I want to thank my colleagues and welcome our guests.
To preface my comment, I want to get at the selection process a bit, about a phrase that particularly Professor Russell used, about getting the best people. If I may, I want to raise the question, and you just said something about the importance of the appeal court, but to the Supreme Court level.
For the first time in my life, if I may say so as a parliamentarian, a political scientist, and someone who was very active in the constitutional change between 1980 and 1982, I was deeply shocked by the Supreme Court decision on the Quebec health care system, which I thought was a very bad decision. I, for the first time in my life, started thinking about the process of selecting our judges.
I followed with interest what's going on in the U.S. Particularly, I was struck by Ronald Dworkin's recent article, and I want to ask you what you think of it. This is about, how do we get the best people? Let me agree with the kind of process that you yourself have said is kind of a minimal level of reform, as I've listened to you.
Here's what he says about the importance of a judicial philosophy of senior appointments to the bench. He makes reference to the U.S. Constitution, obviously, but I think everything he says applies to our Constitution, and I'd like to get your response on it.
He's talking about how to get beyond the abstract language, say, that our charter is written in, or the equivalent writing in the U.S. Constitution, to making practical decisions. He says:
Judges can interpret that abstract language only by appealing to a vision of a desirable, workable form of democracy that they believe both fits and justifies the overall structure of the Constitution. They can then justify choosing one reading of the abstract clauses rather than another by explaining how that reading makes a better contribution to democracy so conceived.
He goes on, and broadly speaking, what he says is that it's of profound importance in appointing a person to the Supreme Court--and I would say the same now to our Supreme Court or to the courts of appeal, as you're talking about--that we understand their conception of democracy and the Constitution.
I would like each of you to respond, if you would. Do you think that is really important for legislators, to understand the kind of conceptual thinking of judges, potential judges? Is their ideology, their philosophy, very important; and if so, in terms of the process that you're recommending, how would that be dealt with?