NDVA Committee Meeting

Notices of Meeting include information about the subject matter to be examined by the committee and date, time and place of the meeting, as well as a list of any witnesses scheduled to appear. The Evidence is the edited and revised transcript of what is said before a committee. The Minutes of Proceedings are the official record of the business conducted by the committee at a sitting.

For an advanced search, use Publication Search tool.

If you have any questions or comments regarding the accessibility of this publication, please contact us at accessible@parl.gc.ca.

Previous day publication Next day publication

37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Tuesday, February 11, 2003

0910

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, Lib.))

Prof. Joel Sokolsky (Dean of Arts, Royal Military College of Canada)

0915

0920

0925

0930

0935

0940

The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.))

Mr. Bill Blaikie (Winnipeg—Transcona, NDP)

The Chair

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant (Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, Canadian Alliance)

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

0945

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

0950

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

The Chair

Mr. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, Lib.)

0955

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

Mr. David Price

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

Mr. David Price

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

Mr. David Price

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

Mr. David Price

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ)

1000

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

1005

The Chair

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien (Labrador, Lib.)

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien

1010

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

The Chair

Mr. Bill Blaikie

1015

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

Mr. Bill Blaikie

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

Mr. Bill Blaikie

The Chair

Mr. Joe McGuire (Egmont, Lib.)

1020

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

Mr. Joe McGuire

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

Mr. Joe McGuire

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

Mr. Joe McGuire

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

Mr. Joe McGuire

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

Mr. Joe McGuire

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

1025

Mr. Joe McGuire

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

Mr. Joe McGuire

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

Mr. Joe McGuire

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

The Chair

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

1030

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

The Chair

Mr. Ivan Grose (Oshawa, Lib.)

The Chair

Mr. Ivan Grose

The Chair

Mr. David Price

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

1035

Mr. David Price

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

Mr. David Price

The Chair

Mr. David Price

The Chair

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

The Chair

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

1040

The Chair

Mr. Joe McGuire

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

Mr. Joe McGuire

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

The Chair

1045

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

The Chair

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

The Chair

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

1050

The Chair

Ms. Anita Neville (Winnipeg South Centre, Lib.)

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

Ms. Anita Neville

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

The Chair

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

The Chair

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

1055

The Chair

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

The Chair

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

The Chair

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

The Chair

CANADA

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

NUMBER 009

2nd SESSION

37th PARLIAMENT

EVIDENCE

Tuesday, February 11, 2003

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¿ (0910)

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, Lib.)): Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.

I will start off by welcoming Bill, our newest member. It's nice to have you with us. I'm sure we'll have some very interesting discussions.

The cold and the traffic problems have held up our chair for a little while, so I'll get the ball rolling here.

First of all, I'd like to welcome Dr. Sokolsky.

It's nice to have you here again. We're looking forward to your presentation. As many of us have seen, with the number of writings you've had, you definitely have the background for what we're studying.

If you would like to go ahead, we will get to questions later.

Prof. Joel Sokolsky (Dean of Arts, Royal Military College of Canada): Thank you for the opportunity to appear.

What I'd like to do today, in talking about Canada-U.S. defence relations, is first look at the nature of contemporary U.S. foreign policy; then look at Canada-U.S. relations, the concepts, and how Canada has related to the United States in the recent past; and then look at it in the context of the present crisis. The overall argument I'm going to make is that the bilateral relationship can't be seen in isolation from the overall strategic environment and with Canada-U.S. relations outside of North America.

There are two aspects of the bilateral relationship. The first is what we do in North America. The second is our relations with the United States in strategic undertakings outside North America, and for the United States, in fact, the latter is probably more important, despite the emphasis on homeland security we're seeing now.

Let me just begin by quoting from a document submitted to the Privy Council of Canada:

The nature of United States leadership of the Western world (which has been largely undertaken through the U.N. and NATO) has given rise to a number of problems between the United States and its much less powerful associates and allies, including Canada. Many of these problems result from the not unnatural desire of the United States to obtain the support of other countries for its policies, and from a lack of sophistication in the methods employed. This in itself would not be too serious if Canada and other countries could always be convinced of the soundness of the policies proposed (and very often imposed) by the United States.

The document goes on to note:

This brings us to what is really the fundamental problem in the current relations between Canada and the United States. This is our underlying fear that the Americans will not be patient enough, especially as their military strength increases; that they are more inclined than we to believe that war is inevitable or almost inevitable; that for this reason they may be too willing to run risks. We and the United States administration agree on the need to build up [our forces] in order to be in a position to bargain....Our differences are largely of emphasis and of timing, but these can be very important.

Finally, the document notes:

There are problems which will face any Canadian government in dealing with the United States which need to be appreciated by Americans. There is first of all a latent anti-American feeling in Canada which means on the one hand that a Canadian administration is subject to the temptation to pull the Eagle's feathers in order to get more support in Canada, and which means on the other hand that the freedom of action of a Canadian government in dealing with the United States is limited by the fact that if it goes too far in deferring to the United States, it would lose a substantial measure of support in Canada.

That document is dated June 29, 1951. It's an indication that the problems we have with the United States are not new.

However, just as at the time that document was issued, it may well now be a turning point or a crucial point in international relations.

So I'll begin by looking at how the United States is now, at American foreign policy, particularly after 9/11, and at how that fits into the bilateral relationship.

It's evident, and in fact it was evident even before 9/11, that the United States, given its dominant position globally--this was true even in the Clinton administration and is not unique to the Bush administration--has been following, at least since the end of the Cold War, a policy of maintaining global dominance for the sake of its own security. This does not, however, exclude working through multilateral organizations. For the United States, multilateralism and the promotion of American interests are not exclusive.

The difference--and this is important for Canada--is that for Americans, multilateralism is a mechanism by which they gather support for their policies. In Canada, we tend to see multilateralism as a way in which we restrain the United States. That is not the American view. In the words of Sir Brian Urquhart, for the United States, multilateralism means rounding up the posse, not having itself restrained.

This trend, which was evident already in the Clinton administration, and which in fact was welcomed in various parts around the world, is reflective of bedrock U.S. foreign policy. Bedrock U.S. foreign policy from the beginning of the republic has emphasized the capacity, the need, to protect the republic from physical attack and to protect the system of government, with an emphasis on unilateral action, but more importantly, I think, on unfettered action. The United States will work with others, but in the final analysis, it is unilateralism.

Indeed, unilateralism is the default U.S. approach to the world. It's often confused with isolationism. It is not. It is the capacity of the United States, when it can and when it wishes, to act abroad on its own. When threatened directly, as it was at the beginning of the republic, as it was in the early 19th century, as it was at the beginning of the American involvement in World War II, the United States will respond by this unilateral action.

To this extent, I think we cannot ever overestimate the impact of the events of 9/11 on the United States. I noted in the news this morning that even Saturday Night Live satire is tending to be supportive of the administration and making fun of its opposition. Even Americans who may have misgivings about the current policy have no misgivings about the importance of the fact that the United States is now threatened and that in the end, it has to act alone in its own defence if others will not go along with it.

This policy is behind the American approach. It's nothing new in the U.S. national security policy; it's just something we haven't seen out front for a number of years. During the Cold War and post-Cold War era there was a lot of multilateral chaff around what the United States was doing, but in fact it was working on its own.

As one scholar has put it, the inclination to act unilaterally, which stems from the traditional American preference to define the national interest without the constraint of allies, has only been strengthened by America's economic and military prowess in the 1990s. With such power underguarded by a belief in America's moral exceptionalism, the most dangerous threat to American omnipotence may well come about as a result of the opposition, the alienation, of Europe, Japan, and other countries.

So the United States is pushing unilaterally, and its approach is bound to elicit a reaction from other powers, as we have seen in the last few days.

There are a number of elements to the American foreign policy, particularly that of the Bush administration, and these will directly affect Canada. They are the assumptions that it is a unipolar world; that the threat to the United States comes from small states, rogue states, and non-state actors, or terrorists; that these groups can be deterred, but if they cannot be deterred, they can be countered with force applied on behalf of the United States pre-emptively; and that the United States has the right to intervene against threats to its security around the world, and it's not going to wait for the threat to materialize.

We all know that prior to 9/11 several presidential committees had already warned about terrorist threats against the United States. The Hart-Rudman committee had warned that large numbers of Americans would die on American soil in the near future. The United States believes those warnings were not taken seriously, and now they are. There is in the current administration a general deprecation of international organizations and rules to the extent that they constrain the United States.

