FAIT Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

COMITÉ PERMANENT DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES ET DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Thursday, February 12, 1998

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[English]

The Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham (Toronto Centre—Rosedale, Lib.)): I would like to call this meeting to order.

On behalf of the committee, I would like to welcome Mr. Jim Fergusson, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba. I also welcome Mr. Rauf, who has come from California, from the International Organizations and Non-Proliferation Project. Thank you both very much for coming.

I want to remind members of a vote at 10.15 a.m., so bells will probably start at 10 a.m. We probably should leave here at 10.05 a.m., so let's keep the questioning of our guests within that framework. When we come back we will hear from the NATO officials. We'll have to break at about 10.05 a.m., so we have just 55 minutes. If you could keep your introductory remarks to about 10 minutes each that will leave more time for questions. Again, thank you for coming.

Mr. Fergusson, will you go first since you're first on the list?

Dr. Jim Fergusson (Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba): Fine. Thank you very much. It's a pleasure to be here. I hope to keep my remarks to about five minutes. I believe all the members have received a copy of the brief and, hopefully, have had an opportunity to read it.

Very quickly, the brief tries to make three important points with regard to the questions of nuclear weapons and issues of nuclear deterrence.

The first concerns the changed structural conditions that have emerged since the end of the cold war. This has in fact created significant structural incentives for an expansion of or more investments on the part of non-nuclear states into development of not only nuclear weapons but also, potentially, chemical and biological weapons as well as advanced delivery systems.

The second concerns itself with NATO and the question of the strategic concept in the role of nuclear weapons in NATO's strategic concept, centred around the issue of first use, which in my belief will likely be the only issue of importance and merit that will be discussed with regard to the upcoming or ongoing NATO strategic review that was announced at the Madrid summit.

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Finally, I have a general set of observations with regard to Canadian policy and multilateralism and the importance of Canada's commitment to NATO as well as the relationship with the United States as it could be affected by a dramatic change in Canadian policy.

Very briefly with regard to new structural incentives, as I've argued in the brief the cold war served an important role in dampening down incentives for non-nuclear states in the periphery outside of Europe to acquire nuclear weapons and advanced delivery systems. This did not mean that these states did not continue to be interested in or at least maintain or hold open their option, but for a variety of detailed reasons the strategic relationships that developed between the United States and the Soviet Union respectively, and their clients and allies on the periphery, served a variety of security benefits to these nations, which in effect reduced their incentives to acquire nuclear weapons.

Since the end of the cold war and the collapse of bi-polarity and the dominance of the United States as leader of the western group of nations, these structural disincentives have now disappeared. We are now in a new strategic environment in which from a perspective, I would suggest, of the periphery or the developing world, there are increased structural incentives for them to acquire nuclear weapons and advanced delivery systems.

These concern, first of all, the absence of any ability to prevent, if it wishes, in any significant way the United States from intervening in local regional conflicts. That is, these states require or will be interested in obtaining means to attempt to deter the intervention of the United States and the west in the absence of their former security relationships with the Soviet Union.

Second is the absence of or the questionable nature of western security commitments. No longer is it guaranteed in the context, as it was in the cold war, that the security allies and clients of the west in the periphery can count on an involvement of the United States in the west in ensuring their strategic security in terms of the way the world divided up during the cold war. Instead, they must now question the extent to which the United States will or will not, or the freedom of the United States to make choices with regard to intervention and its political commitments in that region.

Finally, in both these contexts there's the changing nature of war. As I point out, even under the tacit nuclear umbrellas of the United States and the Soviet Union, and the management process or the management outcome that occurred from that umbrella or those sets of political strategic relationships, this did not foreclose war as a potential option for political purposes. What it did, importantly, was to serve to constrain the nature of war, that is, the potential use of military force for limited political options.

In the absence of questionable security linkages—particularly on the part of the west, the collapse of Russia's relationships with the developing world—now conflicts and crises in various regions could potentially escalate into much more extreme levels, which brings to bear the increasing importance of regional military balances and the relative cost effectiveness, down the road at least, to acquire nuclear weapons for deterrent and potentially compellent purposes.

This leads me to my second point, which is the importance of NATO, the role NATO plays, and our relationship in NATO in maintaining its ability to practise nuclear deterrence, if necessary, in the future; that is to say, for NATO, the interest of the western alliance, the western community of nations, there are certainly situations and potential situations in which intervention or the need to express political will is vitally important. This could be significantly undermined in the case of a non-nuclear based alliance dealing with either overt or covert or ambiguous states on the periphery with regard to their actual ability to deploy and use, if necessary, nuclear weapons. This will be in terms of out-of-area operations, as they're generally known, for NATO in terms of the alliance itself relative to its interests, but also in terms of a potential role NATO would play being called upon under chapter 7 of the United Nations.

The central issue for NATO is not, to me, whether or not NATO should maintain its nuclear capability at a low level with dual-use aircraft or dual-capable aircraft and a relatively small number of nuclear warheads that can be delivered by these aircraft, but rather the question of whether NATO needs a re-look at its current nuclear posture.

• 0915

As you are aware, the current nuclear posture of NATO is one of nuclear weapons as weapons of last resort, with a reservation on the question of first use. That is, in and of itself, a significant change of course from the cold war nuclear posture of NATO, which was an explicit first-use doctrine in the context of the conflict in central Europe.

Today, with the withdrawal of Russia from central Europe, improving relations with Russia, and the current military capabilities of the members of the NATO alliance, I would strongly argue that the actual doctrine of first use, from a strategic perspective, is no longer necessary, and this to me is an important issue and is likely to be the issue that will be discussed with regard to the strategic review that is occurring within NATO circles.

There will be issues that will emerge with regard to the political side of first use, however. I bring to your attention that both France and the United Kingdom, in the context of the new NATO strategic doctrine, were the most reluctant for significant change in strategic posture on the part of NATO, not for strategic reasons per se but largely with regard to questions of the American commitment to Europe.

That brings to my attention, and I think should be emphasized as well for all the members here, that the issue of nuclear weapons in NATO is very much a political question. It is a political question with regard to the commitment on the part of North America to the security of Europe and the Western community of nations. Debate will centre around the question of first use, or the reservation of first use, and images and beliefs with regard to that commitment. I would suggest there are some signs on the horizon where there are questions about the commitment of North America in the future to NATO and European security.

That leads me finally and very briefly to the question of Canada and the question of a dramatic policy change. It is not my belief or opinion that Canada is likely to make a dramatic shift in policy, beyond negotiating or discussing or arguing within NATO circles about the question of first use, because I think as we are all aware, a dramatic change in Canadian policy will in fact serve to marginalize Canada even more in terms of that community of nations of which we are a member.

I would strongly suggest and argue to the members of the committee that as a member of a community—and we are a member of the community of nations, the transatlantic community—through our commitment we share a number of benefits, but in order to share those benefits we also have to share risks. One of those risks is the security risks that come along with the important role of maintaining a nuclear posture on the part of NATO. Thank you.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Professor Fergusson.

Mr. Rauf.

Mr. Tariq Rauf (Director, International Organizations and Non-Proliferation Project (IONP), Centre for Non-Proliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies): Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, through you I would like to thank the committee for this opportunity to make a presentation on the broad theme of Canada, NATO, and nuclear arms control. I would like to apologize for not having a bilingual text available for the committee's use.

