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Results: 421 - 480 of 602
View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2018-02-13 11:25
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I ask because one of the responses to the concerns.... You said that you're not using the information you're collecting under section 24 to create profiles or do any kind of investigation. Does that preclude other agencies from potentially doing the same thing, if you're disclosing the information you've collected to another agency, and it's beyond your mandate to be doing anything yourself with that information?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2018-02-13 11:26
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As the bill reads, you “take measures”, but essentially, those are internal.... There's no retention period, for example, which is often something that we see.
Is there any way you can provide the committee with the specific measures you take to protect the privacy of information collected under section 24?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2018-02-13 11:28
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You'll forgive me, but it's section 24 that specifically says “despite section 23”, which is the one that mentions the prohibition against targeting Canadians or persons in Canada. It says that despite that, you “collect publicly available information for”, and it lists the reasons.
Section 25 mentions these vague notions of measures being taken to protect privacy. Can you point me to the specific part of the bill that explicitly outlines what's done to protect privacy, and the things you're explaining about destroying that information or not keeping it? Insofar as the information collected under section 24 is concerned, I just don't see that.
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View Michel Picard Profile
Lib. (QC)
View Michel Picard Profile
2018-02-13 11:45
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Thank you, Mr. Chair.
My question is for the representatives of the Communications Security Establishment.
You may be testifying before the committee for the first time, but you must know that your organization is central to the legal framework we are studying. We are talking about foreign threats. Given that you do not handle what happens on Canadian soil, if, in your surveillance and interdiction efforts, you were to hear a conversation involving a Canadian citizen, you would be required to destroy this information. Defending the rights and freedoms and protecting the lives of Canadians are always the excuses given. You would have to prove that there is a threat or a reasonable suspicion of a threat to obtain the warrants required to investigate.
How can you prove that there is a threat if, by destroying information concerning Canadians, you lose information about behaviour or behaviour patterns that could be used as proof of an emerging threat?
Obviously, my assumption is that the source is in another country but is relying on co-operation from Canadians.
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View Michel Picard Profile
Lib. (QC)
View Michel Picard Profile
2018-02-13 11:47
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Your premise is a good one if you consider that the intercepted information is already a possible threat. That said, a person who is trying to recruit a Canadian does not ask, during their first conversation, if they are ready to kill for their country. That is rare. These people test the waters, evaluate their target and have mundane conversations, no matter who they recruit. The conversation is of no interest with regard to a possible threat because these people are only testing the waters.
Is that not a problem? At what point does the mundane conversation turn into a threat?
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View Michel Picard Profile
Lib. (QC)
View Michel Picard Profile
2018-02-13 11:49
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Thank you.
I would like to ask one last and more general question.
The most recent departmental report on the terrorist threat continues to indicate that the threat level is medium. This has not changed for four years. The last report for 2014 also indicated that the threat level was medium.
Does bill C-59 provide the tools required to keep the terrorist threat level at medium? Do you also have tools to help us reduce this threat level?
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I have a quick question to ask you.
I would like to go back to foreign financing. I know that Global Affairs Canada can play a certain role, and I regret that the committee refused to invite people from that department to appear before us.
In order to block foreign financing, is your department or one of your organizations in contact with Global Affairs Canada?
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
Thank you.
I would like some explanations, but I am not sure who can provide them.
Several bodies report to the minister. We have the intelligence commissioner, the Privacy Commissioner, the new Committee of Parliamentarians. Several groups report in the interests of protecting privacy. But what about the operational aspect? I want to know how you will interact with all these groups and how that is going to work, especially in the case of CSIS.
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
We agree that protecting privacy is important to Canada, but can all these new players have a negative impact on security? Does the fact that there are many players run the risk of compromising national security? Is the balance between protecting privacy and national security an issue for you?
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
In a broader context, Bill  C-59 was referred to the committee before going through second reading in the House of Commons. The minister wanted us to check whether improvements could be made to some elements of that huge bill. As public servants, you worked on developing the bill.
Now, in insight, would you say to the committee that the situation has changed or there are elements you had not considered at the time? You know how things are being done now. Are there any changes we could propose as amendments?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2018-02-13 12:01
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Thank you very much.
Just on the active cyber operations, the minister of National Defence is the one calling the shots, if you'll allow me to use that expression, and you exist through the National Defence Act. But the CSE—and I know the answer to this, but just for the record—is a civilian organization, correct?
