[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]
Tuesday, October 17, 1995
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[English]
The Chairman: Today, we continue our examination of Bill C-232, an Act to amend the Divorce Act. We have Professor Joseph Magnet, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa.
Professor Magnet, you know the procedures, you've been here before. You can proceed with your presentation and then we'll proceed to questions and answers.
Professor J. Magnet (Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa): Thank you very much,Mr. Chairman. I was asked to come and speak to the members of the committee about the constitutional validity of Bill C-232. As I understand it, some concern was expressed as to whether or not the federalism doctrines might limit Parliament's ability to pass amendments of this type. I was asked to address myself to that issue. I'm quite pleased to do so, and I thank the committee for inviting me. I hope I may be of assistance.
The custody and access provisions of the Divorce Act have been the subject-matter of consideration by the courts more or less since 1969. That is when the Divorce Act originates and the act at that time had in it provisions for interim and permanent custody orders and also invested courts with power to vary those orders from time to time.
Those provisions were immediately challenged before the courts. Parliament has jurisdiction with respect to divorce in class 26, as set up in section 91, of the Constitution Act of 1867, but it has been for a very long time accepted that with respect to family law matters generally, custody, access and things of that sort, the provincial legislatures have primary and to some extent exclusive jurisdiction.
This is why the matter arose, and in 1969 the courts did uphold the validity of the corollary relief provisions of the Divorce Act going to such matters as interim custody orders as, rationally, functionally, incidence of the overall Divorce Act, the whole scheme of the Divorce Act.
Justice Laskin, as he then was, sitting in the Court of Appeal of Ontario, took the view that you had to look at the act as a whole and see the extent to which the challenged provisions - in this case the court had made an interim custody order in a Divorce Act - were integrated into the scheme. He held that Parliament's jurisdiction did indeed extend to making interim custody orders, because obviously in a divorce action where there were minor children provision had to be made for those children, and it made sense for Parliament to do that in the Divorce Act.
That was the first consideration by the courts of the modern regime and since that time the courts of the provinces, and including the Supreme Court of Canada, have upheld Parliament's jurisdiction to make interim and permanent custody orders and to vary those orders from time to time, as necessary. That is not doubted.
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This jurisdiction is limited to divorce actions. The jurisdiction cannot extend beyond divorce actions. If a petition for divorce is presented, an interim custody order is made and the petition for divorce then fails to be granted by the court, that interim custody order would itself cease to operate at that time. Parliament would have no jurisdiction to give a court power to make an order of greater duration than that. The principle, and the point to notice about all of this, is that Parliament's jurisdiction must be integrated into the divorce action.
Now, you have before you a bill that is to a certain extent, I believe, by its proponents, focused on the grandparents' rights. This bill would increase the grandparents' presence in divorce actions by giving greater custody, access and informational rights to the grandparents. This is the extent of the bill. Of course, this raises a certain constitutional question because access and custody are primarily the jurisdiction of the provinces.
This bill is limited to divorce actions and it does not, therefore, suffer from any of the objections that might be made to it if it were to go wider than that. In the bill, for example, it would be very strange to see Parliament providing for the custody arrangements of the children of unmarried parents, because this is not something that would be necessarily incidental to divorce jurisdiction. But the bill, of course, does not do that.
The provincial legislatures, however, in most and perhaps all of the provinces, have done that. They have provided for similar rights for grandparents in their child statutes and in their family law statutes. This also is the view that has been taken by many American states.
Well, what is the inspiration of bills of this type? Generally speaking, as I understand it, the inspiration of this kind of legislation is that the grandparents may in fact be able to provide a steadying role or steadying presence in a crisis situation, in a divorce situation. The parents themselves may have gone a little around the bend in their affairs between each other. In some cases, perhaps in many cases, the grandparents may be well placed to assist, particularly with custodial matters relating to the children. It may, in fact, be helpful to the children to have continuing access to their grandparents, and this I understand to be the principal inspiration of this bill.
In other words, what I am saying is that as I understand the intention of this bill, it is related to the best interests of the children. In fact, the bill itself would appear to reflect that intention because it makes no modification to subsection 16(8) of the Divorce Act. Subsection 16(8) requires the courts to have regard to the best interests of the children. So in deciding whether or not to award custody, access or informational rights to the grandparents, the courts would be bound by this standard in subsection 16(8). The court would still have to consider the best interests of the child.
The Supreme Court of Canada, in one of its more recent decisions just last year in Young v. Young, said that the best interests of the child standard in section 16(8) of the Divorce Act is a child-centred inquiry. You look at it from the point of view of the child.
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I believe, therefore, this increase in what's been referred to as grandparents' rights, this increase in the presence of the grandparents in the divorce action, remains a child-centred inquiry. In other words, as I understand this bill, the grandparents would have only custodial access and informational rights about the child, from a child-centred perspective. Is it in the best interest of the child that the grandparents have these custodial access and informational rights? That is how the proposed amendments in Bill C-232 would have to be interpreted.
If it is interpreted in that way, it seems clear to me this bill runs straight in the channel cut by former constitutional jurisprudence outlining Parliament's jurisdiction. In other words, this is a bill that expresses Parliament's opinion that it is in the best interests of the child in certain circumstances to have continuing access to the grandparents. Of course, for the grandparents to exercise that access or to decide whether to seek custody, they must have certain information about the child, and this bill grants them that information.
So on the whole, it would be my opinion that this bill, limited as it is to giving the grandparents certain custodial access and informational rights about the child, in the best interests of the child, in Parliament's opinion, from a child-centred perspective, as that has been delineated by the courts, has no constitutional problems with it from the point of view of the distribution of powers. It would be my opinion that this bill is constitutionally valid from the point of view of federalism.
I am very pleased to answer questions, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman: Ms Jennings.
Mrs. Jennings (Mission - Coquitlam): Good afternoon, Mr. Magnet. I am Daphne Jennings. I'm sponsoring the bill.
I'm pleased to hear you clear up that bit about the Constitution. That's the way I thought it was, but I wasn't sure.
If I understand you correctly, in the earlier part of the century the custodial parent really had the power. In fact, the custodial parent had all the rights with respect to the child under his or her care, and even control of the access and visitation the child had with a non-custodial parent. Since that time we're now seeing the best interests of the child come forward and we're seeing, according to the United Nations convention, that a child has a right of access to its family. I would understand you to agree with that: that the child does have a right of access to their family.
Would you comment on that?
