Questions and responses 42nd Parliament, 1st session December 3, 2015, to September 11, 2019

With respect to the characterization of persons in the care, custody or control of the Canadian military as “PUCs” and “Persons Under Control,” or use of like categories, whether or not such terms were or are used officially or unofficially: (a) was there, at any point between 2001 and 2011, a government policy, formal or informal, to characterize or label Afghans detained by the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan as ''Persons Under Control'' and ''PUCs''; (b) was there, at any point between 2001 and 2011, a Canadian Forces policy, either formal or informal, to characterize or label Afghans detained by the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan as ''Persons Under Control'' and ''PUCs''; (c) if the answer in either or both (a) and (b) is affirmative, what was the nature of that policy; (d) if the answers in (a) and (b) are negative, were there circumstances under which the Canadian Forces, or Canadian Forces members, (i) could nonetheless engage in a practice, versus implement a policy, of categorizing or labelling a detainee as a ''Person Under Control'' and ''PUC'', (ii) did engage in a practice of categorizing or labelling a detainee as a ''Person Under Control'' and ''PUC'', and, if so, with what purpose and in what periods; (e) if the answer in (d)(ii) is affirmative, has the government attempted to determine whether such ‘'Persons Under Control’' and ‘'PUCs’' were ever transferred to the control of other states and, if so, how many and in what periods; (f) if the Canadian Forces, or Canadian Forces members, did transfer some ‘'Persons Under Control'’ and ‘'PUCs’' to the control of other states, what efforts have been made to determine the identity and fate of those transferred persons; (g) if the Canadian Forces, or Canadian Forces members, wished, at any point between 2001 and 2011, to characterize or label 'detainees' as ''Persons Under Control'' and ''PUCs'', either to engage in a practice or to create a policy allowing for such a characterization or labelling, could they have done so without the approval of (i) the Minister of National Defence, (ii) the Chief of Defence Staff; and (h) if the Canadian Forces, or Canadian Forces members, wished now, in any theatre of war in which Canada may find itself present, to characterize or label 'detainees' as ''Persons Under Control'' and ''PUCs'', either to engage in a practice or to create a policy allowing for such a characterization or labelling, could they do so without the approval of (i) the Minister of National Defence, (ii) the Chief of Defence Staff?

With respect to the characterization of persons in the care, custody or control of the Canadian military as Persons Under Control (PUCs) or use of like categories, whether or not such terms were or are used officially or unofficially: (a) in relation to a statement by Donald P. Wright et al. in A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation – ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) October 2001-September 2005 (Combat Studies Institute, 2010), at p. 221: “Detainees in Coalition hands in Afghanistan were referred to as persons under control (PUCs) instead of EPWs or detainees,”, does this reference to “Coalition” apply to the Canadian military, including special forces in any part of the 2001-2005 period in question; (b) in relation to a claim by Ahmed Rashid in Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation-Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia (Penguin, 2009), at pp. 304-305: “In spring 2002, …CIA lawyers further twisted legal boundaries by establishing a new category of prisoner: Persons Under Control, or PUC. Anyone held as PUC was automatically denied access to the ICRC, and even his existence was denied...PUCs were flown around the world to different locations on private jets belonging to dummy companies owned by the CIA.”, is the government aware of whether this is an accurate statement of one use to which the category of “PUC” was put by the United States; (c) in relation to an observation in Center for Law and Military Operations (United States Army, Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School), Lessons Learned from Afghanistan and Iraq: Volume I - Major Combat Operations (11 September 2001 – 1 May 2003) (August 1, 2004) [Lessons Learned]: “[P]ersons detained were either classified as ‘persons under control’ (PUCs) or simply as ‘detainees.’