Questions and responses 42nd Parliament, 1st session December 3, 2015, to September 11, 2019

With regard to housing provided by the Canadian Forces Housing Agency (CFHA), as of April 22, 2016: (a) for each location where housing is provided, how many units were assessed by the CFHA to be in (i) good condition, (ii) fair condition, (iii) poor condition; (b) for each location where housing is provided, (i) was there a wait list for housing, (ii) how long was the wait list, (iii) what types of housing were waitlisted, (iv) what was the average age of the housing units in the CFHA's portfolio; (c) for each location where housing is provided, how many complaints were made regarding housing quality and what were the issues raised; (d) how many housing units have warning labels or seals because of the potential presence of asbestos in vermiculite insulation; (e) how many units have warning labels for ungrounded electrical outlets; and (f) how many units have water lines that must be kept running from November to April to prevent freezing?

With respect to the recipients of Honours and Recognition for the Women and Men of the Canadian Forces, for each period divided between April 1, 2001, to March 31, 2002, April 1, 2002 to March 31, 2003, April 1, 2003, to March 31, 2004, April 1, 2004, to March 31, 2005, April 1, 2005, to March 31, 2006, April 1, 2006, to March 31, 2007, April 1, 2007, to March 31, 2008, April 1, 2008, to March 31, 2009, April 1, 2009, to March 31, 2010, April 1, 2010, to March 31, 2011, April 1, 2011, to March 31, 2012, April 1, 2012, to March 31, 2013, April 1, 2013, to March 31, 2014, April 1, 2014, to March 31, 2015, April 1, 2015, to March 31, 2016, April 1, 2016, to March 31, 2017, April 1, 2017, to June 19, 2017: who are all the recipients by date awarded by (i) name, (ii) rank, (iii) unit or sub-unit, (iv) Regiment, (v) Battalion, (vi) battlegroup where relevant, of the Commander-in-Chief Unit Commendation, Canadian Forces Unit Commendation, and the Command Commendation?

With respect to the characterization of persons in the care, custody or control of the Canadian military as “PUCs” and “Persons Under Control,” or use of like categories, whether or not such terms were or are used officially or unofficially: (a) was there, at any point between 2001 and 2011, a government policy, formal or informal, to characterize or label Afghans detained by the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan as ''Persons Under Control'' and ''PUCs''; (b) was there, at any point between 2001 and 2011, a Canadian Forces policy, either formal or informal, to characterize or label Afghans detained by the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan as ''Persons Under Control'' and ''PUCs''; (c) if the answer in either or both (a) and (b) is affirmative, what was the nature of that policy; (d) if the answers in (a) and (b) are negative, were there circumstances under which the Canadian Forces, or Canadian Forces members, (i) could nonetheless engage in a practice, versus implement a policy, of categorizing or labelling a detainee as a ''Person Under Control'' and ''PUC'', (ii) did engage in a practice of categorizing or labelling a detainee as a ''Person Under Control'' and ''PUC'', and, if so, with what purpose and in what periods; (e) if the answer in (d)(ii) is affirmative, has the government attempted to determine whether such ‘'Persons Under Control’' and ‘'PUCs’' were ever transferred to the control of other states and, if so, how many and in what periods; (f) if the Canadian Forces, or Canadian Forces members, did transfer some ‘'Persons Under Control'’ and ‘'PUCs’' to the control of other states, what efforts have been made to determine the identity and fate of those transferred persons; (g) if the Canadian Forces, or Canadian Forces members, wished, at any point between 2001 and 2011, to characterize or label 'detainees' as ''Persons Under Control'' and ''PUCs'', either to engage in a practice or to create a policy allowing for such a characterization or labelling, could they have done so without the approval of (i) the Minister of National Defence, (ii) the Chief of Defence Staff; and (h) if the Canadian Forces, or Canadian Forces members, wished now, in any theatre of war in which Canada may find itself present, to characterize or label 'detainees' as ''Persons Under Control'' and ''PUCs'', either to engage in a practice or to create a policy allowing for such a characterization or labelling, could they do so without the approval of (i) the Minister of National Defence, (ii) the Chief of Defence Staff?

