Questions and responses 41st Parliament, 1st session June 2, 2011, to September 13, 2013

With regard to the policies and practices concerning treatment of persons under the control of Canadian forces in Afghanistan in any part of the period from September 12, 2001, to present: (a) were each of Canada’s Defence Intelligence, Canadian Security and Intelligence Service, and the Canadian Security Establishment amongst the intelligence agencies based at Kandahar Air Field (KAF) base; (b) what other intelligence agencies, Canadian or non-Canadian, were based at KAF or operated out of KAF without being based there; (c) is the government aware of a military facility in Kandahar commonly known as Graceland and, if so, what sort of facility was, or is, it, and what institutional actors operated, or operate, from this facility; (d) is the government aware of a military facility in Kandahar commonly known as Gecko and, if so, what sort of facility was, or is, it, and what institutional actors operated, or operate, from this facility; (e) how do, or did, the facilities and the institutional actors operating from Gecko and Graceland (i) relate to each other, (ii) interact; (f) on what date did Canadian special forces, including JTF2, first arrive in Afghanistan and, if they have left, on what date did they leave Afghanistan; (g) if Canadian special forces, including JTF2, are currently in Afghanistan, whether as units or as individual personnel, in what capacity are they in Afghanistan; (h) has Canada ever transferred persons under its control to Afghan authorities with the knowledge that some of those persons would or could end up being held in the facilities of National Directorate of Security (NDS) Kabul; (i) does the government know of cases of persons under initial Canadian control who ended up being held in the facilities of NDS Kabul, whether under the control of NDS or whether under the control of one or more other Afghan or non-Afghan intelligence agencies and, if so, (i) how many, (ii) which other intelligence agency or agencies; (j) did Canada ever seek to trace persons who had been either detained by or otherwise under the control of Canadian special forces, including JTF2, and who Canada knew or suspected had ended up at NDS Kabul facilities and, if so, (i) for what reasons was tracing undertaken, (ii) how many persons did Canada seek to trace, (iii) what were the results of the efforts in terms of the number of persons who were located versus determining that persons were not traceable; (k) is the government familiar with the English expression, whether formal or informal, of “amplifying orders” used in the Canadian military context and, if so, what does this mean; (l) in the period in question (2001 to present), did General Rick Hillier ever issue “amplifying orders” that related, directly or indirectly, to the policy or practice of handing over persons under Canada’s control in Afghanistan to agents of another state, whether Afghan or non-Afghan and, if so, for each set of amplifying orders, (i) what were the dates of the orders, (ii) what previous orders, rules of engagement or other documents were being amplified, (iii) what was the content of the amplifying orders; (m) in relation to the May 25, 2006, capture of “11 suspected Taliban fighters” referenced at page 96 of Ian Hope, Dancing with the Dushman: Command Imperatives for the Counter-Insurgency Fight in Afghanistan (Canadian Defence Agency Press, 2008), could the government set out the manner in which each of these 11 persons controlled by Canadian forces were processed, including what is known about each’s subsequent trajectory after passing from the control of Canada until the point at which the government may have lost track of their whereabouts; (n) at any period and, if so, which periods, did the Canadian government consider that there were one or more categories of persons who Canada passed on to either Afghan or American authorities but who were not categorized as detainees, and did such categories have a designation, whether formal or informal; (o) were there persons under the control of Canadian forces who were transferred to Afghanistan, but who were not treated by Canada as covered by the provisions of the 2005 and 2007 Canada-Afghanistan Memorandums of Understanding on detainee transfer and, if so, on what basis were transfers of such persons not deemed covered by the agreements; (p) were there persons under the control of Canadian forces who were transferred to Afghanistan but whose existence