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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2017-12-12 10:27
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Great. Thank you.
The other piece about the intelligence commissioner, because it's being put out there as the first real form of oversight, as opposed to review, that exists, there is some question about the specificity of that oversight. In other words, we're approving general operational notions without some of the specifics, and in particular, when it comes to collecting datasets and some of the new powers in there for CSE. I just want to hear you a little bit on that.
Is there some way to drill down to a little more specificity so that we're getting the most robust oversight possible, or is it better to stay general, given that this is a new office?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2017-12-12 10:29
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Speaking of ministerial responsibility, though, that being one of the forms of accountability, going back to the intelligence commissioner, some have raised the concern that there's a chicken-and-egg thing as to who is approving whose actions. In that context, does that create a problem as well, that the intelligence commissioner is basically rubber-stamping the minister's decisions and not the other way around, where necessary?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2017-12-12 10:30
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Great. Thank you.
The last question I have about review and oversight is the issue of Global Affairs Canada being omitted from the investigative complaints component of the new body. Is that something that should be fixed?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2017-12-12 10:31
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Great, thank you.
Mr. Fogel, we were talking about the rise in hate crimes and anti-Semitism in particular, which top some of these sad lists and rankings. When we look at the issue of radicalization, which while not necessarily part of the bill in a substantive way is a related issue in terms of how we tackle some of these issues, it was part of the debate on BillC-51 as well.
Given that radicalization is not just one group, it's obviously many hate groups, and many of these groups are sadly targeting your community and others, I want to get your thoughts on the direction in which the government is going with its counter-radicalization efforts and just hear more generally your thoughts on that issue.
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Good morning, Mr. Therrien.
We agree that, when it comes to the threat posed by terrorism, 9/11 was the tipping point for the public.
Last year, I visited NORAD headquarters. Although it concerned a military issue, you will see the connection. The people at NORAD, in Colorado Springs, told us that, prior to 9/11, they dealt with threats originating outside the U.S. and that the federal aviation agency was responsible for domestic threats. According to the commander in charge, after 9/11, the two organizations never hung up the phone. The communication and connection remained constant.
That leads me to the following question. In March 2015, you said that Bill C-51 would allow too many federal government agencies—up to 17—to share information. Do you still think the information sharing involving those organizations is too broad?
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
In your brief, you say that “Canadians are concerned that anti-terrorism efforts in government not unduly impede their privacy rights”. Why do you believe that Canadians are concerned? My impression is actually that Canadians are concerned about security. You, however, maintain that anti-terrorism measures cause privacy concerns among Canadians. Can you cite any sources to back up that statement?
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
Later on, in your remarks, you call the relevance test “too permissive”, saying that it “creates undue risks for ordinary citizens who pose no threat”. The problem with terrorism is that, technically speaking, everyone is a potential threat. How are we supposed to differentiate between an ordinary citizen who poses no threat to national security and someone who does?
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
You were actually very critical of Bill C-51 at the time. Now, you are not satisfied with Bill  C-59. You consider the collection of information to be acceptable and see it as normal. However, you have concerns about Bill  C-59's purpose. That's what you said this morning.
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
I want to come back to the collection of information. When Bill C-51 was introduced, people were worried about intelligence agencies being able to spy on their computer activities. They wondered just how much agencies would be able to invade their privacy.
Do you currently see that as a problem? Do you think Canadians are subject to an excessive invasion of their privacy?
Do you think our intelligence agencies are likely to spy on our computer activities?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2017-12-07 9:12
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Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Therrien, I want to thank you and your team for being with us today.
My question has to do with the Canada Border Services Agency, or CBSA for short.
On the one hand, should the agency have an oversight body? It isn't the only organization that Bill  C-59 excludes.
On the other hand, should we broaden the scope of the bill to include those organizations in national security matters?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2017-12-07 9:13
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CBSA is unlike other agencies in that it deals with travellers crossing the border as part of its day-to-day operations.
