FAIT Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

COMITÉ PERMANENT DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES ET DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Tuesday, May 26, 1998

• 1535

[English]

The Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham (Toronto Centre—Rosedale, Lib.)): I'd like to call this meeting of the committee to order.

Welcome, Minister. Thank you for coming. I appreciate your coming to speak to us about the recent tests in India. As you know, we are conducting a study into nuclear policy in Canada, so we're particularly anxious to hear what you have to say about this issue, which will certainly have an important impact on the study the members are actively pursuing at this time.

I believe the member from Salaberry has a point of order.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp (Beauharnois—Salaberry, BQ): Mr. Chairman, on a point of order—this is not a habit of mine—and I want to do this before the Minister because it concerns a House colleague and, in a way, I want to come to the defence of a member of our committee, the member for Red Deer, Bob Mills. A few days ago, on May 13, in answer to a question by Mr. Mills, a question moreover which we will be looking into today, concerning the CANDU reactor and its sale to India, the Minister's Parliamentary Secretary, Mr. McWhinney, whom I challenge on this matter and who is a colleague I respect, said something incorrect and false. I would like him to answer this charge because, in response to the question Mr. Mills put to him, the Secretary of State said that he found it very strange that the member's party, and I quote:

... objected in the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade to an Asian regional security study begun by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

To my knowledge, my colleague, the member for Red Deer, never objected to that study. On the contrary, in this committee, he even voted in favour of the motion to conduct the study. So I would ask the Parliamentary Secretary to explain the answer he gave to the House on this question.

[English]

Mr. Ted McWhinney (Vancouver Quadra, Lib.): Mr. Chairman, I find it very strange that a point of order of this sort is raised by a member of the Bloc. I would respect the point of order if it were raised by the member of the opposition concerned, and would respond to it.

The Chairman: I have some problem procedurally with the point of order. As it is a matter that was raised in the House, I believe it would more appropriately be brought in the House rather than in the committee.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: It concerns the work of this committee, Mr. Chairman.

[English]

The Chairman: I understand that.

[Translation]

I understand perfectly well that the words spoken in the House of Commons concerned the work of our committee. I suggest to you that we not waste any more of the time we have with the Minister. You've made your point and we can come back to it if that's appropriate. Furthermore, if you want to debate its merits after the Minister has made his speech, we will have the opportunity to question him at that time.

Mr. Daniel Turp: I completely agree, but I wanted to do this in the Minister's presence.

[English]

Mr. Bob Mills (Red Deer, Ref.): I believe it can be dealt with by the committee, and I'd certainly be prepared to comment on it.

The Chairman: Would you be willing to hold your comments until after we've heard the minister? Let us return to this now.

Mr. Bob Mills: I would like to talk about India, but I certainly would be prepared to talk about it after.

The Chairman: Let's not have a long procedural thing where we'll lose time. We can come back to it.

Thank you very much.

Minister.

Honourable Lloyd Axworthy (Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Translation]

First I would like to thank all members of the committee for the opportunity to meet them today concerning the nuclear tests in India, particularly as regards their consequences for Canada's foreign policy.

The situation in India is a major source of concern for all members of the House of Commons and for all Canadians, particularly for your committee which has been reviewing Canada's nuclear policies for some weeks now.

Let me begin today by stating my firm belief that India's recent nuclear tests constitute a clear and fundamental threat to the International Security regime and, thus, to Canada's security.

• 1540

[English]

Because of these tests and the danger that Pakistan will give in to quite substantial political pressure it's now facing at home—and might do likewise—the clock has been turned back to where we were 40 years ago, facing a world in which proliferation is an immediate threat.

Thirty years of successful management of the nuclear proliferation threat has been undermined, and the consensus view of 186 nations that have signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has been deliberately flouted. At the same time we are faced with the danger of a new nuclear realpolitik that threatens the progress we've made on nuclear disarmament.

The nuclear non-proliferation regime is based on, and anchored in, international law, as well as incorporated into a variety of international mechanisms. The NPT is fundamental, but the broader regime is a quite complex system of multilateral and bilateral agreements, arrangements, and mechanisms intended to promote and achieve a world without nuclear weapons sooner rather than later.

This was valid during the cold war and remains equally valid today. At the same time this regime is intended to provide a framework to enable the world to make effective use of nuclear capability for peaceful purposes.

I think it's important to point out, Mr. Chairman, that for all the breast-beating and blustering that's going on about how acquiring weapons makes one a great power, it's important to remember that in 1945 Canada had the capacity and capability to make nuclear weapons.

Canada was the first country historically to deliberately and politically decide not to do so. It means, therefore, that we can speak from some strength of commitment and engagement, because we've made the political decision not to get into the game.

Since that time, over the last 30 or 40 years, Canada has worked hard to develop a process, and has also paid political and economic prices to that end. We have foregone many possibilities for the sales of nuclear technology.

On the other hand, we have been open in our demands that the nuclear weapons states live up to their obligations to pursue nuclear disarmament to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. We have been a constant voice for disarmament. With increased international stability, I would argue that while we have paid costs, the benefits have far outweighed those costs.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty is the most widely adhered-to arms control treaty in existence. It's the heart of efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It provides an essential framework for international cooperation to use the atom for peaceful purposes under international safeguards. It entails the only legally binding obligation on the nuclear weapons states—China, France, the Russian Federation, the U.K., and the United States—to pursue negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

The NPT recognizes five—and only five—nuclear weapons states in return for their pledge to pursue nuclear disarmament to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. For over 30 years this line has held.

Other international legal instruments and agreements build upon the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which Canada signed in 1996, and the stalled Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty are important parts of the non-proliferation regime. So is the bilateral U.S.A.-Russia disarmament process called START. The IAEA and Canada's detailed nuclear cooperation agreements with many countries around the world also form part of this regime.

[Translation]

But let me be clear, these many arrangements are not, and cannot be, substitutes or alternatives for the NPT. Recent Indian suggestions of a willingness to be partial adherents to the CTBT, and to participate in negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, must be seen through that filter.

To preserve the integrity of the non-proliferation regime so critical to International Security, non-nuclear-weapon States, like Canada, need to step forward and take a leading role in ensuring that an emerging tendency to defend the existence of nuclear weapons, that is based on what I would call a new nuclear realpolitique, does not undermine our efforts to support the non- proliferation regime.

[English]

To preserve the integrity of the non-proliferation treaties so critical to international security, non-nuclear states like Canada must step forward and take a leading role.

I use the expression “non-nuclear realpolitik” to convey the complex of new political and security rationales and vocabulary that are being used by both proliferators, such as India, and the nuclear weapons states themselves to justify the proliferation and retention of nuclear weapons, even if at lower numbers.

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We need to address two real dangers. The first is that proliferators, by claiming membership in a nuclear weapons club, do not profit from a view that equates nuclear power with great power. That is no longer the equation that makes sense in the world we live in. We need to resist any movement to validate nuclear weapons as an acceptable currency in international politics. This will require policies marked by viability, integrity, and sustainability in the objectives we pursue.

