Questions and responses 42nd Parliament, 1st session December 3, 2015, to September 11, 2019

With regard to civil aviation enforcement actions by Transport Canada: (a) how many operators currently do not have the confidence of Transport Canada, and specifically the confidence of Prairie and Northern Region (PNR) Civil Aviation and are considered to not be operating safely; and (b) what specific actions have been taken by Transport Canada or PNR to address the assessment on the final page of the Minister’s transition binder that “minimal compliance with regulations has proven to be insufficient to deem these operators safe”?

With regard to the strategy to deal with abandoned and derelict vessels by Transport Canada: (a) how many abandoned and derelict vessels are there in Canada; (b) for each of the vessels identified in (a), (i) what are their locations, (ii) how long have they been considered abandoned and derelict, (iii) what are the removal plans for each vessel, (iv) in which state of removal are each of the vessels, including but not limited to, assessing, removing, or disposing, (v) what are the cost estimates for removal, (vi) what are the assessments on options available for carrying out the physical removal of the vessels, (vii) have the owners been identified, (viii) what has prevented the government from identifying the vessel owners, if anything, (ix) are they registered or licensed, and have the registrations or licenses been cancelled or suspended at any point, (x) are they a threat to navigation or to the marine environment; (c) how many abandoned and derelict vessels in Canada are 300 Gross Tons and over; (d) what would be the total estimated cost for the removal of all vessels in the derelict vessel inventory; (e) how many marine casualties have involved vessels that became shipwrecks in Canada’s internal waters and territorial sea, broken down by year for each of the past ten years; (f) how many accidents and maritime casualties are caused by abandoned and derelict vessels, broken down by year for each of the past ten years; (g) what are the risk factors that could lead to a vessel becoming a shipwreck and how is Transport Canada preventing those risk factors; (h) how many “responds to incidents” did the Canadian Coast Guard complete on abandoned and derelict vessels, broken down by year for each of the past ten years, and for each of these incidents please indicate (i) the date, time, and location of the incident, (ii) a description of the incident, (iii) the names of the vessels involved, (iv) the actions that were taken, if any, with regard to the abandoned vessel, (v) the current status of the abandoned vessel, boat or wreck and whether or not the abandoned boat, wreck, or vessel were decommissioned or disposed of, (vi) the plans to decommission or dispose of the vessel, if any exist; (i) what are the reasons for which vessels in Canadian waters would either be unregistered or unlicensed, or for which the registration or license has been cancelled or suspended; (j) for the vessels identified in (a), how many of these vessels then continue to float at anchor or tied to a dock; (k) how many lawsuits have involved the owner of the vessel and have had the aim of recovering the money to cover the cost of removal for abandoned and derelict vessels; (l) what has the government’s strategy been to date and what are the next steps for dealing with abandoned and derelict vessels, including (i) objectives, (ii) government departments and agencies involved in the strategy, (iii) other stakeholders; (m) what consultations has the government conducted and what are the next steps for future consultations with regard to abandoned and derelict vessels, broken down by (i) date and time, (ii) federal government participants, (iii) other participants, (iv) goal of the consultations, (v) method of inviting participants, (vi) length of time given for participation in the consultations; (n) has the government consulted with (i) municipalities, (ii) provinces and territories, (iii) First Nations, Inuit and Métis communities, (iv) representatives of Canadian ship owners, (v) maritime lawyers, vi) marine underwriters, (vii) shoreline property owners, (viii) the shellfish industry, (ix) the fishing industry, (x) the lobster industry, (xi) the tourism industry, (xii) First Nations and Indigenous People, (xiii) the Canadian Maritime Advisory; (o) if the answer to (n) is in the affirmative, what are the names of each person consulted; (p) has Transport Canada held any conversations with the Coast Guard regarding the possibility of making the Coast Guard responsible for abandoned and derelict vessels in Canadian water; (q) which options are examined by Transport Canada to address the issue of abandoned vessels and wrecks; (r) what did the department recommend with regard to Canadian membership to the International Convention on the Removal of Wrecks (IWR); (s) if the answer to (r) is in the affirmative, when did Transport Canada first make this recommendation; (t) does the strategy propose a manner in which to deal with the wrecks that were in existence prior to its coming into force; (u) how does Transport Canada plan to deal with existing abandoned and derelict vessels; (v) how would the IWR Convention address several of the limitations inherent in Canada’s current legislative framework; (w) has there been any consideration as to the use the IWR Convention as the centrepiece for a new legislative regime; and (x) has the government considered regulatory frameworks from other jurisdictions, and if so, which ones?

