FAIT Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

COMITÉ PERMANENT DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES ET DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Thursday, April 22, 1999

• 1520

[English]

The Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham (Toronto Centre—Rosedale, Lib.)): Can we call this briefing session to order?

Remember, members, if I may just remind you of the ground rules, that this is not a normal committee meeting but a briefing session. We're doing it conjointly with the defence committee. We'll keep to the rules we had last time, with questions of one minute and answers of one minute. We're trying to get in as many members as possible.

General Henault, you're the only consistent member of the group that was here last time—

Mr. Daniel Turp (Beauharnois—Salaberry, BQ): Madame Corneau was here.

The Chairman: Excuse me, Madame Corneau.

You'll recall that last time you went on a bit longer because you were bringing us up to date. This time we'd appreciate any new information and then we can move immediately to members' questions.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: Mr. Chairman, as far as next week is concerned, since several member are also on the Foreign Affairs committee, am I to understand that we will again be holding a joint meeting of these two committees? Do you have some idea of when these meetings will be held?

The Chairman: I think it would be best to schedule them at the same time because if we continue to change the time, we're going to have problems. Therefore, I suggest that we meet at 3:15 p.m. on Tuesdays and Thursday, just like this week.

Mr. Daniel Turp: These meetings will be jointly chaired by....

The Chairman: I believe Ms. Finestone will represent us.

Mr. Daniel Turp: And Mr. O'Brien. Do we know where the meetings are to be held?

The Chairman: Twice we had to change the location of today's meeting. I trust that our clerk, who will not be here, will entrust this task to the clerk of the National Defence committee.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Then the clerk of the National Defence committee will let us know where the meetings will be held?

The Chairman: Yes, in due time and, if possible, far enough in advance.

[English]

Mr. Meyer, would it be appropriate for you to speak first?

Mr. Paul Meyer (Director General, International Security Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

On Tuesday, Jim Wright, my colleague from the Department of Foreign Affairs, along with General Henault, provided a comprehensive initial briefing. Our intention for today and for the future is just really to provide brief updates on that basis. I'll do something on the diplomatic front, General Henault will do something on the military, and Madame Corneau has something to announce as well. Then we'll proceed to your questions.

I will first mention that yesterday at NATO, under the so-called 19 plus 1 formula, there was a meeting with the Prime Minister of Bulgaria, Mr. Kostov. This formula is a provision whereby any partner-state of NATO can request a meeting with the council on matters of security. At that meeting, the prime minister indicated that he was agreeing to NATO's request for use of Bulgarian airspace. He noted the severe economic hardships that his country was under, he noted the security threats from FRY, and he looked to NATO for political and material support. The prime minister concluded by saying that Bulgaria realized that the time for decisions had come and that they would not be a fair-weather friend of NATO, that they would not sit on the sidelines.

Also, of course, the prime NATO event will be coming up, with the Washington summit tomorrow through Sunday. In terms of Kosovo-related meetings of particular importance, I would note the meeting Friday morning, which is dedicated to Kosovo, as well as the session on Sunday morning with the so-called front-line states.

• 1525

There was also consideration in the UN Security Council yesterday of the situation regarding Prevlaka. This is the small area in dispute between Croatia and FRY. There is a small UN observer mission of some 27 observers there—including one Canadian—and there is a demilitarized zone as part of this arrangement. There were reports yesterday that some number of Yugoslav military police had entered the demilitarized zone and had set up a checkpoint.

The President of the UN Security Council issued a statement expressing concern and expressing the commitment to follow this situation closely.

It also recalled the provisions of UN Security Council resolution 1222, which demands a cessation of all violations of the demilitarized zone.

Finally, as I think you are aware,

[Translation]

Former Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin is currently in Belgrade as President Yeltsin's special envoy. He will be trying to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis. Earlier this week, Prime Minister Chrétien held a very productive meeting with Mr. Chernomyrdin at which time he outlined Canada's position and wished the envoy success in his efforts to resolve the crisis diplomatically.

[English]

That's the end of my update, Mr. Chairman. I'll turn to General Henault.

The Chairman: General Henault.

Lieutenant-General Raymond Henault (Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, Department of National Defence): Thank you, sir.

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen,

[Translation]

good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.

My comments this afternoon will be brief because, as Mr. Meyer already said, we gave you a fairly complete update on the situation last Tuesday.

[English]

For the NATO military situation, in regard to the air campaign itself, as you've seen, I think, from news reports, it continues incessantly, with strategic and tactical targets continuing to be struck throughout Yugoslavia. Although cloudy weather has again limited the attacks by manned aircraft, and this continues to be a problem, I might note that this problem is not necessarily widespread across the country; it's normally in isolated areas of the country and therefore affects specific aircraft. Despite all of that, cruise missiles of course continue to strike their targets, with an average of about 350 to 400 sorties a day.

