of my Parisian colleagues said, that the nuclear field is becoming marginalized in the official nuclear powers, and in a way, spreading in other parts of the world, especially in Asia.

It may be a bit of a caricature stated in this form but I believe it is worrisome to see this double movement that sees us set a framework for certain parts of our nuclear role in the West and reject them while the nuclear field is spreading in Asia. I believe that we can take note of the fact that there are more active nuclear powers today in Asia than in Europe. In Europe there has traditionally been Russia, the United States, France and the United Kingdom. In Asia, there is now India, Pakistan, China, Russia and the United States, which therefore gives us a situation where the traditional ways have changed or are changing significantly.

That is certainly the recognition of something that was unofficial but real. So we should not be overly worried. The existence of the nuclear capabilities of India and Pakistan was known, but it is still a major evolution that will make Asia the prime concern in nuclear matters in the coming years.

What is the role of nuclear weapons today, given this more limited framework? It seems to me that we have not drawn all the conclusions from the definition of the evolution of nuclear weapons, either in the Atlantic Alliance or in the strategies of the various nuclear powers.

It seems to me that the strategic and military functions of the atom today are both extremely residual and extremely substantial. That is to say that we are dealing with something that touches on security in the most sensitive way and that at the same time is reduced to that and no longer reaches the entire range of security problems as we used to think of them.

In strategic terms, therefore, there is a framework for the discussion on deterrence. It's what the Americans call the core function, essentially the function of reassurance between the nuclear powers. In essence it is to be forearmed and to forearm our allies against blackmail or a nuclear attack from a nuclear power or a successful expansionist.

Nuclear weapons are a deterrent against massive threats. We can say that that this function has always been and remains a pacifying measure. A French author who was interested in these measures and has since become better known, Régis Debray, spoke about the weapon of peace in the 80s, which is a paradox since many of our European allies, for example, have difficulty integrating it. It is an expression that no doubt makes one think, and that is why I bring it up.

We therefore have an evolution in the strategic positions for a lower level of weapons and a limitation on the question of vital interests and the protection of national territory and allies against a massive attack. I believe that all countries are evolving in this direction.

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It is, for example, the meaning of PDD-60, the presidential decision directive that we learned about last winter, adopted by President Clinton. It substantially reduces, from what we know, and we know it exists, but we don't have the details, the somewhat far-fetched targeting plans of the United States during the cold war.

One somewhat difficult problem remains. It's the issue of chemical and biological weapons that really worries the United Sates. I believe that the possibility of a nuclear response to a chemical or biological attack is both improbable and inefficient. Improbable because I do not believe that any western power with nuclear technology would respond first under any condition, including the United States. If the United States were the first or the second to use a nuclear weapon, or even the third, after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in my opinion that would create a major political problem. It would therefore be very sensitive.

Finally, this threat is very difficult to... How does one define reprisals? If it's chemical or biological terrorism, we won't, based on suspicion, respond with a nuclear attack on the Middle East or whoever. They also seem to me to be militarily inefficient for two reasons, first because such a response would risk being disproportionate and would therefore lose their military value and second because the objectives of this type of reprisal could easily be attained in the short term with conventional methods.

That is why I believe that it is unnecessary to enter into this debate that is relevant, in my opinion, only in absolutely extreme cases of the use of biological weapons against another state, which these days is more in the realm of science-fiction, despite the hit novels on this topic.

I would add, of course, that the fact that chemical and biological weapons were forbidden by the 1972 and 1993 agreements can create a problem when we move to a more limited agreement on nuclear weapons, insofar as these agreements will have to be universal as much as an eventual reduction or elimination of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapons still have a function that I would define as symbolic and that creates a problem today. In my opinion, it is one of the failures of the international community during the last ten years to not have reduced this symbolic function insofar as the artificial and recent historic link between nuclear capability and belonging to the United Nations Security Council as a permanent member is maintained and to often promoted as obvious by the nuclear powers.

I truly believe, for having been in India for example, that if we had been able to respond to their request on the status of their people before they went ahead with last month's tests that we might have—I do say might have—avoided those tests. If we had not continued to explain in some way that it was nuclear weaponry that made the difference between the major and the smaller powers, India might not have felt it so urgent to go ahead with these tests.

We, the nuclear powers—and here I also speak about France—have to demonstrate that the apparent advantages of having nuclear weapons are above all responsibilities and do not grant us prestige or greater rights than other countries. That is why I was insisting on the fact that nuclear and non-nuclear countries must work together on these issues and that it must not be the preserve of the nuclear countries. I am always somewhat wary when I hear French or American officials explain that we can only talk among the five of us because we are among serious people since it seems to me that the countries of the Atlantic Alliance have a role to play in these debates, even though we can imagine that technically, on certain points, the group of five is more appropriate.

Nuclear weapons are boxed in. The question of forbidding or interdicting them is raised whether or not, in my mind it raises strategic or technical issues so complex that the quick setting up of an elimination process seems improbable, even counter-productive.

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I say this both in admiration of the Ottawa process, which has lead to the interdiction of mines, and in thinking—and I say this quite frankly—that such an initiative in the nuclear field is doomed to failure at the present time, even if it is sponsored by a country as respected and as responsible as Canada, for a variety of reasons.