I would also like to avail of this opportunity to commend the efforts being made at the Geneva-based conference on disarmament and at other multilateral arms control fora by Canada's ambassador for disarmament to the United Nations and the two other members of the small delegation, as well as by the non-proliferation nuclear arms control and disarmament division at the Department of Foreign Affairs. These efforts could greatly benefit from visible, high-level support from our political leaders and from the Parliament of Canada, all speaking from a common platform.

On nuclear non-proliferation and arms control and disarmament matters, Canada's political leadership has to take on the responsibility of working to develop a multi-party consensus.

Given the time constraints, I wish to register five points or recommendations on nuclear non-proliferation and arms control and disarmament matters with this committee.

The first recommendation is for improved, closer coordination between the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of National Defence, leading to harmonized statements and policy guidance reflecting a balance between Canada's international, legally binding non-proliferation and arms control commitments and alliance obligations, with the Department of Foreign Affairs taking the lead.

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Second is the reduction and elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons from Europe, with the zone of application as defined under the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, CFE, that is, from the Atlantic to the Urals.

Third is a re-examination of NATO's nuclear weapons employment policies, leading to a binding declaration, in conjunction with the Russian Federation, on no first use.

Fourth is a program funded by NATO members to facilitate a build-down of excess weapons plutonium in Russia, involving conversion into mixed-oxide, or MOX, fuel and its subsequent burn-up in Canadian CANDU power reactors.

And fifth is the creation of an independent think-tank and policy research institution in Ottawa to develop policy options and to train the next generation of Canadian and international security specialists, funded through a partnership between the federal government, industry, and charitable foundations.

Let me elaborate somewhat on the first recommendation, that is, coordination between DFAIT and DND. For some years now, Canada has visibly been taking the lead in promoting at a variety of international fora new initiatives on furthering progress in nuclear arms control. Unfortunately, Canada has been let down by its allies, its NATO allies in particular, who have tended to be more responsive to the views or constraints expressed by the alliance leader.

Diplomats and defence planners in many NATO countries, and, I would argue, even in Canada, tend to exist in two solitudes. For example, at Non-Proliferation Treaty and other non-proliferation and arms control fora, diplomats recognize the integral link between non-proliferation and disarmament embodied in the Non-Proliferation Treaty bargain and promote initiatives on reducing and devaluing the role of nuclear weapons in international security. On the other hand, while NATO communiqués refer to the reduced role of nuclear weapons in NATO strategy, NATO planners find it difficult to seriously discuss the role of nuclear weapons, or to consider, in a post-cold war environment, strategies that do not rely on such weapons.

The politics of nuclear weapons and their continuing role in international security, however, lead one to conclude at this time that at least in the short to medium term it is unlikely that regimes of prohibition of the type negotiated for biological and chemical weapons could be achieved for nuclear weapons. A constructive alternative might be to give weight to the legal commitment undertaken by the nuclear weapons states to pursue nuclear disarmament in the context of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a serious policy goal, and as Canada has advocated, to urge the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee for the substantive discussion of nuclear disarmament issues.

In my view, what Canada needs is for both the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of National Defence to put forward our views on nuclear weapons in a coordinated and forceful manner, reflecting both our own and our NATO allies' international commitments. In practice this may have to involve making difficult choices between our international legally binding non-proliferation arms control and disarmament commitments and our alliance obligations.

In this context, the committee might consider recommending that an interdepartmental consultation and coordination process be established between the Department of Foreign Affairs and DND to coordinate and harmonize our policies on multilateral non-proliferation and arms control with our NATO positions, under the guidance and lead of Foreign Affairs. It would be useful if a DND representative could join Canadian delegations at multilateral non-proliferation fora, at DND's expense, in order to report back assessments of the positions of the international community, which could then be factored into our NATO interventions.

The second point is on non-strategic nuclear weapons. Over the past five years, attention has focused on reductions in and safety and security of strategic nuclear weapons in the context of Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties I and II.

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Non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons have largely been ignored following the successful conclusion and implementation of the 1987 intermediate nuclear forces treaty and the fall 1991 Bush-Gorbachev unilateral initiatives.

Non-strategic nuclear weapons are those with ranges of up to 500 kilometres. Reportedly Russia now holds the entire stockpile of some 19,000 non-strategic nuclear warheads produced by the former Soviet Union. The United States active tactical stockpile currently numbers approximately 1,500 warheads, with apparently several thousand in storage, together with some 150 B-61 variant air-delivered warheads still deployed in Europe. Non-strategic nuclear weapons traditionally have been deemed the most dangerous and the most destabilizing due to their proximity to zones of conflict, lack of strong permissive action links, the danger of pre-delegation, and the risk of early pre-emptive or accidental use.

Given the deterioration in Russian armed forces and the nuclear complex, the safety and security of non-strategic nuclear weapons remains an important concern. These concerns are further exacerbated following Russian threats to either redeploy non-strategic nuclear weapons in Belarus and some of the new independent states or along Russia's western and southern borders. With the advent of smart advanced conventional munitions, non-strategic nuclear weapons are no longer as crucial for military planners as they once were during the height of the cold war. Even the United States air force would prefer to remove its remaining B-61 bombs from Europe.

NATO security would be enhanced if steps were taken to codify the 1991 Bush-Gorbachev declarations and to agree on a data exchange framework on numbers and locations of non-strategic nuclear warheads, monitored central storage, deactivation, and dismantlement.

This committee could consider recommending to the Minister of Foreign Affairs that as part of the re-examinations of NATO's strategic concept there should be a general discussion of issues or concepts designed to find practical ways to consider treaty limits on or total elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons at least in the part of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

On nuclear deterrence and no first use, in today's post-cold war world, defining national security primarily in military terms conveys a false sense of reality. Nearly a half a century of cold war fashioned the issue of security into powerful conventional simplifications that are no longer valid. Unfortunately, many of these traditional and outmoded concepts retain great currency among certain security analysts and defence planners. The dominance of military and strategic considerations in the conduct of international relations endures as a pathetic legacy of the cold war.

Deterrence, in particular nuclear deterrence, overwhelmingly dominated the cold war equation of international security. One of the resulting effects was to confuse diplomacy with strategy. This confusion continues to permeate the thinking of many even today. Deterrence rendered international relations into a basic process of bargaining with threats of force. Coercion and submission of the adversary became the overriding substance and purpose of foreign policy.

A resultant hair-trigger mentality suffused diplomacy and militarized international relations. Even though the leaders of the United States and the U.S.S.R. had agreed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, nuclear weapons continued to be maintained on hair-trigger alert.

Despite their best efforts, the supporters of the concept of nuclear deterrence cannot prove that nuclear weapons have preserved the peace in Europe. What one can claim, though, is that they played a supporting role in preserving the peace. Nor can supporters of deterrence prove that the many crises during the cold war were resolved or contained primarily by the threat of nuclear war.

Despite the changed political climate and the window of opportunity to restructure international relations away from reliance on nuclear weapons, influential thinkers and defence planners in the United States, NATO, and Canada still believe in the integrity of nuclear deterrence; that is, stability and security would be jeopardized without nuclear weapons. Such deeply embedded beliefs are extraordinarily resistant to new thinking or to change. The myth of nuclear deterrence leads only to a fool's paradise.

• 0930

This committee could recommend that, as part of NATO's strategic concept review, Canada encourage a full debate on the utility of nuclear weapons in Europe, in particular regarding NATO's policy of not ruling out first use. What is needed is a fundamental blank sheet review and revision of NATO's nuclear policy. The issue of no first use could be engaged in partnership with Russia.

