Questions and responses 41st Parliament, 1st session June 2, 2011, to September 13, 2013

With regard to the current Canadian policy on providing information to foreign agencies and using information from foreign agencies for the combating of terrorism and the protection of public safety: (a) what is the current policy on providing information to foreign agencies when there is a substantial risk this may lead to acts of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; (b) which departments contributed to the formation of the policy referred to in (a); (c) how long has the policy referred to in (a) been in place; (d) which external experts, including academics, representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGO), private sector representatives, were consulted in the formation of the policy referred to in (a); (e) what was the role of the Minister of Public Safety in the formation of the policy referred to in (a); (f) what was the role of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the formation of the policy referred to in (a); (g) which official is ultimately responsible for determining whether “substantial risk” exists, in reference to (a); (h) who is responsible for deciding to which foreign agencies Canada will provide information, and what are the substantive criteria behind such a decision; (i) when deliberating the decision referred to in (h), are the “concluding observations” of United Nations Committee Against Torture reports consulted; (j) what sources are used by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the RCMP or government officials in considering the human rights records of foreign agencies concerning domestic and international activities, including the treatment and interrogation of detainees; (k) what follow-up procedures are used to verify that information transferred from Canada to foreign agencies does not lead to the commission of acts of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; (l) what is the current policy on the use of information obtained by CSIS from foreign agencies when there are suspicions such information was obtained using acts of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; (m) which departments contributed to the formation of the current policy referred to in (l); (n) how long has the policy referred to in (l) been in place; (o) which external experts, including academics, NGO representatives, private sector representatives, were consulted in the formation of the policy referred to in (l); and (p) what was the role of the Minister of Public Safety in the formation of the policy referred to in (l)?

With regard to intelligence-gathering policies and practices, and Canada’s past policy and practice of transferring Afghan detainees to the government of Afghanistan, especially the National Security Directorate (NDS): (a) was interest, by the Afghan authorities in an Afghan individual, one of the Canadian Forces’ (CF) criteria for detaining that person, and, if so, what was meant by “interest in the individual”; (b) did Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) officials, Department of Foreign Affairs and International (DFAIT) officials, or other non-Canadian Forces officials ever take part in, or provide information with respect to, Canadian Forces determinations as to whether the Afghan authorities had an “interest in the individual”; (c) if CF, with or without CSIS or DFAIT assistance, engaged in tactical questioning and collection of evidence related to a detainee, and no useful information was acquired, would such detainee still be subject to transfer to NDS and, if so, for what purposes; (d) did CF ever transfer someone to NDS without CF or CSIS having first engaged in its own questioning and collective of evidence, in order that NDS would be able to engage in the first questioning of the person; (e) when Canada received intelligence from NDS, (i) did it ask or require NDS to indicate whether that intelligence came from interrogation of any Afghans who had been transferred to NDS by Canada, (ii) did its intelligence services operate standard procedures for assessing whether such intelligence received from NDS was, or may have, been secured as a result of mistreatment, notably torture, and, if so, what consequences did such assessment have for use of the provided intelligence; (f) if Canada continues to receive intelligence from NDS, do its intelligence services operate standard procedures for assessing whether such intelligence received from NDS was or may have been secured as a result of mistreatment, notably torture, and, if so, what consequences do such assessments have as concerns the use of the provided intelligence; (g) since 2001, have NDS officials ever visited Canadian government officials in Canada, and, if so, when and with what government departments and departmental units or branches; (h) considering that the Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) operated in Afghanistan, did Canada ever provide CSEC signals intelligence to NDS and, if so, does it continue to do so; and (i) was a review of CSIS’ activities ordered after it was revealed that CSIS officials had taken part in the interrogation of Afghan prisoners, and, if so, (i) who or what entity conducted this review, (ii) what were the results of this review?