and transfer was not made known to the International Committee of the Red Cross and, if so, on what basis was the Red Cross not informed; (q) during the 2011 Parliamentary process in which a Panel of Arbiters decided what information could be released to Parliament, were documents withheld from this process by the government if they concerned the transfer of persons that were not treated by Canada as covered by the provisions of the 2005 and 2007 Canada-Afghanistan Memorandums of Understanding on detainee transfer; (r) between September 12, 2001, and the entry into effect of the 2005 detainee-transfer Memorandum of Understanding, (i) how many detainees were transferred to US authorities, (ii) to which US authorities, (iii) how many detainees were transferred to Afghan authorities, (iv) to which Afghan authorities, (v) how many persons under the control of Canada, but not considered as detainees by Canada, were transferred to US authorities, (vi) to which US authorities, (vii) how many persons under the control of Canada, but not considered as detainees by Canada, were transferred to Afghan authorities, (viii) to which Afghan authorities; (s) between the entry into effect of the 2005 detainee-transfer Memorandum of Understanding and the entry into effect of the 2007 detainee-transfer Memorandum of Understanding, (i) how many detainees were transferred to US authorities, (ii) to which US authorities, (iii) how many detainees were transferred to Afghan authorities, (iv) to which Afghan authorities, (v) how many persons under the control of Canada, but not considered as detainees by Canada, were transferred to US authorities, (vi) to which US authorities, (vii) how many persons under the control of Canada, but not considered as detainees by Canada, were transferred to Afghan authorities, (viii) to which Afghan authorities; (t) between the entry into effect of the 2007 detainee-transfer Memorandum of Understanding and the present date, (i) how many detainees were transferred to US authorities, (ii) to which US authorities, (iii) how many detainees were transferred to Afghan authorities, (iv) to which Afghan authorities, (v) how many persons under the control of Canada, but not considered as detainees by Canada, were transferred to US authorities, (vi) to which US authorities, (vii) how many persons under the control of Canada, but not considered as detainees by Canada, were transferred to Afghan authorities, (viii) to which Afghan authorities; (u) before General Rick Hillier signed the 2005 detainee-transfer Memorandum of Understanding with Afghan Defence Minister Wardak, did General Hillier call or attempt to call the Canadian Defence Minister Graham from Afghanistan, in order to seek Graham’s authorization for Hillier to sign; (v) at the time of the signing of the 2005 detainee-transfer Memorandum of Understanding between Afghan Defence Minister Wardak and Canadian General Hillier, was the Ambassador of Canada to Afghanistan in the room when the document was signed and thus an eyewitness to each man signing the document; (w) have Canadian special forces, whether JTF2 or other, ever participated in operations designed to obtain control over or custody of persons in Afghanistan as a result of information, instructions or orders originating from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or another US intelligence agency and, if so, in what periods and resulting in how many captures; (x) if not, have Canadian special forces participated alongside or in coordination with United States special forces for such capture operations in Afghanistan where it is known or reasonably assumed by Canada that the US special forces are acting on information, instructions or orders originating from the CIA or another US intelligence agency; (y) have there ever been and are there now Canadian military special forces in Pakistan; (z) have Canadian special forces, whether JTF2 or other, ever participated in operations designed to obtain control over or custody of persons in Pakistan as a result of information, instructions or orders originating from the CIA or another US intelligence agency and, if so, in what periods and resulting in how many captures; and (aa) if not, have Canadian special forces participated alongside or in coordination with US special forces for such capture operations in Pakistan where it is known or reasonably assumed by Canada that the US special forces are acting on information, instructions or orders originating from the CIA or another US intelligence agency?

