:
Good morning, everyone.
I call this meeting to order.
Welcome to meeting No. 65 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics.
Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format, pursuant to the House order of June 23, 2022. Members can therefore attend in person in the room and remotely using the Zoom application. Should any technical challenges arise, please advise me immediately. Please note that we may need to suspend a few minutes as we need to ensure all members are able to participate fully.
Pursuant to Standing Order 108(3)(h) and the motion adopted by the committee on Wednesday, December 7, 2022, the committee resumed its study of foreign interference and threats to the integrity of democratic institutions, intellectual property and the Canadian state.
Madam Clerk, all the required connection tests have been completed.
I would now like to welcome our witness today, Mr. Raphaël Glucksmann.
[English]
He is the chair of the special committee on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation, and the strengthening of integrity, transparency and accountability in the European Parliament.
[Translation]
Mr. Glucksmann, welcome to the committee.
The floor is yours for five minutes.
Thank you, all honourable members, for the invitation.
[Translation]
Thank you so much for your invitation.
The special committee I chair began its work in 2020, and since then, we have methodically analyzed foreign interference in all European democratic processes.
After hundreds of hours of hearings, interactions with European security services, whistleblowers, investigative journalists, experts and diplomats, but also after dissecting various confidential or public memos, various reports published by the different institutions in the countries of the European Union, and after conducting missions on the ground, our verdict against European leaders is quite dire.
For too many years, our leaders and governments have given free rein to the efforts of hostile countries within our own nations. These efforts can be categorized under two types of interference objectives.
On the one hand, there are countries, governments, regimes that interfere in our democratic life to promote their interests, to obtain agreements that are favourable to them, or to prevent emerging criticism against their attitude and behaviour.
On the other hand, some regimes may also attempt to discredit geopolitical opponents. In this category, we place Qatar, for example, which has used corruption within the European Parliament itself to promote its interests, obtain favourable agreements, or discredit the United Arab Emirates. That is classic interference.
There are also two other players whose goals are different. Their goal is not so much to advance their interests, but rather to destabilize and weaken our democracies as such. Their specific goal is to hinder our democratic functioning. Those players are Russia and China.
We have thoroughly analyzed Russian and Chinese actions in Europe. I will begin with Russia, knowing that I must be brief.
Russia's goal is to sow chaos in our democracies. It's a true hybrid war that was unleashed against the European Union. For a very long time, there was no reaction to this war. When I say “hybrid war”, I mean cyber-attacks on our hospitals in the middle of a pandemic. Not far from my office is the Centre hospitalier Sud Francilien, in Corbeil-Essonnes, in the Paris region. It was attacked by Russian hackers and was unable to function for weeks.
This is about cyber-attacks against our institutions, but also the penetration of social networks, with Mr. Prigojine's armies of trolls and bots that, in all the European Union's languages, aim to promote the most extreme points of view and polarize our societies.
We have analyzed how, for example, in Spain, Russian actors favour both the Catalan independentists and the ultranationalists of the extreme right-wing party Vox, that is, completely opposite poles of the political debate, with the aim of polarizing debate and making it chaotic.
Interference also takes the form of corruption and the capturing of elites. We analyzed how the German energy system was reoriented to Russian interests by Schröder, the social democratic chancellor, and by people who worked with him, all of whom ended up working for Gazprom.
It is also the financing of extremist political movements.
Finally, it is also the use of non-governmental organizations, or NGOs, or ultra-reactionary think tanks, which question the existence of European institutions.
All this creates an ecosystem whose goal is the destabilization of democracies.
Other than Russia, the actor that has most occupied our work is China.
For a long time, China belonged to the first category, that is, its goal was to promote Chinese interests. In recent years, it has been inspired by the Russian authorities' modus operandi and the methods employed by the Russians.
We have seen that, since the pandemic, China's goal has also become destabilization. Chinese methods are quite similar to those of the Russians. The main difference is the importance attached to economic actors as opposed to political actors. We also realized that, for example, in the European Parliament and in the European institutions, the Chinese authorities had no need to hire lobbyists since the major European companies, which need the Chinese market for their sales and whose manufacturing needs the Chinese production apparatus—so they are completely linked to China—were doing the lobbying and penetration instead of the Chinese authorities on their behalf.