¿ (0915)

Again, this is nothing new. This is why the U.S. Senate rejected the League of Nations in 1919, because it constrained the ability of the United States to act unilaterally.

I have to say here that while we criticize Americans for saying this, you might want to reflect that they're the only ones being honest, because most great powers would never allow an international organization to restrain its action. At least the Americans are being honest in saying beforehand that they're not going to do it. But it is more explicit in the national security statements that are coming out.

This would create a certain uncertainty with regard to allies, and the approach towards allies is that, here again, the United States will not be constrained by its allies; it seeks to work with them.

Behind this is an assumption that the threat to the United States is a threat to allies, and they should realize it, and this is why they should be cooperating with the United States; but if they don't realize it, the United States will act alone. I can't emphasize this enough, the importance of this belief, and that it is not anything new but rather, in the Cold War and in much of the post-Cold War era, the United States was able to rally allies to what it wanted to do. But it's having more difficulty now, because I think there is resistance to this approach.

In this approach, it's not surprising that the security of the American homeland has become more important for the United States. For the United States, it's the security of the American homeland; it's not the security of North America. I'll come back to this later, but the priority is the American homeland, not necessarily the defence of North America, per se. This is what's motivating them.

At the same time, in the American approach to national security, despite the emphasis on homeland security, despite the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security, the standing up of Northern Command, America intends to take its war against terrorism in rogue states overseas. If you look at the bulk of American defence spending, it is not to protect the homeland; it is to give the United States a capacity to project power overseas.

So in this approach to security, America will defend itself over there as well as over here, but the “over there” is particularly important, and it is this “over there” aspect that creates tensions with allies.

I've laid out what I think is the approach of the American administration. As you can probably imagine, this approach is not without debate in the United States. In fact, there is a much broader debate about this in the United States than in Canada, and there are voices raised against it or cautioning, also within the Senate of the United States. So when we criticize Canadians for criticizing the United States, you have to criticize Americans for criticizing the United States, because if you listen to the debates in the U.S. Senate, you'll find the same sort of cautions raised over this.

As one scholar put it, the United States risks becoming a very lonely superpower by this approach. So there's a certain tension. It has not been fully debated, but I would say that on the need to meet the threat, there is a general consensus in the United States, and the debate in the United States is not whether the United States should act alone but that generally, if it needs to, it has to act alone, but perhaps the Bush administration is being a little heavy-handed.

Now, as I suggested in reading from the Privy Council document earlier, this is not necessarily a new position for Canada. Of all the countries in the world, we're used to dealing with the United States, and in some sense in isolation from our other allies.

¿ (0920)

The basis for our relationship with the United States goes back to what you know as the Kingston Dispensation, the exchange of declarations made between Prime Minister Mackenzie King and Franklin Roosevelt in 1938, where Roosevelt said that the United States would not stand idly by if Canada were threatened by another empire, and Prime Minister King responded that Canada had an obligation to make itself as secure as it could so that enemy forces could not traverse Canada to attack the United States.

The essence of the relationship, therefore, is that Canada cannot become a security liability for the United States. It's often said that the United States defends Canada and we should be grateful. The reality is, the United States does not defend Canada; the United States defends itself by defending Canada when it feels that Canada can't defend itself enough to secure the United States. The motivating factor here is U.S. self-interest.

To the extent that it believes it needs to help Canada, it will engage in cooperative activities, but the bottom line is the defence of the United States, because in fact there's no independent threat to Canada.

That said, by and large, for most of the 20th century, certainly the last half, we have shared the American perception of its threat to itself. We have believed, particularly in the Cold War, that the Soviet Union constituted a threat to the United States, and that it was important for the United States to be secure, because that was in our interest to do so. We shared their values, and to this extent, the cooperative measures established during the Cold War to structure that relationship were in Canada's national security interest and in the interest of its sovereignty; but the motivating factor was American national security.

However, during the Cold War, North America in fact could be said to have been a strategic backwater. Apart from providing attack warning and attack assessment of missiles, Canada's obligations to the security of the United States in the Cold War were minimal. There were few American forces in Canada and they declined. Relative to what our European allies had on their soil, including Canadian forces, we got off pretty easy during the Cold War.

The United States in fact wanted Canadian forces to be anywhere else but Canada. It preferred to have them in Europe, and in Cyprus, and on the Golan Heights. So from the American perspective, the litmus test of Canada's commitment was not what it did for North American defence but what it did for the defence of North America in the broader global sense, and I think this made the bilateral relationship a comfortable one for Canada. There were concerns over sovereignty, but in fact, given the limited nature of the American presence in Canada....

Fundamentally, as we learned during the Cuban missile crisis, the United States would consult Canada, but it would really inform it. When it felt threatened it would expect that Canada would abide by the agreements already made. In the post-Cold War era, initially the defence of North America in relative importance declined even further as the Soviet Union collapsed and the bomber threat, which had never been large, disappeared and we had arms control. And in fact this led to the putting into hibernation elements of the north warning system and the decline in the number of aircraft dedicated to NORAD.

Despite the late 1990s concerns about terrorism, in fact until 9/11 it wasn't clear that NORAD would survive. In the 1990s, however, Canada moved its defence policy closer to that of the United States' than at any time in its history.

¿ (0925)

And this is the irony; in a period of declining direct threat to North America, and declining direct threat to both countries, Canadian defence policy moved closer to that of the United States' overseas.

As I've argued, even before the release of Strategy 2020 by the government, Canada was engaged with the United States, beginning in the Gulf War, running through the peacekeeping operations, which had become I think Americanized in terms of their robustness, through Bosnia, and through Kosovo, even before 9/11.

Canadians were doing things with Americans overseas that they did not do in the Cold War, essentially invading and occupying countries and restructuring their governments. This was acceptable to the Canadian public because these missions were largely seen as providing assistance to the target countries.

During this period, Canadian defence spending declined and the size of the armed forces declined, as did that of most of our allies. I think you're aware that in fact the decline in some countries such as Germany, and in the early 1990s even in the United States, was in a percentage term greater than Canada's.

The Canadian government, largely the Liberal government, was able to get by through providing small but effective forces to multilateral operations led by the United States. Did the United States appreciate it? The answer is yes. Did it admit Canada to its councils in terms of larger strategy? The answer is no.

I think the record of Canada in the 1990s does not point to a government that has distanced itself from the United States. In fact, the record is just the opposite, made possible by a benign public environment that accepted these activities, including at its height the Kosovo campaign carried out outside the UN mandate and with the use of force.

Since 9/11, of course, the relationship has altered and the United States has moved to secure itself, creating the Department of Homeland Security, creating its own combat and command, NORTHCOM, moving Space Command, which had been twinned with NORAD, to Strategic Command.

What does this mean for Canada? It means the United States is taking the security of the U.S. homeland more seriously, and it means that North American security relations, which had been on the decline, are now going to increase in importance for Canada. In particular, the establishment of Northern Command, in terms of organizing U.S. forces, is going to require that Canada become involved beyond air defence and aerospace surveillance, in the defence of North America.

It already had in many ways. If you look at the maritime side we already had cooperation under NATO's Atlantic Command in the Atlantic. You also had close relations between Canada's Pacific forces and the U.S. Pacific forces. So in fact some of this is nothing new. What we could have, however, is more centralizing of this relationship on the American part. And it's not clear how they're going to sort it out, but it is in Canada's interest, in my view, to cooperate here, to make sure that there's a Canadian presence, just as our European allies cooperate with American overseas commands in their area.

I do not see it as necessarily a threat to Canadian sovereignty if in fact there is a Canadian role, and there appears to be, despite some talk in the United States, a receptivity to the Canadian role. You just can't argue, however, that setting up a planning group in Colorado Springs is going to give Canada major influence over U.S. national security policy. That I think isn't going to happen. What's going to happen is it's going to provide a Canadian perspective on issues, and a lot of these are not necessarily military, to the extent, as you know, NORTHCOM also coordinates civil defence in the United States.

¿ (0930)

One issue that should concern Canada is the disestablishment of Space Command and the movement of its functions to Strategic Command. This could cut Canada out from access to information about space, which it doesn't necessarily need, but from which it has benefited. It's likely that Strategic Command, not NORAD, would get the nod for a national missile defence system, and that Canada may have to decide.