Does it raise any concerns that only CBSA's operations involving national security are subject to oversight? It could become difficult to distinguish between an action taken in the name of national security and one taken in the exercise of its mandate?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2017-12-07 9:14
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Thank you.
In terms of the datasets that the Canadian Security Intelligence Service will be collecting, do you think the bill sets out an adequate definition?
I'll start with that question and follow up with my next question in a moment.
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2017-12-07 9:17
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I am going to stay on the topic of datasets.
The definition is rather broad. On one hand, we heard from witnesses on Tuesday about the benefits of having a broader definition; they claimed that it would keep agencies from having to play a constant game of catch-up. The pace of technological change is something that comes to mind.
On the other hand, I wonder whether there isn't cause for concern, since we don't know what this type of data collection—which the various agencies need to carry out their mandate—will look like in five or 10 years.
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2017-12-07 9:18
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Okay.
My last question is about the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) mentioned in part 3 of the bill.
Despite the fact that its mandate is to address foreign threats, do you think, in the operations that the CSE will now be able to conduct, there is a risk of casting a large net that could subject Canadians in the information infrastructure to phishing?
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View Michel Picard Profile
Lib. (QC)
View Michel Picard Profile
2017-12-07 9:20
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Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Therrien, it's good to see you again. Your expertise is recognized, and we greatly appreciate the rigour of your comments.
I will use your big concern to try to move the debate forward, especially since we are at the most important stage where we can make significant changes. Let's try to see what we can do about this.
I would like to ask a quick question, to start.
Are your office's security clearances problematic or are they preventing you from being part of the bigger picture?
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View Michel Picard Profile
Lib. (QC)
View Michel Picard Profile
2017-12-07 9:20
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Okay.
In the surveys you have carried out in the past, including the ones in which I participated for the department, it was clear that the concern is there. It's undeniable, which is normal, considering that the reality is what it is.
In 2017, we have started to feel that people are grasping the reality of the threat, but please correct me if you see things differently. They see what is happening abroad, and they are slowly starting to accept negotiations and compromises. It is always a matter of striking a balance between rights and freedoms and security. It's a never-ending juggling act and it's almost impossible to solve.
Do you feel that people are starting to rethink what they accept as an untouchable privacy threshold and what they would agree to compromise on and give up?
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View Michel Picard Profile
Lib. (QC)
View Michel Picard Profile
2017-12-07 9:23
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The debate about privacy is undeniable and accepted, and it must be protected.
Let's try to be more practical and take a micromanagement approach. Since we are still in the theoretical realm, it may be appropriate to provide a tangible example.
Could you give me one or two specific examples of privacy information to put it in the context of information sharing or national security?
What sort of information are you referring to?
A person's name may not be enough. Is buying a plane ticket to go to Europe in two weeks an example of the type of personal information you are referring to or is it more specific information?
Could you give us one or two hypothetical examples—we will not use names—so that we can have a more concrete foundation for the debate?
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View Michel Picard Profile
Lib. (QC)
View Michel Picard Profile
2017-12-07 9:25
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It's a different story in the case of metadata, correct?
Under the new bill, what is not relevant must be destroyed.
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View Michel Picard Profile
Lib. (QC)
View Michel Picard Profile
2017-12-07 9:26
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Information sharing is problematic. Objective information is may or may not be valuable if it is not contextualized. Information sharing depends precisely on this relationship between information and context. When there are two stakeholders, two or more organizations, we wonder whether the necessity threshold should be used.
When you talk about what is strictly necessary, are we referring to relevance? Here, I'm sort of calling on the lawyer in you. How will that be managed?
An organization may consider a piece of information important and necessary, but the recipient may disagree. The opposite can happen. An organization may consider a piece of information only somewhat useful, whereas the agency with which it interacts is waiting for that information because its context, which the other organization cannot access, justifies it. In this case, the two thresholds for assessing the information seem problematic to me.
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2017-12-07 10:29
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Thank you for that.