Prof. Magnet: I do not want to pretend to be a family law expert. Perhaps I can limit myself to a certain extent to the constitutional validity of the bill. But as I understand this bill, that is correct. This would give the child access to the grandparents. That is a right that is now presumed under the Divorce Act.
It might be of interest, however, to note that the courts treat this as a child right; and I think you're quite correct in phrasing it that way. The court is required to look at this from a child-centred perspective.
I think what this bill does is say yes, it is presumed to be in the child's best interest to have maximum contact with both parents. Also, now we are adding Parliament's presumption that it is in the child's best interest to have considerable contact with the grandparents. So I think you are correct in expressing this - at least this is the way the courts treat it - as a child's right of access, yes.
Mrs. Jennings: Thank you.
A second question I would like to ask you is about the costs involved. We have had a great deal of discussion, and I have maintained all along that the costs involved would be greater if in fact this bill does not go through, because as it stands now, extra litigation is being created by grandparents. Any third party who wants to go to court has to go to court, apply for leave, set up a whole new action and get a lawyer involved for themselves and others, and the parents have to come back to court.
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If it were at the time of the divorce, in fact the cost would not be as great. The time might be extended a bit to hear the grandparents' point of view, but it would not be as great as it would be to initiate a whole new court action. Does that make sense? Do I seem to be on the right line of thinking?
Prof. Magnet: Is your question relating to the informational aspects of Bill C-232 or is it related to the access aspects of it?
Mrs. Jennings: I'm sorry. I'll clear that up. It's the access.
Actually, I've partially agreed and the grandparents have agreed that if it's necessary, we will get rid of the information section that says if granted access or custody, they would have rights to inquire as to the health, welfare and education of the child. That we've already dealt with. We'd be more than willing to amend it. So we're talking just about access, and custody in some cases.
It has been suggested here, in the meetings I have been at, that they're always going to be after custody. I would really like to stress that's not the case at all. Grandparents certainly will not shirk their duty. If they're needed they will definitely go for custody. We have over 5 million in the United States raising their own grandchildren. But for the most part it is access - continuous visitation rights.
Prof. Magnet: I believe there would be a considerable cost involved in enforcing this.
This bill appears to overlay the inherent jurisdiction of the court, what lawyers call the parens patriae jurisdiction of the court. It may be that it's useful to do that because it makes clear this is the route one takes. The parens patriae jurisdiction tends to be a little more mysterious to lawyers. It makes it clear this is the direction a grandparent would take in a divorce proceeding.
If the grandparent actually had to pursue this through the court, I believe there would be a considerable cost involved. I also believe the grandparent would probably be better off financially and better able to bear those costs. There is a possibility, I suppose, that the greater financial capacity could be the cause of a little bit of mischief between the grandparents and the parents who do not want them to have access, for whatever reason, to the child. I think that's a possibility.
However, these matters tend after a while to be well understood by the family law bar. I would imagine that after the initial cases, the situations in which grandparents could have access would be very well defined and that most of these petitions would in fact be settled outside of the courts; the lawyers would work it out.
While there may be some initial greater cost, with the opportunity for some unpleasantness between the grandparents and the parents, I think this would be worked out over time as the bar became familiar with it.
Mrs. Jennings: Yes, that was my understanding. I understand you to say that if they had to initiate a whole new action, that would create additional costs.
Prof. Magnet: I'm sorry; I didn't fully understand your question. Thank you for clearing it up.
Yes, if the grandparents were proceeding under the parens patriae jurisdiction, they would have to bring their own originating application there, etc. Would that increase the costs? It may well.
Mrs. Jennings: There is something I would like your view on. In the 1980s I read an article in a law magazine. Mary Southin, Q.C., from British Columbia mentioned that there are far too many lawyers and they create unnecessary litigation - that we're bogged down with litigation.
I'd suggest that by leaving things the way they are we're actually helping increase all that litigation and therefore work for lawyers. If they didn't have the opportunity to create these new cases as grandparents or other third parties find they are suddenly stuck without seeing the children, but instead did it at the same time, it would be less work for lawyers.
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I'd like to get your view on that. I think it's important. I'm wondering if the law society actually has a vested interest in making sure the bill does not go ahead.
Prof. Magnet: I do think there is something of a dysfunctional environment in the bar these days caused by the factors you have mentioned. It is much more difficult these days to settle cases than it was formerly.
Many of my colleagues at the bar do take the view that practising law isn't as much fun. One has to be a little more careful with one's colleagues than one had to be. It is very difficult to settle cases, which supports your point that there is a little too much litigation because of the excess capacity of the bar.
I really can't speak to whether or not any of the provincial law societies have vested interests in promoting litigation of this type. I take the view that the litigation is helpful only as it sets the parameters within which lawyers understand how these cases are going to turn out and therefore settle them.
As perhaps you're aware, most property and custody things are worked out by settlement. I understand that is becoming more difficult these days for some of the reasons you mentioned.
I believe the future of this is not in litigation but in family law boutiques that include a wide range of services in addition to legal expertise - going to mediation, going to psychological counselling, providing stability and allowing the parents to work it out. I think that's the future.
If Parliament were to go that far I think it would be more difficult for it to found its constitutional jurisdiction on divorce, because a lot of this happens in separation and divorces, than it would be to rubber-stamp what has been worked out in the provincial family law system.
Mrs. Jennings: Thank you.
Mr. Regan (Halifax West): First of all, how many students are there in the law school at the University of Ottawa?
Prof. Magnet: In the common law section we have approximately 500.
Mr. Regan: So would you be teaching more than one course? I understand you're a professor of constitutional law, but do you also teach other areas?
Prof. Magnet: Yes, I teach constitutional administrative law and other areas as well.
Mr. Regan: Do you teach family law?
Prof. Magnet: No, I do not.
Mr. Regan: Do you have experience practising family law?
Prof. Magnet: Very minor, but some.
Mr. Regan: Thank you.
One of the issues that concerns me in relation to the constitutional issues and perhaps a charter issue is that the result of this bill, I suggest to you, would create a situation in which there is discrimination between the grandparents of families that are intact or common law and the grandparents of families where there is a divorce. In other words, the grandparents in a divorce would have rights that others wouldn't.
Can someone claim they're being discriminated against by the effect of the law in this way, as opposed to by the law itself?
Prof. Magnet: No, they could not.
I may be incorrect about this, but I understand that most of the provinces have statutes similar to this for unmarried parents. If there are some that do not, the court's interpretation of it is that family law is given to the provinces, divorce is given to Ottawa, and the fact that different regimes may obtain in different provinces is not a reason for claiming discrimination or inequality.
