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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2018-02-06 11:37
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That's what I'm trying to do. It's a 130-page bill. I can't quite get it quickly enough in a minute. You'll forgive me, Chair.
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2018-02-06 11:45
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Yes, I can.
I will be brief.
I was referring specifically to the complaints mechanisms.
Clause 8(1)(d) of the bill states:
The mandate of the Review Agency is to...(d) investigate(i) any complaint made under subsection 16(1), 17(1) or 18(3),...
The bill then refers to the Citizenship Act, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act, and the Canadian Human Rights Act.
The provisions in this part of the bill concern CSIS, CSE, and people who are unable to obtain security clearances in connection with federal government contracts. As no reference is made to Global Affairs Canada, it would be impossible for someone to file a complaint concerning consular matters in a case such as that of Mr. Arar.
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View Yves Robillard Profile
Lib. (QC)
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Peschard, when you last appeared before the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, you also criticized the new offence of advocating or promoting the commission of terrorism offences. Several individuals have said that this new offence would be unconstitutional because it is vague and too broad and would unreasonably limit freedom of expression.
The new section 83.221 that we are proposing concerns the counselling of another person to commit a terrorism offence. What do you think of this new wording?
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View Yves Robillard Profile
Lib. (QC)
Mr. Barrette, when you appeared before the Committee, you said that the use of investigative measures in the Air India affair had caused a fiasco and that thought should be given to the necessity of the powers conferred on police officers.
I note that, in clauses 145 and 147 of Bill  C-59, we would repeal the investigative measures that have not been used since the Air India affair. I would like you to enlighten us on the fiasco caused by the use of those investigative measures.
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here with us today.
Mr. Peschard, you mentioned in the introduction to your brief that changes obviously occurred after September 11, 2001. You also put the words "war on terror" in quotation marks. Do you feel there is no terrorism now, that we have no reason to fear terrorism?
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
So you basically think there is a scheme afoot to scare people and that potential terrorist actions do not exist?
However, there are examples of actions that have been taken and that have prevented terrorist acts in Canada and France. Do you think that was a fantasy?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2018-02-06 12:41
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Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thanks to all our witnesses for being here today.
I would like to ask you a question about information that is acquired incidentally. This issue comes up in two areas, particularly in connection with data collection by CSIS, but also by the CSE.
Does this concern you? Even though the need to justify retention of information acquired incidentally is addressed further on in the bill, my impression is that, during an investigation, one could justify it quite easily and start creating a fairly broad range of data.
Do you share this concern? Could you discuss it with us?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2018-02-06 12:43
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That's perfect. Thank you.
I would like to discuss the new commissioner position. Part 3 contains a section that concerns the possibility that the minister may renew authorizations of work done by the CSE without obtaining the commissioner's authorization. Do you think this is a problem?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2018-02-06 12:45
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Thank you.
Your answer raises two questions. First, the post created is described as a part-time position. Considering the workload and all the complexities you have just cited, is that appropriate, or should it be a full-time position? I think it is entirely possible that a retired judge could occupy the position on a full-time basis.
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2018-02-06 12:46
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I have a final question on the subject. You may find it hard to answer in what little time we have left because it is fairly broad question.
You discussed automatic authorizations and said that might be difficult for the commissioner. It must also be acknowledged that there is no real-time oversight in this instance. What we can acknowledge as positive is that the commissioner position contemplated would approach that.
If this is not the perfect model, do you have any suggestions or recommendations regarding what we might explore in future to establish an entity that conducts real-time oversight, which is not currently the case in Canada?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2018-02-01 11:23
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Thank you, Chair, and thank you both for being here today.
When we debated C-51 in the previous parliament, one of the issues that came up was that a lot of talk is given to legislation for keeping Canadians safe, but often one of the pieces that's forgotten is actually providing proper resources for police. One of the things that comes to mind is the police officer recruitment fund from the federal government that existed to help provinces and municipalities, as you obviously well know, and provide additional funding. This is a fund that was cut that's never been brought back that we wish would be there and be permanent. How important is it to actually have resources, beyond all the talk of legislation and all the procedures, so you know that you have the ability to properly equip and train those men and women on the front lines in order to keep Canadians safe?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2018-02-01 11:26
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Hypotheticals are always a dangerous thing in this line of work, in politics, and you might not want to go down this slippery slope, but how many of these cases would be dealt with simply by having more resources to deal with them, as opposed to actually bringing in legislative change?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2018-02-01 11:28
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You mentioned intel-to-evidence, but there is also this issue even with regard to terrorism charges. With the situation in Edmonton, if I'm not mistaken, the terrorism charges in many of these cases become moot because the other crimes that have been committed, the different forms of violence, provide enough charges where the prosecution can proceed without having to go down that path.
