Questions and responses 45th Parliament, 1st session May 26, 2025, to present

With regard to the government’s forecasts for use and capacity of the Alto High-Speed Rail project: (a) how many passengers per day does the government forecast will book passage between (i) Ottawa and Montreal, (ii) Ottawa and Quebec City, (iii) Ottawa and Toronto, (iv) Toronto and Montreal, (v) Toronto and Quebec City; (b) what factors did the government consider in calculating the projections in (a); (c) what price range does the government estimate potential passengers will be willing to pay for tickets between (i) Ottawa and Montreal, (ii) Ottawa and Quebec City, (iii) Ottawa and Toronto, (iv) Toronto and Montreal, (v) Toronto and Quebec City; (d) what market research or consultations with potential passengers did the government perform to reach the estimates in (c); (e) for each route in (a) how many trains per day does the government anticipate will be needed to provide enough seats for passengers; and (f) what does the government forecast the cost of the project will be for (i) construction material, (ii) construction labour, (iii) land acquisition, (iv) train acquisition, (v) operations?

With regard to the Alto high-speed rail project between Toronto and Quebec City (formerly known as VIA Rail’s high-frequency rail project): (a) what are the projected start and completion dates for each major project phase, including the (i) design, (ii) environmental assessment, (iii) permitting, (iv) land acquisition, (v) construction; and (b) what are the corresponding critical-path milestones and target completion dates identified by Transport Canada or Alto (formerly VIA HFR–VIA TGF Inc.)?

With regard to Alto staffing levels: (a) what is the current number of employees at Alto, overall and broken down by level; and (b) what is the projected number of employees that will be required at Alto, in total and broken down by level, for each year between 2027 and when the high speed railway becomes operational?

With regard to the high-speed rail project led by Alto between Quebec City and Toronto: (a) has VIA HFR - VIA TGF Inc. produced a comprehensive business plan for Alto’s high-speed rail project; (b) what assumptions were used to establish the project’s estimated cost of between $60 billion and $90 billion; (c) what financial models, profitability scenarios and sensitivity analyses were prepared by or for Alto; (d) what are the costs, broken down by category, including but not limited to (i) land acquisition, (ii) infrastructure construction, (iii) rolling stock, (iv) projected operating and maintenance costs, (v) contingencies; (e) what revenue projections were used (ridership, pricing, anticipated subsidies); (f) what comparative analyses with similar international projects were conducted to justify the cost estimates; (g) has the government obtained independent advice or external reviews of Alto’s business plan, and, if so, what were the results; (h) what portion of the funding is expected to come from public funds versus private partners; (i) what are the main financial risks identified and the mechanisms in place to mitigate them; and (j) what are the details of all documents, memorandums, presentations or internal analyses related to the project’s cost estimates?

With regard to the Alto Crown corporation: (a) how much funding has Alto received from the government since its creation; (b) what is the yearly operating budget of Alto, overall and broken down by type of expenditure; (c) what is Alto's organizational structure; (d) how many employees does Alto have, in total and broken down by position; and (e) what are the details of all contracts over $10,000 signed by Alto to date, including, for each, the (i) date, (ii) amount, (iii) vendor, (iv) list of goods or services provided, (v) start and end dates, if applicable?

With regard to the Alto high-speed rail project between Toronto and Quebec City (formerly known as VIA Rail’s high-frequency rail project): (a) what is the incremental cost difference between the previous high-frequency rail concept and the current high-speed rail scope, as referenced in Alto's (formerly VIA HFR–VIA TGF Inc.) document “Fast Forward: Shaping Canada’s Future with a High-Speed Rail Network” (March 2025), broken down by (i) capital civil works, (ii) rolling stock, (iii) electrification and power supply, (iv) property acquisition and land assembly, (v) environmental assessment and permitting, (vi) Indigenous consultation and accommodation, (vii) project management and owner’s costs, (viii) risk or contingency allowances; and (b) what are the corresponding total figures and confidence levels associated with each category in (a)?

