FAIT Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

COMITÉ PERMANENT DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES ET DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Tuesday, May 4, 1999

• 1517

[English]

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien (London—Fanshawe, Lib.)): I'd like to call to order the joint committee meeting for the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs.

I'd like to again welcome back General Henault, Mr. Wright, Ms. Corneau. Thank you very much. We know the schedule you've been keeping these days. We appreciate you being here.

Who's going to start? Mr. Wright.

Mr. Jim Wright (Director General for Central, East, and South Europe, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): Perhaps, Mr. Chairman, I could give just a very brief summary of the results of Mr. Axworthy's visit to Moscow, Macedonia, Cairo, and Maputo, those elements that relate to Kosovo.

Mr. Axworthy met with Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov last Friday for some two hours. The discussions were very frank, very constructive. Mr. Axworthy was pleased with the direct engagement of the UN Secretary General on the Kosovo issue. Clearly, the Security Council and Mr. Kofi Annan will play an important role once all the elements of the peace process are in place.

Significantly, in these discussions with Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov the Russian side used as the basis of discussions the five main conditions that have been set out by Kofi Annan and by NATO.

[Translationr]

The talks centred primarily on ways of satisfying these basic conditions for implementing a peace process.

[English]

There was, in particular, a discussion on the sequencing of a peace process and who needs to do what and when in order to trigger a suspension of the NATO bombing. Progress was made, but clearly a lot more work needs to be done to bridge differences.

In looking ahead, Mr. Axworthy said that the G-8—the Group of Eight—and the UN Security Council must be engaged. In this regard, there was a G-8 political directors meeting yesterday in Germany on Kosovo. There was some progress made. There was also the possibility of a G-8 foreign ministers meeting taking place in the course of this week.

Mr. Axworthy also made clear in his public comments after his Moscow meetings that Russia is not simply playing the role of a messenger; rather, Russia is constructively engaged, taking into account all points of view, as demonstrated in the talks last week in Moscow.

• 1520

In Skopje, Macedonia, Mr. Axworthy met with the president, the prime minister, and the foreign minister. He visited one of the main refugee camps, Stankovac, and met with representatives of key international organizations, UNHCR, World Food Program, and with non-governmental organizations, including Médecins sans frontière, Catholic Relief Services, and an organization called Handicap International, to discuss the issue of land mines.

At the refugee camps Mr. Axworthy saw first-hand the human face of this tragedy and met with some of the families that have already come to Canada. Mr. Axworthy was in Macedonia 13 months ago. At that time, the country was full of promise and hope, building for a better future in the European family of nations. Today Macedonia's economy is in shambles through no fault of its own, and its democratic government is struggling to avoid further destabilization.

Macedonian foreign trade has been ruined as trade routes through Yugoslavia are closed. Unemployment is over 40%. Domestic production is down dramatically. This year alone, Macedonia faces over $200 million in payments that cannot be met to international financial institutions. And there are over 200,000 refugees in Macedonia, with thousands more arriving each day.

[Translation]

Regarding the refugee crisis, Mr. Axworthy discussed with his hosts Canada's plans to go ahead and welcome 5,000 Kosovar refugees. Macedonian officials expressed their appreciation to Canada for its generosity.

[English]

Mr. Axworthy expressed concern to Macedonian authorities about the seriously overcrowded conditions in the camps. He urged them to meet their obligations under international refugee conventions, to expand existing refugee camps and to allow for new ones. The minister heard first-hand concerns about health risks at the camps, especially from poor sanitation.

On the economy, Mr. Axworthy spoke of Canada's $52 million in assistance dedicated to date for the Kosovo crisis. He emphasized our continuing efforts in the G-8 and with international financial institutions to assist Macedonia and Albania as much as possible.

With regard to NATO, the Macedonian authorities welcomed the Canadian government's decision to pre-deploy some 800 Canadian peacekeepers to Macedonia in preparation for an eventual peace process and an international peacekeeping presence in Kosovo. Mr. Axworthy briefed his hosts on his diplomatic efforts in Moscow.

In all these discussions with Macedonian authorities and refugees, Mr. Axworthy heard a common refrain: President Milosevic's ten-year program of ethnic hatred and ultra-nationalism is responsible for the current crisis, and NATO and the international community must prevail.

[Translation]

Mr. Axworthy travelled to Cairo on Sunday for a meeting with Egyptian Foreign Affairs Minister Moussa. The war in Kosovo was discussed at length during their meeting which lasted over an hour.

[English]

After the meeting, Mr. Axworthy commented on his visit to Macedonia and the need for further urgent action in the face of the tragic situation in the refugee camps. Mr. Axworthy also reiterated Canada's preference for an effective UN involvement in brokering a diplomatic solution to the Kosovo crisis.

[Translation]

Canada is confident that Egypt can help to bring this matter to the UN Security Council for action, in view of its influence among non-aligned countries of the Organization of the Islamic Conference.