With respect to the characterization of persons in the care, custody or control of the Canadian military as Persons Under Control (PUCs) or use of like categories, whether or not such terms were or are used officially or unofficially: (a) in relation to a statement by Donald P. Wright et al. in A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation – ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) October 2001-September 2005 (Combat Studies Institute, 2010), at p. 221: “Detainees in Coalition hands in Afghanistan were referred to as persons under control (PUCs) instead of EPWs or detainees,”, does this reference to “Coalition” apply to the Canadian military, including special forces in any part of the 2001-2005 period in question; (b) in relation to a claim by Ahmed Rashid in Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation-Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia (Penguin, 2009), at pp. 304-305: “In spring 2002, …CIA lawyers further twisted legal boundaries by establishing a new category of prisoner: Persons Under Control, or PUC. Anyone held as PUC was automatically denied access to the ICRC, and even his existence was denied...PUCs were flown around the world to different locations on private jets belonging to dummy companies owned by the CIA.”, is the government aware of whether this is an accurate statement of one use to which the category of “PUC” was put by the United States; (c) in relation to an observation in Center for Law and Military Operations (United States Army, Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School), Lessons Learned from Afghanistan and Iraq: Volume I - Major Combat Operations (11 September 2001 – 1 May 2003) (August 1, 2004) [Lessons Learned]: “[P]ersons detained were either classified as ‘persons under control’ (PUCs) or simply as ‘detainees.’… Persons captured on the battlefield were initially brought to the classified location to establish their identity and determine if they met the criteria for potential transfer to Guantanamo. During this phase, detained personnel were classified as ‘PUCs’.”, is the government aware of whether, during such windows of time, CIA agents or persons working for the CIA would sometimes take custody of PUCs from the US Army before they could be officially designated as “detainees” by the Army; (d) in relation to a claim in Chris Mackey and Greg Miller, The Interrogators: Task Force 500 and America’s Secret War Against Al-Qaeda (Back Bay Books, 2004), at pp. 250-251: “In June [2002]…our [US Army] command in Bagram …came up with a whole new prisoner category called “persons under U.S. control”, or PUCs. The whole idea was to create a sort of limbo status, a bureaucratic blank spot where prisoners could reside temporarily without entering any official database or numbering system.”: is the government aware of whether or not this US Army PUC category was created in concert with and used by the CIA as a way to secure custody of PUCs while they were still in a “bureaucratic blank spot”; (e) in relation to the observations in Lessons Learned that “the term ‘PUC’ did not develop until the [US] XVIIIth Airborne Corps arrived in Afghanistan” in 2002, did Canadian Forces, including special forces, ever conduct joint operations with the US’ XVIIIth Airbone Corps in which captives were taken; (f) is the government aware of whether the commanding officer of the US’ XVIIIth Airborne Corps, Lt. Gen. Dan McNeill, was a direct source of, or conduit for, the notion of “PUC” and if so, whether Lt. Gen. Dan McNeill was working in concert or tandem with the CIA in introducing this term into the Afghanistan theatre; (g) after General Walter Natynczyk was seconded to command 35,000 US forces in Iraq during the US’ Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq from January 2004 to January 2005, did he bring any knowledge of the use of PUC practices or a PUC system from Iraq to the Canada-Afghanistan context when he became head of the Canadian Forces’ Land Force Doctrine and Training system in 2005 and when he was appointed Vice-Chief of Defence Staff in 2006, and if so, was such practices introduced in any way to this doctrine and training system; (h) prior to August 2015 by which time the first Canadian Forces troops had arrived in Kandahar, were there meetings between Canadian Lt. Gen. Michel Gauthier and US Under-Secretary of Defence for Intelligence Steve Cambone or any other officials in the US Department of Defense or in the Pentagon in which they discussed, inter alia, Canada aligning or otherwise coordinating its policy and practices in Kandahar with those of the US, including in relation to detainees, as a condition of the US agreeing that Canada be assigned Kandahar; (i) prior to August 2015 by which time the first Canadian Forces troops had arrived in Kandahar, were there meetings between Chief of Defence Staff General Rick Hillier and any officials in the US Department of Defense or in the Pentagon in which they discussed, inter alia, Canada aligning or otherwise coordinating its policy and practices in Kandahar with those of the US, including in relation to detainees, as a condition of the US agreeing that Canada be assigned Kandahar; (j) prior to August 2015 by which time the first Canadian Forces troops had arrived in Kandahar, were there meetings between any Canadian Forces officers apart from Generals Gauthier and Hillier in which they discussed, inter alia, Canada aligning or otherwise coordinating its policy and practices in Kandahar with those of the US, including in relation to detainees, as a condition of the US agreeing that Canada be assigned Kandahar; and (k) is the mini-biography of Mr. Gauthier on The Governance Network’s website correct in saying Gauthier “[l]ed Canadian Expeditionary Force Command, responsible for all CF operational missions abroad, the Canadian mission in southern Afghanistan” and if so, did this include authority over policy and decisions related to the transfer of captives to other states?