India has publicly justified its nuclear tests on the basis of regional security concerns. It's not evident that any significant change in regional security took place in the period leading up to the tests. Until recently, India's relationships with both China and Pakistan were in fact improving. India's action clearly worsens both its own regional security situation and the global security equilibrium. Nationalist ambition is perhaps the most important source of India's action. Unfortunately, it is accompanied by a total disregard by the Indian government for the implications of its actions.

India appears to be driven by its rivalry with China, which looms particularly large in the minds of India's ruling BJP party. India's military and strategic analysts have consistently overestimated the strategic value of nuclear weapons, both militarily and for national prestige. It would appear that India has not learned the lessons the cold war participants learned by the mid 1960s, that nuclear weapons have no tactical value. Even a limited nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan would destroy most of Pakistan and a greater part of the populace of north India. It would have enormous global implications.

With its decision to test, India may have launched what could be an economically destructive arms race on the Indian subcontinent; risked greater instability in and around south Asia; globally put a great strain on relations with a number of countries with strong ties to India, including Canada; and generated strong adverse reaction within the UN system in the regional organizations, as witnessed by strong statements from the UN Security Council and traditional partners in the non-aligned movement.

These tests demonstrate India's looking to the past rather than to the future, in terms of what the world needs to enhance international peace and security. I believe, in this regard, that India's quest for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council has suffered irreparable damage. It has forfeited any claim to a permanent seat on a body created specifically to preserve peace and security and enhance the international order. I think similar claims to other international bodies suffer from the same disregard.

India has also justified its nuclear tests by arguing that the existing non-proliferation regime is flawed. India bases its claim on the fact the NPT allows five nuclear weapons states to maintain their nuclear weapons without a clear deadline for complete disarmament. This argument is flawed in a very deep and substantial way. While the NPT is indeed a compromise, it is one that 186 nations have accepted, and in my view it's unacceptable for India to stand in judgment of this overwhelming international consensus.

Second, the consequence of India's approach, which is an unlimited number of nuclear weapons states, is far more dangerous to the creeping process of proliferation and should not be underestimated. The risk of India escaping significant real censure, or even worse, gaining in de facto nuclear weapons state stages has far-reaching implications. Certainly Pakistan will be watching, as well as other countries in volatile regions, including countries that have signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and have to date lived up to its obligations. Any widespread endorsement of de facto or de jure recognition—the five nuclear weapons states of the NPT can become six, seven or eight—will inevitably lead to pressures for further expansion of this club.

Canada's actions in response to India's tests have been intended to demonstrate clearly our unwillingness to accept such eventuality. The Prime Minister outlined a number of steps during his meetings at the G-8 in Birmingham last week. We've recalled our high commissioner, Mr. Peter Walker, who is here with us today and will be available for your questions. We have cancelled a number of meetings, including consultations, trade policy talks, and the prescribed joint ministerial committee that was scheduled for this fall.

We've banned all military exports to India. We have opposed any non-humanitarian loans to India by the World Bank. We've stopped our Canadian development assistance to India in non-humanitarian areas, and as the Prime Minister announced, we've offered to Pakistan those aid funds should Pakistan agree to refrain from testing. We are also looking at other measures, particularly as they relate to what's happening at the IFIs.

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Canada, working with other like-minded states, can be in the forefront of ensuring that a “nuclear” and a “great” power are not regarded as the same thing. Using the tools of soft power, we can demonstrate that security is best built through cooperative ventures boldly applied.

But if addressing the dangers of proliferation is the first part of the equation, disarmament is the second part. Canada will continue to pursue its disarmament agenda with vigour. We cannot allow this process to be slowed in any way, and in recent months we've been actively seeking ways of speeding it up.

Since the end of the cold war, the United States and Russia have made some welcome progress. The bilateral START process has been used to create a road map that will lead us to levels of nuclear weapons in the 2,000 to 2,500 range. That is 80% below peak cold war levels. The fact remains that little progress has been made in turning this framework into reality. Just last week, the Russian Douma refused to consider early ratification of the START II agreement. Canada will work with other nations to find ways of getting this process moving again.

We need to be aware, however, that we face challenges. Budget realities have made Russia move away from a declared policy of no first use and increased reliance on tactical nuclear weapons. As a manifestation of the new nuclear realpolitik, we have started to hear that other weapons of mass destruction—chemical and biological weapons—provide a justification for nuclear weapons.

No doubt India's nuclear tests will soon be also cited as complications for further progress in disarmament. The lack of enthusiasm by some of the nuclear weapons states for any forceful and tangible response to India's tests should cause us all great concern.

In that context, I therefore welcomed Secretary of State Albright's address on May 20 to the U.S. Coast Guard Academy in which she stressed the dangers of India's decision and reaffirmed the Helsinki Agreement to negotiate further reductions in American and Russian arsenals. She highlighted the importance of the Senate's ratification of the Comprehension Test Ban Treaty and the priority in halting the spread of nuclear weapons the American government has placed on its bilateral agendas with others, including China.

Early widespread ratification of the CTBT will be another important step to really invigorate the disarmament process. I hope to be able to introduce legislation for Canada's ratification before the House rises this spring.

We will also push in Geneva for the early commencement and conclusion of the talks for the cut off of production of fissile material. We reject the argument of realpolitik. Disarmament politics are what you make of them. Canada remains optimistic and committed to real nuclear disarmament.

The key elements of Canada's policy are, first, a forceful, responsible advocacy of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, based on NPT and its associated instruments; secondly, a direct and clear opposition to any move by the nuclear weapons states to validate their nuclear weapons in the new realpolitik—that is, in creative deterrence policies based on proliferation—coupled with persistent pressure to continue and expand the START process, while resisting destabilizing strategic developments such as weapons in space; thirdly, a vigorous opposition to any move, de jure or de facto, to legitimize any nuclear weapons states; and finally, a persistent advocacy of the non-proliferation regime by tangible measures such as those we have already taken.

In my view, Canada's credentials as a credible participant in building a safer and more prosperous world and our partnerships with individuals, communities, and governments bend to the same purposes, and our ability, if not responsibility, to promote new channels for diplomacy and change should guide us in opposing any pessimistic view of what is possible. We need to work against the new nuclear vocabulary.

I've asked this committee to address the question of nuclear weapons. I believe the emergence of this enhanced threat of proliferation provides a new context for your work. We need to look for means to promote the policy I've outlined, to ensure that it is marked by integrity and sustainability. We need to resist and condemn proliferators while avoiding justifying a new realpolitik based on nuclear weapons. At the same time, we need to put pressure on the nuclear weapons states to pursue an active disarmament agenda, without validating the reasoning of any would-be proliferators.

It's not an easy challenge, but I certainly look forward to receiving the report of your deliberations. I think it can be one of the most important reports that any committee in foreign affairs has made in recent history.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Minister. I understand you have to leave here at 4.30 p.m. sharp for a cabinet meeting.