I want to stay in part 3 of the bill as well and look specifically at proposed section 24. I'm hoping to hear from everyone but in particular from you, Ms. Gill.
You mentioned encryption software and some of the applications that are used and not used just by so-called bad guys but also by law-abiding Canadians seeking to protect their privacy. In the course of, in particular, proposed paragraphs 24(1)(b) and 24(1)(c), where we're talking about essentially testing and studying information infrastructure and evaluating software and testing them for vulnerabilities, does that potentially create a situation in which we can go down that rabbit hole to find ways to counter some encryption that can be used for the lawful purposes of simply having the peace of mind of protecting your privacy?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2017-12-07 10:31
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When you say “disclosing vulnerabilities”, do you mean CSE disclosing those to, say, the private sector, so, for example, a telecom company?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2017-12-07 10:32
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I also wanted to look at proposed subsection 24(4), Information acquired incidentally. I don't know if you had any thoughts on that, where it says:
The Establishment may acquire information relating to a Canadian or a person in Canada incidentally in the course of carrying out activities under an authorization issued under
and then it lists the appropriate subsections.
Especially in the context of information sharing, is there any concern with that type of provision?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2017-12-07 10:33
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Okay.
My last question on part 3 concerns the many sections dealing with ministerial authorizations. I don't know whether you have any thoughts on that. In particular, one aspect is the extension of the period of validity without its being subject to review by the commissioner created by this very same bill.
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Hello, Ms. Carvin.
In your presentation, you said that Bill  C-59 would change the powers of CSIS officers. It is often said that Bill C-51 gave CSIS too many powers. There have been many calls to change that, and I would like to better understand the reason for those requests. Since you worked for that organization, you are familiar with the field. I would like to know more about that.
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
Thank you.
In your statement, you also spoke a lot about the agencies' various review mechanisms or bodies. All we want in the end is to protect ourselves against various potential threats.
Do you think that once Bill  C-59 is passed it will be effective in countering threats?
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
I will continue on the topic of the charter.
One of our main concerns right now is balancing the powers, that is, finding a balance between what we can do and what the charter requires us to do to uphold the freedom of Canadians.
In terms of security and potential threats to Canadian citizens, to what extent should the charter be applied consistently and fully? Criminals don't care about the charter. Criminals and terrorists have no intention of respecting anything. For our part, we endeavour to uphold the charter as much as possible, while they couldn't care less about it.
In your opinion, is the charter the ultimate tool to which we should pay the greatest attention? What are your thoughts on that?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2017-12-05 9:21
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Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I'm going to try to get through all these points quickly because I only have the seven minutes.
Dr. Carvin, on the intelligence commissioner issue, I'm just wondering about the length of the term and whether five years is enough to have some kind of independence from the government apparatus. Given the fact that, potentially, they can be reappointed for a second term, would there not be incentive to have some kind of job security in that sense?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2017-12-05 9:22
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In terms of independence, does it cause potential conflicts by keeping the person as non-reliant on the executive branch as possible for their job security?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2017-12-05 9:23
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The other question was on the part-time nature of the work. Again, that probably connects to how they'll be staffed. Is there any potential issue, especially given that it's actual oversight and not review? Could it cause any problems to have it on a part-time basis?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2017-12-05 9:23
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Okay, great.
The last question is on the intelligence commissioner. Given that it's oversight and not review, there's obviously something novel in that, and that's important. I want to make sure I'm understanding correctly that we're looking more at general authorizations as opposed to specifics, in terms of the actions being carried out by different agencies. I want to make sure I'm understanding that right. They're not actually looking at a specific action being posed but rather at the reasonableness of a general direction that an agency might be going in. Am I understanding that correctly?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2017-12-05 9:25
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Great. Thank you.
The next question is for both of you, moving to the national security and intelligence review agency. The complaints investigation function omits agencies like Global Affairs Canada, which obviously has a huge role to play.