With regard to government funding to develop and build the Alto high-speed rail network: (a) what is the total federal funding commitment for the projects; (b) what are the details of all funding agreements signed to date related to Alto, including, for each, the (i) date of commitment, (ii) start date of the funding, (iii) end date of the funding, (iv) amount, (v) recipient, (vi) purpose of the funding, (vii) type of funding; (c) for each agreement in (b), how much funding (i) has been delivered to date, (ii) will be provided at a later date; (d) for each agreement, what are the details, including the amounts, of any financial cancellation penalties or liabilities included as part of the terms of the agreement; and (e) other than the penalties and liabilities in (d), are there any other costs that the government has agreed or committed to pay in the event that the project does not proceed, and, if so, what are the details, including the amounts and recipients of such payments?

With regard to Alto (VIA HFR - VIA TGF Inc.) and passenger rail in Canada: (a) on what basis, studies, and facts was the change made from pursuing high-frequency rail to pursuing high-speed rail; (b) why has the government not pursued legislated passenger rail priority, in general or for VIA Rail specifically, on privately-owned rail infrastructure in Canada along established passenger rail routes; (c) what funding has been provided, broken down by year since 1990, for infrastructure improvements along established VIA Rail passenger rail routes; (d) by what instrument or instruments is the public release of records relating to the 2023 Request for Qualifications restrained; (e) by what instrument or instruments is the public release of intellectual property that is owned by the Government of Canada relating to the 2023 Request for Qualifications restrained; (f) with respect to the 2023 Request for Qualifications, what are the details of the independent corridor alignments, Class 5 cost estimates, ridership forecasts and revenue models, operating cost models, financial structures, financial models, construction schedules, and risk and opportunity registers submitted by each of the three shortlisted consortia; (g) what are the upper and lower capital cost estimates submitted by each of the three shortlisted consortia included in the 2023 Request for Qualifications; (h) what were the conclusions of the analyses conducted before 2023 on the financial viability of high-speed rail proposals for Canada; (i) what are the current estimates of the capital cost, net present value, benefit-cost ratio, and 30-year government subsidy requirement for Alto; (j) what are the most recent estimates of the capital cost, net present value, benefit-cost ratio, and 30-year government subsidy requirement for the high-frequency rail predecessor to Alto; (k) what is the government’s estimate of the risk levels of the Alto project exceeding $90 billion in capital costs and by what amounts; (l) on what basis does the government believe Alto’s annual ridership projections are credible; (m) what are the methodology, sensitivity ranges, and baseline assumptions used for Alto’s annual ridership projections; (n) has Alto or the government commissioned a comparative freezing rain, snow, or ice risk assessment for the proposed Alro routes and, if so, what are the details and conclusions; (o) what is Alto's planned service reliability target under freezing rain conditions; (p) has Alto commissioned a full comparative winter weather cost analysis; (q) what public benchmarking mechanism will exist to detect cost escalation in the co-development phase before it becomes irreversible; and (r) what are the time and cost savings projected for the expedited Expropriation process in Bill C-15 versus standard Expropriation Act procedures?

With regard to the advertising campaigns of the Crown corporation VIA HFR - VIA TGF Inc., commonly known as Alto, to promote its high-speed rail project along the Quebec City–Windsor corridor, as well as the consultations associated with the implementation of this project: (a) from 2022 to April 15, 2026, what was the amount spent by Alto, including on social media, broken down by (i) campaign, (ii) date of dissemination, (iii) province, (iv) medium, (v) any other form of geographic segmentation; and (b) over the same period, what proportion of the total amount spent went toward promoting the rail project itself and toward informing the public about the consultation process in their region, broken down by (i) campaign, (ii) date of dissemination, (iii) province, (iv) medium, (v) any other form of geographic segmentation?

