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Results: 1 - 27 of 27
View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2019-03-18 17:29
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So, my question becomes this: If we look at Bill C-59, for example, where you're giving CSE defensive and offensive capabilities—and part of that is proactively shutting down malware that might be...or an IP, or things like that—is there concern about escalation and where the line is drawn?
Part of this study.... The problem is that we're all lay people, or most of us anyway—I won't speak for all—when it comes to these things. My understanding of AI—because I've heard that, too—is that it's not what we think of it as being from popular culture. Does that mean that if, due to employing AI to use some of these capabilities that the law has conferred on different agencies, AI is continuing...? How much human involvement is there in the adjustments? If that line is so blurry as to what the rules of engagement are, is there concern that AI is learning how to shut something down, that the consequences can be graver than they were initially, but the system is sort of evolving on its own? I don't want to get lost. I don't know what the proper jargon is there, but....
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2019-01-30 16:14
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I wanted to quickly touch on the cyberwarfare piece with Bill C-59, for example, and CSE having the active cyber capabilities. My understanding is that there is not really any clarity in international law. Some would argue that when you attack a country's sovereignty.... Is data a part of sovereignty? I think that's the uncertainty we're at now.
There's a risk of escalation, but does it go both ways? Even with the announcement today, for example, on fighting foreign interference, if there's any kind of disruption that's being done proactively or pre-emptively, is there a risk there that we might antagonize while trying to protect ourselves if there's no action from a foreign state actor prior to whatever action our agencies are taking?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2019-01-30 16:58
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Just really quickly, with the 15 seconds I have left, would that structure and who's taking the lead look different if Bill C-59 receives royal assent today?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2018-09-20 17:00
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The other piece I want to ask about is the vulnerabilities equities process that exists within the NSA in the U.S. On the same topic of transparency, I'm wondering about this. More and more, especially with the existence of the centre, I'm assuming that there's going to be more work done to identify these vulnerabilities.
In Bill C-59, a lot of the pieces involve working with the private sector to identify the vulnerabilities and to, in some cases, even study them to a certain extent. I don't want to rehash the debate that we've had quite extensively at this committee, but is there a specific protocol that exists here, in the same way that the NSA has developed one, in order to disclose to the public and parliamentarians, etc., the existence of vulnerabilities in software and such?
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View Michel Picard Profile
Lib. (QC)
View Michel Picard Profile
2018-03-22 11:07
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Thank you.
I will ask my questions in French for those who need the earpiece.
Minister, it is a pleasure to see you and your entire team again. Welcome to the committee.
I have just come from a two-hour meeting of the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics, where representatives from Estonia talked about e-governance.
Clearly, beyond what is done on land, on sea and in the air, information is becoming the new battlefield. Big data is becoming a new target and a new playing field for conflicts between countries.
How will those new powers granted by Bill  C-59 serve the CSE?
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View Michel Picard Profile
Lib. (QC)
View Michel Picard Profile
2018-03-22 11:10
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In this committee's previous discussions, we have received comments on the offensive dimension of certain powers or capabilities of the CSE. It is well known that groups that are terrorists or associated with terrorists, such as Daesh, benefit from online informal networks of sympathizers, structures and communications. This new armada or new equipment at the disposal of these terrorist groups represents an additional threat.
How should the offensive approach of the CSE be defined? How will this offensive approach respond to the new threat?
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View Michel Picard Profile
Lib. (QC)
View Michel Picard Profile
2018-03-22 11:12
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You talk about the CSE's support for the various operations, which are not military only. This support is necessary because of the disadvantage of being unable to respond quickly enough to an attack, thereby having to wait for the attack to take place before it can react. This new capacity will support various operations.
Will this support become a new instrument for conducting military operations around the world? Asking the question is sort of answering it.
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View Michel Picard Profile
Lib. (QC)
View Michel Picard Profile
2018-03-22 11:13
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You are comparing our capabilities with those of our Five Eyes partners. Those new powers will enable us to be at the same level as our partners abroad, even ahead, if our technology allows it. By default, I take it that we have some catching up to do, and this bill allows us to do that.