Simple geographical play of different jurisdictions is not a reason for a quality violation. This is something that's already been considered with respect to young offenders' legislation and that sort of thing.
Mr. Regan: You mentioned that you feel this bill will be constitutional in its limited way - in the limited things it tries to achieve. One of the things we've heard from family lawyers, from the family law subsection of the Canadian Bar Association, from the president of the Comité permanent sur le droit de la famille from Quebec, and from the Department of Justice counsel, has been that the provinces have jurisdiction over family law and could provide for rights for grandparents on a much broader scale, for all grandparents, as opposed to just those of divorcing families. Would that not seem to be a more practical way to deal with this issue?
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Prof. Magnet: The provinces could not deal with the situation of divorce.
Mr. Regan: No, but surely.... For instance, I can tell you that not all provinces have the kind of legislation they apparently have in a few provinces. I know in Nova Scotia there is no legislation of the sort you've mentioned, giving grandparents rights of access to children in this way. So wouldn't it be a better solution, where there are not access rights of those sorts, to have the provinces do it?
Prof. Magnet: It may be that it's a better solution, but it's not constitutionally possible to do.
Mr. Regan: Okay. The other question is why isn't it constitutionally possible for each province to do it on its own?
Prof. Magnet: Because divorce is an exclusive federal responsibility under section 91, class 26.
Mr. Regan: I'm not talking about divorce. I'm talking about giving grandparents rights of access; all grandparents equal rights of standing in relation to access matters.
Prof. Magnet: In divorce petitions, in divorce actions, the provinces could not specify that. This is an exclusive federal responsibility. There is a divided jurisdiction there.
Mr. Regan: So you're saying it would have to be after the divorce case had finished.
Prof. Magnet: Or before, or with two parents of unmarried spouses, or same-sex couples, or that sort of thing.
Mr. Regan: One of the arguments we've heard from family lawyers who have appeared before us - they have been representing other family lawyers, for the most part; in fact all of them have, so far - has been that they feel this provision would in fact complicate divorce proceedings very much and would increase their length. So when you say there would be increased costs if someone has to bring an application outside of a divorce proceeding, are you referring to the cost of the initial application and notice? Surely in either case you're going to have the cost of a hearing, etc. - the hearing and whatever negotiations there might or might not be.
Prof. Magnet: I think the point Ms Jennings was making was that the grandparents would have to start a whole separate proceeding to invoke the parens patriae jurisdiction of the court. It was in that context that I did agree with her that there is likely to be some cost to that separate proceeding additional to that of the situation where the grandparents simply file a motion in the divorce action seeking the rights Bill C-232 gives to them. I believe there would be some additional cost there.
I'm a little agnostic about all of that, because as I say, I expect most of these things to be understood. I would hope that would be the intention of the bill and most of these cases would be settled and not litigated. But in the initial period, when there is litigation, and to the tip of the iceberg, where there is some litigation, it may well be that the ability for the grandparents to enter this by motion would cut down on the cost...than starting a parens patriae action.
Mr. Regan: You mean asking for leave for standing? Right now they have the right, of course, to apply for standing. But if this bill were passed, then it seems to me you would have a situation where a grandparent who hadn't seen the child for ten years, if they wanted to get involved and interfere in the matter, for some reason, would have the same right and the same standing before the court as a parent or as a grandparent who had seen the child every day. We've heard from family lawyers that there's a need for the kind of safety valve a provision that requires them to apply for standing provides.
Prof. Magnet: You are taking me beyond the constitutionality here - which is fine; I understand where you're coming from. But the answer to this specific question is that yes, they would then have a greater presence in the divorce action. Is this in some way going to complicate that action? I suppose it could complicate the action if the grandparents were abusively to seek custody or access or to want to duke it out with their own children in this action. There is that potential, but there is also the potential to do that now by seeking leave of the court and that sort of thing. There would be some sort of court control in that situation, as there would be under Bill C-232.
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Mr. Regan: Surely leave to appeal is the control.
Prof. Magnet: All of this is subject to the best interests of the child standard. That is the governing thing in this legislation. It's not in the bill before you, but it's in the Divorce Act.
Mr. Regan: But if the court felt that a person were bringing the action for all the wrong reasons, under the present situation it would have a chance to deal with that. The court can say it is vexatious and refuse to give them a standing in a case, whereas after this bill it wouldn't have that chance. They'd have standing automatically.
Prof. Magnet: They would have the right to seek custody, access and information. Under the present situation, the court can cut off their participation early on. Under this bill, the court would still have the opportunity to give them a very limited participation in that case. The judge could make it very clear to abusive grandparents that they wouldn't get access and custody on their motion for it.
Mr. Regan: But surely if they wanted to proceed and had the dollars, the legal expertise and so forth to pursue it, they could delay it for quite a while.
Prof. Magnet: This is one of the unfortunate things about divorce and custody proceedings. I mentioned Young v. Young. That case went on in the courts, up and down to the Supreme Court, for over five years. The court commented about this, but there was just no opportunity to stop it. The court can express its displeasure, and one of the Quebec judges got so displeased that she actually awarded costs against the plaintiff's lawyer, saying ``You really don't belong here and we're going to tag you good and hard. You're paying for it''. But that was set aside by the appellate courts.
The danger you refer to is a real one, but it's the thin edge of the bell curve in these actions. I think you're quite right to raise it, but I don't think considerations like that should deflect you from the main thrust of this type of legislation. Again, I'm not here to support or challenge the wisdom of this legislation, but I do think you're in the margins there.
Mr. Ramsay (Crowfoot): Thank you for your presentation. You're the first constitutional expert we've had give an opinion on the constitutionality of this bill. I'm pleased to hear that you feel it will pass the constitutional test.
Just to follow up on what Mr. Regan was saying, it seems to me that the argument against this bill is based on the fact that it's going to allow grandparents who may have a mischievous motive or a motive not aimed at the best interests of the child to make application, but that's available now. The Young v. Young case is a typical example where parents or grandparents are so minded to do that. I don't see what difference the passage of this amendment will have on the Divorce Act.
I'm not sure of the process that would be followed, but I understand that under this new authority the grandparents would probably file a motion with the court that would be considered by the court. At that time, the court could consider the frivolous or vexatious nature of that motion and deal with it for all time, unless they wanted to go forward with appeals and so on, as they can now.
I don't see anything wrong with granting the grandparents this simple right to make their application for either visitation rights or custody, in isolated cases, and have the court decide that. I don't see anything wrong with that, and yet we've had legal minds appear before the committee objecting to it. It seems to me, and I say this with respect, that their main argument is the convenience - we don't want another group of people or another couple involved in the proceedings.