… Persons captured on the battlefield were initially brought to the classified location to establish their identity and determine if they met the criteria for potential transfer to Guantanamo. During this phase, detained personnel were classified as ‘PUCs’.”, is the government aware of whether, during such windows of time, CIA agents or persons working for the CIA would sometimes take custody of PUCs from the US Army before they could be officially designated as “detainees” by the Army; (d) in relation to a claim in Chris Mackey and Greg Miller, The Interrogators: Task Force 500 and America’s Secret War Against Al-Qaeda (Back Bay Books, 2004), at pp. 250-251: “In June [2002]…our [US Army] command in Bagram …came up with a whole new prisoner category called “persons under U.S. control”, or PUCs. The whole idea was to create a sort of limbo status, a bureaucratic blank spot where prisoners could reside temporarily without entering any official database or numbering system.”: is the government aware of whether or not this US Army PUC category was created in concert with and used by the CIA as a way to secure custody of PUCs while they were still in a “bureaucratic blank spot”; (e) in relation to the observations in Lessons Learned that “the term ‘PUC’ did not develop until the [US] XVIIIth Airborne Corps arrived in Afghanistan” in 2002, did Canadian Forces, including special forces, ever conduct joint operations with the US’ XVIIIth Airbone Corps in which captives were taken; (f) is the government aware of whether the commanding officer of the US’ XVIIIth Airborne Corps, Lt. Gen. Dan McNeill, was a direct source of, or conduit for, the notion of “PUC” and if so, whether Lt. Gen. Dan McNeill was working in concert or tandem with the CIA in introducing this term into the Afghanistan theatre; (g) after General Walter Natynczyk was seconded to command 35,000 US forces in Iraq during the US’ Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq from January 2004 to January 2005, did he bring any knowledge of the use of PUC practices or a PUC system from Iraq to the Canada-Afghanistan context when he became head of the Canadian Forces’ Land Force Doctrine and Training system in 2005 and when he was appointed Vice-Chief of Defence Staff in 2006, and if so, was such practices introduced in any way to this doctrine and training system; (h) prior to August 2015 by which time the first Canadian Forces troops had arrived in Kandahar, were there meetings between Canadian Lt. Gen. Michel Gauthier and US Under-Secretary of Defence for Intelligence Steve Cambone or any other officials in the US Department of Defense or in the Pentagon in which they discussed, inter alia, Canada aligning or otherwise coordinating its policy and practices in Kandahar with those of the US, including in relation to detainees, as a condition of the US agreeing that Canada be assigned Kandahar; (i) prior to August 2015 by which time the first Canadian Forces troops had arrived in Kandahar, were there meetings between Chief of Defence Staff General Rick Hillier and any officials in the US Department of Defense or in the Pentagon in which they discussed, inter alia, Canada aligning or otherwise coordinating its policy and practices in Kandahar with those of the US, including in relation to detainees, as a condition of the US agreeing that Canada be assigned Kandahar; (j) prior to August 2015 by which time the first Canadian Forces troops had arrived in Kandahar, were there meetings between any Canadian Forces officers apart from Generals Gauthier and Hillier in which they discussed, inter alia, Canada aligning or otherwise coordinating its policy and practices in Kandahar with those of the US, including in relation to detainees, as a condition of the US agreeing that Canada be assigned Kandahar; and (k) is the mini-biography of Mr. Gauthier on The Governance Network’s website correct in saying Gauthier “[l]ed Canadian Expeditionary Force Command, responsible for all CF operational missions abroad, the Canadian mission in southern Afghanistan” and if so, did this include authority over policy and decisions related to the transfer of captives to other states?

With regard to payments made by the government during the 2016 calendar year: (a) how much money was given to the (i) Education Quality Improvement Project in Afghanistan, (ii) Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, (iii) World Bank; and (b) under which specific allotment in the Main Estimates for Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development did the funding for each of the payments in (a) originate?