The disposition of excess weapons fissile materials is the fourth point. As a result of sweeping arms reduction agreements, the Russian federation will be releasing about 89 tonnes of plutonium and nearly 500 tonnes of highly enriched uranium from dismantled nuclear warheads. As I mentioned earlier, given the collapse of the former Soviet nuclear infrastructure, the safety and security of the direct weapons usable fissile material is very much in doubt.

There are a number of proposals on how to deal with it. The United States is buying the entire 500 tonnes of uranium coming out of dismantled warheads. The problem that still remains to be resolved is what to do with excess weapons plutonium. Canada, Japan, and France have all expressed interest in burning up such plutonium once it has been converted into mixed oxide fuel. While the French proposal calls for MOX burn-up in Russia with French technical assistance, there are certain doubts about this given the lack of proper controls in Russia. Therefore, building a new plutonium-burning reactor in Russia would not be recommended.

Similarly, Japan does not have the reactors to burn such plutonium. Canada does. Without any major engineering modifications, our CANDU reactors could burn up this mixed oxide fuel and the spent fuel could then be kept under international safeguards.

However, the responsibility should not be Canada's alone. This committee could consider a recommendation that the government approach the NATO allies and Japan to put in place a multilateral program to provide the technical expertise and the funding to facilitate the safe interim storage of excess weapons fissile materials, to assist the Russian federation in converting excess weapons plutonium to MOX, and to underwrite the subsequent burn-up of this material in Canadian CANDU reactors, followed by permanent storage under IAEA safeguards.

Coming to my last point, I believe this committee would be somewhat shocked and concerned to learn that Canada is the only G7 country that does not have an independent think-tank or research institution dealing with national and international security issues. While the Department of National Defence still funds ten or more university-based centres under its military and strategic studies program, the Parliament of Canada and DFAIT have both terminated their respective funding programs for institutions other than this committee.

The newly established Centre for Foreign Policy Development is a part of DFAIT. It is responsive to the government's policy agenda and to my knowledge has not as yet engaged in substantive work on hard security issues.

I would argue that properly managed independent think-tanks and research institutions constitute an integral part of civil society and contribute to good governance. They can help strengthen democratic processes and encourage open debate. Public scrutiny, openness, and transparency, while sometimes being inconvenient, nevertheless can result in better government policies and can also contribute to enhancing private sector competitiveness. This committee could consider a recommendation that the government establish an Ottawa-based independent think-tank or research institution that would rely on this committee's expertise and that would be funded by a partnership of government, industry, and charitable foundations.

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Finally, with respect, might I state for the record that it would have benefited the committee to have heard the two officials from DFAIT and DND, who will follow the two of us, in an open hearing, thus facilitating dialogue between the witnesses, between officials and NGO viewpoints.

There is very little on nuclear and NATO issues that is not out in the open.

To conclude, let me quote from the recent report of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, whose findings reportedly have been welcomed by Minister Axworthy: “The world would be a safer place and the risks of deadly conflict would be reduced if nuclear weapons were not actively deployed.”

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Thank you very much.

Both witnesses were very helpful.

Mr. Mills.

Mr. Bob Mills (Red Deer, Ref.): I think all of us on this committee would agree that it would be nice not to have any nuclear weapons.

Having said that, you downplayed the whole idea of using nuclear weapons as a deterrent.

It's rather pointless to talk about this as long as there are nuclear weapons out there, talking about the Russians and the U.S. and China and France and Britain. Maybe that isn't the real issue, because as long as somebody has them I can't imagine strategically not having them.

You might say that's an out-of-date idea, but that just seems to me to be the mentality you're going to get into this.

When you are saying that we'd like to get rid of all of them, all of us would agree. To me, that's not really the issue, but let's hope there won't be any maybe 50 years from now.

I guess the real issue is the danger I see of other people getting them. As Dr. Fergusson says, the need to have them seems to be growing. It seems to me that rogue states and individual power groups out there are the ones.... If this stuff is as mobile as it seems it might be, that's what we could be dealing with.

How do we keep them from getting it? That's one question.

A second one has been raised, about moving that plutonium. Politically that seems to me like a very difficult issue to deal with as well. You're talking about taking Russian plutonium and transporting it, with the problems of security, the problems of potential contamination—that whole transport issue. Then a huge issue, I think, would be storage, because you don't burn it all and you're left with nuclear waste that you still have to deal with.

If you use terms like 89,000 tonnes, that sounds like a lot of stuff.

Mr. Tariq Rauf: Eighty-nine tonnes.

Mr. Bob Mills: Okay. I'm not sure where I got the thousands, but it doesn't matter anyway.

You're talking about the storing of this and the difficulties of storing it. We have trouble storing what we have now. It seems as if we're constantly worrying about how we are going to store it from our own CANDU reactors. If we're bringing all of this in, that seems to be a problem.

I'm just wondering if you think that's politically saleable to the Canadian public. I'd like you to comment on that.

Mr. Tariq Rauf: With respect, dealing with the first part of your question, that argument boils down to the idea that our and our allies' nuclear weapons are good but everyone else's nuclear weapons are bad.

Proliferation threats in terms of nuclear weapons are declining, and I would strenuously disagree with the type of policy statements coming out of Washington, made by authoritative figures who wave little vials of anthrax and so on and talk about countries developing nuclear weapons.

We have had only two instances, and of those two Iraq was the more serious. This was a failure of the international community not to detect that program earlier, but it was also collusion of the international community. The United States actively supported Iraq in the Iran war. They shared satellite reconnaissance information with Iraq. The Iraqis had very good information on how to elude U.S. satellites.

I can go into a long explanation, which I don't want to go into here now.

The other case that still needs to be fully resolved is that of North Korea. However, in partnership with the U.S., the South Koreans, and Japan, that problem is being dealt with.

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So we have three nuclear-capable countries that remain outside the non-proliferation treaty—India, Israel and Pakistan. These three countries lie in two conflict-prone regions. As long as the Middle East peace process remains stymied, or gains made earlier are being reversed, the nuclear, chemical, and biological problem in the Middle East will not go away.

In South Asia, unfortunately, we have a 50-year record of an intractable dispute. Canada and other countries have tried to intercede, but unfortunately haven't been successful.

Today 186 countries are parties to the non-proliferation treaty. The treaty verifies peaceful uses of nuclear energy and verifies that new material has been diverted. We need to enhance our verification capabilities. The IAEA is still doing that.

If, for the most powerful countries in the world, nuclear weapons are still necessary, then I find it very hard to argue why weaker countries would not also want to develop those same weapons. So this logic that because the re-proliferation threat is out there our nuclear weapons are good, and we need to have them, is I think a false logic.

In terms of weapons plutonium, yes, there are transport vulnerabilities, but these can be mitigated. We can use aircraft ships and so on. The problem of nuclear waste storage can also be dealt with. If we did burn the plutonium, it would displace uranium that we would ordinarily have burnt in our reactors. The waste coming out of burning MOX would be 30% less in quantity or volume than that produced by burning natural uranium. The downside, however, is that radiologically it would be hotter. So we would have to keep it in cooling ponds for a longer time. Since this is displacing uranium that would be burnt in any case, we are not adding to our burden of storing nuclear waste. Actually, it's reducing it at one level.

Politically, yes, I would argue that this would be a difficult thing to sell to the Canadian public, particularly the routes along which trucks would pass carrying this material, but I think this is an issue where, again, there needs to be a multiparty debate and hopefully consensus on this issue. We're helping to reduce proliferation dangers. We're helping to reduce the danger of this plutonium finding its way to, as you call them, “rogue countries”—and I would disagree with the use of that term—such as Iran or Iraq or Libya, who may be interested in such materials.