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I think you have shed some light on that, for me at least, and I wonder if you could clarify that so that I can be assured once you leave here, at least from your point of view, that not very much is going to change in terms of grandparents seeking access and visitation rights as well as custody rights than what is happening now, other than that they will have standing at the time of the divorce and can make their application at the time of the divorce and have that matter settled at the time of the divorce under the federal statute rather than having to deal with it under provincial statutes which, right now, are not uniform across the country.
Prof. Magnet: I think that's correct. I don't know that I could be as confident in making predictions about whether or not you would have more grandparent applications. I think what you've said is largely correct.
I believe grandparents do have a uniform access across the country, though, at least in a substantive law sense, because it's a parens patriae jurisdiction which is inherent in all of the superior courts of the provinces, and quite irrespective of the provincial family law statutes, all grandparents are able to access that substantive jurisdiction of the courts. The procedures may differ from province to province.
I think you're correct also when you say that this would be by motion, because these amendments fit into section 16 of the Divorce Act and section 16(1) empowers a court to award custody and access on application, meaning by motion.
The Chairman: Ms Torsney.
Ms Torsney (Burlington): One of the other issues that was raised throughout the discussions here is that somehow by enacting this particular legislation there would actually be a notification that would be automatic so that grandparents would be notified that there was a divorce taking place and that they should be part of the proceedings. Is that correct?
Prof. Magnet: That's not as I understand Bill C-232. That is not in the bill and the notification is not something that the cases give to the.... It's a right to information that the access parent has, and I think Young v. Young is very clear about this. The access parent has rights to information that they can seek, but that is not a right to be consulted. If they don't have a right to be consulted, I don't see how they have a right to be notified.
Ms Torsney: If I were becoming divorced and I had children and Bill C-232 was in place, would my parents be automatically notified, or do they have to indicate to the court that they would like to have access written into the decision?
Prof. Magnet: As I understand Bill C-232, unless I'm misreading it, they do not have a right to be notified and the Divorce Act would not give them that right.
Ms Torsney: We are still in a position then, even with Bill C-232, that grandparents would have to come forward at the time of the divorce. Someone would have to know about it, because there are apparently cases where parents don't know their children are becoming divorced, and that they should be seeking access. In a lot of the cases where there is a problem in access to the grandchildren, it arises several months afterwards when the grandparents realize that there's a problem getting access and that there has been a divorce and that they have to seek some kind of formal procedure to get access to those grandchildren.
Prof. Magnet: Yes, that's the situation. The grandparents would have to come forward.
Ms Torsney: Why don't we leave it with the provincial jurisdiction, then?
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Prof. Magnet: I don't think I can assist you on that. I think I could assist you best on the constitutional division of powers aspect that I was asked to testify about.
You certainly could leave the grandparents' rights with the parens patriae jurisdiction of the provinces, or under provincial family law statutes where it does exist. You certainly do have that opportunity.
Ms Torsney: The only change that Bill C-232 would offer, then, is that this hearing where the grandparents who know about a divorce, who want to get access to their grandchildren, would have to seek leave to have standing at the time of the divorce. That's the only change that this will make.
Prof. Magnet: That's correct. It overlays the parens patriae jurisdiction and gives them rights in the divorce action under the federal legislation.
Ms Torsney: It would also give them, should they be given access, information about those grandchildren, school records, health records or anything else.
Prof. Magnet: You say only when they get access. If I understood Mrs. Jennings correctly, you have now decided to delete the informational aspects from the bill.
Ms Torsney: We have? I'm sorry.
Mrs. Jennings: We discussed it on the very first day and we agreed. Beryl Gaffney actually suggested it two months ago.
Ms Torsney: Okay. Secondly, then, those grandparents will have access written in at the time of the divorce if they have so indicated to the court. They're still involved in the decisions about the access, if this bill goes through.
Prof. Magnet: They would have rights to seek access. They would not be involved in deciding which of the parents of the children were to get access. They would have rights to seek access themselves.
Ms Torsney: For people who are involved in this kind of a proceeding, where is the bulk of the cost and the bulk of the work done? Is it in those applications to the court for standing, or is it later when they're deciding access and agreements amongst custody and what have you?
Prof. Magnet: I don't think I could assist you with an answer to that.
Ms Torsney: What kind of proceeding is it currently for grandparents to get standing in the courts?
Prof. Magnet: They have to make a motion to the court under subsection 16(3). There would have to be a hearing on that motion and the court would sort out whether or not they're going to get standing.
Ms Torsney: So the only difference is that little thing doesn't take place.
Prof. Magnet: That would not take place.
Ms Torsney: But there is no notification incumbent in this legislation.
Prof. Magnet: No notification.
The Chairman: Mrs. Jennings.
Mrs. Jennings: I'd like to follow along Ms Torsney's line of questioning.
First of all, I'd like to point out that I believe that that end of notification.... It was mentioned before and, unfortunately, I didn't have the value of having Mr. Côté here at the time to clear it up for us - because he drafted the bill for me. It was my understanding it was done by the provinces, but it seemed to me I was being asked if we were in fact doing that.
I still understand it is up to the provinces and that it is not mentioned in the bill. Am I correct,Mr. Côté?
Mr. Louis-Philippe Côté (Legislative Counsel, Legislative Counsel Office, House of Commons): That is correct, yes.
Mrs. Jennings: Thank you.
Mr. Ramsay: I'm sorry, I didn't understand. What is correct?
Mr. Côté: That there is no mention of notification in Bill C-232.
Mr. Ramsay: Then is Ms Torsney correct, and is Professor Magnet correct, in saying that it is not compulsory that the grandparents be notified in the event of a divorce of their children?
Mr. Côté: Right now, there is nothing in Bill C-232 that deals with notification. Therefore, you have to go into provincial legislation. For example, in Quebec it would be the Code de procédure civile. In Ontario it would be their own provincial laws. You would have to go and dig into each of these laws in order to find out if there is such notification. But Bill C-232 does not address the issue of notification.
Mrs. Jennings: Thank you, Mr. Côté. That is my point.
In that case, it's provincial legislation. It might even be necessary for us to take a look in something like a year's time for the provincial courts to get into the mode to make sure this is all in place, because obviously they're going to have to do something to adjust.
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But that's not to say the initial action of the bill isn't good and it's not necessary and not needed. Because the provincial courts have to administer it their own way, which they do right now with every other action to do with law, to do this, as I see it, is not another difficult step for them to take. They're already doing it in other things. So they would have to decide how to do it.