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: Yes, I do have a cabinet commitment.

The Chairman: So members, I suggest we keep our questions to five minutes each and then we'll get more in.

Mr. Mills.

Mr. Bob Mills: Thank you, Mr. Minister, for joining us. Certainly you raised a lot of questions in your comments. I always have this problem of having way too many questions.

• 1555

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: I'm sorry. I've been negligent. I introduced Peter Walker, our high commissioner. I would also like to introduce Paul Heinbecker, our ADM for global issues, and Ralph Lysyshyn is head of our arms control/disarmament division. They are here to give me all the help I need and will require.

The Chairman: They're familiar faces to the committee, as we've often had them before us. I presume they'll be able to stay after 4:30 p.m., after you go away, to clean up any questions we might have.

Mr. Bob Mills: I think all of us, in doing this study, would like to agree that it would be great if there were no nuclear weapons, it would be great if there never had been any nuclear weapons, and we would like to see them all destroyed. However, looking at the real world, and not getting a technicolor view of it, to think that France can really stand as any kind of example of how to handle its nuclear program, or that Russia, as you mentioned, would ever get into a START III when they've lost all conventional methods I think is dreaming.

However, I would like to try to address the India situation specifically and say that it seems to me that we have some responsibility here.

If we look at 1956, when we gave a reactor to China, if we look at 1974, when we reacted to them turning it into weapons grade plutonium.... Then we went on, however, in our desire to sell nuclear weapons, and of course we did have an agreement with China in 1994 that they would only transfer technology with the consent of Canada. Then we found out in 1996 that in fact they had transferred nuclear technology from China to Pakistan. All of that has our fingerprints on it, and because it has our fingerprints on it, it seems to me that we now have a much higher level of responsibility.

I wonder what exactly we're going to do. In our desire to sell nuclear reactors, I wonder how we're going to keep from actually being.... While saying one thing, we are in fact, it seems to me, letting the world know that we will transfer this technology to the Romanias, the Turkeys, and wherever else we can get a sale. That seems a little hard to justify.

Along with that, Pakistan right now seems to be holding a card where they're saying they might not test nuclear weapons—they have the capability—but if we will help build their conventional...plus giving them a guarantee of nuclear backup, they won't do that.

In 1996 Canada sold $ 2.5 million worth of weapons to Pakistan. Are we prepared to dramatically increase the sale of weapons to Pakistan in order to get that balance, and if we do that, as they're requesting, what do we do with the China-India-Pakistan relationship?

It seems to me that the big problem in that whole region is a security one. If we were to work on security with those three countries, it seems to me we'd be doing them a lot bigger favour than chastising them or going after them because of the responsibility we have.

I wonder if you could reply to that. I have other questions.

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: First I'd like to reply by correcting some of the historical record that Mr. Mills enunciated.

I think it's certainly true that the original reactors sent to India were used for the wrong purposes. Since that period, which is 25 years ago, I think Canada has been the most active country in the world to secure safeguards, both through international treaties and the IAEA, which sets a whole series of standards that must be required before any use is made.

Secondly, in any bilateral sale we take, we have very clear undertakings, signatures, legally binding requirements, about the use of any fissible material.

Mr. Bob Mills: What do you do if they break the rules?

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: Well, if they break the rules then they are subject to the same kinds of sanctions that are available under the IAEA.

I should correct one thing. While it's reported that China transferred nuclear technology, it was not ours. We are not the only supplier. We would be glad to table for you the very extensive levels of agreements that have been signed with these countries in terms of what can be done, what the requirements are, what their obligations are. It might be useful, Mr. Chairman, as part of your study that we submit those agreements to you so you can see for yourself.

• 1600

On the other issue, Mr. Mills, I frankly don't think selling more weapons to Pakistan is the way of trying to provide greater security. Already there are flashpoints, for example, between India and Pakistan. Today there are reports of artillery firing on the Kashmir region. We have to bring the temperature down, not raise it. We don't want to be part of an increasing arms race in that region.

I agree with you that there has to be a greater security concern, but unfortunately in that region there is no security organization. The only one that comes close is the Regional Forum under ASEAN, of which India is a member but Pakistan is not. It would certainly be our hope that through the ARF meetings this summer, we will advance the need for some regime that would provide a degree of intervention to help provide some assurances or guarantees in the region, but the ASEAN ARF has a very limited range.

Where we can provide more support is to demonstrate that we're a country that will show restraint, and we certainly hope Pakistan will be amongst that number and that they receive the proper incentives to do so. That's why it's an appropriate gesture that the Prime Minister indicated that the direct development money we would not be giving to India any more would be available to Pakistan as an alternative, and other countries are doing the same.

Part of the point is that when you consider the enormous, overwhelming tasks of development, of reduction of poverty, and of coming to grips with these issues that are on the subcontinent in that area, to allocate very precious resources towards the development of a nuclear weapon makes absolutely no sense whatsoever. If Pakistan is prepared to restrain, then the world community, both through the international banks and through direct development, should reward that kind of restraint.

That's the message that has certainly been given. The Prime Minister spoke directly to Prime Minister Sharif and indicated that that's the way we see it.

Mr. Bob Mills: Wouldn't sending three envoys to those three countries be a lot stronger message than recalling Mr. Walker? Those seem to be just traditional. It seems to me we could take a much more proactive role in this whole security initiative.

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: I agree in part with that. One of the reasons Mr. Walker returned is so we could talk about this, and he will be returning soon with the kind of message the Prime Minister and the government would like to give.

At the same time, we spoke directly to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, and we're certainly in very active contact with a number of the other countries involved. We've asked all our ambassadors or high commissioners to make démarches in key capitals.

At this stage one of the prescriptions we have to establish, however, is the one I tried to put in my remarks. We have to demonstrate very forcibly that if it is the popular view in India that acquiring a nuclear weapon or the capacity for a nuclear weapon is a way to elevate your status, the international community has to say no. That's why I made it very clear that if they think this is the way to get entry to the Security Council or to positions of responsibility in the Commonwealth or other areas, they can forget it.

The Chairman: Thank you, Minister.

I'd just draw your attention to the fact that the quorum bell is ringing. We had this before. I would tell the members, I don't know who's calling for quorum, but if it doesn't stop within three minutes, I'll adjourn this hearing and we'll all go to the House, and the minister will come back whenever time is available.

Monsieur Turp.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: I would just like to make one comment, sir, on your remark concerning the money that India invests in developing its nuclear program. When our committee went to the United States, I was very surprised to learn that the U.S. invests $ 36 billion in its nuclear program, whereas that money could be invested in development assistance.

It must be understood that when the developing countries talk about the nuclear powers' double standards, particularly when they are told that their money could be better spent, and when we know that the money of the United States and other nuclear powers is not very well spent either when it comes to nuclear weapons.

I have two questions. In your presentation, you said, and I quote, "Nuclear weapons have no tactical value." For the purposes of our committee's work, I would like to ask the Minister: "What value do nuclear weapons have?" That's my first question.

