FAIT Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

COMITÉ PERMANENT DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES ET DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Tuesday, February 24, 1998

• 0911

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Bob Mills (Red Deer, Ref.)): I'd like to call the meeting to order, please. We're waiting on our chairman, so we will start without him and surprise him.

This is a continuation of our hearings on the policy on nuclear non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament. We're going to follow the printed order that most of you have, so I'll ask Simon Rosenblum to begin, please.

Mr. Simon Rosenblum (Director, World Federalists of Canada): Thank you very much.

First of all, on behalf of the World Federalists of Canada, I would like to thank this committee for the invitation to discuss nuclear weapons policy with you. We are also most appreciative of the work of Foreign Affairs Minister Axworthy, particularly his definition of the issues that he hoped this committee might explore.

Personally, it has been many years since I last appeared before the parliamentary foreign affairs committee— or external affairs, as it was then called —and I must reluctantly put forward a caveat at this time. Nuclear weapons research and writing do not occupy my time anywhere near what they used to in the 1980s, as I am presently preoccupied with Israeli-Palestinian affairs. Consequently, I am not an expert on the technical details of nuclear weapons developments, although I hope my more general policy analysis will be of some assistance to you in your deliberations.

Let me begin by quoting Bruce Blair, a prominent American nuclear weapons expert presently at the Brookings Institution:

No major change in the US-Russian nuclear equation has occurred— not in war planning, not in daily alert practices, not in strategic arms control and maybe not even in core attitudes.

Unfortunately, even in a favourable post-cold war environment, rather than being progressively put on the back burner, nuclear weapons still remain highly integrated into conventional military strategies. To a significant degree, they even remain on a hair trigger.

In the most general terms, we would very much like Canada to call upon the nuclear weapons states to both quickly and dramatically reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons in their arsenals and to adopt measures that would render those remaining to a non-usable status, in addition to strenuously working towards an achievable and workable verification regime of nuclear weapons abolition. In respect to the latter, the verification required to guard against nuclear breakout— a nuclear breakout with very dangerous consequences, I might add —demands a degree of intrusiveness and a relinquishment of state sovereignty still unattainable in the present international climate. You will forgive me for saying that a little bit of world federalism might be helpful in this regard.

The Canberra Commission acknowledges that:

—even allowing for future developments, it seems unlikely that technical verification alone can provide the level of assurance needed for the elimination of nuclear weapons.

Consequently, here I draw from “The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy”, a 1997 report by the Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the National Academy of Sciences in the United States. It reads as follows:

Complete nuclear disarmament will require continual evolution of the international system toward collective action, transparency, and the rule of law; a comprehensive system of verification, which itself will require an unprecedented degree of cooperation and transparency; and safeguards to protect against the possibility of cheating or rapid breakout.

• 0915

All of this presents quite a challenge, but no matter how difficult it will be to create the conditions that will finally allow us to achieve nuclear abolition, we must work diligently in quickly addressing practical steps toward this goal.

I'm sure that others have spoken to you of the urgency of taking nuclear forces off alert status and of standing down nuclear weapons systems— in other words, the separation of warheads from delivery vehicles. These and other qualitative measures must accompany the speedy reductions in nuclear forces.

I will now focus directly on the issue of the no first use of nuclear weapons, as it is the cornerstone of our presentation to you this morning.

The scientist Joseph Rotblat was an important member of the Manhattan Project and later was a recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize for his work as co-founder of the Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs. He currently argues that:

—the most important step at the present time— and this can be taken virtually overnight —is for the nuclear powers to declare that the only purpose of possessing nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear attack.

What could be more obvious? Yet both NATO and Russia reserve the right to use nuclear weapons first. NATO for a very long time has had a first-use policy as part of its flexible response strategy, even though the nearly unanimous conclusion of those who have studied the issue is that a nuclear war cannot be limited and controlled without a likely global escalation. The argument, for what it was worth, was that the threat of going nuclear was needed to offset the conventional weapons superiority of the Warsaw Pact. The conventional weapons picture in Europe has of course completely changed, but the NATO policy remains largely in place.

On December 17, 1996, the NATO defence planning committee, a nuclear planning group, issued a communiqué in which the alliance defence ministers declared that the alliance had no need “to change any aspect of NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear policy— and we do not foresee any future need to do so”. Hopefully, the current NATO review of its policy will be more enlightened. Similarly, there is reason to believe that Russia would not be adverse to a nuclear no-first-use agreement with NATO. There is always the danger of applying yesterday's strategic logic to tomorrow's problems. This is particularly problematic when the strategic logic of the past was deeply flawed. Neither deterrence of conventional attacks, chemical or biological use, requires either a nuclear threat in advance nor a nuclear response. “As matters now stand”, senior arms control experts McGeorge Bundy, William Crowe and Sidney Drell have written, “every vital interest of the United States, with the exception of deterring nuclear attack, can be met by prudent conventional readiness.”

The response to or deterrent against chemical or biological attack must of course be vigorous. Western leaders can credibly promise both a devastating conventional response and the determination to seek the unconditional surrender of the offending nation. Paul Nitze, who was a prominent nuclear weapons adviser to President Reagan, agrees, and I quote:

I believe nuclear weapons cannot be relied on to deter chemical or biological attacks or to deter conventional strikes. In both cases— the prospect that a nuclear weapon would be used in response to such an attack is too incredible for deterrence to be reliable.

All of the above leads to an obvious recommendation: that NATO and Russia eliminate their nuclear first-use military doctrines. Such a no-first-use deal would have obvious technical and legal consequences. Canada might want to go further and lead a global effort to enshrine in an international treaty the principle of no first use of nuclear weapons and to establish tough sanctions for such use up to and including removing from power any national leaders who initiate such use. Indeed, the global pledge to renounce nuclear first use and to respond dramatically to such use is a necessary precondition for any form of complete nuclear disarmament.

Please let me conclude by reading into the record a call for a “no first use of nuclear weapons” regime by leading Canadian international affairs and defence experts. This document was written and coordinated by both Peggy Mason, who was a former Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament, and myself, with the work of this committee in mind.

It reads as follows, accompanied by the names of those who have signed the statement.

The end of the cold war has dramatically altered the international security environment. Yet the United States, Russia, and other nuclear weapons states have only made a small start on dismantling their nuclear weapons arsenals and have made even less progress in reducing their reliance on nuclear weapons.

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We, the undersigned, while divided on the practicality of the call for early abolition of nuclear weapons, are united in our belief that in the post-cold war world, nuclear weapons states must radically reduce both the size of their respective nuclear arsenals and their reliance on them. We want to emphasize that in the words of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, “the only conceivable residual role of nuclear weapons is to pose a threat of retaliation against nuclear aggression”.

Attention must also be paid to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, which in 1996 ruled that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is “generally contrary to the rules of international law— and in particular the principle and rules of humanitarian law”.

NATO traditionally reserved for itself the right to introduce nuclear weapons into a conflict in order to offset the perceived conventional weapons superiority of the then Warsaw Pact. Many western experts believe that policy lacked credibility and that it was predicated on the supposed practicality and morality of a limited nuclear war and consequently was either a gigantic bluff or a dangerous suicide pact.

In any case, the conventional weapons picture in Europe has changed completely. NATO's modified nuclear doctrine, while less dependent on the early first use of nuclear weapons, still retains the first-use option as a key component.

Paragraph 55 of the Alliance Strategic Concept announced at the Rome Summit of November 7 and 8, 1991, states in part that nuclear forces:

—will continue to fulfil an essential role by ensuring uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the Allies' response to military aggression.

More recently, Russia too has updated its military doctrine, and now, due to its decline in conventional weapons strength, also claims the right to be the first to use nuclear weapons when it believes it must.

The alleged military missions for nuclear weapons continue to grow in response to new concerns about chemical and biological warfare. We do not want to understate these dangers but point to the fact that the vast majority of the international community, including the five declared nuclear weapons states, have by international treaty, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, assured the right to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against states adhering to the treaty. In addition, under the Chemical Weapons Convention, all five have abandoned the right to stockpile, produce or use those weapons in any circumstances whatsoever. The only situation not covered by these international treaties would be the use or threat of use of biological weapons by a state not party to the NPT.

In our view, rather than trying to justify the early use of nuclear weapons to deal with such a possibility, nuclear weapons states, who are also the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, should be leading in international efforts to find adequate conventional responses to these new threats to international peace and security, including the development of more effective collective security mechanisms approved and supported by the international community in general.

So long as the emphasis is not on such broadly supported mechanisms but on the alleged right of a few to resort to the early use of nuclear weapons in response to aggression, there is unlikely to be meaningful progress made in convincing the threshold states to abandon the nuclear weapons option, nor in solidifying support for an effective nuclear non-proliferation regime.

The current hearings of the parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade on Canada's current nuclear non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament policies, and the announcement at the Madrid Summit in July 1997 that NATO will review its nuclear policy once again, provide an unprecedented opportunity for Canadians to call upon both NATO and Russia to negotiate a no-first-use regime and to restructure their military forces accordingly. We hope the Government of Canada will join us in this call.

The heads of state and government at the first NATO post-cold war summit in London on July 5 and 6, 1990, declared that nuclear weapons must truly be “weapons of last resort”.

The latest review of NATO nuclear doctrine now under way offers a historic opportunity to implement that high level political commitment. The time for an end to the threat of nuclear first use is now.

This document was signed by the following: Maurice Archdeacon, who is chairman of the board of the Canadian Council for International Peace and Security; the Honourable John Bosley, who is a former chair of this committee; the Honourable Ed Broadbent, former president of the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development; the Honourable Barney Danson, a former Minister of National Defence; Dr. David Dewitt, a political scientist at York University; retired Admiral Robert Falls; the Honourable Flora MacDonald, a former Minister of External Affairs; Peggy Mason, who I've mentioned; Geoffrey Pearson, a former Canadian ambassador to the Soviet Union; Professor John Polanyi, a Nobel Prize winner; Ernie Regehr, policy director, Project Ploughshares; myself; Dr. Michael Shenstone, a former assistant deputy minister for international security at the Department of Foreign Affairs; and Fergus Watt, executive director, World Federalists of Canada.

• 0925

Again, I thank you very much for your attention.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Bob Mills): Good. Thank you very much. We'll just carry on and go through all of the presenters and then members will ask questions.