Just for your information, the total number of sorties that have been flown to date—that is, the total number of manned aircraft sorties—is now 9,300, with about 2,750 of them, or about one-quarter, being actual strike missions. The rest are support missions of all kinds—air-to-air refuelling, suppression of any in-the-air defence and so on.

NATO targets over the past two days have been similar to those that I reported to you previously, and those are strategic targets, including airfields, refineries, bridges and depots, headquarters and so on, and command and control sites. We continue to strike integrated air defence systems, as I've mentioned previously, and high-value military targets, including command facilities and so on.

You will also be aware, I think, from reporting, that NATO attacks have struck the Serbian political headquarters—or what's called the presidential command post—in Belgrade, as well as President Milosevic's residence, which in fact is also a command and control centre and therefore was considered to be a legitimate target.

In an assessment of the air campaign, and as briefed, the NATO air campaign is continuing and is currently systematically disrupting, degrading, and, where it can, destroying the Yugoslavian military machine, its command and control organization, its command and control structure, and its supporting infrastructure, as well as fielded forces.

In terms of the integrated air defence system, step-by-step degradation is underway, as I've said to you previously.

[Translation]

Our aircraft have destroyed approximately 50 per cent of the Yugoslavian air force's fighters and the remaining forces are essentially ground troops that are encountering major problems in carrying out their missions, primarily because of the air strikes.

• 1530

[English]

That is about 50% of their fighter force, so their effective fighter force has now been destroyed. NATO basically controls the air, particularly at night, and although FRY air force defences, and FRY air defences in particular, have shown some resiliency and continue to operate, they're largely ineffective. Again, that's as I reported previously.

In terms of the national command authority—and these are targets in that respect—there is a broad target set, which includes command and control posts, army and corps level installations, other command and control facilities, and command posts at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. In large terms, many of those have been degraded.

[Translation]

There has also been widespread destruction of the infrastructure and of the forces of the third army, namely the forces deployed in the Kosovo zone. Support for these troops has been seriously affected thus far. According to our reports, troop morale is low.

[English]

That is, the destruction is ongoing and certainly the morale appears low, at least in some portions of the army.

In the short term and perhaps in the longer term, depending on how long the NATO campaign does go on, NATO will continue with the air strikes against the strategic targets, the tactical and operational targets I've mentioned and, of course, the fixed installations, despite the bad weather, using a variety of munitions.

I could also report to you that the U.S. Apache helicopters, attack helicopters being deployed by the U.S. as part of the air campaign, arrived in theatre today. They will certainly add a very capable and very real dimension to the conflict. However, let me caution you—as U.S. officials have already cautioned—that they're not necessarily a silver bullet; they do have limitations and they are a vulnerable aircraft, especially to small arms, not necessarily the small arms that we think of in terms of rifles but things like man-launched missile systems and the reasonably high calibre anti-aircraft artillery that's in the region.

NATO forces also continue to deploy into Albania, primarily in support of humanitarian activity. There are now more than 2,000 troops in place in support of that particular operation. This is the operation called A-FOR, or Albania Force. They are continuing to organize themselves around the focal point of the Tirana airport and are providing assistance to the Albanian authorities in trying to bring under control the humanitarian disaster and certainly the refugee support activities in Albania.

In terms of Canada's specific contribution over the past two days, our fighters have in fact been unable to actually execute their mission because of weather problems. Therefore, we have not actually dropped any ordnance for the last 48 hours. There are missions ongoing today. In fact, there are missions that are currently airborne—four aircraft at the moment. I don't have the report from that. They will not be back for at least another hour or so.

[Translation]

As I mentioned last Tuesday, the government has offered to make six additional fighters available to the NATO force. They are currently being readied for deployment and should arrive in Aviano within two weeks.

[English]

The types of targets that have been hit by our fighters—you asked me this in the last session—have included a variety of targets: army barracks sites, army command and control positions, petrol, oil and lubricant sites, that is, POL sites, like storage facilities and so on, radio transmitters, command posts, and also fielded forces, specifically, fielded artillery.

The Canadian Forces remain prepared to send a peacekeeping force into the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in support of a peacekeeping mission, as I think you are well aware. Again, I will just remind you that this force primarily consists of the reconnaissance squadron we talked about earlier, the helicopter squadron, and the national support that is the supply and logistics element and command element that go with it.

The land and air force elements—again, I reported this to you previously—have now completed their training and are in fact declared operationally ready to deploy.

My second-last point is that the ability of the Canadian Forces to receive refugees, in co-operation with Citizenship and Immigration Canada and other agencies, remains now at 72 hours' notice. As yet, we have not had any clear indication of numbers that might come to us. I was speaking about that to Ambassador Girard just before the session. Again, that will all depend on the ongoing priorities and so on of the UNHCR, and, of course, on the Canadian policies in that respect. We all stand ready to do what we have to in that context.