Thank you.

The Chairman: Very briefly, Mr. Fergusson. We have only 20 minutes left, and we have about four other people who want to ask questions.

Dr. Jim Fergusson: I'm not going to get into the question of why or why not and under what conditions—there are various arguments—states will decide to go down a nuclear route or a chemical-biological one. Of course, if there was a harmony of interests among all states we wouldn't have this problem, but the reality is that there is conflict. The question of military forces and the maintenance of such forces remains important to states for their security interests.

There is one point I want to stress with regard to the issue of proliferation. If one goes down this path toward whatever the future may be of a nuclear-free world, serious problems emerge with regard to what we will do in these cases when we do discover the presence of a state covertly acquiring nuclear weapons. Is it in the interests of this country and our allies, and what is the probability that we would actually enact a policy of counter-proliferation—that is, an American policy—where, under situations when a state is identified and is about to deploy, the threat of intervention will occur? Will we be willing to do so? Will we be willing, in fact, to have the abilities in intelligence terms to be able to identify and act quickly enough in these very dangerous circumstances?

A world with thousands of nuclear weapons is not a safe world, but a world without nuclear weapons where one party does happen to acquire two or three is an extremely dangerous one. I think we have to be very cautious when we consider these things.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Mr. Sauvageau.

[Translation]

Mr. Benoît Sauvageau (Repentigny, BQ): My first comment is for Mr. Fergusson, who said that we had to be suspicious of small countries that might secretly acquire nuclear weapons. Unless I am mistaken, it seems to me from what the previous witnesses have said that this couldn't happen except in the movies. They would have to have an immense territory, where radioactivity would be detected by today's highly developed satellites. Consequently, to all intents and purposes, that would be impossible.

• 0945

Could you first answer what previous witnesses have said? It would be good to know whether or not this kind of thing can be done in secret.

Both of you, but mainly Mr. Rauf, spoke about the principles that Canada should promote internationally. I have nothing against that. However, if concrete and quick action were taken in accordance with a timetable, what concrete actions should Canada undertake?

First of all, if we want to occupy a prominent place on the international scene, somewhat as we did in the case of anti- personnel mines, wouldn't it be a good idea for Canada to prohibit production of fissionable material within its borders, within the country, where it can act "unilaterally".

Second, wouldn't it be desirable for Canada to declare itself a free zone for nuclear production and the transportation of nuclear weapons?

After taking these two concrete actions domestically, which it could do quickly, Canada could place itself at the head of a group of countries in favour of zones where nuclear weapons are prohibited.

If you had the time, could you answer a question concerning Iraq? That's a completely different issue. Is Iraq the only country in the Middle East that has chemical and bacteriological weapons, weapons of mass destruction, which make the Americans feel so threatened?

Thank you.

[English]

Dr. Jim Fergusson: If I understand the question correctly, you're asking if it's impossible to develop nuclear weapons in a hidden way and if we don't have guarantees that we can detect the development.

The history of international politics is a history of intelligence failure after intelligence failure, and I think Iraq is a good case in point. North Korea is another good case in point of intelligence failure. A lot of it is assumed on the basis of old technology about what is required to go nuclear and assumptions that you need to test the warhead.

Israel and South Africa—it depends what you think the arguments are about the mysterious flash in the south Atlantic several decades ago and whether that was a nuclear test or not. India certainly detonated a peaceful nuclear device. Pakistan—suspected—has not. Both Argentina and Brazil at one time were apparently going down this path. No one is sure exactly how far they went, although they both have renounced. North Korea, of course, we now believe actually possesses or did possess at least enough fissile material for a nuclear bomb and perhaps had one, but again it was the political events. So I am very reluctant to guarantee that our intelligence capabilities would be able to uncover such violations.

It's important to recall that it's not the old system of deployed developed weapons, of missiles and silos readily identifiable as in this cold war relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. There is a variety of mobile missile systems that are in place and being developed for delivery. There are also air delivery systems. Of course, these have limits with regard to military utility, but in political terms we're seeing the emergence of what may be called an ambiguous strategy.

It's not a question, in many ways, of whether or not they have the weapons; it's a question of whether or not we believe they have the weapons. If we believe them, ambiguity restructures or alters a political bargaining relationship. I think the most important thing is to recognize that the role and utility of nuclear weapons in terms of covert and ambiguous as well as overt deployment is one in which it structures and alters political relationships. It's a political question and not a military one, and shouldn't be conceived of in military terms per se.

The Chairman: But to be a credible political one it has to be militarily credible as well, doesn't it?

Dr. Jim Fergusson: Yes, there has to be a degree of credibility about the threat, but the concern about nuclear weapons is to conceive them in political strategic terms, not in military terms.

The Chairman: Yes, I appreciate that. I understand what you're saying.

Benoît.

• 0950

[Translation]

Mr. Benoît Sauvageau: Mr. Rauf, could you just answer yes or no? I'm sorry if I didn't understand. Just tell me whether a country can obtain them secretly. I didn't understand in your answer, which was very interesting, whether a country could secretly obtain nuclear weapons. Can you answer the question with a yes or no?

[English]

The Chairman: If I understood the question, it was clearly yes, but I think the quote I got was “The history of political strategy is one of intelligence failure after intelligence failure”. I think what he was telling us is that we can't assume we know everything the other guys are doing.

Mr. Rauf, did you want to add to it?

Mr. Tariq Rauf: I would like to disagree. Israel needed French help, with the supply of the Dimona reactor, to get nuclear expertise. India and Pakistan were helped by Canada and the U.S. with peaceful nuclear reactors. China helped Pakistan. DPRK was not a failure. It was the IAEA that found the plutonium problem in time.

Iraq was an intelligence failure. I already explained in part why it was an intelligence failure.

To respond to the direct questions that were addressed to me, I did not advocate a timeframe for nuclear reductions. What I mentioned was that Canada should support, and we are supporting in Geneva, that there should be a discussion on nuclear weapons issues. Unfortunately, the United States is not interested in discussions in a multilateral forum on nuclear weapons reductions.

When you said Canada would enhance its credibility by getting rid of all nuclear facilities on its territory, I think one needs to make a separation between nuclear weapons and peaceful uses of nuclear energy for producing electricity for radiation treatment in hospitals, radiation treatment in agriculture. These are two very separate things. One can very adequately verify peaceful non-weapons uses. In Canada, using our own taxpayers' money, we have helped the IAEA strengthen its own safeguards and mechanisms.

In the Middle East, according to the CIA, the countries that are reported to have chemical and biological weapons capabilities are Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Israel.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Thank you very much. Mr. Bachand.

Mr. André Bachand (Richmond—Arthabaska, PC): I would like to continue in the same vein as my colleagues, Messrs. Mills and Sauvageau. Mr. Mills talked a great deal about the public reaction to the way in which the plutonium from our CANDU reactors is disposed of. So, ultimately, Canada would do its share to ensure there are fewer nuclear weapons in the world.

However, if you only think of the example of PCBs, in Quebec and elsewhere in the world, but mainly in Quebec, we should forget the idea of processing plutonium from other countries in Quebec or elsewhere in Canada. Forget that completely. That won't work. That much is clear.

Having said that, however, when a government takes a position in favour of disarmament, it is asked what it has done on its own in that direction or what can be done.