Ms. Shelly Bruce: That's correct.
Mr. Matthew Dubé: When cyber operations are being undertaken, you referred in your presentation—I'm going with the notes—to “cyber aggression by foreign states”. You are not phrasing cyber aggression as an act of war per se. You also refer to disrupting “cyber aggression by foreign states”. Is there not concern that a civilian organization answering to the Minister of National Defence, in essentially undertaking offensive actions against another state, could be perceived as engaging in an act or war? What would be the legal consequences of that? We've had witnesses who've explained that, because legally you're seen as a civilian organization, that muddies the waters significantly. That's where a lot of the concern comes from. I don't necessarily feel you've addressed that in your comments.
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2018-02-13 12:03
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Just to be clear, if we need what I would almost call a counterattack to something being done by a foreign state actor, and the military is developing similar capabilities to what CSE has, if you're the Minister of National Defence, how do you respond? Are you looking to the military to take that action, or are you looking to CSE? If the military is developing those capabilities, why should a civilian organization be taking action that a military actor could take against a foreign state?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2018-02-13 12:18
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It's not a party position, I imagine.
My question is for CSE, to start, since this was discussed in your presentation, but it's also for CSIS, because it is mentioned in part 4 as much as it is in part 3 of the bill when it comes to the definition of “publicly available information”.
The sense I've gotten from people who know about it better than I do and have been before the committee is that, up until now, there's been no definition in Canadian law and no jurisprudence about what publicly available information is.
You've defined it as the sort of public resources that would be available to anyone in Canada. One example that the Canadian Bar Association offered was that of information being sold by Facebook to advertisers—which arguably would be available to anyone if they were in that business. It's unclear to me whether we're talking about googling someone whose Facebook page doesn't have strong privacy settings, or whether we're actually talking about things that technically are available to anyone, but wouldn't actually be.
Therefore, my first question is, can you drill down that definition? My second one is why is there no definition in the bill or anywhere in Canadian law of this, and should there be a definition in the bill to make that more explicit?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2018-02-13 12:22
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All right. Thank you.
When it comes to information acquired incidentally, is there any notion of why that would be retained? Right now, I think, it's in proposed subsection 24(4), which talks about information acquired incidentally through the research that's done. Is there any reason that you would retain that information and not just put it back, throw the fish back in the water, if that's happening?
I'm not clear on the authorizations when it comes to proposed section 24. I'm pretty clear on the authorizations for information acquired incidentally for datasets with CSIS, but I'm less so on part 3.
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I will talk about ISIS fighters. We know that 180 Canadians decided to wage Jihad around the world, especially in Irak and Syria, but also in other places, including Africa. Some 60 of them are known and have returned to Canada. Ten of them are followed more closely by our police services and CSIS, but there is a legal problem. Will Bill  C-59 help Canada take measures to enable it to prosecute those people, even if it means deporting dual citizens?
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
There is an example I would like to look at with you.
Jack Letts, alias Jihadi Jack, has Canadian citizenship and British citizenship. Of course, Great Britain does not want to take him in. We heard on Friday that Mr. Letts and his mother were trying to put pressure on our government to allow him to come here, to Canada. There is an issue with evidence. If Mr. Letts enters Canada, he will be free before we know it because we have a problem. We don't have the evidence needed to detain him.
Do you have a relationship with Five Eyes governments or those of other countries—I assume you do—through which you could get evidence that could incriminate him here, or do we have no way to take action?
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
Thank you.
I want to talk about CSE's role. Currently, unless I am mistaken, the relationship between CSE and the Department of National Defence is one of funding and operations. Under Bill  C-59, there will be a transfer, or a severing of CSE from the Department of National Defence. As a result, Public Safety Canada will have more responsibilities.
Is that indeed the case?
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
Basically, I want to know whether you think the provisions of Bill  C-59 will change things, or if your role will remain the same without changing significantly.
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View Michel Picard Profile
Lib. (QC)
View Michel Picard Profile
2018-02-13 12:35
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My question is for CSIS and the RCMP. Throughout the bill, we note the absence of FINTRAC. That is not an oversight. There is no denying that terrorist financing is a reality. That said, the current trend is to keep reducing the cost of terrorist attacks. For example, a truck may be stolen and crashed into a crowd. The financial aspect has changed.