• 1605

My second question concerns India and the sanctions. How long will the sanctions last?

I don't know whether you had the opportunity to read the essay by Charles Krauthammer in Time Magazine last week. If you or one of your advisors read it, I would like to hear your reaction to Mr. Krauthammer's thesis that introducing standards on this issue of non-proliferation or a nuclear test ban does not appear to be sufficient; we have to use the power, and all the power, we have. Krauthammer was mainly talking about the Clinton administration in that case.

[English]

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: On the last point, I didn't have the occasion to read that article, but with that critique you've provided, I will make sure I get to it and read it.

Let me make one comment that goes partly, Daniel, to the gist of your question. When the nuclear genie was let out of the bottle—and you only have to read the really quite fascinating work by Richard Rose as to what brought it about and the decisions that were made—it was there. It became a weapon of use.

We as a country—and we should be grateful to our predecessors, because we were one of three countries that worked on the original technology—decided we would not buy into that procedure. That was a clear decision of the government of the day, for which I will be eternally grateful to those decision-makers, because we at least helped set another path. We said you don't have to equate power with nuclear weapons possession.

That's the whole thrust of the non-proliferation treaty. It's not just to stop other countries acquiring; it also puts an obligation on the nuclear weapons states to reduce and eventually eliminate. That's the bargain that was struck.

Perhaps part of the problem we faced was that not enough progress was being made to give some comfort to those outside the regime that in fact the bargain was being lived up to with the kind of responsibility necessary.

That's why, now that the genie's out of the bottle again, this generation has to be equally forthright in saying that those who, for reasons of le grandeur, acquire those weapons must take some responsibility to reduce them now and to clearly, specifically, publicly work towards their elimination. That's the deal that was done. That's why in my remarks I made the point of saying it's a two-way bargain; it goes both ways.

As to the value, at this stage, when you consider the incredible power of nuclear weapons, it seems that most commentators, including those who possess them, realize that no one wins any kind of nuclear exchange. It becomes destructive for the entire world. But they're there and we have to find ways to manage them appropriately so we can work towards their elimination.

Mr. Daniel Turp: No deterrence value?

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: There has been a deterrent. That was the dominant theory, and there still might be some value in it. That's what I've asked the committee to examine. We put that question back to the committee to examine and come back with your conclusions on it.

It still is part of the strategic weapons systems we have under NATO, of which we're a member. But even that strategic concept, as you know, is under review over the next two years. That's why we asked in particular this committee to look at what recommendation they would make from a public point of view to help inform our stand on that matter.

As to the question of sanctions, I can't give you a specific answer on that. Let me just say that by no means are we simply going to throw up our hands and accept this as a fait accompli and a de facto measure. If we showed some wavering or some willingness to let it pass, we would be giving in. As a result, that in itself would be an encouragement to even more rapid proliferation. So we have to stay very tough on this one.

The Chairman: Thank you. That's five minutes.

Monsieur Bachand.

• 1610

[Translation]

Mr. André Bachand (Richmond—Arthabaska, PC): I would like to welcome you here today, Minister, gentlemen.

I'm going to raise the question of India in general, but also, with your permission, a question concerning Romania. One thing is clear, sir: you were not there, nor was I, but it was really Canadian technology, and U.S. heavy water, that enabled India to conduct what was called "a peaceful nuclear test" in 1974, that is two peaceful implosions. I believe we must learn something from that. You are quite right, sir, in saying that we get the impression from what is going on in India that we are going back 40 years. Will Canada make the same mistake with Romania or other countries that it made 40 years ago in selling a nuclear reactor to India? Perhaps we should pay attention to the issue of sales.

The Indian problem is complex, indeed even too complex for me to understand on my own. However, we see in the India and Pakistan question that there are two super-powers entering the picture: Russia with India and China with Pakistan. India sees that China is building a sea port in the Gulf of Bengal, where it promises to keep submarines capable of launching nuclear warheads, thus potentially threatening India's security.

What does the Government of Canada intend to do about India and Pakistan as regards the two major powers that appear to be backing the situation in the region, that is to say Russia and China? We know that India has between 60 and 200 nuclear warheads with short- and medium-range missiles, that those short-range missiles are installed on the Pakistani border and that Pakistan has missiles that were tested this year and nuclear warheads that were given or sold to it by China.

In view of what is currently happening with regard to Russia and China, what does Canada intend to do about these two major countries to ensure the situation is not aggravated? Have you had any meetings with Russia and China, which are two very, very important players, or do you intend to hold any? As I said a moment ago, we know that China is building a port in the Gulf of Bengal and that it has completed transactions with Pakistan, and we know what is going on in Tibet. Technologies are being developed to launch intercontinental nuclear warheads. Furthermore, some time ago, a U.S. satellite was sent to China, with Mr. Clinton's permission. What action do you intend to take with Russia and China? There appears to be a major problem there. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I will reserve a little time to ask a question on Romania.

[English]

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: Again, it's an interesting package of questions, but I'll try to respond to them.

Mr. André Bachand: It's free.

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: Mr. Bachand, I've learned that around Parliament nothing is free.

Let me first come back to the fact that after the events of the fifties, when there was a sale of nuclear technology and the Indians at the time sort of abused that commitment that was made, we, I think perhaps more than any other country, went to work to build up a regime that would provide safeguards.

So one very important initiative under the International Atomic Energy Agency, which is part of the agreement, is to monitor and give full access to it so that it's transparent, it's visible. In terms of the opportunity to use it in a covert way, to use the materials from a nuclear reactor, it is now far more visible than it was before, and a condition of any sale is that they subject themselves to that inspection. Similarly, we have very direct bilateral agreements for any sale of a nuclear reactor through AECL and through our own Atomic Energy Board, again subject to inspections and to end-use requirements.

• 1615

I think it would be, as I said earlier, very useful...we can submit documents and maybe, through officials of the various energy agencies, give you a full briefing on how those safeguards work, because I agree with you that it can't be an open system; it has to be one that's tightly controlled and regulated. I think I can say from the discussions I've had with some of our officials who work at IEA that it is a fairly tight system right now. That is the requirement of any sale, so reactors would not be sold without that kind of commitment and guarantee being made by the purchaser.

On the issue of China itself, Mr. Heinbecker has informed me that we've asked our ambassador to China to make very direct representations, not only to the Chinese themselves about the situation but also to urge all restraints on Pakistan. They clearly are a major player in this matter.

On the broader level, because of the testing, it was clearly an issue of pretty major relevance at the G-8 meetings in Birmingham, where the leaders of the summit, including Russia, were there. The whole talk was about more extensive export controls and the requirement to put much tighter limits as to the movement of goods.

We're certainly facing an issue where not only in the nuclear field but in other areas a lot of the weapons systems that were in the former Soviet Union are now coming on the market. I think, again, there is a very strong movement to put tighter regimes in place internationally, because you can't do it from one country or the other.