Here, I think, given the nature of the international relations, to the extent it can participate, national missile defence as envisioned by the United States is something that Canada should not oppose. It's not clear how Canada would participate, but I'll come back to my earlier section: If the United States believes now it needs a limited system, there is no advantage to Canada in opposing it. There are no arms control concerns. If they wish to spend on it, that's fine, but I think it may well become another litmus test for Canada's commitment to the strategic defence of the continent.

So I think the cooperation of NORTHCOM is something we should in fact look forward to. We've always complained that there was no single address for American strategic relations with Canada. It wasn't the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, it wasn't the Military Cooperation Committee, and it certainly wasn't the NATO Canada-United States Regional Planning Group. For all those Canadians who were concerned that Canada wasn't taken seriously by the Pentagon, well, this may be not taken seriously but at least taken with more concern.

In terms of sovereignty, I think the issue, as one of my colleagues put it, is not sovereignty, it's a loss of certain autonomy. But few countries have total autonomy. We should also be aware, given the American mood, some of which is directed against Canada, that the acceptance of a Canadian, General Penney, as head of the planning group, and an American deputy, and the continuation of a Canadian as the deputy NORAD commander is something that, if a lot of Americans found out about, they might have problems with. So it may be important not to rock the boat.

Finally, let me turn to the larger context. In my view, we can manage the bilateral relationship. I think it's a question of building on the existing ties we have, bureaucracy to bureaucracy, the close military cooperation, and building on a certain amount of goodwill. What's going to impinge on our relationship with the United States, I believe, is going to come from outside. I think we saw it already before recent events, but we're seeing it now.

Henry Kissinger once remarked, in his three pages on Canada in his three-volume memoirs, that Canadians were often caught between their instinct in favour of the common defence, which led them to collaborate with the United States globally, and their temptation to stay above the battle as a kind of international arbiter, which was often encouraged by domestic opinion.

In Kissinger's view, Canada had a narrow margin in which to manoeuvre, a margin of manoeuvre that it managed to navigate with extraordinary skill. My argument today is that this margin may become even more narrow, that the danger to Canada in its relations with the United States is not the management of NORAD or NORTHCOM, which I think can be worked out; it's what happens if the current trends that we see lead to a breakdown or at least a reordering of the western alliance system, particularly with tensions with the United States, with Europe, and with the Security Council. If these multilateral organizations suffer because of the current crisis--and there is a risk that even without war, they're already irreparably damaged from the American standpoint--Canada, if not home alone with the United States, will find itself with the United States, with a smaller number of allies, and for Canada, it's particularly important.

¿ (0935)

I think we have to realize that although we've cast our relationships in broad multilateral terms, especially in NATO, Secretary Rumsfeld was expressing a general view that the NATO we knew was the old alliance, that the trans-Atlantic bargain has been replaced by what I would call a trans-European bargain; that for the United States, the locus of security concerns and its relations have moved eastward to the countries of eastern Europe; and that, in fact, if this tension leads to an undermining of NATO, there will be more pressure on Canada. A line may be drawn, and we'll have to make a decision. Hopefully there will be other allies still with us.

If the United States does go to war, it will go along with the willing, but there will also be the worried, people who are worried about what will happen if they don't go along; the wary, people who will go along but will worry about what this means; and the wannabes, the eastern Europeans who are going along because this is the only game in town and they want to be, in fact, where Canada is now.

So I think the problem any Canadian government will face is that it will move closer to the United States in bilateral terms, but it will be in a much closer and tighter American-led alliance, particularly if the UN suffers. So, in fact, it will take all the skill we have to manoeuvre in what would now be much more limited room for Canada.

In this, I think it is important for Canadians, and particularly for you in your responsibilities, to avoid a sterile polarization of a debate over Canada-U.S. relations. Very often this is the debate in Canada, a dialogue of the deaf between those who say we do nothing to help the United States and those who say we should do nothing to help the United States. It's a debate between those who believe greater defence spending will buy us great influence in Washington and those who believe lower defence spending and more foreign aid will buy us influence at the UN.

It's a debate between those who see no sovereignty concerns about further integration in North America and those who see only sovereignty concerns. It's a debate between those who believe we can change the world by working with the United States and those who believe we can change the world by opposing the United States.

My view is that we must do what the United States does, which is to follow its national security interest. In general, I think that would lead us toward closer relations with the United States, based on a justifiable threat to the continent, but the goal here is not to integrate with the Americans but to stand with them in terms of making an identifiable and sovereign contribution. That will be difficult to do, but that's really the challenge we face, and there's no way out of this dilemma.

Thank you.

¿ (0940)

The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.)): Professor Sokolsky, on behalf of the committee I would like to thank you for that very forceful, creative, and I would say informative presentation.

I would also like to extend to the committee my apologies for arriving late today. The traffic on the Queensway was absolutely horrendous. I thank Mr. Price for getting the meeting started.

On behalf of committee as well, I welcome Mr. Blaikie to the defence committee. I think in the view of most of us around the table, you have some pretty big shoes to fill in terms of Mr. Stoffer's previous contribution, but I'm sure you'll be up to the task.

Mr. Bill Blaikie (Winnipeg—Transcona, NDP): Size 13.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

The Chair: That pretty much covers it.

Let's begin the questioning with Mrs. Gallant, for seven minutes.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant (Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Dr. Sokolsky.

In your interesting speech, you were able to anticipate what our questions were, and you were answering them as we were going along.

First, do you think the way the United Nations is applying the situation in Iraq, with courtroom rules--for example, requiring burden of proof, evidence, smoking guns--is really applicable in a situation where a country is trying to prevent the crime from happening?

Prof. Joel Sokolsky: I think the UN has to try to do that. But the reality is, given the nature of the government you are dealing with, you will never get that clear evidence. International relations doesn't run like domestic policy. It's the first thing they teach you in IR-101. It's not domestic; it's self-help. If you are looking for absolute proof, you won't find it.

Let me also say that I believe the countries who are asking for this proof, if they had been attacked, would not be asking for it. If that plane had flown into the Eiffel Tower, the French would not be asking for absolute proof or a UN army to go in and verify it.

¿ (0945)

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: So then we would agree that the countries holding out in the UN are asking for the impossible.

Prof. Joel Sokolsky: They're acting in their own self-interest. When countries sit down at the Security Council, they don't suddenly become altruist and only act for world affairs. They also say, if the plane had flown into the Eiffel Tower, the United States would not be leading the war on terrorism.

We have to realize what's going on here. The UN didn't decide to act on its own; the United States got it to act.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: Do you think sufficient intelligence information is presenting itself in such a way that there is a clear and present danger to the Americans?

Prof. Joel Sokolsky: I believe there is a danger to the United States by disaffected groups around the world. I have seen no solid evidence linking the Iraqi regime to those groups, but his actions to this date indicate that his interests are opposed to the United States and that he has encouraged groups around the world in their opposition to the United States. It's very clear that if the United States had stayed home, he wouldn't be doing this, but the United States is exercising power and influence in his part of the world, and that's the cause of the resentment.

But, no, the intelligence is not conclusive. Of course, we haven't seen all of it, but I think there's enough to warrant the current U.S. policy towards him--which is not without risk. If you're looking for no-fault foreign policy, you're not going to find it.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: Saddam hasn't been playing by the rules and the resolutions of the UN for over a decade now. In your opinion, what brought things finally to a head with the United States in launching this position?

Prof. Joel Sokolsky: Clearly it was the attacks of 9/11. It was the belief that the United States, which had been warned about this by its own commissions, would not wait around. This is the Barbary pirates; this is the shores of Tripoli; this is the United States going after....

So I think it certainly brought it to a head. That said, of course the United States doesn't always play by the rules either, but that's the reality of international affairs. What brought this to a head was those attacks and the belief that actions had not been taken beforehand, and the belief that governments, not just the Iraqi government but also the Saudi Arabian government and other allies in the region, had not taken the threats seriously.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: You've made reference to the United States acting unilaterally. Mr. Bush is building a coalition. Do you still see the coalition that he is putting together as acting unilaterally, or are you just comparing that as opposed to a United Nations sanction?

Prof. Joel Sokolsky: Yes. As I said earlier--and I know it sounds oxymoronic--for the United States, unilateralism and multilateralism are not.... It's acting on its own and it's asking others to join it. It is not a group getting together and deciding to act.

