Questions and responses 41st Parliament, 2nd session October 16, 2013, to August 2, 2015

With regard to Bill C-22, with particular emphasis on the Nuclear Liability and Compensation Act (NLCA): (a) in developing this legislation, what was the government`s policy for consulting with non-industry stakeholders and civil society groups, (i) which non-industry stakeholders and civil society groups did the government consult with, (ii) which aspects of the legislation were they consulted on, (iii) what were the exact dates on which these consultations took place; (b) in developing the NLCA, did the Department of Natural Resources ask licensees of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission who are nuclear power generating station operators who supply electricity to public electricity grids whether adopting unlimited liability for nuclear operators, without increasing financial security, would increase electricity prices, and if so, (i) what were the responses of the licensees, (ii) what evidence does the government have to support the assertion that removing the cap on operator liability, without raising financial security, would increase electricity prices; (c) does the Department of Natural Resources know how much self-insurance licensees carry for on-site damage and, if so, what amount is insured by the licensees for that on-site damage; (d) what analysis or assessment has the government performed to determine whether signing and ratifying the Convention on Supplementary Convention (CSC) and passing this legislation would result in an increase in public safety; (e) has the government assessed whether the NLCA will have a negative or positive impact on the achievement of Canada’s sustainable development goals and, if so, what were the results of this assessment; (f) has the Department of Natural Resources asked industry whether nuclear suppliers would accept exposure to liability and, if so, (i) what were the responses provided, (ii) what were the exact dates on which these consultations took place; (g) is it necessary to link operator liability caps to the capacity of insurance providers to provide insurance and, if so, (i) why is this so, (ii) why was this not a limiting factor in developing Part 1 of Bill C-22; (h) what is the government's analysis of what level of costs would be an inordinate "burden" on the nuclear industry for insurance; (i) why did the government not use the same definition of ‘reasonable costs’ for insurance for the nuclear industry and the offshore oil and gas industry, (i) what were the respective definitions used for Parts 1 and 2 of Bill C-22, (ii) how are they different, (iii) what was the policy rationale for using different definitions; and (j) after the passage of the NLCA, how would the CSC be ratified, (i) would parliamentary debate be required before the convention could be ratified, (ii) does the government agree that the ratification of the convention should be reviewed by an all-party committee, (iii) why has the government not ratified any other international nuclear liability conventions since the 1960s, (iv) can the government file reservations or exemptions regarding any requirements of the CSC, v) have any other signatories to the CSC filed any such reservations or exemptions, and if so, which signatories have done so and what are the specifics of the reservations and exemptions?

With regard to Bill C-22, and the government's obligation to enact laws that respect the Charter of Rights and Freedoms as well as Supreme Court jurisprudence related to the “polluter pays” principle: (a) in developing the Nuclear Liability and Compensation Act included in Part 2 of Bill C-22, on what (i) studies, (ii) case law, (iii) doctrinal sources did the government rely; (b) in developing the changes to Canada’s offshore oil and gas operations regime in Part 1 of Bill C-22, on what (i) studies, (ii) case law, (iii) doctrinal sources did the government rely; (c) what statistics or empirical evidence as to the likelihood and consequences of reactor accidents causing offsite damage did the government rely on to justify (i) the need for the Nuclear Liability and Compensation Act, (ii) the limitation of reactor operator liability to $1 billion, (iii) the total shielding of reactor suppliers and vendors from liability even if their negligence causes damage; (d) what statistics or empirical evidence as to the likelihood and consequences of accidents in the oil and gas sectors did the government rely on to justify (i) the need for the provisions included in Part 1 of Bill C-22 related to the liability of offshore oil and gas companies, (ii) the maintenance of unlimited liability where fault or negligence is proven, (iii) the raising of the absolute liability limit for Atlantic offshore areas and the Arctic to $1 billion where fault or negligence is not proven; (e) what analysis has the government performed to determine whether the Nuclear Liability and Compensation Act will increase or reduce the risk of nuclear facilities to Canadian society and the environment, and what are the conclusions of this analysis; (f) did the government review the causes and contributors of major reactor accidents, such as Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima, in assessing the need and impact of the Nuclear Liability and Compensation Act, and if so, what are the conclusions of this analysis; (g) has Bill C-22 been examined by the Department of Justice to ascertain consistency with the Charter, and if so, (i) who was responsible for performing the examination, (ii) when was the examination initiated, (iii) when was the examination completed, (iv) what were the conclusions of the examination; (v) when was the Minister of Justice presented with the conclusions of the examination; (vi) was a report of inconsistency prepared; (vii) was a report of inconsistency presented to Parliament; (viii) has there been an assessment of the litigation risk relative to the enactment of this legislation and, if so, what are the conclusions of this assessment; (h) has the Nuclear Liability and Compensation Act included in Bill C-22 been examined by the Department of Justice to ascertain consistency with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, including the right of every Canadian to “liberty and security of the person” pursuant to section 7, and if so, (i) did the Department of Justice examine whether the Nuclear Liability and Compensation Act’s limitation of reactor operator liability to $1 billion was consistent with the right of every Canadian to “liberty and security of the person”, and what were the conclusions, (ii) did the Department of Justice examine whether the channeling of liability to reactor operators and removal of any liability for damages of reactor suppliers or vendors, even if the negligence causes or contributes to an accident causing offsite damage, was consistent with the right of every Canadian to “liberty and security of the person”, and what were the conclusions; (i) has the Department of Justice evaluated whether the inclusion of an absolute cap on nuclear reactor operator liability in C-22, regardless of negligence or other tortious conduct, while allowing for claims in tort against oil and gas operators beyond the absolute liability requirement in C-22, meets the provisions of section 15 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and if so, (i) what were the conclusions; and (j) has the Nuclear Liability and Compensation Act included in Bill C-22 been examined by the government to ascertain compliance with the Supreme Court ruling Imperial Oil Ltd. v. Quebec (Minister of the Environment) and if so, what were the conclusions?