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Finally, as indicated by the minister, we have reported or laid out at least the incremental costs associated with Canadian Forces operations in the Balkans to date—and specifically in terms of the operations in Aviano—encompassing all Kosovo-related operations. This is the full range of both military and humanitarian operations to date since the first deployment to Italy of the CF-18s in June 1998. At this time, the Canadian Forces have expended approximately $32 million in incremental costs. Of this total, approximately $12 million has been incurred since March 24, the beginning of air operations, when the air campaign began. Of that, about $1.5 million has been actual weapons expenditures.

That concludes my statement for today, Mr. Chairman. We stand ready for questions after Madam Corneau has said a few words.

The Chairman: Thank you, General.

Madam Corneau.

[Translation]

Ms. Hélène Corneau (Program Manager, Central and Eastern Europe, Canadian International Development Agency): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Minister responsible for CIDA, Diane Marleau, today announced that Canada will be supplying an additional $30 million in humanitarian and financial aid to address the crisis in Kosovo.

A further $20 million will be provided in humanitarian relief in the form of food, clothing and shelter. CIDA's humanitarian aid will be distributed by partners such as the UN High Commission for Refugees, the World Food Programme, the Red Cross and Canadian NGOs.

[English]

The remaining $10 million will be used for economic assistance to the region. People in the regions have been hosting refugees, and there have been additional demands placed on social infrastructure such as schools and hospitals. As well, the region's trade and transit routes are blocked. Recent hard-won improvements in Albania's economic prospects have deteriorated, and in Macedonia, unemployment and poverty levels remain high. To date, CIDA has committed $10 million in humanitarian assistance and $5 million in food aid. With today's announcement, CIDA's total contribution to this Kosovo crisis will be $45 million.

[Translation]

Thank you.

The Chairman: Thank you, Ms. Corneau.

[English]

Mr. Martin, you came in after the introductions. We have one minute for the question and one minute for the answer.

Mr. Keith Martin (Esquimalt—Juan de Fuca, Ref.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thanks to all of you for being here.

I have a couple of quick points. This is really spiralling dangerously out of control, and I fear we're going to get ourselves into another Cyprus situation, a very expensive long-term commitment for all concerned. My questions are as follows.

Is there any view towards engaging in a propaganda campaign within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in order to let the Serbian people know of the atrocities Milosevic has been responsible for, not only in Kosovo but also in Croatia and Bosnia?

Second, are we considering approaching Kofi Annan, who has been waiting in the wings to engage in a diplomatic initiative with Mr. Milosevic? Are we going to formally ask him or pressure, with our contemporaries, to have him approach Mr. Milosevic to engage in a diplomatic solution that will involve a peacekeeping force involving UN and Russian troops?

Thank you.

LGen Raymond Henault: I can take the first question about propaganda campaigns. Of course, any of those campaigns or anything of that nature would have to be undertaken by NATO as part of an alliance agreement to undertake those types of operations. I can tell you that in terms of that type of propaganda I'm not familiar with the full range of activities that they would take from that level, but I do know that leaflets and so on were distributed. That's the only level of propaganda that I know of at the moment.

I would note, though, that in terms of propaganda, I suppose, or at least in terms of the Yugoslavians' knowledge of operations, in terms of how they're ongoing, and what types of things are happening in Kosovo and so on, some of them undoubtedly would have access to that type of information, in that it has been reported to us by journalists in Belgrade that there is access to CNN, NBC, and a number of other western media outlets. So without a campaign that NATO would necessarily push forward on those networks, they obviously have access to the western view of what is going on with the campaign. That's about as much as I can tell you at this point, knowing that only the leaflets have been distributed so far.

• 1540

Mr. Keith Martin: Thank you.

Paul?

Mr. Paul Meyer: Indeed, we're very encouraged by the active role that Kofi Annan is taking. We've been very supportive of his involvement. With respect to his intentions to travel to Moscow and engage, I think we all recognize that Russia can play a key role here in terms of recreating the consensus within the Security Council regarding an ultimate solution in Kosovo. Certainly the question of the composition of a peacekeeping force would be one of those areas where it would be very important for Secretary-General Mr. Annan to have discussions with the Russians and to see if a common basis can be arrived at again.

The Chairman: Thank you very much.

Mr. Turp.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: Mr. Chairman, I wouldn't want this to count as part of the minute allotted to me, but I would like to mention the presence among us of Ambassador Girard. We saw you on television and realized that you were here. At the conclusion of the meeting, I'd like us to give the ambassador an opportunity to relate to us his experiences and some of the lessons learned during his tour of duty.

My first question is for Mr. Meyer. This weekend will be very decisive, in my view. Will the focus in Washington be on sending in ground troops or on finding a diplomatic solution to the crisis? I'd like you to try and answer that question as honestly as possible, in light of the initiative undertaken by the special Russian envoy and of the fact that the European Union appears poised to present a new peace plan based on the German initiative. As far as Kosovo is concerned, what will be the priority issue on the Washington Summit agenda?

