Questions and responses All Sessions January 17, 1994, to present

With regard to the statement made by the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness on March 10, 2015, before the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security that "[c]urrently CSIS can detect security threats but is unable to take action unlike most allies are doing": (a) has the government compiled a list of which allies permit "action" by their intelligence agencies in those agencies' domestic operations, that is, in their operations within the state's own borders; (b) at the time of this statement, was the government aware of the report issued by the Security and Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) on June 2, 2010, on its Study 2009-05 entitled "CSIS' Use of Disruption to Counter National Security Threats", and, if not, is the government now aware of this report; (c) does the government accept the conclusion of SIRC that not all disruptions were a mere by-product of investigative interviews but, rather, some were intended courses of action; (d) after the SIRC report, did CSIS cease the activities characterized as disruption by SIRC report; (e) if the answer to (d) is in the affirmative, was it as a result of a government directive; (f) since the SIRC report was published, has the government issued any directives, guidelines, or any other form of instruction permitting the activities characterized as disruption by SIRC in its report subject to conditions on, and criteria for, such activities; and (g) if the answer to (f) is in the affirmative, has the government or SIRC made any or all of them available to SIRC to facilitate SIRC's review functions and, if so, when was this done?

With respect to Natural Resource Canada’s latest plant hardiness zones map: (a) what factors does the government consider when determining the plant hardiness zone of a particular geographical area; (b) are some variables given more weight than others in determining the plant hardiness zone of a particular geographical area; (c) how is it that Vancouver Island is the only place in Canada to have gained additional plant hardiness zones since the last release of climatic zone data ten years ago; (d) has the government explored using climate envelope models; and (e) what is the government’s plan to ensure that trades people that work on plant growth and maintenance are regularly getting the most accurate information on plant hardiness zones?

With respect to the government’s knowledge of rendition, detention and interrogation activities: (a) is the government aware of the existence of the United States’ Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) Detention and Interrogation Program (the Program) and, if so, (i) when was the government made aware of it, (ii) who had such knowledge, (iii) what was the extent of that knowledge; (b) if the answer in (a) is affirmative, has the government sent observers within the Program, or to act as a liaison between the Program and any government department, agency or intelligence entity; (c) at any point, has Canada been one of the “other nations” from which the Program “required secrecy and cooperation”, according to the United States Select Committee on Intelligence’s Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, released in December 2014 (the Study); (d) has the government been aware of the role of “contract psychologists” in the design and execution of CIA torture programs, as revealed by the Study and, if so, is there record of anyone in Canada being a contract psychologist; (e) has the government been aware of the existence of a CIA detention and interrogation site known as Detention Site COBALT (the Site) and, if so, (i) when was the government made aware of it, (ii) who had such knowledge, (iii) what was the extent of that knowledge; (f) did the government send any employees or contractors to (i) observe activity within the Site, (ii) transfer persons to the Site, (iii) assist in the transfer of persons to the Site, (iv) learn of the transfer to the Site of persons who had, at any point, been in the custody of or detained by Canadian armed force personnel; (g) when the Program was terminated, was the government aware that, in Afghanistan, the National Directorate of Security (NDS) would serve as the continuation of the Program in close collaboration with the CIA; and (h) after the invasion of Iraq by forces of the United States and other countries in 2003, did any Canadian official, discuss with a person or persons employed by the Pentagon or by the U.S. Secretary of State for Defense the subject of collaboration in Afghanistan, most notably in Kandahar province, by Canadian armed forces personnel, notably special forces personnel, with US armed force personnel or the CIA in the capture and transfer of persons into CIA or NDS custody by, or with the involvement of, Canadian armed forces personnel?

With respect to the government and activities in Sudan or South Sudan of oil and mining companies incorporated in Canada or of subsidiaries of such companies: (a) has the government provided any assistance of any kind, including via the Export Development Corporation, consular assistance or assistance of any other government officials, to a company called the State Oil Company Canada Ltd; (b) which Canadian oil and mining companies, or subsidiaries of such companies, does the government know to be operating either (i) in Sudan, (ii) in South Sudan; and (c) is it the policy of the government to encourage and facilitate the investment of Canadian oil and mining companies in Sudan and in South Sudan, (i) if so, in what ways, (ii) if not, does the government have a policy to counsel against, discourage and prohibit such investment and, if so, through what measures?

