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View Ralph Goodale Profile
Lib. (SK)
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.
In the spirit of brevity and efficiency, I think I will forgo the opportunity to put a 10-minute statement on the record and just speak informally for a couple of minutes about BillC-98. Evan Travers and Jacques Talbot from Public Safety Canada are with me and can help to go into the intricacies of the legislation and then respond to any questions you may have. They may also be able to assist if any issues arise when you're hearing from other witnesses, in terms of further information about the meaning or the purpose of the legislation.
Colleagues will know that BillC-98 is intended to fill the last major gap in the architecture that exists for overseeing, reviewing and monitoring the activities of some of our major public safety and national security agencies. This is a gap that has existed for the better part of 18 years.
The problem arose in the aftermath of 9/11, when there was a significant readjustment around the world in how security agencies would operate. In the Canadian context at that time, the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency was divided, with the customs part joining the public safety department and ultimately evolving into CBSA, the Canada Border Services Agency. That left CRA, the Canada Revenue Agency, on its own.
In the reconfiguration of responsibilities following 9/11, many interest groups, stakeholders and public policy observers noted that CBSA, as it emerged, did not have a specific review body assigned to it to perform the watchdog function that SIRC was providing with respect to CSIS or the commissioner's office was providing with respect to the Communications Security Establishment.
The Senate came forward with a proposal, if members will remember, to fix that problem. Senator Willie Moore introduced BillS-205, which was an inspector general kind of model for filling the gap with respect to oversight of CBSA. While Senator Moore was coming forward with his proposal, we were moving on the House side with NSICOP, the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, by virtue of BillC-22, and the new National Security and Intelligence Review Agency which is the subject of Bill C-59.
We tried to accommodate Senator Moore's concept in the new context of NSICOP and NSIRA, but it was just too complicated to sort that out that we decided it would not be possible to salvage Senator Moore's proposal and convert it into a workable model. What we arrived at instead is BillC-98.
Under NSICOP and NSIRA, the national security functions of CBSA are already covered. What's left is the non-security part of the activities of CBSA. When, for example, a person comes to the border, has an awkward or difficult or unpleasant experience, whom do they go to with a complaint? They can complain to CBSA itself, and CBSA investigates all of that and replies, but the expert opinion is that in addition to what CBSA may do as a matter of internal good policy, there needs to be an independent review mechanism for the non-security dimensions of CBSA's work. The security side is covered by NSICOP, which is the committee of parliamentarians, and NSIRA, the new security agency under Bill C-59, but the other functions of CBSA are not covered, so how do you create a review body to cover that?
We examined two alternatives. One was to create a brand new stand-alone creature with those responsibilities; otherwise, was there an agency already within the Government of Canada, a review body, that had the capacity to perform that function? We settled on CRCC, the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission, which performs that exact function for the RCMP.
What is proposed in the legislation is a revamping of the CRCC to expand its jurisdiction to cover the RCMP and CBSA and to increase its capacity and its resources to be able to do that job. The legislation would make sure that there is a chair and a vice-chair of the new agency, which would be called the public complaints and review commission. It would deal with both the RCMP and the CBSA, but it would have a chair and a vice-chair. They would assume responsibilities, one for the RCMP and one for CBSA, to make sure that both agencies were getting top-flight attention—that we weren't robbing Peter to pay Paul and that everybody would be receiving the appropriate attention in the new structure. Our analysis showed that we could move faster and more expeditiously and more efficiently if we reconfigured CRCC instead of building a new agency from the ground up.
That is the legislation you have before you. The commission will be able to receive public complaints. It will be able to initiate investigations if it deems that course to be appropriate. The minister would be able to ask the agency to investigate or examine something if the minister felt an inquiry was necessary. BillC-98 is the legislative framework that will put that all together.
That's the purpose of the bill, and I am very grateful for the willingness of the committee at this stage in our parliamentary life to look at this question in a very efficient manner. Thank you.
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View Julie Dabrusin Profile
Lib. (ON)
View Julie Dabrusin Profile
2019-06-17 15:50
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Thank you.
I was very happy to see this bill because, Minister, as you know, pretty much every time you have been before this committee, I have asked you about CBSA oversight and when it would be forthcoming, so when I saw this bill had been tabled, it was a happy day for me.
You talked a little about the history of the bill. You talked about Senator Wilfred Moore's bill and how you dealt with the different oversights in Bill C-59 and NSICOP.
Why did we have to wait so long to see this bill come forward?