With regard to project funding for Strong, Secure, Engaged (SSE) for the 2017-18 and 2018-19 fiscal years (to date of this filing): (a) which projects in SSE that were projected to spend money in those years did not; (b) of the projects listed in (a) what is the operational impact of these projects not spending money on schedule; (c) how much money will be reprofiled into Budget 2019 as a result of this underspending?

With regard to Operation IMPACT and the Canadian Armed Forces’ (CAF) support for the international coalition against ISIS: (a) who was consulted in the government’s decision to change Canada’s contribution; (b) how many Canadian troops are currently deployed, broken down by (i) location, (ii) occupation; (c) how many groups of Canadian troops, including the group size, have been deployed on or since February 8, 2016; (d) what has been the additional cost incurred as a result of withdrawing Canada’s CF-18s from theatre; (e) what is the planned cost for increasing the number of personnel on the ground; (f) have any changes been made to the force protection measures since February 8, 2016; (g) were the rules of engagement changed on or since February 8, 2016; and (h) are the support crews for the Royal Canadian Air Force’s contribution of one CC-150 Polaris, up to two CC-140 Aurora, and three CH-146 Griffon helicopters included in the total number of CAF members deployed?

With regard to malaria, malaria medication, and the Department of National Defence, Veterans Affairs Canada, Health Canada, or the Privy Council Office, since November 4, 2015: (a) what are the details of all meetings involving the Department of National Defence, Veterans Affairs Canada, Health Canada, or the Privy Council Office where malaria, any malaria prevention treatments, Mefloquine, or Lariam was on the agenda, including the (i) date, (ii) attendees, (iii) description of meeting, (iv) contents of agenda or meeting notes, (v) location, (vi) decisions made; (b) what are the details of all briefing notes related to malaria, any malaria treatments, Mefloquine, or Lariam including the (i) date, (ii) title, (iii) summary, (iv) sender, (v) recipients, (vi) file number; (c) what is the current Department of National Defence policy regarding the distribution of Mefloquine and other malaria prevention treatments to members of the Canadian Forces; and (d) when did the policy come into effect?

With regard to the use of malaria prevention drugs in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) for each year since 1990: (a) which deployments were required to have anti-malarial drugs administered; and (b) in each deployment, how many CAF members were given (i) doxycycline, (ii) atovaquone-proguanil, (iii) chloroquine, (iv) primaquine?