With regard to the policies and practices concerning treatment of persons under the control of Canadian forces in Afghanistan in any part of the period from September 12, 2001, to present: (a) were each of Canada’s Defence Intelligence, Canadian Security and Intelligence Service, and the Canadian Security Establishment amongst the intelligence agencies based at Kandahar Air Field (KAF) base; (b) what other intelligence agencies, Canadian or non-Canadian, were based at KAF or operated out of KAF without being based there; (c) is the government aware of a military facility in Kandahar commonly known as Graceland and, if so, what sort of facility was, or is, it, and what institutional actors operated, or operate, from this facility; (d) is the government aware of a military facility in Kandahar commonly known as Gecko and, if so, what sort of facility was, or is, it, and what institutional actors operated, or operate, from this facility; (e) how do, or did, the facilities and the institutional actors operating from Gecko and Graceland (i) relate to each other, (ii) interact; (f) on what date did Canadian special forces, including JTF2, first arrive in Afghanistan and, if they have left, on what date did they leave Afghanistan; (g) if Canadian special forces, including JTF2, are currently in Afghanistan, whether as units or as individual personnel, in what capacity are they in Afghanistan; (h) has Canada ever transferred persons under its control to Afghan authorities with the knowledge that some of those persons would or could end up being held in the facilities of National Directorate of Security (NDS) Kabul; (i) does the government know of cases of persons under initial Canadian control who ended up being held in the facilities of NDS Kabul, whether under the control of NDS or whether under the control of one or more other Afghan or non-Afghan intelligence agencies and, if so, (i) how many, (ii) which other intelligence agency or agencies; (j) did Canada ever seek to trace persons who had been either detained by or otherwise under the control of Canadian special forces, including JTF2, and who Canada knew or suspected had ended up at NDS Kabul facilities and, if so, (i) for what reasons was tracing undertaken, (ii) how many persons did Canada seek to trace, (iii) what were the results of the efforts in terms of the number of persons who were located versus determining that persons were not traceable; (k) is the government familiar with the English expression, whether formal or informal, of “amplifying orders” used in the Canadian military context and, if so, what does this mean; (l) in the period in question (2001 to present), did General Rick Hillier ever issue “amplifying orders” that related, directly or indirectly, to the policy or practice of handing over persons under Canada’s control in Afghanistan to agents of another state, whether Afghan or non-Afghan and, if so, for each set of amplifying orders, (i) what were the dates of the orders, (ii) what previous orders, rules of engagement or other documents were being amplified, (iii) what was the content of the amplifying orders; (m) in relation to the May 25, 2006, capture of “11 suspected Taliban fighters” referenced at page 96 of Ian Hope, Dancing with the Dushman: Command Imperatives for the Counter-Insurgency Fight in Afghanistan (Canadian Defence Agency Press, 2008), could the government set out the manner in which each of these 11 persons controlled by Canadian forces were processed, including what is known about each’s subsequent trajectory after passing from the control of Canada until the point at which the government may have lost track of their whereabouts; (n) at any period and, if so, which periods, did the Canadian government consider that there were one or more categories of persons who Canada passed on to either Afghan or American authorities but who were not categorized as detainees, and did such categories have a designation, whether formal or informal; (o) were there persons under the control of Canadian forces who were transferred to Afghanistan, but who were not treated by Canada as covered by the provisions of the 2005 and 2007 Canada-Afghanistan Memorandums of Understanding on detainee transfer and, if so, on what basis were transfers of such persons not deemed covered by the agreements; (p) were there persons under the control of Canadian forces who were transferred to Afghanistan but whose existence and transfer was not made known to the International Committee of the Red Cross and, if so, on what basis was the Red Cross not informed; (q) during the 2011 Parliamentary process in which a Panel of Arbiters decided what information could be released to Parliament, were documents withheld from this process by the government if they concerned the transfer of persons that were not treated by Canada as covered by the provisions of the 2005 and 2007 Canada-Afghanistan Memorandums of Understanding on detainee transfer; (r) between September 12, 2001, and the entry into effect of