In our case, we have substantially strengthened our own arms export control regime to tighten up as to what is sold and to whom and under what circumstances. That's why I said, when I answered Mr. Mills, that I wouldn't see us advancing or promoting the rearmament or advanced armament in Pakistan. In the way of security I think that would in fact be counter-productive.

[Translation]

Mr. André Bachand: Excuse me for interrupting, sir. I believe it is important to consider what is going on in the Gulf of Bengal. We know that Russia is Pakistan's shield, while China is in a way India's shield or protection. That's the situation in the field in these two respects.

I would like to ask you a question about Romania. Having seen this imbalance in the situation between Indian and Pakistan, don't you believe that Canada should be extremely prudent in selling another reactor to Romania, in view of its entry into NATO, which could destabilize the region and make one of its neighbours, Russia, feel, perhaps not threatened, but apprehensive that its balance might be much more precarious? I apologize for asking a question on Romania, but it is a concern of mine.

[English]

The Chairman: I don't want to interrupt your answer, but could you be very brief? We're well over the time for this issue.

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: Sure.

On that question, in fact we've had the Romanian president visiting Ottawa in the last couple of days, and there have been further discussions. I think one of the objectives that the Romanian government would like to provide through its nuclear reactor as a source of peaceful energy use is to expand it more as a regional source—not to use it as something that gives it an advantage over its neighbouring countries, but in fact using the existing power grids to export and share its nuclear energy with Ukraine or its neighbouring countries as part of a broader regional economic cooperation. They have developed a facility there where all the infrastructure front-end costs have been paid for. They have very strictly adhered to all the international control requirements, all the bilateral requirements, and now see this as part of a broader economic integration in that region. It could lead to a higher level of integration as opposed to a source of conflict, and I think that's certainly the policy and position that has been put forward.

On the China question, I'll make one comment and maybe ask the high commissioner to respond. You might have noticed in recent events that the Pakistani foreign minister went to China to ask for that kind of guarantee that you said they would provide, but in fact the Chinese said, no, they weren't going to do it. In fact, they were playing a very low-key role in this matter. I don't know whether that's good or bad, but perhaps the high commissioner, who's just come from the area, can comment on that.

Mr. H.E. Peter Walker (High Commissioner of Canada to India, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): I can't comment on the China-Pakistan debate or discussions, but I can say that India's concerns about China relate not just to the relationship between Pakistan and China but to the long border between India and China, both Kashmir in the west and, in the east, Arunachal Pradesh. These are both unsettled border issues. You mentioned the Bay of Bengal. The Indians have referred several times recently to a Chinese monitoring station on a small Myanmar island off the coast, which they suggest would be used as a control post for Chinese naval activities in the Bay of Bengal.

Those are a number of their concerns.

• 1620

The Chairman: Thank you.

Madam Beaumier.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier (Brampton West—Mississauga, Lib.): Minister, since we're talking about India and my area of interest in India has been the human rights abuses—but certainly India isn't the only one—the explosion of the nuclear bomb is not the only very interesting thing that's happened in the last couple of weeks. There was also the departure of Suharto. From a human rights point of view, could you comment on what you see this new government being? Are we going to be able to move forward with this new government, or is it just going to be more of the same?

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: Mr. Chairman, as Madam Beaumier has said, it has been quite a couple of weeks. I just wish the time zones were a little closer in sync so there wouldn't be so many calls in the middle of the night.

As a quick answer, I think in terms of the changeover, the new government under the new President Habibie may offer some hope that reform can be extended in a number of areas. Our ambassador has just had a series of meetings with senior officials and political leaders in Indonesia, where we've advanced, after some consultation, an agenda that we felt would be appropriate. It includes the releasing of the political prisoners, which has already started. Pakpahan, the labour leader, was released yesterday. He's somebody we had close contact with because we helped him with his medical problems last fall.

Other issues are political electoral reform and revisions, particularly in the boundary levels, to make it more democratic. I think the president has promised free and fair elections, and we again endorse that.

We've made the case that there should be investigations of misconduct of the police and security forces dealing with students and implementation of the IMF reforms that we've agreed to. But where I think we've added a special note is that, as you recall, we signed a memorandum of agreement with Indonesia last summer to deal with democratic development on human rights, which would give us an opportunity to consult with Indonesians on this matter. In that agreement we had proposed that there be a move towards the ratification of the UN human rights instruments, and particularly to find some form of political settlement for East Timor. Those are the two areas that we had particularly emphasized during the negotiations with Indonesia last summer.

That forum that's been set up, the bilateral consultative forum we established last summer, last July, I think provides the framework in which we can provide a continuing discussion on how we can support approved governance and human rights issues, as you've raised them.

We're just in the final stages of negotiating an agreement on technical operation in the field of human rights, which would provide direct support for organizations, institutions, and the administration of human rights in Indonesia, and we've just had recent discussions on a similar agreement on legal reforms in Indonesia. Our ambassador, in discussions this week with the new justice minister in the new Indonesian government, confirmed that the new Indonesian government is very anxious and interested in pursuing the question of Canadian support for that legal reform initiative.

So I think there's a new start there that gives us the opportunity.... In a sense, it was fortuitous that we were able to get in on the ground floor by getting that agreement signed last summer, setting up the mechanics for consultations, and starting work on direct assistance on human rights institutions.

That gives us I think an opportunity now to substantially broaden our activity in the area and to build upon that as one of the countries that can be most helpful as the new government tries to find its way in bringing about this new package of reforms.

• 1625

So far the transition has been an adequate one, but more importantly, I think the door is now open for some very significant change, and we're in a position now to play an important role in making that happen.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: Okay. The treaty was signed by the old government. Are you a little more optimistic that this new government will in fact—

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: Yes, we had made some progress on it. We'd signed the agreement. We then set up a consultative forum. We had started negotiating, as I said, on a program for direct technical assistance for human rights institutions in Indonesia. Clearly, the new situation accelerates that. It just opens up the potential of that agreement to a far greater extent.

I think the kind of initiatives that we asked our ambassador to specifically take forward to the new Indonesian government, like those dealing with the release of political prisoners, the development of investigations and a new electoral system, can be supplemented by direct work under that agreement on human rights matters. I think that's where we can make a major contribution.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: Thank you.

The Chairman: Minister, before I go back to Mr. Mills, you mentioned that you expected that legislation for the CTBT—the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty—would perhaps be introduced. Would that be extensive legislation? I wouldn't have thought there'd be a need for a lot of domestic legislation to be changed by virtue of entering into that agreement. Would there?

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: No.

Mr. Daniel Turp: What do you want Parliament to do?

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: Mr. Turp, it would simply be an instrument ratification of the treaty. We signed the treaty, but as you know, not to ratify it.... There are a number of federal departments involved in terms of monitoring and accepting responsibilities in the treaty and you have to be prepared to provide scientific evidence of what you're doing or not doing. We've worked that out with the departments and I think we're now ready to move to ratification.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Do you want Parliament to approve it before ratification?

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: Yes. It has to be ratified by Parliament. You guys do it.

The Chairman: You're getting there, Mr. Turp.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

The Chairman: Mr. Mills.