With regard to the decision to send Canadian Forces personnel to Afghanistan: (a) what specific evaluations of the additional requirements and costs for health-care services for the Forces (funding and budget, health-care staff and professionals, their areas of specialization, organizational structure, evaluation tools, recruiting programs, and any other aspects) were conducted before or after this decision, including evaluations of (i) the requirements of the mission in Canada and in the field, (ii) the long-term needs of service personnel and veterans following the mission, (iii) mental-health assessments; (b) what were the findings and recommendations of these evaluations, and (i) what recommendations were implemented and to what extent, (ii) what recommendations were not implemented and why, (iii) what follow-up was conducted on the recommendations that were implemented; (c) what programs and recruitment campaigns were introduced for health-care staff and professionals; and (d) how many health-care staff and professionals were recruited while Canadian Forces personnel were deployed to Afghanistan, and to what extent has the number of medical staff and health-care professionals increased compared with the number of uniformed Canadian Forces service persons deployed?

With respect to the Afghan Detainee Document Review (ADDR) submitted on April 15, 2011, by the Panel of Arbiters (PoA) under the June 15, 2010, Memorandum of Understanding signed by three party leaders in Parliament: (a)have the documents referred to in paragraph 30 ever been provided, unredacted, to any Canadian government law-enforcement investigators for purposes of tracing the detainees named in the documents in order to determine whether any suffered mistreatment after transfer to Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security (NDS), if not, why not; (b) has the government ever provided compensation to any person or family of any person transferred to Afghan authorities, or sought out a person or family with compensation as the purpose; (c) with regard to the public-domain research (regular reviews of credible media reporting, government reports and reports of international organizations) conducted by the PoA’s staff referenced in paragraph 36 of the ADDR, was this public domain research handed over to the government, if not, where is it located, and, whatever its location, will the government release any bibliographies generated by this research or any documents archived by the research that fall within the categories of “credible media reporting, government reports and reports of international organizations”; (d) with regard to the PoA’s review of documents redacted on the basis of national security confidentiality (“NSC” documents), national defence and international relations whereby the PoA reviewed between 1450 and 2300 pages of documents (paragraphs 52-54) while releasing 113 NSC documents (paragraph 56), will the government release those documents that were not yet ready for release with the ADDR because the Department of Justice had not yet had time to complete the technical process of preparing the documents for release after the PoA had finished its reviews and determinations (paragraphs 54 and 55), and how many PoA-reviewed documents remain unreleased because the technical process of preparing the documents remains incomplete; (e) with regard to the 15 documents for which the government had initially claimed solicitor-client privilege (paragraph 63 and page 1 of the ADDR annex called “Documents subject to Solicitor-Client Privilege Claims”) but later withdrew the claim, in each case, (i) what were the bases on which privilege was initially claimed, (ii) why did the government change its view; (f) with regard to the 117 documents for which the PoA upheld the government’s solicitor-client privilege claim (paragraphs 64 and 65; pages 2-7 of the ADDR annex called “Documents subject to Solicitor-Client Privilege Claims”), will the government waive the solicitor-client privilege to the limited extent of revealing the subject matter of each of the 117 documents; (g) in the ADDR annex called “Documents subject to Solicitor-Client Privilege Claims”, why are the large majority of documents described with the acronym PoA (presumably, Panel of Arbiters) while some are specifically indicated as being DFAIT (Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade) documents?

With regard to each document detailing the capture, transfer, and treatment of Afghan detainees by Canadian and Afghan forces between 2002 and 2009, excluding all matters which are in their nature secret and excluding those documents tabled in the House of Commons on March 25, 2010, April 1, 2011, and June 22, 2011: (a) what are the details of each document; (b) what are the names of the (i) sender, (ii) recipients; and (c) on what date was it sent?

With regard to the Afghan detainee documents, excluding all matters which are in their nature secret, for each document: (a) what are its contents; (b) what are the names of the (i) sender, (ii) recipients; and (c) on what date was it sent?