the 2005 detainee-transfer Memorandum of Understanding, (i) how many detainees were transferred to US authorities, (ii) to which US authorities, (iii) how many detainees were transferred to Afghan authorities, (iv) to which Afghan authorities, (v) how many persons under the control of Canada, but not considered as detainees by Canada, were transferred to US authorities, (vi) to which US authorities, (vii) how many persons under the control of Canada, but not considered as detainees by Canada, were transferred to Afghan authorities, (viii) to which Afghan authorities; (s) between the entry into effect of the 2005 detainee-transfer Memorandum of Understanding and the entry into effect of the 2007 detainee-transfer Memorandum of Understanding, (i) how many detainees were transferred to US authorities, (ii) to which US authorities, (iii) how many detainees were transferred to Afghan authorities, (iv) to which Afghan authorities, (v) how many persons under the control of Canada, but not considered as detainees by Canada, were transferred to US authorities, (vi) to which US authorities, (vii) how many persons under the control of Canada, but not considered as detainees by Canada, were transferred to Afghan authorities, (viii) to which Afghan authorities; (t) between the entry into effect of the 2007 detainee-transfer Memorandum of Understanding and the present date, (i) how many detainees were transferred to US authorities, (ii) to which US authorities, (iii) how many detainees were transferred to Afghan authorities, (iv) to which Afghan authorities, (v) how many persons under the control of Canada, but not considered as detainees by Canada, were transferred to US authorities, (vi) to which US authorities, (vii) how many persons under the control of Canada, but not considered as detainees by Canada, were transferred to Afghan authorities, (viii) to which Afghan authorities; (u) before General Rick Hillier signed the 2005 detainee-transfer Memorandum of Understanding with Afghan Defence Minister Wardak, did General Hillier call or attempt to call the Canadian Defence Minister Graham from Afghanistan, in order to seek Graham’s authorization for Hillier to sign; (v) at the time of the signing of the 2005 detainee-transfer Memorandum of Understanding between Afghan Defence Minister Wardak and Canadian General Hillier, was the Ambassador of Canada to Afghanistan in the room when the document was signed and thus an eyewitness to each man signing the document; (w) have Canadian special forces, whether JTF2 or other, ever participated in operations designed to obtain control over or custody of persons in Afghanistan as a result of information, instructions or orders originating from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or another US intelligence agency and, if so, in what periods and resulting in how many captures; (x) if not, have Canadian special forces participated alongside or in coordination with United States special forces for such capture operations in Afghanistan where it is known or reasonably assumed by Canada that the US special forces are acting on information, instructions or orders originating from the CIA or another US intelligence agency; (y) have there ever been and are there now Canadian military special forces in Pakistan; (z) have Canadian special forces, whether JTF2 or other, ever participated in operations designed to obtain control over or custody of persons in Pakistan as a result of information, instructions or orders originating from the CIA or another US intelligence agency and, if so, in what periods and resulting in how many captures; and (aa) if not, have Canadian special forces participated alongside or in coordination with US special forces for such capture operations in Pakistan where it is known or reasonably assumed by Canada that the US special forces are acting on information, instructions or orders originating from the CIA or another US intelligence agency?

With regard to Sri Lankan nationals being sent back to Sri Lanka by Canada: (a) in assessing the risk of torture or other abuses that could be faced by a person sent by Canada to Sri Lanka, what relevance is given to the following factors: (i) the person being a young Tamil male from the north or northeast of Sri Lanka, (ii) the person being returned from a country or city viewed by the Sri Lankan government as formerly or currently a hub of pro-Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) activity, (iii) the person having voiced criticism or engaged in peaceful protest against the government of Sri Lanka while outside Sri Lanka; (b) does the government consider Sri Lankan nationals of Tamil or Tamil-speaking origin to be vulnerable as a group to mistreatment in Sri Lanka and, if not, does the government consider any of the following sub-groups to be at risk: (i) young males, (ii) critics of the Sri Lanka regime, (iii) journalists, (iv) failed refugee claimants, (v) successful refugee claimants being refouled, (vi) known members of the LTTE, (vii) persons