How challenging is this notion of identifying what is or isn't terrorism, and how does that pose any challenges for the work that you do?
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
My thanks to the witnesses as well.
Your testimony on national security is very important. Our primary objective is to see whether Bill  C-59 will allow the police forces you represent to continue to do their work.
As I understand it, terrorism and the return of ISIS fighters worries you a great deal. On the one hand, without giving much away, the government has confirmed that some safeguards are in place, but on the other hand, you seem to be saying that there is a problem.
Can you give me more information about this? Is there a problem with communication between Canada’s intelligence services, the RCMP and the police forces you represent at more regional and municipal levels?
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
You just talked about people who went abroad to join the jihad and then came back; that’s one problem. Another is the domestic issue in Canada. You said that, in Vancouver, the number of identified individuals has gone up from 13 to 268, and that there is a problem with resources.
For the purposes of our study, we need to know whether parts of Bill  C-59 may be reducing your legal capacity to intervene. You talked about the need to request a warrant from a judge in order to intervene if the possibility of a terrorism offence is detected.
Do you think Bill  C-59 contains problematic provisions that are likely to interfere with your work on the ground?
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View Michel Picard Profile
Lib. (QC)
View Michel Picard Profile
2018-02-01 11:52
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Thank you.
I have a lot of questions. Something popped up in my mind: my colleague here has suggested a very good idea. Patrolmen and -women have the challenge of being on the street and facing everyone on a daily basis. Based on that knowledge of what goes on on the street, what is your interpretation of the level of risk or danger the Canadian population faces? Has this changed, increased, or decreased over the last five or six years?
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View Michel Picard Profile
Lib. (QC)
View Michel Picard Profile
2018-02-01 11:53
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Is the Canadian population more at risk now than it was six years ago?
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View Michel Picard Profile
Lib. (QC)
View Michel Picard Profile
2018-02-01 11:53
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To your knowledge is this situation very recent, or did we start to look at those issues five years ago? The Internet for example, propaganda, and....
Have you looked at cases where we start to see more Internet propaganda messages? Without knowing how to quantify one person travelling abroad, apparently we have a possible foreign fighter coming back. We didn't start to look at that last year, did we?
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View Michel Picard Profile
Lib. (QC)
View Michel Picard Profile
2018-02-01 11:55
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That triggers an interesting exchange of information among different levels of police forces. Is security clearance an issue in those communications?
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View Michel Picard Profile
Lib. (QC)
View Michel Picard Profile
2018-02-01 11:56
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Does the need-to-know basis limit some information accessible to you when you approach someone, if you expect the person to be a potential foreign fighter? Does that change your position and the means that you have at your disposal to act toward this person? What is your interpretation of what we call foreign fighters from the street standpoint, the patrol person standpoint? When you look at someone and you say he might be a foreign fighter, what are the means at the disposal of the police force on the street then?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2018-02-01 11:57
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Thank you, Chair.
Deputy Chief Rankin, did I hear you correctly earlier when you said that even with a warrant you couldn't gain access to laptops, computers, or things like that?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2018-02-01 11:58
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Thank you.
The comparison might not be appropriate, but looking at the debate that goes on about looking at peoples' cellphones at the border, many have argued that having a cellphone is not like having a suitcase. When you cross the border, you have an expectation that your suitcase will be searched, that it's okay to look through clothes and things like that, whereas on a cellphone you can have banking information, health information, all kinds of information that puts someone's privacy in jeopardy in a different way. Notwithstanding any crime that may or may not have been committed, is there a concern about accessing, for example, laptops and phones? Then by decrypting that, you're getting access to a whole swath of information that casts a fairly large net.
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
Thank you very much for joining us today.
In my naivety, I am trying to understand one thing. In my view, the two largest intelligence agencies in the world are Facebook and Google. I think we can agree on that. Moreover, most Canadians are on those networks.
When you sign up on Facebook, you must approve a list of regulations, which no one reads and to which everyone agrees. Details about your life are then published and you can be tracked and followed everywhere. People see no problem with that. Google and Facebook employees, be they in California or elsewhere in the world, can find out everything about our lives and no one makes a big deal out of it. However, people want to put restrictions and roadblocks on the work of the professionals in our intelligence agencies, who want to ensure that our society is protected.