First, with this type of prohibition, unlike that for mines, we cannot wait for 20 years until the United States has solved its strategic problems with the Korean border. In between, the others would be depriving themselves of the nuclear weapon until the United States solves the question of its guarantees to NATO. Similarly, we can imagine a system in which a certain number of nations that are building up armaments or are likely to would stay out of such a treaty for an indefinite period. I therefore believe that the approach often proposed by the NGOs, of an agreement with a cut-off date which has been defended by the non-aligned countries, seem to me inefficient and counter-productive given the current situation. In any case, it will come up against—and I have had the opportunity of discussing this briefly before coming to your committee, to almost immediate opposition, both from the French and the American governments, and even from the British government since the Labour party has made its nuclear agiornamento about 20 years ago, after the French socialist party, which shows that we are sometimes ahead of our British friends.

A voice: Aren't you always ahead?

Mr. Camille Grand: So, what can we do today? We first have to set priorities, and those are priorities that involve countries like Canada very directly.

First, after the Indian and Pakistani test, it seems to me essential to save what is left of the non-proliferation and disarmament agreement. What does that mean in practical terms?

It means keeping the NPT. I have a lot of sympathy for India, but I believe that to keep the NTP we cannot look at opening it up to new nuclear powers because that is opening a Pandora's box. We therefore have to find another way of dealing with the problem of India and Pakistan, but it cannot be through a review of the NPT. Otherwise tomorrow other countries will want to force their way through that door.

I am aware of the fact that that door can be somewhat arbitrary. After all, there are 185 countries that signed the NPT, of which 180 are non-nuclear, including some great industrial countries that freely accepted that. So I don't see why we would make an exception today. Otherwise, we would allow a slew of countries with more or less legitimate reasons, and perhaps more, to jump into the breach when the time came.

The Chairman: What countries are you thinking about?

Mr. Camille Grand: Recently I heard some very official statements from Iran at the disarmament conference that the issue of non-proliferation was in question because of the Indian and Pakistani decisions and that therefore Iran had to keep that possibility of withdrawing from the NPT, etc.

I believe that a country such as Taiwan, has obvious security concerns that could lead it to get nuclear arms if it felt it's security was no longer guaranteed by the United States if faced with a China that was particularly aggressive.

In such an unstable Asiatic environment, when we can imagine... and I say this with precaution because the worst is never a sure thing and everyone wants to prevent it, but there are at least four Asiatic countries that are legitimately tempted by the nuclear option by withdrawing from the NPT and saying: "Look, as far as we are concerned, you have admitted India and Pakistan after one year. As for us, it might take five years, but we believe we need it".

I was thinking of Iran, Taiwan and the two Koreas, who are also involved. In those cases, if I were the advisor to the Japanese government, I would be hard pressed to advise it to be satisfied with a position of retreat. That's a scenario for catastrophe but I believe it is not completely excluded in the mid-term.

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It's the same thing with the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the famous CTBT. It is now indispensable. On the one hand, we must avoid that there be a stoppage in the ratification process in the signatory countries. This is a treaty that favours non-proliferation, that is favourable to everyone, and I believe that if tomorrow the American Senate chose not to ratify the CTBT, using the Indian tests as a pretext, which is already in process, it would be a blow to the disarmament system, a very regrettable blow.

Similarly, we must incite India and Pakistan, by all means possible, including sanctions, to... I believe that in the framework of a compromise between India and Pakistan, which is inevitable, and I truly believe this, being part of the CTBT would be the key to this compromise since it would demonstrate, for India and Pakistan, a real willingness to stop the development of their nuclear arsenal after having demonstrated their ability.

Finally, there is the issue of stopping the production of fissile material, the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, which has been blocked in Geneva for years and which must be unblocked. I believe that a country like Canada has a role to play in this Ottawa-type process because it is true that the nuclear powers may be poorly positioned to push for this type of treaty.

On the other hand, non-nuclear countries with a strong nuclear industry, such as Canada and Germany, have a role to play to get this treaty out of the kind of rut in which it is blocked in Geneva for regrettable procedural questions. If we do not want the disarmament conference to be dissolved because of a lack of means, because all the governments remove their diplomats because nothing is happening, we have to save this treaty. I believe that a real push on the part of the non-nuclear western countries with a tradition of disarmament would be beneficial.

The Chairman: I would like us to have a lot of time for questions.

Mr. Camille Grand: I will finish in one minute if you will allow me.

The Chairman: Agreed. Thank you.

Mr. Camille Grand: The second step that seems important to me is the issue of transparency and confidence measures on the part of the five nuclear countries and the nuclear-capable countries, as we would say today. It's the key to the evolution of disarmament towards very low numbers. Afterwards, it will be an accelerated reduction towards more reasonable ceilings. There is no sense, today, in the United States having 7,000 nuclear warheads. It is time to move to about a thousand, which is more than enough to burn the useful part of Russia, China, Iraq, Iran and North Korea. I believe we must move quickly and that all proposals to speed up the process are welcome.