My second question ties in with that of Mr. Sauvageau as to whether it is appropriate to declare Canada a nuclear-weapons-free zone. For most people, nuclear energy means nuclear bombs. I've been receiving messages for some time now concerning the nuclear issue in Canada and calling, of course, for complete disarmament. People want Canada to adopt a very firm position on this, but they also want nuclear energy to disappear completely from the Canadian landscape because of the risks it entails.

So, in your view, how credible would Canada be? When you propose something internationally, it's a good idea to look at what's being done at home and to consider the opinion of your own citizens. What position on nuclear weapons can Canada defend internationally?

The Chairman: Mr. Rauf or Mr. Fergusson, or both?

Mr. André Bachand: Or even you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: No. We're not experts yet.

[English]

Dr. Jim Fergusson: This is not my field of expertise at all, fissile material, but it does seem to me one thing this committee and this country could consider doing is developing a program similar to the Nunn-Lugar program in the United States, which is designed to facilitate and assist Russia in meeting its obligations under START I and subsequently START II reductions; to provide capital and technological expertise to Russia to assist it. I think that is an important thing and something that would be supported widely in this country.

Mr. Tariq Rauf: I would agree with Mr. Fergusson. Already Canada is supporting the International Science and Technology Centre in Moscow and the Science and Technology Centre in Kiev, precisely along the lines that Dr. Fergusson suggested.

• 0955

There is a small percentage of the Canadian population that would like Canadian energy sources for Canadians to be generated from non-nuclear sources of energy. Sometimes there is a confusion that nuclear materials are the most toxic on earth; however, there are many other materials—caesium, lead and other things—other chemicals that we routinely use in producing various products and that are very long-lived as well. The big problem with nuclear energy, of course, is that accidents tend to be much more catastrophic, such as Chernobyl or Three Mile Island. However, we have a very good safety record in Canada in operating our nuclear power reactors. With more investment and better training, we could improve on that even more.

I think we have a responsibility. We've lived under the nuclear umbrella for fifty years. We were co-inventors of the nuclear bomb with the British and the U.S. We were the first country to give up voluntarily our right to develop nuclear weapons.

The effects of nuclear weapons testing atmospherically conducted in the United States have affected the Canadian population. That radiation has crossed the international boundary, according to Health Canada. The official Canadian position is that this radioactive waste mysteriously stopped at the 49th parallel and didn't cross over, but if you look at the data from Health Canada, there is a percentage of the Canadian population affected.

So we have good credentials, and our technology works. This is a public education exercise that the government and political parties would have to undertake if this were to go ahead.

[Translation]

Mr. André Bachand: Mr. Chairman, to expand on my question, when Canada decided to abandon nuclear weapons, the decision was not that difficult to make. When you have a neighbour like the United States, when you are a member of NATO and NORAD, and when you have a common border with the United States, and Russia is not that far away, you know perfectly well that the Americans will protect you. That was an easy decision to make. That's when we began developing the domestic uses of nuclear energy more than its military use.

But, still today, as I said, before the Canadian government adopts a position, we have to be certain that people clearly understand the difference between nuclear energy and nuclear weapons; and I'm telling you people generally don't know the difference. As you clearly pointed out, a disaster at a CANDU reactor would be much worse than an ice storm in Quebec with Hydro- Québec. In people's minds, nuclear power is very dangerous, but the only image they have is that of the two bombs that exploded over Japan during the Second World War. That was 52 years ago, but people still view nuclear energy as destructive.

As I said, Canada's political credibility is at stake here and we have to know what position Canadians are prepared to support so that it can be put forward internationally.

The Chairman: If I understand you correctly, the real enemy, the real danger, is Ontario Hydro.

[English]

Anyway, before I go to Mr. Assadourian, because we're going to have Canadian NATO people afterwards—and I got your point about the desirability of their testimony being public. Before you go, perhaps you could make sure you tell us what you think we should be asking them in terms of how flexible NATO would be towards changing its first-use policy and the extent to which that would require that we would get an acceptable Russian acceptance of that as well. To my mind, both of you seem to suggest that would be required for any chance of it going forward. The question is how reliable those two would be, because it seems that what we're hearing about is the reliability.

Added to that, what I heard the other day was rather perturbing. That was this issue of these non-strategic nuclear weapons on which, the suggestion is, the Russians are now more dependent than they ever were before. Their conventional forces are weaker and they maybe don't have all these magic gadgets that the Americans have to zap folks with, so maybe they're just going to stick with the old nuclear stuff that they do know.

So maybe you could help us with all that.

Mr. Tariq Rauf: Now or later?

The Chairman: We'll give Mr. Assadourian his chance first. Do you want to go ahead, Mr. Assadourian?

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian (Brampton Centre, Lib.): Can you decide? Shall I ask the question or wait for him to answer?

The Chairman: If the members would like to get answers to those questions, maybe we'll do those first and then go to you, if that's all right.

• 1000

Mr. Tariq Rauf: Given the orthodoxy in NATO circles, having a fundamental review of NATO policy and getting no first use would be difficult.

I want to separate the two issues. On no first use, I think we need to talk with the Russians, because in 1993 they revoked the former Soviet Union's strategy of no first use. As you suggested, they are more reliant—this is also their way of getting back at us for NATO enlargement. But it is their non-strategic nuclear weapons that are a threat, so we can find ways whereby at least in terms of CFB Europe there could be a zone free of these weapons.

I think a question you might consider asking the officials is whether NATO is prepared to do, as I mentioned, a blank sheet review of NATO nuclear policy and its nuclear weapons employment policy. This is the equivalent of the bottom-up review conducted in the United States.

With the end of the cold war the thinking hasn't changed. Instead of having bloated arsenals we now have much smaller arsenals, but all of the thinking and the logic that led us to have 70,000 nuclear weapons deployed led to a total production of nearly 150,000 nuclear weapons. That thinking has fundamentally not changed, and we need to change that thinking.

The threats to Europe are from ethnic conflict, from refugees, from economic deprivation. Nuclear weapons are completely and totally useless in that context. They make no sense at all. Unfortunately, again, as I mentioned, when Canada makes these suggestions in NATO circles, our other, non-nuclear allies do not support us because they are afraid of Washington's reaction. Sometimes, I am told, they will come up to Canadian delegates privately and say they agree with us, but unfortunately they are not in a position to stand up and be counted.

So while we may make these recommendations, politically I don't think NATO is at a level where they would do anything really meaningful.

Dr. Jim Fergusson: Very briefly on the question of Russian first use, I don't think it's an issue that should even be breathed, as far as I'm concerned. The Russians, for a variety of domestic political reasons and other political strategic reasons, have faced a series of what they would view as foreign policy setbacks. Attempting to go at them with first use now in the context of concerns about ballistic missile defence, the ABM Treaty, NATO enlargement, and a host of other political questions in central and eastern Europe is basically waving a red flag at them.

This is vital for political, strategic, and security reasons for Russia. It has to do with the important remaining vestige of Russian prestige, and I don't think it's very fruitful for NATO or for the west in general to engage Russia whatsoever in first use.

In terms of NATO, I think there are some important questions that need to be asked about NATO, first of all largely in terms of the member nations, and this concerns, of course, Britain and the current status of nuclear weapons and the ongoing strategic defence review—Trident is in place; whether or not Britain is considering any other further significant changes, if any, to its deterrent posture; France; the question of a Euro-deterrent, which many would argue would be vital to replace the absence of a nuclear base NATO alliance.... There has been very little indication, at least that I've seen, that the French, despite floating hints of it, are willing to go down that path. Germany as well has suggested strongly that it will not acquire nuclear weapons through the back door, through Franco-German cooperation.