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2018-03-22 12:00
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It's the first time I've ever liked daylight saving time.
Voices: Oh, oh!
Mr. Matthew Dubé: Really quickly, I have just one question. I want to get back to the details I asked about on the Cambridge Analytica situation with Facebook.
There's clearly not a situation here of the information having been obtained illegally. It's nebulous, and perhaps dubious and immoral, but it's not quite clear that it's illegal. Information like this that is being obtained and being used by political parties in a variety of countries around the world arguably could fall under the definition of publicly available information. How do you see that, Minister, and how does CSE see that?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2018-03-22 12:01
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I appreciate that, Minister. If we're talking about operating legally, and this information is obtained legally—although arguably the laws should be changed in that context—doesn't that mean that CSE could obtain that information under publicly available information?
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View Michel Picard Profile
Lib. (QC)
View Michel Picard Profile
2018-02-15 11:59
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I have a quick question for you about the cyber threat.
This is a broad field. You have mentioned a few key themes of the cyber threat. We are interested in this but, since it is so broad, where should we start?
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
All right.
We also heard Mr. Fadden speak about China, which has about 200,000 people conducting cyberoperations.
Do you believe that the powers granted by bill C-59 open the door to effective action against the Chinese threat in cyberspace?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2018-02-13 12:01
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Thank you very much.
Just on the active cyber operations, the minister of National Defence is the one calling the shots, if you'll allow me to use that expression, and you exist through the National Defence Act. But the CSE—and I know the answer to this, but just for the record—is a civilian organization, correct?
Ms. Shelly Bruce: That's correct.
Mr. Matthew Dubé: When cyber operations are being undertaken, you referred in your presentation—I'm going with the notes—to “cyber aggression by foreign states”. You are not phrasing cyber aggression as an act of war per se. You also refer to disrupting “cyber aggression by foreign states”. Is there not concern that a civilian organization answering to the Minister of National Defence, in essentially undertaking offensive actions against another state, could be perceived as engaging in an act or war? What would be the legal consequences of that? We've had witnesses who've explained that, because legally you're seen as a civilian organization, that muddies the waters significantly. That's where a lot of the concern comes from. I don't necessarily feel you've addressed that in your comments.
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2018-02-13 12:03
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Just to be clear, if we need what I would almost call a counterattack to something being done by a foreign state actor, and the military is developing similar capabilities to what CSE has, if you're the Minister of National Defence, how do you respond? Are you looking to the military to take that action, or are you looking to CSE? If the military is developing those capabilities, why should a civilian organization be taking action that a military actor could take against a foreign state?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I'd like to welcome both of the witnesses.
Ms. Tribe, at one of the committee's last meetings, a leading national security expert said that approximately 200,000 people in China were actively engaged in computer network operations, the technical term for cyber operations. He said that China was a genuine threat to Canada.
Do you, knowing that genuine threats exist, maintain that the Communications Security Establishment should not have any defensive capability?
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View Michel Picard Profile
Lib. (QC)
View Michel Picard Profile
2018-02-08 11:33
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Thank you.
You mentioned that we have laws and regulations indicating that we don't spy on Canadians. The CSE commissioner came before us and confirmed that there's no spying on Canadians. Even so, you mentioned at the beginning of your speech that there's no guarantee that Canadians will not be spied upon and that we cannot trust the simple fact that it is written somewhere, that we are not sure whether the CSE will or will not spy on Canadians. What does it take then to make sure that we can be assure of that?
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View Michel Picard Profile
Lib. (QC)
View Michel Picard Profile
2018-02-08 11:35
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When you talk to a stranger, do you ask whether the stranger can be under surveillance by another country, so you don't get caught in what may be a monitored call?
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View Michel Picard Profile
Lib. (QC)
View Michel Picard Profile
2018-02-08 11:35
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If you talk to a stranger, how do you make sure you will not be caught in a monitored call, because that person might be a target?