I think it makes a very big difference as to the nature of the coalition. If the UN had decided on its own to move against Iraq without American prompting, that would have been multilateralism, but behind this multilateralism is an American unilateral act. None of this would be happening without the United States. That's what creates the dilemmas. That's why the French are upset, why the Russians are upset, and why the Chinese are upset.

So it's not the issue; if the United States pulls this off, their power and influence globally may take a hit, and they understand that.

¿ (0950)

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: Why do you think Canada's official position so far, in terms of its foreign policy as it pertains to this situation, has been what it is--virtually no position?

Prof. Joel Sokolsky: Well, the UN if necessary but not necessarily the UN; I think Canada has been sort of wobbling on this. As I said, Canada committed itself to a multilateral approach like others for domestic opinion.

I've given a defence of the United States, but my critique would be that America encourages democracy abroad. It cannot expect democratic governments to easily appear to simply go along with it without debate. So it's a certain blind spot of the United States.

People in Canada read articles in the National Post and say, “The Americans want us to be more active. The Americans want us to spend more on defence.” That's true, but that's not what they want. That's part of it. They want us to spend more on defence in support of the United States. They want us to be more active in support of the United States. I happen to agree with that, but let's put the cards on the table. That's what has placed the current government in a difficult position.

However, as I suggested at the end of my talk, for the current government, which has actually used its wiggle room pretty well in the last decade, time may be running out . The margin may be narrowing, particularly if NATO can't reach agreement.

The Chair: Thank you, Mrs. Gallant, and thank you, Professor.

Mr. Price, for seven minutes.

Mr. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair. I probably won't take the full seven minutes.

As Mrs. Gallant said, you answered a lot of our questions with your talk. It was very interesting. The most interesting clip I heard you say right at the beginning was “rounding up the posse”. That's the first time I've heard that one. That is very good. It's much better than “coalition”. It's fact.

¿ (0955)

Prof. Joel Sokolsky: It's attributable to Sir Brian Urquhart, the former head of the peacekeeping operation at the UN. He used it to talk about American actions in Somalia.

Sorry, sir. I just didn't want to take credit for it.

Mr. David Price: I guess the only point I'd really like to get your thoughts on is the NATO problem we're facing right now, particularly in Turkey. The Turks are in a situation where, yes, they're going to let the Americans in. There aren't going to be any troops right now on the ground, but they're in preparation.

At the same time, the Turks are in Kurdish territory right now. They're in northern Iraq supposedly hunting down some of the Kurds who have been creating problems in Turkey. So have they already been invaded? You could say that if you really stretched it. Then you could invoke article 5. On the other hand, I think France and Germany are not looking at that situation at all. They're looking at that as small potatoes, and they're looking at the bigger picture.

Canada is stuck in a situation. Nothing has been invoked yet, but we're still sitting in that group of 16 that is sort of ready to go ahead, but we haven't given any go-ahead, by any means.

I would just like to get your comments around that.

Prof. Joel Sokolsky: I think the French, the Belgians, and the Germans don't want to go ahead with Turkey because it would be a signal to the rest of the world that they were going along with the American initiative. It's the same reason they're balking at the UN. I think that's a correct assessment. I think they're correct that if they go along now, it means a further endorsement of the American initiative. There's no question this is what the United States wants.

But it's very difficult. Even if you are in favour of doing this without war, you have to show Saddam Hussein that you're ready for war. Part of this would be a strong signal from NATO to reinforce Turkey. For those who oppose this war or want to see a diplomatic solution and are perhaps willing to go along with some of the new concessions that the Iraqi regime has made, you have to understand that he's playing this split within the alliance. Now, who's responsible for it? Is it the Europeans for being ungrateful to the Americans, or is the Americans for being heavy-handed in their diplomacy?

The French certainly well understand Turkey's position, but if they go along...and to say no now doesn't necessarily place Turkey at risk, because there's no war.

Mr. David Price: It doesn't place them at risk, but by not positioning themselves at this point it makes it sound like, if it became a real article 5 situation, they would not look at it that way because they would consider Turkey as being the aggressor, since they had troops stationed. So how would they get out of it after? I think you agree with me they should be--

Prof. Joel Sokolsky: Right. They are in NATO but they are not in the integrated military command structure, so you could convene the defence planning committee.

How do the French get out of it? Frankly, I don't know. They are gambling a lot that it's going to go their way, but I think you can sense the concern in the other members of NATO. They're worried about what this will do to the future of the alliance.

Countries like Spain and Italy that will not really contribute to this war in a large way are still going along. Canada, as always, is in a unique position here relative to the Europeans because of our geographic location. But I think the reaction of the U.S. administration is a signal as to how serious the United States now sees any balking on this issue.

Let me also say further that I'm glad the current government has resisted the temptation to join the French and the Germans, because they're not interested in our problems either. They'll say, “Come along with us to oppose the Americans”, but they're not interested in our security. They're not interested in our relations with the United States.

Mr. David Price: And there isn't any way out after.

Prof. Joel Sokolsky: Yes. We're in a different position. And frankly, there are enough Canadians buried in Europe for us to be as upset as the Americans about some of this behaviour.

Mr. David Price: Thank you very much.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Price.

Monsieur Bachand.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ): First of all, I would like to thank you for your presentation. Obviously, if we could linger [Editor's Note: Technical difficulty]. There are issues that I would simply like to touch on, because I have a question with regard to Canadian sovereignty. But I would like to talk about multilateralism and unilateralism.

You stated that the Americans' unilateralism was mostly due to their will to defend their own territory. However, without wanting to contradict you or to move too far away from my question, I would nevertheless like to mention that American unilateralism is probably based as well on economic imperatives.

With regard to prevention, you stated that from now on Americans would be able to use [Editor's Note: Technical difficulty] preemptive attacks. However, everyone is well aware that that flies in the face of international relations' doctrine. For my part, I have always said that if the Americans can get away with that, then North Korea could eventually do the same against South Korea and Pakistan against India. We could discuss this at length.

I would however like to concentrate my attention on Canada's geopolitical situation vis-à-vis the United States. There is at present a tremendous integration movement between Canada and the United States. You stated earlier that there was a matter of sovereignty here and that this could lead to a loss of autonomy for Canada. I see sovereignty and autonomy as very closely linked. They are virtually equivalent.

If we are talking about the economic aspect, I would like to invite my colleagues to read Paul Hellyer's book entitled Goodbye Canada. Mr. Hellyer looks at the economic issue and gives a very good description of the integration under way. There is also the pressure that the Americans are exerting in order for us to fall in line with their immigration laws and enter into bilateral agreements such that the American army might intervene--albeit at our request--in the case of a disaster. There is also the Northen Command and interoperability that the Canadian Forces, and this involves not only the army but also the air force and the naval force, have enforced, because of a lack of resources.

You talked earlier about our narrowing wiggle room. I would even go so far as to say that this wiggle room no longer exists. We are not yet the 51st American State, but we are to my mind well on the way of becoming it. You obviously are aware of my political leanings; this is a sovereigntist speaking to you.

In brief, could you give us more details with regard to the way in which we could jostle for greater sovereignty? Can we allow ourselves or not to express to Americans our disagreement on issues as important as the war in Irak?

À (1000)

[English]

Prof. Joel Sokolsky: In terms of sovereignty and autonomy, what I mean by autonomy is our capacity for independent action to do what we want. I think this is always limited by the international system. We're already heavily economically integrated given the nature of our trade--85% or more is with the United States--but this also gives us a strategic interest in the stability of the United States and its economy. So that's why I think it's important for Canada.

On Northern Command interoperability in these things, yes, we would appear to be more sovereign and autonomous if we did not engage in Northern Command or interoperability. And on the American side, that would not be a problem. The issue then would be whether we would have any influence, or what the alternative would be. The alternative for Canada is not to avoid close collaboration with the United States in favour of being a more active and independent international actor in other venues; the alternative is simply avoiding cooperation with the United States and slipping further into irrelevancy.

So it's a hard choice. I don't believe that if we avoid these things there is an alternative out there that would give us greater influence. I don't believe the other great powers--Germany or France--are interested in Canada the way the United States is.

That's basically my position. I agree that cooperation with the United States sometimes restricts Canadian options, but I think if we agree with the general threat, then it is in the Canadian interest. Furthermore, I think while the Americans do expect Canada to go along, and anticipate this, and are angry about this, our status in their eyes would only diminish if we avoided this sort of cooperation.