suspected or likely to be suspected by the Sri Lankan government as being members of the LTTE, (viii) persons known to hold pro-LTTE views; (c) in the case of sending a Sri Lankan national to Sri Lanka, whether by extradition, deportation, removal or any other method involving the government, do Canadian officials take any of the following precautions: i) escort returnees on the plane back to Sri Lanka, ii) meet returnees upon their arrival at the airport in Sri Lanka, iii) observe treatment of the returnee at the airport (and if so, for how long), iv) monitor the whereabouts and treatment of a returnee after the airport arrival; (d) does the taking of precautions relate in any way to whether or not a person has been sent back to Sri Lanka only after Canada has received diplomatic assurances; (e) has the government, whether in Canada or at the Embassy of Canada in Sri Lanka, received reports or expressions of concern from reliable sources about the treatment of persons sent from Canada to Sri Lanka and, if so, how many and on what dates; (f) has the government, whether in Canada or at the Embassy of Canada in Sri Lanka, received reports or expressions of concern from reliable sources about the treatment of persons who voluntarily returned from Canada to Sri Lanka after having arrived in Canada to make a refugee claim and, if so, how many and on what dates; (g) when concerns are expressed from reliable sources in cases (e) and (f), such as by a Canadian lawyer, about the treatment of a returnee after their return to Sri Lanka and the location of the returnee, such as in Criminal Investigation Division (CID) custody or in hospital, (i) what measures does the Embassy of Canada in Sri Lanka take, (ii) if any measures are taken, do they include visiting the returnee and interviewing them about any abuse or persecution they may have suffered, (iii) if interviewing does take place, does it take place in the presence of Sri Lanka state officials and, if so, whom, (iv) if the interview raises concerns or suspicions about abuse of persecution, what is then done; (h) are Canadian law enforcement, border services, intelligence, military, or diplomatic officials permitted to (i) participate in interrogations by any state actors in Sri Lanka, (ii) observe such interrogations, (iii) supply information for, or questions to be asked at, such interrogations, and if so, which category of officials (law enforcement, intelligence, military, or diplomatic) with which Sri Lanka state actors, under what circumstances and subject to what conditions may this have taken place; (i) from 2003 to present, have Canadian law enforcement, border services, intelligence, military, or diplomatic officials ever (i) participated in interrogations by any state actors in Sri Lanka, (ii) observed such interrogations, (iii) supplied information for, or questions to be asked at, such interrogations and, if so, by which category of officials (law enforcement, intelligence, military, or diplomatic), to which Sri Lankan state actor, under what circumstances and subject to what conditions may this have taken place; (j) how many Sri Lankan nationals have been sent back to Sri Lanka, whether by extradition, deportation, removal or any other method involving the government, since the beginning of 2007, in each of (i) 2007, (ii) 2008, (iii) 2009, (iv) 2010, (v) 2011, (vi) 2012 to date; (k) within the above numbers, which are due to removal orders; (l) how many Sri Lankan nationals are currently subject to removal orders that have not yet been executed; (m) how many of those sent to Sri Lanka since the start of 2007 have been sent only after diplomatic assurances were obtained; (n) are such assurances legally binding and, if not, on what basis did the government consider them reliable; (o) in light of the Supreme Court of Canada’s comments in Suresh on the problem with relying on assurances from a government of a state where torture is practised, does the government consider that diplomatic assurances from Sri Lanka can be relied upon at the present time; (p) in light of the Supreme Court of Canada’s comments in Suresh on monitoring in relation to diplomatic assurances, does the government consider that monitoring mechanisms must be part of diplomatic assurances and, if so, what are the nature of the mechanisms in any diplomatic assurances with respect to returnees to Sri Lanka; (q) are there written policies, sets of guidelines or similar documents containing rules, principles or considerations for determining when and how assurances will be sought, and for determining if assurances are adequate; and (r) with respect to Vote 30b of the Supplementary Estimates considered at the Justice and Human Rights Standing Committee on November 29, 2012, and its reference to “assurances against torture in exceptional removal cases”, (i) what is the definition of an “exceptional removal case”, (ii) how many such cases have there been between 2007 and present, (iii) how many have been removals to Sri Lanka?