With regard to all operational contexts in which members of the Canadian military have been involved since September 11, 2001, up to the present and with respect to all military orders, directives, instructions, etc., whether binding or non-binding, interim, provisional, or final, related to persons in the care, custody, or control of members of the Canadian military and to all persons with whom members of the Canadian military come into contact but who are judged as being in the care, custody, or control of armed forces, security, and intelligence forces, and police forces of another state: (a) what were the numbers, titles and dates of all Canadian Forces Theatre Standing Orders and the identity of the issuing official; (b) what were the numbers, titles, and dates of all Fragmentary Orders and the identity of the issuing official; (c) what were the numbers, titles, and dates of all International Security Assistance Force orders of a similar nature issued in relation to the conflict in Afghanistan and the name of the issuing official or entity which issued them; and (d) what were the numbers, titles, and dates of any orders of a similar nature issued by American, Iraqi, or other forces, including Kurdish authorities in northern Iraq, that apply in any way, directly or indirectly, to Canadian soldiers who come into contact with detainees while serving in Iraq and the name of the issuing official or entity which issued them?

With regard to the use of antimalarial drugs in the Canadian Armed Forces, from 2003 to March 9, 2017, broken down by year: (a) which pharmaceutical companies were awarded contracts for administering antimalarial drugs; and (b) what was the unit cost for (i) 250 mg mefloquine, (ii) 100 mg doxycycline, (iii) 250/100 mg atovaquone-proguanil, (iv) 500 mg chloroquine phosphate (300 mg base)?

With regard to the use and cost paid by the government for prescribed medical marijuana and prescribed pharmaceuticals used by members of the Canadian Armed Forces and veterans of the Canadian Armed Forces, and administered by Veterans Affairs Canada: (a) what was the total amount paid annually, broken down by year from 2015 up to the current year, 2019, for (i) medical marijuana, (ii) Diazepam, (iii) Clonazepam, (iv) Trazodone, (v) Zopièlone, (vi) Wellbutrin, (vii) Effexor, (viii) Celexa, (ix) Seroquel, (x) Ambien, (xi) Remeron, (xii) Nabilone, (xiii) Valium, (xiv) Prazosin, (xv) Oxycodone, (xvi) Demerol, (xvii) Dilaudid, (xviii) Fentanyl, (xix) Mirtazapine, (xx) Gabapentin, (xxi) Baclofen, (xxii) Propranolol, (xxiii) Targin, (xxiv) Pantoprazole, (xxv) Nortriptyline, (xxvi) Ketoconazole, (xxvii) prescribed pharmaceuticals, including opioids and other pain relief medications; and (b) what evidence, reports, scientific studies or otherwise have been used as a reference or a basis for the use, prescription, or non-use or non-prescription of the pharmaceuticals or medical marijuana?

With regard to Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) members required to take mefloquine, since 1990: (a) how many were required to take mefloquine, broken down by deployment; (b) broken down by country of deployment, what were the dates of the deployment; and (c) what is the breakdown of CAF members required to take mefloquine by rank?

With regard to the use of mefloquine by members of the Canadian Armed Forces as an anti-malaria drug as directed by the Minister of National Defence: (a) how many Canadian Armed Forces members have been given mefloquine annually in each of the years since 1993; (b) what other anti-malaria drugs has the Canadian Armed Forces administered to Forces members; (c) what year did the Canadian Armed Forces change the use of mefloquine from mandatory to optional for Canadian Armed Forces members; (d) how many members of the Canadian Armed Forces have been returned to Canada from deployment for not taking or refusing mefloquine; and (e) how many Canadian Armed Forces members were refused deployment to a mission for refusing to take mefloquine?

With regard to the changes to the uniforms of Generals in the Canadian Armed Forces involving the removal of pips and the inclusion of metal maple leaves and gold braids: (a) what was the justification for making these changes; (b) what are the details of any documented evidence which exists to support this justification; (c) what evidence exists to suggest that either Canadian Armed Forces members or Allied officers were confused or misled by the current ranking insignia; (d) what process was used to determine what insignia should be included on the new uniforms, in particular, (i) who was consulted, (ii) how were they consulted, (iii) what options were considered to be included in these changes; (e) how many uniforms will need to be changed in total; (f) what is the total cost incurred by the government to implement these changes; and (g) how will the government measure the effectiveness of these changes?