In the current modern circumstances, would it be a good idea to reconsider the link with FINTRAC? Are our legal methods for working with the organization enough to keep us from having to establish a link with FINTRAC in Bill  C-59?
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View Michel Picard Profile
Lib. (QC)
View Michel Picard Profile
2018-02-13 12:37
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Thank you.
Mr. Brown, Bill  C-59 changes the powers to oversee the various agencies mentioned in it.
What impact will that have on the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2018-02-13 12:46
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Thank you, Chair.
This is perhaps for our representative from the Department of Justice, but in the charter compliance statement, there is mention about the expectation of privacy when it comes to publicly available information, which would be considered low for that type of information.
How is that concept changed in law in terms of the expectation that people have? I say that as someone who's not a lawyer. In other words, going back to that example, I think very few people are really aware of information that could be purchased legally, for example, that could technically fall under that definition. Is the expectation of privacy and the reasonable expectation of privacy changed in the advent of the use of things such as social media, where we can arguably state that there's a lack of knowledge on that front?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2018-02-13 12:48
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If we take the example of assessing the nationality of an individual or organization, can you walk me through what that means specifically?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2018-02-13 12:49
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When you say “other databases”, that's pretty wide open. Can you give an example of something such as that? That seems troubling to me, that kind of phrasing, with all due respect.
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2018-02-13 12:51
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In terms of the measures you take that aren't known to the public, this is the challenge, right? You mentioned that there are some things you do with regard to protecting the privacy of information in terms of, for example, what's in proposed section 25 and that kind of thing. Is there any way in which we as parliamentarians can be made aware of what's being done? Unfortunately, from my reading of the bill, it seems that these measures are there, you're saying you take them, and beyond that we don't necessarily know.
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I'd like to welcome both of the witnesses.
Ms. Tribe, at one of the committee's last meetings, a leading national security expert said that approximately 200,000 people in China were actively engaged in computer network operations, the technical term for cyber operations. He said that China was a genuine threat to Canada.
Do you, knowing that genuine threats exist, maintain that the Communications Security Establishment should not have any defensive capability?
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
I'm having trouble understanding your reasoning. Fundamentally, Canada does not want to take an aggressive position against any international community, but we have to protect ourselves. According to what you've written and what you've provided to the committee, we are giving CSE too much power, but we have to be prepared to defend our institutions and systems.
You see the rise of certain practices in Canada as a potential gateway to intervention abroad. That's what I'm having trouble wrapping my head around. I appreciate that you don't want a cyber-arms race, but we have no choice. We want to protect ourselves, and we need the tools to do so.
Your group, OpenMedia, posted a video on YouTube. According to the video, Bill  C-59 will give Canada's electronic spying agency near-limitless powers in the international realm, in terms of what you were saying, and make it possible to spread false information online for the purpose of influencing foreign elections, as the Russians are said to have done in the 2016 U.S. election.
Is it your position that CSE will proactively influence the democracies or elections of other countries?
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
Do you really believe CSE could and would do that? What makes you think Canada would want to interfere in that way?
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
I see.
You talk about the influence of the Government of Canada, but you issued a call to action on your website. The message reads as follows: “Not in the U.S.? You can still help save Net Neutrality. This is how.”
In Canada, you don't want to give CSE the power to intervene abroad, but your organization is intervening in the U.S. through a call to action. That's hypocritical; you are encouraging action abroad, and yet you are telling the Canadian government not to acquire certain tools because you fear they could be used for intervention abroad. Don't you think that's a bit hypocritical?
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
Your organization is based in Canada but is exerting influence in the U.S., meaning that it has influence abroad. You want the Canadian government to have fewer tools to achieve its objective of protecting Canadians. Don't you think that's contradictory?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2018-02-08 11:26
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Thank you.
I think we've confused citizen activism with state surveillance, but that's a whole other discussion.
I want to ask about this notion in the bill of publicly available information. When the Canadian Bar Association was here, there was a discussion about how there isn't really any kind of jurisprudence or legal definition in Canadian law about what publicly available information is. I think a lot of people have assumed, perhaps wrongly, that this basically means that if I Google something right now, that's publicly available information. What some witnesses brought up was that it could mean information being sold for advertising purposes by social media or search engines like Google, and it could perhaps even go further than that. I know that at OpenMedia you've been very active on some of these “digital clauses”, for lack of a better term, in trade agreements and things like that, which, arguably, from this very broad discussion that's happened over publicly available information, could potentially be what that means when companies start being able to freely exchange information across borders in that way.