It also makes no sense today to have stocks of tactical weapons. The unilateral withdrawal of 1991 should be formalized as a treaty so that we need not fear a Russian blackmail in response to a further expansion of NATO. That would seem to me to be a positive thing that would also allow us to not get into useless debates on the deployment of strategic arms in Poland, which has no strategic usefulness and only worries the Russians.

Then, when we have reached this level of 1,000 warheads, we will have to question the feasibility of elimination, of a prohibition on nuclear weapons. I do not believe that is feasible in the current environment. I say, and this is a significant point of disagreement with my friend Harold Mueller, whom you heard about this, that it is not doable. It seems to me to create a certain number of problems, and that in conclusion and perhaps to start the debate I will underline these problems.

Non-use is the first issue, requested by many NGOs, and that in my opinion creates major problems, both in terms of concept and doctrine, because it is counter to the logic of deterrence, which is a pacifist doctrine, and because it raises the question of the guaranties given by the United States to NATO allies and western Asia allies. For me, that is a real problem. It will be one of the big debates. First, we will have to find verbal solutions that will allow us to extricate ourselves from this question of non-use that creates real blocks, even if it is an obvious temptation.

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The second issue is control. I believe the Indo-Pakistani situation provides us with the opportunity to go forward on this issue because it is clear that that we will not get a significant reduction or elimination of nuclear weapons unless the question of breakout, the appearance of a clandestine proliferator, is resolved. For me, that is the best justification for keeping minimal nuclear arsenals with all kinds of guarantees and limits that we may discuss.

Finally, there is the question of credibility levels. I do not believe that we should be throwing out numbers at random. For a country such as France, which now has about 400 nuclear warheads, or for the United Kingdom, the issue of credibility is about 200 or 100 warheads. There is a need for a second strike capability to have a policy based on equanimity and based on deterrence.

I thank you for listening to me. I await your questions with impatience.

The Chairman: Thank you, sir. I don't know if you allow questions from the students in the military school, but here parliamentarians love to ask questions.

Mr. Mills.

[English]

Mr. Bob Mills (Red Deer, Ref.): I welcome you to our committee.

Listening to what you have to say, I guess the one thing I didn't hear you comment on and might put into this mix would be the reasons countries get involved and use nuclear weapons and so on.

I guess I'd start with France. It would seem to me that as a nationalist in France, I would like to have my country testing nuclear weapons, because the message that sends to Germany is “Hey, guys, don't get too far ahead of us, and remember that we have the bomb”. I could see a nationalism within me welling up.

I could then go to Russia and say, as a nationalist in Russia, “We want to be an international player, we're in chaos, our conventional weaponry has disappeared, but at least we have the bomb”. It would give us an international presence.

I would go to India, where 90% of the people said “Test the bomb”. It's the most popular thing. They have a coalition of 19 parties. Especially if I'm fascist over there, like the government is, if I wanted to coalesce national opinion one way to do that would be to make me an international player.

In Pakistan it's “Obviously those guys have the bomb, so we'd better have the bomb, and if we can throw in and call it a Muslim bomb, then it raises our profile even more”. Now we expand that to Iran: “Hey, we have one Muslim bomb, so let's maybe have it balance this one, and look at how popular we'd be in the Arab world and in this part of the world”. But then, of course, Israel says “Okay, we'd better make sure they know what we have, because then that positions us”.

I don't think I need to keep going on this, but I think you get the point.

Let me go one more place. You say that the U.S. has 7,000 and should have 1,000. Well, if I were in the U.S. Congress and I saw all this other stuff happening around me, it would be a pretty tough sell to convince me that we, the superpower in the world, had better reduce the number because, after all, everybody else is increasing them so we'd better decrease them. That would be a non-sale item in a nationalist sense.

I'm not saying it's wrong. We should get rid of them all, and it's too bad it ever was found, but we have them, and we have that nationalism. I'm not sure that we're not going against the tide at this point and that it would not be much better to say we shouldn't let these fringe things happen. We should be defusing it by saying, “Okay, India and Pakistan, let's fix Kashmir, whatever it takes, provided you reduce and get rid of your nuclear”. That then defuses the Iran-type issue.

It seems to me that's where nuclear non-proliferation and reduction in 1998 should be at. Am I wrong in that, or am I seeing it through different eyes than are others? What would be your opinion on that?

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Mr. Camille Grand: In order to respect the bilingual status of your Parliament, I will answer English questions in English.

The Chairman: Before you go on, I want to warn you that unfortunately they have to bring something through here to get it into the next room. This is embarrassing. They're going to bring this coffee through behind us. If there's a little noise, we'll ignore it.

Even nuclear war has to stand down to coffee. It seems to be life around here.

[Translation]

Mr. Camille Grand: That's OK.

[English]

I must say, you're absolutely right in pointing to the possible spread of nuclear weapons if everyone wants to follow a nationalist perspective on them. I do think hopefully four-fifths of the world's nations don't have the means to get a nuclear weapon, and that's why they support non-proliferation. I always say that if I was Cameroon, my main worry would be to make sure that Nigeria didn't get the bomb and not to make sure that the United States or France reduced their stockpile. I think that's a key point to understanding non-proliferation.