With regard to the process of administering pension payments to retired members of the Canadian Armed Forces: (a) how many staff, military and civilian, administered Regular Force pensions since 2012, broken down by fiscal year; (b) what are the longest, shortest and average lengths of time that a Reserve Force member in the part-time pension plan had to wait before receiving a pension cheque since 2012, broken down by fiscal year; (c) what are the longest, shortest and average lengths of time that a Reserve Force member in the full-time pension plan had to wait before receiving a pension cheque since 2012, broken down by fiscal year; (d) what is the average wait time for a General/Flag Officer for a pension since 2012, broken down by fiscal year; (e) what is the average wait time for an officer for a pension cheque since 2012, broken down by fiscal year; (f) what is the average wait time for a non-commissioned member for a pension cheque since 2012, broken down by fiscal year; (g) in comparison with the public service pension plan and the RCMP pension plan, what are the average wait times for a pension cheque; (h) are pensions that take longer than 30 days to implement, and that are paid in arrears to service members, paid with the prevailing interest rate as compensation for the unnecessary delay and, if not, why; (i) what is the government's policy regarding paying interest on pensions in arrears; and (j) what is the Canadian Armed Force's policy regarding paying interest on pensions in arrears?

With regard to each one of Canada’s CF-18 Hornets, as of April 22, 2016: (a) what are the aircraft numbers; (b) at which Canadian Forces Bases are they currently based; (c) what are their current ages; (d) what is the total number of airframe hours each of them have logged; (e) what are each of their approximate expected airframe hours at retirement; and (f) in what year are they expected to be retired?

In relation to Canada’s transfer of captives in Afghanistan to the authorities of other states, including the United States and Afghanistan, from 2001 onward: (a) have there been any investigations by any federal agency, including but not limited to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or the Canadian Armed Forces National Investigation Service, of senior officers in the Canadian Forces up to and including the Chief of Defence Staff for possible criminal conduct in violation of one or more Canadian statutes and one or more international legal obligations; (b) if the answer in (a) is affirmative, (i) between what dates, (ii) with respect to what conduct, (iii) with what result were these investigations conducted; (c) have there been any investigations by any federal agency, including but not limited to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or the Canadian Armed Forces National Investigation Service, of any Minister of the Crown including the Prime Minister for possible criminal conduct in violation of one or more Canadian statutes and one or more international legal obligations; (d) if the answer in (c) is affirmative, (i) between what dates, (ii) with respect to what conduct, (iii) with what result were these investigations conducted; (e) have there been any investigations by any federal agency, including but not limited to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or the Canadian Armed Forces National Investigation Service, of any member of the public service for possible criminal conduct in violation of one or more Canadian statutes and one or more international legal obligations; (f) if the answer in (e) is affirmative, (i) between what dates, (ii) with respect to what conduct, (iii) with what result were these investigations conducted; and (g) have there been any investigations by any federal agency, including but not limited to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or the Canadian Armed Forces National Investigation Service, of any member of the a minister’s political staff including any member of the Prime Minister’s Office for possible criminal conduct in violation of one or more Canadian statutes and one or more international legal obligations; and (h) if the answer in (g) is affirmative, (i) between what dates, (ii) with respect to what conduct, (iii) with what result were these investigations conducted?