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View Ralph Goodale Profile
Lib. (SK)
I think, Ms. Dabrusin, it's simply a product of the large flow of public safety business and activity that we have had to deal with. I added it up a couple of days ago. We have asked this Parliament to address at least 13 major pieces of legislation, which has kept this committee, as well as your counterparts in the Senate, particularly busy.
As you will know from my previous answers, I have wanted to get on with this legislation. It's part of the matrix that is absolutely required to complete the picture. It's here now. It's a pretty simple and straightforward piece of legislation. I don't think it involves any legal intricacies that make it too complex.
If we had had a slot on the public policy agenda earlier, we would have used it, but when I look at the list of what we've had to bring forward—13 major pieces of legislation—it is one that I hope is going to get to the finish line, but along the way, it was giving way to things like BillC-66, BillC-71, BillC-83, Bill C-59 and BillC-93. There's a lot to do.
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2019-06-17 16:04
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Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Minister, thank you for being here.
I want to go back to the question Ms. Dabrusin was asking in terms of the time that this took. The fact is, there was a Senate report prior to the last election in 2015, legislation by Senator Segal in the previous Parliament and a recommendation from this committee in 2017.
Also, for anyone who wants to take a minute to google it, you can find articles from at least the last three years with you promising this legislation—it's coming, it's coming. Also, most of the bills you enumerated in responding to my colleague, if not all, were tabled in 2016 or 2017.
I'm wondering about this mechanism. You called it simple and straightforward, faster and cost-effective and said it builds on existing infrastructure. I'm having a hard time with this, especially in knowing that the legislation is only going to come into effect in 2020, if I'm understanding correctly, with regard to the ability of Canadians to make complaints.
I'm still not quite understanding why, with all those pieces on the table and at the very least two or three years in the lead-up.... To me, it doesn't seem to wash that you sort of dropped your arms and said, “Oh well, the senator's proposal won't work in Bill C-59.” That seemed to be what you were implying in response to the question.
I want to ask again why it took so long when there continue to be incidents with work relations for those who work at CBSA—allegations of harassment and things of that nature—and obviously, of course, the issues that some Canadians face in the way they are treated at the border.
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View Ralph Goodale Profile
Lib. (SK)
Well, as I said, Monsieur Dubé, we have had an enormous volume of work to get through, as has this committee, as has Parliament, generally. The work program has advanced as rapidly as we could make it. It takes time and effort to put it all together. I'm glad we're at this stage, and I hope the parliamentary machinery will work well enough this week that we can get it across the finish line.
It has been a very significant agenda, when you consider there has been BillC-7, BillC-21, BillC-22, Bill C-23, Bill C-37, Bill C-46, Bill C-66, Bill C-71, Bill C-59, BillC-97, BillC-83, BillC-93 and Bill C-98. It's a big agenda and we have to get it all through the same relatively small parliamentary funnel.
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2019-06-17 16:07
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I think maybe three of those bills were tabled after 2017 or early 2018. I mean, for the C-20s and the single digits, we're talking days after your government was sworn in. I think there needs to be some accountability, because you've been on the record strongly saying that this needed to be done, and so I don't want to leave it being said that.... For example, with Bill C-59, why not make the change then?
I just want to understand, because my concern, Minister, is that I want to make sure there's no, for example, resistance internally to this issue. I can't understand, if this is a simple and straightforward mechanism in BillC-98, why it took years to come to the conclusion that this was the way to go.
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View Ralph Goodale Profile
Lib. (SK)
There is no internal resistance at all. In fact, the organization, CBSA, recognizes that this is a gap in the architecture and that it needs to be filled.
Part of it was filled by Bill C-22 with the committee of parliamentarians, as far as national security is concerned. Part of it was filled by Bill C-59 and the creation of the new NSIRA, again with respect to national security.
This legislation fills in the last piece.
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2019-06-17 17:23
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That's fine.
In terms of paragraph (b), not only in the context of the proposed subclause 18(2), but in general, Mr. Graham spoke earlier about the risk of stepping on the other agency's toes. That's interesting. As part of our study of Bill  C-59, we met with representatives of your commission. Forgive me, I don't remember whether the information came from you or other representatives, but we were told that there was no issue with regard to the RCMP, since the functions weren't national security functions. However, during the presentations and debate on Bill  C-59, some people pointed out that, in the case of the Canada Border Services Agency, the issue still concerned national security, given that we're talking about border integrity.
Are you concerned that, in terms of the agency, it may be more difficult to determine what falls under the different oversight mechanisms for national security issues? For example, in the case of the committee created by Bill  C-59 or the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, there's a clearer and more obvious distinction with respect to the RCMP.