I'll call on Lieutenant-Colonel Coroy, please.

Lieutenant-Colonel Victor A. Coroy (Executive Director, Conference of Defence Associations): Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members. Good morning.

It's a pleasure for me and my colleague, Colonel Sean Henry, our senior defence analyst of the Conference of Defence Associations, to appear before you and deliver testimony on behalf of the chairman of the Conference of Defence Associations, Brigadier-General Jerry Silva. I should remind you as well that the CDA has been in existence for 66 years and represents over 500,000 Canadians who retain an active interest in defence policy issues and the Canadian Armed Forces. Please note that my remarks are only a summary of a paper delivered to you last week.

I also wish to underline the fact that the CDA regards nuclear weapons policy as a most important component of the structure of international security. Although I dislike relying on slogans in discussing such an important matter, I must remind you that nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented. For this reason, the CDA advises government to make haste slowly when moving ahead with processes such as nuclear non-proliferation, weapons reductions, and bids to eliminate nuclear warheads completely. To ignore caution and race ahead blindly to circumvent the alleged inefficiencies of old-style diplomacy would be a serious mistake. The consequences could be to unleash the very nuclear disasters so many activists fear.

On a positive note, it's important to consider that the nuclear powers and most other developed nations have undertaken a broad range of nuclear weapons control and elimination initiatives since the end of the cold war. These are being conducted bilaterally between the United States and Russia and at various international fora on the understanding that work would continue to eliminate all nuclear weapons at some future date.

In the meantime, nuclear deterrence remains as a necessary guarantee of international security. This follows from the fact that positive changes in the international environment are not demonstrably stable or permanent. Russia still has a formidable strategic nuclear capability plus large stocks of tactical nuclear weapons. Although negotiations are under way to reduce all of these, it's only prudent to retain a hedge against reversal of political reform in Russia, and one could say the same for China.

Moreover, there's a growing concern over the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to rogue states and terrorists. In this respect, it is now generally accepted that Saddam Hussein was deterred from applying his capability in this area by the fear of nuclear retaliation by the United States or Israel. Thus, although nuclear weapons do not of themselves maintain peace, they continue to place great premium on caution when one nuclear adversary deals with another and vital interests are at stake.

On the other hand, the role of nuclear weapons in NATO's defence posture has diminished greatly in recent years. In particular, U.S. spending on strategic nuclear forces has declined from 24% of the defence budget to less than 3% today.

The focus for strategic nuclear reductions for both the U.S. and Russia is the series of Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties, or START. The final goal, after START III, is to have reduced strategic weapons to 2000 to 2,500 on each side. In addition, the U.S. has unilaterally eliminated a number of nuclear weapons from its arsenals, including short range battlefield missiles, artillery rounds, air delivered systems, and nuclear depth bombs. Many remaining have been taken off alert status, and the non-strategic role of the U.S. Navy has been eliminated.

These nuclear reduction initiatives have been reflected most in NATO Europe, where since 1985 all U.S. short range missiles, nuclear artillery, and nuclear depth bombs have been removed. IRBMs are also removed. NATO has also agreed to further reduce its remaining stockpile of nuclear bombs for land-based dual capable aircraft by approximately 50%.

Both Britain and France have taken similar steps to reduce their stocks of tactical and air delivered weapons. Similarly, a number of processes have also eliminated strategic nuclear weapons based in non-Russian nations of the former Soviet Union.

• 0930

It's therefore clear that encouraging progress is being made to reduce the nuclear inventories of those nations that in the past have possessed the largest arsenals. At the same time, the whole process is moving forward in a measured, rational, and stable manner.

The range of non-proliferation fora and international agreements on nuclear arms reduction is extensive and ongoing. None of these measures is foolproof, as the example of Iraq demonstrates, but they also represent progress in the right direction. They also demonstrate warnings against trying to achieve perfect solutions. Consider in particular the sobering prospect of eliminating all nuclear arms and then discovering that Colonel Gaddafi managed to obtain and conceal one medium-sized warhead.

In July 1996 the International Court of Justice made a ruling on the legality of nuclear weapons. It was a divided opinion that presented something for everybody. It said that nuclear weapons would be generally contrary to international law, but there was no definite conclusion as to whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons was legal in an extreme case of self-defence in which, and I quote, “the survival of the state would be at stake”.

The court also concluded that a commitment exists to pursue and finalize negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament. This is exactly the aim of most individual nations today and the mandate of the various disarmament fora I've already noted. As well, the ICOJ decision also provided justification for the retention of nuclear weapons for the five major nuclear powers.

In August 1996 the Canberra Commission went a step further and proposed a series of practical, realistic, and mutually reinforcing steps that could be taken immediately. Once again, can one be sure that the Canberra process, the ICOJ decision, and deliberations such as those of this committee may not actually raise the level of insecurity by making it more possible for nations to employ chemical and bacteriological weapons and nuclear weapons retained by terrorists and rogue states?

In common with most of its NATO allies, Canada aims at making progress in the field of general nuclear disarmament, with the eventual aim of eliminating nuclear arms completely. For the medium term, Canada also endorses the NATO policy that nuclear weapons still play an essential role in the alliance and that NATO countries have no need to change that policy. This is not hypocritical; it's merely wise and pragmatic, reflecting the hedge I described earlier.

A number of people have urged Canada to lead the way in the crusade to abolish nuclear weapons, citing the example of the recent landmines treaty and so-called alternatives to conventional diplomacy.

CDA recommends strongly against actions of this sort. In the first place, Canada's influence in NATO and elsewhere is at a very low level, after some 30 years of armed forces reductions. More important, the landmines treaty is a poor example to use, because it does not include the nations that produce the greatest number of mines or non-state and terrorist groups not bound by it. Instead, more time and effort should have been spent on action for mine removal.

Overall, these flaws are probably acceptable when dealing with landmines, but could be catastrophic in the case of nuclear weapons, as I've noted in the case of Colonel Gaddafi.

Already the landmines treaty is causing serious divisions and instability within NATO. This is occurring because a rush to action overturned sober examination of all the possible outcomes. This illustrates the law of unintended consequences arising from hasty arms control deals. Once again, extrapolating this instability into nuclear affairs would be unacceptable.

A significant aspect of modern armed conflict is that it exists almost always between a state and a non-state organization or two non-state organizations. A major implication is that instruments such as the landmines treaty or a nuclear elimination treaty may ultimately be of little value, because non-state organizations are not bound by them.

• 0935

The real problem is that war and conflict now have little relevance in contemporary international law. It is no longer a question of restoring order through suasion among a community of states. Rather, it is a matter of imposing constraints on non-state organizations engaged in unconventional conflict. In this respect, one of the pillars of Canadian foreign policy, the sanctity of international law, is under serious siege.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly for Canadian national interests, nuclear deterrence remains the cornerstone of United States national security strategy. Canada, of all U.S. allies, must be particularly alert not to take unilateral steps or make policies that would weaken or compromise that strategy. The reasons behind this emerge from geography and an integrated North American defence system. The consequences for Canada of renouncing NORAD would be either to spend vastly more on an independent aerospace defence or to abdicate responsibility for its own aerospace security to the United States. Surely this is not a serious option for a sovereign state.

On the practical level, but crucially for Canada, one should worry about linkages, such as softwood lumber, subsidized dairy products, salmon treaties, and other irritants that emerge from our 80% of foreign trade with the United States. Foreign trade is Canada's lifeblood. Is it worthwhile jeopardizing it in pursuit of a flawed objective?

In summary, in view of instabilities in the international security regime, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and emergence of rogue states, non-states, and terrorist entities, it is necessary to continue with a system of nuclear deterrence in the medium term. At the same time, established nuclear disarmament negotiations should proceed. CDA recommends, therefore, that Canada continue to follow its current policy of working towards greater achievements in nuclear arms control while avoiding measures that could destabilize and lower the effectiveness of NATO and NORAD, the true cornerstones of our security policy.

I thank you for your attention.

The Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham (Toronto Centre—Rosedale, Lib.)): Thank you very much, sir.

I apologize to the previous witnesses for the fact that I had to come in late. Sometimes in this place we get trapped in meetings that don't end when they are supposed to.

We're now turning to Science for Peace and Mr. Gardner.

Mr. L. Terrell Gardner (President, Science for Peace): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I don't read as fast as my colleagues. I'm going to start with our list of recommendations. Then I'll back up and start reading some of the arguments. When I run out of time I'll stop.

Science for Peace recommends, first, that Canada respect the International Court of Justice's advisory opinion as a definitive element of the body of international law and make public declarations interpreting this respect.

Second, we recommend that Canada begin to press nuclear weapons states (a) to take strategic nuclear weapons off alert and to commit themselves to a policy of no first use, and b) to make these steps verifiable and therefore credible by removing warheads from delivery vehicles to remote secure storage.

Third, we recommend that Canada take initiatives, both formal and informal, that lead to a time-bound nuclear weapons convention.

Fourth, we recommend that the Canadian government (a) reject the concept of nuclear deterrence as useful for achieving national or international security, and (b) replace common nuclear peril deterrence with common security as central.

Fifth, we recommend that the Canadian government (a) work within NATO for rejection of NATO's nuclear dependency and nuclear war-fighting strategy, and (b) simultaneously and openly conduct a review of NATO's contribution since 1991 to the stability and security of its region and beyond, and of the prospect of any permanent regional military alliance's compatibility with global common security. This review, conducted over a period of say five years would, together with monitoring progress of the effort in (a), result in a decision by Canada as to whether to remain in NATO or to give notice of denunciation under article XIII of the North Atlantic Treaty.

• 0940

Sixth, we recommend that the Canadian government remove its reservation to the ratification and conform in full to the additional protocol 1 to the Geneva Convention.

Seventh, we recommend that Canada offer moral support, argumentation, and other aid ad hoc to nation states, or groups of such, endeavouring to establish nuclear weapons free zones.

Eighth, we recommend that Canada encourage, through every avenue in Canada and abroad, the growth of a culture of non-violent conflict resolution.

Ninth, we recommend that Canada terminate its low-level flight training activity in Labrador and Quebec.

Tenth, we recommend that Canada do its utmost through diplomatic and other channels to mitigate tension between Russia and the NATO powers.