How do you explain the fact that people are not concerned about Facebook or Google, but that there is a kind of restriction on the work of our intelligence officers?
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
By no means do we want Canada to become a police state, to start acting like North Korea or China, which are absolutely deplorable. That said, the objective is to protect ourselves. The world has changed, as have the threats to the world; these darned networks like Facebook are tools for hate-filled propaganda. And it does not necessarily come from here, it may very well come from elsewhere.
Let me go back to the act. Let us suppose that someone posts a video on YouTube in which he suggests attacking Canada or setting off a bomb, but without asking anyone specific to do so. In your opinion, should that individual be charged with counselling an attack?
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
Amendments have been made to the wording of Bill  C-59, in order to make it more specific or broader.
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
Now I would like to go back to Ms. Szurlej.
Bill  C-59 amends part 5 of the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act. You spoke about it a little. In terms of the threshold, could you tell us the difference you are making between “reasonably necessary” and “strictly necessary”?
Could you give us a concrete example of that?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2018-02-01 12:41
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Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
One of the questions that often comes up deals with publicly available information, as we find in parts 3 and 4 of the bill. Could you tell me whether Canadian legislation or case law contains a definition of what “publicly available information” means?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2018-02-01 12:43
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Okay, but the bill, in paragraph 24(1)(a) of part 3 or in subsection 11.24(1) of part 4, refers to publicly available information. Part 3 deals with the CSE and part 4 deals with data collected by CSIS.
Do you consider that publicly accessible information is defined in the bill? Is there a need to define what exactly is understood by ”publicly accessible”?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2018-01-30 11:30
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Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here today.
I have one question, but I have the feeling that you will not want to be too definite with your answer.
There was not a lot of time for this bill. That is not a criticism, on the contrary, but it explains why extremely major changes are proposed.
Your suggestions mainly affect three different parts of the bill: parts 2, 3 and 4. In your opinion, would it have been appropriate for the parts that create new structures and vastly expand the authority of the CSE to be dealt with in a separate bill, instead of being included in a 130-page bill with a number of objectives?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2018-01-30 11:31
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Of course.
In the answers you have provided to some of my colleagues, you discussed the mandate of the CSE. Ms. Bossenmaier, the CSE chief, appeared before us, and I asked her specific questions on the proposed subclause 24(1), the first paragraph of which presents exceptions for cases of publicly available information. This concerns us, as do the paragraphs that follow. Ms. Bossenmaier mentioned that the mandate of the CSE essentially affects foreign entities, and not Canadians. I would like to ask you a number of questions about that.
First, is the mandate legal or is it understood as such by the CSE?
Also, these types of exceptions are included in the bill, but we really have yet to hear why. For example, it reads: “The Minister may, by order, designate any…electronic information or information infrastructures as…of importance to the Government of Canada.” All these matters are unclear, and we are not able to justify the scope.
I have touched on several questions, some of them in the form of comments. I would simply like to know your point of view on these subjects.
What is the mandate of the CSE? Is the bill widening its scope without us being able to justify the concrete reasons for doing so and the intended objective?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2018-01-30 11:34
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Although the mandate isn't to target Canadians, some aspects of the bill are worrying in this regard. I'm going to address several points quickly.
Subclause 22(1) states:
22(1) The Minister may, by order, designate any electronic information, any information infrastructures or any class of electronic information or information infrastructures as electronic information or information infrastructures—as the case may be—of importance to the Government of Canada.
Although the target is foreign entities, the designated infrastructure may be in a global ecosystem and be used by Canadians.
The other thing I want to draw your attention to and get your comments on is the proposed section 23, which talks specifically about the targeting exceptions for Canadians. However, it says in proposed subsection 24(1):
24(1) Despite subsections 23(1) and (2), the Establishment may carry out any of the following activities in furtherance of its mandate:(a) acquiring, using, analyzing … publicly available information;
The following is stated further on:
Information acquired incidentally(4) The Establishment may acquire information relating to a Canadian or a person in Canada incidentally in the course of carrying out activities under an authorization issued under subsection 27(1), 28(1) or (2) or 41(1).
Despite the mandate and what is understood by the agency, there are a lot of loopholes. Canadians could be affected.
Given the exchange of information between the agencies and with our allies, particularly the Americans, and the absence of a prescription regarding the length of time the data will be retained, don't you think that risks might be incurred?