There is the question of political prestige, the politics attached to the American commitment of nuclear weapons, as I mentioned earlier. I think that's a very important issue, and this is a real issue that requires an understanding of European sensitivity to the linkage between the presence of nuclear weapons in NATO at these low levels as a symbol of that American commitment. I think that's a very important question.

Finally, of course, there are latent concerns about what would happen to other powers within NATO and outside of NATO with regard to the absence of a nuclear ability to practice nuclear deterrence. I think one important issue needs to be emphasized. The problem of NATO nuclear strategy right now is that it does not have a nuclear strategy because it does not need a nuclear strategy. What it needs is to have a capability and a declaratory posture to structure political bargaining and political relationships both within and outside of Europe.

The problem of last resort and the question of the reservation of first use has nothing to do with an exact strategy because NATO has no one to deter right now. No one is practising deterrence. We are maintaining the ability to practice it if necessary under certain conditions in the future.

• 1005

The Chairman: Thank you very much. That's helpful.

Mr. Assadourian.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: Thank you. Last week witnesses told us the former U.S.S.R. has so many weapons and their technology to maintain their inventory is so poor that they don't know exactly where those weapons are and how many they actually have.

Based on this being true, and after the cold war, with the break-up of the Soviet Union, can you assure Canadians and our government that no other country in the former U.S.S.R., whether it is in east Europe, the Caucasus or the Far East, has any nuclear capacity?

Mr. Tariq Rauf: The nuclear successors to the former Soviet Union, the countries that found themselves with nuclear weapons on their territory after the collapse of the Soviet Union, were Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Russia.

Under the START I agreement, which was modified in the Lisbon protocol, all non-strategic and strategic nuclear weapons as well as their missile launchers were removed from the territories of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. These three countries subsequently joined the non-proliferation treaty as non-nuclear-weapon states, and several months ago in the Ukraine the former U.S. defence secretary presided over the destruction of the last ICBM long-range missile silo that was left in Ukraine; this was just a place where the missile was stored.

U.S. intelligence sources have reassured the U.S. leadership at the highest level that all non-strategic nuclear weapons were removed to the territory of the Russian federation even prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Now there have been reports that some tactical or so-called “suitcase bombs” or devices might have been sold to the Iranians or acquired by somebody else. No one can prove or disprove that. It seems very unlikely that it would have been done.

If one speaks to Russian military officials they get really very upset if one accuses them of having lax control or of allowing these devices or this weapons-related nuclear material to go outside of their territory.

The two programs I mentioned and the program Dr. Fergusson mentioned—the cooperative threat reduction program—where the United States has now spent somewhere around $3 billion or $4 billion helping to build, with the Russians, storage facilities where nuclear weapons would be stored...they have provided them with safe, secure transports. These are railcars that are specially designed to carry nuclear weapons, with kevlar blankets so that you can cover the nuclear weapon with warheads in case somebody attacks those weapons with a rifle and so on.

There are many other measures that could be put in place and are being put in place. Slowly the situation in Russia is being stabilized. We still have a long way to go. Also, this is a very expensive process.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: Basically, you're assuring us 100% that no other former U.S.S.R. country has nuclear weapons except Russia.

Mr. Tariq Rauf: As somebody said, no one can give a 100% guarantee on anything, but as far as is known and as far as the United States claims and believes, only the Russian federation has nuclear weapons from the former Soviet Union.

Dr. Jim Fergusson: I certainly wouldn't give you that assurance at all. In the cases of Belarus and Kazakhstan I would be more confident in giving an assurance like that, from what I've read, largely because of the political relationship—which remains very close—between both countries and Moscow.

In the case of Ukraine I would be less assured about whether they have been able to maintain some tactical or limited nuclear capability; for what purposes, it's difficult to know. Certainly there has been some evidence and enough indication that the Ukraine did try to gain control of the access codes and in fact gain control of the operational ICBMs on Ukrainian soil and failed. Arguments have been put forward that in fact that failure itself was one of the reasons they decided to give up the strategic end, and in fact, then, for political reasons, move down the NPT.

But Ukraine is a nuclear-capable country and under certain security conditions it would not take, in my view, very long for Ukraine to go down the nuclear path if it believed it was vital to its security interests. I certainly wouldn't give you 100% assurances at all.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: So these threshold countries, Israel, India, and Pakistan, are actually just numbers. They're not the only ones that should be called threshold countries. Others are potential threshold countries for nuclear weapons. That's what you're saying.

Dr. Jim Fergusson: Yes. I would agree.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: How about China? My colleague reminded me of China. What can you tell us about their nuclear capacity?

• 1010

Dr. Jim Fergusson: China's nuclear capacity is extremely limited. They have a small intercontinental ballistic missile system capability. At least according to some sources, they have not developed advanced, sophisticated delivery systems. By that I mean multiple, independently targeted re-entry vehicles, or MIRVs.

They've invested much more in tactical and theatre systems, which is reflected by the security conditions that China faced through the cold war, particularly the tacit relationship with the west vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

They have deployed, and are attempting to develop, a submarine-launched ballistic missile system. This is despite fears by many that China, under certain political conditions that are emerging, will rapidly expand its offensive strategic force, particularly its long-range forces. This is in the context of concerns about national missile defence deployments in the United States that, the Chinese will argue, threaten their strategic deterrent capability.

All indications are that there are much more pressing military security requirements in which China will invest. I do not foresee for the future a significant expansion of Chinese nuclear forces. I see a very gradual modernization by moving closer and closer or improving their capabilities over the next several decades. For the moment, they remain a global power in the sense of having a very small number of long-range delivery systems.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: Thank you.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Madam Beaumier.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier (Brampton West—Mississauga, Lib.): Thank you.

Doug Roche has testified that if we don't continue with the process and take more action, then the non-proliferation treaty will fizzle. What do you see as the future of the non-proliferation treaty?

Dr. Jim Fergusson: I would tend to argue that the non-proliferation treaty has been useful. It has been useful in two senses and it will remain useful in those two senses. It's a mechanism in international agreements and through the IAEA's role in verification and safeguarding the proliferation of nuclear material that serves as a barrier. It retards the ability and the speed at which states can, if they so wish, acquire nuclear weapons.

The flip side of that is that it also, because of the NPT and the political interests around why the various states all signed on, in fact drove a lot of programs underground relative to a range of political costs and benefits relative to national security interests. Nonetheless, it will still serve that purpose. The overwhelming majority of states will still remain supportive of it regardless of what does or does not happen between the United States and Russia.

There is a second point at which it would still remain in place and useful. For those states, in certain security situations whereby they have no desire to go down the nuclear path but are somewhat concerned by their neighbours, the NPT provides valuable reassurance to each other that they're not going to do so. That will remain useful and in the interests of states throughout the international system, independent of what the advanced nuclear powers do or not do. It will remain a political bat to beat us over the head with, but so be it.

Mr. Tariq Rauf: I would like to add that the NPT is the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime. Without the NPT, there would be no strategic arms reductions and no reductions in nuclear weapons. Without the NPT, we would not have the assurance that the many countries—38 countries or so—with civilian nuclear programs are not diverting those technologies and materials toward nuclear weapons use.

The non-proliferation treaty is the only multilateral legal commitment that has been undertaken by the five nuclear weapons states to reduce and ultimately eliminate their nuclear weapons.