Most Americans and the U.S. government will never really see Canada the way Canadians want to be seen by the United States. But we're now being seen by them the way we don't want to be seen because of a perception that we're not doing enough. I don't agree with all the criticism in Canada, but I agree that this is going to mean hard choices for Canada. The bottom line is our economic and physical security.

You mentioned immigration. Turn it the other way around; if we felt that criminal elements were coming from the United States into Canada and engaging in unlawful activity, we would raise this with the U.S. government. So they have a legitimate concern in that regard.

In terms of our immigration policy, yes, it's going to take a certain amount of adjustment. I see, however, that the threat to Canadian sovereignty comes from not engaging in it, and you see on the American side a desire to engage in a give and take on these issues and to set up collaborative activities.

À (1005)

The Chair: Thank you, Professor Sokolsky, and thank you, Mr. Bachand.

Mr. O'Brien, seven minutes.

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien (Labrador, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This is my first morning at the committee; I'm brand new. although I'm not necessarily brand new to defence issues. I hail from Goose Bay, Labrador, so needless to say I have to deal with the issues of defence as they relate to the industry of the town I'm from.

First of all, I'd like to ask, do you think the media in Canada is putting the right portrayal in terms of allowing Canadians the opportunity to think this through with regard to the potential conflict between the U.S.--and whoever chooses to go along with them--and Canada? I get the sense sometimes that the way the media puts the issue forward doesn't always allow us the opportunity to make up our minds properly.

Prof. Joel Sokolsky: In parts of the Canadian media, if I understand your question, there's an anti-American bias in the way things are reported. Certainly the Bush administration is sometimes caricatured the way Europeans and others caricature it, as a yahoo, cowboy, gun-toting person who doesn't understand the reality of international relations. On the other hand, I think there's been more of a debate in Canada on defence issues than we've seen in a good while.

As I suggested before, however, I think it's important to avoid a polarization. There are some people in Canada who think that every criticism of Canada coming out of Washington is gospel, and there are those who think every criticism of the United States coming out of the Canadian media is a revelation.

There are people on the pro-defence side who will trash what we do on defence when I don't think that's justified. There are some people in the pro-defence lobby who are as unrealistic about the amount of influence greater defence spending will buy us as those on the other side are unrealistic about the amount of influence cutting back on defence spending will buy us. There's a certain realism. You don't see that in the debate in Canada.

The bottom line here is what is in the Canadian national interest? I think we actually follow our national interest, we just don't couch it in those terms. One side says we have to be good and loyal allies; the other side says we have to be campaigners for world peace. The purpose of Canadian defence policy is the national security interest of Canada.

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien: You're giving some pretty interesting analogies, but simply put, with 9/11 under our belts, as you said--and I'm not going to repeat the comments you made earlier--we have border concerns, we have massive trade with the United States, and the list goes on. We're on the North American continent, and it's a case of the security of the continent as well as United States, and Canada is part of that, and of course many other things.

If we were to assume that conflict took place, and if Canada stayed out of it, what would that do to Canada-U.S. relations on trade, tourism, all the various other things we do, and going back and forth hundreds of thousands of times a day?

À (1010)

Prof. Joel Sokolsky: We would see linkages that we hadn't seen before. I think this is rapidly becoming a litmus test. I also believe that if we didn't see them in the economic area, we'd certainly see them and find a chilly reception at NORTHCOM and other areas.

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien: I have one last question. Missile deployment is becoming a major issue in North American protection. I've listened to some of the experts around, and I'm sure you have a position on this.

Where do you feel Canada fits into the American deployment of anti-ballistic missiles, or whatever, and the geography of Canada? Being from Goose Bay, which the Americans built, I want to zero in on this a little bit, because it's part of the transatlantic route, the northern route, and so on. I've heard some experts talk about that being a good potential base, with long runways, lots of facilities, infrastructure, and so on.

What's your take on that?

Prof. Joel Sokolsky: On missile defence, if the Americans want to go ahead with it, first of all, they can go ahead with it. We should try to cooperate where we can, including supplying Canadian territory where useful.

The Chair: Do you have anything further, Mr. O'Brien?

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien: No, that's fine.

The Chair: Mr. Blaikie.

Mr. Bill Blaikie: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I just want to engage Dr. Sokolsky on a few of the things he had to say. I thought I detected a kind of position there that I want to challenge to some degree. You said Canadian foreign policy should be dictated only by what was in the national security interests of Canada, and you sort of juxtaposed that against people who were interested in things like global peace.

But isn't it conceivable that global peace might be in the national security interests of Canada? Why would you set up that sort of dichotomy when it's not necessarily so? It could well be that peace has something to do with security. That's a radical notion in some contexts; nevertheless, I just want to put that on the table.

I remember being on what was then called the external affairs committee in the late eighties, and someone said something relevant to the Canadian way of doing things. The comment was made that the Canadian position often seems to be that there's a need for someone in the room, when you're talking about a multilateral table, to have no principles so that they can help the process along. It seems to me this is the kind of thing we're seeing from the Canadian government at this point.

Unlike the Americans, the French, the Germans, a variety of other people, or even people within the Canadian opposition--even though a variety of positions are taken within the opposition parties--the government's position seems to be that whatever they do they'll do it only at the last minute and have it appear--and I say “appear” because sometimes I think they already know what they'll do in the final analysis--to have come about as a result of necessity, or at the end of a long process they've been faithful to, etc.

You've obviously studied Canadian foreign policy for a long time. Do you think that's a fair characterization of how things are done?

I have just one other thing for your comment. You talked about the Americans always acting in their own self-interest. But you also talked about their view of themselves; this sort of moral exceptionalism they have. It seems to me part of the problem is they always want to cloak their self-interest in this moral exceptionalism. Some of us might not gag as often if they simply said what they were up to, rather than asking us to believe this was all in the name of democracy, freedom, and human rights.

We know, according to your own testimony, that is not exactly the real motivating factor. But ever since Woodrow Wilson they have clothed things in this garment of righteousness, instead of just telling us what they're really up to so we can make a decision about whether it's also in our national security.

À (1015)

Prof. Joel Sokolsky: I'll start with your last comment. There's a very good book out now by Andrew Bacevich, called American Empire. He's a former U.S. army officer. He says, yes, this is what the United States has been doing all along, and if fact we have to get over putting this glaze on it.

The other view, the view of other Americans, is that in the United States the public will not support a foreign policy that does not also appear moral.

Mr. Bill Blaikie: Which isn't dressed up in this way.

Prof. Joel Sokolsky: Which isn't, and I think that applies to other.... Fortunately, the United States has largely been able to do good and do well at the same time.

The alternative in some cases is that Americans will stay home. You know the John Quincy Adams phrase, “America goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy.” It's the defender of its own interest.

But I agree with you, yes, that the United States does have this moral exceptionalism.

On the Canadian side, multilateralism is a tool we use, because we can exercise independent power. Although when we found the Spanish catching some of our fish, we acted unilaterally. When we're faced with something, if we can act unilaterally, we do.

On your initial point, global peace is in the Canadian national security interest. The issue for the government is how to achieve that. Canadian foreign policy, since at least 1945, has been somewhat schizophrenic. We go to collective security through the UN, and collective defence through NATO and our U.S. allies.

My view is that when push comes to shove, we go with the U.S. and its allies. That's where our security really lies. In the present context, the current danger is not so much at the UN, it's the breakdown in NATO. It's just who we are. I think if you look at our record, we were for disarmament in the Cold War, but we really were supporters of NATO.

If I may, Mr. Chairman, this is the Canadian position you may be familiar with. Stephen Leacock, on the eve of the Second World War, was asked by an American, “If Britain goes to war, does Canada have to go to war?” Stephen Leacock said, “No, we don't have to, through the Statute of Westminster.” Next question: “If Britain goes to war, will Canada go to war?” The answer: “Yes. Why? Because we have to.”

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

Prof. Joel Sokolsky: I think this is somewhat the position we're in now. Do we have to support the Americans? No. Will we? As Mark Twain said, predictions are always risky, especially about the future, but I think we have to. We would be conspicuous by our absence, although for those who support an activity, we won't necessarily be conspicuous by our presence.

It's just the reality. This is our world. Our world is the world of the northern democracies. Whether it's the Anglo-Saxon world, it's our world. We do good work in the third world and elsewhere, but in the final analysis we're western, northern, and tied in with the American economic system. We can do lots of other things, but only if we secure that base. That's what I'm saying.