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View Ralph Goodale Profile
Lib. (SK)
Our concern, Monsieur Dubé, is with providing information in the public domain that could, in fact, reveal sensitive and very critical operational details of the RCMP, CSIS or CBSA in a way that would compromise their ability to keep Canadians safe.
The information can be shared in the context of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians. It would also be available to the new national security and intelligence review agency, which will be created under Bill C-59. Those are classified environments in which members of Parliament around the table have the appropriate clearance level. It's more difficult to share that information here.
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View David McGuinty Profile
Lib. (ON)
View David McGuinty Profile
2019-05-13 15:26
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Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Good afternoon, colleagues. Thank you for your invitation to appear before your committee. I am joined by Rennie Marcoux, executive director of the Secretariat of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, or NSICOP.
It's a privilege to be here with you today to discuss the 2018 annual report of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians.
The committee's first annual report is the result of the work, the dedication and the commitment from my colleagues on the committee. It is intended to contribute to an informed debate among Canadians on the difficult challenges of providing security and intelligence organizations with the exceptional powers necessary to identify and counter threats to the nation while at the same time ensuring that their activities continue to respect and preserve our democratic rights.
NSICOP has the mandate to review the overall framework for national security and intelligence in Canada, including legislation, regulations, policy, administration and finances.
It may also examine any activity that is carried out by a department that relates to national security or intelligence.
Finally, it may review any matter relating to national security or intelligence that a minister refers to the committee.
Members of the committee are all cleared to a top secret level, swear an oath and are permanently bound to secrecy. Members also agree that the nature of the committee, multi-party, drawn from the House of Commons and the Senate, with a broad range of experience, bring a unique perspective to these important issues.
In order to conduct our work, we are entitled to have access to any information that is related to our mandate, but there are some exceptions, namely, cabinet confidences, the identity of confidential sources or protected witnesses, and ongoing law enforcement investigations that may lead to prosecutions.
The year 2018 was a year of learning for the committee. We spent many hours and meetings building our understanding of our mandate and of the organizations responsible for protecting Canada and Canadians. The committee was briefed by officials from across the security and intelligence community and visited all seven of the main departments and agencies. Numerous meetings were also held with the national security and intelligence adviser to the Prime Minister. NSICOP also decided to conduct a review of certain security allegations surrounding the Prime Minister's trip to India in February 2018.
Over the course of the calendar year, the committee met 54 times, with an average of four hours per meeting. Annex E of the report outlines the committee's extensive outreach and engagement activities with government officials, academics and civil liberties groups.
The annual report is a result of extensive oral and written briefings, more than 8,000 pages of printed materials, dozens of meetings between NSICOP analysts and government officials, in-depth research and analysis, and thoughtful and detailed deliberations among committee members.
The report is also unanimous. In total, the report makes 11 findings and seven recommendations to the government. The committee has been scrupulously careful to take a non-partisan approach to these issues. We hope that our findings and recommendations will strengthen the accountability and effectiveness of Canada's security and intelligence community.
The report before you contains five chapters, including the two substantive reviews conducted by the committee.
The first chapter explains the origins of NSICOP, its mandate and how it approaches its work, including what factors the committee takes into consideration when deciding what to review.
The second chapter provides an overview of the security and intelligence organizations in Canada, of the threats to Canada's security and how these organizations work together to keep Canada and Canadian safe and to promote Canadian interests.
Those two chapters are followed by the committee's two substantive reviews for 2018.
In chapter 3, the committee reviewed the way the government determines its intelligence priorities. Why is this important? There are three reasons.
First, this process is the fundamental means of providing direction to Canada's intelligence collectors and assessors, ensuring they focus on the government's, and the country's, highest priorities.
Second, this process is essential to ensure accountability in the intelligence community. What the intelligence community does is highly classified. This process gives the government regular insight into intelligence operations from a government-wide lens.
Third, this process helps the government to manage risk. When the government approves the intelligence priorities, it is accepting the risks of focusing on some targets and also the risk of not focusing on others.
The committee found that the process, from identifying priorities to translating them into practical guidance, to informing ministers and seeking their approval, does have a solid foundation. That said, any process can be improved.
In particular, the committee recommends that the Prime Minister's national security and intelligence advisor should take a stronger leadership role in the process in order to make sure that cabinet has the best information to make important decisions on where Canada should focus its intelligence activities and its resources.