This commitment was reinforced in 1995, as Ambassador Roche must have discussed here, when the NPT was made indefinite. Also, under UN Security Council resolution 984 of April 11, 1995, the five nuclear weapons states gave binding negative security assurances to all non-nuclear members of the NPT that they would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them.

Therefore, I'm very concerned about this new talk coming out of Washington that's being adopted in NATO circles and even by some of our military planners that nuclear weapons are needed to deter chemical and biological attacks, because this would be a clear violation of the NSAs given in 1995. It could undermine the NPT. The sole role of nuclear weapons is to deter the use of other nuclear weapons.

• 1015

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: What do you see as its future? Do we have to take a next step?

Mr. Tariq Rauf: Yes, we do. The NPT is a bargain, whereby 181 non-nuclear countries gave up their right to make nuclear weapons, and the five nuclear weapon states are obligated to reduce and ultimately eliminate their nuclear weapons.

On the last page of my testimony there is a chart that shows that even in the year 2007, when START I, START II, and START III, which has not yet been negotiated—even after START III has been implemented, the two largest nuclear weapons states will still have more nuclear weapons than they had in 1970 when the non-proliferation treaty came into force.

What kind of message does this send to the non-nuclear weapon states? Here you have nuclear possessors. For them, nuclear weapons are legitimized in perpetuity, whereas other states have to live under the existential threat of nuclear weapons, of accident, unauthorized use, and so on.

Dr. Jim Fergusson: I can't help but disagree. Tariq, I don't think those numbers are correct at all. The strategic warhead numbers are significantly reduced from the level of the 1970s and the 1960s, and in fact from the level of about the late 1950s onwards. They are significantly reduced.

You can play little counting games with what you call a strategic weapon and what you don't call a strategic weapon. Nonetheless, there is a significant reduction. I would also disagree with Dr. Rauf in that the START agreements have absolutely nothing to do with the NPT—nothing whatsoever. They are a function of the changed political strategic relationship between Moscow and Washington; a function of a new set of political requirements that necessitated—demanded in many ways—for political reasons and legitimized a significant reduction in nuclear warheads.

Those will continue to come down. I would suggest they'll come down even below START III levels, assuming the political strategic relationship remains where it is. They will not go away, at least for the foreseeable future.

Mr. Tariq Rauf: I would like to challenge Dr. Fergusson to provide me the data that shows that in the year 2007 these warheads will be lower.

Dr. Jim Fergusson: I'll send it to you.

The Chairman: We're going to challenge our researchers to find out which one of you two is right on the numbers, because if we can't agree on that we're going to have a lot of trouble.

That's a good question we might be able to ask when we're in Washington and New York. Any help you could offer by giving us suggestions for that would also be good.

Before I turn to Madame Debien, let me ask you a question. I believe, Dr. Rauf, you said that in terms of cooperation with Russia—it may have been Dr. Fergusson who said that we should be looking at ways of helping them reduce the arsenal, the way the Americans have. I don't know how successful that program has been. I do know that when we were in Russia as a committee, a group of us here met with the head of the atomic energy commission of Russia. When we talked about the removal of the nuclear waste around Murmansk, he said they had been promised $20 million a year, or something like that, just to help them clean up. They've never seen the money, so they're not doing it.

We also heard horror stories in Russia that there's a lot of reluctance to give the Russians money because you don't know where it's going to go if you give it. You don't know whether it's going to be used for the purpose you give it for. Within these two extremes there may be something.

Have you any comments? You did mention that this would be an important thing for Canada to do. Have you any confidence that if Canada were to be more active and provide more funds along these lines that this would be a positive development, they would be properly used, and we could be confident that in fact we'd be contributing something to this situation?

Mr. Tariq Rauf: Earlier the United States had a lot of problems ensuring the proper use of these moneys, but over the years they have gained a lot of experience. They've put in place a number of procedures that give the U.S. government a pretty good handle as to exactly where these moneys are being used.

There are a number of problems. There is the waste from nuclear submarines and dismantled submarine reactors in Murmansk and on the Far East in the Pacific. There is nuclear waste from nuclear weapons production facilities. Then there are excess weapons—nuclear materials coming out of dismantled nuclear warheads.

The Russians have a whole series of problems and no amount of money is going to help resolve them all together. We are still contributing through the EBRD to the science and technology centres in Kiev and Moscow, so it's not that Canada is not doing anything. We could up our contribution a little bit if we had the money, but we would need to direct it to specific programs that we control. Most of our money that goes to the science and technology centres is controlled by the U.S., Japan, and the Europeans. We have very little say in where our Canadian dollar is spent.

• 1020

The Chairman: That's probably because we contribute proportionally very little. The amount of say we have is in terms of the proportion of what we contribute.

Mr. Tariq Rauf: That's right, but our economy is one-tenth the size of that of the U.S., so proportionally we are contributing the same.

The Chairman: From the Russian perspective, they say they haven't gotten what they were promised. Do you have any comment on that or do you know whether that's true?

Mr. Tariq Rauf: It's partly true. Sometimes because of language problems, when the Americans say something it's interpreted by the Russian side as a promise to give money whereas the Americans might be exploring the possibility of giving money.

Also there have been bottlenecks on the U.S. side in the actual transfer of moneys. There are government accounting office reports that suggest this program was not very well managed in its early years, and some of these bottlenecks still continue.

The Chairman: Thank you.

[Translation]

Ms. Debien.

Ms. Maud Debien (Laval-Est, BQ): My question is for Mr. Fergusson.

Mr. Fergusson, in the last paragraph of your brief, you place considerable emphasis on the notion of burden sharing, a NATO global security philosophy that goes back to the 1980s.

Do you really believe, as you emphasize in your text, that Canada could be marginalized within the alliance, if it decided, for example, to promote the total abolition of nuclear weapons? We know that the United States is now virtually the only major nuclear power on the planet and, since the end of the Cold War, and even before, has been playing a global policing role. We also know that Canada is only a mid-size player within the alliance and that it occupies a very minor position when it comes to risk sharing within the alliance. Do you really believe Canada will be marginalized?

[English]

Dr. Jim Fergusson: Very quickly, I agree entirely with you. In fact, I have seen and I have argued in other places that a variety of policies have been undertaken by Canada with regard to NATO and our membership in that alliance over the past several years. That was done for a variety of understandable and explicable reasons, but in the eyes of our European allies in particular, and to a lesser degree of the United States, it has led to questions about our real commitment to Europe, that longstanding commitment of Canada to European security and to the transatlantic community.

I would strongly suggest that a dramatic policy shift towards the idea that we are going to stand for the abolition of nuclear weapons would make our membership in NATO untenable and would also affect our relationship with the United States in terms of the role we play in aerospace defence of North America. If it did not make it untenable, it would completely marginalize us. It would put us in the back rooms where we would have little ability to influence and have a voice in security issues that are interests of Canada. I agree entirely with you.

[Translation]

Ms. Maud Debien: I was contending the opposite. I don't think we would be marginalized, since we are merely a mid-size player and play a very minor role in risk sharing within the alliance. I don't think we would be marginalized if we promoted the total abolition of nuclear weapons.

My position is completely opposite to yours. I don't think Canada would be marginalized if it took the initiative of promoting total prohibition of nuclear weapons by proposing a very specific program for the elimination of such weapons, given the minor role it plays within the alliance. Not much would change in the benefits we derive from it. In fact, we don't have very much of a say. We have more of a moral power.