With regard to the administrative investigation by Transport Canada listed on proactive disclosure with the reference number T7038-15-0648: (a) what prompted the investigation; (b) what allegations or suspicious activity was being investigated; (c) what were the findings of the investigation; and (d) what punitive or recovery measures were made as a result of the findings?

With regard to contracts under $10,000 granted by Transport Canada, since January 1, 2017: what are the (i) vendors' names, (ii) contracts' reference and file numbers, (iii) dates of the contracts, (iv) descriptions of the services provided, (v) delivery dates, (vi) original contracts' values, (vii) final contracts' values if different from the original contracts' values?

With regard to contracts under $10 000 granted by Transport Canada since January 1, 2016: what are the (i) vendors' names, (ii) contracts' reference and file numbers, (iii) dates of the contracts, (iv) descriptions of the services provided, (v) delivery dates, (vi) original contracts' values, (vii) final contracts' values if different from the original contracts' values?

With regard to aviation safety: (a) what was the annual failure rate from 2005 to 2016 for the Pilot Proficiency Check (PPC) conducted by Transport Canada inspectors for pilots working for 705 operators under the Canadian Aviation Regulations (CARs); (b) what was the annual failure rate from 2005 to 2016 for the PPC in cases where industry-approved check pilots conducted the PPC for pilots working for Subpart 705 operators; (c) how many annual verification inspections did Transport Canada inspectors conduct between 2007 and 2016; (d) how many annual Safety Management System assessments, program validation inspections and process inspections of 705, 704, 703 and 702 operators were conducted between 2008 and 2016; (e) how many annual inspections and audits of 705, 704, 703 and 702 system operators were carried out pursuant to Transport Canada manual TP8606 between 2008 and 2016; (f) how many aircraft operator group inspectors did Transport Canada have from 2011 to 2017; (g) what discrepancies has Transport Canada identified between its pilot qualification policies and the requirements of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) since 2005; (h) what are the ICAO requirements for pilot proficiency checks and what are the Canadian PPC requirements for subparts 705, 704, 703 and 604 of CARs; (i) does Transport Canada plan to hire new inspectors and, if so, what target has it set for hiring new inspectors; (j) what is the current number of air safety inspectors; (k) how many air safety inspectors were there in (i) 2010-11, (ii) 2011-12, (iii) 2012-13, (iv) 2013-14, (v) 2014-15, (vi) 2015-16, (vii) 2016-17; (l) what is the training budget for air safety inspectors broken down by each year listed in (k); (m) how many hours were allocated to air safety inspector training, broken down by each year listed in (k); and (n) how many air safety inspectors are anticipated for (i) 2017-18, (ii) 2018-19, (iii) 2019-20?

With regard to the incident involving two-metre-high waves in Yamachiche and the Collision Regulations: (a) does the government intend to amend the Collision Regulations to provide for a victims’ financial compensation fund; (b) if the answer to (a) is affirmative, what are the details of the implementation of the compensation fund; (c) if the answer to (a) is negative, what are the detailed reasons for Transport Canada’s decision; (d) how many cases similar to the Yamachiche incident have been identified by Transport Canada; (e) did the victims of the cases identified in (d) receive financial compensation; (f) if the answer to (e) is affirmative, what compensation mechanism did these victims use; (g) if the answer to (e) is negative, what are the reasons for Transport Canada’s refusal to provide for a financial compensation mechanism; (h) does Transport Canada plan to publish a detailed investigation report on the Yamachiche incident; (i) if the answer to (h) is affirmative, when will this report be published; (j) if the answer to (h) is negative, what are the detailed reasons for Transport Canada’s decision; (k) has Transport Canada estimated the financial cost of the damage to the affected properties in Yamachiche; (l) if the answer to (k) is affirmative, what was the estimate provided by Transport Canada; and (m) if the answer to (k) is negative, what are the reasons for Transport Canada’s refusal to provide an estimate of the financial cost of the damage to the affected properties in Yamachiche?