So we have—
:
Thank you very much for your question.
What should our reactions be? They should already be much faster and much harsher. What has allowed these repeated assaults is, first of all, the absence of sanctions, the absence of consequences. In fact, as soon as there is an attack on a strategic infrastructure, as soon as there is evidence of corruption, there must be a sanction. In the European Union, there have been no sanctions.
And then the big issue for us, in particular, as you mentioned, Mr. Gourde, is our dependence on energy. Until now, we were totally dependent on Russian energy, and we realize how dependent we are today on Chinese production, including in the most strategic sectors.
If you want to assert European sovereignty, you must work to reduce your dependencies. This is what the European Commission calls risk mitigation. In my view, this is our great task in the coming years. In fact, we had very specific recommendations in that regard.
:
Good morning, Mr. Glucksmann. Thank you very much for being here today. We are enormously grateful to you for sharing your insights and expertise in this area.
In your introduction, you said that some countries, such as China and, in particular, Russia, are trying to drive a wedge into democracies.
Several witnesses who appeared before the committee said that Russia and China have been conducting activities, especially on social media, for quite some time.
What are your observations on this, in hindsight and based on your investigations? When do you think Russia and China began their cyberpropaganda or cyberterrorism activities?
:
I thank you for the question, Mr. Fergus.
In our view, the tipping point was 2007, when massive cyber-attacks were conducted against Estonia. Estonia was one of the first European countries to switch to all-digital for its government. In 2007, Russian hackers coordinated and attacked Estonian institutions, making the country almost ungovernable for a while. In our view, this date marked the beginning of hybrid warfare and massive virtual attacks.
Then, on social networks, there was a gradual evolution of Russian propaganda. In 2012 or 2013, with the creation of the Internet Research Agency, in St. Petersburg, it became massive and, above all, structured and thought out in a systematic way. These are the two dates that marked Russia's tipping point in the hybrid war against our democracies.
I insist on one thing: the analysis of these campaigns is fundamental to understanding the situation. When one is a European, Canadian or American democratic leader, it is difficult to understand that political leaders can have as their objective not to defend their interests to the maximum, but to sow chaos in other countries. One understands this by pragmatically studying different campaigns that have been conducted.
In France, for example, there were campaigns on the issue of police violence. Russian agents explained that the police were committing violence and railed against police violence, while the same troll farms in St. Petersburg encouraged the police to shoot into the crowd. The two poles are always fed simultaneously.
The contradiction in this kind of campaign is not a problem; it is the campaign itself.
:
For us, China's action has gone through a progressive radicalization and the establishment of structures in China that we have been able to discover. It is really Xi Jinping who is developing this strategy and thinking. The shift, in terms of disinformation campaigns, manipulation of information and destabilization of social networks, occurred during the pandemic, a moment of radicalization whose goal was no longer so much to promote a narrative line, but to make ungovernable, especially on the health issue, the European countries in which we conducted the studies.
Targeting the economic side has been a strategy of the Chinese government from the beginning. Indeed, this government believes that globalization will eventually allow large European multinationals to become fundamentally Chinese companies, because their interests will be in China first, before they are in Germany.
When you take a company as large as Volkswagen and analyze their sales and production figures, you understand that, ultimately, Volkswagen has a much higher turnover in China than in Germany and that Volkswagen is dependent on the Chinese government. Moreover, even when there are scandals, such as the presence of Volkswagen factories in the Uyghur region, where the Chinese communist regime practises systematized slavery, the company is still present there. It would be in Volkswagen's economic interest to get out of this region. However, this car company is hostage to the Chinese government, because Volkswagen is hostage to the Chinese market and the Chinese production apparatus.
So the Chinese government can decide where Volkswagen will open or close a plant. It's no longer a choice made by a private actor, it's now a choice made by an economic hostage, if you will, a voluntary choice, obviously, because the goal is to make money. This is recurrent and this is what allows the penetration of the European debate.