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View Michel Picard Profile
Lib. (QC)
View Michel Picard Profile
2018-01-30 11:37
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Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I find this fascinating. I will move directly to my questions because I want to give our guests more time to expand on the subject.
First of all, I would like a few clarifications. In your—
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View Michel Picard Profile
Lib. (QC)
View Michel Picard Profile
2018-01-30 11:38
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I can tell you that you don't seem 75.
In your sixth proposal, you state that the Commissioner of Intelligence should prepare a public annual report for the Prime Minister. I'm not convinced, and I would like some clarification.
In your current role, is the annual report issued to Parliament or to the Prime Minister?
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View Michel Picard Profile
Lib. (QC)
View Michel Picard Profile
2018-01-30 11:39
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Since you are intervening, the version submitted to the Prime Minister will have to be amended to make it public, because of the sometimes very sensitive nature of the information.
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View Michel Picard Profile
Lib. (QC)
View Michel Picard Profile
2018-01-30 11:40
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I would like to go back to another point on which the debate has been rather limited. Your second proposal concerns the famous one-year extension of the validity period of a foreign intelligence authorization.
If the activity has already been approved by you at the start and it's just a matter of validation, why is it necessary to ask for permission again for an ongoing activity? Have you taken into account the fact that circumstances are likely to change during the year and that it might make you change your mind, perhaps even to the point where you would not have allowed the mission from the outset if you had known a number of things?
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View Michel Picard Profile
Lib. (QC)
View Michel Picard Profile
2018-01-30 11:42
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Thank you.
I'd like to come back to your first recommendation. It's a philosophic discussion, but I can never get a grip on the principle: we're talking about active cyber operations, at worst, and defensive cyber operations. We are cautious in our choice of words when we say that cyber attacks are not made in particular circumstances.
I had a whole series of questions, but I'm going to start backwards. The first question may be a bit silly: would conducting a cyber operation targeting a foreign country constitute an act of war?
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View Michel Picard Profile
Lib. (QC)
View Michel Picard Profile
2018-01-30 11:43
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Would it be an act of war, legally speaking? I think there's the whole legal aspect.
Regardless of the number of laws involved, if an organization that is a government organization by definition is conducting a foreign operation, the same way that we are victims of overseas operations that greatly justify cyber operation defensives, are we on the playing field of acts of war?
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you, gentlemen.
First, thank you for the very comprehensive document you submitted to the committee. Bill  C-59 is, indeed, complex to study, and the document you have provided contains very important elements.
I would like to come back to one point, the approval process.
The problem right now is cyber threats. In cyber defence, there is a maximum number of resources that can be in the know and that can counter cyberattacks. We work together on this. However, when we talk about active trading, that is, when Canada conducts cyber operations, I find that there are many levels of intervention, given the secret nature of the information. If you want to carry out an operation, you need to collect information or make computer-based interventions in the systems.
This morning, I attended the meeting of the Standing Committee on National Defence. We have heard from people who work on cyber operations. According to them, in defence, the important thing is to provide protection. In case of attacks, they will especially turn to the CSE.
According to Bill  C-59, when we talk about conducting operations, we seek the approval of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. On your side, you also ask for supervision by the Intelligence Commissioner.
Don't you think there are too many people involved in secret operations?
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
For the committee's information, could you provide two examples of operations Canada could request be conducted abroad? Could that be, for instance, collecting telecommunications intelligence in particular circumstances? I'd like to hear some examples. The debate is theoretical right now, and no one wants to actually say what type of active operations Canada might need to carry out.
Could you provide some examples to us?
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
Since I only have one minute left, I will conclude by highlighting proposal 7, for the benefit of the members of the committee. It's an important proposal that concerns the National Defence Act. This act states that “the expected foreign intelligence value of the information that would be derived from the interception justifies it.” However, that provision does not appear in Bill  C-59. So that is a good recommendation, and I thank you for it.
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Good afternoon, Mr. Boisvert and Ms. Vonn.
Mr. Boisvert, I'll start will you.
I want to say a few words about the Islamic State group. We now know that that group has lost a lot of ground in Syria and Iraq, but it has begun to carry out cyber-attack operations. The 2017 public report on the terrorist threat to Canada confirmed that Daesh had used cyber exploitation to draw up hit lists. These lists included the names and personal information of people chosen at random, and Daesh sympathizers were encouraged to attack them.