[English]

Mr. Moussa and Mr. Axworthy discussed Egypt's willingness to participate in an eventual peacekeeping force in Kosovo under UN auspices. Egypt, like Canada, has extensive experience in peacekeeping in the Balkans.

Finally, Mr. Axworthy was in Maputo, in Mozambique. He was attending a meeting of states parties to the anti-personnel mine ban convention, the Ottawa convention, where he called on the international community to develop a capacity for rapid, coordinated, humanitarian mine action in post-conflict situations. Mr. Axworthy spoke specifically about the prospects for such an initiative in Kosovo, where land mines will clearly be a problem in the future.

That concludes my opening remarks, Mr. Chairman.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, Mr. Wright.

General Henault, did you...?

Lieutenant-General Raymond R. Henault (Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, OP ABACUS, Department of National Defence): Yes, I do have an opening statement, Mr. Chairman.

[Translation]

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I plan to give you a brief overview of Canadian Forces operations since our last briefing a few days ago. Mr. Wright and I will then take questions.

• 1525

[English]

On the NATO military situation, the NATO military forces continue their intensified air campaign and their air strikes against a number of military and fielded forces targets in Kosovo and in fact in strategic targeting throughout the country.

Just for your information, the current number of sorties registered by NATO to date is in excess of 15,000 sorties in support of this operation, with approximately 5,000 of those sorties being strike sorties. Those include the actual bombers and also aircraft related to suppression of enemy air defence. That ratio is about 4,000 strike sorties to 1,000 SEAD sorties.

In terms of Canadian numbers of sorties, they have to date flown about 300 sorties, the vast majority of those sorties being strike sorties, some of them being combat air patrol. Again, that ratio is in the neighbourhood of 85% strike sorties, 15% combat air patrol.

SACEUR has now available to him more than 700 aircraft in theatre. That number continues to climb slowly. The air campaign now is conducted on a 24-7 basis.

[Translation]

The offensive is continuing 24 hours a day, seven days a week.

As for NATO missile targets, they haven't changed in the last few days of our operations in Yugoslavia. NATO forces continue to target troop mustering areas and Serb forces across the country, along with infrastructure support sites, as we already mentioned, bridges, oil and lubricants facilities, active radar sites, munitions storage facilities, radio transmission towers and air fields.

[English]

The only new type of target that's been declared over the last several days and since we last met is power generation sites. They in fact were hit over the weekend by what are declared as special weapons by NATO. I can't officially confirm, in fact, the use of what are called graphite weapons or graphite bombs, more commonly known as soft bombs. Canada doesn't use this type of weapon, nor does it have it in its inventory. With respect to how it's used, I don't have a whole lot of information, but there is an article today in The Globe and Mail that speculates on that type of munition. It essentially short-circuits power relay stations without actually destroying them.

Over the weekend, NATO did lose two aircraft, as you may also be aware: one F-16, which now has been confirmed as having been shot down by Serb air defences, and a U.S. Marine Harrier jet on a training mission. That aircraft was not involved in combat operations of any kind; it was lost during a training sortie to a mechanical defect. Again, I don't have the details of that. I do know, nonetheless, that both pilots ejected safely from their aircraft and were recovered successfully.

There was also an A-10 aircraft, or Warthog, as we call it, that was damaged by anti-aircraft artillery; that is, not by missiles but more by shots from cannons. It nonetheless recovered safely to a deployment or diversion base and will go back into operations in short order.

[Translation]

Generally speaking, NATO is continuing to make progress in its air offensive against Yugoslavia's military and security forces. We are inflicting heavy damage on the country's strategic infrastructure.

[English]

NATO forces do continue to support non-governmental organizations, as I know you're well aware, in the humanitarian efforts that are going on in the bordering countries, particularly in Albania and the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia, and continue contributing significantly to all of the relief efforts, not only in terms of equipment, material, and so on, but also in terms of manpower.

As a benchmark, NATO soldiers, sailors, and airmen have helped in the delivery so far of in excess of 3,500 tonnes of food and water, over 1,000 tonnes of medical supplies, and over 1,800 tonnes of tentage. Also, they have delivered in excess of 3,000 tonnes of general support supplies of all kinds.

In terms of Canada's contribution, Operation Echo continues. We now have the 18 aircraft that we talked to you about earlier, now in country and operational. In the past five days, our CF-18s in Aviano flew 66 out of their planned 80 sorties. To give you an indication of rates of activity, we have planned in the neighbourhood of 400 sorties but have actually flown about 300 sorties. That just gives you an indication of what weather does to the cancellation of sorties. If not the vast majority, I would say in excess of 90% of those sorties were cancelled before departure because of weather.

• 1530

We do continue to use our aircraft primarily in the delivery of precision-guided munitions and primarily in bombing missions against strategic targets, which include highway bridges, storage and POL facilities, Serb assembly areas, and so on. We are nonetheless doing missions with non-precision munitions, but then again those are also at a relatively low rate, probably less than 20%.