With regard to Alto, High Frequency Rail, and VIA HFR - VIA TGF Inc.: (a) will the fairness monitor's full report on the procurement be released in its entirety, and, if so, when, and if not, under what provision of the Access to Information Act is the full report being withheld; (b) what was the total value of the contract or task authorization under which the fairness monitor was engaged, including any amendments; (c) did the fairness monitor's mandate or review include any assessment of whether SYSTRA Canada was eligible to participate as a member of the Cadence consortium in the procurement; (d) did the fairness monitor's mandate or review include any assessment of whether WSP Canada was eligible to participate as a member of the QConnexiON Rail Partners consortium in the procurement; (e) has any fairness monitor been engaged to observe the Co-Development Phase between Alto and Cadence, and, if so, who, under what solicitation, and at what cost; (f) did the fairness monitor assess or report on concerns raised by Transport Action Canada regarding the presence and date of addition of Air Canada in the Cadence consortium; (g) did the fairness monitor assess or report on concerns raised by Transport Action Canada regarding access to commercially sensitive VIA Rail information; (h) does the fairness monitor's mandate extend to assessing whether the design of the procurement, as distinct from the conduct of the procurement as designed, permitted firms that authored the project's foundational studies to subsequently bid on it; (i) on what date was the financial and technical peer review engagement on VIA Rail’s proposed High-Frequency Rail business case, or any project designated Project Arrow, initiated and on what date was the final deliverable received by the Canada Development Investment Corporation; (j) were the findings of the financial and technical peer review on VIA Rail’s proposed High-Frequency Rail business case, or any project designated Project Arrow, shared with Transport Canada, Finance Canada, or the Privy Council Office, and, if so, on what dates; (k) does a complete and final report or deliverable, conducted by WSP Canada exist for Project Arrow. and. if so, to what organizations was it delivered, when was it delivered, and when and in what format and in what location was it publicly released; (l) if a complete and final report or deliverable, conducted by WSP Canada, for Project Arrow does not exist, or was not publicly released, what are the reasons for that being the case; (m) on what basis are the numbered ridership findings, contained in documents relating to Project Arrow released by Transport Canada in May 2023 under ATI file A-2016-00827, withheld under sections 18(1)(e) and 20(1)(b) of the Access to Information Act; (n) during the financial and technical peer review on VIA Rail’s proposed High-Frequency Rail business case, or any project designated Project Arrow, conducted by WSP Canada, were any restraints on VIA Rail’s ability to share information with WSP Canada disclosed to the Privy Council Office or Finance Canada; (o) did the restraints on VIA Rail’s ability to share information with WSP Canada during the financial and technical peer review on VIA Rail’s proposed High-Frequency Rail business case, or any project designated Project Arrow, affect the government’s assessment of the reliability of VIA Rail’s capital cost estimates; and (p) during the 2023 Request for Qualifications process, did Public Services and Procurement Canada, or any other federal institution, apply a conflict-of-interest screening assessment to WSP Canada with respect to its prior role in related peer review processes, and, if so, what was its outcome and where is it documented, and, if not, on what basis did the government determine that WSP Canada’s participation as a commercial bidder in the procurement did not constitute a conflict of interest?

With regard to the government's high-speed rail project: (a) what are the details of all contracts with a value over $100,000 signed by the government, VIA Rail or Alto in relation to the project including, for each, the (i) date, (ii) vendor, (iii) value, (iv) duration, (v) description of the goods or services, (vi) manner in which the contract was awarded (sole-sourced or competitive bid); (b) which of the contracts in (a) include clauses related to financial liability or cancellation penalties should the government choose not to proceed with the high-speed rail project, and what are the details, including the vendors and amounts associated with those clauses; and (c) what are the details of any financial liabilities, required payments or cancellation penalties the current government has agreed to pay should the high-speed rail project not proceed or come to fruition?

With regard to the Alto high-speed rail project between Toronto and Quebec City: (a) has the government conducted a financial analysis of the program, and, if so, what were the key findings, including the projected costs, benefits, and any identified risks; (b) if no such analysis has been conducted, what is the rationale for proceeding without one, and are there plans to undertake such an analysis in the future; and (c) what data sources and methodologies were, or would be, used in any financial analysis related to Alto?

