Questions and responses 42nd Parliament, 1st session December 3, 2015, to September 11, 2019

With regard to Canada's current fleet of CF-18 Hornets: (a) how many Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) members are currently fully trained and operationally qualified to fly a single seat CF-18 Hornet; (b) how many RCAF members are fully trained to fly a two-seat CF-18 Hornet; (c) how many total flying hours does each CF-18 pilot have; (d) how many RCAF members are currently being trained to fly the CF-18 Hornet; (e) how many CF-18 training simulators are currently operated by the RCAF; (f) how many RCAF members are CF-18 Hornet trainers; (g) what is the attrition rate for CF-18 Hornet pilots for each year from 2014 until 2017, inclusively; (h) what is the retirement rate for CF-18 Hornet pilots for each year from 2014 until 2017, inclusively; (i) what is the pilot production rate for CF-18 Hornet pilots for each year from 2014 until 2017, inclusively; (j) how many RCAF members are part of the CF-18 maintenance crew, and for each one, what is their trade; (k) how many additional pilots are estimated to be required to operate an additional fleet of 18 F-18 Super Hornets; (l) will additional training simulators be required (i) to accommodate for the mechanical and technical differences between the CF-18 Hornet and F-18 Super Hornet, (ii) to accommodate for the need for additional pilots; and (m) how many additional maintenance crew members does the government anticipate would be required support 18 additional Super Hornet aircraft?

With regard to the agreement between Transport Canada and Air Canada on the safety of Air Canada’s entire operations, including its pilot training: (a) what are the details of the agreement; (b) what are the details of the measures taken to date by Air Canada as a result of the agreement; (c) what is Transport Canada’s detailed assessment of the measures taken to date by Air Canada; (d) what did Transport Canada determine was the level of risk of the safety of Air Canada’s entire operations before the agreement was made; (e) what has Transport Canada determined is the level of risk to date, since the agreement was made; (f) what are the issues associated with managing pilot fatigue identified by Transport Canada during its review of Air Canada’s safety management system; (g) how long had Air Canada had its system in place for the safety of its entire operations before reaching the agreement with Transport Canada; (h) what were the reasons for the six-month delay between the first Air Canada incident in July 2017 and when the agreement was reached with Transport Canada, in January 2018; (i) what was the annual failure rate for Pilot Proficiency Checks (PPCs) when Transport Canada inspectors carried out the PPCs for Air Canada pilots between 2005 and 2016; (j) what was the annual failure rate for Pilot Proficiency Checks when industry Approved Check Pilots finished the PPCs for Air Canada pilots between 2005 and 2016; (k) has Transport Canada estimated the savings achieved by Air Canada regarding the safety of its entire operations before the agreement; (l) if the answer to (k) is affirmative, what are the details of the estimate; (m) how many agreements have Transport Canada and Air Canada entered into since 2005 on the safety of its entire operations; (n) what agreements have been made between Transport Canada and other airlines on the safety of their entire operations and all of their pilots; and (o) what are the details of the agreements in (n)?

With regard to the statement by the Minister of Transport in the House of Commons on October 30, 2017, that “We are not getting rid of the function of checking the check pilots of the airlines”: (a) on what evidence or documents is the Minister’s statement based; (b) what are the details of the evidence or documents in (a); (c) has the Minister read the document entitled “Risk Assessment - Oversight of the ACP/AQP Evaluator Programs (Ottawa, ON; 6-10 February 2017) Conventional Tool”; (d) if the answer to (c) is in the affirmative, when did the Minister read this document; (e) did the Minister approve the policy as described in the document in (c); (f) does the Minister intend to overturn the decision made by the Civil Aviation Directorate and National Operations at Transport Canada to delegate responsibility for the evaluation of company check pilots to the airlines as of April 1, 2018; (g) when was the Minister informed that Transport Canada had decided to delegate responsibility for the evaluation of company check pilots to the airlines; (h) did the Minister speak to the Director of National Operations at Transport Canada about this statement; (i) if the answer to (h) is affirmative, what are the details of this conversation; (j) what other member countries of the International Civil Aviation Organization have transferred responsibility for evaluating company check pilots to the airlines; (k) has Transport Canada assessed the internal need for aviation safety inspectors; (l) if the answer to (k) is affirmative, what is the result of the department’s assessment; and (m) what is the impact of this need in terms of inspectors on the new policy adopted by Transport Canada?