Mr. Bob Mills: In terms of the G-8, it seems to me that there was a lot of talking but not a lot of concrete things came out of that, particularly as related to the issue we're talking about here. It seems to me that it was pretty much a failure when it came to sanctions and imposing pressures on India or Pakistan or China. It seems to me that really nothing was agreed to, and I guess I think that was politics.

Again, the EU wants to trade with India, which has a billion people. The U.S., by their sanctions, obviously will lose a lot of market to the EU, which will be able to jump in. It seems to me they were playing economics more than really trying to diffuse this issue.

The second part of this is, I guess, that when we talk about the potential escalation, we should also be talking about Iran, about Israel, and maybe about South Africa. Where do we stop, now that, it seems to me, another genie has come out of the bottle? Do you really think that economics and the other factors won't become more dominant than this search for a permanent peace?

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: I agree with your assessment. In fact, as you know, our Prime Minister made a pretty tough judgment at the end of the G-8 meetings about the lack of agreement. I can tell you that he was certainly in the forefront of trying to gain an effective stand from the G-8 members, but it didn't happen.

The question of economics in certain European Union countries played a part. I think there's also, in the minds of some, the fact that they equate the possession of nuclear weapons with la grandeur. We don't. It's as simple as that. We have a very different view about what a nuclear weapon constitutes with respect to one's status in the hierarchy of the world's countries.

Mr. Bob Mills: Do you ever question your soft power? If these guys are thinking that way, how are you going to push this soft power?

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: I guess it's to get more countries to agree with us. Some will take a lot of persuasion, but the fact of the matter is, as I say, that realpolitik that's emerged.

• 1630

In answer to your second question, the one thing we have to make sure of so other countries don't follow is that the so-called status one acquires by possession of a nuclear weapon isn't given legitimacy by this action of India's. And that's where I think it's very important, particularly in the case of their ambitions to occupy seats of responsibility internationally, where, clearly, they have to be stopped.

Mr. Bob Mills: I hear what you're saying. I just can't really buy into it. I see it as being able to be at talk shops, but I just really don't see how you're going to turn that into some kind of positive leadership. It seems to me it would be better to face reality and say, okay, in regard to our reputation as Canadians, we can serve a role here, be it with envoys or be it with some really positive action. And we can sit down at the table and say, “Look, this is the kind of security that we're going to negotiate between you and the big picture. That way you don't have to get into nuclear proliferation and so on.” In other words, you come up with a positive thing rather than just talking about how it's not good and how we don't agree with them and so on.

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: Yes, but as I pointed out, Mr. Mills, we're not just talking. We're walking the talk. We've taken very tough measures, which will probably have some economic impact on us as well.

Mr. Bob Mills: But we sell nuclear reactors and we don't deal with Israel and we don't deal with some of the other places.

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: But, Mr. Mills, you're making a large jump. I think we've tried to demonstrate that we do not sell reactors to countries that we think would be using them for nuclear purposes. We have been, in fact, architects of a major regime to put controls on, to put safeguards on, and that is part of the whole broad non-proliferation strategy.

It's not perfect. We have five countries who have already committed to using weapons. Those were the historical decisions. Part of the mission is to make sure that there are no more, to put some kind of limit on it, and another part of it is to demonstrate that the so-called benefits that one would acquire aren't there.

Whether they're economic benefits or political benefits, there is, I think, a horrible misconstruction by the Indians of what they will gain from this. In fact, they're losers—big-time losers—as a result. Their own security is more vulnerable and their positioning with respect to their own people has, I think, been substantially impacted in terms of what they can do in development.

I think their position in a world where.... I'm probably older than you are, Mr. Mills, but I remember a time when the voices of Indian statesmen, the Ghandis and others, provided a real beacon, a real set of values and standards. It's certainly not the case with the current government.

Mr. Bob Mills: I guess it's emotion, though.

The Chairman: I'll go to Ms. Augustine. You have about one minute left and there is a chance, quickly....

Ms. Jean Augustine (Etobicoke—Lakeshore, Lib.): Mr. Minister, there is a counter-argument to the argument you present, another side to the coin, and maybe I'll ask you to address it. Are we strengthening the hand of Pakistan? Are we encouraging relations between Pakistan and China? How do we balance this with having sanctions or toughened measures against India?

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: Right now, Jean, I think the real issue is to use every ounce of influence we can to make sure that Pakistan itself does not test. Clearly, one of the dilemmas the Pakistani government faces is that they are under enormous pressure from their own population to respond to the Indian testing, but they also recognize that if they test they will be subject to the same sanctions and therefore will be cast into the same kind of category that India's put itself into.

So in the very immediate term, it's crucial that we mobilize whatever we can to.... As I said, our Prime Minister has already spoken to the Pakistani Prime Minister to make that case. We continue to do what we can, even by a gesture such as promising to transfer the aid allocation from India to Pakistan if they can provide the restraint.... And we're not the only country to make that kind of effort.

In fact, I think if we can somehow.... It may be a long shot. If Pakistan decides not to follow in the tracks of India, that, in a sense, I think, would be a very significant event in reversing the damage provided by India. It shows that it doesn't become simply open sesame, or become simply a trend line. It's a discrete event. To me, it's very crucial that we undertake that now.

• 1635

The Chairman: Minister, on that line, one of the things we're going to have to come to grips with in the committee report will be this distinction between those states that have nuclear capacity but haven't recently tested and those that don't. This is a very hard line to draw in terms of their power.

We had Mr. Faisal Husseini before this committee recently, and Ms. Beaumier asked him a question specifically about possession of the bomb by the Israelis, and whether that factors into Middle East politics. He said, yes, of course it does. It's an enormous factor—

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: Huge.

The Chairman: —in terms of restraining our capacity to act. I believe that was correct, was it not?

How does the government see this distinction between the five, as we've been told, and now we have India, and these other rather more grey areas? I can see you saying you don't want them to move up into the next category, but if in fact they have the military and political leverage that goes with the threat of moving up, what is the real distinction?

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: I think part of it is the so-called threshold states, those who have a capacity but haven't actually taken that capacity into a capability. That's where you begin to draw the line.

Certainly if there was to be seepage of the argumentation that India's used, that somehow you acquire greater security or greater status into the Middle East, then you're into a real pot-boil. The issues we've been discussing here on the subcontinent are tough enough and dangerous enough.

The way we're doing it—and I'm not saying we have the magic wand—is to do everything we can to try to get signatures onto the Non-Proliferation Treaty. That is why I said in my remarks—and I hope the committee understood how much significance we've put on it—that this is the base structure, really the best line of defence we have against the proliferation that is now a clear threat. Using whatever resources we have, diplomatically and otherwise, it's going to be very crucial that we pursue it.

I would hope that in your own studies and your own report—and I don't know where you're at on it—you note that our personal security as Canadians is dependent upon getting the non-proliferation regime as the legitimate base and to get other countries signed in.