With respect to the characterization of persons in the care, custody or control of the Canadian military as “PUCs” and “Persons Under Control”, or use of like categories, whether or not such terms were or are used officially or unofficially: (a) does the government accept the accuracy of the finding of a Canadian military Board of Inquiry (BOI) on the subject of the “14 June 2006 Afghan Detainee Incident” [BOI June 2006 Incident Report], in its report of May 4, 2010, (para 30, part II) that the term “PUC” was in “widespread use” amongst Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan in 2006; (b) in relation to a BOI June 2006 Incident Report observation (para 30, part II), stating that “[T]he B Coy MP [B Company Military Police officer] testified that he was directed during ROTO 1 [rotation/deployment 1] to always use the term “PUC” and to avoid the term “Detainee.””, who directed this Military Police (MP) to systematically use “PUC” and to avoid “detainee” and for what reasons was this MP so directed; (c) in relation to a BOI June 2006 Incident Report finding (para 30, part II), stating that “When made aware of the term the TFA Advisors (LEGAD and PM) endeavoured to remove it [“PUC”] from the tactical reporting lexicon, as it had no legal foundation in detainee policy.”, (i) when and how were the Task Force Afghanistan (TFA) Advisors “made aware of the term”, (ii) for what period did “PUC” appear in tactical reporting, (iii) did its use in tactical reporting end, and if it ended, when did it end and was this the result of the initiative of the TFA Advisors; (d) in relation to the same report finding as in (c), was any person in position of strategic command in the Canadian Forces, including Generals Rick Hillier, Walter Natynzyk, Michel Gauthier and David Fraser, at any time aware of the use of the term “PUC” and if so, what actions did one or more of them take in relation to its use; (e) does the government accept the BOI June 2006 Incident Report finding that persons characterized by Canadian soldiers and commanders during one or more periods in 2006 as “PUCs” were transferred to Afghan authorities without also being characterized as “detainees” with the result that there was no triggering of the record-keeping and reporting (including reporting to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)) connected to official detainee policy and to the 2005 Transfer Arrangement with Afghanistan, and if so, what is the number of such PUCs transferred without record or reporting to the ICRC; (f) in relation to the observation in the BOI June 2006 Incident Report (para 33, Part II), that, in relation to the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation published Canadian military reports from the field that 26 persons were “captured” on May 17, 2006, by Task Force ORION, those 26 were transferred to the Afghan National Police without ever being processed as detainees, were those persons treated as PUCs by TF ORION; (g) in relation to question (m) of Order Paper Question Q-1117 (41st Parliament, first session; filed by Craig Scott, MP) that asked the government to set out how 11 captured persons referenced at page 96 of a book by the commanding officer of Task Force ORION, Ian Hope – Dancing with the Dushman: Command Imperatives for the Counter-Insurgency Fight in Afghanistan (Canadian Defence Agency Press, 2008) – were processed, were these 11 persons processed as “detainees” with attendant record-keeping and reporting or were they instead treated as “PUCs” and transferred to Afghan authorities on that basis, with no attendant record-keeping or reporting to the ICRC; (h) in view of the statement in a report by the Directorate of Special Examinations and Inquiries (DESI), in “Directorate of Special Examinations and Inquiries Investigation—Passage of Information, Final Report (14 June 2006 Afghanistan Detainee Incident)”, document number 7045-72-09/26, that it was “of very significant concern …that a number of TF ORION War Diary records for the period 13 May – 17 June 2006 could not be located”, have some or all of those war diary records since been located; (i) if some or all of the war diaries referenced in (h) have been located, do they shed light on the use of “PUCs” or like designations as a way to avoid labelling a captive as a “detainee”; (j) in relation to point (o) in Q-1117 (41st Parliament, first session) – “were there persons under the control of Canadian forces who were transferred to Afghanistan, but who were not treated by Canada as covered by the provisions of the 2005 and 2007 Canada-Afghanistan Memorandums of Understanding on detainee transfer and if so, on what basis were transfers of such persons not deemed covered by the agreements?” – that the government did not then answer in the affirmative, would the government now like to change its answer; (k) in relation to point (p) in Q-1117 (41st Parliament, first session) – “were there persons under the control of Canadian forces who were transferred to Afghanistan but whose existence and transfer was not made known to the International Committee of the Red Cross and if so, on what basis was the Red Cross not informed?” – that the government did not then answer in the affirmative, would the government now like to change its answer; (l) in relation to point (n) of Q-1117 (41st Parliament, first session) – “at any period and if so, which periods, [were] there …one or more categories of persons who Canada passed on to either Afghan or American authorities but who were not categorized as detainees, and did such categories have a designation, whether formal or informal?” – why did the government not reveal the existence of “PUCs” as an informal category; (m) in relation to, inter alia, the government answers to points (n), (o), and (p) of Q-1117 (41st Parliament, first session), does the present government consider that the former government deliberately sought to mislead or even deceive the then Member of Parliament who submitted Q-1117 (41st Parliament, first session); (n) inclusive of points (n), (o), and (p) of Q-1117 (41st Parliament, first session), are there any answers to this question that the present government considers were incorrect or untruthful; (o) in relation to a September 19, 2016, letter from Mr. Craig Scott, former MP for Toronto–Danforth, to the current Prime Minister in which Mr. Scott presented reasons as to why he “believe[d] it to be likely that the Department of National Defence crafted its answer to Order Paper Question Q-1117 (41st Parliament, first session) in order to avoid revealing” the existence of persons who were transferred to Afghanistan without being recorded or reported to the ICRC as “detainees”, has that letter resulted in any inquiries by or on behalf of the Prime Minister and if so, of what sort and with what result; (p) when on December 8, 2009, then Member of Parliament the Hon. Ujjal Dosanjh asked a question to former Chief of Defence Staff Walter Natynczyk in the latter’s appearance before the Standing Committee on National Defence in which Mr. Dosanjh quoted from a Globe and Mail article in which a Military Police officer’s field notes used the term “PUC”, did the government conduct any other investigation into why “PUC” had been used apart from the ordering of Board of Inquiry and Chief of Review Services investigations into aspects of the underlying incident and if so, what was the result; and (q) in relation to findings in BOI June 2006 Incident Report (para 12, Part II), stating that “Although BGen [David] Fraser did not become familiar with TSO [Theatre Standing Order] 321A until arriving in Kandahar…, its underlying principle of transferring detainees to ANSF was made clear to him before departing Canada. Direction provided to him verbally by the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) [General Rick Hillier] emphasized that Afghan detainees were to be transferred to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) as far forward in the field and as rapidly as possible; indeed, that their transfer from CF to ANSF custody was to be measured in terms of “minutes to hours.”, does the government consider that this constituted an instruction by General Hillier to circumvent the formal “detainee” system with a “PUC” practice?