With respect to the drafting of the new liability provisions in Bill C-46, Pipeline Safety Act: (a) what are the names, positions, organizations or affiliations of all the stakeholders consulted leading up to the creation of this legislation; (b) what submissions, proposals or recommendations were made by stakeholders during the consultation process before the creation of this legislation; (c) other than Natural Resources Canada, what other departments were involved or consulted in the creation of this legislation; (d) what are the dates, times, and locations of the meetings with those individuals or organizations consulted before the creation of this legislation; (e) who proposed the $1 billion limit for absolute liability; (f) who proposed that this legislation apply only to pipelines with the capacity to transport at least 250 000 barrels of oil per day; and (g) what evidence was used to determine that $1 billion would be sufficient to clean up a spill?

With regard to the Nuclear Liability and Compensation Act enacted as part of Bill C-22, with particular reference to the government's decision to increase the absolute liability amount and mandatory insurance coverage for nuclear operators to $1 billion: (a) has the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) asked Ontario Power Generation whether removing the cap on operator liability, while maintaining the level of absolute liability and mandatory insurance coverage required under the Act at $1 billion, would increase its generation costs and, if so, what were the details of the response, including the estimated increased cost-per-kWh; (b) has the DNR asked Bruce Power whether removing the cap on operator liability, while maintaining the level of absolute liability and mandatory insurance coverage required under the Act at $1 billion, would increase its generation costs and, if so, what were the details of the response, including the estimated increased cost-per-kWh; (c) has the DNR asked New Brunswick Power whether removing the cap on operator liability, while maintaining the level of absolute liability and mandatory insurance coverage, would increase its generation costs and, if so, what were the details of the response, including the estimated increased cost-per-kWh; (d) in the scenario in which the limit on reactor liability is removed while the mandatory insurance coverage and absolute liability of the operator remain at $1 billion, what is the DNR's estimate of the impacts that removing the cap on liability would have on provincial electricity rates, (i) what additional impacts would there be if the mandatory insurance coverage and absolute liability of the operator were increased to $1.5 billion, all other things being equal, (ii) what would the additional impacts be if the mandatory insurance coverage and absolute liability of the operator were increased to $2 billion, all other things being equal; (e) does the government determine the amount of liability required of nuclear operators by estimating whether it will be within the capacity of insurers to provide insurance at reasonable costs and, if so, (i) did the government use the same criterion for determining the absolute liability and insurance requirement for offshore operators, (ii) how does the government define "reasonable costs" for insurance, (iii) what is the limit in cost-per-kWh for what the DNR considers "reasonable costs" for insurance, (iv) did the government use the same definition of "reasonable costs" for insurance for the nuclear and oil industries; (f) what are the insurance costs-per-kWh for the $1 billion in insurance that is currently required for nuclear operators under Bill C-22, (i) what would these insurance costs-per-kWh be for the insurance requirement of $1.5 billion, (ii) what would these insurance costs be for the insurance requirement of $2 billion; (g) does the DNR determine the amount of liability required of nuclear operators by estimating its commensurability with the consequences of controlled releases of radiation and, if so, (i) what studies has the DNR undertaken regarding the consequences of accidents involving controlled releases of radiation, (ii) what is the estimated likelihood of such accidents, (iii) how has the DNR determined that the current amount of liability for nuclear operators under Bill C-22 is commensurate with the risk of such accidents; and (h) has the DNR commissioned any studies to estimate the implicit subsidy per kWh that would be created by imposing a cap on liability since the time it commissioned an empirical analysis of the Nuclear Liability Act (Heyes, Anthony, and Catherine Heyes. 2000. An Empirical Analysis of the Nuclear Liability Act (1970) in Canada. Resource & Energy Economics 22 (1):91-101) and, if so, what were the results of any such study?