There is also the issue of strategic infrastructure. This is really a strategy that involves Chinese investment first. In our opinion, the key date is 2008‑09, at the time of the debt crisis in the European Union and, in Greece, the sale of the port of Piraeus to Chinese investors.
Since then, we have seen how this is a strategy to gradually take control of strategic infrastructure.
I am very happy to see you again.
The strategy is the same for Russia and China in this aspect. The first problematic element for the integrity of the state is the capture of the elites, and therefore the networks. One of the strategies of these two countries is to turn themselves, for example, into providers of golden pensions for our senior leaders and officials. This compromises the integrity of the decision-making process. When you are at the top of a state and you have to make a decision, if you have the retirement prospect of being paid by Huawei, you will not make decisions that are hostile to Huawei or to Chinese interests as a whole.
We have really pushed for legislation against the phenomenon of revolving doors or collusion, in other words, with authoritarian regimes hostile to our principles and interests. This assumes one very simple thing: a Canadian company is not the equivalent of a company in the Chinese communist system. Yet, on paper, they are both private companies. The only problem is that when a Chinese private enterprise reaches a certain size, it is no longer private, in reality. It is dependent on the Communist Party, it has to be subject to the National Intelligence Law and it has to have a representative of the Communist Party on its board of directors. So in fact, they are no longer private actors; they are actors in a hostile state system.
The second element that concerns the integrity of the state is the question of institutional ties. We have realized the extent to which institutional co‑operations, including decentralized ones, enable espionage. There are many other situations of the same type. That said, the problem is even more acute for the Australians, for example, than for the Europeans.
:
Once again, thank you for the question.
I am far from an expert on the issue of foreign interference in Canada. That said, what is certain is that in Europe, it is an extreme danger. It is an existential danger. I hope for your sake that your democracy is more stable than ours and that it is better protected. But what is certain is that it is a danger for all democracies. I can tell you that even without being an expert on Canada.
We have to understand one thing. For a very long time, we have not wanted to see that there are regimes, not whose interests are contradictory to ours—this is normal since, even between democracies, there can be contradictory interests—but which are philosophically, ideologically and viscerally hostile to liberal democracies and whose aim is to weaken us in order to establish what Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin have together called a new international order.
So I see no reason why a democracy as important as Canada's should be exempt from the threats that affect others.
:
You know, it's a common line to say that you can do wars for pipelines. Actually, Putin did war “through” pipelines. The pipes were a tool in his hybrid warfare against European democracies.
I'll explain the strategy on Nord Stream, for instance, which is connected to elite capture. Gerhard Schröder was the chancellor of democratic Germany. Five to 10 days before he was going to lose the election in 2005, he signed the Nord Stream project with Putin. A few weeks after his planned defeat, which everybody knew he would lose, he went to work for Gazprom. The result was that European dependence on Russian gas only grew until February 24, 2022.
When the war started, we discovered that not only had Germany built Nord Stream 1 and 2, but that they had also sold their stocks in Germany to Gazprom. Gazprom emptied these stocks, these reserves, and as a result, we could not have an embargo on fossil imports from Russia. The European Union, during the first six months of the war, financed the Russian regime 800 million euros per day because of these policies.
Thank you, sir, for joining us today. I appreciate your perspectives.
I'm wondering if you can tell us about the events that led to the creation of the special committee. I am most interested in the whistle-blower protections that were part of the plan that was proposed.
I wonder if you could also speak to the non-partisan nature in which it was approached. My reading of English-language media reports of some of the events of late last year, in the context of Canadian politics, would have placed someone in a similar position in Canada in a difficult political position to propose and champion the types of reforms you're speaking about today. People who were, if I'm understanding correctly, ideologically more aligned with you were at the centre of some of these scandals. I read that led to the creation of these reforms. However, you persisted and in fact, maybe in spite of that or maybe because of that.... My reading is that you pushed quite hard for these reforms.
Could you speak to that?
:
Yes. Thank you very much for your question. I think it's an important one.