Today, for instance, a small country like Bangladesh doesn't feel very secure in their environment and they would have hoped that both their neighbours would have avoided that series of nuclear tests.

What should be your task? I definitely agree with you on the fact that regional security and confidence-building measures are our main objective today, for one very simple reason. Obviously what troubles me the most in south Asia is Kashmir, because Kashmir is the hot spot. It's where the war can break out. I'm very sure that the goal for all of us should be to avoid another border war between India and China, to get the Chinese to give some assurances to the Indians on their borders.

I was in Delhi in January, and I was shown about 12 times the Indo-Chinese border and the difference in the Chinese map and the Indian map. This is very frightening, because you see small portions of India that would be Chinese, according to China, or the other way around. At any rate, they are Indian for the moment. When you try to defuse the problem by telling our Indian friends, “Look at how it's a very small part of your territory; maybe you should find an agreement on that”, they say, “There are only 600,000 people who live in that very small part”, about the size of Alsace-Lorraine, by French standards, and we fought about three wars for Alsace-Lorraine.

I do think it is the key issue to get those problems solved and to back the Indians when they want the border dispute with China solved, to back the Pakistanis when they try to get an international involvement in the Kashmir issue, because it is the key issue.

So I definitely agree with you on that.

Mr. Bob Mills: Just very shortly—the chairman will cut me off—you said we should blockade the transfer of fissionable material. Does that mean then that nuclear reactors should not be sold anywhere in the world?

Mr. Camille Grand: I know it's a difficult issue here.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh.

Mr. Camille Grand: First of all, whatever I say about the sale of nuclear reactors goes for France as well as Canada. We both are leading exporters, including to China.

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The cut-off in fissile material production does deal with production of fissile material with an explosive destination. So it is a very military issue. The London Club, the nuclear suppliers group, has some precise guidelines on nuclear exports, guidelines that were strengthened after the Iraqi problem.

I am not sure it is the brightest idea to stop selling nuclear technology, because when we sell nuclear technology now, except in the case of China—that's a complicated case because it's a nuclear weapons state—we do impose, all of us, all exporters, full-scope safeguards on nuclear exports. This means the IAEA, the Vienna agency, can go into the nuclear plants and check what's going on.

In the old days, when neither you nor us applied full-scope safeguards to our nuclear exports, that was a big problem. I wonder whether it was the brightest thing to do to stop selling CANDU-type reactors to India at some point and have the Indians replicate them through their national means. Now they are in the position to....

It's the same thing with missiles. It's the same thing with a lot of things. Technology denial, especially with a country like India or China, does sometimes lead to a paradox in which after a few years the country gets the technology by its own means, and we have no means to control it whatsoever.

So it is a difficult issue. We should, especially when it's purely civilian technology, agree on the principle of transfers, including with countries that are risk countries, as long we get what we expect—that is, full-scope safeguards.

The Chairman: That is actually what we were told by the Pakistanis when they were here the other day.

Mr. Bob Mills: But the technicians are the same for military and domestic. That's the problem. In Pakistan and India, they are the same people. They work in this plant today and they work in that plant tomorrow. That's the problem.

The Chairman: Yes.

I'm going to go to Mr. Turp.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp (Beauharnois—Salaberry, BQ): Mr. Grand, thank you very much for your presentation. I believe that it is of such interest that I would like the clerk to give us a transcript. I saw you give your presentation from notes, but I would like a full transcript of your presentation today. I believe that you have, at the end of this series of testimony, done a most interesting synthesis of other testimony that we have heard, and, speaking for the Bloc québécois and other members of this committee, I would like to thank you.

I have three questions. I think that the most interesting thing you have said, for me at least, is to raise the very important idea of non-proliferation, especially in light of what has just happened in India and Pakistan. You said we had to find another way. Which one? I would like to hear your thoughts on that to enlighten us on the recommendations we will have to make.

I was also interested in the distinction you made about a similar process that could be applicable in Ottawa. You said that it would only be applicable in the case of fissionable materials. I would like you to be more specific on this issue, on the way things should go, on how to proceed so that an Ottawa process could again be possible in this specific area. I would also like you to say if Canada's leadership would be sufficient or if the process should be extended to include a certain number of other countries.

My last question is about a word you used. I would like you to specify its extent and that you tell us what, in the final analysis, you think of the recent events in India and Pakistan, of their global impact on the entire issue. You spoke about the spread of nuclear weapons in Asia. I am somewhat curious as to why you put the United States in Asia, and perhaps a part of Russia. What does spread mean for you? What are the consequences of spread, as you understand it?

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Mr. Camille Grand: I will deal with your questions in reverse order.

On the issue of the spread of nuclear weapons, I start from an observation that has not been sufficiently made. It is that there is a spread of nuclear weapons in Asia today, which is obvious, and that the risk of nuclear conflict, which is not only Indo-Pakistani, is mostly in Asia.