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View Michel Picard Profile
Lib. (QC)
View Michel Picard Profile
2018-02-08 11:38
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You mentioned—and I'm following the question of Mr. Paul-Hus—that the technology in other countries may increase that threat in Canada, and therefore you are looking for, and I'll quote you, “tools to take down”. Therefore, you are open to the possibility of taking measures to make sure that we reduce the aggression or the attack before it happens, and then we have to act after the fact.
What is the justification behind your position to increase those offensive measures, which seems to be the same as the justification not to allow CSIS or CSE to act?
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
The current government had some critical comments to make about Bill C-51. We then proposed Bill  C-59 to change certain things. We are often reminded that we must not violate the rights and freedoms of Canadians; we all agree on that. However, in a defensive context, we have to have the means to protect ourselves.
In your opinion, will Bill  C-59 excessively constrain or weaken the government's safeguards?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2018-01-30 12:45
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I'd like to hear from you both on this.
The words “information infrastructure” get thrown around a lot. There's a definition there. We can debate that, but the definition of a foreign entity being attacked or information being collected on them by CSE is not the same as it was when the CSE act first came in. These information infrastructures.... I'm thinking in particular of Ms. Damoff's questions over the last two witness panels about this notion that....
Even when we look at telecommunications companies in this country, we would have blinders on if we believed that things like LTE networks and stuff like that are being developed in a silo. There are obviously international efforts going on to make these networks better and more robust, but while that's happening, these legal definitions of what's.... It just seems that it's a bit out of date in terms of what's foreign and what's not. As soon as we give the power for the minister to identify information infrastructure, inevitably that net is going to be wider than it ever was before. I'm wondering what your thoughts are on that.
Perhaps we could start with Mr. Boisvert and then go back to Ms. Vonn.
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
Thank you, Mr. Chair. I will be brief.
My question is addressed to Mr. Boisvert.
Canada has adopted a laissez-faire approach to Chinese investments in Canadian businesses, in the technology sector in particular. Does that concern you, all the more so since one of Canada's closest allies has criticized us for selling a high tech business that sells satellite communications systems to the Chinese?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2017-12-07 10:29
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Thank you for that.
I want to stay in part 3 of the bill as well and look specifically at proposed section 24. I'm hoping to hear from everyone but in particular from you, Ms. Gill.
You mentioned encryption software and some of the applications that are used and not used just by so-called bad guys but also by law-abiding Canadians seeking to protect their privacy. In the course of, in particular, proposed paragraphs 24(1)(b) and 24(1)(c), where we're talking about essentially testing and studying information infrastructure and evaluating software and testing them for vulnerabilities, does that potentially create a situation in which we can go down that rabbit hole to find ways to counter some encryption that can be used for the lawful purposes of simply having the peace of mind of protecting your privacy?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2017-12-07 10:31
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When you say “disclosing vulnerabilities”, do you mean CSE disclosing those to, say, the private sector, so, for example, a telecom company?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2017-12-05 9:27
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Thank you very much.
There is one last question I wanted to ask. You talked about the importance of having legal grounds for the operations that CSE does. There are different parts that I've been looking at. I don't have enough time to get into some of those details, but there is one I was asking them about with proposed section 24, about testing and studying information infrastructure. There's also proposed section 28, which is about the minister authorizing cybersecurity—essentially, authorization to protect federal infrastructure and non-federal infrastructure.
Could the bill benefit from more clarity as to what exactly CSE can be doing in those particular contexts?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2017-12-05 10:25
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Thank you, Chair, and while you're reminiscing, I'll spare you the knowledge of where I was 16 years ago, because that might be embarrassing for all of us.
I want to focus on the changes to CSE, because I don't think we quite have the institutional memory on that aspect given that it's mostly been something that National Defence has dealt with in the appropriate committee.
Does the amendment you suggested, Professor Forcese, affect proposed sections 27 through 54, which deal with the different authorizations that the minister can give? There's a lot of mention of acts of Parliament in those sections of the bill.
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