Someone in the committee - and it seems to me, Mr. Magnet, this is necessary, and I've agreed very much - I think it was someone on the government side, said what we need here is more education, so grandparents in fact know that just because you have a good relationship with both sides in a divorce does not mean that relationship is going to continue, so make sure in future you are aware.... That's an educational process, which could be part and parcel...and which if we're good legislators we'll be very concerned about.
Ms Torsney: That was me.
Mrs. Jennings: Thank you, Paddy.
Prof. Magnet: I have no comment on that.
Mrs. Jennings: The other thing I would like to point out is that I was talking to Barbara Baird just an hour ago. She's in family law in New Brunswick. In fact, we hope to have her as a witness here. She pointed out that the Family Law Act in Ontario and the Family Services Act in New Brunswick right now are both very compatible with what we are striving for in Bill C-232, and that it would be very helpful if the federal law did have aspects of it; with maybe some changes, some minor amendments. It would be very helpful, because then all of Canada could come into play. She said right now it's very difficult, because only New Brunswick and Ontario, as she sees it, have easy remedies for grandparents to come and have access.
Is your experience at all with any of the provinces? Do you see that as being beneficial, that we have one change, one amendment, under the federal Divorce Act?
Prof. Magnet: It may be that this is a sensible amendment. As to whether or not it is fully harmonized with the provincial systems, I don't think I could assist you on that.
The Chairman: Ms Phinney.
Ms Phinney (Hamilton Mountain): I think we're a little confused now about notification and getting the provincial court system into it. You've said that in this bill as it stands, if it were to pass, there's no requirement for the courts to notify any grandparents.
Prof. Magnet: That's right. Bill C-232 does not say you must say to divorcing parents of children ``You must tell the grandparents you're getting divorced so they can decide whether or not to seek access to the children''. There is in the bill as it's before you the right for the grandparents to seek information about the grandchildren. I understand this is going to be deleted.
Ms Phinney: That's not the same question.
Prof. Magnet: No, but it is a very related question. I -
Ms Phinney: But I'm not asking that question. I'm asking this question about notification, because we're confused about the answer from your counsel about going to a provincial court and mixing that up into a federal divorce. You can't mix the federal and the provincial at the same court case.
Prof. Magnet: Who said so?
Ms Phinney: You said that.
Prof. Magnet: That's correct; there's no requirement for notification. But perhaps it would assist you if I just said I think it's related to the informational aspect of the bill in this way. If the grandparents have no information about the grandchildren, they couldn't be too interested. If they're not getting information on a continuing basis, they couldn't be too interested. If the parents are getting divorced and the grandparents don't know about it, they could not be in a position where they're taking a tremendous interest in the grandchildren. So it would be odd to see them come forward at that point.
Ms Phinney: I beg to differ with you. You could have the parents with the children living in Vancouver, the rest of the family living in England, and no letters back and forth. You can't continue to have lawyers or private detectives spying on the family to find out because you're not communicating with them.
I don't think it has anything to do with giving notice that a divorce hearing is pending or it's coming up.
It should be clear, because I think the intention when the bill was being presented was that you felt this was going to give notification automatically, and we want to have that cleared up. You thought, from your legal counsel, that it was going to give notification, but I don't think it does.
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Mrs. Jennings: I understood that would come under the administration end, which is provincial, as I understood it. The provinces interpret and administer the federal law within the provinces. I understand that is in fact what happens today in Canada.
Mr. Regan: You can't make the law.
Prof. Magnet: Say Parliament wanted to include a notification requirement to the grandparents. In my opinion, that would be constitutionally valid, and Parliament could do that. That would be rationally functional.
Mrs. Jennings: It's not here now?
Prof. Magnet: It's not there now.
The Chairman: Could we have legislative counsel say whether he has any comments on this?
Mr. Côté: On that last point, there is some jurisprudence that indicates that some procedural issues could be brought into the federal Divorce Act. For instance, this committee could decide to amend this act, if it's procedurally acceptable, to address the issue of notice.
If there is no amendment to this act, then this entire issue of notice, as well as the entire issue of procedure, will fall back to the province. What you have to do is look into each provincial jurisdiction.
For example, in the province of Quebec, when you file a petition of divorce, you file it through a declaration. I will read section 813.5 of the Code de procédure civile:
- The declaration must be accompanied with a notice to the other party to appear within twenty
days...
- In Ontario it might be forty days. I don't know.
Mrs. Jennings: I'd like a clarification as to whether this is what I said. If the bill passes as it is right now, it would go to the provinces to take care of the notification under the administration, which is what I've said all along. Or, if we want to make an amendment, which is what I said a few minutes ago, then we could change the bill at the federal level so that it included notification. I think that's exactly what Mr. Côté said. He repeated just what I said. That's the clarity there.
Mr. Knutson (Elgin - Norfolk): I just wondered if counsel had any knowledge of the law in Ontario or any of the common law jurisdictions.
I'm not a family lawyer either, but the strangest thing I ever heard is that the Divorce Act is silent on the issue of notice. If Parliament could put it in, but it doesn't, it presumably means we don't think grandparents require notice.
You're saying one should look at some other law book to see whether grandparents are required to obtain notice.
A voice: It's up to them.
Mr. Côté: No, I do not have experience in a common law jurisdiction, but I do have experience in the Quebec jurisdiction. That's why I've quoted the Code de procédure civile du Québec. It's only to make the point that in terms of procedure you have to fall back on the provincial jurisdiction, unless you put something in the federal act.
That has been granted by the courts in the case of Montel c. Groupe de consultants in the Quebec Court of Appeal.
It is accepted in jurisprudence that unless you have something in the provincial procedure, you fall back on the federal procedure, if there is such a procedure in the Divorce Act.
Mr. Knutson: So it's conceivable that we'd have to amend nine family law acts around this issue of notice.
Mr. Côté: The federal Parliament would not amend those acts; it would be up to each province. That's unless, once again, the committee wants to address this issue, which could be an interesting proposal.
Ms Kristen Douglas (Committee Researcher): I'm an Ontario lawyer. I would just suggest that what would happen in Ontario would be not an amendment to the Family Law Act, because that's not the law that would be changing. It would be under the administration of the court's power. It would be the rules of civil procedure that would change. There would be a rule in the parts of the rules that deal with divorces that says that if you are divorcing and there are grandparents, you have to send this form that gives them notice the divorce is taking place.
It would be a provincial determination as to whether they wanted to create such a requirement or not.