With regard to details of Bill S-7, the Combatting Terrorism Act: (a) when will cooperation protocols or memoranda of understanding relating to enforcement of the new ‘leaving the country’ Criminal Code offences be ready; (b) what agencies will be part of the protocols or memoranda, and what subject matter will be covered; (c) will the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) have any vetting or review functions with respect to the protocols or memoranda, and will any other review mechanism for the operation of the protocols or memoranda be put in place; (d) is either (i) an exit control system being planned, or (ii) an information system to allow the government to be aware of when people are leaving being planned; (e) is it the intention of the government to reform the passenger information system for departing airplanes so that passenger lists are available to Canadian agencies before planes leave the ground, in order to permit the arrest of persons leaving contrary to the ‘leaving the country’ offences in Bill S-7; (f) is a reform of the no-fly list being envisaged as one method of enforcing the ‘leaving the country’ offences in Bill S-7; (g) how is it envisaged that investigative hearings will be used to discern an individual’s intention of leaving the country for purposes of terrorism, and is it envisaged that neighbours, family members, friends and acquaintances in the community of a suspect will be the subjects of investigative hearings for this purpose; (h) how would hearings that deal with recognizance with conditions produce evidence of intention to leave the country; (i) can a person suspected of wanting to leave, or wanting to attempt to leave, the country in violation of the new ‘leaving the country’ offences in Bill S-7 be preventively detained and subjected to recognizance with conditions that include a prohibition on leaving Canada and measures such as confiscating the suspect’s passport for up to 12 months; (j) is the above interaction of the leaving the country offences and recognizance with conditions a planned use of the recognizance with conditions provisions; and (k) can a person be subjected to preventive detention or recognisance with conditions in an effort to prevent terrorist activity that another person – other than the person subjected to the conditions – may engage in, even if there is no concern that the person subjected to the conditions will herself or himself commit terrorist activity?

With regard to the announcement made by the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans on May 28, 2012, that “new funding totaling $17.5 million will be allocated over the next five years to four key activities: prevention, early warning, rapid response, and management and control” to protect Canada’s Great Lakes from the threat of Asian carp: (a) in what specific ways will emphasis be placed on initiatives to educate people about the danger of Asian carp; (b) in what specific ways will human beings be prevented from bringing Asian carp into Canadian waters; (c) will public hearings be held in Canada to allow Canadians to provide input to key U.S. decision-makers on combating Asian carp migration; (d) what specific efforts will be made to raise the awareness of Canadians of the potential harm that Asian carp could cause in the Great Lakes; (e) what efforts will the government make to facilitate or mobilize public participation in decision-making concerning Asian carp; (f) what discussions or arrangements have been made by the government to work with American counterparts to develop an extensive early warning and monitoring system to alert officials of signs of any potential problems, along with rapid response protocols for both countries to be able to react quickly should there be signs that they are spreading; (g) when will the extensive early warning and monitoring system be put in place; (h) how does the government envision the extensive early warning and monitoring system working; (i) what discussions or arrangements have been made by the government to work with enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with regulations relating to the transport of Asian carp; (j) what tools will be used to ensure compliance with regulations relating to the transport of Asian carp; (k) what resources will be allocated to compliance efforts relating to the transport of Asian carp; (l) is the government aware of any plans, intentions, or studies with respect to bans on carp in provinces other than Ontario, or in any territory; (m) are there mechanisms in place at the Canada-US border for inspecting vehicles in an effort to assist the province of Ontario’s prohibition on possession or sale of live big head carp in Ontario and, if so, what are they; (n) are the same or other mechanisms in place to inspect for live big head carp at border crossings in provinces and territories outside Ontario; (o) is the government intending or considering an international trade requirement that big head carp only enter Canada after heads and tails have been cut off, in order to ensure fish are dead when crossing the border; (p) are there any regulations on interprovincial trade or transport of live carp, including those reinforcing Ontario’s prohibition on live big head carp in Ontario; and (q) does the government intend to attend or participate in the November 8, 2012, Great Lakes/St Lawrence Cities Initiative meeting, or to press relevant US agencies such as the US Army Corps to attend that meeting in order to hear directly from Canadians?