If I spoke of the United States, it is because it is an Asiatic military power without being an Asiatic country to the extent that it is the American guarantee, including the American nuclear guarantee, that is behind the issues of Taiwan, Japan and South Korea. We could also extend that to other countries in the region such as the Philippines, where it is much less obvious, but we can imagine a situation where conflicts in the South China Sea and the entire conflict around the Spratly and Paracel islands, that involve China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Brunei, Taiwan, etc., cause the United States to become involved in the region. That is why I mentioned the United States.

By spread, I mean two things. I mean the phenomenon of dissemination and the phenomenon by which we get the impression that in Asia today, to be a major player, one must be nuclear. That is why Russia still counts a little as a country in the Asian situation. That is what brings it to protect the countries of central Asia against the wishes of China and causes it to be involved in regional security matters that we can imagine already exist with APEC. That means that Russia remains an Asian-Pacific country even though it is the far end of Russia and not the most prosperous region if I believe what is being said about Vladivostok.

In my opinion, we have to stop this trivialization. If spreading leads to trivialization, then trivialization can lead to use. In a situation where the weapon is trivialized, someone will end up using it.

I do not believe that it is in any way a sure thing, but I fear that it is a possibility, especially since the doctrine of the countries in question and the confidence systems and the communications systems are not in place in Asia, which is a different situation than that which existed in Europe during the cold war. By that I mean that the mechanisms that would ensure that China and India, in the context of a border dispute, would be sure to be able to talk to one another, to avoid the takeoff of a plane that would be misinterpreted, that the test of a missile would be misinterpreted, etc., are not as well tested and as efficient as they were in Europe or between the United States and the Soviet Union.

It is therefore important to think about regional systems. I believe we must not limit ourselves to southern Asia. This is not an Indo-Pakistani issue. It is an issue that involves China, obviously, and that no doubt involves smaller countries and the powers that play a role in the region, including the United States and certainly Russia.

We have to put into place something that allows dialogue, that reduces tension, that sends an observer into such a region and that permits discussion on nuclear doctrine. The Chinese call the tactical nuclear weapon the second artillery. In Chinese military magazines, there are documents that say that in the border conflict with Vietnam in 1979, if they had had tactical nuclear weapons as they have today, they should have used them. I am not saying that....

The Chairman: The Chinese or the Vietnamese?

Mr. Camille Grand: The Chinese against the Vietnamese.

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Mr. Daniel Turp: We would have to create a place.

Mr. Camille Grand: That's it. I believe that a mechanism such as the OSCE, a remarkable mechanism in many regards, that allows the reduction of conventional tensions and increases confidence, etc., should exist for the region and have a nuclear aspect, which is the answer to your first question on non-proliferation. Undoubtedly we cannot include these countries in the NPT, but we can envision a regional mechanism that, without recognizing them as nuclear powers, admits that they have made nuclear tests, that they therefore have fissionable material and that recognizes their nuclear capability instead of recognizing them as nuclear powers.

The best mechanism is a regional one. For example, France, which has been a part of the NPT only since 1992, has been a member of Euratom since 1957 and has therefore actively participated in a non-proliferation mechanism. NATO itself has been a means of non-proliferation in its way that has avoided that a certain number of western countries do not give themselves nuclear weapons, such as Germany, Italy and perhaps even Canada, by offering them a mechanism that would reassure them on that issue.

Mr. Daniel Turp: It's a NATO mechanism or an OSCE mechanism?

Mr. Camille Grand: No, I am thinking more of the OSCE to the extent that there is a conflict, but perhaps we should add that there are other systems that reassure, such as the Southern States, so that ASEAN or Japan can have renewed guarantees from the United States in certain areas. In fact, it is a combination of the two, depending on the countries.

Then, on the question of a process similar to that of Ottawa on stopping the production of fissionable material, it is a technical discussion but it is mostly a discussion that requires a strong political will.

Today, four of the five declared nuclear powers are in favour of adopting such a treaty and have taken unilateral measures to stop the production of highly enriched uranium or of military quality plutonium.

I believe that a certain number of countries like Canada, that are civil nuclear powers... I insists on this because it will create the same problems in Canada as it will in France when inspectors come to see what is happening in the reactors if, when a reactor is discharged, we take out military or non-military plutonium. Those countries can, no doubt not alone—if it is a western initiative, because we know that the western powers are in favour of negotiating such a treaty—but perhaps with other countries that have already demonstrated their willingness to move ahead on these issues...

Mr. Daniel Turp: Or others?

Mr. Camille Grand: Or others.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Which ones?

Mr. Camille Grand: South Africa in any case. I believe that a country such as India is not opposed to it. In Delhi, I heard that it was possible to work on this because the Indians believe they have a considerable advance over the Pakistanis in the area of production of fissionable materials and they therefore have a interest in that. We can find a system where, for various reasons, we can find these winning coalitions that worked for the Non-proliferation Treaty or the signing of the CTBT, which means coalitions that allow the treaty to go forward. Does that mean withdrawing the Geneva Treaty? It may be dangerous for the Conference of Geneva. I think we have to see with the diplomats what they think about it because it is the main treaty being negotiated in Geneva today.

Mr. Daniel Turp: That's what we did for antipersonnel mines.