Mr. Knutson: There's currently no rule in the Courts of Justice Act, or whatever it's called, saying that grandparents have to be notified so that they can apply for leave, is there?
Ms Douglas: Right.
Mr. Knutson: So we'd have to do that nine times.
Ms Douglas: The provinces would have to do it, yes.
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Ms Phinney: We'd have to suggest them.
Mr. Knutson: Collectively, Canadians would have to see that it gets done.
Mrs. Jennings: When we shall go to clause-by-clause consideration, will that be the appropriate time to raise an amendment if we feel that one is necessary?
The Chairman: The clerk says yes.
Mrs. Jennings: We have an amendment already drafted, and I just wanted to know whether to mention it now or not.
The Chairman: Okay. Thank you.
Ms Torsney: I have to disagree with your earlier comment about the fact that there would be knowledge and that these grandparents would be seeking leave because they've been involved with the grandchildren all the time. The grandparents we've heard from in fact said that they've had little contact with their children and that they're trying to get contact with them and that they want to help those grandchildren in those divorce situations.
So in fact there has been a communication breakdown a lot earlier, and if there was a notification, then in many cases these grandparents would be receiving some information right out of the blue. ``Oh, look, the kids are getting a divorce. We'd better get access to those grandchildren''. That's what was coming across from some of the grandparents to whom we spoke: that they had not had contact, that they didn't know about their rights currently to seek leave to appeal, that it was very costly for them to do these things, that this bill was going to make everything a lot better for the grandparents in terms of getting access.
In light of your earlier comments about the lawyers and the amount of litigation out there, I have to wonder how adding to a situation where there are currently two parties, where we could in fact see as many as six or eight parties depending on what combinations and permutations there are amongst the grandparents in their marital status, is going to simplify the procedure or help or be in the interests of children if these procedures get more and more complicated.
Prof. Magnet: I think it's within -
Mrs. Torsney: Speaking as a constitutional lawyer.
Prof. Magnet: - this committee's authority and within Parliament's authority to take the view that contact with the grandparents is a good thing. I make no comments as to whether or not that's a wise view, but I think it's within this committee's authority. It would be rational, reasonable, for this committee and for Parliament to decide that maximum contact with the grandparents is a good thing for the children.
That having been said, it then is a question as to how you facilitate it.
I take the point of view that if there has been absolutely no contact, if the grandparents do not know what is going on with the grandchildren, then they are unlikely to be seeking these rights. I understand that you don't agree with that.
When I came before you, I was unaware that the informational aspect of the bill is under this committee's knife, so to speak. If the grandparents do not have the right to information, then in certain circumstances, particularly the ones you've mentioned, it will make it very difficult for them to exercise their right to access and custody. Of course we've now also considered that they will not necessarily be notified as to the difficulties in the family. So deleting the informational aspect would make it even more difficult for the grandparents to exercise their rights.
This all goes to your view as to whether or not you think facilitating access to the grandparents is good for the children. It's within your authority to take that view. If that's what you think, then this bill is within your authority. If you think that's a good thing but there are going to be too many parties involved in this litigation and it's going to get a bit too complicated and too costly, that ultimately it's a good thing but the procedures for implementing it are just too difficult for the children, then that's also a judgment open for you to make.
Ms Torsney: If we agree that it's a good thing for the grandparents to have contact with the children, then do you think this is the only way in which to achieve it? Is there currently not enough law on the books for grandparents to get access to those grandchildren? Currently that's not necessarily onerous, but perhaps we do need to do a better job of informing grandparents of their current rights and encouraging that context in some other mechanism, perhaps through an educational mechanism rather than a legal mechanism.
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Prof. Magnet: Ms Torsney, this will facilitate the access of grandparents to their grandchildren. I don't think there's any question about that, because this bill expresses Parliament's view that access to the grandparents is a good thing.
Under the provincial system, either under the provincial legislation or the inherent jurisdiction of the court, there is no guidance saying that access to the grandparents is a good thing. So the court can see whether or not it agrees with that.
If it agrees with that, it has authority, either inherently or under provincial legislation, to facilitate that access to the grandparents. When Parliament comes forward with its own legislation saying access to the grandparents is in the best interest of the child, it should be facilitated and directs the courts. This obviously will have an impact on the way in which these family law actions are worked out.
Ms Torsney: I have a really short comment.
The Chairman: You're over five minutes.
Ms Torsney: Only for those grandchildren whose parents are divorced.
Prof. Magnet: Only for those married people -
Ms Tornsey: Given that 80% of families are two-parent families, it's for only 20% of the children in Canada.
Prof. Magnet: I don't think that's exactly the correct statistic. I actually did look into that in preparing myself to come before you. Yes, it certainly is not universal. Parliament's authority, and this committee, can really only deal with the divorce situation. But that being said, this is the only body that can deal with the divorce situation.
The Chairman: Mr. Ramsay.
Mr. Ramsay: If it is correct that grandparents' right to know or right to apply for access of visitation rights in the event their children are being divorced is in the best interests of the grandchildren, then what we have today is a situation where divorces can occur without the grandparents knowing about it. It means that those who wish to help, as well as those who would create a problem through mischievous and other motivations, are kept in abeyance. It's only those parents or grandparents who happen to know that their children are divorcing who can make an application.
Prof. Magnet: Yes, that's right.
Mr. Ramsay: Under the present law.
Prof. Magnet: That's right.
Mr. Ramsay: I do not think we should be formulating law based on the premise of withholding information. I think if we're looking at the best interests of the child, and if grandparents' access and visitation rights, and in some cases custody, are in the best interests of the child, we need this law and we need the notification requirement as well.
What is the point of continuing on with the system where we're denying grandparents the knowledge of a divorce proceeding when their knowledge of that and whatever action they might take might be in the best - in terms of application to the court - interests of the child?
Could I have your comments on that, please?
Prof. Magnet: Mr. Ramsay, it is within Parliament's constitutional authority to provide that in divorce actions grandparents must be notified. You haven't provided so in this bill, but it is within your authority to do that if you want to.
Mr. Ramsay: The basis of this amendment, Bill C-232, is that it is in the best interests of the child for the grandparents to have the right to make application at the time of the divorce. At least part of what goes with that would be the right of notification a certain period of time before the divorce takes place so they could decide whether or not they want to make application, as they would have the right to do. At least they would be notified. Not all grandparents would take advantage of this law, as they don't now take advantage of the law that provides for them to make application after they see things start to go wrong.
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Am I correct in that line of thinking?
Prof. Magnet: I believe that if you want to know how notification requirements would actually work out in practice, the proper way to get that information is by a comparative study of those American states that have a system like this in place.