I will enter the argumentation in section B within item 1 of that section.

As the Canadian government affirmed in its 1995 publication, “Canada in the World”:

The international system must be ruled by law, not power. The rule of law is the essence of civilized behaviour both within and among nations.

The Canadian response was to remain tacit to the International Court of Justice's invitations to submit briefs or to make oral presentations in connection with the court's decision to decide the General Assembly's question: is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under international law? Canada seems to have made no public response to the court's advisory opinion, except perhaps to welcome the unanimous decision, dispositif 2.F that:

There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

The rest of the opinion seems to be set aside by Canada as requiring no action on the grounds that it is after all an advisory opinion. This is rather like the responses of our NATO partners, the U.S. and the U.K., to the same decision cited earlier, but not read here.

Yet, these nations went to great lengths to argue before the International Court of Justice that it should decline to respond to the request for an advisory opinion.

If an advisory opinion required no action, why all the fuss? Perhaps our friends know well what International Court of Justice Judge Shahabuddeen knows:

Although an advisory opinion has no binding force under Article 59 of the Statute, it is as authoritative a statement of the law as a judgment rendered in contentious proceedings.

If our friends also feared the ICJ opinion might confirm— as it did— that the Nuremberg principles apply to nuclear weapons, they would want to fend it off.

Now they and we are in a state of denial, but illegally so, unless ever so quietly they and we rewrite our manuals of arms to include advice to individuals of all ranks that if they follow orders to launch nuclear weapons, they risk prosecution. As Commander Robert Green, who is retired from the Royal Navy, puts it:

Military professionals need to be seen to be acting within the law if they are to be distinguished from hired killers or terrorists.

Commander Green also points out, inter alia, that NATO's nuclear umbrella doctrine is likely to be vulnerable to legal challenge. It seems that the same arguments that support this view would label as illegal any use of nuclear weapons by, for instance, the U.S. in response to an attack on Canada, say. Canada, therefore, would presumably be complicit, since the response would have been called for by a treaty to which Canada is a party.

• 0945

Item C, political integrity. Canada cannot have it both ways. If Canada's important and constructive representations of its great respect for the rule of law as a key element of common security are to be credible, we must break our silence regarding the International Court of Justice's advisory opinion.

If the legal opinions of Judge Shahabuddeen and, for instance, John Burroughs of the Western States Legal Foundation are to be set aside, and with them the reflections of Commander Green referred to above— all views to the effect that the advisory opinion does competently advise states to take a variety of actions beyond that called for in 2.F in order that they be in conformity with international law —then Canadians, and persons generally, since the security of all is affected, are entitled to see the legal arguments justifying this rejection. Otherwise Canada has a severe domestic and global credibility problem.

If Canada's decision goes the other way, then much else follows. Science for Peace favours this position, because, although not legal experts ourselves, we see the arguments referred to as sound. Also, we have, in diverse ways, developed confidence in the competence and integrity of some of the individuals offering these arguments. We have a strong bias in favour of the better Canada and the better world we see as consequent to this strengthening of the law.

For convenience, let us give short neutral labels to the decisions described above. The earlier will be called “bad” and that hypothesised later “good”. Much of what follows will either push harder for a “good” decision or assume that a “good” decision has been made.

The essential point here is that integrity requires that a decision be made and that it be declared, and democratic tradition requires openness in documenting either decision.

If the decision be “good”, political integrity makes further demands. Canada will without doubt persist in its affection for a rule of law and continue to proclaim it, this in either case. But with a “good” decision, we have newly recognized obligations under the law. Canada must lodge with her partners in all relevant treaties, whether bilateral or multilateral, an indication of intent to conform to the law as represented in the advisory opinion, and then set about the arduous negotiations.

Given a good decision, Canadians could experience a new freedom in the General Assembly of the United Nations, in the disarmament conference, and in, for instance, the negotiations leading to an international criminal court.

Recall, Mr. Chairman, the abominable proposal made in the course of those negotiations last fall, that while the use of biological or chemical weapons should be labelled criminal, that of nuclear weapons should not. This, in designing a putative instrument of justice! Canada's contributions to these negotiations and to the arguments, lobbying and voting, could all be simplified and could all make us proud.

Science for Peace does not suppose that even in the case of a “bad” decision Canada would abandon its policy objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons. It would, however, lose a splendid opportunity to advance the cause.

Further attention to Canada's political integrity and credibility— even its presentability —is demanded by a NATO-related transgression of human rights: the low-level flight training program conducted in the Labrador-Quebec corridor for our NATO partners, in spite of continued efforts of the Innu nations to recover the peaceful occupancy of their territory. Even a finding in an Ontario courtroom in favour of the Innu seems not to have budged the intransigent trespasser. Is this the promised protection of human rights? Is this respect for the rule of law?

I'll rest there, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

The Chairman: Absolutely perfect. May I congratulate you on your “night vision”?

Voices: Oh, oh.

Mr. Terrell Gardner: Thank you.

The Chairman: I don't whether you have magic glasses down there, but I'm not sure I could have done that. Well done!

Since you made a reference to the Ontario court decision, could you— not right now, but later —give us a reference to that decision? I was not aware of that decision. I'd be very interested in seeing it.

• 0950

Mr. Terrell Gardner: I can send you a copy of the decision. I was unable to locate it in my chaos of files.

The Chairman: It's the Ontario court decision about the NATO practice flights in Labrador. I wasn't aware a decision had been made.

A voice: It's probably about two years old.

Mr. Ted McWhinney (Vancouver Quadra, Lib.): It probably relates to Keiller Mackay's much earlier decision.

The Chairman: Keiller McKay was dead before those flights started, I think.

Mr. Ted McWhinney: His views ring through the corridors of history. He was a very interesting person.

The Chairman: Thank you. If you could get us that, we'd be interested in seeing it.

Mr. Ted McWhinney: Yes, I'd be delighted to see it.

The Chairman: We appreciate it. Thank you, sir.

Ms. Newcombe, please go ahead.

Ms. Hanna Newcombe (Director, Peace Research Institute—Dundas): I'm very happy to be here representing the Peace Research Institute—Dundas, which is near Hamilton, Ontario. I have been in peace research for 35 years, not specializing in nuclear weapons but reading a lot about them.

This paper addresses six topics.

On the World Court advisory opinion and NATO, how should Canada resolve the contradiction? I will argue there is a contradiction.

The second topic is nuclear risks in the late 1990s and the need for early agreement on nuclear abolition.

Third is NATO's eastward extension and possible alternatives or supplements to that.

The fourth point is the Gulf crisis. This has changed radically in the last two days and I may say something different from what is written.

The fifth point is Canada's specialty in peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

The last point is that globalization should be political and spiritual, not only economic.

On the first point about the World Court advisory opinion and NATO, this places Canada in a dilemma between abiding by the court's advisory opinion and complying with our obligations to NATO. The advisory opinion of the ICJ declares use or threat of nuclear weapons illegal under almost all circumstances and reserves judgment even on the rare exception of extreme danger to the survival of the state where it couldn't decide whether it would be legal or illegal. It was a very narrow vote, too.

NATO, on the other hand, has a policy of first use of nuclear weapons if attacked by chemical or biological weapons or even an unlikely massive conventional attack. This NATO policy certainly constitutes a threat of using nuclear weapons.

To resolve this dilemma, Canada must press vigorously within NATO to change its first-use policy, giving notice that by a certain stated date it will have to quit NATO unless this policy is changed. There is very little practical justification for NATO's first-use policy.

While Russia has revoked the previous no-first-use declaration the Soviet Union made some years ago, we could expect that Russia's previous policy of no first use would be restored in reciprocation of a NATO decision of no first use. Then we could make a no-first-use agreement that would pin it down.

• 0955

Now the second point on nuclear risks. The risk of nuclear war is actually rising at this time, although the cold war is supposedly over. About 30,000 strategic missiles still exist.

If you're following the written paper, there's a mistake. It's 30,000, not 10,000.

They still exist in the U.S. and Russia; about half the peak number in 1986. There have been some reductions, to half, but there is still an overkill capacity.

They have been detargeted, but this is not of much consequence, because they can be retargeted automatically in minutes. Even if this is not done, the missiles would be aimed at the previous target.

The dangerous point is that the missiles are still programmed for launch on warning; that is, to be launched even before enemy missiles arrive. This is extremely prone to accidental launch, which is the main danger today. Recently an accident almost happened when a Norwegian weather rocket was mistaken by the Russian military for a hostile missile. Norway had properly announced the launch beforehand, but somehow the message did not get through to the Russian military. This shows the importance of human error.

As well, Russian military doctrine is changing. Because their army is becoming disorganized for economic reasons— men have not been paid regularly —the new publicly announced Russian military doctrine places greater reliance on nuclear weapons. As well, the Russian Duma is dominated by hard-line communist and nationalist deputies and the next president of Russia may be a hardliner. We know Yeltsin's health is frail. Such considerations make even a deliberate launch of nuclear weapons more likely than it used to be.

What should be done to avert disaster? The call for a total abolition of nuclear weapons is being organized by the international coalition, Abolition 2000. That means not that all nuclear weapons will be abolished by the year 2000, which is very close, but that a treaty, a nuclear weapons convention, would be in place by that time. This would parallel the chemical weapons convention and the biological weapons convention, which already exist. The chemical weapons convention has considerable verification measures accompanying it. The biological weapons convention unfortunately does not, but attempts are being made to get verification for it. So actual biological and chemical attack, if the ban on these weapons is properly implemented, should be less than many people think.

The Canberra Commission of prominent persons, chaired by Australian foreign affairs minister Richard Butler, has suggested some immediate steps in this direction of nuclear abolition. I will mention only two: ending the launch-on-warning situation, which means de-alerting, perhaps by disconnecting the warheads from the missiles; and secondly, no-first-use declarations by all nuclear weapons states, not just the two main ones, and the start of immediate serious negotiations, with a timetable for the total abolition of nuclear weapons. There have been declarations by a group of generals, by a group of civilian leaders, by a group of Nobel Prize winners, and so on, in favour of such serious negotiations.

• 1000

The third point is NATO extension. NATO is inviting three central European countries— the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland —to join the organization, and the intention is to invite some others later. This is perceived as a threat by Russia, and there is therefore a danger of a renewed cold war. We could be back into a cold war situation.