From your perspective in particular, Mr. Neve, when it comes to our international human rights obligations, what importance does that have? Is keeping it to three agencies, with the fact that we're keeping an information-sharing regime in place, problematic?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2017-12-05 9:27
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Thank you very much.
There is one last question I wanted to ask. You talked about the importance of having legal grounds for the operations that CSE does. There are different parts that I've been looking at. I don't have enough time to get into some of those details, but there is one I was asking them about with proposed section 24, about testing and studying information infrastructure. There's also proposed section 28, which is about the minister authorizing cybersecurity—essentially, authorization to protect federal infrastructure and non-federal infrastructure.
Could the bill benefit from more clarity as to what exactly CSE can be doing in those particular contexts?
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View Michel Picard Profile
Lib. (QC)
View Michel Picard Profile
2017-12-05 9:41
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I'll go to French, if you don't mind.
My first question is for Mr. Neve.
You raised the issue of torture. In this regard, our security agencies all do the same job with the same objective, regardless of the government in power: they must verify the information obtained and make sure it is not the result of torture in another country. How can we protect the good faith of our agencies in this process?
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View Michel Picard Profile
Lib. (QC)
View Michel Picard Profile
2017-12-05 9:42
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If the information was obtained through torture in another country, it is very likely that we will learn that after the fact, not before. That is rarely indicated on the report providing the information.
How should we manage that information, considering that we unfortunately did not learn until after the fact that the information was contrary to its own values?
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View Michel Picard Profile
Lib. (QC)
View Michel Picard Profile
2017-12-05 9:43
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That is true, provided that we have not taken action yet. That said, we rarely have three or four weeks to react to information, especially if the threat is imminent. Action must be taken fairly urgently if the lives of Canadians are at risk. I am referring to cases in which, unfortunately, we learn after the fact that the information was tainted.
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View Michel Picard Profile
Lib. (QC)
View Michel Picard Profile
2017-12-05 9:44
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Rest assured that I completely agree with the principle you have just stated. Yet we also have to look at the practical application. In practice, the texts are not always adaptable.
Ms. Carvin, you said there are more reports and that there is a need for transparency. How does it help people to inform them of the current level of security or danger? I am not referring to security professionals and legislators, but to people who work in a store, a restaurant, a factory, and so forth.
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
In her remarks, my colleague Ms. Dabrusin drew a comparison between Bill C-51 and Bill  C-59. That is important for the committee. It is my understanding that Bill C-51 was enacted in response to an emergency at that time. It was very important for national security. Today, Bill  C-59 is simply a refined version of Bill C-51. The latter was useful when it was adopted, but we want to clarify certain things.
Is that also your understanding?
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
Okay, thank you.
We have not talked about it this morning, but you spoke recently about the no-fly list and the problem of false positives. I would like you to elaborate on that.
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
Will Bill  C-59 help solve the problem of false positives? That is mentioned in the bill. In your opinion, will the provisions of the bill be enough to solve this problem?
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View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
Thank you.
I would like to go back to Part 1 of Bill  C-59, which pertains to the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency.
The National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians was created, pursuant to Bill C-22, and Part 1 of Bill  C-59 includes this committee.
Our party was in favour of creating this committee, but we expressed reservations about the information being centralized in the Prime Minister's Office, and so we voted against the bill.
I would like to hear your thoughts on that.
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2017-12-05 10:25
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Thank you, Chair, and while you're reminiscing, I'll spare you the knowledge of where I was 16 years ago, because that might be embarrassing for all of us.
I want to focus on the changes to CSE, because I don't think we quite have the institutional memory on that aspect given that it's mostly been something that National Defence has dealt with in the appropriate committee.
Does the amendment you suggested, Professor Forcese, affect proposed sections 27 through 54, which deal with the different authorizations that the minister can give? There's a lot of mention of acts of Parliament in those sections of the bill.
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2017-12-05 10:26
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Staying within the authorizations, you get proposed section 37, where we talk about the periods of validity of authorizations, and then in proposed subsections 37(2) and 37(3), it talks about the extension. Proposed subsection 37(3) specifically mentions that they're not subject to review by the commissioner under the intelligence commissioner act.