With respect to the recently published document Building Resilience against Terrorism: Canada’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy (“the Strategy”) and the testimony on June 5, 2012, of the Minister of Public Safety and two of his officials before the Public Safety Committee on the Strategy: (a) what was the process by which the Strategy was planned and generated, from date of conception (i.e. when it was decided to produce a strategy document) to the date of release, including (i) which unit, branch or agency within the Department of Public Safety took the lead, and what other units, branches or agencies of the Department were closely involved, (ii) were other departments consulted and, if so, which units, branches or agencies within those departments were involved; (b) did the planning process for the Strategy include conducting ‘lessons learned’ or similar reviews or studies of counter-terrorism policy and operations since September 11, 2001, including with respect to intelligence policy and operations in Afghanistan, and/or were reviews or studies that were done outside the Strategy’s own planning process drawn upon in formulating the Strategy, including with respect to Afghanistan; (c) with respect to studies and reviews mentioned in (b), (i) what are their names or titles, (ii) on which dates were they conducted, (ii) what were the authoring governmental units, branches or agencies responsible for the said studies and reviews; (d) have there been reviews or studies of lessons learned from the Afghanistan experience that will be used for future counter-terrorism policy, notably with respect to how counter-terrorist intelligence interacts with military operations and imperatives; (e) did the reviews and studies referred to in (d) include a review or a study of the lessons learned with respect to the interaction of CSIS operatives who were in theatre with Defence Intelligence, Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) and other intelligence operatives who were also working in theatre; (f) has the Security and Intelligence Review Committee conducted reviews and studies on the role of CSIS in Afghanistan including, but not limited to, reviews and studies relevant to CSIS relations to the National Directorate of Security concerning transfer and interrogation of detainees; (g) what was the nature, timing and process of each review or study identified in (f), and what are the details regarding the relevant documents or summaries; (h) has the government conducted a review to identify what can be learned concerning what the Strategy identifies as the challenge of “increasing interaction with non-traditional partners” (p. 17) as a result of the interactions of CSIS, Defence Intelligence and CSEC with Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security (NDS), and, if so, what are the lessons learned or conclusions of any such review; (i) with regard to the recommendations in the recent Concluding Observations of the UN Committee against Torture, will the government implement any aspects of Justice O’Connor’s Arar Inquiry report with respect to oversight of intelligence agencies, including RCMP intelligence, in addition to measures already taken, and (i) if so, which aspects, (ii) if not, why not; (j) given that on page 9 of the Strategy “environmentalism” is listed as one advocacy area that can generate “extremism” leading to terrorism, has the government concluded that any environmental group currently present in Canada is “extremist” in this sense; (k) does the mandate of the integrated national security enforcement team include the protection of the Canadian oil and gas industry and its employees from environmental “extremism” that turns into terrorism, as described in the Strategy; (l) in its planning process for the Strategy, did the government study how Bill C-304, An Act to amend the Canadian Human Rights Act (protecting freedom), and specifically its clause to repeal section 13 of the Canada Human Rights Act, could affect the Strategy’s goal of establishing “stronger laws against ... hate propaganda” (p. 32), and, if so, what were the government’s conclusions; (m) is Bill C-30, An Act to enact the Investigating and Preventing Criminal Electronic Communications Act and to amend the Criminal Code and other Acts, a part of Canada’s counter-terrorism strategy, and, if so, why was it not included in the Strategy; (n) is Bill C-31, An Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, the Balanced Refugee Reform Act, the Marine Transportation Security Act and the Department of Citizenship and Immigration Act, a part of Canada’s counter-terrorism strategy, and, if so, why was it not included in the Strategy; (o) will further legislation be put forward to implement the Strategy and, if so, on what matters and with what purposes; (p) with respect to the the Strategy’s statement concerning the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the importance that the group is “not allowed to rebuild in Canada in order to engage in terrorist activities,” (p. 8) , (i) why does the Strategy refer to conduct that predated the end of the civil war in 2009 (i.e., the 2008 conduct of an LTTE fundraiser, for which he was convicted after the war in 2010) to illustrate the concern about the LTTE rebuilding, (ii) does the government possess information that suggests that the LTTE is in the process of rebuilding in Canada for purpose of terrorist activities; and (q) has Canada ever accepted communications intelligence from one of the traditional “Five Eyes” allies mentioned in Minister Toews’ testimony from June 5, 2012, where that intelligence consisted of communications that took place between persons both or all of whom were within Canada at the time the communications occurred?

