Questions and responses 44th Parliament, 1st session November 22, 2021, to January 6, 2025

With regard to Canada’s military trade with Israel: (a) is Global Affairs Canada (GAC) aware of any evidence of use of Canadian military goods or technology, including components, by Israel in the current war; (b) has GAC conducted an internal review of previously authorized arms export and brokering permits to Israel since October 7, 2023, and, if so, (i) what branch or sector organized, (ii) what was the outcome of, the review, and if not, why not; (c) has GAC reviewed any applications for arms export and brokering permits to Israel since October 7, 2023; (d) has GAC issued any arms export permits to Israel since October 7, 2023; (e) has GAC reviewed its assessment on export permits to Israel in light of the humanitarian crisis in Gaza and the situation in the West Bank; (f) has GAC identified any serious violations of international humanitarian law or international human rights law since October 7, 2023; (g) in GAC’s analysis, do the deaths of over 6,500 children and 4,000 women amount to serious violence against women and children; (h) has GAC reviewed its risk assessment of small arms exports to Israel given reports that the Israeli government has been arming extremist settlers in the West Bank, and given reports of Israeli soldiers participating alongside settlers in violent acts against Palestinians in the occupied West Bank; (i) how does GAC define “serious” when assessing risk of (i) a serious violation of international humanitarian law and international human rights law, (ii) serious acts of violence against women and children, under section 7 of the EIPA; (j) has GAC sought to mitigate the risk that Canadian arms exports to Israel could be used in serious violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and, if so, what were those mitigation measures; (k) have Canadian officials ever denied an arms export or brokering permit for the transfer of military goods to Israel, and if so, when and under what circumstances; (l) what assessments has GAC conducted with regard to Canada’s obligations under the Arms Trade Treaty and violence in Israel and Palestine since October 7, 2023; (m) since 2015, have GAC officials conducted a review to determine the risk associated with Canada’s arms exports to Israel, and if they have been used in serious violations of international humanitarian law or international human rights law in the occupied Palestinian territories (OPT), and, if so, what were the findings of this or these reviews; (n) are Israeli companies vetted for connection to serious violations of international humanitarian or human rights law in their bids for government contracts; (o) does Canada currently procure military goods or technology that is “battle-tested” in the OPT; (p) has Canada conducted an assessment of Elbit Systems for risk of complicity in breaches of international law in the occupied Palestinian territories; (q) given Israel’s arms trade relationship with Azerbaijan and their involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, has GAC, since 2021, reviewed arms trade export and brokering permits given Israel’s arms trade relationship with Azerbaijan and their involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict; and (r) if the answer to (q) is affirmative, what branch or section handled the review, and what was the difference in risk evaluations between the export permits for Türkiye and export permits issued for Israel?

With regard to the government’s expedited assessment process for arms exports: why is Ukraine not considered eligible for the same expedited assessment processes for arms exports that is used for other allies?

With regard to the letter sent to the Minister of Health by the office of the Member from Chatham-Kent—Leamington in December 2023, and the minister's mandate letter of July 2023: (a) why were representatives from Health Canada (HC) and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) not made available to attend the CFIA Food Security Roundtable in Chatham-Kent, Ontario on March 24, 2024; and (b) what are the current best practices for industry and various levels of government, including HC, in the event of a pathogenic or contamination crisis, when importing and exporting Canadian greenhouse and mushroom products to and from the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement and the European Union?

With regard to the performance indicators in Prairies Economic Development Canada’s 2024-25 departmental plan: (a) how much fuel does the government project will be consumed by exports of $360 million reaching foreign markets from the prairie provinces between April 1, 2024 and March 31, 2025; and (b) what does the government project to be the dollar value collected on the fuel in (a) under the price on pollution in provinces subject to the federal backstop?

With regard to the Federal Ministerial Coordinating Committee on PEI Potatoes: (a) what is the exact mandate of the committee; (b) what specific goals or assignments have been issued to each minister on the committee, broken down by minister; (c) what is the time period provided related to each goal or assignment in (b); and (d) what are the (i) dates, (ii) locations, (iii) ministers in attendance, for each meeting of the committee which occurred to date?

With regard to lethal and non-lethal military export control permits currently awaiting a governor-in-council decision: what are details of each item, including the (i) vendor, (ii) item description, (iii) dollar value of the export, (iv) date on which the control permit was referred to the governor-in-council for a decision, (v) country for which the item is destined?

With regard to Global Affairs Canada, since 2015: (a) what is the total amount of funds dispersed through the CanExport SMEs program, broken down by fiscal year; and (b) what are the details of all recipients of funding for each fiscal year of funding in (a), including (i) the name, (ii) the province of operation, (iii) the sector, (iv) the funding requested, (v) the funding granted, (vi) the intended non-travel activity indicated in the application, (vii) whether the recipient successfully exported their product?

With regard to Environment and Climate Change Canada providing fines to companies that illegally shipped or transported waste overseas, since January 1, 2016, and broken down by year: (a) how many fines or other financial penalties were issued; and (b) what are the details of each fine or financial penalty, including for each the (i) date of the incident, (ii) date of the fine, (iii) amount of the fine, (iv) name of the company, (v) summary of the infraction, (vi) description of the illegally shipped waste, including volume?