I know it's a different opinion from people here, but unlike others, I think I have no illusions about the exercise in America and American power. My wife is American.

Mr. Bill Blaikie: I won't say amen to that.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

The Chair: Thank you, Professor.

Mr. McGuire, seven minutes.

Mr. Joe McGuire (Egmont, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I was wondering, just to regress a bit, you mentioned that if the Eiffel Tower had been the object of the terrorist attack, things would be different, and it wouldn't be the U.S. leading the charge. What do you think France would have done if the Eiffel Tower had been bombed, given the Russian experience in Afghanistan and all the hand-wringing that was done by them, as it turned out?

À (1020)

Prof. Joel Sokolsky: I think the French would have engaged in a series of covert and other activities against terrorists. They moved against Greenpeace at one point when they thought it was threatening their nuclear tests. You can see their activities in Sierra Leone. The French are not afraid to exercise power overseas if they feel it's in their interest.

They don't have the capability of the United States to invade a country, but they would have targeted with their agents and others. You would have had a crackdown in France itself.

The Europeans have another problem, which is the large Muslim population there, who, in the case of Germany and others, have never been fully integrated.

Mr. Joe McGuire: But don't you think they would have had to rely on the U.S.?

Prof. Joel Sokolsky: They would have looked for American support.

Mr. Joe McGuire: And the U.S. probably would have responded?

Prof. Joel Sokolsky: It would have given some, but I don't think the United States would have made a large-scale commitment. You would have had a general western approach to terrorism, but not this campaign that's going on now.

Mr. Joe McGuire: Why do you think Germany and France are playing chicken with the U.S. when they know that if they don't back down, then a lot of the alliance, for instance NATO and a lot of other things, could unravel? Why are they doing this?

Prof. Joel Sokolsky: I think they are doing this because, one, they generally believe this is not the right policy, but behind it, I think, is the view that this is a reaction against the attitude of the Bush administration, which has been heavy-handed with allies in many respects, which has not sympathized enough with their domestic concerns.

As well--and I think this is more speculation--there is concern amongst France, Germany, Russia, and China that if the Americans pull this off, there'll be no living with them afterwards, that it will reinforce American dominance in a way they would feel uncomfortable with.

I know that sounds suspicious and paranoid, but I think there are Americans who were warning, when the Bush administration started, that this would happen, that it's asking for trouble, that it's eliciting an alienation of its allies.

The dilemma is, this is really important to the United States, too, but it's not handling it right. Our dilemma is, we don't want to be caught in the middle.

Mr. Joe McGuire: So what do you say to Canadians who, on domestic policy, ask why we should support the U.S. morally, militarily, or any other way, when you look at what they're doing to us on softwood lumber, on the Wheat Board, on potatoes, the milk exports, you name it? They're pretty heavy-handed with us, too, and maybe it's time we sat back and....

Prof. Joel Sokolsky: Well, my first response would be that our negotiating position in those disputes would not be improved by not supporting them here. And second, as much as we may resent their clumsiness in doing this, they do have a legitimate security threat here, and it threatens us too.

So as I said earlier in response to Mr. Blaikie, I'm not a sentimentalist. It's hard national interest that dictates cooperation.

But let me get sentimental. The Americans, I think, will appreciate it. We don't have to do a lot. They know, more than we do probably.... We don't have to put thousands of troops in the desert. They've asked for certain stuff; I think we'll get it.

It's not a question of quid pro quo; it's a question of the atmosphere. And I'm concerned that given the American mood against allies, we don't want to be in that camp.

Mr. Joe McGuire: I agree with you on Stephen Leacock's quote, that we will have to be there, because I don't think there's any question about that, but how do you bring Mexico into this? If it's bunker North America, it's the security of.... We all think of Canada, but we never think of Mexico as being part of this.

Prof. Joel Sokolsky: I wonder if there are any Mexicans here....

Look, we're not in the same league as Mexico, and we wouldn't want to be. We consider--and they consider--us to be in a different league. I mean, when we said North America's security is at risk, in Europe nobody worried that Mexico wasn't in NATO. They didn't even want Mexico in NORAD, and they still don't.

So if we want to be Mexico, then fine, the Americans will start treating us like Mexico.

À (1025)

Mr. Joe McGuire: But aren't they treating Mexico a lot better than they're treating us?

Prof. Joel Sokolsky: Well, not in everything.

Mr. Joe McGuire: They're beginning to switch around there.

Prof. Joel Sokolsky: Then not getting into this campaign would only accelerate it.

You know, in the American view of Canada, there's an expectation. We're almost worse when we don't go along, because they expect us to. They always expect problems with the French, although not this big; they expect problems with the French. But from Canada, there was an expectation that we would support them.

And the record in the 1990s was good. It was pretty good. Not so much with this administration, but if you asked officials from the Clinton administration about Canada and what we did for them in Haiti, how we supported them in Bosnia, and stood with them in Kosovo, it was appreciated. Now, Clinton couldn't help softwood lumber, because, look, an American president doesn't have as much power vis-à-vis his administration and his legislative branch as the Canadian Prime Minister does.

Mr. Joe McGuire: How was that appreciation translated into action?

Prof. Joel Sokolsky: I think it would translate into a hearing. I think on the military side it would translate into having close cooperation with Canadians through NORTHCOM. It might translate into allowing for an expansion of interoperability, things like maintaining the joint training, allowing Canadians to train at American bases, and allowing access to technology.

So I think it would chill the atmosphere in bilateral security relations.

Now, to a certain extent the United States has to cooperate with Canada, but not as much as we think they do. They don't need that planning group.

The Chair: Thank you, Professor, and thank you, Mr. McGuire.

Mrs. Gallant, five minutes.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: I just want to make sure I understand the answer to your explanation of why Canada participated in the Kosovo conflict without UN approval. Was it because of our participation in NATO and that it was NATO led?

Prof. Joel Sokolsky: Yes. I think the credibility of the alliance was at stake. I also think it was a morally justified cause. But I think NATO was looking pretty bad.

May I say here, and this is something I do feel strongly about, that we don't have to apologize to the Europeans for anything. We picked up the ball in Yugoslavia, which they said in the early nineties they were going to do. So if we talk about a lack of appreciation, we get more lack of appreciation from the Europeans than we do from the Americans. That's why I tend to favour the American alliance. In fact, when push comes to shove, if we don't have enough forces to support a campaign in Iraq, we should pull out of Bosnia. Let France handle it.

We were there. We were the second unit into Pristina, before the U.S. marines, and we were there solving a European problem. So when the Europeans, or even Lord Robertson, complain about Canadians, those are people we don't need to apologize to.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: One of the options Canada is considering is going into Afghanistan and relieving more American troops. How do you compare the impact of doing that, as opposed to becoming part of the first line in Iraq?

Prof. Joel Sokolsky: That will be accepted if that's what we offer, but I don't think it will go as far. And the optics aren't as good.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: The optics aren't as good.

Prof. Joel Sokolsky: Yes.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: And how will this impact on our economy and our relations?

Prof. Joel Sokolsky: No, I don't think it will be anything specific, but I think the Americans will have a remembrance of that.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: So it's the idea that we're participating in Iraq specifically that shows our support for what they are trying to do. Okay.

You have taught Canadian studies at Duke University, so if we fast-forward a bit into the future, when you are teaching that again, how are you going to explain to your students Canada's justification for sitting on the sidelines this long?

À (1030)

Prof. Joel Sokolsky: This long? Oh, I'd say that the government wanted to appear as other democratic governments do want to appear, that they are making their own decisions, that Canadians have always tried to promote the notion of multilateralism, and that, depending on how it works out, it may have miscalculated this time.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: For my last question, you've answered in a roundabout way, and many people have alluded to the same thing, that at this point, even if Canada does become part of this unilaterally led coalition, we will be perceived as irrelevant. What--

Prof. Joel Sokolsky: No. In fact, with other allies deserting the United States, a reaffirmation by Canada at this time may play well in Peoria, because what the American public sees is other allies going against it, and Canada--which the Americans don't see, since it's not on the radar screen--uses this opportunity of a crisis in the alliance to reaffirm its support for the United States. So inadvertently, it may have worked out for the best.

Critics and supporters of the view cannot exaggerate the importance of Canada. I'm not trying to get around your question, but don't exaggerate it. In fact, if Canada were tomorrow to say, “Enough is enough, we're worried about the security, the alliance, and we're going to come out supporting the United States”, juxtaposed against the French, the Germans and the Belgians, that may play better. Is the United States going to say, “Oh, well, take a seat right down here next to us on the National Security Council”? No. But other allies are in the same position.