Four suggestions have been made to avert this danger. One is to form a nuclear weapons free zone from the Baltic to the Black Sea as a buffer between NATO and Russia. This actually could be done either instead of NATO extension or combined with it. There may not be any nuclear weapons in the region anyway, but declaring it to be so would help.

The second alternative is to invite Russia into a wider NATO in such a way as to draw a circle to take them in rather than to keep them out.

A third alternative is a wider European Union instead of a wider NATO, thus letting economic interests supersede military interests— and I think the central Europeans very much want to be in the European Union.

A fourth alternative— and I would rather stress this one —suggests that instead of NATO, the OSCE, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, should be used for east-west relations. The OSCE already includes western and eastern Europe and all of Russia down to Vladivostok, as well as the U.S. and Canada. It's an organization that goes from Vancouver to Vladivostok, almost the entire moderate regions of the northern hemisphere, so this could provide both security and economic cooperation. As a member of the OSCE, Canada could take a leading role to advocate this and to strengthen the OSCE to perform this role. Sometimes it is argued that the OSCE is a weak organization, but it certainly could be given strength if the great powers so decide.

The Chairman: Ms. Newcombe, I want to thank you personally for that reference. I happen to be vice-president of the OSCE general assembly, and most of my colleagues here think I'm just going on a frolic when I go to their meetings. I therefore very much appreciate your strong endorsement of that organization, which I, too, happen to think is extremely important in terms of peacebuilding. I feel conflict resolution is best achieved by avoiding conflict, and I think a lot of people don't realize the work that it does.

So thank you very much. You're my favourite witness so far.

Ms. Hanna Newcombe: It's strange that the OSCE has been kind of downgraded when it was hoped after the end of the cold war that it would be the primary instrument for east-west relations. An upgrading is certainly called for.

Now, about the Persian Gulf crisis, things have changed for the better, but I'd still like to point out that this crisis is basically different from the one in 1991 in two respects. There has been no invasion of a neighbouring state, which certainly was a breach of international law in 1991. Secondly, the United Nations has not authorized military action. If military action occurred, it would be undertaken by a small group of states only.

It is doubtful that a military air strike would accomplish the aim of removing all weapons of mass destruction from Iraq. I'm especially worried that if they manage to blow up a depot of chemical weapons, this might spread them over a large territory, and with disastrous consequences. They need to think about that.

• 1005

I don't know the contents of the present agreement Kofi Annan was able to obtain, but our brief advocates, as an alternative, using positive inducements instead of military threats to obtain compliance from Saddam Hussein. It has been shown in peace research that positive inducements in all kinds of social situations are more effective than negative sanctions. So it might achieve the result.

In particular, we might promise Iraq a gradual reduction of the economic sanctions that have really wreaked havoc among the civilian population in Iraq if he complies with UN inspection without any exceptions.

Mr. Chairman, how much time do I have?

The Chairman: Actually, the clerk has drawn my attention to the fact that you're over your time now. Your fifth point is more general. In your sixth point, I take it, in terms of global governance, you're really stealing the thunder from the World Federalists, who chose not to discuss it.

Could you wrap up quite quickly on those two points? Then we'll move on.

Ms. Hanna Newcombe: Point five points out that Canada has been a peacekeeping, peacemaking, peacebuilding nation, and it should live up to that reputation.

The sixth and final point is that we have a lot of globalization around, but it's been mainly economic. That has actually hurt some people, as we well know. Political globalization, in the form of a strengthened United Nations, is very desirable.

Spiritual globalization would simply mean acknowledging that we are all members of the human race, and whatever divisions exist are largely irrelevant.

I'll stop with that.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Ms. Newcombe. I appreciate that.

Can we now go to Ms. Gertler.

Ms. Ann Gertler (Adviser, International Peace Bureau): I want to say, first of all, that I very much appreciate the opportunity to talk to you— talk with you, I should say.

I should tell you, I have asked questions about military matters since 1945, when, as a young staffer on the U.S. Senate military affairs committee's subcommittee on war mobilization, I escorted a delegation of young scientists around Washington. They came, with agonizing urgency, to explain to everyone, from the cabinet down, that the bomb was not just another weapon. You might extend that to say that war is not war any more, or at least not in the traditional sense we have known it.

Nuclear weapons were quantitatively and qualitatively different, immensely different. The overwhelming difference about nukes, the thing that is shared with landmines, is that their effects last and last and last, beyond the proverbial seventh generations, covering the whole world.

That's why Albert Einstein said, “Everything has changed but men's minds”. I think we still have that problem, just the way we still have a problem about first use, which extends back to the time, in my memory, when I was a member of the consultative committee to the Ambassador for Disarmament beginning in 1979.

By the way, the consultative committee was a very pivotal experience for me in one special way: There were 19 men and me.

The Chairman: We won't ask who the driving force of the committee was.

Ms. Ann Gertler: No, no. I was patronized and put upon and ignored and petted.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier (Brampton West—Mississauga, Lib.): Oh, say it isn't true. It doesn't happen.

Voices: Oh, oh.

Ms. Ann Gertler: That was in 1979.

The Chairman: Don't encourage Ms. Beaumier along these lines or we're going to have a lot of trouble in this committee.

Ms. Ann Gertler: It's all changed now, of course. It's good that there are two women testifying this morning. We always think it should be at least two women.

• 1010

By the way, I have not looked up the beginning of the OSCE, which was then called the CSCE, which took place in Stockholm, I believe, in 1984.

The Chairman: Seventy-five.

Ms. Ann Gertler: Seventy-five. Then I saw the next instalment of it. Incidentally, Mark Moher, our present Ambassador for Disarmament, when he was in Vienna, was in touch with the OSCE. It's full of promise. Well, NATO was full of promise, too. It has a whole bunch of causes that are non-military and we've never looked at them. Maybe your committee should, and I would be glad to supply you with a list in case you don't have it.

For the purposes of this meeting, I'm representing the International Peace Bureau. I have submitted to the clerk its particulars. Our president is Maj Britt Theorin, who is formerly the Swedish ambassador for disarmament. She was the only woman member, by the way, of the Canberra Commission.

There's a list of Nobel prize winners among the past presidents of the IPB. Its headquarters are in Geneva. I like to go there because I have a son there. Well, I have a son almost anywhere, having five of them.

But Geneva— I talked to Mark Moher about that. He calls me Ann in the modern, informal fashion, so I call him Mark. I asked if he remembered when the pear blossoms came out on the plain behind Geneva and we decided that the timing of the new conference on the non-proliferation treaty will be held in Geneva in April or May. Maybe some of the committee would like to arrange to be there, too.

The list of interests of the IPB is long, even too long. The list of advisers is long, even too long, but they have always talked about the abolition of nuclear weapons, of course, something of which we've been talking about for a long while in the NGO community.

Among other things, it also suggests a change in the mandate of the International Atomic Energy Agency so that it no longer promotes nuclear power plants in third world countries.

In 1978, the United Nations special session on disarmament called for a program with an agreed timeframe— timeframes are one of the bugaboos in the western world —leading to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

In passing, I might just say that although I have not dealt in detail with the problem of verification, I think it's probable that verification is easier for total abolition than it is for partial abolition. Not only that, when the counting game goes on I always think of the information we have that a lot of the weapons that both the U.S. and Russia have gotten rid of are the no-good ones. So I think that one is too many when it comes to nuclear weapons. I always have thought that I would like to have a private death, not a public one. It motivates me very heavily, of course. I haven't got time to think about it.

It is said that there will be a resolution coming into the IAEA— if it makes it —at the next General Assembly to divest it of the nuclear power promoting work.

As a whole, the UN has made slow progress on nuclear questions. One of the reasons, I think, is that those questions have been dealt with in a piecemeal fashion and it doesn't get us very far. Of course we tackle the easy ones first.

• 1015

I think the current interest in controlling conventional weapons, particularly small arms and so forth, is a way of ducking doing the tough one about nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. I think also that the attempt to control conventional weapons may be an endless undertaking with no good possibilities of serious outcome. I don't know that it's a wise way for the UN or its member states to go.

A report card on Canada's votes in 1997 on disarmament questions at the UN shows more continuity than change. You know, I could take out my old files, if I could find them, and find most of the things that have been considered. Particularly I would go back to the so-called strategy of suffocation that Trudeau presented so many years ago and see that we have no strategy of suffocation. We really do not.

Part of the problem for having no strategy of suffocation is that it aims only at the weapons. Weapons are controlled by institutions, and we haven't dealt with that in any serious manner. We deal more happily with the hardware, and as long as we do that, we don't seem to be getting very far. I don't have the answer to that. I think a lot of my questions have no good answers.

In the fall session of 1997, Canada voted “yes” four times, “no” three times, and abstained twice. Canada has taken exception to resolutions that contained recommendations for timeframes for nuclear disarmament. It voted for the original final document of the first special session.

Canada voted against the proposal for a convention to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons, through the General Assembly. Maybe that will change. And Canada abstained, as it always has, on a resolution on the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states.

Lastly, I should mention the fact that Canada has not succeeded— in fact I think the prospects have grown dimmer for a control on nuclear materials.

All this is contained in the 94-page publication Disarmament Times, published by the UN NGO Committee on Disarmament.

The Chairman: We do get that publication.

Ms. Ann Gertler: You do? Well, that's good.

The Chairman: I'm not promising everybody reads everything.

Ms. Ann Gertler: I didn't say it; you said it.

I know I'm running late. I didn't even look at my clock.

The Chairman: Yes, I'm afraid we've kind of come to the end of our time.

Ms. Ann Gertler: I just wanted to say that I have recommended in some detail that you have further contact with NGOs not only here but in the States. You can read that for yourself.

I also would say that I am a past co-chair of the Group of 78, which held a landmark meeting on nuclear weapons and the law, which had heads of— You have had, too, I suppose.

An hon. member: Yes. Maxwell Cohen.

Ms. Ann Gertler: Ghosted by my husband.

The Chairman: Are you saying Professor Cohen's part was ghosted by your husband?

Ms. Ann Gertler: No. My husband is a book editor, and he did a lot of the editing work for this book. “Ghosted” is not the right word.

The Chairman: Edited, believe you me. You have three law professors at this table. We know how much work the editors have to do to clean up our work.