With respect to rail safety: (a) what is the current number of rail safety inspectors; (b) how many rail safety inspectors were there in (i) 2010–11, (ii) 2011–12, (iii) 2012–13, (iv) 2013–14, (v) 2014–15, (vi) 2015–16, (vii) 2016–17; (c) what is the training budget for rail safety inspectors, broken down by each year listed in (b); (d) how many hours were allocated to rail safety inspector training, broken down by each year listed in (b); (e) how many railway safety inspectors are anticipated for (i) 2017–18, (ii) 2018–19, (iii) 2019–20; (f) what are the document numbers for the training manuals for rail safety inspectors; (g) what updates have been made to the manuals in (f) since November 2015; (h) when does Transport Canada plan to complete its review of the fatigue risk management systems implemented by railway companies; (i) what are the findings to date of the review in (h); (j) in detailed terms, what steps has Transport Canada taken since November 2015 to mitigate the risk of fatigue among crew members on freight trains; (k) how many preventive inspections has Transport Canada conducted since November 2015, broken down by year; (l) how many reactive inspections has Transport Canada conducted since November 2015, broken down by year; (m) what is the total number of violations of laws and regulations committed by rail companies since November 2015; (n) how many monetary penalties has Transport Canada imposed on rail companies since November 2015; (o) in detailed terms, what is the budget for the 2017–18 Railway Safety Act Review Committee; (p) what consultations have been conducted to date by the review committee in (o); (q) what organizations have been consulted to date by the review committee in (o); (r) does the review committee in (o) contract out to fulfil its mandate; (s) if the answer to (r) is affirmative, what are the sole source contracts; and (t) what is the anticipated total remuneration for the members of the review committee in (o)?

With regard to the investigation of the incident in Yamachiche caused by two-metre waves: (a) on what date did Transport Canada and Fisheries and Oceans Canada learn of the incident; (b) on what date did Transport Canada launch an investigation; (c) what is the timeframe for the investigation; (d) will the report and the findings of the investigation be available to the public and posted on the Transport Canada website; (e) have inspectors been assigned to the investigation; (f) how many inspectors have been assigned to the investigation, if applicable; (g) what is the mandate of the inspectors; (h) what penalties does Transport Canada provide for; (i) is any compensation available to the victims; (j) if the answer to (i) is affirmative, what is this compensation; (k) when is compensation expected to be paid to the victims; (l) what are the details of the investigation files, broken down by file number; (m) how many meetings took place between Transport Canada officials and Fisheries and Oceans Canada officials, broken down by (i) date, (ii) department and titles of government representatives present at the meetings, (iii) subjects discussed at these meetings; and (n) how many meetings took place between officials from Transport Canada and the Corporation of St. Lawrence Pilots Inc., broken down by (i) date, (ii) department and titles of government representatives present at the meetings, (iii) subjects discussed at these meetings?

With regard to the fares charged by Air Canada for regional air transportation and Air Canada’s virtual monopoly in several regional markets: (a) how many times has the Minister of Transport met with Air Canada officials; (b) what are the details of the issues discussed by the Minister of Transport and Air Canada officials during the meetings in (a); (c) what are the details of Transport Canada’s analyses of the fares charged by Air Canada; (d) has Transport Canada requested an opinion or a review from the Commissioner of Competition; (e) if the answer to (d) is affirmative, (i) when did Transport Canada request this opinion or review, (ii) what are the details of this request for an opinion or a review, (iii) what were the responses from the Commissioner of Competition to this request for an opinion or a review; (f) if the answer to (d) is negative, what were the reasons behind Transport Canada’s refusal to request an opinion or a review from the Commissioner of Competition; (g) what is Transport Canada’s position on establishing a financial compensation mechanism; (h) what is Transport Canada’s position on setting a floor price; (i) what are the detailed reasons for Transport Canada’s position in (g); (i) what are the detailed reasons for Transport Canada’s position in (h); (k) how many regional air carriers in Quebec and elsewhere in Canada have withdrawn from the regional air transportation market each year since 2003; (l) what is Transport Canada’s detailed position on the withdrawal from the regional market by each of the regional air carriers in (k); and (m) what is Transport Canada’s detailed position on Air Canada’s pricing strategy in regional aviation markets?

With regard to the certification of the Boeing 737 MAX 8 aircraft by Transport Canada: (a) what specific safety tests were conducted by Transport Canada prior to the certification of the aircraft; (b) what specific tests results did Transport Canada use from the United States' Federal Aviation Administration in lieu of Transport Canada conducting its own tests; and (c) did Transport Canada rely on any testing information provided directly by the manufacturer instead of conducting its own tests, and, if so, for which tests did Transport Canada rely on the manufacturer’s information?

With regard to Transport Canada’s use of a database called GradeX to predict potential accident hot spots at railway crossings: (a) how long has Transport Canada maintained this database; (b) who is consulted in preparing and updating the lists on this database; (c) what metrics are used by Transport Canada to assess potential accident hot spots; (d) how does Transport Canada measure whether a crossing poses a high risk for collisions; (e) what are the 500 highest risk railway crossings as of May 10, 2016; (f) for each of the crossings listed in (e), and since the government began collecting this data in the database, how many (i) accidents have occured, (ii) fatalities have occurred; (g) how many public complaints have been received about each of the crossings listed in (e) since the government began collecting this data in the database; and (h) does the government have any plans to make this database available to the public and municipalities, and, if so, when and how does it intend to do so?