My second question is for General Henault. Is NATO's objective to kill Slobodan Milosevic? One of his residences was bombed at four o'clock this morning. Perhaps there had been reports that he was spending the night there. Is killing Milosevic one of the objectives of the allied force and is it also true that NATO is in the process of establishing a land corridor, considering that the Czech Republic, Slovakia and even Germany have agreed to let allied forces use their land to gain access to Serbia and Kosovo?

Mr. Paul Meyer: As a NATO member, Canada has consistently held that a diplomatic resolution to the crisis is preferable. In my view, this will continue to be a priority on the agenda. However, we mustn't let up our military efforts aimed at convincing the government in Belgrade to accept the demands of the international community.

Mr. Daniel Turp: That's a concise response. Does the European Union have a plan?

The Chairman: You have already used up more than two minutes. If you want General Henault to respond, I suggest you let him speak.

LGen Henault: Regarding the attacks on residences, it is not NATO policy, and certainly I know of no specific policy, as far as our air offensive is concerned, to assassinate Milosevic or target specific individuals. The strikes were ordered because in addition to being owned by Mr. Milosevic, this residence was known to be a command and control centre. That's why it was targeted.

With respect to establishing land corridors in Kosovo, I'm not familiar with the information you gave, but I do know that we are currently weighing several options for assisting refugees, including ones which would enable NGOs to deliver humanitarian aid and so forth.

• 1545

In order to exercise these options, we may need land corridors, but I remind you that maintaining corridors like this would require the presence of ground troops, which would also imply a ground offensive inside Kosovo. For the moment, I'm not aware of any such plan, Mr. Turp.

The Chairman: Thank you.

[English]

Monsieur Robinson.

Mr. Svend J. Robinson (Burnaby—Douglas, NDP): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I just wanted to followed up on one of Mr. Turp's questions, and then I have another question.

In regard to the decisions on targeting, we were told initially that this would be selected military targets. That's what Parliament was informed of on March 24. Now we see Milosevic's home targeted. I'd certainly be interested in seeing the evidence that this was a military control centre as well as his home. I hope that we will be provided with that material from the general. We've seen a major office tower in downtown Belgrade targeted—which is not a military target. We've now learned that a petrochemical plant near Belgrade, in the city of Pancevo, was bombed, with some very grave environmental consequences, possibly, as a result of that. Does Canada agree with these targeting decisions? What role do we play in targeting? Or is it strictly the United States' supreme command?

Second, I've asked this question before. We're told that there are 300,000 to 400,000 internal refugees within Kosovo. Our briefing material says that they lack the basic necessities of life: food, water, medicine, and shelter. What concrete steps is Canada taking to get food and basic necessities to those people now? All we've heard from Tony Blair and, yesterday, from Axworthy, the minister, is, “wait until the bombing is finished”. What are we doing to deal with this humanitarian crisis now?

Finally, to Mr. Meyer, the Russians have said that a NATO-led force is not on, that they won't participate in a NATO-led force. Is Canada continuing to insist that this peacekeeping force must be NATO-led? Yes or no? What's our position at the NATO summit?

The Chairman: Mr. Robinson, I don't want to interrupt your questions, but I do think it's fair to say that our guests are here to give us the information as bureaucrats, as members of—

Mr. Svend Robinson: I'm asking what the position of the government—

The Chairman: But political decisions about Canada's role and who selects targets and things like that may or may not be within the military domain. I'm just saying that if you want to ask a policy question, we'll have to get the minister here to answer it. In terms of policy, we can't put more on our officers and our members of the department than they're capable of responding to. They understand that and you understand that, so I'm sure they'll answer the questions the best they can, but I just want to remind you of that—and we are trying to keep these to short answers. You had three questions, so we'll get three very short answers.

LGen Raymond Henault: I'll respond as quickly as I can. Targeting is controlled at the NATO level. It's controlled by the North Atlantic Council. Targeting is agreed to amongst all of the nations. The Secretary-General has the ultimate decision on targeting and obviously consults with all the nations in doing that. Targeting, at least on the NATO air-tasking order, is controlled by the Secretary-General and ostensibly by all of the NATO members. Canada has a part to play in that, as we have an ambassador at NATO who sits on the NAC and we have a military representative who sits at the military committee.

In terms of refugees inside Kosovo, I know that it is a matter of urgent concern, especially in the military committee and at the NAC. A number of papers have been circulated over the last several days in regard to methods and means by which to try to provide them with aid inside Kosovo, but the reality remains that it is a very high risk undertaking. Air drops, for example, would certainly be very if not extremely risky in terms of low-flying aircraft flying over the terrain without an agreement not to engage that type of a target with manned PAD systems.