Ms. Ann Gertler: I have two lawyer sons, and I know, too.

Everybody from Escott Reid— who was a member of the Group of 78 —down has raised questions about the performance and non-performance of the NATO organization. Many people, from Pierre Elliott Trudeau down, have complained about the lack of real consultation in the NATO councils.

• 1020

I might say that I feel a little uneasy in this committee because the day I came to hear Mark Moher speak it was in camera. I did get the transcript of the statement but not of your questions. Similarly, when I came to hear the Department of National Defence, it suddenly— because I think of some visitors we had —became a closed hearing and I went home.

It may be necessary, but I'm not convinced that the Canadian people should not be party to the policies that so vitally concern their lives. I'm going to stop now because you want me to stop.

The Chairman: I have two points. The first is that we certainly will be meeting with NGOs. This committee will be travelling both to Washington and New York as part of this study and we intend to meet with American NGOs when we're there. The committee is very sensitive to your comment about in camera hearings, which are often requested of us. There are times when you will appreciate that very sensitive information— Our job is to try to evaluate and understand and get the best information we can. Sometimes we'll be told more behind closed doors and other times—

Ms. Ann Gertler: I look forward to your report.

The Chairman: We try to make sure that everything we possibly can do is done openly. We appreciate your comments, and your observations are only going to be useful to us if you can get as much information as well. We take your observation very seriously. I heard several members saying they approved of your comment.

We move to questions. Mr. Mills.

Mr. Bob Mills (Red Deer, Ref.): I have a couple of comments that are in the form of questions. Maybe I'll go through the four areas I've heard today and have questions about.

One certainly is the concern about the U.S., Russia, France, Britain, and China, but it seems to me we should also be talking about the other states that have nuclear weapons. We should also be talking about the potential growth of rogue states with these nuclear weapons. Those are the ones I'm more worried about than the five main countries that have the nuclear weapons.

I also think a major concern is the deteriorating condition in Russia. The problems in Russia would seem to me to make nuclear weapons more important to them; as their conventional forces deteriorate, nuclear obviously comes their only deterrent. I would be pretty hard-pressed as a politician in Russia, with guys like Zhirinovsky around, to start advocating getting rid of nuclear weapons. That would seem to be totally against this nationalistic movement within Russia. It seems to me that we're obviously talking about something that— why would the others give them up if in fact Russia is in that turmoil?

Third, I think an interesting point that came out is that Canada should not lead in the move to remove nuclear capability from NATO. I think that would put us in a horrendously difficult position, particularly as we already are the bad boys of NATO because of the decline of our commitment. I think we would be biting off far more than we would want to chew on that issue.

Fourth, when I hear somebody tell me that children are dying in Iraq, I can't help but ask about the 80 palaces Saddam Hussein has built covering 40,000 acres of land. You could have provided an awful lot of food with those 80 palaces and 40,000 acres.

Those are four comments and they cover a broad range, but that's what I heard today.

The Chairman: Would anyone like to pick up on any of those? Mr. Rosenblum and then Mr. Henry.

Mr. Simon Rosenblum: It's always difficult to know exactly who you are referring to. If there is by any chance any suggestion that our brief today was in the short term suggesting we remove nuclear weapons capability from NATO, that is in fact not the particular policy measure we are advocating. We are talking about a no-first-use regime, which still leaves residual nuclear weapons capability for a period of time, whatever it may take, in order to get to further reductions.

• 1025

In so far as you say the Russians are not interested in further reductions, the test of that will be how we proceed with START II ratification as we move to START III. One thing is for sure: there are plenty of signals that indicate that Russia would in fact be willing to go to a no-first-use nuclear weapons regime with NATO— in other words, go back to their prior policy —but they will not do so unilaterally.

It has been suggested— and I will abuse my time by saying this —that we did not choose to trumpet world federalism in our brief today. Well, we're disciplined by the instructions given to the committee, but I would say— and I think this is terribly important —that what we tried to get across here today was the notion of global governance as it regards the transparency and enforceability of verification regimes. That is indeed a very strong subset of global governance.

Secondly, and equally important if not more so, is the whole notion of enforcement regarding collective action when it comes to rogue states and people who break out of agreements and use weapons of mass destruction, etc. So we are talking about not just a vigorous passive regime, but an enforcement regime with teeth and muscle. And all of this could lead back, of course, to questions of Iraq and what have you.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Mr. Henry.

Colonel A. Sean Henry (Senior Defence Analyst, Conference of Defence Associations): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Before I comment on two of the points that were raised, I should bring to the committee's attention a very important reference that was not in the bibliography of the paper we have already submitted to you, simply because we didn't have it when that was put together. It's a Whitehall paper produced by the Royal United Services Institute, written by Sir Michael Quinlan, who was a senior civil servant in the British government for many years in the Ministry of Defence and spent a lot of his time dealing with nuclear issues and nuclear policy.

This is an excellent reference, not least because it is rather thin and at the same time covers the subject very well. I would really recommend it for your perusal.

The Chairman: —

[Inaudible—Editor] —Is that what you're suggesting?

Col Sean Henry: I will save the Queen money, because the only way you could get one quickly would be to spend money on a courier between here and London. If the clerk promises faithfully to get this back to me shortly, I will leave it with her to reproduce it in whatever way she sees fit.

The Chairman: I'm told by our researchers that we do have a copy already.

Col Sean Henry: Oh, okay. That, I would say, is a reference that bears some detailed study by this committee, because it covers all the factors, and it's coming from a man who knows whereof he speaks.

Back to the observations, on the first one, regarding rogue states, we must keep in mind that this is a very complex situation when we're talking about nuclear possession and nuclear proliferation. There are the five original nuclear powers, but then before you get to rogue states you go through a couple of other categories, if you wish.

There are the near-nuclear states— the Israelis, the Indians, and the Pakistanis —and then there are those who could become nuclear states quite quickly, including Canada, and there are about 16 of them. And then you get to the rogue states. This all points out that there is an awful lot of potential instability out there. Therefore, when there's potential instability in a situation as important as this, you must approach it with very great care and make sure you weigh all the factors very carefully as you proceed forward, which reinforces what CDA has said about making haste slowly.

The second one about Canada not leading the move is relevant, and I think this was brought out in Colonel Coroy's remarks. Although Canadians get their back up when you talk about American influence in Canadian affairs, regardless of that aspect, there is the reality that this country has security interests that have to do, still, with the strategic nuclear threat. If we did not cooperate with the Americans, it would cost us much, much more to do it on our own, and if we did not do it and relied entirely on the Americans, then a lot of your sovereignty would go out the door. If you want to discard everything else that is brought up in this argument, in terms of bread-and-butter issues, disrupting our bilateral arrangements for the defence of North America with the Americans has to be a significant factor.

• 1030

Ms. Ann Gertler: I just want to say the part of my paper I did not read called attention to what President Clinton called one of the most satisfactory experiences in arms control that had ever existed, and that was the UNSCOM work in Iraq, which destroyed a lot of weapons, put in monitoring devices at other weapons sites, read a tremendous amount of documentation, which told them a great deal about the country, and so forth. I think we should take a serious view of how you deal with weapons. This is verification at a very useful level.

Mr. Terrell Gardner: I want to deal briefly with Mr. Mills' question about Russian turmoil, instability, and increased dependence upon nuclear weaponry. This is addressed in the Science for Peace brief. I didn't read it out, but it's there. I am informed very largely from a document by Bruce Blair, earlier referred to by, I think, Simon Rosenblum. That document can be tabled here for your consultation if you don't have it at present.

The concern that gives rise to our recommendation 10, that Canada do its utmost through diplomatic and other channels to mitigate tension between Russia and the NATO powers, is meant in part to address this. This is meant to address Russia's responses to the tension referred to and to avoid fanning the flames of nationalism on the Russian political scene, to give a chance to a mood within the leadership of Russia, or the several leaderships within Russia— there seem to be several —to give the scope within which to do the sorts of things we want them to do, and we must do too.

If we take initiatives such as a nuclear weapons free zone in eastern Europe, this will assuage some of the tension. If we take no such initiatives, the tension continues to mount. We have to view their frame of mind— perceive them as threatened —as a counter-threat, and out of humanity and out of motives for our own self-defence we have to find ways of assuaging this fear by really reducing the pressure. I think one of these is certainly not to vote for further expansion eastward on the part of NATO.

The Chairman: Ms. Newcombe.

Ms. Hanna Newcombe: About verification of disarmament, I would like to refer to a book by the Pugwash conferences group. This is a group of scientists. The book is co-edited by Joseph Rotblat. You will remember he received the Nobel Peace Prize. The book is entitled A Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: Desirable?, Feasible?

• 1035

It describes in great detail the technological means of verification that nuclear disarmament has actually been implemented. Since these people are largely physicists, they know what they're talking about on the technical means. But also in the same book they mention a non-technical means of verification called citizen reporting or societal verification. If people involved in illegal arms production— the workers on the spot —have any suspicions that the treaty is being violated, they could report to the inspectors. Thus the whole society would be immobilized to implement the prohibition of the weapons in question.

So verification can never be 100%, I suppose, but it can be close to that so we can rely on it.

Regarding chemical weapons, that has just come into force recently. It has verification provisions. We don't know yet how well it will work, and everybody has not yet ratified, but I think proper control of chemical weapons is on the horizon, and hopefully this will work properly.

I get a lot of e-mail, and one of the messages I received recently was about the Russian Duma being willing now to perhaps ratify the START II treaty. If that's true, it would open the way to further negotiations on START III and we would be making some bilateral progress toward nuclear disarmament of the two main possessors of these weapons, at least.

Thank you.

The Chairman: You may know, Ms. Newcombe, that Canada has ratified the chemical weapons convention. In fact, we've also put through the necessary implementing legislation in this country. This committee dealt with that in the last Parliament.

Mr. Turp.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp (Beauharnois—Salaberry, BQ): First, I would like to thank all the witnesses for taking time to make their presentations this morning, and specially for presenting their papers in French or allowing enough time for their translation, which is not always the case before the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

More specifically, I would like to point out that the battle for eliminating nuclear weapons, or at least for reducing their use and specially controlling their proliferation, seems to be a battle of all generations, as we have seen at the committee. The generations you represent here are certainly those who lead the battle.