[Translation]

As I mentioned earlier, our 18 CF-18s are now operational in Aviano and we can expect the pace of our operations to pick up. To give you an idea of the number of sorties we conduct, let me remind you that we began with four sorties daily.

[English]

At the outset of the operation we started flying four sorties a day with the six aircraft that were in theatre. That has increased progressively to what is now 16 sorties a day on average. With the 18 aircraft now in theatre and an increased serviceability rate, of course, or availability of aircraft that is likely to now stabilize at 20 sorties per day for task force Aviano.

Our preparations for the deployment of our peacekeeping force are also continuing apace, with the rail movement of equipment from the western area, from Edmonton in particular, to Montreal expected to start sometime toward the end of next week, and also with the advance reconnaissance team with the commander, who is Colonel Mike Ward, from the western area, deploying to the former republic of Macedonia today to assist in the planning of the deployment and to do some very essential liaison with the U.K. forces that are already in theatre.

This contingent of 800 persons—and I know that you know the composition of it, so I won't go through it—is made up of our land forces western area troops and also members of 1 Canadian Air Division, specifically from 408 Squadron. They will be operational in theatre, if all goes according to our plan, no later than June 25 of this year.

Finally, in terms of Op Parasol, we currently have about 900 Canadian Forces members engaged in support to the reception of refugees.

[Translation]

Approximately 900 Canadian Forces members from across Canada, particularly Eastern Canada and more specifically Ontario and Nova Scotia, are supporting the refugee reception operations that are beginning today.

[English]

In fact our forces at Trenton and CFB Greenwood are assisting Citizenship and Immigration Canada with all of their undertakings in this respect. We expect the first aircraft to arrive about eight o'clock this evening, with somewhere in the neighbourhood of 250 or so refugees on board. Subsequent arrivals of aircraft are expected on alternate days at both Greenwood and Trenton for the duration of the actual movement of refugees into Canada.

[Translation]

That concludes my remarks. We will now take questions.

[English]

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, General Henault.

Madame Corneau, did you have any opening remarks? Okay, thank you.

We'll go to questions of members. I'll just remind members that with the limited time we have for these briefings it's one minute for a question or two and try to look for a response in that same minute.

We'll start with Mr. Turp, then Mr. Graham.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp (Beauharnois—Salaberry, BQ): It's interesting to note that we have reached day 41 in our offensive, whereas the Gulf War lasted 44 days in total. Let's hope we reach a political settlement before day 44.

I have a general question for Jim Wright. Have diplomatic talks progressed to a point where we can reasonably hope a diplomatic resolution to the crisis is at hand? Do you have any information to share with us, either about current or future talks between G-8 members? It's my understanding that G-8 political officials met or are now meeting and that a meeting of ministers could be called on short notice. Both Canada and Russia are G-8 members. I'd like Mr. Wright to give us a status report on this situation.

My second question concerns assets and whether or not they can be seized. I asked a question earlier in the House and Mr. Reed read me a response. Perhaps you could provide us with additional details, so that we have some idea whether or not the Canadian government is thinking about taking steps such as seizing the private assets of people like Mr. Karic, who are officials in the Milosevic government. That's my second question.

• 1535

I also have a brief question for General Henault. Has Canadian infrastructure sustained any kind of damage?

[English]

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Mr. Turp, you're already close to two minutes.

I'm going to ask the members to please cooperate. There are a lot of members here, and there are a lot of questions.

Mr. Wright.

Mr. Jim Wright: I'll do my best to answer very quickly.

As the Prime Minister has said before, we are actively pursuing two tracks: the diplomatic track and the military one. We continue to hope that we can arrive at a diplomatic solution as quickly as possible here.

The G-8 political directors were meeting on Monday in Bonn, following Mr. Axworthy's visit to Moscow and to Skopje. They made some progress, but there still are bridges that need to be crossed between Russia and the other members of the G-8. We are focusing attention on the five conditions that have been set down by the UN Secretary General and by NATO, and we are trying to see whether or not we can translate those five conditions into a peace process, properly sequencing who needs to do what exactly when in order to facilitate an end to the bombing.

In an ideal world, what we would like to see is if it is possible to arrive at agreement on the diplomatic track ahead, the G-8 foreign ministers would then ask officials to go away and to see whether they can translate that diplomatic process into a UN Security Council resolution that could win support from the UN Security Council, most probably under chapter 7, as was done in the case of the Dayton peace agreement.

The diplomatic activities remain very, very intense. As you know, President Clinton also leaves this evening for Brussels, where he will be meeting Secretary General Solana. He will then be proceeding to Germany. There is the possibility of a G-8 foreign ministers meeting later this week. It has not been absolutely confirmed yet, but it's a very real possibility. Mr. Axworthy will have finished his program in Africa in time to be able to attend that. So we are in active consultation with all our G-8 partners in preparation for that, should it take place.