Therefore, I don't have the answer to that yet. There is a clear focus on what we can do and on how we can do it, but there isn't agreement amongst nations yet to do that. I can't give you the answer, and I would suggest that Mr. Milosevic, as well, would want to be taking care of his own people. It is a NAC problem and it certainly is an allied problem, but it's also Mr. Milosevic's problem.

Mr. Paul Meyer: On the question of the peacekeeping force, a careful reading of NATO's position—and, indeed, it figures as one of the five demands—indicates that there be an international military presence. It doesn't specify that it has to be a NATO-led presence. The alliance has offered to lead such a force, but it doesn't figure, and I think it's quite evident, that this is one of the areas that's crucial to an eventual negotiation, which would allow there once more to be a consensus within the Security Council about the exact composition and nature of that force.

• 1550

Mr. Svend Robinson: Thank you.

The Chairman: Thank you. That was interesting.

We now go to Mr. Price.

Mr. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, PC): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My questions will be to—

The Chairman: No revelations, just questions.

Mr. David Price: Pardon?

The Chairman: No revelations, just questions.

Mr. David Price: I see.

General, first of all, we received the information on our costs so far. We're talking about $32 million, with roughly $12 million of that for weapons. Does that mean we're spending another $12 million now to get our weapons stocks back up? We're also hearing now that our weapons stocks are pretty well depleted, yet we're going to send six more planes over there. Does that mean we're now going to start into flying cover more than going on bombing missions? How are our CF-18s holding up at this point? How are we doing with spare parts? Do we have planes over there that we're starting to rob for parts?

LGen Raymond Henault: Mr. Price, in terms of the cost that I just portrayed to you, $12 million is the overall cost of operations in the Balkans since the beginning of the operation on March 24. That includes a wide range of things: the deployment of the CF-18s, the humanitarian activities that we've undertaken so far, the preparations to receive refugees, and so on. Of that $12 million, $1.5 million is actual weapons costs at this stage of the game; that's weapons replacement costs. We are continuing to replenish our weapons, but I can assure you that we have a very good stock of weapons in theatre, and we're now replenishing them to make sure that we have a rolling stock, if you like, if we—

Mr. David Price: So we've reordered, on a continuous—

LGen Raymond Henault: We've reordered. We're doing a lot of that with stocks available in Europe, which we can transfer through foreign military sales and so on. It's done with the greatest of economy, if you like, in terms of availability and so on and so forth. We have no problems in that respect at the moment, and it doesn't necessarily reflect a role change for our fighters. The fighters continue to do operations in the full scope of activity that we talked about, which includes the air-to-air, the combat air patrol, and the precision-guided and non-precision delivery of weapons. There is still the full range of capability and still a full stock of weapons for some time yet, and we're keeping a very close eye on that.

The aircraft themselves are actually holding out reasonably well. That is a good question. Aircraft normally provide a serviceability rate of somewhere around 75%. When I looked at the figures today for the 12 aircraft that are actually in Aviano, 11 of those were combat ready, so that meant that only 1 was down for maintenance. That's a reasonably good rate. On average, about 75% are available to us on any given day, and what we plan on flying is 8 of 12; when we get the 18 in theatre, it will be 12 or 13 of 18 that we will use.

Mr. David Price: Just in passing, are the dollars we're talking about Canadian dollars?

LGen Raymond Henault: Yes.

I would only add that those are incremental costs, not the full costs.

Mr. David Price: Yes.

The Chairman: The Bloc proposal to use the U.S. dollar hasn't come to fruition yet.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

The Chairman: Mr. Turp.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Has there been any damage to aircraft at this point?

LGen Raymond Henault: We have had no battle damage to aircraft. One aircraft had some damages caused to it during a air-to-air refuelling at night, when what we call an “angle-of-attack vein” on the side of the aircraft was damaged. That's the only damage that we've had so far.

Mr. Daniel Turp: How was it damaged?

The Chairman: Mr. Turp.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Sorry, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: It's Mr. White's turn.

Mr. Daniel Turp: I thought it would be interesting to know.

The Chairman: Sorry. Mr. McKay and then Mr. White.

Mr. McKay.

Mr. John McKay (Scarborough East, Lib.): Mr. Meyer, I assume that at some point NATO entered into a resolution among the 19 countries to enter into this conflict. Was that an open-ended resolution or are there points at which nations have choices to participate in this conflict? Is Washington one of those points where nations, in theory at least, if they wanted to, could make the choice of opting out of the conflict?

• 1555

Mr. Paul Meyer: It's my understanding, from a political perspective.... Of course, it's always a choice of national governments as to whether to participate or not; no one is forced to participate in a NATO operation if they've taken a sovereign decision not to. You know that even among the NATO member states there is a variety of different types of participation or non-participation in the allied military efforts that are going on.

But I think there is a premise of overall political solidarity, which has continued to characterize the attitudes of member states. You're also right that at any time in Washington when there are leaders gathering there could be changes in the nature of participation by states.