With regard to cooperation between the Canadian military and the United States (US) military and intelligence agencies in Afghanistan and Iraq and to findings of the Canadian military Board of Inquiry report of May 4, 2010, on the subject of the “14 June 2006 Afghan Detainee Incident”: (a) when did Canada decide to no longer transfer persons in the care, custody, or control of members of the Canadian military to members of the US military; (b) were there any omissions or exclusions from the scope of this decision at the receiving end, such as US intelligence agencies like the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or did the decision apply to transfers to any agent or actor acting on behalf of the US government; (c) at the transferring end, did this decision apply to all members of the Canadian military, including special forces and intelligence officials, and if not, to whom did it not apply; (d) for what reasons was this decision taken; (e) was this decision taken after legal advice had been received on whether it would be lawful to continue to transfer to the US and if so, was the government advised that it would be unlawful to continue the transfers; (f) what was the date of the last transfer before the decision came into effect; (g) did this decision apply to persons who would or could be characterized as Persons Under Control (PUC) by the US Army, units within the US Army, or the CIA, considering that this is a term that the Canadian military Board of Inquiry report of May 4, 2010, referred to as an “American Army Term”; (h) were there any instances of this decision not being implemented, and thus of persons being transferred to the US military or another US agency in situations in which members of the Canadian military themselves characterized a person as a PUC, considering that the same Canadian military Board of Inquiry report of May 4, 2010, observed that the term PUC was in “widespread use” within the Canadian military in Afghanistan; (i) is the government aware of any instances in which persons who were determined not to be “detainees” were transferred on the battlefield or elsewhere to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) personnel, including the Afghan National Police, the Afghan National Army, the National Directorate of Security, and any paramilitary or like organizations working for or alongside the foregoing, to then learn that the person was re-transferred by ANSF personnel to members of the US military, CIA, or private US actors cooperating with the US Army or CIA; (j) is the government aware of any instances in which persons treated by Canada as “detainees” were transferred to ANSF personnel and then re-transferred by ANSF personnel to members of the US military, CIA, etc., especially before the 2007 Transfer Arrangement between Canada and Afghanistan took effect; (k) was this decision conveyed to the US government and if so, what reasons were provided and how did the US government respond; and (l) was this decision ever reversed or revised and if so, on what terms, when, and for what reasons?

With respect to the periods of service of the Hon. Harjit Singh Sajjan, Minister of National Defence, in the Canadian military in Afghanistan: (a) in terms of Mr. Sajjan’s written terms of employment, terms of deployment, terms of service, terms of engagement or any like conditions of service/employment, what was or were Mr. Sajjan’s jobs, positons, and functions in Afghanistan throughout the periods in which he served in Afghanistan, including as they may have been modified or otherwise developed over time; (b) is it correct, as Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner Mary Dawson reports in a letter to Mr. Craig Scott of February 27, 2017, that Mr. Sajjan told the Commissioner that he was “deployed as a reservist to Afghanistan where he was responsible for capacity building with local police forces” and, if so, was this the extent and limit of his role or roles; (c) if Mr. Sajjan had a role or roles going beyond what he told the Commissioner, did he deliberately withhold that information from the Commissioner; (d) when or after General David Fraser had Mr. Sajjan transferred from Kabul to Kandahar, what orders, instructions, changed terms of service, or the like, whether written or verbal, were given from time to time by General Fraser to Mr. Sajjan about what his role or roles would entail in Kandahar; (e) what was or were Mr. Sajjan’s role or roles in Afghanistan in relation to liaising with, working with, mentoring, training, advising, assisting, cooperating with or conducting any similar forms of engagement with the Afghan National Police (ANP), the National Directorate of Security (NDS), the Afghan National Army (ANA), the Governor of Kandahar, and any informal or paramilitary organizations working for or with the aforementioned four organizations; (f) how many meetings and on what dates did Mr. Sajjan attend (i) meetings with the Joint Coordination Committee (JCC) in Kandahar and (ii) meetings on the same day as JCC meetings that consisted of a sub-section of the attendees of the JCC meeting; (g) what was or were Mr. Sajjan’s role or roles with respect to the JCC and with respect to any other meeting consisting of some but not all members of the JCC, and did his role include facilitating and then reporting on intelligence flows from the National Directorate of Security to the Canadian and/or allied militaries; (h) is any part of what General David Fraser said in the following report by David Pugliese (“Afghan service puts Defence Minister Sajjan in conflict of interest on detainees, say lawyers,” [June 21, 2016] Ottawa Citizen), namely that “Retired Brig.