Questions and responses 41st Parliament, 1st session June 2, 2011, to September 13, 2013

With respect to the Afghan Detainee Document Review (ADDR) submitted on April 15, 2011, by the Panel of Arbiters (PoA) under the June 15, 2010, Memorandum of Understanding signed by three party leaders in Parliament: (a)have the documents referred to in paragraph 30 ever been provided, unredacted, to any Canadian government law-enforcement investigators for purposes of tracing the detainees named in the documents in order to determine whether any suffered mistreatment after transfer to Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security (NDS), if not, why not; (b) has the government ever provided compensation to any person or family of any person transferred to Afghan authorities, or sought out a person or family with compensation as the purpose; (c) with regard to the public-domain research (regular reviews of credible media reporting, government reports and reports of international organizations) conducted by the PoA’s staff referenced in paragraph 36 of the ADDR, was this public domain research handed over to the government, if not, where is it located, and, whatever its location, will the government release any bibliographies generated by this research or any documents archived by the research that fall within the categories of “credible media reporting, government reports and reports of international organizations”; (d) with regard to the PoA’s review of documents redacted on the basis of national security confidentiality (“NSC” documents), national defence and international relations whereby the PoA reviewed between 1450 and 2300 pages of documents (paragraphs 52-54) while releasing 113 NSC documents (paragraph 56), will the government release those documents that were not yet ready for release with the ADDR because the Department of Justice had not yet had time to complete the technical process of preparing the documents for release after the PoA had finished its reviews and determinations (paragraphs 54 and 55), and how many PoA-reviewed documents remain unreleased because the technical process of preparing the documents remains incomplete; (e) with regard to the 15 documents for which the government had initially claimed solicitor-client privilege (paragraph 63 and page 1 of the ADDR annex called “Documents subject to Solicitor-Client Privilege Claims”) but later withdrew the claim, in each case, (i) what were the bases on which privilege was initially claimed, (ii) why did the government change its view; (f) with regard to the 117 documents for which the PoA upheld the government’s solicitor-client privilege claim (paragraphs 64 and 65; pages 2-7 of the ADDR annex called “Documents subject to Solicitor-Client Privilege Claims”), will the government waive the solicitor-client privilege to the limited extent of revealing the subject matter of each of the 117 documents; (g) in the ADDR annex called “Documents subject to Solicitor-Client Privilege Claims”, why are the large majority of documents described with the acronym PoA (presumably, Panel of Arbiters) while some are specifically indicated as being DFAIT (Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade) documents?

With respect to the government’s investigation of potential human rights abuses related to the transfer of Afghan detainees from the custody of Canadian Forces to the government of Afghanistan, especially the National Security Directorate (NDS): (a) do the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister automatically receive either copies of or briefings on the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT)’s annual human rights reports on Afghanistan; (b) if so, has this practice of automatically receiving copies or briefings always existed; (c) if not, when did this practice start; (d) once knowledge of human rights abuses within the NDS became known, did the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and/or the Minister of Defence order copies of or briefings on the DFAIT annual human rights report on Afghanistan; (e) if not, does the practice of not reading or being briefed on the DFAIT human rights report on Afghanistan continue to this day; (f) following the April 23, 2007, Globe and Mail article by Graeme Smith on transferred detainees as victims of mistreatment within NDS facilities, did the government seek to verify the alleged experiences of the people interviewed by Smith and, if so, (i) what precise measures were taken, (ii) by whom, (iii) for how long and until when did these measures last; (g) consistent with the book The Savage War by Murray Brewster (page 276), did lawyers representing the government while simultaneously representing military police involved in the Military Police Complaints Commission’s hearings on Afghan detainees “t[ake] their direction from senior levels inside the civil service”, and, if so, (i) did this include one or more officials within the Privy Council Office (PCO), (ii) is this normal practice, (iii) what are the guidelines for how Department of Justice lawyers receive direction from outside the Department of Justice, particularly from PCO officials; (h) in relation to Afghan detainee issues, have government lawyers ever received instructions, directions or representations from staff, at any level, within the Prime Minister’s Office; (i) did Amnesty International suggest to NATO and/or the government that one way to ensure no torture of detainees would occur would be to embed soldiers or military police in Afghan facilities and, if so, (i) was this option considered (ii) why was it not adopted if it was considered; (j) why did the government decide to approach the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) to start monitoring transferred detainees under the December 2005 arrangement, leading to the February 20, 2007 agreement with AIHRC; (k) did the government do an assessment of AIHRC’s capacity to engage in this role and, if so, what were the results of this assessment; (l) with respect to the testimony of David Mulroney before the Special Committee on the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan that Canada could not find evidence of former Kandahar Governor Khalid having a detention facility in or next to his compound, exactly what efforts were undertaken to investigate this matter, (i) by what actors, (ii) using what methods, (iii) on how many occasions; (m) did the government of Canada ever receive information from the AIHRC conveying a belief that Khalid operated a private jail and, if so, did the AIHRC also convey a belief that mistreatment of prisoners took place there; (n) for what reasons was the government of Canada unable to verify whether such a jail existed; (o) when the head of the AIHRC, Canada’s partner in monitoring detainees, “estimated publicly... that approximately one-third of the prisoners handed over ended up being tortured” (Brewster, The Savage War, page 67), (i) what was the government’s response to this information, (ii) was this deemed a credible estimate and, if not, why not; (p) after the statement in (o) was made, was it the government’s policy that it was lawful to transfer detainees; (q) did any communications occur within the Canadian Forces or the government about the concerns expressed by military police official Major Kevin Rowcliffe about the torture of detainees and what actions did the government take in response to Major Rowcliffe’s testimony before the Military Police Complaints Commission; and (r) has either DFAIT or PCO ever conducted an analysis or assessment of the NDS and, if so, what was the subject-matter of the analysis or assessment?

With regard to the Prime Minister’s Office and the Privy Council Office: (a) how many records exist regarding the letter of understanding between the Prime Minister’s former Chief of Staff, Nigel Wright, and Senator Mike Duffy regarding the payment of $90,127 to cover Senator Duffy’s living expenses; and (b) what are the details of each record?