It may well be—I don't know; I'm speculating for a moment—that perhaps the hard reality that's been faced by the Indian testing means there may be a more cold and clear idea of just what nuclear weapons are. They are not weapons that are in the same category as any other weapon, because of the destructive power they have. It might bring a new round of serious thinking and discussion and negotiation about the nuclear problem on all sides. The nuclear weapons states who possess the weapons, those that are on the threshold and those of us who have made past decisions not to get involved in this—it may reinvigorate the whole procedure, if there is any salutary effect of this whole event, to remind people that nuclear weapons have not gone away and that we'd better deal with them.

I think there was a certain complacency building in after the breakdown of the Soviet Union. We had the START I, and everybody kind of said, gee, that problem's looked after, so let's go on to other ones. I never believed it went away, and I don't think a lot of other people did, either. Now we know it hasn't gone away. In fact, the same threat is there.

The Chairman: Thank you very much.

How are you doing for time?

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: I have to be at a cabinet presentation at about 4.45 p.m.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Ms. Debien.

Ms. Maud Debien (Laval-East, BQ): Good afternoon, sir, and welcome to our committee.

At the very start of your remarks, you said that Pakistan's nuclear test had taken us back 40 years. I'll tell you more precisely that it in fact takes us back 42 years to 1956, when Canada gave India a reactor for research and plutonium production and subsequently two more reactors, RAPP-1 and RAPP-2. Canada was also kind enough to provide the instructions for India to manufacture others, which India hastened to do by making six more.

• 1640

Sir, I will first make a comment, then ask my question.

So we even provided the instructions for India to produce clones.

You also told us that we should be very thankful that our predecessors did not use nuclear weapons when we had them. Should we also be thankful to them for selling nuclear weapons, particularly to totalitarian regimes and fragile democracies?

And speaking of fragile democracies, this week we met Romanian representatives in the committee. My question is similar to Mr. Bachand's on Romania. The President of Romania told us that they were entering phase two of the purchase of a CANDU reactor, that they needed $ 750 million, but that they were being held up by lenders requiring 100 percent guarantees and very high interest rates.

Consequently, as regards Romania, I would like to know what policy—because you did not specifically state it earlier—Canada intends to follow with respect to that country's search for funds. You told us that Romania intended to use the CANDU for peaceful energy purposes, for the purposes of economic integration with its neighbours, and that it intended to comply with all standards and to sign all nuclear non-proliferation treaties. However, as you know, Iraq signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and we know what happened then. That's my question. It mainly concerns Romania.

[English]

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: First of all, the old saying in politics is that hindsight is always the beginning of wisdom, but in this case, to make a direct connection between the Canadian transfer of nuclear technology in 1956 to the explosion of a test is a long stretch over 25 years. That's a long period of time. It is our understanding that the Indians went through a substantial re-engineering of their reactors and all the other techniques that go with it to get to the point where they could actually have fissionable material. So I think we should be careful before we go too far in rewriting history on that matter.

What I would say, and I think it's very accurate, is that when it was discovered by Canadian authorities at the time that there might be some attempt—and by the way, India was a democracy at that time, not a dictatorship—to use nuclear reactors for the production of materials that could be used in weapons, we immediately withdrew all support, all technical engineering. We simply made our opprobrium known very clearly to them and went on to begin establishing a regime—and this is in the early nuclear years—of an international control system that would ensure that any peaceful uses of nuclear energy were not transferred for weapons purposes.

As I said several times, I think Canada took the lead very much in trying to put that regime into place. I think we've been quite successful through the IAEA.

I mean, I know part of the point is to make some points, but I think we shouldn't rewrite history totally to make them.

As far as Romania is concerned, it's a democracy. It's a country that has gone through, I think, quite a substantial transition to a much more open society. It has the same energy needs as many other countries do, including us. We use nuclear reactors.

I don't think we should necessarily be subjecting them to a degree of suspicion, especially because they've signed all the agreements.

I hope, Madam Debien, you understand that we don't sell reactors without getting agreements for them to adhere to both the international regime and bilateral agreements, which gives us full access and transparency. So it's very well—

[Translation]

Ms. Maud Debien: People don't comply with them. Consider the example of Iraq, which signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

• 1645

[English]

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: I don't recall us selling reactors to Iraq. I'm sorry. I think it's getting a little absurd to stretch those points.

The fact is that even right now, as we speak, I gather, talking to the Romanians, they're negotiating with the Italians for the sharing of energy in that whole south-central part of Europe. Nuclear reactors are very much part of the energy supply in Europe.

France itself, if you want to get into specifics, supplies almost 40% of its energy through nuclear reactors. We don't second guess them, and they made weapons out of it. Maybe we should examine what they're doing with their nuclear reactors. But the fact is, in south-central Europe it's very important, in the redevelopment of the countries, to make sure there is an adequate supply of energy, always subject to the utmost safeguards that can be applied.

As I said before, and this is just my own assessment, if they are able to put an energy resource into a broader power grid in that part of Europe, it helps in the integration and economic cooperation those countries desperately need, as they advance to become members of NATO and members of the European Union. I think we should be very careful not to establish a paranoia about that.

Mr. Bob Mills: But the CIA says that, in 1996, technology was transferred from China to Pakistan using U.S. and Canadian technology.

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: They were not using Canadian technology.

Mr. Bob Mills: Well, they said U.S. and Canadian.

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: I don't read too many CIA reports. I'm not on their subscription list. Maybe I'm on their list, but not on their subscription list.

The Chairman: Do we have time for a question from Mr. Paradis?

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: On what Ralph was saying, in order to clear up some of the confusion we're hearing, because the committee is seized by these issues, it is very important to arrange a briefing for the committee on the IAEA safeguards, how they're applied and how they work. I think then we might be able to clear up some of these matters.

The Chairman: Thank you. I was going to make that suggestion, because we've often heard that the CANDU is the least likely to be able to be converted into nuclear grounds. I think we have to fill in that hole in the report. I totally agree with you.

This afternoon we'll follow that down. That's very helpful.

Thank you.

Do you have time for a question from Mr. Paradis?

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: A quick one.

The Chairman: Denis.

[Translation]

Mr. Denis Paradis (Brome—Missisquoi, Lib.): Some committee members went to Washington in early April to meet with U.S. nuclear experts, and one of those experts raised the concept of no first use. Earlier, Mr. Turp said that we needed firmer measures. In any case, we're not going to bomb them to prevent them from using their nuclear arsenal.

On the other hand, we also consider that there is a non- proliferation treaty and a test ban treaty. If we added another concept, the concept of no first use, would that add something to a kind of world movement against nuclear weapons? The expert said that no first use would be another step in the right direction and I asked him, out of the blue, "Who on the world scene do you think could monitor that?" He answered, "Canada." I would like to hear your comments on that, sir.

[English]

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: I think it gets into a fairly long discussion about deterrence theory and where it's going.

The question may be most effectively examined as NATO goes through its own strategic review in the next year or two. I'll be at NATO meetings beginning this week where it will just be started, but that's where the matter will be clearly looked at, as to the application of the deterrence theory, which has been the mainstay of NATO since its inception. That is where the question will be seriously examined. But I don't have an obvious answer right away.