-Gen. David Fraser has said Sajjan’s work as an intelligence officer and his activities in Afghanistan helped lay the foundation for a military operation that led to the death or capture of more than 1,500 insurgents”, untrue and, if so, why and/or to what extent; (i) is any part of what Sean Maloney reports in his book Fighting for Afghanistan: A Rogue Historian at War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011) in the following sentence – “Harj [Mr. Sajjan] attended the weekly security meeting and learned that the meeting could become a tool as well. Over time, he developed rapport with all the security ‘players’ in Kandahar.”— untrue and, if so, why and/or to what extent; (j) is any part of what Sean Maloney also reports in his book in the following sentence – “[Following JCC meetings] Harj was able to send two pages of solid intelligence to TF [Task Force] ORION per week. The quality of the intelligence was awesome.” – untrue and, if so, why and/or to what extent; (k) is any part of what Sean Maloney also reports in his book in the following sentence – “[T]he NDS funneled most of the information into the JCC, so it wasn’t all just coming from OEF systems or resources.” – untrue and, if so, why and/or to what extent; (l) is any part of what Sean Maloney also reports in his book in the following sentence – “[F]rom then on, Harj sent intelligence directly to AEGIS, to ORION, and to the ASIC with his analysis attached.” – untrue and, if so, why and/or to what extent; (m) is any part of what Sean Maloney also reports in his book in the following sentence – “My responsibilities were vague at first. General Fraser had me work with [Governor of Kandahar Province] Asadullah Khalid. But I also worked at the PRT [Provincial Reconstruction Team] to assess emergent Afghan policing issues.” – untrue and, if so, why and to what extent; and (n) when Mr. Sajjan delivered a speech in New Delhi on April 18, 2017, and said from a prepared text – “On my first deployment to Kandahar in 2006, I was the architect of Operation MEDUSA where we removed 1,500 Taliban fighters off the battlefield…” – was he referring, in whole or in part, to his intelligence role for which he was praised by General David Fraser, the commander of Operation MEDUSA, as referenced in (h) above?

In relation to Canada’s transfer of captives in Afghanistan to the authorities of other states, including the United States and Afghanistan, from 2001 onward: (a) have there been any investigations by any federal agency, including but not limited to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or the Canadian Armed Forces National Investigation Service, of senior officers in the Canadian Forces up to and including the Chief of Defence Staff for possible criminal conduct in violation of one or more Canadian statutes and one or more international legal obligations; (b) if the answer in (a) is affirmative, (i) between what dates, (ii) with respect to what conduct, (iii) with what result were these investigations conducted; (c) have there been any investigations by any federal agency, including but not limited to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or the Canadian Armed Forces National Investigation Service, of any Minister of the Crown including the Prime Minister for possible criminal conduct in violation of one or more Canadian statutes and one or more international legal obligations; (d) if the answer in (c) is affirmative, (i) between what dates, (ii) with respect to what conduct, (iii) with what result were these investigations conducted; (e) have there been any investigations by any federal agency, including but not limited to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or the Canadian Armed Forces National Investigation Service, of any member of the public service for possible criminal conduct in violation of one or more Canadian statutes and one or more international legal obligations; (f) if the answer in (e) is affirmative, (i) between what dates, (ii) with respect to what conduct, (iii) with what result were these investigations conducted; and (g) have there been any investigations by any federal agency, including but not limited to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or the Canadian Armed Forces National Investigation Service, of any member of the a minister’s political staff including any member of the Prime Minister’s Office for possible criminal conduct in violation of one or more Canadian statutes and one or more international legal obligations; and (h) if the answer in (g) is affirmative, (i) between what dates, (ii) with respect to what conduct, (iii) with what result were these investigations conducted?