It would be a modest but interesting research task to find out just how many grandparents' petitions there have been in states that have notice requirements compared to states that don't, and whether statutes like that facilitate grandparents' access in ways that are helpful to the child, or facilitate in ways that are not helpful to the child.
I believe that's the proper way to answer that question. I have not done that research in preparing to come before you.
Mr. MacLellan (Cape Breton - The Sydneys): I have just a little problem on the constitutionality. I understand what you're saying. You are saying that with regard to the grandparents' right to intervene, they have the right to intervene because the welfare of the child is paramount, even in the case of divorce. This being a federal jurisdiction, the rights of the child are invariably interlocked in the question of divorce. Even though the grandparents don't have to apply and have the right to intervene automatically, it is not a constitutional problem because the rights of the child are interwoven so closely in the whole divorce question. Is that correct?
Prof. Magnet: That's correct.
Mr. MacLellan: I just want to take it one step further. If the grandparents have the right to be notified and are to be notified, would that elevate it another step to the extent that in de facto, the grandparents would almost become parties in the divorce action, thereby raising their profile to the extent that the whole question of child custody and access would become as large as the divorce question itself? It would become more than just an interwoven part of the Divorce Act itself; it would become a separate issue. Would that affect the constitutionality of Bill C-232?
Prof. Magnet: I think you've correctly identified the limit of federal jurisdiction there. If you were to take this away from a focus concentrated on the best interests of the child and simply started to provide for grandparents' rights, unrelated to the disposition of the children, you would be beyond federal jurisdiction. The grandparents' rights vis-à-vis the children is something that is exclusively provincial jurisdiction, and Parliament has no business meddling around there.
The specific question is, if we elevate the grandparents so high that we notify them so they can get involved, are we approaching that provincial domain? My answer to that is no, because you are entitled to take a view that the grandparents are very important to the welfare of the children.
It's a child-centred inquiry and it would not be unreasonable for Parliament to take the view that the grandparents are very important parties to a divorce action. They're more mature, they have better resources, and they're not in crisis like the parents. They have a role to play, and it may be a very important one in many of these divorces.
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That's not an irrational view; and it not being an irrational view, Parliament is entitled to take that view of divorce policy. It then is rationally, functionally connected to divorce, and to the provision of the care of children in a divorce action.
I think that's the touchstone of federal jurisdiction. You've expressed it in that way. I agree with what you have said, and I would perhaps express it that way and in this alternative way: so long as Parliament has a rational basis, or has a reason, for believing its a provision for the care of children in divorce actions, it is constitutionally valid as a necessary or an ancillary incident of its jurisdiction over divorce.
Mr. MacLellan: Just to further the argument on the whole question, I know what you're saying, and I don't have a problem understanding it, it's just the question of whether I completely agree. I'm not really completely satisfied. Whereas a divorce action is between the husband and the wife and they are the major care-givers and guardians of the children - one will be a custodial parent and the other would be a non-custodial, or there might be joint custody - and whereas I agree with you that the grandparents are vitally important in the welfare of the children, and I agree with you completely that the welfare of the child is integrally involved in the marriage, in the divorce action, I guess what I'm saying is that if the grandparents come to that extent where they are notified, then of course they are then considered to be an integral party as well, as care-givers for the child, and a bona fide first-rank party in the actual welfare of the child.
Can you elevate them to that status? I guess that is what I'm asking.
Prof. Magnet: I believe Parliament can. I wouldn't want to be seen as saying it should. I wouldn't want to be seen as a proponent of this legislation. I really am here just to help you with the constitutional question.
Mr. MacLellan: No, no. You've been very helpful.
Prof. Magnet: I believe that is a judgment open to Parliament.
I would go further. I would say it is open to Parliament to say the official guardian must be notified in all divorce actions, as a check on improvident parental dealings with their children. I think that's a judgment open to Parliament under the federal system. I don't say it's a wise one; I don't say it's one you ought to take; but Parliament can form a view on how the best interests of children will be served in divorce actions, and once it has formed that view it can stipulate rules that have to be followed. This is one such rule.
Although the notification requirement does tighten the standard a bit there - it does insert, as you say, the grandparents deeper into the divorce action - that's a judgment open to you. You said it almost makes them parties. I would say that even if the federal action went so far as to make them parties - principal parties - that is a judgment open to you. Under the federal distribution of powers, Parliament could take the view that the grandparents are that essential to the welfare of children, and that would be a springboard for the federal jurisdiction. I don't say that's a wise course of action, but it would be open to you.
Mrs. Jennings: I'm speaking again because I'm very concerned about some of the line that was taken today in relaying the situation with grandparents to you. It was not as I found it on travelling around the country.
There are two things. One is that I think we have to change our thoughts that the custodial parent has the rights here. We have to realize the United Nations has set policy that in fact it's the child's right of access to their family, not the parents. I would have to agree with the New Brunswick Court of Appeal in 1986, when they said the right of access and visitation is the right of the child, not the parent.
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Then, to go further in the preamble of the Family Services Act, it also acknowledges that the children have basic rights and fundamental freedoms no less than those of adults and that the family exists as the basic unit of society and its well-being is inseparable from the common well-being.
That's my first point on which I'd like you to comment. It's a whole change of thinking, but I think some of us are hung up on the business of the custodial parent having all these rights.
I don't know if anybody else in this room did this, but I travelled across the country and spoke to grandparents and found out what the problem is. Then, not relying on my own findings, I went to family lawyers who on a daily basis are dealing with grandparents' rights cases, Mr. Culhane in particular.
Grandparents were telling me that at the time of the divorce they did not know that there would be a problem, that in fact they had good relationships with the in-law, whichever it would be, and did not suspect for a minute that they would not be able to see their grandchild. However, as time went on they were to find out that suddenly there were problems. Maybe that spouse remarried, or whatever. It wasn't the fact that they were not interested or didn't care about their grandchildren or had never had any contact; it was in fact that they had had a lot to do with their grandchildren but suddenly were severed. It has been very distressing.
That is the issue here. Had they been notified at the time and had they known, then it could have been done in a very amiable relationship, because they were all quite amiable at the time.
The proof of that is Mr. Culhane, who deals with approximately one hundred cases a year. I understand from him that in the last year only 30 to 40 of the cases went to court. All of the others were settled out of court.
I'd like your comments. We have to rethink where we are today. We have to look ahead instead of back to where we were.