Seeing Ms. Newcombe and Ms. Gertler here shows how much perseverance you have in this battle, which you feel is a battle for future generations. This is a battle often fought by women, maybe because they believe more strongly than men in the quality and precious value of human life.

However, I would like to ask a question to all of you. I would like to reflect with you on an issue we are now faced with, as the military intervention in Irak involves the threat of using weapons, apparently for maintaining international peace and security.

• 1040

In the current debate over the UN resolutions— as you heard again yesterday —the American President and those who support his intervention argue that it is the threat of using weapons— not nuclear in this case —that has convinced Saddam Hussein to comply with the UN resolutions.

I would like to know if you are convinced by this argument, and if, in this case, the argument seems appropriate to you, because threatening to use nuclear weapons is based on the same rationale for maintaining world order and complying with the United Nations resolutions. Therefore, I would like to know if this argument has convinced you in the current situation, because if it has, then the argument according to which nuclear weapons must exist as a threat against those who refuse to abide by international law is also valid. This is true when there is a first strategic attack, because without a first strategic attack, no threat can convince any state leaders to respect their international commitments. This is my first question. I would really like to hear you on this.

My second question is about the idea of a convention for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. I would specially like to know, Mr. Rosenblum, what your group thinks of this idea, and how this can be achieved. What can we actually do to reach an agreement on the total elimination of nuclear weapons?

[English]

The Chairman: Mr. Rosenblum, Mr. Henry, and then Mr. Gardner.

Mr. Simon Rosenblum: First of all, on suggestions by the President of the United States or otherwise that it was the threat of the use of force in this particular instance that brought Saddam Hussein to at least ostensibly or for a period of time—we will have to see the duration of that—allow UN regulations on the verification of weapons of mass destruction to proceed unimpeded, I have no doubt whatsoever that Mr. Clinton is correct.

Are we to believe it was simply by moral suasion that Saddam Hussein decided to abide by international law, or we hope he will? The whole issue of peace enforcement, which is beyond the mandate of this committee, is a very difficult one. But undoubtedly at certain junctures it means the international community will have to be very serious in dealing with those who break agreements that have enormous consequence for international stability, world peace, and enormous loss of life.

Needless to say, we know this was an incredibly tricky situation because there was no good military mission that would do either irreparable harm to the programs of weapons of mass destruction or be able to eliminate them in one fell swoop. There were a lot of rather unfavourable options to choose amongst.

I don't want to spend time on that per se because it's wandering into another path, but I do think this brings me back to what I have said earlier, both in testimony and in response to questions: there has to be a vigorous form of collective security. This is just an example, and one could immediately wander afield and talk about situations of genocide, whether it be Rwanda or otherwise, and talk about what is the appropriate use of force. Here, we're hopefully talking in a much more collective way through the United Nations Security Council, the UN Assembly, and what have you.

• 1045

Even though force is often the tool of last resort—as it should be—that should not mean it is something on the back burner. It has to be a decisive part of your security regime. But I think it is a gap in logic to then move on to say that, somehow or other, this means nuclear weapons become a pivot in all of this, either in a residual fashion or in a primary fashion in regard to the threat of the first use of them. One, on moral grounds, it is a much more tricky proposition; and two, if you are to have a credible international collective deterrent, all the informed testimony that is brought to bear on this talks about what it means to be credible.

To be credible means that there is in fact a strong likelihood it will be used and that the other parties to the equation will have the fear or the confidence that it will in fact happen. That is not the case. It never has been the case as regards the threat of the first use of nuclear weapons, because it is understood to be in many respects abhorrent. You therefore have to have some type of collective machinery internationally, with a vigorous and robust conventional deterrent to a whole variety, and they have to be measured and proportioned in regard to the threat at hand.

This cannot be something that is done in an ad hoc way. It has to be done in a pre-planned fashion and as part of a larger configuration, most of which will in fact not be military. To assume that because it is not the first resort, the military is therefore an insignificant resort is, I think, very dangerous.

We should respect that nuclear weapons are extremely different from any other type of weapon. No matter what, conventionals—and in some cases we get into a lot of science fiction with regard to conventionals and biologicals—as insidious as they are, pale in reflection in terms of their military use and their dangers. As for biologicals, in time we will know to what degree passive measures will be able to compensate and protect, or what particular military force they will in fact have.

We have people from all sides of the equation—from people who worked with Reagan and others higher up—saying that through their conventional arsenals, the United States, NATO, and what have you internationally have the means at their disposal to deal with all forms of threat and that the only role of nuclear weapons is as a retaliatory force. That must be underlined.

The Chairman: Mr. Turp, you wanted a quick question.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: I would like to hear Mr. Henry on these issues, but also Ms. Gertler and Ms. Newcombe, who are the wise women of your group.

[English]

The Chairman: We have Mr. Henry and Mr. Gardner indicated, as well as Madam Newcombe.

Mr. Henry, you're next.

Col Sean Henry: I think we must approach this set of questions with the same care we've been trying to bring out with respect to nuclear weapons generally. Let's not mix apples and oranges.

In the first case in your remarks, we started out with the former Gulf War. The former Gulf War was a case of deterring a major war. If Saddam had used his weapons of mass destruction on his Scuds against Israel, Israel would have retaliated with nuclear weapons. I think a lot of people, including Saddam Hussein, knew that.

An hon. member: Does Saddam have nuclear weapons?

Col Sean Henry: In that case, in deterring major war, it was successful. But let's not mix that with what is going on right now.

Saddam Hussein is a very clever and devious man. He learned his lesson back in 1990 and 1991. Today, he is operating well below the nuclear threshold. That's his aim. He doesn't want to bring nuclear deterrents into this at all. He's being smart. Saddam Hussein has one aim in this whole exercise, and that is to get rid of the UN sanctions in order to start selling oil again. At the same time, he hopes to not have to give up all his weapons of mass destruction, but they are a ploy.

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It looks as though he's probably going to win, or achieve his aims, because the situation is by no means finished, based on what you saw on last night's news. Even if the Americans endorse it, there's going to be another period of toing and froing. In the end, though, Saddam Hussein is manipulating the process to get a lifting of the sanctions.

Where do you end up? Well, you end up in a not-very-satisfactory position, but at least you have made some progress on both sides. You have reduced the injuries to the Iraqi people. You have some of the inspections back in, working, and you have at least applied stability to the situation. Perhaps, if you're lucky, you will reduce some of his weapons of mass destruction even more than what they are now.

Back to the position of CDA, this is slow, gradual progress, feeling your way forward, and not rushing off in all directions to come up with unexpected consequences.

LCol Victor Coroy: If I may, Mr. Chairman, I would address it on probably more of a moral issue.

People have mentioned their devotion of time and energy to maintaining the peace process and that type of thing. I represent a constituency of half a million Canadians who have taken on the unlimited liability clause to make sure peace was maintained. When you're in that position, it brings into focus very clearly the effects of weapons, be they mass destruction or be they pointed and directed weapons—rifles, mines, and that type of thing.

So we're not speaking in an imaginative, Pollyanna-like way, taking a rosy-glass approach to the problem. We've been there. We've seen the effects. We understand very clearly that if you've let the genie out of the bottle, you cannot really put it back in. Somehow or other, the things man has invented should not be misused against the population or individuals.

The problem with the use of force is that inadequate force, when you have that as your last resort, will aggravate a condition. I suppose you can parallel this with the reaction to terrorist activities, and that type of thing. If a state is weak and unable to counter terrorist activities, you're going to have a generation of terrorist activities.

In the international sense, if you have no capability, or a very reduced or limited capability, to deal with nuclear or biological blackmail, then you're going to be hostage to those conditions by rogues or terrorist conditions.

So you have to be prepared to use force in the international sense. Otherwise, we abrogate our own freedom and our own ability to determine our own destinies.

The Chairman: Ms. Newcombe.

Ms. Hanna Newcombe: We mustn't forget the legal aspect. The International Court of Justice has declared that nuclear threat is illegal under most circumstances. Certainly the exception where they couldn't say yes or no doesn't apply in this case. Respect for law should be a very important aspect of how we behave internationally. Let's not forget the legal aspect of the policy of first use of nuclear weapons.

Second, I'd like to remark on the 1991 war. People who are experts in this field tell me that Israel was ready to use nuclear weapons, but the United States held them back. There was an announcement in this crisis that the U.S. would no longer hold Israel back. So if this crisis had escalated, as it still might, because there is a real danger about what Israel would do, not just about what the U.S. would do—I think we should remain aware of that.

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The Chairman: In the context of Mr. Turp's question, though, you seem to be suggesting that Israel's ability to use a first strike may well have been the reason why Mr. Saddam Hussein made it very clear a few weeks ago that he would not strike Israel, that Israel would not be a target.

Where is this taking us in terms of NATO's first-strike decision, or first use? That seems to be the area where the committee is having to struggle a great deal with trying to understand whether in fact that principle is edging us closer to peace or whether it's edging us closer to a possible conflict. That seems to be one of the great issues we're going to have to deal with in the committee.

But it seems to me, if I may just say so, that the example you just gave us seemed to be a pro-first-use argument and not an anti-first-use argument. I interpreted it as such.

Ms. Hanna Newcombe: There is still the legal argument—

The Chairman: Of course. I understand that.

Ms. Hanna Newcombe: —that should weigh on our consciences.

The Chairman: Ms. Gertler, did you want to add something?

Ms. Ann Gertler: Yes, I hope I won't wander too much this time—

The Chairman: That's all right.

Ms. Ann Gertler: —but I want to say that my activities with regard to affairs of war and peace were not really motivated by my motherhood. Though I always felt my children could take care of themselves and maybe the world, it's the grandchildren that really bother me now. But that's taking up your time—

The Chairman: No, not at all. Those of us with grandchildren agree entirely. They're the ones that interest us.

A voice: Some of us are working on it too.

Voices: Oh, oh.

Ms. Ann Gertler: I want to remind you that when you talk about the UN and its accomplishments, such as they are, it's widely believed in New York that failure to act on article 6 of the NPT will result in the non-nuclear states losing faith in the non-proliferation treaty, increasing the danger of what you call rogue states—or other kinds of states you don't approve of—launching on a nuclear career.