The committee was set up much before Qatargate and the scandal. I pushed for the creation of the committee. It was especially after Brexit that I saw we needed to set up this kind of committee. We worked for three years and a half and we were supposed to finish our work, and then came the Qatargate. I pushed very hard, despite the fact that people—you're right—connected to social democrats were involved.
I believe that we worked in our committee in a tripartisan manner from the very start. The protection of democracy is above partisan differences. It is actually the protection of the framework that allows us to disagree with each other. Second, I think it's our duty to fight corruption, to fight foreign interference, including in our own respective political families or groups.
I was pushed to go on with the leadership on the committee because everybody, including those from other political groups, trusted that I would go after reforms and also truth, not having any consideration for what the flag was of the people who were actually betraying democracy.
I wanted to welcome and thank our witness in French. My French will improve, but, for the time being, as I'm still more comfortable in English, I’ll continue in that language.
[English]
I'm a former journalist, I'll let you know, so it's been really frustrating for me to see the amount of misleading information out there in the world. At the same time, we see a decline in the number of newsrooms.
In particular, lately, something stood out for me on the American social media platform Twitter. We've seen news organizations like NPR in the U.S., the BBC and, here in Canada, the CBC/Radio-Canada labelled as state-funded or government-funded media. Coincidentally, this is happening at the same time Russian news outlets and government accounts are being allowed back onto that platform.
I have this article that was published this morning in the Kingston Whig Standard entitled “Russia uses Twitter to attack democracy”. In it, there is quoted a former Conservative cabinet minister who was a Canadian diplomat and is an expert on Russia. He says that this labelling of public broadcasters is “outrageous...it implies that these outlets are under government editorial control” in the way that, say, Russian television is.
I'm wondering if you agree with this characterization. What do you think of this labelling of public broadcasters and media outlets?
:
I feel that regulating platforms is crucial if you want to fight disinformation. Accountability just needs to be imposed. We can't live in a world with no accountability. When the newspaper publishes information that is questionable, it's accountable for that information. Why shouldn't the platforms that let this information go viral be accountable? That's the first thing. We're talking about content here.
In addition, I believe the fundamental point we need to understand is how significant the press and NGOs are in the democratic ecosystem. We need to go beyond simple market logic and let these organizations receive constant support.
Lastly, I feel that fundamentally, we also need to understand that we're up against enemies of democracy and that they will see any weakness as an invitation to attack. So we need sanction regimes. The European Union has a toolbox, but it still hasn't used any of the tools.
In the case of Qatargate, the scandal we've mentioned, sanctions will be imposed on those who let themselves be corrupted, but what sanctions will be imposed on the Qatar regime that's linked to that corruption? It will face no sanctions.
:
That's okay. I will put this in my remaining 30 seconds to you for your consideration for future correspondence back to this committee.
I agree that our democracies are very fragile. I agree that they are under threat from hostile actors internationally, both those that are explicit and, quite frankly, some of our allies.
I would also agree that our Parliament needs to deeply consider, whether it's through this ethics committee.... I think in this moment, a special committee for this particular purpose would be warranted to keep up with the absolute velocity of tools used by foreign hostile actors against Canada, against our democracies and against our democratic institutions.
In your consideration of all of those things, when you report back to our committee, I'm going to ask you to be candid. I'm going to ask you to think in the framework of an elected official defending the fate of a nation and give us whatever candid recommendations you see fit.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
:
I call the meeting back to order.
I'll remind committee members that we're dealing with committee business. We're in public.
I wanted to bring the committee up to date on where we are in terms of the schedule. First and foremost, we have lost a couple of days, May 5 and May 19, as a result of the motion that was passed.
I see your hand. I have Mr. Barrett first and then you second, Mr. Villemure.
We lost a couple of days, based on the motion that was passed in the House of Commons yesterday by unanimous consent.
For Tuesday, we have the final two witnesses who are coming in on access to information, and then we have the departments for the second hour. We are going to leave time for drafting instructions on Tuesday. We have gone full circle on that study, and I think there's enough—not just based on the interim report that we have received, but also subsequent to having the in, etc.—for the analysts to finalize that report and make recommendations to Parliament and the government.