Moving on, chapter 4 reviews the intelligence activities of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. The government's defence policy, “Strong, Secure, Engaged”, states that DND/CAF is “the only entity within the Government of Canada that employs the full spectrum of intelligence collection capabilities while providing multi-source analysis.”
We recognize that defence intelligence activities are critical to the safety of troops and the success of Canadian military activities, including those abroad, and they are expected to grow. When the government decides to deploy the Canadian Armed Forces, DND/CAF also has implicit authority to conduct defence intelligence activities. In both cases, the source of authority is what is known as the Crown prerogative. This is very different from how other intelligence organizations, notably CSE and CSIS, operate. Each of those organizations has clear statutory authority to conduct intelligence activities, and they are subject to regular, independent and external review.
This was a significant and complex review for the committee, with four findings and three recommendations.
Our first recommendation focuses on areas where DND/CAF could make changes to strengthen its existing internal governance structure over its intelligence activities and to strengthen the accountability of the minister.
The other two recommendations would require the government to amend or to consider enacting legislation. The committee has set out the reasons why it formed the view that regular independent review of DND/CAF intelligence activities will strengthen accountability over its operations.
We believe there is an opportunity for the government, with Bill C-59 still before the Senate, to put in place requirements for annual reporting on DND/CAF's national security or intelligence activities, as would be required for CSIS and CSE.
Second, the committee also believes that its review substantiates the need for the government to give very serious consideration to providing explicit legislative authority for the conduct of defence intelligence activities. Defence intelligence is critical to the operations of the Canadian Armed Forces and, like all intelligence activities, involves inherent risks.
DND/CAF officials expressed concerns to the committee about maintaining operational flexibility for the conduct of defence intelligence activities in support of military operations. The committee, therefore, thought it was important to present both the risks and the benefits of placing defence intelligence on a clear statutory footing.
Our recommendations are a reflection of the committee's analysis of these important issues.
We would be pleased to take your questions.
Thank you.
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
Minister Goodale appeared before this committee during the hearings on Bill  C-59, I believe. At that time, he told us that he could not answer certain questions because it was a matter of national security. After that, in the House of Commons, Minister Goodale said the opposite. Daniel Jean also testified before our committee that it was not a matter of national security.
In your opinion, is it a matter of national security?
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
Your notes mention Bill  C-59. You make recommendations involving the Department of National Defence, DND. I know that the bill is being studied in the Senate at the moment, but I no longer recall which stage it has reached. Do you think that amendments will be proposed by the Senate or the government? Have you heard anything about that?
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View David McGuinty Profile
Lib. (ON)
View David McGuinty Profile
2019-05-13 15:48
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Our role is to submit reports to the government, and we have done that. All we can do is hope that the government will take them seriously
The national security and intelligence review agency, NSIRA, once it's created under Bill C-59, will have the power to review the Department of National Defence but will not be obligated to do so on an annual basis like it will for CSIS and CSE. The committee was unanimous in calling for NSIRA to have that annual responsibility built into Bill C-59 so that the extensive activities of the Department of National Defence in intelligence were reviewed on an ongoing basis.
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2019-05-13 15:56
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Right, thank you.
I have another question on National Defence and the recommendation to amend Bill  C-59 as well as on the definition of the mandate that would be given to the new committee.
Is your committee concerned about the resources that this new sister committee would have to do this monitoring? The resources are already rather limited. If the mandate is expanded, are you concerned about whether the new committee will be able to carry it out each year? I would like it to be and I agree with the recommendation, but the question is whether it will be able to do so adequately given current or planned resources.
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View Julie Dabrusin Profile
Lib. (ON)
View Julie Dabrusin Profile
2019-05-13 16:10
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Over the past few exchanges, we've heard a little bit about Bill C-59 and the other forms of oversight or review that might be put in place. In respect of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, NSIRA, how would you see the complementarity between the review agency and yourself?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2019-03-18 17:29
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So, my question becomes this: If we look at Bill C-59, for example, where you're giving CSE defensive and offensive capabilities—and part of that is proactively shutting down malware that might be...or an IP, or things like that—is there concern about escalation and where the line is drawn?
Part of this study.... The problem is that we're all lay people, or most of us anyway—I won't speak for all—when it comes to these things. My understanding of AI—because I've heard that, too—is that it's not what we think of it as being from popular culture. Does that mean that if, due to employing AI to use some of these capabilities that the law has conferred on different agencies, AI is continuing...? How much human involvement is there in the adjustments? If that line is so blurry as to what the rules of engagement are, is there concern that AI is learning how to shut something down, that the consequences can be graver than they were initially, but the system is sort of evolving on its own? I don't want to get lost. I don't know what the proper jargon is there, but....