With regard to changes to Compensation and Benefits Instructions, Chapter 205, Allowances for Officers and Non-Commissioned Members, that became effective on September 1, 2017: (a) what consultations were done prior to changing this policy; (b) what measures were taken to notify members of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) of the change; (c) when did the drafting of the revised policy begin; (d) when was the revised policy finalized; (e) what ministerial approval was required before implementing the revised policy; (f) what calculations have been done to understand the financial implications on (i) Paratroop Allowance (Monthly), (ii) Rescue Specialist Allowance (Monthly), (iii) Aircrew Allowance (Monthly), (iv) Land Duty Allowance (Monthly), (v) Diving Allowance (Monthly), (vi) Sea Duty Allowance (Monthly), (vii) Submarine Allowance (Monthly), (viii) Special Operations Allowance (Monthly), (ix) Special Operations Assaulter Allowance (Monthly), (x) Submarine Crewing Allowance (Monthly); (g) have any members of the CAF been asked to repay allowances awarded to them as a result of this policy change, and if so, how many; (h) if the answer in (g) is affirmative, have any members returned their allowance or portions of their allowances to the government, and if so, how many; (i) for each occupation listed in (f) what is the number of individuals who served under a temporary medical category or a medical employment limitation since 2015; and (j) how many individuals listed in (g) served continuously under a temporary medical category or a medical employment limitation for 180 days or more?