Prof. Magnet: On the two points you're asking me about, you speak about the access rights in the Divorce Act as being the rights of the children and not the rights of the parent. I think that is absolutely clear from what the courts have said about section 16.
Furthermore - and this relates to the point Mr. MacLellan was making earlier - it is only from that point of view that there is in fact federal jurisdiction.
If you were to be drafting a bill that, although it was dressed up in this best interest of the child concept, had as its real thrust the right of the grandparent, then I believe federal jurisdiction would be at an end. I think this is the point Mr. MacLellan was driving at earlier.
If it is truly a grandparent right that you are seeking to enact, then you cannot do so. But from the perspective from which you have addressed it, not only in the United Nations conventions but also in the way in which the courts interpret the federal Divorce Act, this is a right of the child to access.
You have also expressed in the Divorce Act the view that Parliament takes that the court shall give effect to the principle that a child of the marriage should have as much contact with each spouse as is consistent with the best interests, and you now want to include the grandparents.
From that perspective, the right of the child, that it's good for the child in a divorce situation to have this contact with either the spouse or the grandparent, federal jurisdiction accrues. That would be my comment on that.
Secondly, the grandparents don't know about this. They don't know how to react. I really don't want to jump out of my constitutional....
I have, in fact, litigated some of these grandparents cases myself.
I'm not here before you in that capacity, but as I think Mr. Regan pointed out, my very limited experience with this is that, yes, the parents go to war with their parents.
In a couple of cases of which I am aware it was the grandparents' interfering in the parents' marriage that ultimately led to the divorce, and the parents didn't want the grandparents involved in either their or their children's lives.
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So, yes, there is certainly a range of cases where the parents of children in a divorce want to exclude the grandparents and want to prevent them from having any information. This is why I am surprised that the informational aspect has been deleted, or is proposed to be deleted, because this is a problem that I am aware of in the practice of these cases.
Mrs. Jennings: My point, Professor Magnet, was that the grandparents did not -
The Chairman: You're way over time. You're way over the five minutes.
Mrs. Jennings: Perhaps I could take the liberty that others did and finish my question.
The Chairman: I have given the Reform Party liberties of going back and forth, rather than going twice to the government.
Mrs. Jennings: Thank you, Professor Magnet, for your explanations.
The Chairman: Ms Skoke.
Ms. Skoke (Central Nova): I'll be very brief, Mr. Chairman. Further to the line of questioning of Mr. MacLellan, in your capacity as a constitutional expert, what you're telling us is that we cannot, as parliamentarians, confer a statutory right on grandparents pursuant to the Divorce Act. Is that correct?
Prof. Magnet: As the object and purpose of your legislation, you cannot deal with grandparents' rights, but you may confer.... You can call them grandparents' rights - I think this is the jargon of the trade - when what you are in fact doing, through court interpretation and through the structure of the Divorce Act, is facilitating the access of the grandchild to the grandparent, and you're doing that from a child-centred interest. That is within federal jurisdiction.
Ms Skoke: I don't agree with you on that, because if you call it ``grandparents' rights'' it is in fact conferring grandparents rights.
Now, one part of your paper here indicates:
- The limited nature of Parliament's jurisdiction to empower courts to make custody and access
orders may be seen in the case where a petition for divorce fails.
Prof. Magnet: It's predicated upon the bringing of a petition for divorce. Once the petition for divorce is brought, the court can make interim orders and -
Ms Skoke: It can make interim orders. But where in fact the petition for divorce fails, so too does the jurisdiction fail. Is that correct?
Prof. Magnet: That's exactly correct, Ms Skoke.
Ms Skoke: So this is not a child-centred act, the Divorce Act; it is in fact predicated upon a granting of a petition for divorce -
Prof. Magnet: That's correct.
Ms Skoke: - which, in effect, is related to two parties who are married and are now terminating that marriage. Two adult parties, is that correct?
Prof. Magnet: That's correct as far as it goes, as part of that provision. It is, of course, the Divorce Act, but as part of providing for divorce, Parliament has a well-recognized authority to provide for the care of the children of the divorcing parents.
Ms Skoke: Of the divorcing parents, that's correct.
As a constitutional expert, do you see any charter challenges with respect to the competing interests and rights of parents versus grandparents; for instance, the primary right of parents with respect to nurturing and caring for their children? What charter challenges do you foresee that would be raised by the parents, by the mother and the father?
Prof. Magnet: I do not foresee successful charter challenges to that. I have in fact considered that. I would have been quite happy to provide you with some notes on that - I wasn't asked to; I was asked to address the federalism aspect. But I did in fact consider that.
In my view, I don't really see there would be liberty problems, equality problems or free-conscience problems with that, or the other panoply of charter guarantees there. I think the parents have primary responsibility for their children, but not exclusive.
Ms Skoke: You say ``not exclusive''. Who has the responsibility, then? Are you saying that the state has the right to interfere in the rights of parents?
Prof. Magnet: Ultimately the state does, as parens patriae, have an authority to step in for the care and welfare of the children where the emergency switch is thrown. Yes, it does.
Ms Skoke: Can you quote any case-law with respect to that authority? If you don't have it now, can you provide it?
Prof. Magnet: I would be quite happy to provide you with some well-recognized authorities under parens patriae jurisdiction, and I could probably do that if you give me two minutes after the hearing. I would be quite happy to provide you with leading cases on parens patriae jurisdiction.
The one that comes to mine is re Eve, which is a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada dealing with the rights of the court as parens patriae toward a consent to certain medical procedures over parents' objections.
Ms Skoke: Mr. Chairman, could I ask if those cases could be reduced in writing, so that we could have them here with the committee? Would that be too much effort, just the notations, the citations?
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Prof. Magnet: I'd be quite happy to do that and I believe I can do that for you today.
Ms Skoke: Thank you.
Prof. Magnet: Parens patriae jurisdiction is a well-recognized one.
The Chairman: Perhaps you could make those available to the clerk, the citations only.
That concludes this matter today. It's almost 5 p.m. and we have one other short matter to be dealt with by committee.
Thank you very much for appearing here today, Professor Magnet. It's been most enlightening.
Prof. Magnet: Thank you very much.
The Chairman: The one matter we have to deal with here is the report of the subcommittee on agenda and procedure of the standing committee. I believe it's been circulated to you, the 16th report, has it not? It's a matter of adoption of the report, and we can do it quickly, if there's a motion to adopt.
Ms Torsney: I so move.
Motion agreed to
The Chairman: Tomorrow we'll be hearing from the Solicitor General and the senior officials of the RCMP on Bill C-78.
Thank you very much. This meeting stands adjourned.