With respect to the government’s investigation of potential human rights abuses related to the transfer of Afghan detainees from the custody of Canadian Forces to the government of Afghanistan, especially the National Security Directorate (NDS): (a) do the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister automatically receive either copies of or briefings on the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT)’s annual human rights reports on Afghanistan; (b) if so, has this practice of automatically receiving copies or briefings always existed; (c) if not, when did this practice start; (d) once knowledge of human rights abuses within the NDS became known, did the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and/or the Minister of Defence order copies of or briefings on the DFAIT annual human rights report on Afghanistan; (e) if not, does the practice of not reading or being briefed on the DFAIT human rights report on Afghanistan continue to this day; (f) following the April 23, 2007, Globe and Mail article by Graeme Smith on transferred detainees as victims of mistreatment within NDS facilities, did the government seek to verify the alleged experiences of the people interviewed by Smith and, if so, (i) what precise measures were taken, (ii) by whom, (iii) for how long and until when did these measures last; (g) consistent with the book The Savage War by Murray Brewster (page 276), did lawyers representing the government while simultaneously representing military police involved in the Military Police Complaints Commission’s hearings on Afghan detainees “t[ake] their direction from senior levels inside the civil service”, and, if so, (i) did this include one or more officials within the Privy Council Office (PCO), (ii) is this normal practice, (iii) what are the guidelines for how Department of Justice lawyers receive direction from outside the Department of Justice, particularly from PCO officials; (h) in relation to Afghan detainee issues, have government lawyers ever received instructions, directions or representations from staff, at any level, within the Prime Minister’s Office; (i) did Amnesty International suggest to NATO and/or the government that one way to ensure no torture of detainees would occur would be to embed soldiers or military police in Afghan facilities and, if so, (i) was this option considered (ii) why was it not adopted if it was considered; (j) why did the government decide to approach the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) to start monitoring transferred detainees under the December 2005 arrangement, leading to the February 20, 2007 agreement with AIHRC; (k) did the government do an assessment of AIHRC’s capacity to engage in this role and, if so, what were the results of this assessment; (l) with respect to the testimony of David Mulroney before the Special Committee on the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan that Canada could not find evidence of former Kandahar Governor Khalid having a detention facility in or next to his compound, exactly what efforts were undertaken to investigate this matter, (i) by what actors, (ii) using what methods, (iii) on how many occasions; (m) did the government of Canada ever receive information from the AIHRC conveying a belief that Khalid operated a private jail and, if so, did the AIHRC also convey a belief that mistreatment of prisoners took place there; (n) for what reasons was the government of Canada unable to verify whether such a jail existed; (o) when the head of the AIHRC, Canada’s partner in monitoring detainees, “estimated publicly... that approximately one-third of the prisoners handed over ended up being tortured” (Brewster, The Savage War, page 67), (i) what was the government’s response to this information, (ii) was this deemed a credible estimate and, if not, why not; (p) after the statement in (o) was made, was it the government’s policy that it was lawful to transfer detainees; (q) did any communications occur within the Canadian Forces or the government about the concerns expressed by military police official Major Kevin Rowcliffe about the torture of detainees and what actions did the government take in response to Major Rowcliffe’s testimony before the Military Police Complaints Commission; and (r) has either DFAIT or PCO ever conducted an analysis or assessment of the NDS and, if so, what was the subject-matter of the analysis or assessment?

With respect to the answer of the Minister of the Environment in the House of Commons on June 13, 2012, that “[a]t this point my officials have advised me that none of the triggers required to spark a federal intervention have been, or are likely to be, tripped” with respect to the application of 3191574 Nova Scotia Company, operating as The Highland Companies, for a 2,316 acre open-pit limestone quarry to be situated on lands they own in Melancthon Township, Dufferin County, Ontario: (a) what government units are the source of this advice and on what date or dates was this advice received; (b) does this advice concern (i) federal environmental law in force as of June 13, 2012, (ii) prospective federal environmental law as it will stand once changes in the Budget Implementation Act, Bill C-38, An Act to implement certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on March 29, 2012 and other measures, enter into force, or (iii) both (i) and (ii), (c) what is the significance of the Minister’s proviso “at this point,” and does the advice given “at this point” concern the planned quarry or only current use of the land by the owners of the land; (d) what are the reasons that current federal environmental law environmental assessment provisions are viewed as not being triggered; (e) will environmental assessment under federal environmental law as it will be changed by Bill C-38, An Act to implement certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on March 29, 2012 and other measures, be triggered with respect to use of the land as a quarry, and, if not, why not; (f) what form did the advice received by Minister Kent take; (g) considering Minister Kent’s reference to the future with the word “likely”, will further advice be provided to the Minister in the future, and, if so, what will determine when and how this advice is given; (h) within any of the advice so far provided, what view was taken on each of the following as potential reasons for federal environmental assessment, (i) the fact that the area is the headwaters for five rivers, (ii) the fact that those rivers empty into the Great Lakes system, (iii) the fact that waters pumped out of the below-water-table quarry will be pumped back into the water table, with possible resultant contamination, (iv) the status of much of the land as amongst the most arable land in Canada, with corresponding relevance for national and global food security, (v) the fact that the area is the source of a high percentage of potatoes for the Toronto area and that loss of this source of potatoes will likely increase the distance which replacement potatoes have to travel, thus increasing transportation use with a knock-on impact on carbon emissions, (vi) the existence of trout in some or all of the rivers, (vii) the area as habitat for undomesticated animal and bird species, (viii) the impacts on humans living in or adjacent to the area; (i) in what ways will impending changes to environmental law affect the advice given as per the answers to (h)(i) through (h)(viii); (j) with respect to (h) and (i), what sources of information did the advisors to the Minister rely upon and did any of that information come from (i) proponents of the quarry, identifying the entities or persons, (ii) opponents of the quarry, identifying the entities or persons; (k) has the federal government consulted with the government of Ontario with respect to whether or not federal environmental law applies, and, if so, when did the consultations occur and what was the position taken by Ontario; (l) has the government received any factual or other data relevant to the lands and project in question from the government of Ontario, and, if so, what is the nature of this data; (m) has the government had any interaction with 3191574 Nova Scotia Company, operating as The Highland Companies, or any person or organization advocating or lobbying on its behalf and, if so, what was the subject matter and outcome of such interactions; (n) is there any foreign ownership of 3191574 Nova Scotia Company, operating as The Highland Companies, and, if so, are there any implications for Canadian foreign investment law of acquisition and use of the land for purposes of operating a quarry; (o) assuming that conversion of the land in question from arable food-producing land to quarry land will have impacts on interprovincial and/or international trade and commerce, does the government have jurisdiction to legislate in order to prevent or limit conversion of arable to non-arable uses; and (p) in the event that the loss of arable land to other uses is deemed to have an impact on national and global food security, does the government have any jurisdictional basis to legislate to preserve arable land?

With respect to the Afghan Detainee Document Review (ADDR) submitted on April 15, 2011, by the Panel of Arbiters (PoA) under the June 15, 2010, Memorandum of Understanding signed by three party leaders in Parliament: (a)have the documents referred to in paragraph 30 ever been provided, unredacted, to any Canadian government law-enforcement investigators for purposes of tracing the detainees named in the documents in order to determine whether any suffered mistreatment after transfer to Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security (NDS), if not, why not; (b) has the government ever provided compensation to any person or family of any person transferred to Afghan authorities, or sought out a person or family with compensation as the purpose; (c) with regard to the public-domain research (regular reviews of credible media reporting, government reports and reports of international organizations) conducted by the PoA’s staff referenced in paragraph 36 of the ADDR, was this public domain research handed over to the government, if not, where is it located, and, whatever its location, will the government release any bibliographies generated by this research or any documents archived by the research that fall within the categories of “credible media reporting, government reports and reports of international organizations”; (d) with regard to the PoA’s review of documents redacted on the basis of national security confidentiality (“NSC” documents), national defence and international relations whereby the PoA reviewed between 1450 and 2300 pages of documents (paragraphs 52-54) while releasing 113 NSC documents (paragraph 56), will the government release those documents that were not yet ready for release with the ADDR because the Department of Justice had not yet had time to complete the technical process of preparing the documents for release after the PoA had finished its reviews and determinations (paragraphs 54 and 55), and how many PoA-reviewed documents remain unreleased because the technical process of preparing the documents remains incomplete; (e) with regard to the 15 documents for which the government had initially claimed solicitor-client privilege (paragraph 63 and page 1 of the ADDR annex called “Documents subject to Solicitor-Client Privilege Claims”) but later withdrew the claim, in each case, (i) what were the bases on which privilege was initially claimed, (ii) why did the government change its view; (f) with regard to the 117 documents for which the PoA upheld the government’s solicitor-client privilege claim (paragraphs 64 and 65; pages 2-7 of the ADDR annex called “Documents subject to Solicitor-Client Privilege Claims”), will the government waive the solicitor-client privilege to the limited extent of revealing the subject matter of each of the 117 documents; (g) in the ADDR annex called “Documents subject to Solicitor-Client Privilege Claims”, why are the large majority of documents described with the acronym PoA (presumably, Panel of Arbiters) while some are specifically indicated as being DFAIT (Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade) documents?