With respect to the periods of service of the Hon. Harjit Singh Sajjan, Minister of National Defence, in the Canadian military in Afghanistan: (a) in terms of Mr. Sajjan’s written terms of employment, terms of deployment, terms of service, terms of engagement or any like conditions of service/employment, what was or were Mr. Sajjan’s jobs, positons, and functions in Afghanistan throughout the periods in which he served in Afghanistan, including as they may have been modified or otherwise developed over time; (b) is it correct, as Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner Mary Dawson reports in a letter to Mr. Craig Scott of February 27, 2017, that Mr. Sajjan told the Commissioner that he was “deployed as a reservist to Afghanistan where he was responsible for capacity building with local police forces” and, if so, was this the extent and limit of his role or roles; (c) if Mr. Sajjan had a role or roles going beyond what he told the Commissioner, did he deliberately withhold that information from the Commissioner; (d) when or after General David Fraser had Mr. Sajjan transferred from Kabul to Kandahar, what orders, instructions, changed terms of service, or the like, whether written or verbal, were given from time to time by General Fraser to Mr. Sajjan about what his role or roles would entail in Kandahar; (e) what was or were Mr. Sajjan’s role or roles in Afghanistan in relation to liaising with, working with, mentoring, training, advising, assisting, cooperating with or conducting any similar forms of engagement with the Afghan National Police (ANP), the National Directorate of Security (NDS), the Afghan National Army (ANA), the Governor of Kandahar, and any informal or paramilitary organizations working for or with the aforementioned four organizations; (f) how many meetings and on what dates did Mr. Sajjan attend (i) meetings with the Joint Coordination Committee (JCC) in Kandahar and (ii) meetings on the same day as JCC meetings that consisted of a sub-section of the attendees of the JCC meeting; (g) what was or were Mr. Sajjan’s role or roles with respect to the JCC and with respect to any other meeting consisting of some but not all members of the JCC, and did his role include facilitating and then reporting on intelligence flows from the National Directorate of Security to the Canadian and/or allied militaries; (h) is any part of what General David Fraser said in the following report by David Pugliese (“Afghan service puts Defence Minister Sajjan in conflict of interest on detainees, say lawyers,” [June 21, 2016] Ottawa Citizen), namely that “Retired Brig.-Gen. David Fraser has said Sajjan’s work as an intelligence officer and his activities in Afghanistan helped lay the foundation for a military operation that led to the death or capture of more than 1,500 insurgents”, untrue and, if so, why and/or to what extent; (i) is any part of what Sean Maloney reports in his book Fighting for Afghanistan: A Rogue Historian at War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011) in the following sentence – “Harj [Mr. Sajjan] attended the weekly security meeting and learned that the meeting could become a tool as well. Over time, he developed rapport with all the security ‘players’ in Kandahar.”— untrue and, if so, why and/or to what extent; (j) is any part of what Sean Maloney also reports in his book in the following sentence – “[Following JCC meetings] Harj was able to send two pages of solid intelligence to TF [Task Force] ORION per week. The quality of the intelligence was awesome.” – untrue and, if so, why and/or to what extent; (k) is any part of what Sean Maloney also reports in his book in the following sentence – “[T]he NDS funneled most of the information into the JCC, so it wasn’t all just coming from OEF systems or resources.” – untrue and, if so, why and/or to what extent; (l) is any part of what Sean Maloney also reports in his book in the following sentence – “[F]rom then on, Harj sent intelligence directly to AEGIS, to ORION, and to the ASIC with his analysis attached.” – untrue and, if so, why and/or to what extent; (m) is any part of what Sean Maloney also reports in his book in the following sentence – “My responsibilities were vague at first. General Fraser had me work with [Governor of Kandahar Province] Asadullah Khalid. But I also worked at the PRT [Provincial Reconstruction Team] to assess emergent Afghan policing issues.” – untrue and, if so, why and to what extent; and (n) when Mr. Sajjan delivered a speech in New Delhi on April 18, 2017, and said from a prepared text – “On my first deployment to Kandahar in 2006, I was the architect of Operation MEDUSA where we removed 1,500 Taliban fighters off the battlefield…” – was he referring, in whole or in part, to his intelligence role for which he was praised by General David Fraser, the commander of Operation MEDUSA, as referenced in (h) above?