So it's very difficult to translate specific payoffs and specific policies. The best I could say is, if we don't go along it'll be noticed.

The Chair: Your time has expired, Mrs. Gallant.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: Oh, I've expired.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

The Chair: Yes, I regret to inform you.

Mr. Grose, do you...?

Mr. Ivan Grose (Oshawa, Lib.): No, thank you. Mrs. Gallant went down the road I was going to go down, and the professor answered it very well.

The Chair: You don't want to go down that road any further?

Mr. Ivan Grose: No, thank you.

The Chair: Mr. Price.

Mr. David Price: This is a little away from Canada-U.S., but it's more into NATO. I'm having a hard time getting my head around the Germans, the French, and the Belgians working together in this.

If I look at the Germans, the second-largest immigrant population in Germany is the Turks, and the Germans are backing away from supporting Turkey. In France we have an extremely large Muslim population, which I'm sure is putting on pressure, in some ways, to support the fact that all of us now are finally going to get a window into.... With Turkey belonging to NATO, this is the first country that we could call at least a semi-Muslim country, and they're against France's pushing away. As well, if we look at the other side of the picture, Germany and France are both selling arms indirectly, parts and pieces, and so on, into Iraq. That's fairly open knowledge. Belgium is probably a little involved in that too.

We don't hear of any pressure being put on by the Turks in Germany. Do you see anything happening there?

Prof. Joel Sokolsky: The Turkish public opinion is split on this. So it may be that the Muslim populations in these countries would not support an attack on another Muslim state. And that may be a problem.

The other problem is that Turkey has always suspected, or did suspect, for example, that its exclusion from the EU, or its difficulty in getting into the EU, was based on the fact that it was Muslim. As well, Europe's apparent inability to deal with the problem in Bosnia was based on the fact that Europeans weren't anxious to come to the aid of Muslims. The irony of Bosnia was that the United States was the one that came out on the side of the Bosnian Muslims.

So I think there's a lot going on here. The Muslim populations may be opposed to the war. On the other hand, Turkey has always been suspicious that the older European allies discriminated against it because it was NATO's only Muslim member. Certainly they're very upset about the difficulties posed in getting into the European Union. The European Union has said, “You don't treat the Kurds properly” or “You're not really a democracy.” Behind that I think the Turks feel there's a little discrimination.

À (1035)

Mr. David Price: Of course, the Germans also have not been very pleased with the problems they've had with the Turks on their territory so they've tended to go against it.

Prof. Joel Sokolsky: There's an old German-Turkish alliance, but the Turkish population in Germany has a difficult time getting citizenship even after several generations.

Mr. David Price: That's right.

The Chair: Anything further, Mr. Price?

Mr. David Price: No, thank you.

The Chair: I'd like to take a couple of minutes on the government side. I'd like to pursue this issue of the positioning of the Government of Canada in terms of when to come onside.

Could I get your views, Dr. Sokolsky, on the whole business of whether or not, if Canada were to come onside--for instance, after Mr. Blix's report--that would have a significant effect on world public opinion as far as the momentum of the U.S. position is concerned? Is there any benefit that way, or is that completely over-exaggerated?

Prof. Joel Sokolsky: I think it would be exaggerated in terms of Canada coming along, but certainly that would be the latest. It depends; let's say the Security Council fails to act in the way the United States wants it to act. I think at that point Canada will have to make a decision.

For some Americans, this will be too little, too late, even if Canada sends forces. For others, it will be in line with what Senator Kennedy or Senator Bird have said, to let the UN play it and let the process be set out. For most, it will make no difference at all.

Here, I think, the government deserves some.... There is some value in letting the process go, to see how it worked out after all. The United States...we committed to the process to see it through to the end. There's no danger in seeing it through until the end.

The new danger, and this is what I've tried to stress, is what has come about with NATO, because that really does affect Canada. For us, the UN doesn't secure our security. We use the UN to meddle in other people's affairs. But NATO, that's us, and that's why it's important.

So I was pleased to see the Prime Minister come out in favour of sending the arms to Turkey.

The Chair: Mrs. Gallant, five minutes.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: I have one short question.

Canada's position has been to go the way of the UN and abide by their pace and strategy. Is that in any way inoculating our country against being the target of Saddam's retaliation, or potential retaliation?

Prof. Joel Sokolsky: No. I think if we go, if he had it in mind or someone had it in mind to strike at Canada, how we did this would be irrelevant. Those people respect the UN even less than parts of the U.S. administration. I mean, Saddam Hussein is not restrained by the UN. He's restrained by the power of the United States.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: So regardless, if he has chosen Canada as a potential target for whatever reason, our deciding to go it slow isn't protecting Canadians at all.

Prof. Joel Sokolsky: No. Frankly, the rest of the world doesn't see us as independent as some people do, and rightly so, because we're not. We're in NATO. We're in a security alliance with the United States. To go out in the world and pretend that we are some type of independent arbiter that's above all this is false. I think they see us for what we are. You can't have a national security strategy founded on interoperability with the U.S. Armed Forces and expect to be seen outside as something other than a U.S. ally.

That doesn't mean we can't support any other number of worthy activities all around the world, in Africa or elsewhere. But that's the way the world, I think, sees us, and we might as well....

I don't know if we'll be particularly targeted, and neither should we be enticed into abandoning that position for the sake of trying to appear to be something we're not.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: Thank you.

À (1040)

The Chair: Mr. McGuire, five minutes.

Mr. Joe McGuire: Mr. Chairman, the President is coming to visit in the next few months. A lot of water will have gone under the bridge between now and then.

If the witness was Prime Minister, what decisions would he make leading up to the visit that would benefit Canada in the future for the security of our state?

Prof. Joel Sokolsky: I would wait for the Blix report and then when it became clear that the UN was deadlocked, announce that we would participate in a coalition and that we would offer as much as we could to the actual Iraqi operation rather than Afghanistan. And I would continue with a lot of what the government has already done in terms of cooperation with the United States on borders and on immigration.

It's not because the President was coming, but I think it would be very difficult for the President to come here if there's a war on and we're not there. I think that's simply the reality of it.

If it were not in Canada's interest, if the United States was invading Patagonia for no good reason, then of course it would be different, but I believe this is in our interest.

It's not without risk. You can have a number of reasons why this is going to be done, but I think it would certainly assist. It's interesting that he's accepted the invitation in advance of knowing what's going to happen.

Mr. Joe McGuire: So the report on Friday, if it continues to be fuzzy and that we should give peace a further chance--

Prof. Joel Sokolsky: I think it's going to say that the Iraqis are now cooperating more, but it will not be conclusive. I don't think I have any doubt that the Americans will dismiss it as too little, too late. So we have to be prepared.

The French and Russian proposal of UN forces going in there is just completely unrealistic. Whose forces? Americans will not go in. Once UN forces are in the area, the British and Americans will be unable to attack if the Iraqis shoot at their planes. You'd be in a Bosnian situation where you have peacekeepers trapped there, being played on by the local government. That paralyzes the international community, because they say, “You can't do anything now, we have our own troops on the ground.”

It's exactly what I think he wants. The risk here is that what you're supplying Saddam Hussein with is not with the UN police but with a whole bunch of hostages.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. McGuire.

Are there any further questions?

There are a couple of questions I'd like to ask as well, Professor.

It is likely that we're going to be, probably within the next 18 months, I would say, or two years, into some sort of a white paper exercise, some sort of review of Canadian foreign policy and possibly defence policy as well.

It will deal with this whole business of Canada-U.S. relations and how we make ourselves, amongst other things.... Obviously we have a lot of priorities as far as our defence policy is concerned in terms of the traditional goals of the defence of Canada, protection of North America, and involvement in efforts to increase international peace and security. How would you suggest that we make ourselves relevant to the United States in defence terms from the standpoint of defence budget, and in terms of the sorts of capabilities that we might bring to the table? Do you have any thoughts on that?

À (1045)

Prof. Joel Sokolsky: Yes. Broadly, I think we have two major tasks--one is the defence of North America, the other is participation in multilateral or other activities related to the defence of North America but outside the defence of North America. We need a North American capability and an expeditionary capability.