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Dan Rogers
View Dan Rogers Profile
Dan Rogers
2019-02-26 17:21
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Under the current mandate for CSE, our authorities are limited to intelligence collection. There are provisions in Bill C-59, which the Senate is currently considering. If that bill is passed, we may have more authorities in the future.
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View Pam Damoff Profile
Lib. (ON)
Thanks, Chair.
Minister, it's always great to have you here, along with your very able officials. Thank you for taking the time to join us this afternoon.
On Friday, media reported that the Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence had delayed consideration of crucial government legislation on national security, as well as firearms, in order to hold meetings on the number of ministers who had held the Veterans Affairs portfolio.
Dr. Stephanie Carvin, an expert in national security at Carleton University, tweeted on Friday with regard to the delay, and this is her tweet:
Not great, @SenateCA. You came to work late and you need to get the job done and pass #C59. Failure to do so will mean @NoFlyListKids will go years without redress, CSIS will not have a legal basis to store datasets crucial for ops and CSE will not have powers to protect Canada.
Are you concerned about Bill C-59, our national security legislation, as well as BillC-71, which included really important protections for survivors of intimate partner violence, being delayed in the Senate?
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View Ralph Goodale Profile
Lib. (SK)
I consider both BillC-71 and Bill C-59 to be vital pieces of legislation that need to receive the appropriate parliamentary attention as quickly as possible. I want to thank this committee for dealing with both of those items of legislation in a very thorough way. There was no compromise on your scrutiny. You examined the issues very carefully. You made a number of recommendations for changes in the legislation and sent them back to the House in a timely way. I thank this committee for that work. Now, both of those issues are before the Senate.
I have had the opportunity to speak with a number of senators about the very heavy agenda that is before them, including BillC-71 and Bill C-59. They do seem to be optimistic that in the time they have available between now and the summer they will be able to deal with the legislation in a full and final way.
I share the belief that this legislation is vital. It contains very important measures, such as the extensive background checks that you referred to in BillC-71, which I believe has received support across all party lines.
In Bill C-59, issues that you mentioned included the ability of CSIS to deal properly with bulk datasets, the new authorities that are provided to the Communications Security Establishment, as well as the creation of a new national security and intelligence review agency to get out of these silos for reviewing our security intelligence organizations and to have one review agency that has full jurisdiction to examine any issue in any department or agency of the Government of Canada and follow the evidence wherever it may go.
There's a lot more to the legislation than that, but those are really critical innovations in the law, and it is important for the legislation to receive careful and timely consideration. The communications that I have heard from the Senate would lead me to believe that they are working diligently on the issues before them and are confident that they will be able to discharge their parliamentary duties in a timely way, and I look forward to that.
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2019-02-25 15:53
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Thank you very much, Chair.
Minister and all the officials, thank you for being here.
I want to ask about the $3.8 million that goes to CSE, because in the debate on Bill C-59, there's been this question that keeps coming back, which is that CSE is an organization that exists under the National Defence Act, as you know. Given that a lot of these umbrella organizations are being created and that money is now coming from your department to fund them, do we arrive at a point where the government envisages changing whose authority is over that department?
Minister, with all due respect to your colleague Minister Sajjan, you seem to be taking the lead on a lot of the issues that CSE works on. I'm wondering if there ever is a concern that, when the legislative, budgetary and parliamentary agenda is being led by one minister and authorizations by another, it starts to get a little muddled in terms of the responsibilities.
Is there ever any thought over rejigging how that works within cabinet?
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View Ralph Goodale Profile
Lib. (SK)
I think you would need to be constantly alert to the issue of national security architecture, accountability and lines of reporting to make sure that you're not in any way compromising the ability of the organizations to do their jobs or compromising the capacity to be accountable to Canadians through the appropriate parliamentary or governmental authorities.
When Bill C-59 is ultimately approved, as I hope it will be, by the Senate and becomes law, the legislation governing CSE will be a new stand-alone bill, rather than an add-on to another piece of legislation.
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2019-02-25 15:56
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On that note, going to the elections interference piece raised by my colleague, what I wonder about is that some of the powers that are being used or potentially will be used by CSIS and others in the plan that was put forward by you and your colleagues are going to change if and when Bill C-59 finally gets adopted.