With regard to the agreement between Transport Canada and Air Canada on the safety of Air Canada’s entire operations, including its pilot training: (a) what are the details of the agreement; (b) what are the details of the measures taken to date by Air Canada as a result of the agreement; (c) what is Transport Canada’s detailed assessment of the measures taken to date by Air Canada; (d) what did Transport Canada determine was the level of risk of the safety of Air Canada’s entire operations before the agreement was made; (e) what has Transport Canada determined is the level of risk to date, since the agreement was made; (f) what are the issues associated with managing pilot fatigue identified by Transport Canada during its review of Air Canada’s safety management system; (g) how long had Air Canada had its system in place for the safety of its entire operations before reaching the agreement with Transport Canada; (h) what were the reasons for the six-month delay between the first Air Canada incident in July 2017 and when the agreement was reached with Transport Canada, in January 2018; (i) what was the annual failure rate for Pilot Proficiency Checks (PPCs) when Transport Canada inspectors carried out the PPCs for Air Canada pilots between 2005 and 2016; (j) what was the annual failure rate for Pilot Proficiency Checks when industry Approved Check Pilots finished the PPCs for Air Canada pilots between 2005 and 2016; (k) has Transport Canada estimated the savings achieved by Air Canada regarding the safety of its entire operations before the agreement; (l) if the answer to (k) is affirmative, what are the details of the estimate; (m) how many agreements have Transport Canada and Air Canada entered into since 2005 on the safety of its entire operations; (n) what agreements have been made between Transport Canada and other airlines on the safety of their entire operations and all of their pilots; and (o) what are the details of the agreements in (n)?

With respect to Transport Canada’s Trade and Transportation Corridors Initiative (TTCI), and the 2 billion dollar commitment over 11 years for the National Trade Corridors Fund: (a) what are the details of all completed applications received for the National Trade Corridors Fund as of December 31, 2017, including (i) applicant, (ii) amount requested, (iii) project description, (iv) province or territory of applicant; and (b) what are the details of all pilot project applications for the 50 million dollar investment for transportation innovation, including (i) applicant, (ii) amount requested, (iii) project description, (iv) province or territory of applicant?

With regard to the statement by the Minister of Transport in the House of Commons on October 30, 2017, that “We are not getting rid of the function of checking the check pilots of the airlines”: (a) on what evidence or documents is the Minister’s statement based; (b) what are the details of the evidence or documents in (a); (c) has the Minister read the document entitled “Risk Assessment - Oversight of the ACP/AQP Evaluator Programs (Ottawa, ON; 6-10 February 2017) Conventional Tool”; (d) if the answer to (c) is in the affirmative, when did the Minister read this document; (e) did the Minister approve the policy as described in the document in (c); (f) does the Minister intend to overturn the decision made by the Civil Aviation Directorate and National Operations at Transport Canada to delegate responsibility for the evaluation of company check pilots to the airlines as of April 1, 2018; (g) when was the Minister informed that Transport Canada had decided to delegate responsibility for the evaluation of company check pilots to the airlines; (h) did the Minister speak to the Director of National Operations at Transport Canada about this statement; (i) if the answer to (h) is affirmative, what are the details of this conversation; (j) what other member countries of the International Civil Aviation Organization have transferred responsibility for evaluating company check pilots to the airlines; (k) has Transport Canada assessed the internal need for aviation safety inspectors; (l) if the answer to (k) is affirmative, what is the result of the department’s assessment; and (m) what is the impact of this need in terms of inspectors on the new policy adopted by Transport Canada?

With respect to the Victoria Flying Club, and complaints registered with Transport Canada by constituents in the riding of Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, concerning frequent and low-flying aircraft: (a) how many complaints have been received by Transport Canada since October 19, 2017; (b) how many photos, aircraft registration numbers and witnesses have been provided to Transport Canada to corroborate information supplied by the public in relation to public complaints; (c) what information has been provided to the constituents by Transport Canada; and (d) what steps is Transport Canada taking to address complaints registered by the constituents concerning frequent and low-flying aircraft?

With regard to the contract that was signed between Transport Canada and the City of Charlottetown and any of its agencies pertaining to the Charlottetown Port Authority: (a) what are the guidelines or conditions of use; and (b) do these include a provision for industrial use?