Regarding the threat posed by the Islamic State group, do you think we should focus mainly on cyber-attacks of that type, and on monitoring?
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
Let's talk about those economic interests. A few days ago, the newspaper Le Monde informed its readers that African Union headquarters located in Addis-Ababa were being spied on by Beijing. The building was built in 2012 by the Chinese, who took the opportunity to install systems allowing them to transfer all of the information from African Union headquarters to Shanghai.
Are you surprised by this type of thing?
The government is trying to forge economic ties with China, but several countries consider China and Russia to be major actors behind cyber-attacks and the gathering of information through these means. Do you agree with that?
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
We were just talking about warfare. I don't remember if it was here or at the meeting of the Standing Committee on National Defence. I believe it was Ms. Damoff who raised the topic. We discussed certain ill-intentioned activities on the part of China and Russia that targeted Canada.
Earlier, you said that offence is the best defence. Is Canada in a position to conduct offensive operations in order to protect our country, or is that process too complex?
I know it is complex, but I wonder what sort of activities Canada could undertake to protect itself.
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
The current government had some critical comments to make about Bill C-51. We then proposed Bill  C-59 to change certain things. We are often reminded that we must not violate the rights and freedoms of Canadians; we all agree on that. However, in a defensive context, we have to have the means to protect ourselves.
In your opinion, will Bill  C-59 excessively constrain or weaken the government's safeguards?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2018-01-30 12:40
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Thank you, Chair.
Thank you both for being here. It's interesting, given the comment that was just made about incidental information, because there's incidental information, there's the publicly available information, and there's this notion that there's clearly an intent in the legislation to expand the powers for this new threat that's being described, but when we ask the chief of CSE to explain why those powers would be used, there's no example that's able to be provided.
This question is for you, Ms. Vonn. I want to understand, because there's a link here. One of the answers that was given to me when these officials were before the committee was, “Don't worry. If you look at part 3 of the bill, in proposed section 25, they have to ensure measures are in place to protect the privacy of Canadians", but that's a very vague notion, because it then goes on to say, “of Canadians and persons in Canada in the use, analysis, retention and disclosure of...” and then goes on to describe the information.
The use of the word “disclosure” is particularly troubling, because that's how the government has rebranded the information sharing that was created under former BillC-51. I'm wondering if there's some concern about that information. It's seemingly for research and other innocuous purposes by CSE, but it can nonetheless be shared, and I'm wondering if there's some concern about what consequences there might be, in particular if it's being shared with Five Eyes allies, when we see examples like what was reported in La Presse at the end of last week about the RCMP acquiring information on Canadians from the DEA without the proper judicial oversight that would normally be involved if they were doing it here in Canada.
With that very broad portrait I've painted, I just want to understand, because I think a lot of people don't quite understand how maintaining, even with a cosmetic change, information sharing as was brought in by the former BillC-51has an impact on how these new powers of CSE are going to potentially play out.
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2018-01-30 12:45
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I'd like to hear from you both on this.
The words “information infrastructure” get thrown around a lot. There's a definition there. We can debate that, but the definition of a foreign entity being attacked or information being collected on them by CSE is not the same as it was when the CSE act first came in. These information infrastructures.... I'm thinking in particular of Ms. Damoff's questions over the last two witness panels about this notion that....
Even when we look at telecommunications companies in this country, we would have blinders on if we believed that things like LTE networks and stuff like that are being developed in a silo. There are obviously international efforts going on to make these networks better and more robust, but while that's happening, these legal definitions of what's.... It just seems that it's a bit out of date in terms of what's foreign and what's not. As soon as we give the power for the minister to identify information infrastructure, inevitably that net is going to be wider than it ever was before. I'm wondering what your thoughts are on that.
Perhaps we could start with Mr. Boisvert and then go back to Ms. Vonn.
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2018-01-30 12:47
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When I led myself to the exercise that CBC/Radio-Canada did with the cellphones and CSE not commenting on what that does for public confidence, is that potentially because those same loopholes are being exploited, and inevitably there's that risk?
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
Thank you, Mr. Chair. I will be brief.
My question is addressed to Mr. Boisvert.
Canada has adopted a laissez-faire approach to Chinese investments in Canadian businesses, in the technology sector in particular. Does that concern you, all the more so since one of Canada's closest allies has criticized us for selling a high tech business that sells satellite communications systems to the Chinese?
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
After this meeting, I am going to go to a meeting of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security where we will discuss Bill  C-59. We'll be meeting with the CSE Commissioner, as it happens.