With regard to the government's relationship with Alto, the Crown corporation responsible for developing and implementing the High-Speed Rail Initiative between Toronto and Quebec City: (a) what is the total amount paid by the government to Alto in consulting fees since its creation in 2022; (b) what are the amounts of these consulting fees, broken down by (i) fiscal year, (ii) department or agency issuing the payment, (iii) purpose or description of the work, (iv) vendor or subcontractor, where applicable; (c) what internal controls or oversight mechanisms are in place to monitor and approve consulting expenditures by Alto, including any requirements for reporting to Transport Canada or the Minister of Transport; (d) what audits, evaluations or reviews have been conducted regarding Alto's use of consulting services, including the dates, findings and recommendations of each review; and (e) what steps, if any, has the government taken to ensure value for money and prevent excessive reliance on external consultants, to ensure appropriate controls over spending on professional services?

With regard to the Alto high-speed rail project between Toronto and Quebec City (formerly known as VIA Rail’s high-frequency rail project), and the Pre-Development Agreement between Alto (formerly VIA HFR–VIA TGF Inc.) and Projet Cadence Rail s.e.c.: what is the total amount in dollars paid to date and what is the total amount in dollars committed to be paid under the agreement, broken down by (i) fiscal year, (ii) funding source or departmental vote, (iii) deliverable category or milestone (preliminary design, engineering studies, consultation activities, permitting work, or management services)?

With regard to Alto, High Frequency Rail, and VIA HFR - VIA TGF Inc.: (a) has the government commissioned a replacement business case for the 300 km/h Alto specification to supersede the December 10, 2021 Joint Project Office Business Case Update; (b) if a replacement business case has been commissioned or completed, on what date was it completed, which firm or institution produced it, what is its Net Present Value and Benefit-Cost Ratio for the 300 km/h specification, and when will it be published; (c) if a replacement business case has not been completed, what is the analytical basis for the $60–$90 billion cost range and the $35 billion annual gross domestic product return figure cited in supporting materials at the February 19, 2025 announcement; (d) does the government agree that the December 2021 Business Case is outdated and largely, if not entirely, no longer applicable; (e) what is the current internal cost estimate held by Transport Canada for the full Alto project, classified by cost estimation class as defined in Alto's Amended Corporate Plan 2024-25 to 2028-29; (f) what is the current internal cost estimate held by Alto Inc. for the full Alto project, classified by cost estimation class as defined in Alto's Amended Corporate Plan 2024-25 to 2028-29; (g) to what extent do the provisions of the High-Speed Rail Network Act referring to land, interest, right, or immovable real right refer to (i) the operational right-of-way, (ii) development land for station hubs beyond the operational footprint, (iii) land for storage, maintenance, repair, or emergency capabilities or facilities, (iv) land for electrical infrastructure, (v) land for any other purpose relating to the high-speed rail network; (h) what, if any, limitations exist on the ability of Alto or a minister of the Crown to designate land, interest, right, or immovable real right for the purposes of (g)(i) to (g)(v); (i) does the phrase "lands needed for the project," including for the purposes of the expropriation powers in the High-Speed Rail Network Act, refer only to the operational right-of-way, or does it also include development land for station hubs beyond the operational footprint; (j) to the extent that any element of the responses to (g) or (i) refer to development land for station hubs, (i) what is the geographic extent of the land contemplated for acquisition around each proposed station, (ii) on what basis is that land deemed "needed for the project"; (k) is land value capture, in any of its fiscal, regulatory, or land-assembly forms, contemplated as a financing mechanism or revenue source for the Alto project; (l) is transit-oriented development, in any of its fiscal, regulatory, or land-assembly forms, contemplated as a financing mechanism or revenue source for the Alto project; (m) if land value capture or transit-oriented development is contemplated as a financing mechanism or revenue source for the Alto project, which mechanisms are under consideration, including but not limited to fiscal and regulatory tools such as levies, development charges, density bonuses, or tax increment financing, or land assembly in which the government acquires a development portfolio around a station for subsequent sale, lease, or joint development; (n) what is the projected revenue from any contemplated land value capture, transit-oriented development, or station-area development, over what period, and to what extent does this projection form part of the Net Present Value or Benefit-Cost Ratio in any government financial analysis of the project; (o) has any station-area land acquisition and development strategy been implemented or carried forward into the Co-Development Phase with Cadence Rail, and, if so, in what form and to what extent; (p) why has the government's public communication on Alto land acquisition referred to the operational right-of-way of approximately 60 metres; (q) when, how, and to what extent has Alto or Transport Canada publicly communicated on station-area land acquisition or procured land value capture or transit-oriented development advisory services and, if no such public communications have occurred, for what reason; (r) was the Joint Project Office Technical Lead responsible for technical validation of the capital cost estimates in the December 2021 Business Case able to provide professional support for the CAPEX position as submitted, and, if not, was that qualification or dissent recorded in any document provided to Transport Canada, Finance Canada, the Canada Infrastructure Bank, Infrastructure Canada, or any minister; (s) was the Business Case Update submitted to the Joint Leaders Committee and subsequently to ministers accompanied by any disclosure that the capital cost estimates had not received field validation, including borehole drilling, topographic surveys, or geotechnical site investigations, due to COVID-19 restrictions, and, if so, in what document and on what date was that disclosure made; (t) on August 3, 2021, did the Canada Infrastructure Bank forward to Finance Canada and Infrastructure Canada an internal Joint Project Office email dated August 1, 2021, disclosing $883 million in new capital cost increases and a negative Net Present Value that had not yet been presented to the Joint Leaders Committee, through an informal channel, and, if so, was that email or its content approved for release by the Joint Leaders Committee before it was sent; (u) what authorization, if any, existed for the transmission of the email referred to in (t) to Finance Canada and Infrastructure Canada; (v) what steps, if any, did Finance Canada take upon receipt of the email referred to in (t) to ensure it did not affect its position at any briefings that occurred on August 3, 2021; (w) was the existence of the email referred to in (t) disclosed to the Joint Leaders Committee or to any minister, and, if so, when, how, to whom, by whom, and at whose direction; (x) what were the two specific sources of the $883 million in capital cost increases disclosed in the email referred to in (t); (y) how and to what extent did the email referred to in (t) refer to (i) costs arising from host railway requirements, including CN Rail capacity study findings for the Montréal approach, previously excluded from the base estimate, (ii) costs arising from a forced alignment change at Toronto resulting from Metrolinx’s rejection of the Don Branch corridor access in favour of the Uxbridge Subdivision, with the Toronto station moving from Eglinton to Kennedy; (z) were either of the two specific sources of the $883 million in capital cost increases disclosed in the email referred to in (t) and their amounts disclosed in the December 2021 Business Case as submitted; (aa) is the Business Case, as submitted in December 2021, supported by field-validated cost estimates, and, if so, to what extent and from what sources; and (ab) did the internal technical reviewer responsible for validation express reservations or concerns about the CAPEX position, and, if so, how and to what extent and for what reasons?