The Chairman: Monsieur White.

Mr. Ted White (North Vancouver, Ref.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The first part of my question is addressed to General Henault. In the event that we end up with Canadians on the ground, the Auditor General has reported that he's not very impressed with the state of the Griffon helicopters, the Leopard tanks, and the Coyote armoured vehicles. I have never known the Auditor General to be wrong in his audits, so I wonder if I might have your comments on that.

The other question comes in reaction to constituent letters I've been sent. Two things come up consistently. They charge that this whole exercise is illegal—and maybe someone can make a comment if any of you feel appropriately qualified to do so. How would you answer constituents who are writing in that way?

Also, can anyone give me an idea of the flow of refugees before and after the bombing began. Is it 10 times as many now? Can someone give me a feel for that number?

LGen Raymond Henault: If you like, I can take the first question, give the second to Mr. Meyer, and then perhaps Ambassador Girard would like to take the third question.

For example, I can tell you that in the case of the tanks, we don't have any plans to deploy tanks at this time, although our tanks are being “up-armoured”, as we call it, so the Leopard tanks are being improved as time goes on.

At the moment, the plans that do exist are for the 600- to 800-man peacekeeping force that I've talked to you about previously, which includes our Coyote, the newest vehicle in the land force inventory. It's the most modern in the world and it's considered to be state of the art. It has all of the self-protection systems and capabilities that a commander would want on the ground for long-term reconnaissance or long-vision reconnaissance—day-night, all-weather.... There is also the Griffon helicopter, one of the newest helicopters in the inventory, which will be equipped with a full suite of defence electronic warfare systems.

So I can tell you that what we are going to deploy is amongst the best that we have at the moment. They are ready, the training has been done, and all of those forces, including their support and command elements, are in fact ready to go. I'm very confident in what we're planning on deploying.

Mr. Paul Meyer: We always saw our action as being a legitimate action, so that's the short response.

If you want to cite process, I think there's a long diplomatic history. There is the series of resolutions by the United Nations Security Council in terms of the condemnation of what was going on, the support for the political negotiations and settlements that were offered at Rambouillet, and the demands for the end to the violence, the disproportionate use of force and the expulsions. These had featured throughout this.

As you know, it broke down when it came to a resolution authorizing all necessary means. Two members of the Security Council balked at that, but the resolve and determination of the alliance member states was that they were justified in taking this action to, in a sense, enforce the demands of the international community.

Also here, I think, and quite apropos in this regard, is the attitude of Kofi Annan himself, who spoke to the emerging norm regarding humanitarian intervention, and spoke very eloquently, saying that he, for one, would not want to see the UN charter used as a refuge for those who were engaged in violent repression of their people.

The Chairman: Minister, very quickly.

Mr. Raphael Girard (Canadian Ambassador to Yugoslavia): The movement of people through this crisis has changed dramatically in the space of a year. Last year, with the beginning of systematic attacks against civilians, we saw a great deal of internal displacement but not a great deal of external expulsion.

• 1600

The first attacks started in March and pushed people from the Drenica region of central Kosovo largely into other areas of Kosovo. A second campaign against the western edges of Kosovo and the Uzice emplacements in that part of the country pushed people into Montenegro in the north and Albania in the west and south. The numbers were under 50,000.

What we've seen since the departure of the KVM monitors around March 24 is a very large—tenfold—increase in the number of people being pushed externally. I would warn you against concluding that it is as a result of bombing. That's not what the refugees tell us and that's not what we see on the ground. These are people who are leaving because the heavily armed Serbian police—not the military—are going village to village, burning and terrorizing people, as they did all last summer, and pushing them this time towards the border.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Ms. Guay.

Ms. Monique Guay (Laurentides, BQ): My questions will be about international aid, in particular aid for refugees. I think we've just about covered the military side of things.

Ms. Corneau, I have three questions for you. How were the first $15 million in international aid distributed? Who is responsible on the ground for distributing these funds? I'd like more information on this. You've said that NGOs are handling this, but are there any CIDA or government officials on site to ensure that the relief is distributed to those who really need it? Have you had any reports about problems with the local mafia? According to another report, one that I haven't been able to confirm, only three out of every ten ration packets are getting to the refugees and the situation could get even worse. If you don't have any information about this, perhaps you could find out and pass it along to us at the next briefing.

Ms. Hélène Corneau: Thank you. Of the $15 million in relief aid announced a while back, $5 million was distributed to the UN High Commission for Refugees, $2 million to the Red Cross, $1 million to UNICEF, $2 million to Canadian NGOs like CECI, CARE Canada and World Vision, and lastly, $5 million for food aid.

When it comes to distributing relief, we work closely with multilateral organizations who have a very important role to play in terms of coordinating efforts on the ground in Macedonia and Albania. We take care to respond as best we can to the needs of the refugees in Albania and Macedonia.