With regard to the export of Canada’s plastic waste under the Basel Convention: (a) what measures are in place to ensure that plastic waste exported without a permit is clean, sorted, and intended for recycling; (b) how many times since January 1, 2021, has the government imposed punitive measures on companies for failing to comply with these requirements; (c) does the government monitor the final country of destination for plastic waste exported to the United States, and, if so, what specific processes are in place to accomplish this; (d) does the government track the exported plastic waste that is (i) covered under export permits, (ii) exempted from the permit process, to determine if this waste is recycled or disposed of safely, and, if so, what specific processes are in place to accomplish this; (e) since November 4, 2015, has the government conducted research to evaluate the potential impact that banning the export of plastic waste would have on stimulating investments in a national circular economy, and, if so, what are the details of this research, including (i) who conducted it, (ii) its methodology, (iii) its findings; and (f) what are the details of each punitive measure in (b), including, for each, the (i) date, (ii) name of the company, (iii) type of punitive measure, including the amount fined, (iv) incident summary?

With regard to the prime minister's claim that there has never been a strong business case to export liquefied natural gas from Canada to Europe: on what specific evidence or analysis, if any, did the prime minister base such claim?

With regard to the commitment in the December 16, 2021, mandate letter for the Minister of Environment and Climate Change to ban thermal coal exports from and through Canada as swiftly as possible, and no later than 2030: (a) what steps has the government taken to advance this commitment, including details and dates of consultations with (i) provinces and territories, (ii) stakeholders and the public; (b) for the years 2015 to 2022, broken down by year, how many tonnes of thermal coal have been exported (i) from, (ii) through, Canada; (c) for the years 2023 to 2030, broken down by year, how many tonnes of thermal coal are projected to be exported (i) from, (ii) through, Canada; and (d) what are the associated greenhouse gas emissions for the thermal coal exports identified in (b) and (c)?

With regard to the sales and transfers of military equipment and weapons from Canada to Israel and in light of the International Court of Justice determination that Israel is carrying out a plausible genocide in Gaza and has issued several orders to Israel: (a) what military equipment and weapons has the government of Canada sent or approved to be sent to Israel since October 7, 2023; (b) what military equipment and weapons has the government of Canada sent or approved to be sent to Israel since January 26, 2024; (c) what military equipment and weapons has the government of Canada rejected sending to Israel since October 7, 2023; (d) what military equipment and weapons has the government of Canada rejected sending to Israel since January 26, 2024; (e) what surveillance equipment has the government of Canada sent or approved to be sent to Israel since October 7, 2023; (f) what surveillance equipment has the government of Canada sent or approved to be sent to Israel since January 26, 2024; (g) what surveillance equipment has the government of Canada rejected sending to Israel since October 7, 2023; (h) what surveillance equipment has the government of Canada rejected sending to Israel since January 26, 2024; (i) what is the monetary value of the military equipment and weapons the government of Canada has sent to Israel since October 7, 2023; (j) what is the monetary value of the surveillance equipment the government of Canada has sent to Israel since October 7, 2023; (k) what is the monetary value of the surveillance equipment, military equipment and weapons the government of Canada sent to Israel in 2021, 2022, and 2023; (l) what surveillance equipment, military equipment and weapons the government of Canada sent to Israel in 2021, 2022, and 2023; (m) as a signatory to the Genocide Convention, has the government of Canada taken legal advice to comply with the orders that the International Court of Justice has issued to Israel and to ensure the government of Canada does not contravene them; and (n) what plan, if any, does the Government of Canada have to comply with the orders of the International Court of Justice?

With regard to end-of-life marine vessel decommissioning and recycling, colloquially known as Shipbreaking, since January 1, 2016, broken down by year: (a) how many oversea tows of retired laker or coastal ships did Transport Canada approve; (b) how many of the oversea tows of retired lakers or costal ships that Transport Canada approved changed their final destination once in international waters; and (c) how many retired laker or costal ships were recycled in Canada?

With regard to the export of military equipment and technology and the repression of widespread protests following the arrest and replacement of former president Pedro Castillo: (a) since December 2022, have officials from the Export Controls Division of Global Affairs Canada (GAC) undertaken an independent review to determine whether Peruvian authorities used any Canadian military equipment, including light armoured vehicles, crowd-control equipment and “less-lethal” equipment, in the crackdowns, and, if so, what were the findings of this review; (b) have Canadian authorities contacted their Peruvian counterparts to determine whether military equipment made in Canada was used in the violence, and, if so, what were their findings; (c) was authorization granted for the export of Canadian military equipment to end users involved in the violence; (d) have Canadian officials put the authorization of arms exports to Peru on hold; (e) has the government investigated what Canadian-sourced arms were used for in Peru prior to December 2022; (f) what are the details of the types of military equipment that have been authorized for export to Peruvian authorities since 2014, building on the information previously provided by GAC; and (g) what criteria, protocols or other considerations were taken into account in 2020 when the minister at that time decided to suspend arms exports to Belarus?