Mr. Camille Grand: That's it. You did it for the mines. To renew this destruction of the Geneva process may be somewhat delicate, but perhaps... In Geneva, there was an initiative in 1993, following a statement by President Clinton that had lead to the adoption of a mandate for Ambassador Shannon. There may be mechanisms such as ad hoc committees, special reporters, etc., that will allow straying from the agenda of the Disarmament Conference and to say: let's have a caucus, work on a system that will allow us to move quickly on things and then force everyone to take a position on that.

I think we really have to push on this. Quite honestly, I think the nuclear powers are not well placed to do so and that it is the place of the non-nuclear powers to do so.

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Mr. Daniel Turp: You have said very little about France. We would also be interested in knowing France's position since the Americans have told us a lot about what Europeans think.

In the document you have distributed, you spoke about minimal deterrence, which I find somewhat interesting. Could you say a few words, very briefly, about the current thinking about this concept of minimal deterrence?

Mr. Camille Grand: I will say a few words and, if you wish, I will make available two copies of a report I made to the United States and that is titled A French Nuclear Exception?. I'm sorry, but it's only in English.

Mr. Daniel Turp: We will have it translated.

Mr. Camille Grand: The document will give you a certain number of additional elements about that. "Minimal deterrence" is not exactly French language. It is more a way for French experts to describe the French situation that cannot be described as such. The French government talks about reasonably sufficient, very reasonably sufficient, and strong-weak deterrence, etc.

What do we mean by minimal deterrence? In terms of numbers, minimal deterrence is deterrence that can work with very few nuclear weapons. I believe that we are all convinced, around this table and generally, that nuclear weapons are sufficiently horrible so that the threat of using tens or hundreds of them is sufficient to deter most aggressors. During the cold war, we thought for a long time that the thought of destroying 100 million soviet citizens was sufficient to not attack France. The French objective has always been to kill between 50 and 100 million Russians, which seemed sufficient to deter the Russians. So that is basically minimal deterrence. It is a sufficient number, defined as sufficient for the purpose. It is reasonable sufficiency.

After that, it is also, in my opinion, a practice. That means that nuclear arms are not battlefield arms. We will not use them to solve a conventional superiority problem with Iraq's tanks in the Persian Gulf. They have no place in that context.

It is therefore in the strategic area of the military. Minimal deterrence only works to defend vital interests that are not exclusively dependent on national territory. I believe that minimal deterrence can apply with allies. It seems obvious to me that for the United the defence of Canada is part of its vital interests. It is hard to imagine Canada being victim of a nuclear attack without an American reaction, for the obvious reasons of geographic proximity.

It's the same thing for France and Germany, and it has been stated in very official statements, such as the Nuremberg text in December 1996. We have vital joint interests, as do France and the United Kingdom. That is a 1995 statement.

I believe that this practice of minimal deterrence can still be reduced, if I may say so. We can go further on the road to survival if we can accept a very limited nuclear capability that says: If you take us on, whoever you are... In the French case, we do not even specify who the opponent is. In the most purist doctrine, the opponent is not even designated. The Soviet Union was not even designated in official French documents until the middle of the 1980s. That shows you that we are sometimes a little slow, to respond to the question asked a while ago.

We are getting to a situation where we can protect national territory, where we can protect allies with only a nuclear capability. In India, I even defended the idea that India had a deterrence force simply because people knew it could build a bomb. That is why I thought it was superfluous and damaging to make those tests. In the end, India already has a form of deterrence vis-à-vis China, simply because it knows how to make a bomb.

You can see how far that can go. I do not believe that that must become real in any case, but that it can be significantly reduced. I believe that it is a very important trend and that countries such as the United States or Russia, even though they are superpowers, will gravitate towards a position where the number of weapons will be less significant and their use will be more limited, because it's time, thankfully.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Thank you.

The Chairman: Thank you.

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[English]

Mr. Assadourian.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian (Brampton Centre, Lib.): Thank you very much.

I join with my colleagues in welcoming you here. I really appreciate the views from across the Atlantic ocean.

I have two questions. For the last 30 or 40 years, we have tried to prevent the threshold countries of Israel, India, and Pakistan from having nuclear weapons. Now all three of them obviously have them, which means we have failed in our efforts to stop nuclear bomb proliferation. Obviously NPT didn't work. What can we do as a society, bilaterally and internationally, using the UN Security Council? What have you to make sure future threshold countries, like the three you mentioned, will not have nuclear weapons?

My second question has to do with the fact that you mentioned Kashmir is the last point between India and Pakistan. Now, imagine Kashmir is Berlin. NATO wants the alliance between India and Pakistan, because after the Cold War NATO had nuclear weapons, Russia had nuclear weapons, and they tried to outdo each other, and we maintained peace for the last 40 to 50 years. When I say peace, I'm talking in a world war context. Can't the same thing be said about the Kashmir situation and India and Pakistan?

One of our colleagues a few weeks ago said “Let everybody have nuclear weapons so we'll have peace”. Does that argument carry any weight, or is it just fiction that it will guarantee us peace and security if everybody has them, since they guaranteed us peace and security in preventing World War III, in the Berlin situation? Why can't the same policy work in the Kashmir situation and others on the list, and what have you?