Regarding your final question, which is most disturbing, Minister Marleau spoke this morning with Brigadier General Maisonneuve in Albania. The latter informed us that news reports are highly exaggerated. You maintain that 70 per cent of....

Ms. Monique Guay: That's what the newspapers are reporting.

Ms. Hélène Corneau: According to media reports, 70 per cent of the aid is being diverted. These reports are highly exaggerated. General Maisonneuve is heading up a team working in the 12 counties in Albania and when any suspicion arises about the possible diversion of humanitarian aid, this is brought to the government's attention as quickly as possible so that immediate action can be taken. The general also informed us that this information was probably leaked by a member of the government coalition experiencing problems with one of the other coalition partners.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Could you please repeat that?

The Chairman: I'm sorry, sir.

• 1605

Mr. Daniel Turp: I would merely like Ms. Corneau to repeat that information.

Ms. Hélène Corneau: The government....

The Chairman: It took her two minutes to supply that information in the first place.

[English]

We're over the time. Look, we're in the middle of an extremely complicated situation. These people have taken time out of very valuable time. I'm going to ask them if they'll stay a few extra minutes because there are a few other questions, but we really have to try to respect the time rules of what we're trying to achieve here or we won't be able to have these briefing sessions. These are very serious issues and they have to get back their offices to deal with them.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: That's why we must take the time to talk about it, Mr. Chairman.

We are seven minutes behind schedule because we started seven minutes late. You were late.

[English]

The Chairman: Okay.

Mr. Reed.

Mr. Julian Reed (Halton, Lib.): Thank you.

At the last briefing, the question of depleted uranium was raised. Subsequent to that, I've seen two interpretations of depleted uranium, both over television. One was that depleted uranium simply contained reduced radioactivity levels. Another was that depleted uranium was in fact totally depleted. There is some fear expressed by the Serb-Canadian community. This is one area that is being dwelled on by the Serb-Canadian community, so I was wondering if it would be possible to get some kind of fairly precise description of what depleted uranium is and whether it is causing the massive environmental degradation that it's being accused of.

LGen Raymond Henault: If you like, sir, I can forward to the clerk the briefing note that we have prepared on depleted uranium so that you have a clear vision of what depleted uranium ammunition actually means.

But I can assure you that depleted uranium is in fact a harmless.... I hesitate to call it harmless, because it is a weapon, but it is not radioactive. It's used because of its density and its penetrating power, particularly because of its penetrating power through armour. All the studies that we are aware of show that there is no environmental impact from using that type of depleted uranium. The only environmental degradation comes from the actual propellants and the other chemicals that go with the actual launching of the actual round, if you like. There is no radioactive implication.

If you like, if it would help, next time I will bring a copy of the briefing note and that will lay it out for you a little more clearly.

Mr. Julian Reed: Thank you, General.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, General.

Monsieur Laurin.

[Translation]

Mr. René Laurin: Speaking hypothetically, if we do send in ground troops, obviously we will have to prepare for their arrival. Are any preparations being made at this time in Kosovo, if the event a decision is made to send in ground troops?

LGen Henault: As you know, Mr. Laurin, no preparations are being made at this time. NATO still does not have plan to deploy ground troops. We are continuing our air offensive, which NATO intends to follow up with peacekeeping forces on the ground. To my knowledge, no preparations are under way for a ground offensive in Kosovo.

Mr. René Laurin: NATO is not even preparing for this possibility? Are you awaiting a decision?

LGen Henault: From a military standpoint, we do not begin our planning until we receive policy instructions and orders from NATO, from the North Atlantic Council, from the military committee and finally, for our political leaders, namely the minister. We haven't yet received any orders of this nature.

Mr. René Laurin: Mr. Meyer, this week we have witnessed a growing number of major television reports on life inside Kosovo. One half-hour report delved into the mind set and military background of Mr. Milosevic. Do you think the government has a plan in place to broadcast programming depicting life in Kosovo and the state of mind of Kosovar and Serbian leaders? Is broadcasting these programs part of the overall strategy, or was the timing of this program merely coincidental, given that the networks choose their own programming?

• 1610

Mr. Paul Meyer: General Henault has already mentioned NATO's contribution and efforts to counter this kind of psychological warfare, but we have no intention of....

Mr. René Laurin: I was referring to programming shown here in Canada.

Mr. Paul Meyer: We are not responsible for Serb television programs. I have no information about these programs being shown here in Canada.

LGen Henault: It's always possible that Mr. Milosevic is monitoring our daily technical briefing. As I see it, this would be a form of psychological warfare.

Mr. René Laurin: Ours aren't that long, so I don't think that....

[English]

The Chairman: Mr. Robinson, do you have a very quick question?

Mr. Svend Robinson: Indeed, a very quick question, just to follow up. I must say I'm profoundly concerned about the answer of General Henault concerning the internal refugees within Kosovo. Basically he was saying, “We don't know what to do.” They face famine; there will be no harvest.

