Questions and responses 41st Parliament, 2nd session October 16, 2013, to August 2, 2015

With regard to the Standards Council of Canada (SCC): (a) does the SCC consider the Canadian Standards Association (CSA) a commercial entity or a regulatory entity; (b) does the SCC believe that CSA owns any portion of Canadian law; (c) does the SCC believe that the CSA is afforded an exemption, or exemptions, to Canadian law; (d) does the SCC believe that the CSA has the right to restrict public access to Canadian law; (e) what is the average annual value transferred from CSA to provincial governments in payment for those contributions; (f) what percentage of CSA members’ payments for Canadian Electrical Code (CEC) influence are diverted to non-CEC activities; (g) does the SCC believe that the CSA practice of trading influence over, or control of, legislative processes in exchange for money or other value consideration is a violation of law; (h) does the SCC believe that the CSA practice of leveraging regulatory authority for commercial advantage is an abuse of regulatory authority; (i) what is the increase in annual revenue experienced by CSA, expressed both in percent and in Canadian dollars, resulting from this decision to tighten the Code development cycle by 25 percent; (j) what is the average annual value of royalty payments made to CSA by each of the government of British Columbia and the government of Ontario in exchange for the right to print the statutes that CSA claims to own and that these jurisdictions have passed into law; (k) does CSA provide access to Canadian law at different costs to different customers according to the values that these customers have at various times paid to CSA; (l) does the SCC assure Parliament that CSA does not leverage any value in any form, including contributions of content and labour, from activities related to the CEC for any of its commercial developments including the CSA Handbook; and (m) does the SCC believe that articles and documentation that are developed as part of a legislative process and that are to constitute part of law in any jurisdiction of Canada may not be concealed from the public for purposes of commercial advantage or financial gain, nor may they be leveraged preferentially, by time or by access or by other advantage, by any entity for purposes external to the legislated passage of those articles or documentation?

With regard to the Nuclear Liability and Compensation Act enacted as part of Bill C-22, with particular reference to the government's decision to increase the absolute liability amount and mandatory insurance coverage for nuclear operators to $1 billion: (a) has the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) asked Ontario Power Generation whether removing the cap on operator liability, while maintaining the level of absolute liability and mandatory insurance coverage required under the Act at $1 billion, would increase its generation costs and, if so, what were the details of the response, including the estimated increased cost-per-kWh; (b) has the DNR asked Bruce Power whether removing the cap on operator liability, while maintaining the level of absolute liability and mandatory insurance coverage required under the Act at $1 billion, would increase its generation costs and, if so, what were the details of the response, including the estimated increased cost-per-kWh; (c) has the DNR asked New Brunswick Power whether removing the cap on operator liability, while maintaining the level of absolute liability and mandatory insurance coverage, would increase its generation costs and, if so, what were the details of the response, including the estimated increased cost-per-kWh; (d) in the scenario in which the limit on reactor liability is removed while the mandatory insurance coverage and absolute liability of the operator remain at $1 billion, what is the DNR's estimate of the impacts that removing the cap on liability would have on provincial electricity rates, (i) what additional impacts would there be if the mandatory insurance coverage and absolute liability of the operator were increased to $1.5 billion, all other things being equal, (ii) what would the additional impacts be if the mandatory insurance coverage and absolute liability of the operator were increased to $2 billion, all other things being equal; (e) does the government determine the amount of liability required of nuclear operators by estimating whether it will be within the capacity of insurers to provide insurance at reasonable costs and, if so, (i) did the government use the same criterion for determining the absolute liability and insurance requirement for offshore operators, (ii) how does the government define "reasonable costs" for insurance, (iii) what is the limit in cost-per-kWh for what the DNR considers "reasonable costs" for insurance, (iv) did the government use the same definition of "reasonable costs" for insurance for the nuclear and oil industries; (f) what are the insurance costs-per-kWh for the $1 billion in insurance that is currently required for nuclear operators under Bill C-22, (i) what would these insurance costs-per-kWh be for the insurance requirement of $1.5 billion, (ii) what would these insurance costs be for the insurance requirement of $2 billion; (g) does the DNR determine the amount of liability required of nuclear operators by estimating its commensurability with the consequences of controlled releases of radiation and, if so, (i) what studies has the DNR undertaken regarding the consequences of accidents involving controlled releases of radiation, (ii) what is the estimated likelihood of such accidents, (iii) how has the DNR determined that the current amount of liability for nuclear operators under Bill C-22 is commensurate with the risk of such accidents; and (h) has the DNR commissioned any studies to estimate the implicit subsidy per kWh that would be created by imposing a cap on liability since the time it commissioned an empirical analysis of the Nuclear Liability Act (Heyes, Anthony, and Catherine Heyes. 2000. An Empirical Analysis of the Nuclear Liability Act (1970) in Canada. Resource & Energy Economics 22 (1):91-101) and, if so, what were the results of any such study?

With regard to housing provided by the Canadian Forces Housing Agency (CFHA): (a) for each location where housing is provided, how many units were assessed by the CFHA to be in (i) good condition, (ii) fair condition, (iii) poor condition; (b) for each location where housing is provided, (i) was there a wait list for housing, (ii) how long was the wait list, (iii) what types of housing were waitlisted, (iv) what was the average age of the housing units in the CFHA's portfolio; (c) for each location where housing is provided, how many complaints were made regarding housing quality and what were the issues raised; (d) how many housing units have warning labels or seals because of the potential presence of asbestos in vermiculite insulation; (e) how many units have warning labels for ungrounded electrical outlets; and (f) how many units have water lines that must be kept running from November to April to prevent freezing?