With regard to the impact of the government's proposed Alto high-speed rail system on agriculture: (a) how many farms are estimated to be impacted by the route of the high-speed rail system, in total and broken down by type of farm (crop, livestock, etc.); (b) what is the estimated number of acres of (i) total agricultural land, (ii) prime farmland, which will be taken out of production; (c) what is the projected impact of those acres being taken out of production, on (i) business risk management programs, (ii) local food security; (d) how many of the farms impacted have loans out with Farm Credit Canada; (e) what is the government's estimate on the number of farms which will experience a reduction in available land for crop growth, as a result of having the rail-system go through their property, and how many of those farms are projected to be required to shut down or go out of business as a result of the Alto project; (f) what infrastructure, such as underpasses and overpasses will be in place to allow farmers whose land is dissected by the rail line to reach the other side of their property and how often (for example every 10 kilometers) will such infrastructure be installed on dissected farmland; and (g) what is the projected cost associated with the infrastructure in (f)?

With regard to the government's Alto high-speed rail project: was a Treasury Board Submission for the project filed before the Request for Proposal was issued for the Alto project, and, if so, what was the Treasury Board's submission number and the date of the approval?

With regard to the Department of Finance's briefing note 2026-FSP-000184 titled "Alto (Via HFR) – 2026-27 Borrowing Authorities": (a) which ministers and exempt staff members received the briefing note, and on what days did each receive the note; and (b) what measures, if any, were in place to ensure that the Minister of Finance was not put in a personal conflict of interest by knowing the contents of the briefing note?