I can tell you that we have spoken to the Americans about the letter that Mr. Jesse Jackson carried on behalf of Mr. Milosevic to President Clinton, and I regret to say that there were no new proposals on the table from President Milosevic. We keep waiting for a more substantive response, and we still are not seeing that yet from Mr. Milosevic.

The engagement of Russia to date has been constructive. I would have to say that there still remain differences of view in terms of the road ahead, but we're trying to see whether we can bridge those differences. In particular, those differences relate to the composition of the international force and the sequencing of the different events. You saw some of that playing out in the last 24 hours in respect of President Clinton's comments about possible consideration by NATO of a pause in bombing. If Mr. Milosevic agrees to the five conditions, and if Mr. Milosevic starts the process of withdrawing his forces, under those circumstances NATO would consider a pause in the bombing. But we're a long way from that. President Milosevic has done nothing to accept those conditions yet.

Now, I don't have the benefit with respect to your answer that you received from the honourable member across the floor, but I can tell you we have taken a number of economic measures, as you know, including this past weekend going ahead and adding Yugoslavia to the area control list, which requires all exports to Yugoslavia to receive an export permit. We have frozen the assets of the Yugoslav and Serb governments in Canada. The international community has not taken steps yet to address the question of individual Serb assets overseas. To the best of my knowledge, no country has gone ahead and taken steps to freeze assets of representatives of the Serb government overseas. It is an issue we've been thinking about.

• 1540

We've been thinking about a lot of issues pertaining to the Kosovo crisis. Our focus, frankly, has been largely on getting some of these economic measures in place, working within NATO, looking at the visit-and-search regime for an oil embargo, putting in place the area control list. We have this issue in mind. We want to discuss it with some of our NATO allies to see whether this is a course that would have a significant impact.

We know that the measures we have taken to date, either individually by the Canadian government or in concert with others through the UN or through NATO, are having an impact on Yugoslavia. Frankly, we need to have a better assessment of the nature of the assets in Canada to make a determination as to whether this would have a significant impact. If we were to do this, we would have to do so using the Special Economic Measures Act that is available to us. But we would want to talk to our NATO allies and to others to see whether it was worth while. In the meantime, we are putting most of our resources into the diplomatic efforts.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, Mr. Wright.

That was a two-minute question requiring a six-minute answer. I'm going to try to ask everyone to be a little bit more succinct so we can get through the whole list.

Mr. Graham.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Bill Graham (Toronto Centre—Rosedale, Lib.)): Why are we bombing Montenegro? Is this some sort of attempt to create a civil war where we didn't have one going before? Isn't this a very dangerous game, to be stirring that pot, Mr. Wright?

Mr. Jim Wright: I think NATO made it very clear right from the very outset of this campaign that we were very supportive of the democratically elected government of Montenegro. We were going to try to limit the amount of NATO bombing that had to be undertaken in Montenegro. The only targets that have been chosen have been Serb military targets. I regret to say that the Yugoslav Second Army is based in Montenegro. NATO was in touch with President Djukanovic in the preceding months. The president and his government know perfectly well that our efforts are not directed at him, but at the Yugoslav forces that happen to be based there. The targets are legitimate military targets that are being pursued to wear down the Yugoslav military machine.

As far as we have been able to read the Montenegran government, their stance remains the same. They would like to see NATO not pursue its bombing campaign, but at the same time they've declared neutrality and they have opposed the policies of President Milosevic. Most of the game that's being played out at the political level in Yugoslavia pertains to a power play by Milosevic to try to wrest control away from that democratically elected government in Montenegro to further enhance his own stature within Yugoslavia. NATO has made it very clear that any attempt by Milosevic to oust that democratically elected government will be looked upon very seriously by NATO.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Mr. Proud.

Mr. George Proud (Hillsborough, Lib.): The general mentioned that the Canadians had 300 sorties and 85% of them were strike-related. I just wonder if you could tell us how successful these were.

The second question deals with the morale. We often overlook the morale of the people involved in these things. I wonder if you could tell us how the morale of the air crew and all of the other people involved in this operation is.

Thirdly, how long do these tours last? Are they based on six months, as some are in other areas, or is their rotation shorter?

LGen Raymond Henault: Thank you for those questions.

The strike sorties have been good and successful. The historical rates of success are what we're enjoying at the moment. Historical rates that we've seen in terms of precision-guided munitions in which we were able to actually target an area.... We have been limited somewhat by weather, as I think everyone is well aware. That has not only been our aircraft, but all NATO aircraft. When we have been able to target targets or to strike targets, the success rate has been somewhere in the neighbourhood of 70% to 85%. So the precision-guided munitions are doing the job they were designed to do. In terms of our non-precision deliveries, those deliveries have also been very successful in virtually all of the cases we're aware of. Where the radar designation has worked as it was supposed to, the bombs have fallen within what we call the circular error probable—that is, within the target area. So again, we have very good success on both of those fronts.