According to our briefing notes, Greece has negotiated permission from the Yugoslav authorities for the operation of a humanitarian medical and food supply operation in Kosovo, through the Greek branch of Doctors of the World.

I wonder if we could get a bit more information about this and ask whether Canada is prepared to work with Greece and to provide resources to Greece to get food in to the people that so desperately need it. Because, in the absence of that, what we're hearing from NATO is “we don't know what to do”, and people are going to starve to death in the hills and mountains.

LGen Raymond Henault: Certainly, Mr. Robinson, I share your concern, but from a military perspective we need to wait until the military committee gives us some direction, either to the NATO forces or to Canada specifically, before we can take any action at this point. At this stage of the game, I'm not aware of any opportunity—

Mr. Svend Robinson: I'm asking about the Greek proposal. Is anybody here aware of this?

LGen Raymond Henault: I'm not familiar with it.

Mr. Daniel Dhavernas (Director, Southern Europe Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): We're aware of it. Because of the events between Yugoslavia and Greece, some Greek NGOs are able to get in. How much aid they're able to bring in and what they're able to do, I don't know. We'll look into this and get you an answer next time.

Mr. Svend Robinson: If we can get food in through the Greeks, let's do it.

The Chairman: Maybe, Mr. Meyer or Mr. Dhavernas, you could get some further information to us next Tuesday. It would be helpful. I think the members would be very interested in that situation.

If it's not an imposition, I'd like to ask two quick questions myself, one to General Henault.

You mentioned the destruction of aircraft of the Yugoslav forces. Obviously it's the use of the military vehicles—particularly the use of the mechanized vehicles by the police—that has largely led the charge of blowing up the villages and tanks. Have you any record of how many tanks and mechanized vehicles of the Yugoslav army have been destroyed? Are they hurting in that respect? Do we have any idea of how much damage they've suffered?

LGen Raymond Henault: No, I don't have an exact count of the numbers, but I do know that it would be in the dozens now, if not more than that.

I do know that from an aircraft perspective we've destroyed at least five MiG-29s in the air. We've destroyed a large number of aircraft on the ground. As I indicated to you, somewhere in the neighbourhood of 60% of their fighter force has now been either destroyed or damaged severely, to the point where they can't operate. With respect to vehicles on the ground, there are vehicles destroyed every day. The NATO briefers would probably have those numbers. If you like, I can try to get some compendium of numbers that would give you an indication of what that might be and I can bring it to the next meeting.

The Chairman: It would be very obvious if we were told that he had 300 tanks and 220 had been destroyed.... It starts to give you an idea as to how much capacity he has to wage the campaign. With respect to the Apache attack helicopters, I assume that's going to be one of their roles, to go in and get those—

LGen Raymond Henault: Yes, it is. The Apache has not yet started operations, as you're probably aware, and will not for at least the next week or two, but that is exactly the type of vehicle the aircraft that have been operating in what we call the Kosovo engagement zones have been targeting: heavy armour, artillery, tanks, and so on.

The Chairman: Ambassador, we have heard that the bombing campaign has stiffened the resolve of the Serbs around Mr. Milosevic and that, in fact, if anything, there's no room for dissent now. Can you, from your experience there, tell us...? At some point, I would have thought, if I were a Serb sitting in Belgrade, I might say that Mr. Milosevic's policy of guaranteeing Greater Serbia is not working, that it looks like Kosovo is going, Montenegro might split off, they've already lost Croatia, Slovenia, etc. What is the view of the political situation in Belgrade as to his capacity for being able to survive in light of what he has drawn his people into?

• 1615

Mr. Raphael Girard: The campaign in the initial phases has certainly consolidated support in the country for Milosevic. If you can generalize, Serbs generally see this as an unwarranted attack on Serbia by people from abroad who are perhaps determined to inflict damage on the Serbian nation, so their patriotic response is to unite behind the leader even though they don't agree with his policies.

The most articulate and most visible of the critics of Milosevic have gone on record to that effect. The head of the independent media association, who has been under constant attack by Milosevic and his regime for the last many months, wrote a piece in the New York Times about ten days ago saying exactly that, that is, the bombing campaign has done nothing to enhance the internal opposition against Milosevic. On the contrary, those people who disagree with him have to bite their tongues and get behind him in what they regard as an unjust attack on Serbia.

The Chairman: But there must be some sort of political theories or thought as to how much damage one can absorb before something gives, or at least.... This is going to be a situation like the end of the Second World War. We're going to have to say that it has to be total surrender or nothing. At some point.... Well, that's another question, however. I won't get into that. That requires a very long answer.

Mr. Raphael Girard: It's a very depressing one, believe me.

The Chairman: Thank you very much. We appreciate you taking the time. We know you're very busy. We'll see you at 3.15. Merci.