In mentioning the UN, I will also mention that we might well use our time and strength here to persuade our U.S. colleagues to do everything in their power to have Congress cough up the necessary and widely neglected dollars that will make the UN function. Of course, one of the things about the UN functioning, which Canadians have spent some time looking into, is the possibility of a UN-ready force, and maybe we're not ready for that yet, even though we have a great deal of faith in the current Secretary-General.

I do think that what we're neglecting in this whole discussion is the idea about how it's force or nothing, or force or international law. There are many paths in addition to the use of force that one can take in bringing forward some satisfactory solutions.

Finally, two more things. First of all, the railroad train from Montreal to Ottawa didn't run for 19 days in January, and anybody who took it saw an absolutely surreal picture of electrical devastation because the controls had left— that was just a reminder of how urgent our task is.

I want to say one more thing. I think the words “the end of the cold war” have become a kind of a mantra that doesn't make sense. It doesn't make sense in view of our continued usual activity in NORAD northern defences. You wonder who the enemy is if you have those defences and there is no cold war. I think there is, as Simon might say, a serious logical problem in the idea that (a) the cold war is over, and (b) you go on doing the same things you did for the last 50 years.

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Finally, I might say, if the committee needs it, I have a copy of the Smyth report, which I got in August of 1945.

Mr. Daniel Turp: I would like to add one short thing before I end my remarks. I very much appreciate those comments. They come from someone who is wise and whom we have a lot to learn from. But I think what you said about—and I'm sure I won't make friends; I haven't in the past—the idea that the hearings of this committee be public and not in camera is something I will fight for in front of this committee more than ever, because my experience now is that when people come here in camera they don't really say more than they say when it's public. You've made a good point, and I hope that point is heard by our chairman, by the people who too often insist that these meetings be in camera. Especially in this debate, nothing should be in camera.

Tell that to your Secretary of State.

The Chairman: We have had two in camera meetings of this committee since the beginning of the Parliament. The members can choose between— I think we can discuss that issue ourselves. Anyway, we appreciate the witness's observation about it.

Mr. Reed.

Mr. Julian Reed (Halton, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As I listen to this discussion, it seems to me we're all operating under false assumptions. We assume everyone will respond to the rule of law when the fact is that those people who are out to cause turmoil and havoc in the world, especially in this day and age, are not respecters of any rule of law. We talk about taking a moral position. That's fine for us, but our enemy knows no morality in these situations. We talk from a perspective of civility. Canada is one of the most civilized countries in the world. Yet those who would cause havoc in the world know no civility. We assume the enemy thinks as we do. Obviously the enemy doesn't, because if the enemy thought as we do, then negotiation and discussion and so on would become paramount in resolving conflicts.

I say to those who support the maintenance of a nuclear deterrent, it seems to me we have gone beyond that now, to the point where those rogue states that have neither the technology nor the financial ability to put together a weapon of mass destruction can very easily do it. If you brew a little home-made beer you can very, very easily stir up a lot of anthrax and put it in a suitcase and raise absolute hell in a crowded city somewhere in the world, or with a chemical weapon, if you like. The use of chemical weapons has already been demonstrated, and it's not very pretty.

I would like to hear some comment about this. It seems to me we're trying to put a thread of civility through something that is not civil.

Col Sean Henry: I certainly agree with that assessment, and I think that was one of the points Vic Coroy brought out. The western nations in particular are probably guilty of not yet fully grasping what is going on out there in a large part of the world. That is, worldwide, the framework of the rule of law is coming not to apply to more and more people. On the one hand, you will always have states that don't adhere to it, going from Adolph Hitler through to Saddam Hussein and a few others. There are always going to be states that don't adhere to the rule of law. That's always been there.

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That's sort of in the old context, but I think the new context is even more frightening. That is, you are getting mass popular movements within states, over which the states' governments have no control, that are going to start emerging. They will not have one bit of respect for the rule of law because they see it as a method used by the people they're against to control them. The people who are rebelling in places like Mexico, Algeria, Afghanistan, and so on, are examples of that.

Perhaps the most serious problem along those lines I see out there is Indonesia. Indonesia could dissolve into a vortex. So could South Africa.

If you get that sort of situation emerging, where the people are going to discard rule of law and go for whatever allows them to achieve their objectives, I can guarantee that weapons of mass destruction will be one of the things they use as a strong card. So I agree wholeheartedly; that's a good point.

The Chairman: Next is Mr. Gardner, and then Mr. Rosenblum and Madam Newcombe.

Mr. Terrell Gardner: Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Reed particularly, in my view and I think in that of Science for Peace, respect for the rule of law needs to be demonstrated. We have to ask, where can we cause it to be demonstrated? Where is our control?

We cannot control directly Gaddafi nor Hussein. On the other hand, if we don't control ourselves, then we have lost the game. Then immorality and civility have taken over. Then what's left?

Look to our condition. Look to the fact of the NPT treaty, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, having its article 6 ignored by the western powers, by the nuclear powers, from the inception of that treaty. New commitments were required of them and made by them in 1995 at the 25-year review and extension conference. The commitment was refreshed: yes, we will work in good faith towards nuclear disarmament. Nothing of significance has happened in that direction.

The NPT is, as Ann Gertler said, likely to be viewed, and I would say it is increasingly viewed and will be increasingly viewed, by the non-nuclear weapons powers, particularly those party to the treaty, as a terrible irony, as a great injustice, and as something they will gladly cheat on. We are teaching them to cheat by not controlling the respect for law on the part of the nuclear weapons states. We have an influence there and we should be using it. Canada should be using it.

This is one illustration: the decision by the International Court of Justice and the way in which both the U.S. and the U.K. brushed that off by saying, well, we don't see any need to change our deterrence policy and we're going to retain nuclear weapons as long as we find them essential to our security. What is that communicating to the rest of the world about respect for law? It makes it a matter of indifference, of convenience. If you get a decision you like, fine, you preach it. If you get one you don't like, you thumb your nose at it. Well, we're going to get the kind of world we earn, and I think we have to earn a better world.

I'll stop with that.

The Chairman: Thank you, sir.

Mr. Rosenblum and Ms. Newcombe.

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Mr. Simon Rosenblum: Mr. Reed, I represent an organization that pays a lot of attention to the codification and development of the role of international law, the rule of law, and respect for it. We can lay out in other circumstances a variety of appropriate venues and usages for such further development.

But if I may make an analogy, when we talk about the rule of law domestically, when we talk about a criminal justice system, it has a whole continuum of measures within it, some of which are social, some of which are passive in terms of their encouragement, but most definitively there is an enforcement vehicle that is always connected to a criminal justice system. I suggest to you that through the respect for the international rule of law there will also need to be the development of an appropriate enforcement regime. That is a very complex and multidimensional work in progress, if you will.

Again, to draw out the analogy one step further, we have chosen, as many other countries have chosen, as part of that criminal justice system, that we do not have capital punishment. Some people think it's immoral and some people think it's not a credible deterrent. I suggest you might draw some instruction from that as well.

Also, I was intrigued when the chair, Mr. Graham, suggested that the issue of Iraq and its relationship with Israel would be of great interest to the committee in trying to draw out the lessons of the appropriateness of the nuclear first-use issue. Given that at this moment in time I function more or less as an Israeli specialist, let me say to you that, first, it was by no means self-evident to anyone, including the Israelis, that in fact the response to a conventional attack or even conceivably a chemical attack from Iraq was necessarily going to be nuclear.

Israel is blessed with an extremely strong conventional deterrent, which if unleashed in a fulsome way could wreak havoc with Iraq. But let me also suggest to you that there was a lot more to this, and it had very little to do, ironically, with Israel's deterrent, whether that be conventional or nuclear. Of course its nuclear deterrent remains in some state of limbo, if you will.

There were a number of reasons why Saddam Hussein would not risk attacking Israel, especially with biological weapons but most likely with anything. First, it would in all likelihood widen the coalition. The last thing he wanted at this point in time was to basically allow the United States and Britain to bring into the ensemble a lot more players. This particularly would have given a green light for Clinton and Blair to be able to attract a lot more allies.

Second, in terms of the weapons of mass destruction, at this moment Saddam Hussein wants to keep hidden whatever he does possess—and we know that in all likelihood he possesses some of each weapon of mass destruction, both biological and chemical. He needs to keep them hidden. If he ever began to use them, of course they are not hidden, and whether it be through satellite imaging or what have you, he immediately creates the conditions he absolutely doesn't want. In other words, they then become apparent in terms of their locations and subject to immediate attack.

There are a host of reasons that have very little to do with Israel's supposed nuclear deterrent, and I think it would be very dangerous ground for the committee to begin to build a case for a nuclear first-use on the basis of this particular example.

The Chairman: Thank you. That's helpful.

Believe me, I recognize this is an extraordinary, complex kaleidoscope we're looking at. It's also a moving one. I certainly didn't want to leave you with the impression that one example was going to be the only building block on which we're using our logic.

Ms. Newcombe.

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Ms. Hanna Newcombe: I agree that not all nations respect international law and that this is a danger. This is actually a very good argument for working toward enforceable world law, which is the aim of world federalists, of course.

Domestic law is enforceable, as Mr. Rosenblum pointed out, through the system of police and courts. The same thing is needed at the international level, probably through a greatly strengthened United Nations. This would be at least part of the solution to the problem that was outlined. This is the direction we should take.

The problem with military enforcement, to my mind, is that it harms innocent civilians rather than guilty leaders. It would be as if we still had the death penalty but executed the wrong person. Think about that.

Most of the victims in modern wars are now civilians—I believe the latest figure is around 90%—and many of them are children. Children haven't committed any war crimes that they should be punished for. Deterrence doesn't make any sense. Therefore, warlike actions are inappropriate to the situation.

Guilty leaders who plot aggressive war should be brought before an international criminal court, which the United Nations is in the process of creating. They're trying it out in former Yugoslavia. It's not totally successful yet, but then, when is social innovation immediately successful at first try? It has to evolve. Evolving new social arrangements takes a certain amount of time.

I have great hopes for the international criminal court to be eventually effective. Guilty leaders of so-called rogue states would be brought before such courts. This is how the rule of law would be maintained internationally.

The Chairman: I hope you're aware of the fact that the Government of Canada is a strong supporter of the international criminal court.

Mr. Julian Reed: We're trying to apprehend criminals in Bosnia right now, with no success. It would be wonderful to apprehend Saddam Hussein, but tell us how. What is the mechanism for doing this?