• 1545

In terms of the morale, I could say to you that the morale is extremely high in task force Aviano. The minister recently visited task force Aviano, as did the chief of the defence staff and the chief of the air staff. All the reports we're getting back from them are that there is very high morale and very high commitment to the task they're undertaking. We're getting that same type of reporting back from our NATO allies who are in country, particularly the commander of 5 ATAF, the Italian commanders who are there and so on. They are doing great work.

I would also add that the NATO airborne EW force, which is operating out of Geilenkirchen, is also very committed to this operation. They fly daily and fly normally two or three missions a day with the NATO AWACS aircraft. They also have very high morale.

Finally, in terms of the length of tours, the normal length of tour for this operation and prior to it was three months for our personnel in theatre. That included both the pilots and the air crew, the pilots being on somewhat different rotation cycle, depending on currency requirements or maintenance of currency requirements and so on. With what is proving to be a longer period of operations, we are now reconsidering the length of tour, looking at whether it would be more appropriate or prudent for us to make sure we can sustain this operation in the longer term, to extend tours to a longer period, up to as much as six months, which is common among our land force, navy, and air force contingents that deploy. All of that is being reviewed at the moment. In this current light and in the current rate of activity we're undertaking, the length of tours that we currently have appears to be appropriate.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, Mr. Proud.

Mr. Price.

Mr. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, PC): Thank you.

General, we know that the Griffon helicopters we're going to be sending over are probably going to be doing reconnaissance work, probably some rescue work, and they're going to be carrying our soldiers around. You mentioned last week that the radio problem has been rectified and now we'll be able to communicate and interchange with our NATO allies. We've heard for quite a while now about the static problem, and that kind of worries me. Could you comment on that?

LGen Raymond Henault: Yes. I think what you're referring to, Mr. Price, is the static problem related to static discharge from the helicopter.

Static discharge from the helicopter is actually a fairly common problem with helicopters. All helicopters in fact have this type of problem associated with their operations. In fact in helicopters I've flown in the past, which include the Twin Huey and the Griffon, and in operations I'm familiar with in terms of search and rescue operations, there is always a requirement to ground the aircraft prior to actually touching the aircraft humanly or with the human hand.

In the terms of Labrador operations, for example, the static discharge always requires you to touch the rescue hoist to the ground before an individual, whether it's a survivor or a rescue specialist, touches it to relieve the discharge or to statically discharge the aircraft to the ground before you actually touch it. So it is very common.

With the Griffon, the problem that manifested itself is one that's related to composite blades. We have a four-bladed composite rotor system on the Griffon, which is slightly different from the one that was on the Twin Huey. It revealed to us some static discharge issues that had to be resolved.

Those issues were undertaken fairly aggressively over the last year, but more specifically over the last several months, to establish appropriate procedures to ensure that the static discharge was not a threat to anyone, nor in fact was it ever a large threat. But it was a threat to someone actually touching the aircraft prior to actually touching the ground. We've put in place a number of procedures, not only for hoisting but also for disembarking people from the helicopters, all of which we're now very confident in. In fact we've done the test through our aerospace test establishment to ensure that the static discharge will not be a problem for operational theatres.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, General.

Mr. Pratt.

Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

• 1550

Lieutenant-General, you mentioned earlier the F-16 and the Harrier that were lost last weekend. I gather there were a couple of planes lost before—a Stealth fighter, as well as another F-16. I guess we're into the fifth week of the air campaign now, and having lost just three planes due to operations is an extraordinary number when you consider the number of sorties flown and the fact that the Yugoslavs must have what they describe in the military as a target-rich environment, with that many sorties having been flown. How do the NATO allies account for the weakness of Yugoslav air defences?

LGen Raymond Henault: That's a very appropriate question. I would say that the F-117 stealth fighter that was lost very early in the campaign was lost to reasons we're still unaware of. We're not absolutely sure that it was shot down; it could very well have been a mechanical problem. In the case of the Harrier, we do have confirmation that it was a mechanical problem. And in the case of the F-16, it has now been confirmed that it was taken out by a Serb missile.

I think the reason we have been having the success we have been having in terms of resistance to missile attack has been exactly what an air campaign is designed to do; that is, an air campaign in the outset of the campaign will target the integrated air defence system, command and control systems, and the related storage facilities and so on that go with that. That was the focus of the NATO air force's targeting, if you like, for the first several days, and continues to be throughout the campaign. Those were the phase-one targets we've often talked about; that is, the integrated air defence system overall, the surface-to-air missile systems themselves, and the anti-aircraft artillery that's still located in theatre.

I think what that shows is that the deliberate process that's used in an air campaign is a sound one, because you're absolutely right: we have now flown in excess of 15,000 sorties, and only one aircraft that we can confirm has actually been shot down.