The Chairman: Thank you.

I understand that while you appear calm, Minister, some of your aides are looking a little nervous behind you about getting you to that meeting.

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: They're always nervous. Wherever I go in public, they're always nervous.

The Chairman: They looked really nervous when you started telling about those CIA briefings you were getting. That was getting some real reaction.

However, I hope Mr. Heinbecker can stay for a few minutes, if there are more questions.

• 1650

Members, do you have more questions? Yes, there are more questions. Can you stay a few minutes? Mr. Heinbecker has to go, but Mr. Lysyshyn and Mr. Walker are going to stay.

You'll recall that these gentlemen have specific expertise, so we'll try to keep our questions to them in their area of expertise and not get back into Romania and other non-geographically specific issues.

Mr. Turp.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: What I find interesting in the U.S. position is that, on the question of nuclear testing and even nuclear non- proliferation, some Americans have claimed that India was violating international law and that, even if India were not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, it was nevertheless violating international law. My colleagues Graham and McWhinney may be interested in this question. I would like to know what you think of this argument that tests should be banned under current international common law. Is Canada's position that India's tests violated to international law?

[English]

Mr. Ralph Lysyshyn (Director General, International Security Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): We have never stated that the Indian action is a violation of international law. We have focused instead on the international norm and international consensus as represented by 186 signatories of the NPT.

I am not an international lawyer. I believe however that some international lawyers would try to suggest that the effect of 186 signatures is in fact to create an international law. India has always been very vocal, even before it tested, in saying “That's not a law we've signed; we don't accept it”. So we have never focused on that. In many ways the strict legality of what India has done is less important than the clear violation of the international norm, and we have focused on that.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: At least the government's position seems to me to be quite clear. Is there a legislative obligation, as in the United States, to terminate Canadian aid, or were the sanctions adopted the result of a purely political decision?

[English]

Mr. Ralph Lysyshyn: This is a political decision. We do not have legislation that enforces sanctions.

The Chairman: Mr. Mills.

Mr. Bob Mills: Mr. Walker, when I see the people in India out on the streets cheering their government for having done this test, there appears to be a lot of emotion, a lot of excitement, a lot of support. How much of that is media hype and how much of that is the real people of India? What kind of opposition, if there is any opposition within India—I know the coalition government.... I think there are 19 parties. If I had 19 parties that I was trying to get to work, a bit of nationalism would go a long way to keep them all together. Is that what it's all about on the ground? Who is the opposition? Is it emotion? I think you know what I'm trying to get at.

Mr. Peter Walker: You've asked a big question.

Certainly the tests were a very popular measure with a great many Indians. I don't think it was just media hype. I think some of the polls that were taken very shortly after the tests, not in rural India but in the major Indian cities, indicated that this was very popular. The poll results were in the vicinity of 90% in favour. It has struck a responsive chord among many Indians, which could be described as nationalism. That euphoria, if you wish, is subsiding a bit. There seem now to be a few questions being asked about the implications of the test, the timing of the test, and the question that the minister raised as to whether the security situation facing India has indeed changed significantly in the last little while. But it remains a very popular step on the part of the government, and I think it is seen by the government as having strengthened the coalition government.

• 1655

Mr. Daniel Turp: But why is it so popular? What's the driving force?

Mr. Peter Walker: Indians feel, living as they do next to the Chinese and the Pakistanis, that nuclear weapons are an essential element of their national security policy, and that argument has found a responsive chord with many Indians.

Mr. Bob Mills: Does it not follow then that the Pakistanis would respond in exactly the same way? I would be demanding that the government conduct these tests.

Mr. Peter Walker: As the minister said, I think there's a fair amount of pressure on the Pakistani government to do that. The question is, will they? We sincerely hope they won't. That would be a further step in the wrong direction as far as we're concerned.

Mr. Bob Mills: What is the feeling of the Chinese in this regard, in your opinion?

Mr. Peter Walker: I'm not the right person to ask about the Chinese. I look after a billion people; that's enough, thank you. You'd have to ask my colleague who looks after China what their views are on it.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Would the Pakistani support be as high if they did a test? Would it be 90% in Pakistan?

Mr. Peter Walker: I don't know whether it would be.... Certainly there seems to be some enthusiasm for this in Pakistan among some Pakistanis, but I would hesitate to guess as to the level of support.

The Chairman: Members, actually this might be an appropriate time to say that we've been advised that there is a delegation from Pakistan that will be in Ottawa at the beginning of June. They've asked if they can come before the committee. I'm kind of assuming, given this discussion, that we would accede rather quickly. You can ask them the questions directly, Mr. Mills, and find out whether they'll be dancing in the streets or in mourning.

Are there any other questions?

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: I would just like one point clarified. The Minister said in his remarks, and I quote:

[English]

We must put more pressure on nuclear non-weapons states.

[Translation]

It's very important for our committee's work, its work on the report. What does that mean? I'm asking you to interpret your minister's remarks.

[English]

Mr. Ralph Lysyshyn: My understanding was he said we need to put pressure on the nuclear weapons states to pursue their agenda. One point he referred to, for example, was the recent blockage of the START II ratification by the Russian Douma. I think we need to apply whatever kind of diplomatic pressure we can on the Russian government to return to the Douma and ask them to reconsider this issue and proceed with ratification. Their START process is an extremely important one as far as nuclear disarmament goes.

We need to find what other kinds of pressures we can apply to get this process moving again.

Canada has taken a position in the Conference on Disarmament that there is room in that conference for discussion of—not necessarily negotiation of—nuclear disarmament in order to try to find ways of moving the agenda ahead.

• 1700

So these are the kinds of things we can do to ensure that there is progress to apply some pressure. Some nations would rather we didn't raise it, for example, in Geneva. We continue to raise it as an issue that should be discussed. I think that's the kind of thing the minister had in mind.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: Was he also thinking of the United States?

[English]

Mr. Ralph Lysyshyn: I think the point the minister made in saying that we believe the START process should continue applies not just to Russia—they're the ones blocking it right now—but also to the United States, which is part of that process, and we would like to see it go forward. There have been voices in the United States that have said maybe it's not good to move to START III after START II. I think we would indeed like to see that process move ahead.

The Chairman: Everyone is drawing my attention to the fact that it's 5 p.m., so I'm going to draw things to a close. Thank you, Mr. Lysyshyn and Mr. Walker, for staying on. We appreciate that.

I have a couple of announcements before everybody leaves. There is a substantial reorganization of the agenda going on. We've got Pakistan coming. There's an Algerian delegation coming. We'll accommodate that. We'll get you that information as soon as we possibly can. Things are being moved around a bit, but we want to try to accommodate all the obligations we've lined up before we leave in June. That's the first thing.

The second thing is Pakistan and the committee.

Tomorrow Mr. Delors will be coming before the committee at 3:15 p.m.

The meeting is adjourned.