In terms of North America, this means participation in NORTHCOM, and another thing we could do is take a look at the coast guard. The U.S. Coast Guard has come under the Department of Defense now. The navy is looking at integrating it more.

Perhaps we should be looking at building more of the MCVDs, the maritime coastal defence vessels, as part of our contribution to the defence of the American homeland, and looking at our own coast guard. Since our navy does a coastal defence, I think there's one area where we might continue to cooperate.

We should maintain an overseas expeditionary capability, but we may not be able to afford, nor may it be necessary, to maintain a heavy armour capability in the future. They like our Coyotes. They like our LAV IIIs. They've used them. They bought them. That's maybe where we should go. Maybe we should have more special forces, like JTF-2 or something that can cooperate with them that can be used overseas.

As I said, I think we must focus on the defence of North America at home and abroad, which is the organizing principle, and not so much on peacekeeping. As I mentioned a moment ago, we have to re-evaluate in any white paper long-term peacekeeping commitments, which keep tied down large numbers of our forces for a long time, and which restrict our ability to secure our own interests.

I think people should be upset that we may have few forces to go to Iraq because we've just renewed a contingent in Bosnia. While that's important, it's not as important as the other thing. Those are the sorts of things I think we would need to go on.

The committee should take a look at strategic lift and transport. What is it that we need? Do we have to get there, absolutely, positively overnight? Or do we have another role, are we the backup? If we want to play a role, we probably need a greater lift capability, but how many forces would we need to deploy?

I'd take a look at the Australians. They get a lot of mileage out of a lower defence budget and a lower force. One of my students now is an Australian, Lieutenant-Colonel John Blaxland, and he had an article in the Canadian Military Journal about Australia and Canada. I think that may be relevant.

The Australians seem to do a better job than we do. Why is that?

The Chair: As well, they're spending a lot more, as a percentage of GDP, than we are.

Prof. Joel Sokolsky: Yes, but in absolute terms they're getting more and they seem to get more with what they do, and they're cooperating with the United States. Above all, to borrow a line from my colleague, Douglas Bland, the purpose of Canadian Armed Forces is pretty simple: it is to be able to apply force, whether actual or threatened, on behalf of the Government of Canada, when that application of force is a useful policy tool.

The Chair: I have one adjunct question. In terms of possible capabilities, would you see it as important for Canada to have a capability, for instance, to lead multinational coalitions in places like Africa? In other words, to be able to transport a command and control structure and be able to manage Third World or other types of troops in multinational engagements outside of any U.S. involvement.

Prof. Joel Sokolsky: I would rank it below North America and below the ability to collaborate with the United States. If we could add unlimited funding and unlimited forces, I'd say yes, but I think the bottom line is, Africa may be important, but our vital national interests are not at stake there.

Remember, we can do a lot. We have individual forces, small numbers with individuals, but leading a coalition of forces I think would be a good idea. I think we may look into collaborating with other countries, perhaps even with Australia, in places where the United States is not acting, such as in East Timor, or which may be tangential to our vital national interests.

That said, if we have a good capability, solid capability, we can make a contribution and take a leadership role, but given the present, I would rank it below that.

À (1050)

The Chair: Thank you.

Mrs. Neville.

Ms. Anita Neville (Winnipeg South Centre, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you, Mr. Sokolsky, for a very informative presentation.

I'm new to both the committee and the topic so I'm hesitant to even engage, but I was struck by your comment about the close cooperation between Canada and the United States in the nineties. You cited several instances. It struck me that it came under a tenure that emphasized multilateral approaches to world affairs. How do you explain that in an emphasis on Canadian human security?

Prof. Joel Sokolsky: Human security was not inconsistent with the policy of the Clinton administration. In fact, the Clinton administration was charged by its critics with following a Mother Teresa approach to foreign policy, confusing it with social work.

The Clinton administration promoted the intervention by U.S. forces for humanitarian reasons in Bosnia and Haiti. Although it wanted to restrict American involvement and there was a question of the Congress, it was not inconsistent with what the Clinton administration was supporting.

The human security agenda was criticized, but I'm on record as saying I didn't see it as being inconsistent with Canadian interests, where possible. Moreover, under the human security banner we cooperated more closely with the United States than we had before.

The other thing about the human security agenda was it was discretionary. You didn't have to do it.

Ms. Anita Neville: I just find there's a certain inconsistency, given the leadership in Canada at the time and the nature of the close cooperation you're describing.

Prof. Joel Sokolsky: I think you're absolutely right. It appeared to be inconsistent. People were writing that this was pulpit diplomacy and Canada wasn't living up...but I think the record speaks for itself. We intervened, along with the United States, all over the world to save people from their own governments.

Even in East Timor, where there was an American fleet offshore and we went in with the Australians, what was that? That was human security. Why were the Americans there? There was Indonesia, but we could not have carried out the human security agenda without American support.

In intellectual terms, the human security agenda owes more to an American heritage than a Canadian one. It's Wilsonianism; it's global meliorism. We are the ones who always said during the Cold War, “Forget about what goes on inside countries.”

So it was the irony of the Chrétien-Clinton years.

Ms. Anita Neville: Thank you.

The Chair: Gee, I hope you don't make that comment to Lloyd Axworthy.

Some hon. members: Oh, Oh!

Prof. Joel Sokolsky: Actually, I did. I published an article praising the human security agenda for its realism and its pro-Americanism.

The Chair: Before we conclude, are there any other questions on the government side or otherwise? No?

I want to ask you just a couple of quick questions on the issue of the weaponization of space. What are your feelings on what appears to be the existing Canadian policy? Where, if anywhere, should we be moving on that policy in the future, given what we're faced with in terms of national missile defence?

Prof. Joel Sokolsky: We wouldn't have a problem on land-based systems. If the United States put up space-based systems for missile defence, in the present context it would strain our arms control policy, but given that we're not in a cold-war competitive situation, I don't think it would necessarily be destabilizing.

You have to ask yourself whether a drone unmanned observation vehicle such as the Predator, which also has missiles, is any different from having a satellite with missiles. It's just a question of where it is in the atmosphere.

À (1055)

The Chair: Do you buy the argument that because there are assets in space those assets have to be protected? Clearly there's some thought that if there were a low earth-to-orbit nuclear blast, it would probably take out just about all of the civilian satellite systems we have--roughly $100 billion worth of satellites. As a result of that, we might want to take some measures to protect those assets.

Prof. Joel Sokolsky: I would agree with that position. Where it is shouldn't determine whether it's.... The satellites are important for stability because they allow us to know what's going on.

The Chair: On the PJBD, the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, do you see any room for possible reform and a change in the mandate of that body, given what's happened over the last couple of years? Is there an opportunity that we're missing if we don't re-examine its mandate?

Prof. Joel Sokolsky: This is where I think NORTHCOM and that joint group would have a better overview of defence relations. Unless the United States is prepared to elevate its assessment of the PJBD and appoint more high-ranking people to give it greater access, I don't think there's any percentage in it for us.

The structural relationship has always been on a bureaucracy-to-bureaucracy, service-to-service basis. It will be easier for the Canadian and U.S. navies to collaborate on North American defence than the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Army to collaborate on North American defence. I don't think the PJBD...that it makes any sense to do that. This is where I think NORTHCOM would come in.

I think the government has done this just to avoid confusion. As you know, the American combatant commanders have a political adviser--a senior foreign service officer of ambassadorial rank--with them. We haven't had that with.... We've had the DCINC down there, but there's been nobody from DFAIT or PCO. There should be a high-level political representative in NORTHCOM in the working group, just as the Americans have one from their State Department, so there is a direct link between the commands.

Although I have great respect for the Canadian military, sometimes they can cook up things with the Americans. The government has to know what's going on. In order to manage this carefully, in order to prevent misunderstanding on the Americans' part, the Government of Canada has to make sure it speaks with one voice in Colorado Springs. It has to make sure the military isn't saying, “We'd like to do this but our Prime Minister doesn't agree with this.” They can't hear that. They have to hear, “This is the policy of the Canadian government.”

The Chair: On behalf of all of the members of the committee, I'd like to thank you for a very insightful presentation today. I think you can tell from the volume and breadth of the questions that there was a lot of interest in your comments. Although you're not the first speaker we've had in connection with our study of Canada-U.S. defence relations, you certainly helped us kick this study off in a very significant way.

Again, I thank you for your presence here today.

Prof. Joel Sokolsky: Thank you.

The Chair: This meeting is adjourned.