Mr. Camille Grand: As far as your last question is concerned, there was a tendency, in the French nuclear thinking, to think the spread of nuclear weapons was peace-enhancing. General Gallois, for instance, wrote a lot about that. I think it is interesting that the main political figure who defended the idea of giving nuclear weapons to every country in the world was the late President Idi Amin Dada, who is not absolutely known for being a humanist. He actually wrote that.

A joke was made by a diplomat that makes it very clear. When the nuclear game is played by two players, it's just like chess: you know the rules and there is very little room for chance; you can make mistakes, but usually you're in a very small set of 36 black and white squares. When you play with five players, you start moving into a card game, something like poker, where you still have rules, but the chance of a problem is higher and you have to rely on your luck to get the right cards and come out with the right answers. But there are still many rules.

When we are in a world of 36 nuclear weapon states, which is probably the number of countries that could get nuclear technology to that point, you're entering a world of roulette, in which it's pure luck and sheer luck if you don't use nuclear weapons—

An hon. member: It's not pure luck.

Mr. Camille Grand: —or bad luck. We put ourselves in a situation in which one bomb will go off and we don't know—

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: Accidentally, too.

Mr. Camille Grand: —who sent it, why and so on. So that's why we should stick to the non-proliferation regime, even though nuclear weapons preserve peace in some regions.

On your second point, of whether the Kashmir situation, or the India-Pakistan situation, could evolve into a cold war situation with a form of nuclear deterrence, pacifying nuclear deterrence, it is a possibility. I think both countries are mature enough and responsible enough. The elites of both these countries are extremely serious, and it would be a racist statement to say the whites—Europeans and North Americans and Russians—could handle that and the people in the Indian subcontinent are not wise enough to handle the bomb.

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However, as I said, there are some technical difficulties because of the lack of proper communication systems, because of the lack of those confidence-building measures. So indeed it is a possibility, but I'm not sure I want to try it. And if we try it, we will go through a few months or years of uncertainty there, because whenever either of the two countries test-fires a missile, what will the other one think? Could a Pakistani general get very worried because he sees this missile going up from southern India on his poor radar system and decide that it's time to retaliate to a nuclear attack—by mistake? I'm not talking about madness or anything like that.

It could evolve into mutual deterrence, but I'm not sure it will. Then what to do with the NPT and future threshold states? I'm not sure the NPT has failed, because, after all, we are down to the three problems we had from the very beginning, the three countries that we knew would pose a problem to the NPT when we first signed it—actually, when you first signed it, because France was among the other few that had a problem with the NPT. So it was globally successful. We've eaten all the meat, and we're down to the bone, where we cannot do much with it. We have to address it via other means.

I'm very sure the NPT is still a very good regime, and we should stick to it and enhance it, including its verification and a 93-plus-2 system of enhanced IAEA safeguards that will enable us to go into Iran and check what's going on in the lab, and enable us to go into North Korea in a better way, with a surprise inspection and all of that. That's very important, and the safeguards.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Mr. Cannis, we want to try to get our ICC resolution through. Everybody's going to run from here at 12 noon, so do you have a fairly short question?

Mr. John Cannis (Scarborough Centre, Lib.): It doesn't matter, Mr. Chairman. I get cut off. Everybody has their time. We respect that. I won't bother asking the question.

The Chairman: Is that all right? Sorry, I don't mean to cut you off.

Mr. John Cannis: That's quite all right. We can move on.

The Chairman: There's one point we have to clear up for our report—

Mr. John Cannis: But I do want to make a point, Mr. Chairman. When other members' times were up, they said “One quick question”, and we dragged it on for an extra five minutes. I certainly don't want to participate any more in this committee. Thank you.

The Chairman: I'm sorry about that, but we have to get the answers to our questions.

Professor, could you tell us quickly about France? We have Russia and the United States talking about START II. At what point do France and the U.K. get involved, and when does this become a multilateral instead of a bilateral discussion between the United States and Russia?

Mr. Camille Grand: I think they will get involved at some point; that's for sure. It's not clear yet whether it will be somewhere between a START II and a START III, or somewhere between a START III and a START IV, or later. I think the proper answer would be that they should get involved right away when it comes to transparency, when it comes to confidence-building measures. They've been doing it on a unilateral basis through, for instance, the targeting, and they should continue to do that.

When it comes to actual disarmament measures, I think the proper thing to do would be, when the United States and Russia decide on the next step, which is already almost planned, 1,500 warheads—the whole process started in Helsinki—France and Britain and China should say they seal at a certain level. It could be 500; it could be 400; it could be the existing level at the time. So they would make public their position and seal at that point.

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Then, when Russia and the United States go below the 1,000 warhead point, we should accept, probably, a lower ceiling. Then, when we all come in the hundreds, we should determine if there should be a difference between France and the United States. Probably there should be, because we don't have the same responsibilities. And if there is a difference, should it be from one to two, or from one to three? I don't know. I think it depends on the entire scene. It's the way I see this thing evolving. And I think we should also continue our unilateral participation in the entire process.

The Chairman: Thank you very much. That's helpful.