The second thing is on Friday. As you recall, the committee passed a motion on Tuesday on the appointment of the Ethics Commissioner. My plan is to call the witnesses for next Friday. This will push off the foreign interference study for a bit.
That's the update I have.
Mr. Barrett, I saw your hand. Go ahead, please, and then we'll hear Mr. Villemure.
:
Thanks very much, Chair.
I would just note that the motion is very distinct. In terms of point a), it does “invite” Mr. Trudeau, but then, in part b) it does “summon”, so there is a pretty big difference in the approach. I think it would address an aspect of what Mr. Green's concerns are, because part b) is certainly a more direct and stronger push to ensure that those who were involved in this, who have not at this point responded to the committee's overture....
At this point, certainly, if Mr. Trudeau were interested in coming to the committee, he would be able to respond to an invite, but there's a pretty big difference in that, so I would just be curious to know if that addresses aspects of some of the concerns Mr. Green has.
:
The amendment is on the floor. It is in order.
Is there any discussion on that? Do we have unanimous consent to remove part a)?
We don't. Let's go to a vote, please.
(Amendment agreed to: yeas 6; nays 5)
(Motion as amended agreed to: yeas 6; nays 5)
The Chair: Thank you for that.
I still have two speakers on other issues.
[Translation]
Mr. Villemure, you have the floor.
It's troubling that we have an attitude, certainly from members of the Liberal government, that when a mistake is made they adjust course after they've received significant criticism and their misdeeds have been called out. If there's a growing opposition to the actions they've taken, then they rescind an order or backtrack on a contract. The list is getting too long to articulate in the limited time we have, Mr. Chair.
I find it concerning that the attitude, then, is that it is old news that is no longer relevant and, therefore, does not meet the threshold of being discussed.
My suggestion is this. The initial motion asked for three hours, which I think we have, if my understanding of the calendar is correct. Instead of dismissing the study altogether, we can acknowledge that mistakes were made—serious ones. The fact that we have a massive conflict of interest with the sister-in-law of a cabinet minister being appointed as the interim Ethics Commissioner is the stuff that.... I am not even sure Hollywood would be that bold.
My suggestion is that, instead of three hours, it would be reasonable to ask for that hour we have on Tuesday to try to get to the bottom of this, so that members of this committee can ask questions on behalf of the many Canadians who are flabbergasted with the lengths that the government would go to and the actions it takes, which are eroding trust in our institutions.
That would be my submission, Mr. Chair. Certainly, I will not be supporting ending the study, but I would be happy to see it amended and adjusted because of the changing circumstances. That would be where I'm coming from.
Suggestions and proposals don't work as it relates to the Standing Orders. We need formal motions. Mr. Fergus indicated that he has a motion to not continue with this study.
Based on what I heard from you, Mr. Kurek.... I'll remind the committee that we approved up to three meetings on this. If you're proposing an amendment to Mr. Fergus's motion, I would ask you to formalize that now so we can deal with a discussion on your amendment.
What would your amendment be, Mr. Kurek?
I'm sorry, Damien. I just received clarification from the clerk.
Mr. Fergus's motion is in order to not continue with the study. There's nothing to amend on that. It's clear what his motion is, so we would either agree with it or not. That would require unanimous consent, and if not, then a vote.
Greg, did you have one more thing to say?
Mr. Greg Fergus: No.
The Chair: You're done. Okay.
On Mr. Fergus's motion, I'll now ask for unanimous consent. If there's no unanimous consent, then I will ask for a vote. I see heads shaking.
Depending on what happens with that motion, Damien, I'll perhaps go to you next.
(Motion agreed to: yeas 7; nays 3)
The Chair: Mr. Fergus's motion carries. There will be no further study on this issue, which will open up a little more time. As I said to the committee earlier, we only have 14 meetings because we've lost two.
If there is no other committee business, I want to thank the analysts. Thank you to the clerk and all the technicians for today's meeting.
The meeting is adjourned.