First of all, I'm just wondering what you think publicly available information means. Secondly, why would that be a cause for concern in the context of what's being presented here, both with the datasets for CSIS but also with the capabilities of CSE?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2018-02-08 11:29
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The natural follow-up to that is what's collected incidentally, which is also brought up in the legislation. The counter-argument could be made that when they do collect incidental information, keeping it requires authorization, but it feels as though the way the thresholds are defined is not sufficient and that it would be relatively easy to justify the collection of incidental information while going after someone else. What are the concerns about incidental information being collected?
I think to some people in the digital world incidental information means something very different from what it would have meant for a more old-fashioned police or national security investigation from 25 or 30 years ago, for example.
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2018-02-08 11:32
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As my time wraps up here I'll try to make this as much of a yes-or-no question as possible, which is always precarious in this line of work.
There has been the notion that things have changed at the border when it comes to cellphones. There is the suitcase rule, or however it's referred to, where you have this expectation of sacrificing some privacy when you cross the border, whereas now, with the increasing ability to look at cellphones, that's different. Do you feel with legislation like this that the same kind of principle applies, that in a traditional investigation there would have been an expectation of people to hand things over, whereas now, given how much information is on cellphones, the expectation has shifted about what people are giving up to investigators?
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View Michel Picard Profile
Lib. (QC)
View Michel Picard Profile
2018-02-08 11:33
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Thank you.
You mentioned that we have laws and regulations indicating that we don't spy on Canadians. The CSE commissioner came before us and confirmed that there's no spying on Canadians. Even so, you mentioned at the beginning of your speech that there's no guarantee that Canadians will not be spied upon and that we cannot trust the simple fact that it is written somewhere, that we are not sure whether the CSE will or will not spy on Canadians. What does it take then to make sure that we can be assure of that?
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View Michel Picard Profile
Lib. (QC)
View Michel Picard Profile
2018-02-08 11:35
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When you talk to a stranger, do you ask whether the stranger can be under surveillance by another country, so you don't get caught in what may be a monitored call?
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View Michel Picard Profile
Lib. (QC)
View Michel Picard Profile
2018-02-08 11:35
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If you talk to a stranger, how do you make sure you will not be caught in a monitored call, because that person might be a target?
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View Michel Picard Profile
Lib. (QC)
View Michel Picard Profile
2018-02-08 11:36
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The work that both of your organizations are doing, making sure that our private lives are well protected and our rights are well protected, is needed. We salute that.
I had the privilege of leading more than a dozen consultations on Bill C-59 in the first year I was here. People were very loud, on both sides of the fence. There were those who wanted to have a bit of protection, and those who accepted the fact that we need to maybe compromise—if the word works—part of our privacy in order to make sure we are safe.
I'm sure you did a lot of research here and there to make sure you got the most precise and value-added comments supporting both sides of the fence. What is the nature of the comments you received from those who accept reducing their privacy in order to be more secure?
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View Michel Picard Profile
Lib. (QC)
View Michel Picard Profile
2018-02-08 11:38
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You mentioned—and I'm following the question of Mr. Paul-Hus—that the technology in other countries may increase that threat in Canada, and therefore you are looking for, and I'll quote you, “tools to take down”. Therefore, you are open to the possibility of taking measures to make sure that we reduce the aggression or the attack before it happens, and then we have to act after the fact.
What is the justification behind your position to increase those offensive measures, which seems to be the same as the justification not to allow CSIS or CSE to act?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2018-02-08 11:40
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Thank you.
We don't want to start trends here or rumours of any kind.
I just want to go back to the issue of datasets. Even for parliamentarians there is some confusion as to what that means.
The Privacy Commissioner made an important and interesting point when he mentioned that you always have to consider the future definition of datasets as technology evolves, but also how it's being defined currently. I'm just wondering what you think of the definition and whether or not that's appropriate for now, but also for how things will change in the future.
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2018-02-08 11:43
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Great. Thank you.