With that, Professor Grand, I'm going to draw this part of our discussion to a close.

[Translation]

Thank you very much for having been among us.

Mr. Camille Grand: Thank you for your invitation.

The Chairman: If you can stay for a few minutes, we may have time to talk with you further.

Mr. Camille Grand: Yes.

The Chairman: We will now move on to our question on the resolution regarding the international criminal court.

[English]

While we had a quorum before, I think my understanding is that there's no problem with this resolution from the government side. I spoke to Mr. McWhinney about it.

Mr. Turp, I'm hoping you don't have any amendments to propose.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: Yes, I have an amendment to propose. But just one thing before that.

[English]

The Chairman: If it's a discussion about an amendment that goes past 12 o'clock, we're going to adjourn; we're leaving. I, at least, have to leave; we're out of here. Everybody's leaving at 12 o'clock, which is in two minutes, so if you have an amendment or a complicated issue, I suggest we stand this whole issue down. We won't be able to deal with it today. If you have something that's really quick, we can deal with it.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: Agreed. Mr. Mills also had some amendments.

The Chairman: I will yield the floor to him for just...

Mr. Daniel Turp: I would like to know what Mr. Mills is thinking about.

[English]

The Chairman: Mr. Mills.

Mr. Bob Mills: My basic concern is the method we're using here. We got the information yesterday—this has been going on long before this—and if we wanted to produce something like this, we should have been given time to research it, to do some work on it. I'm objecting as much as anything to the method that's being used. I don't know the cost. I don't know the proposed structure of this court. I don't know the stated objectives in detail. I simply don't like this method of sort of slamming it down and saying yes, I guess that sounds fine. I don't have objection to this court. That's not the point. The point is I don't like doing business this way, and I think this needs to be stated and so on.

That's what I have to say.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Do you have an amendment?

Mr. Daniel Turp: Listen, I agree with the feeling about the process, but at the same time I believe that it is important for this committee, before the negotiations start, put its weight behind the government and give it some indications.

Mr. Chairman, you know what we think and continue to think on the questions of treaties and on the role of Parliament on the issue of treaties. That is why despite many improvements in the French text, which is really very bad and beats all records in this area, we would have liked, in terms of follow-up, that in the third paragraph we add that the government agrees to present the text of the treaty for approval to the Standing Committee and to the House of Commons before it is signed.

[English]

The Chairman: Mr. Mills.

Mr. Bob Mills: It's going to be signed by July 17. They said here yesterday they would sign it if they can agree with it. The answer, I don't know who gave it to me—I think it was Mr. McWhinney—said yes, they'll bring back the signed agreement for us to discuss. Well, you know....

An hon. member: Do you understand your parliamentary rules?

Mr. Daniel Turp: Yes, we do understand the parliamentary rules; we want to change them.

The Chairman: Even in the United States of America, in a congressional system, they bring it back for approval. They don't—

Mr. Bob Mills: But they have a lot of input.

The Chairman: If they're going to have a negotiation and they're going to get a treaty struck in Rome, to suggest the Canadians are going to come back here to our committee before we're going to sign means the treaty will never be signed, because everyone will say the Canadians aren't on, we don't know whether it's signed or not.

Mr. Daniel Turp: That's not true.

The Chairman: Of course that's true.

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Mr. Daniel Turp: Especially in the case of history.

[Translation]

In the case of the treaty, I do not see any serious objection on the essence of the treaty. But you know that it is important, and we had a debate with Mr. Mills yesterday in the House on peacekeeping operations, that Parliament be more involved in the process of treaty negotiations before they are signed or ratified. But we will continue to insist, and we will do it continuously, to demand that this committee and the House be made aware of proposed treaties before they are signed and ratified. I believe that is very important.

The Chairman: I understand what you are saying, but you want to make a radical change in Canada's constitution through what we are doing here. If you want to add that, I think the resolution is far too important...

Mr. Daniel Turp: We have already done it. There is a precedent. We did it for the Multilateral Investment Agreement before this committee. We asked that the government present the MIA to this committee before it was signed. So there is a precedent.

[English]

The Chairman: Anyway, that's a proposed amendment. Why don't we see if we can do this? If the resolution is worth doing, let's see if we can do it. Let's put your amendment. We can vote on the amendment, and if it stands it stands; if it's defeated it's defeated. Then we move on.

We'll have to call in our members, and I don't think we're going to have enough time to do that because we're going to have to leave. It's now 12 o'clock. It's unfortunate; we won't have a resolution on the international criminal court.

This will be our last meeting of the committee, probably. It looks like we're adjourning tomorrow.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: Is there any other way we can present a resolution to the government, if you have no time?

The Chairman: There's no way I know how to do it. If we had the time—

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: I think it's a good resolution. Maybe it's not perfect, but it's a very good resolution. It reflects—

The Chairman: I know. That was my view too.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: Nothing is perfect—

The Chairman: But everybody wants to tag on their—

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: —but it would be a shame to stop this resolution now and then—

The Chairman: This is the U.S. system of value...on abortion or something.

We're not going to resolve this. We're going to have to go.

We're adjourned. We'll see each other in fall. Have a good summer, everybody.