That bill involves transferring CSE national defence-related powers to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. The bill also contains provisions that will require the authorization of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to conduct an operation.
How do you see that?
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
Good morning, gentlemen. Thank you for being here.
Mr. Gardee, at the beginning of your testimony, you took some time to level some quite serious charges against CSIS and CSE. You say that your organization, the National Council of Canadian Muslims, does not trust our intelligence services.
Could you be specific about what could shed some light on that subject? Personally, I trust our services. Could you be more specific?
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
That answers my question, thank you. As I do not have a lot of time, I would like to continue with my questions to you.
When you testified about Bill C-51, you mentioned that members of the community want to help with deradicalization, but they are afraid of being accused of being extremists.
Do you think that Bill  C-59 solves that problem?
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
Okay.
I would like to go back to the no-fly list.
I am one of the MPs who signed a letter that has been sent to the Minister asking him for action.
Bill  C-59 provides for the possibility of issuing a unique identifier to people, but do you feel that using biometric data could be something to add in order to make it easier to identify people?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2017-12-12 9:24
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Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Gardee and Professor Bhabha, I think this is what my colleague was getting at concerning what was said with regard to BillC-51, and we heard this during the national security framework review that this committee undertook.
One of the concerns that were raised with the changes to the Criminal Code, the offences related to the promotion of terrorism.... Some families, for example, in terms of reporting to the proper authorities certain actions in hopes of rehabilitating a member of their family or their community, because those offences were so wide and general and vague, remained silent in order to not implicate a member of their family or their community.
Are the changes proposed to the Criminal Code in Bill C-59 related to that specific issue sufficient as far as you and your organization are concerned?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2017-12-12 9:25
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Going back to the issue of information sharing, certainly you've explained the concerns you have with that. There's a new piece in the bill with regard to the collection of datasets and things like that. One of the concerns with these wider and wider nets that are being cast is the targeting of specific individuals. In the cases you've outlined that are, tragically, very possible, things like profiling and so forth, there is the potential of casting such a wide net that it reaches many people.
What are your concerns with regard to the collection of datasets and the impact it can have on your community given the state of affairs you've outlined?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2017-12-12 9:27
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Speaking of trust, we talked about the workplace culture issues that have been raised and the lawsuit going ahead against CSIS. One of the reasons I've asked the minister to investigate this is not just because of what's happening internally. I think you're saying the same things, but I just want to, perhaps, seek clarity there. It's not just what's happening internally but also what that might mean for how work is being done. In other words, if we're asking CSIS to engage with certain communities and this is the behaviour that's being seen internally, we have a reason to wonder whether this is what's happening outwardly.
Would that be a fair assessment of the comments you're making?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2017-12-12 9:29
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Thank you.
My time is limited, so I just want to come to you, Mr. Khan, and first thank your organization for all the advocacy you do. As I've said to some of the other parents, it's hard enough to do that kind of advocacy, but I think it's even more challenging when it relates to a matter that affects your family and children, so thank you for that.
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2017-12-12 9:29
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I have two questions I wanted to hear you on. The first is related to a notion that was raised in the press conference here on the Hill from one of the kids, who's not really much of a kid any longer. His name escapes me. Unfortunately, I don't have it in front of me at the moment. He was mentioning the issue for some of these children, when they become older, of potentially getting caught in this web of.... It's one thing when you have an infant, but if it's an 18- or 20-year-old man, then suddenly a false positive can become much more dangerous in terms of the consequences. I want to hear you on that first.
Secondly, what are your organization's concerns with what seems to be a very inflated number as to what the actual costs would be of implementing the redress system?
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View Michel Picard Profile
Lib. (QC)
View Michel Picard Profile
2017-12-12 10:17
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Speaking of SCISA, that brings me to my second question.
You are proposing a stricter definition of information sharing. But you understand that, in the current situation, the organization providing the information and the one receiving it do not necessarily see eye to eye about the information that needs to be shared.
Given that the criteria that determine which information needs to be shared are always different from organization to organization, would a stricter definition not get in the way of the information sharing?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2017-12-12 10:26
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Thank you, Chair.
Professor Roach, I just want to come back to the intelligence commissioner. I had a few questions about that. First of all, in terms of the idea of its being a retired Federal Court judge, and as well the five-year mandate with the possibility of renewal, I'm wondering how it affects the independence of the office, and if you have any thoughts on that.
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