Even if you have a world court and so on, the process is totally unclear and obviously very unsuccessful. We have Rwanda at the present time. The same process is being attempted, but how does one get to the people who should be brought to trial?

Ms. Hanna Newcombe: It is not yet clear, I admit. I think that eventually ways will be worked out. I don't have any exact prescription. Even abduction of a leader might be tried. The other alternative is to try them in absentia, which would then expose them to the judgment of the international public. They wouldn't be able to travel outside their country. They would feel in constant personal danger of apprehension. That would be at least some kind of initial punishment, but further measures have to be invented.

We're inventing a totally new world. This is how I look at it. It's like evolution going on and it's unpredictable. I can't yet give you an exact recipe, but we have to keep trying and collecting opinions on how to do it properly.

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To have international legal procedures against aggressive leaders is extremely important. We have to work on it.

The Chairman: Thank you very much.

Mr. McWhinney and then Mr. Assadourian.

Mr. Ted McWhinney: Thank you. I'd like to ask the group, and perhaps some who haven't spoken before, about the relationship between what they've been proposing, nuclear disarmament, and general changes in the structure and institutions of world public order.

One of the fascinating things in the apparent quick resolution of the latest Gulf War issue is the augmented role of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. We backed Boutros Boutros-Ghali the first time—Mr. Mulroney did—and we backed him the second time for re-election. As you know, he was opposed on the basis that, among other things, he was too strong a Secretary-General.

It's very apparent that Mr. Kofi Annan hasn't regarded himself as a mere delegate of the Security Council; he's negotiated with a considerable degree of freedom and flair. It reminds one a little bit of Dag Hammarskjöld, although I hope the office changes with the personality.

I'd be interested in your reaction to changes in the institutions and the incumbents, and the new confidence if the Secretary-General is able to deliver on this. How does that affect your proposition?

Secondly, with the International Criminal Court, it is a clear matter of Canadian policy, and the minister is committed to it, but the International Criminal Court would have general jurisdiction and would obviously have to have jurisdiction over UN forces and their compliance with the UN Security Council and other resolutions and the law of war.

The experience with ad hoc tribunals from World War I and even the limited post-war thing has not been a particularly happy one, but I'd be interested in your comments, Dr. Newcombe. We've corresponded in previous years, but I've never had the pleasure of meeting you, so welcome. Do you have any reaction to the new Secretary-General and his apparent initiatives? He's certainly gone beyond you might say a limited, bureaucratic interpretation of his role. Since I worked with Mr. Hammarskjöld, I'm always interested in seeing a strong Secretary-General emerge.

Ms. Hanna Newcombe: The present Secretary-General is doing a very good job, obviously. One needs to create the machinery, though, so that it won't depend on one person.

If the Secretary-General is to have more power than at present, it will have to be described in some constitutional manner what he can do and what he cannot do. I don't believe in highly centralized structures. Obviously something is needed at the global level, because we have almost a vacuum there now, but it shouldn't be a world dictatorship. So we have to proceed carefully with constitutional guarantees. We're familiar with how to do that.

Mr. Ted McWhinney: But all seven have operated under the UN charter. There isn't very much there. It's like the office of Prime Minister, which isn't defined in our Constitution either. So much depends on custom and convention. You would want to spell it out, would you?

The Chairman: Does anybody else want to respond?

Col Sean Henry: First of all, with respect to Mr. Annan, the jury is out. We still don't know whether this initiative is going to be successful or not.

Mr. Ted McWhinney: In terms of his success, but not in terms of what he's done, surely. He didn't regard himself as simply a clerk, carrying out—

Col Sean Henry: No, no, but having said that, one must understand that he would not have done what he did and taken with him the message that he took with him without the agreement, so to speak, of the United States. You cannot back off from this. The United States is quite happy to see Kofi Annan proceed on a project such as this as long as it is under the umbrella of U.S. interests. I think you have to face that.

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Mr. Ted McWhinney: Mr. Turp asked a question in the House yesterday and the minister, quite properly, refused to answer it. You don't answer hypothetical questions. But I would have thought what you've just said was put in issue by Mr. Turp, at least.

The Chairman: Since Mr. Turp is not here—

Mr. Ted McWhinney: It's curious. He did raise it, and the minister quite properly, I thought—it was a hypothetical question—didn't answer it.

The Chairman: Mr. Assadourian.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian (Brampton Centre, Lib.): Thank you very much.

First I would like to make a couple of observations. Earlier you mentioned how Saddam Hussein and Israeli weapons are facing each other. I think what is happening there is a form of arms race. Whether we like it or not, it is an arms race in the region. Who started it and who is encouraging it are still unknown, but the fact is that we have an arms race going on in the Middle East.

Second, about bringing criminals to justice, a few months ago I remember reading in the paper, and we asked questions about it in the House of Commons, about Pol Pot, who killed one million of his own people. He was apprehended and he was to be brought to justice, but nobody had the courage to bring this international criminal to justice. Although we go after individuals who happen to kill one person, it seems to me if you kill one million people, especially your own, international justice has difficulty dealing with you.

I come to my question. Earlier you mentioned that five states have nuclear weapons, for three there are indications they may have them, and eighteen will have them. We know how five countries in the Security Council got them. Correct me if I'm wrong. Two of them got them from us, from the sale of CANDU reactors. At least India did. Because of India, Pakistan has them. I don't know whether Israel has the ability to manufacture or build nuclear weapons. Can you tell us whether the other 18 might have it, or what sources they might use to have their own atomic weapons or bombs?

The first question is how did the first three get it, namely Israel, India, and Pakistan— and if you can name the other 18 countries, the ones you have in your mind, and how they might have the technology to develop a nuclear bomb.

Col Sean Henry: To blame Canada for India and Pakistan is perhaps going a little too far, but by the same token it is alleged that the nuclear technology provided by Canada was a factor in their ability to build bombs. I would tell you this in relation to them and in relation to the other 16. If they had not obtained the technology from Canada they probably would have obtained it from someone else, because, again, the genie is out of the bottle and time is moving on. But I don't want to use this as an excuse.

In the majority of cases the technology was a spin-off from the use of nuclear means for power, in particular, and for those who wanted to build their own nuclear weapons capability that was their first step. It was not the only step. Many other things were done. In the case of Israel, I think it's virtually assured that they were assisted by the United States, to greater or lesser degrees, over and above nuclear power. Also, Israel in its own right has the scientific capability to do very great things.

So it's a combination of factors. In the majority of cases it's a case of the countries obtaining nuclear technology for use in nuclear power and then proceeding from there to develop weapons programs. On the other hand, some of them were able to get direct assistance by collaborating with nuclear powers in other ways. There's the alleged connection, say, between Israel and South Africa. South Africa's nuclear capability occurred through collaboration with Israel. There are other nations I can't even mention that are possibly in that one as well, in that particular—

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Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: We're not in camera now. You can mention any nation you want. Go ahead.

Col Sean Henry: I would prefer not to. I will just say that the Israel-South Africa connection is an example of something a little beyond the technology coming from nuclear power. I think I'm right in saying that nuclear power is the big one, but there are others as well.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: Before others come to question, can I make one comment?

You mentioned, Colonel Henry, that once the genie is out, it's difficult to contain it. Are you saying that because we don't give you technology, Germany is going to give it to you? They'll be the ones to give it to you and make some money. Is that what you're saying?

Col Sean Henry: Again, in general terms, yes, although I would not wish to say that the nuclear non-proliferation regime is not doing a reasonable job. I think it is. The trouble is there are no perfect solutions in human life. When you're dealing with something like nuclear weapons, you had better understand that. The nuclear non-proliferation regime is doing an almost perfect job, but not perfect.

There are means that are used in public in that regime that people know about, but believe me, there are other means—what they call national technical means, particularly at the disposal of the United States, but also Russia—that are in use as well that are tremendously effective. They can pin down exactly what is going on.

Having said that, there are areas, particularly Russian—former Soviet tactical nuclear weapons—where they just don't know. That is very scary. There are nations like North Korea, and China until recently, who have chosen to disregard that regime and carry on with assisting countries like Iran to generate a nuclear program.

I would say of the genie that is out of the bottle, do the best you can to control it. But to take some sort of rash action and say, “All right, we've got all these signatures on a treaty here; we've now solved the problem, let's sit back and there's no more problem with nuclear weapons”, I think would be terribly naive and dangerous.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Mr. Rosenblum, quickly. We're now out of time, so you'll have to make your interventions extremely short. We have another meeting.

Mr. Simon Rosenblum: Just as a caution with regard to the NPT, which is an incredibly valuable treaty, if we take the case of Iraq, everybody thought it was okay, through the enforcement regime of the NPT we could protect ourselves against breakout there. Everybody was looking the wrong way, because they looked at the plutonium angle while in fact Iraq did it through the back door, on the cheap if you will, with enriched uranium and what have you, through a very insidious and ongoing arms trade that continues to exist, in which you pick up bits and pieces. So no one should be sanguine that the NPT, of and by itself, is foolproof.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Ms. Gertler.

Ms. Ann Gertler: I mentioned 1945 at the beginning of my testimony. I just want to say the United States did a remarkable job of keeping the Manhattan Project secret, but at the time they announced it they put out a booklet by Smyth that explained how the bomb was made. I have always believed there was enough explanation in that document, which was a press release, for any country in the world to come a long way to making the bomb.

The Chairman: So why did those people go to jail and get shot for dealing with the Soviets if they put it out in their own press release?

Ms. Ann Gertler: I don't know.

The Chairman: That's a mystery that we will—

Ms. Ann Gertler: It was about as irrational as the present attempt to make war in the gulf.

The Chairman: Thank you all very much.

I'd like to thank the members of our panel this morning. It has been very helpful, and we will certainly continue to wrestle with these issues.

Some of the points you brought up about procedure— we are going to try to talk to our American colleagues, as some of the witnesses suggested. We intend to talk to as many NGOs as we can, both North American as well as Canadian. We hope that when you get a copy of our report you will see that this is obviously something that will be in constant ongoing discussion. We hope, at least, that we can enrich the debate. Your position here this morning has enriched our understanding.

Thank you all very much.

The committee will meet again on Thursday at 9 o'clock. The meeting is adjourned.