I just want to shift gears a bit and go to the position of the intelligence commissioner. It perhaps seems like a nitpicking thing, but it is important, this notion that it's a part-time position. I'm just wondering what your thoughts are on that, and if you think it should be full time, especially considering that, should this bill be adopted, it's essentially the only form of real-time oversight, versus everything else in this country that's based on review after the fact.
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2018-02-08 11:44
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Thank you very much.
When it comes to information sharing, how concerned should be about what are essentially cosmetic changes in this bill from what was brought in by the former BillC-51? You mentioned it in your comments, and I don't really have time to get into some of the details I was going to ask about, but perhaps you could reiterate those concerns in the 30 seconds that are probably left.
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2018-02-08 11:50
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I want to go back to the information-sharing issue again, because there was a report in LaPresse a few weeks on an RCMP operation that essentially collects information from the DEA on Canadians, which circumvents the warrant system and all the other legal and accountability measures that would normally be in place for that type of thing.
I'm wondering about it in this context, where departments are exchanging information. If you're working with Five Eyes Allies, let's say, and the RCMP is taking that kind of action, and that information can then be shared between departments, I just want to elaborate—beyond even the legislation—on this notion of this ecosystem, almost, that exists and that I think people are underestimating. It seems on the surface to make sense that Canadian department A should share information with Canadian department B, but insofar as it goes beyond that, I'd like to hear some of your thoughts on that.
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2018-02-08 11:53
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Something that has come up a few times—and the minister has evoked interest in this, but nothing has really come of it yet. Do you both believe that there should be an oversight and complaints mechanism specifically for CBSA, which is currently the only body dealing with national security that doesn't have that kind of thing in place?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2018-02-08 11:54
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There's a sense that everything the CBSA does could be considered national security because it involves the flow at the border. Is there any concern that this definition is not tight enough even for the work that existing bodies such as SIRC currently do when they have to follow the breadcrumbs leading to CBSA?
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you for being here today, ladies and gentlemen. Your assistance is very important.
I will begin with you, Mr. Fadden.
You said at the outset that you would have voted for Bill  C-59 at second reading. However, in accordance with the procedure that was used, the bill was not considered at second reading and was referred to the committee with the recommendation from theHon. Ralph Goodale (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) that the parliamentarians around this table propose serious and worthwhile amendments.
You more specifically reviewed part 4, but, if you had any changes to suggest to the bill as a whole today, what would they be?
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
Thank you for your answer.
Part 4 of Bill  C-59, which concerns CSIS more specifically, contains a point respecting the thresholds of what is authorized. It concerns new measures and ways of making applications. Do you think these changes proposed in Bill  C-59 can reduce CSIS's ability to disrupt threats?
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
Mr. Fadden, you mentioned the various threats that Canada faces. What three countries currently represent the greatest threat.
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
Thank you very much.
Mr. Blais, each of your statements revealed a communication problem that might arise.
Many agencies and sub-agencies must cooperate, such as the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, the national security review agencies, the intelligence commissioner, and the national security advisor to the Prime Minister. All these groups must intervene in decision-making on measures that must be taken with respect to national security. Since so many people are involved, aren't you afraid that leaks might occur or that information might not be protected? We are so eager to establish protections that we are creating a problem.
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2018-02-06 11:31
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Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for being here.
Mr. Blais, I would like to ask you a question about the presence, or rather absence, of various review mechanisms for the Canada Border Services Agency. Several witnesses have said it would be important to have some kind of committee or organization that would review that agency's activities, considering that it plays an increasingly important national security role.
Do you agree with that view?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2018-02-06 11:32
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You mentioned national-security-related issues. How do you make that distinction?
You could say that border security is always and inevitably a national security issue.
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2018-02-06 11:33
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I agree.
In the circumstances, should we follow the indicators? You usually conduct a review because you believe that information could have been shared with CSIS, for example. That is why you are reviewing the actions the agency has taken. Is that an appropriate conclusion?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2018-02-06 11:34
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So that's another reason for an organization to examine the agency's activities specifically.
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2018-02-06 11:35
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I understand. I also think our discussion clearly shows how difficult it is to determine when that's important and when it is not.
Now I would like to talk about Global Affairs Canada, which is exempted from review by the new committee that has been established. Isn't that a problem considering the role that–
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2018-02-06 11:36
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I understand because that includes consular affairs.
Do you think that what is proposed in the bill is enough to fill the gap that has been shown to exist on numerous occasions, particularly in cases such as that of Mr. Arar?
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