We do know that there are considerable numbers of launches every evening now of surface-to-air missile systems as well as anti-aircraft artillery, none of which—except for the F-16—have actually brought down an aircraft. I think the way in which SACEUR and the North Atlantic Council have devised and progressed the air campaign, ensuring that we put safety as much as possible in the favour of our pilots and our air crews, has paid off in the longer term. I would say that this is a lesson or an example for the process and the progress of an air campaign overall.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, Mr. Pratt.

Monsieur Laurin.

[Translation]

Mr. René Laurin: I have a technical question for you. You mentioned the number of sorties flown. For example, you said that four sorties are flown per day. Are you talking about four aircraft making one sortie, or one aircraft involved in four sorties? Which is it?

LGen Raymond Henault: I'm often asked this question on television, Mr. Laurin. A number of aircraft take part in a mission, normally from two to four, and sometimes up to six. In some cases, two to six CF-18s have been involved in missions. Our aircraft always fly in pairs, for coordination and mutual protection.

Over the past two weeks, CF-18s have flown in five or six missions each day. Two to four aircraft participated in each mission or operation under way. As for the number of sorties, this refers to the number of aircraft involved.

Thus far, we have had 300 sorties during the course of 70 missions. I can't tell you exactly how many aircraft were involved in each case, but it's never fewer than two.

Mr. René Laurin: When two aircraft leave on a mission, you calculate this as two sorties.

LGen Henault: That's correct.

Mr. René Laurin: Military strategy isn't my forte. Could you explain something to me. Why is NATO afraid of making the first move? It says it doesn't want to stomp the bombings until the Serbs withdraw, while the Serbs say they'll withdraw only once the bombings have ceased. It's the chicken and the egg issue. Why is NATO afraid of blinking first?

LGen Raymond Henault: I can't comment specifically on this, because basically, it will be up to the North Atlantic Council and to the Secretary General, along with national representatives, to decide whether or not to make the first move. From a military standpoint, we're going to wait until someone decides to make the first move.

Perhaps Mr. Wright can comment further. It's not a question of being afraid.

• 1555

[English]

Mr. Jim Wright: The only point I would add

[Translation]

it's a matter of trust. Quite frankly, we don't think very much of Mr. Milosevic's promises. He's made many promises and signed agreements with NATO, but right now, we're waiting for a clear signal from Mr. Milosevic, and for him to withdraw his troops from Kosovo.

Mr. René Laurin: I understand that, Mr. Wright, but couldn't NATO order a halt to the air strikes, in the hopes that Mr. Milosevic will withdraw his troops. If, after 24 hours, he hasn't complied, then NATO could resume its strikes. Why couldn't NATO try this?

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): I'm sorry, Mr. Laurin.

[English]

I'm not getting any interpretation. Are members getting interpretation? Okay.

Monsieur Laurin, you've had two questions, so be very brief, please.

[Translation]

Mr. René Laurin: Let me repeat my question. You claim that trust is an issue. Supposing NATO were to make the first move, hoping that Milosevic would then withdraw his troops, and, 24 hours after air strikes had stopped, it's clear Milosevic was not complying. There is nothing to stop us from resuming the air offensive. Would a 24- or 48- hour halt to the air offensive seriously comprise the outcome of this conflict?

[English]

Mr. Jim Wright: I would simply answer that all of the diplomatic efforts to date with Mr. Milosevic have come up blank. The conditions that have been on the table from Secretary General Kofi Annan, from NATO, and from governments like Canada ask them to please send a clear signal to us that they will agree to the five conditions that have been set out and simply start the process of withdrawing their troops. There have been too many broken promises in the past.

The other problem associated with this is if the Serb forces on the ground were doing absolutely nothing in Kosovo, that would be one set of circumstances, but they're not. They are continuing the process of ethnic cleansing. They are continuing the process of burning villages. And there are still atrocities going on. The interviews that are being undertaken by international relief organizations of refugees suggest that the Serb forces remain as active as ever. So facilitating a pause in the bombing, frankly, simply facilitates President Milosevic's continuing campaign of ethnic cleansing.

So you're right, it is a chicken-and-egg situation, but the demands of NATO and the demands of the international community are very, very clear: we are prepared to consider a pause in the bombing, but there has to be a clear signal of cooperation on the part of President Milosevic, and we have not seen that to date.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Mr. Richardson.

Mr. John Richardson (Perth—Middlesex, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I have just a couple of quick questions, General Henault, and thanks very much for your answers.

What is the capacity of Aviano at the moment? Are we over capacity? Are we looking for a new air base?

LGen Raymond Henault: I would not be able to give you what residual capacity is available at Aviano off the cuff, in that I don't have the exact figures. I can tell you that Aviano had about 40 or so combat aircraft on the base when this operation started, and it's now in excess of 150 combat aircraft. Therefore, the ramp space is very, very tight.