With respect to the government’s investigation of potential human rights abuses related to the transfer of Afghan detainees from the custody of Canadian Forces to the government of Afghanistan, especially the National Security Directorate (NDS): (a) do the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister automatically receive either copies of or briefings on the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT)’s annual human rights reports on Afghanistan; (b) if so, has this practice of automatically receiving copies or briefings always existed; (c) if not, when did this practice start; (d) once knowledge of human rights abuses within the NDS became known, did the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and/or the Minister of Defence order copies of or briefings on the DFAIT annual human rights report on Afghanistan; (e) if not, does the practice of not reading or being briefed on the DFAIT human rights report on Afghanistan continue to this day; (f) following the April 23, 2007, Globe and Mail article by Graeme Smith on transferred detainees as victims of mistreatment within NDS facilities, did the government seek to verify the alleged experiences of the people interviewed by Smith and, if so, (i) what precise measures were taken, (ii) by whom, (iii) for how long and until when did these measures last; (g) consistent with the book The Savage War by Murray Brewster (page 276), did lawyers representing the government while simultaneously representing military police involved in the Military Police Complaints Commission’s hearings on Afghan detainees “t[ake] their direction from senior levels inside the civil service”, and, if so, (i) did this include one or more officials within the Privy Council Office (PCO), (ii) is this normal practice, (iii) what are the guidelines for how Department of Justice lawyers receive direction from outside the Department of Justice, particularly from PCO officials; (h) in relation to Afghan detainee issues, have government lawyers ever received instructions, directions or representations from staff, at any level, within the Prime Minister’s Office; (i) did Amnesty International suggest to NATO and/or the government that one way to ensure no torture of detainees would occur would be to embed soldiers or military police in Afghan facilities and, if so, (i) was this option considered (ii) why was it not adopted if it was considered; (j) why did the government decide to approach the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) to start monitoring transferred detainees under the December 2005 arrangement, leading to the February 20, 2007 agreement with AIHRC; (k) did the government do an assessment of AIHRC’s capacity to engage in this role and, if so, what were the results of this assessment; (l) with respect to the testimony of David Mulroney before the Special Committee on the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan that Canada could not find evidence of former Kandahar Governor Khalid having a detention facility in or next to his compound, exactly what efforts were undertaken to investigate this matter, (i) by what actors, (ii) using what methods, (iii) on how many occasions; (m) did the government of Canada ever receive information from the AIHRC conveying a belief that Khalid operated a private jail and, if so, did the AIHRC also convey a belief that mistreatment of prisoners took place there; (n) for what reasons was the government of Canada unable to verify whether such a jail existed; (o) when the head of the AIHRC, Canada’s partner in monitoring detainees, “estimated publicly... that approximately one-third of the prisoners handed over ended up being tortured” (Brewster, The Savage War, page 67), (i) what was the government’s response to this information, (ii) was this deemed a credible estimate and, if not, why not; (p) after the statement in (o) was made, was it the government’s policy that it was lawful to transfer detainees; (q) did any communications occur within the Canadian Forces or the government about the concerns expressed by military police official Major Kevin Rowcliffe about the torture of detainees and what actions did the government take in response to Major Rowcliffe’s testimony before the Military Police Complaints Commission; and (r) has either DFAIT or PCO ever conducted an analysis or assessment of the NDS and, if so, what was the subject-matter of the analysis or assessment?

With regard to intelligence-gathering policies and practices, and Canada’s past policy and practice of transferring Afghan detainees to the government of Afghanistan, especially the National Security Directorate (NDS): (a) was interest, by the Afghan authorities in an Afghan individual, one of the Canadian Forces’ (CF) criteria for detaining that person, and, if so, what was meant by “interest in the individual”; (b) did Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) officials, Department of Foreign Affairs and International (DFAIT) officials, or other non-Canadian Forces officials ever take part in, or provide information with respect to, Canadian Forces determinations as to whether the Afghan authorities had an “interest in the individual”; (c) if CF, with or without CSIS or DFAIT assistance, engaged in tactical questioning and collection of evidence related to a detainee, and no useful information was acquired, would such detainee still be subject to transfer to NDS and, if so, for what purposes; (d) did CF ever transfer someone to NDS without CF or CSIS having first engaged in its own questioning and collective of evidence, in order that NDS would be able to engage in the first questioning of the person; (e) when Canada received intelligence from NDS, (i) did it ask or require NDS to indicate whether that intelligence came from interrogation of any Afghans who had been transferred to NDS by Canada, (ii) did its intelligence services operate standard procedures for assessing whether such intelligence received from NDS was, or may have, been secured as a result of mistreatment, notably torture, and, if so, what consequences did such assessment have for use of the provided intelligence; (f) if Canada continues to receive intelligence from NDS, do its intelligence services operate standard procedures for assessing whether such intelligence received from NDS was or may have been secured as a result of mistreatment, notably torture, and, if so, what consequences do such assessments have as concerns the use of the provided intelligence; (g) since 2001, have NDS officials ever visited Canadian government officials in Canada, and, if so, when and with what government departments and departmental units or branches; (h) considering that the Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) operated in Afghanistan, did Canada ever provide CSEC signals intelligence to NDS and, if so, does it continue to do so; and (i) was a review of CSIS’ activities ordered after it was revealed that CSIS officials had taken part in the interrogation of Afghan prisoners, and, if so, (i) who or what entity conducted this review, (ii) what were the results of this review?