With respect to the characterization of persons in the care, custody or control of the Canadian military as “PUCs” and “Persons Under Control”, or use of like categories, whether or not such terms were or are used officially or unofficially: (a) does the government accept the accuracy of the finding of a Canadian military Board of Inquiry (BOI) on the subject of the “14 June 2006 Afghan Detainee Incident” [BOI June 2006 Incident Report], in its report of May 4, 2010, (para 30, part II) that the term “PUC” was in “widespread use” amongst Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan in 2006; (b) in relation to a BOI June 2006 Incident Report observation (para 30, part II), stating that “[T]he B Coy MP [B Company Military Police officer] testified that he was directed during ROTO 1 [rotation/deployment 1] to always use the term “PUC” and to avoid the term “Detainee.””, who directed this Military Police (MP) to systematically use “PUC” and to avoid “detainee” and for what reasons was this MP so directed; (c) in relation to a BOI June 2006 Incident Report finding (para 30, part II), stating that “When made aware of the term the TFA Advisors (LEGAD and PM) endeavoured to remove it [“PUC”] from the tactical reporting lexicon, as it had no legal foundation in detainee policy.”, (i) when and how were the Task Force Afghanistan (TFA) Advisors “made aware of the term”, (ii) for what period did “PUC” appear in tactical reporting, (iii) did its use in tactical reporting end, and if it ended, when did it end and was this the result of the initiative of the TFA Advisors; (d) in relation to the same report finding as in (c), was any person in position of strategic command in the Canadian Forces, including Generals Rick Hillier, Walter Natynzyk, Michel Gauthier and David Fraser, at any time aware of the use of the term “PUC” and if so, what actions did one or more of them take in relation to its use; (e) does the government accept the BOI June 2006 Incident Report finding that persons characterized by Canadian soldiers and commanders during one or more periods in 2006 as “PUCs” were transferred to Afghan authorities without also being characterized as “detainees” with the result that there was no triggering of the record-keeping and reporting (including reporting to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)) connected to official detainee policy and to the 2005 Transfer Arrangement with Afghanistan, and if so, what is the number of such PUCs transferred without record or reporting to the ICRC; (f) in relation to the observation in the BOI June 2006 Incident Report (para 33, Part II), that, in relation to the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation published Canadian military reports from the field that 26 persons were “captured” on May 17, 2006, by Task Force ORION, those 26 were transferred to the Afghan National Police without ever being processed as detainees, were those persons treated as PUCs by TF ORION; (g) in relation to question (m) of Order Paper Question Q-1117 (41st Parliament, first session; filed by Craig Scott, MP) that asked the government to set out how 11 captured persons referenced at page 96 of a book by the commanding officer of Task Force ORION, Ian Hope – Dancing with the Dushman: Command Imperatives for the Counter-Insurgency Fight in Afghanistan (Canadian Defence Agency Press, 2008) – were processed, were these 11 persons processed as “detainees” with attendant record-keeping and reporting or were they instead treated as “PUCs” and transferred to Afghan authorities on that basis, with no attendant record-keeping or reporting to the ICRC; (h) in view of the statement in a report by the Directorate of Special Examinations and Inquiries (DESI), in “Directorate of Special Examinations and Inquiries Investigation—Passage of Information, Final Report (14 June 2006 Afghanistan Detainee Incident)”, document number 7045-72-09/26, that it was “of very significant concern …that a number of TF ORION War Diary records for the period 13 May – 17 June 2006 could not be located”, have some or all of those war diary records since been located; (i) if some or all of the war diaries referenced in (h) have been located, do they shed light on the use of “PUCs” or like designations as a way to avoid labelling a captive as a “detainee”; (j) in relation to point (o) in Q-1117 (41st Parliament, first session) – “were there persons under the control of Canadian forces who were transferred to Afghanistan, but who were not treated by Canada as covered by the provisions of the 2005 and 2007 Canada-Afghanistan Memorandums of Understanding on detainee transfer and if so, on what basis were transfers of such persons not deemed covered by the agreements?” – that the government did not then answer in the affirmative, would the government now like to change its answer; (k) in relation to point (p) in Q-1117 (41st Parliament, first session) – “were there persons under the control of Canadian forces who were transferred to Afghanistan but whose existence and transfer was not made known to the International Committee of the Red Cross and if so, on what basis was the Red Cross not informed?” – that the government did not then answer in the affirmative, would the government now like to change its answer; (l) in relation to point (n) of Q-1117 (41st Parliament, first session) – “at any period and if so, which periods, [were] there …one or more categories of persons who Canada passed on to either Afghan or American authorities but who were not categorized as detainees, and did such categories have a designation, whether formal or informal?” – why did the government not reveal the existence of “PUCs” as an informal category; (m) in relation to, inter alia, the government answers to points (n), (o), and (p) of Q-1117 (41st Parliament, first session), does the present government consider that the former