I don't agree when you say you share my opinion. I'm saying I don't share your view regarding Canada's eventual marginalization within the alliance.

• 1025

[English]

Dr. Jim Fergusson: There's no easy answer to this question of marginalization. It goes to the question of influence, Canada's interests, what role Canada wants to have, what role Canada could have, and then what types of commitments Canada is willing to make to our relationship with our European allies.

Since the end of World War II, it's generally been the standing policy of Canada that we are committed to European security. That commitment has been in place or been evident through the deployment of forces in Europe, our commitment to NATO infrastructure, and largely solidarity with our NATO allies.

There is nothing difficult or wrong for any member nation such as Canada to make its views known in the NATO council. But I would suggest that, for a country that prides itself on the concept and the policy of multilateralism, here is a multilateral context, where of course certain constraints are placed upon Canada.

Would we be marginalized? To what end? What would it mean to Canada? Perhaps at the end of the day it would mean absolutely nothing, but that depends on what we want to put into it and what we want to get out of it, and that's a question that it seems to me is rarely ever addressed. Why are we in NATO? Why are we in Europe?

I can give you a host of good reasons why we should be there and why we have common interests and common values that require us to make greater commitments than we make right now. But to think that there will be no political price to pay by dramatically altering or defecting from our allies unilaterally is somewhat misleading.

[Translation]

Ms. Maud Debien: That's not quite what I said. I didn't suggest abandoning the alliance or that Canada should withdraw from it. I simply contended that, if Canada decided to promote total nuclear disarmament within the alliance, that would not marginalize it within the alliance. On the contrary, that could give it an extraordinary global moral power. That's my view.

The question I'm asking is ultimately whether Canada could do this within the context of NATO and whether it would be marginalized within the alliance if it promoted total disarmament. I'm not thinking that it should withdraw from the alliance.

The Chairman: Total nuclear disarmament?

Ms. Maud Debien: Nuclear disarmament, yes, of course.

The Chairman: Not total.

Ms. Maud Debien: No.

The Chairman: Okay.

Ms. Maud Debien: That's what I mean by my question.

[English]

Dr. Jim Fergusson: I'm not sure if you're talking about behind closed doors. If this is the rhetoric in a sense—

[Translation]

Ms. Maud Debien: No. I'm thinking of an official policy.

[English]

Dr. Jim Fergusson: In official politics? How will we officially and publicly push the abolition of nuclear weapons in an alliance where the communiqués that come out of that alliance will be nuclear? It seems to me there's a fundamental contradiction in Canadian policy to say one thing and do something else.

[Translation]

An Hon. member: It wouldn't be the first time.

Ms. Maud Debien: It wouldn't be the first time, in any case.

[English]

The Chairman: For the members' information, it's a half hour bell. Everyone is getting a little bit nervous.

[Translation]

We have a little time left.

[English]

Mr. Tariq Rauf: I think NATO policy on nuclear weapons is fundamentally confused. The French tried to pass off their nuclear deterrent as a European deterrent when President Chirac resumed weapons testing in 1995, but a number of non-nuclear European Union states, members of NATO, basically refused to buy that French argument.

Under this ESDI, the European Security and Defence Identity, the follow-on to Maastricht, where the European Union will have a common foreign and defence policy, there too there is a lot of confusion.

What I'm told happens traditionally at many international fora is that the European Union comes in with an EU position that is very difficult to budge. I'm told that it makes it very difficult for countries like Canada, if they want to inject new ideas, to budge the European Union, because they have to go back into a European Union conclave to come up with their position and there on nuclear issues the French and the British dominate.

Given their history, the Germans remain silent on nuclear weapons issues. There is a fundamental problem within Germany itself about the continued deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons on their territory.

I might remind the members that in 1995, as part of the bargain, that extended non-proliferation treaty document on principles and objectives was adopted, under which all NATO members, including the five nuclear weapons states, committed themselves to undertaking a program leading to the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

• 1030

Vice-President Gore and President Clinton have uttered these words. Unfortunately, our Prime Minister, and as far as I know, our Minister of Foreign Affairs, have not uttered the words “eventual elimination of nuclear weapons”. This is largely because they are being held back by officials who are concerned about reactions coming from London and Paris. I think it is time, in a post-cold war world, to stand up and exercise some leadership on these issues.

The Chairman: Did you have a quick question you wanted to ask, Ms. Augustine?

Ms. Jean Augustine (Etobicoke—Lakeshore, Lib.): My quick question would be one that I asked before. If you were writing this report, what would you be recommending?

Mr. Tariq Rauf: That's a question that would require a very long answer. I would recommend that I think Canada, within NATO circles, recommend an honest and fundamental re-evaluation of the role of nuclear weapons in Europe. We can do away with removing non-strategic nuclear weapons from Europe because there will always be American nuclear missile submarines that would be devoted for the use of the allied commander in Europe should the situation require it.

Tactical nuclear weapons do not add to European security. If tactical nuclear weapons are needed in Europe to provide the glue to hold this alliance together, then I think this alliance has outlived its utility, and it's time to recognize that. We should move on to new challenges of the 21st century rather than to be stuck in an alliance that was created to deal with the cold war. The cold war is over and I think we need to look at these issues in a fundamentally different manner.

The Chairman: Mr. Fergusson.

Dr. Jim Fergusson: That's a rather daunting challenge. In terms of NATO, in my view the report from this committee should re-emphasize the importance of our commitment to NATO, our commitment to Europe.

In terms of specific policy considerations, I do believe that Canada should go into the councils of Europe and raise the issue and discuss the question of first use, the reservation of first use. I believe there are several European like-minded nations within the alliance who would likely also agree to a serious look at the question of first use.

A question of the nuclear posture of NATO, whether or not NATO should maintain its ability to practise nuclear deterrence if required in the future, and the important political reasons why a small nuclear capability remains vital to NATO, is an issue that I do not think will be substantively discussed. Any attempt to raise that fundamental issue will create more problems and difficulties, and in fact would, in my view, be ignored if we stick strictly to NATO.

The Chairman: Could you give us your opinion as to what those other European states would be?

Dr. Jim Fergusson: That's a difficult one. Probably if you look beyond the British and the French in specific, because they were the two who were most concerned about the first use question in the last consideration in the development of the new strategic concept, I think for most of the Europeans the issue will be the question of the reservation of first use. I don't think there will be a shortage of states that will be interested in this question.

The Chairman: Would the Dutch, for example, be—

Dr. Jim Fergusson: Yes, I would say the Dutch and perhaps the Belgians. I'm not sure about the Germans. I would agree with Dr. Rauf about the Germans not really wanting to deal with this for a variety of other reasons.

The Chairman: Thank you both very much for coming. We appreciate your advice very much, and certainly you know that this study will be going on until the spring. If you have any further observations or would like to make any communications with us, please communicate with our clerks and our staff.

We would be more than happy to receive any other observations you had, particularly if you had any suggestions about questions we might ask or issues we might look at when we go to Washington or New York or talk to other countries.

Thank you both very much for coming.

I'm going to adjourn until after the vote because the clerk advises me that by the time we clear the room for in camera and everything, we will have lost another five minutes, and then we will only have six minutes before we have to leave to go and vote anyway. So let's go to the vote.

Could I ask members if they could come back

[Translation]

fairly quickly after the vote so that we can resume the debate sooner.

• 1035

[English]

We're adjourned until approximately 11.15 a.m., immediately after the vote.

Thank you very much.