I would suggest that any increases to the numbers in Aviano or any mix in the aircraft that are currently there would require that aircraft actually leave Aviano to allow other aircraft to come in. I do know that in the case of the F-18s, room was made for our aircraft to go in there by the departure of other aircraft. And I know that some of our allies also moved some of their aircraft in several cases out of Aviano to other deployment bases to make room for other aircraft to consolidate contingents and so on.

So I would say that Aviano is very congested at the moment and probably is very close to the limit of its capacity. That would be my assessment at the moment.

Mr. John Richardson: As a follow-up, I would skip from Aviano to the future and the potential for our troops to be involved in the support of the refugee camps and maintenance of support for the refugee situation. I understood that we were sending something like a battalion in strength, using numbers of 700 to 800 people. Is that true?

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LGen Raymond Henault: Yes. The total complement is about 800, and that includes the reconnaissance squadron of Coyotes; the helicopters that are going in, the eight Griffons; our national command element; our national support element; and an engineering complement. So in total numbers it is of the same number as a battalion, but it's not a formed unit as a battalion as you would know it.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Mr. Clouthier, then Mr. Mills. We have three or four other members. We'll try to finish up.

Mr. Clouthier.

Mr. Hec Clouthier (Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, Lib.): Jim, you mentioned the oil embargo. Could you give us an update on the oil embargo or the proposed one, and in particular the status on the Athabascan?

Mr. Jim Wright: I can't answer the second, but perhaps the general could answer you on that.

On the question of the oil embargo, I can tell you that on the weekend the Canadian government announced that Yugoslavia had been added to the area control list under Canada's Export and Import Permits Act. Essentially, that obliges potential Canadian exporters to Yugoslavia to obtain an export permit for every export to Yugoslavia. The Canadian government has made it very clear that we will not facilitate export permits for oil, petroleum, lubricants. So the Canadian government has already gone ahead and taken that particular measure.

Secondly, NATO is in the process of examining something that is referred to as a visit-and-search program in the Adriatic to deter countries from going ahead and shipping oil by boat into the harbour of Bar in Montenegro. That's the main entry point for all petroleum products by sea. All the land routes have been more or less closed off. Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia—I think those are the other three routes into Yugoslavia—all have been closed. The one remaining one is the naval route. NATO is looking at this.

The supreme allied commander has been developing military options, but he has had to go ahead and adjust some of those options based on political and especially legal advice to ensure that whatever NATO is doing is consistent with international law. So that issue is being looked at this week by NATO. We may find that recommendations are put forward later this week by the supreme allied commander to the North Atlantic Council. That's part of the multinational effort that would be under way.

LGen Raymond Henault: In terms of the Athabascan, the commander of the Athabascan is a navy captain. On board the Athabascan, which is a command-and-control ship primarily, is Commodore David Morse, who is the commander of the Standing Naval Force Atlantic, which I know you're aware of. He has been in command of the standing naval force since April 16. My understanding, although I don't know the exact location of the force, is that it's operating in the Atlantic off the coast of Spain and Portugal. They are operating under normal command-and-control rules at this point in time.

We have not yet got any indication whether the standing naval force would be involved in a visit-and-search regime, as Mr. Wright has already talked about, in that the concept of operations is of course still being considered. So we're still waiting for more information on that. If in fact the standing naval force is applied to that mission, then of course a Canadian will not only command the force, but we'll also have a Canadian ship involved in the operation.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, General.

Mr. Mills.

Mr. Bob Mills (Red Deer, Ref.): I have been trying to find out as much detail as I can about the KLA, and I've come up with some pretty disturbing information. I wonder if Mr. Wright might just confirm his evaluation of the KLA.

Mr. Jim Wright: I guess I would answer by giving a little bit of historical perspective, very briefly.

KLA remains a relatively new organization. In fact I'd say they've been around for two or two and a half years. The only reason they arose.... They are, in a sense, a guerrilla group. They're engaged in an insurgency action in Yugoslavia. They are fighting the oppression against the Kosovar people. They have engaged in some terrorist activities, for which they have been condemned by the international community and Canada.

I mentioned historical perspective in the sense that quite a few governments, including Canada, were pushing Yugoslavia very hard in the mid-nineties to go ahead and negotiate with the moderate Kosovar community, including Dr. Rugova, to start to implement some of the agreements Milosevic had agreed to. That included an education agreement, to start to give back some of the autonomy that Milosevic stripped away from Kosovo in 1989. We made the point to Milosevic and to his regime that if they did not do this, there was going to be a rise in extremism in Kosovo. There were already minor incidents here and there.

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Two or three years later, we now find ourselves with I wouldn't say a sophisticated force, but a reasonably well equipped guerrilla force collecting money all around the world and new recruits arriving every week to go ahead and help out in the effort. They're based largely in Albania, crossing the Albanian border into Kosovo. They remain very active in certain pockets in Kosovo. They have obviously taken a very bad beating at the hands of the Serb forces in the course of the last month.