government deliberately sought to mislead or even deceive the then Member of Parliament who submitted Q-1117 (41st Parliament, first session); (n) inclusive of points (n), (o), and (p) of Q-1117 (41st Parliament, first session), are there any answers to this question that the present government considers were incorrect or untruthful; (o) in relation to a September 19, 2016, letter from Mr. Craig Scott, former MP for Toronto–Danforth, to the current Prime Minister in which Mr. Scott presented reasons as to why he “believe[d] it to be likely that the Department of National Defence crafted its answer to Order Paper Question Q-1117 (41st Parliament, first session) in order to avoid revealing” the existence of persons who were transferred to Afghanistan without being recorded or reported to the ICRC as “detainees”, has that letter resulted in any inquiries by or on behalf of the Prime Minister and if so, of what sort and with what result; (p) when on December 8, 2009, then Member of Parliament the Hon. Ujjal Dosanjh asked a question to former Chief of Defence Staff Walter Natynczyk in the latter’s appearance before the Standing Committee on National Defence in which Mr. Dosanjh quoted from a Globe and Mail article in which a Military Police officer’s field notes used the term “PUC”, did the government conduct any other investigation into why “PUC” had been used apart from the ordering of Board of Inquiry and Chief of Review Services investigations into aspects of the underlying incident and if so, what was the result; and (q) in relation to findings in BOI June 2006 Incident Report (para 12, Part II), stating that “Although BGen [David] Fraser did not become familiar with TSO [Theatre Standing Order] 321A until arriving in Kandahar…, its underlying principle of transferring detainees to ANSF was made clear to him before departing Canada. Direction provided to him verbally by the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) [General Rick Hillier] emphasized that Afghan detainees were to be transferred to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) as far forward in the field and as rapidly as possible; indeed, that their transfer from CF to ANSF custody was to be measured in terms of “minutes to hours.”, does the government consider that this constituted an instruction by General Hillier to circumvent the formal “detainee” system with a “PUC” practice?

With regard to the methods used within the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces including Army Command (combined, “the Canadian military”) to secure accurate knowledge about whether there was reason to be concerned about incidents of, or the practice of, torture in Afghanistan during Canada’s military presence there: (a) was any research conducted within the Canadian military in 2006, 2007 and 2008, that focused, in whole or in part, on determining whether soldiers serving in Afghanistan had, during their deployment, witnessed anyone within their units committing torture and, if so, what were the parameters or, if they were formalized, terms of reference of the research; (b) if such research was conducted, what was the name and institutional position of the person who ordered or commissioned such research and which units and persons (names and institutional positions) were involved in the research, in whatever capacity, including conducting, supervising and evaluating the research; (c) if conducted, did the research eventuate in a written document (however termed, whether report, memo, or other) and, if so, what was the title and other identifying reference of the report and what were its essential conclusions; (d) if a research report, memo or like document (“report”) eventuated, to whom in the Canadian chain of command did the report or any mention of the report circulate and, specifically, were the Commander of the Army, the Commander of Canadian Expeditionary Force Command, the Chief of Defence Staff, the Minister of National Defence and the Prime Minister made aware of the results of such research and, if any of persons in those five positions at the material time were not made aware, why were they not and who made the decisions not to make them aware; (e) if a report eventuated, were its findings accepted and, if so, did it impact policy or practice in any respect and, if questioned in whole or in part, what questions were raised about the research and were efforts made to do follow-up research to address some or all of those questions and, if so, what was the nature of such follow-up research; (f) if there was follow-up research (of any kind, including checking of research methodology or of the phrasing of any interview or survey questions), did it include asking whether any other state’s military had conducted similar or analogous research or whether the Canadian research instrument may have drawn on research conducted by another military and, if so, was it considered whether the US Army Research Institute had ever conducted similar or analogous research and, if so, was the US Army Research Institute consulted about the questions being raised about the Canadian research results; (g) if follow-up research was conducted, did that follow-up research eventuate in a written document (however termed, whether report, memo, or other) and, if so, what was the title and other identifying reference of the report and what were its essential conclusions; and (h) whether or not follow-up research was conducted, was the initial research and any report eventuating from it suppressed (by whatever term may have been used formally or informally, such as “shelved”) and, if so, why and who made this decision?

With regard to the Prime Minister’s meeting with Joshua Boyle: on what date did the Prime Minister’s Office or the Privy Council Office become informed that Mr. Boyle was under investigation for possible violations of the Criminal Code?