I asked the same question of Scott Jones when he was here on our cybersecurity study. Does that mean you're then bringing everything back to the drawing board in the event that Bill C-59 gets adopted, since some of the powers that are being used aren't even clearly defined or will change under the new legislation when it gets royal assent? I'm thinking of threat disruption as an example.
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2019-02-25 15:57
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Yes, Minister, of course.
With the announcement that was made, I believe the threat disruption powers that were first conferred by what was then BillC-51 in the previous Parliament are one tool that CSIS may use in that event, and even with CSE's role will obviously significantly change once Bill C-59 gets royal assent. They have a large role to play in the election interference piece as well.
What happens for the whole-of-government approach if and when Bill C-59 gets royal assent, just with regard to the elections?
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View Ralph Goodale Profile
Lib. (SK)
One thing that Bill C-59 does with respect to the threat reduction measures is to create a very clear procedural, as well as legal and constitutional, frame that will ensure more transparency and more accountability. Exactly how the powers can be used is laid out now more explicitly in legislation than ever before.
The one major criticism of the old BillC-51 was that the way those powers were worded in the old law implied that you could somehow exercise those powers in violation of the charter. We have clarified in the law explicitly that it is not the case, and that indeed, if and when those powers are ever exercised, they must be exercised in a manner consistent with the charter, not in violation of the charter.
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View Ralph Goodale Profile
Lib. (SK)
In those two cases, the commissioner and SIRC have very extensive powers to know everything that those two agencies do, the CSE and CSIS. They have very well-established relationships where the agencies report to the review agencies. If the review agency wants any information, under the law they have complete access to all of that information. The problem is that they work in silos. SIRC can look at CSIS, and nothing else. The commissioner can look at CSE, and nothing else.
The new NSIRA, the national security and intelligence review agency created by Bill C-59, will be a comprehensive review agency with the legal authority to look at the security and intelligence operations of any agency or department of the Government of Canada.
Apart from the couple I've mentioned, there are at least 17 different departments and agencies of the Government of Canada that have some security or intelligence function—for example, CBSA, the Privy Council Office, the Department of National Defence, the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Transport and so forth. NSIRA will be able to look at all of that, without limitation.
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View Ralph Goodale Profile
Lib. (SK)
The legislation is in the process of being drafted, and we intend to present it at the earliest opportunity. The functions of the CBSA that touch on national security are covered by Bill C-59, just as any other department or agency of the Government of Canada that deals with security or intelligence issues is covered by C-59.
However, where you're dealing with individual officer complaints or concerns about specific functions or situations, you will need a separate instrument. That's what we're drafting now, and we will present it as rapidly as we can. It's very much in progress.
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2019-02-25 17:05
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I have a minute left, Minister.
One of my colleagues, Ms. Dabrusin, asked about CBSA oversight. It feels like it's been three years now that Mr. Goodale has been telling us over and over that it's coming, so maybe we'll get a bill that we can adopt before the election.
Glibness aside, I do want to address this issue. I don't know if you could comment on this, or if this is for Minister Goodale. He did mention that the new review body created in Bill C-59 would look into issues relating to national security. However, many of the issues that have come forward, especially in the media, that such a body could look at—in particular, allegations of harassment in the workplace and things of that nature, or even some of the security issues that have been raised—could be looked at by a more specific mechanism that doesn't necessarily fall under....
There's some debate about whether everything the CBSA does, as a national security body, falls under that committee. Can you comment on that specifically? What's being done to address some of those issues in the workplace and some of those security screening issues, for example, that oversight and review could help us address?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2019-01-30 16:14
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I wanted to quickly touch on the cyberwarfare piece with Bill C-59, for example, and CSE having the active cyber capabilities. My understanding is that there is not really any clarity in international law. Some would argue that when you attack a country's sovereignty.... Is data a part of sovereignty? I think that's the uncertainty we're at now.
There's a risk of escalation, but does it go both ways? Even with the announcement today, for example, on fighting foreign interference, if there's any kind of disruption that's being done proactively or pre-emptively, is there a risk there that we might antagonize while trying to protect ourselves if there's no action from a foreign state actor prior to whatever action our agencies are taking?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2019-01-30 16:58
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Just really quickly, with the 15 seconds I have left, would that structure and who's taking the lead look different if Bill C-59 receives royal assent today?
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Scott Jones
View Scott Jones Profile
Scott Jones
2019-01-30 16:59
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We're using whatever tool is the appropriate one at the time. If Bill C-59 is passed by the Senate, gains royal assent and comes into force, then we would re-evaluate how we approach these problems, given those new—
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>
>|
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