It's a force that didn't have to be, if Mr. Milosevic had cooperated more with the Kosovar community. But he didn't.

Mr. Bob Mills: Do you know much about their relation to drugs and contraband goods and so on in Macedonia?

Mr. Jim Wright: I know that there have been incidents where the KLA has certainly crossed into Macedonia. I know that the Macedonian authorities have found large caches of weapons and that the Macedonians are extremely concerned about the presence of KLA on their territory. I think the KLA tend to operate more out of Albania. They use Albania more as a base than Macedonia. But it's a real problem.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, Mr. Mills.

Mrs. Carroll, and then the last question to Mr. Earle and then we'll have to break.

Ms. Aileen Carroll (Barrie—Simcoe—Bradford, Lib.): I have two really quick questions.

Mr. Wright, last week, when we were in Strasbourg at the Council of Europe, it happened to be at the same time as the NATO missile went astray into Bulgaria, and we were queried about that. I just wondered what the update was on that.

The second question is to General Henault. The 800 Strathconas, when they go, will they be serving under Canadian officers?

LGen Raymond Henault: I'll answer the second question first, if you would like.

The 800-person force is actually made up of Lord Strathcona's Horse, which make up the reconnaissance squadron; the Coyote squadron; the 408 Tactical Helicopter Squadron in fact makes up the complement of the Griffon unit that's going overseas; and then there is a component of what we call national support, which is a national support element made up primarily of logisticians, administrators, supporters, suppliers, and so on, which come from the brigade in the western area; and then we have a national command element and an engineering squadron minus, as we call it, because it's not a full squadron, going over there with them.

All of that is under the command of a Canadian, who is a Canadian full colonel. I mentioned him a little bit earlier, Colonel Mike Ward. We always have a national command element that deploys with a contingent of this nature, because our troops, sailors, and airmen always remain under Canadian command. In fact Colonel Ward will report directly to the CDS, through me, throughout the time he's in operations.

We do, though, once the force is declared operationally ready, place the force under the operational control of the NATO commander. In this case, they will be under the operational control of the British armoured brigade commander, or in fact in this case the battle group commander in which they'll integrate. Ultimately, they will be primarily brigade-level troops—operational control of the Brits, but under command of Canadians throughout their period in theatre.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): I'm sorry, was there a second part?

Mr. Jim Wright: There was the question pertaining to the errant missile that ended up in Bulgaria.

I'm afraid I don't know the technical answer as to why that particular missile.... I think it was a smart weapon that simply didn't work—whether or not it misfired. But NATO acknowledged responsibility for the action right away, took responsibility for it.

I guess the only point I would add is that in respect to the campaign Mr. Milosevic is engaged in, there's never an expression of regret, never an expression of error, because the ethnic cleansing that's under way right now is not an error—it's premeditated. He intends to do it. In the case of NATO, when a mistake is made NATO acknowledges its responsibility right away.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you.

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The Co-Chair (Mr. Bill Graham): I might just help you, Mr. Wright, by letting you know that when I was in Iran at the beginning of the year, they were shooting at Iraq and managed to bomb Iran. So some of these smart weapons may not be as smart as they're supposed to be.

Ms. Aileen Carroll: I don't think there were any casualties, which I think was a very important part of the story.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Colleagues, we have to wrap up. We've got a meeting and witnesses coming at 4.15 p.m.

Mr. Earle, last question.

Mr. Gordon Earle (Halifax West, NDP): I have two very quick questions.

Mr. Wright, you mentioned that the letter transported by the Reverend Jesse Jackson contained nothing new. Media reports would have it that the letter contained an offer from President Milosevic to meet with President Clinton. Is that not correct? If so, is that not new and worth pursuing in the best interests of peace?

My second question is to Lieutenant-General Henault. You mentioned that you didn't have too much information on those bombs, but media reports would also have it that these graphite bombs would drop certain particles. Is there any information on the harm or potential harm to human beings from the fallout from those weapons?

LGen Raymond Henault: I can answer the second question first. I'm not technically competent in graphite bombs because I'm not familiar with the technology, other than what I've read in the open press. So I can't really answer you very effectively. I will try to get more information for you, perhaps for the next meeting, and give you a little bit of an update. But again, these are weapons with which I'm not familiar either.

Mr. Jim Wright: To answer your first question, I regret I have not seen the letter. I was briefed on this this morning by the State Department, and the information we were given by the Americans was that we were all looking for some substantive answers from Milosevic to some of the questions we've been putting to him, and there was no new information there.

I did not ask whether or not President Milosevic had asked to see President Clinton, but I think I know what the answer from President Clinton would be.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you.

General Henault, Mr. Wright, Madam Corneau, thank you very much again for these ongoing briefings.

The defence committee will convene in five minutes in this room.

The meeting is adjourned.