Do you believe it's appropriate that the minister be able to extend without undergoing the same review process that he would be subject to while making the initial authorization?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2017-12-05 10:28
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I'm just having trouble with something like this because it seems that, in a lot of instances in the bill, the minister basically can't move ahead without getting the commissioner's authorization. Then in that instance you'd be able to extend without the commissioner's authorization.
I'm just wondering if it creates a difficult situation when it comes to the chain of command, for a lack of a better term.
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2017-12-05 10:29
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Okay. Thank you.
Moving backward to an earlier section of part 3 of the bill, proposed section 24 is one that I'm particularly concerned about. There are a few elements that I want to get to. I want to skip ahead to proposed subsection 24(4) because it does mention information acquired incidentally, which was something that was raised in your remarks. Proposed subsection 24(4) says:
The Establishment may acquire information relating to a Canadian or a person in Canada incidentally in the course of carrying out activities under an authorization issued under subsection 27(1), 28(1) or (2) or 41(1).
Are there sufficient safeguards beyond these vague notions of privacy for that kind of information being collected through the course of CSE's activities?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2017-12-05 10:31
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Lastly, very quickly to both of you because I'm on my last minute here, I'll just go to another part of the bill on the metadata or the datasets, depending on your preference—that seems to be the synonym, more than anything, but....
I tried to ask the director of CSIS about issue. It seems unclear to me in what way it will parse through...because its operations will be authorized, it seems to me, in a more general way. The way it chooses to retain doesn't necessarily seem to be subject to the same kind of scrutiny. It's not going to be piece by piece of the information, but rather this sort of general collection of datasets.
Am I misconstruing that? I'm just seeking some clarity in my last 30 seconds.
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2017-11-30 9:11
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Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Minister, thank you for being here.
I want to point out a couple of things for the record before we get going.
A lot has been made about our ability to study the bill more thoroughly by doing this before second reading, but at the end of the day, we still only get you for one hour on a 138-page bill. Certainly, I want to express some disappointment about that. At the end of the day, beyond the question of scope of amendments, it doesn't necessarily allow us more space to study quite an extensive bill, as you can see from the size of our binders.
The other thing I want to mention in this notion of unscrambling eggs is that certainly I have no doubt of the ability of the justice department to do what my colleague Randall Garrison did in his BillC-303, which is on the order paper right now and which repeals in its entirety all of the provisions that were brought in by former BillC-51. I would argue the notion that it is unfeasible is incorrect, because we have been able to develop such a bill.
Those things being said, I do have questions.
The first one I want to get to is the changes to CSE in part 3 of the bill, in proposed subsection 24(1), in paragraphs (a) and (b) specifically, where we talk about “acquiring, using, analysing, retaining or disclosing publicly available information”. That section specifically mentions “Despite subsections 23(1) and (2)”, which are the subsections that are specifically protecting those actions from being done to Canadians and in Canada. Therefore, my understanding is that it obviously means that, for any of this data being acquired in this way, these actions can be done to Canadians and in Canada.
I just want to understand here, because certainly the argument can be made that it's publicly available information and that's too bad for people who maybe don't manage their social media very well. However, a few things are of concern, specifically language like “disclosing...information”, and who that—
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2017-11-30 9:13
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It goes on in proposed paragraphs 24(1)(a) and (b), with (a) “acquiring” the information and (b) talking about “infrastructure information for the purpose of research and development...testing”, and so on. Then, in 24(1)(c), it has “testing or evaluating products, software and systems, including testing or evaluating them for vulnerabilities.”
Is there not a concern that we can get a web of inference here and that, despite the publicly available nature of this, we can start going through someone's social media information that might be public, creating profiles of people who might not necessarily be national security threats, and having this data stored? That's my first question.
Second, what is meant by “disclosing”? Who exactly is that information being disclosed to?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2017-11-30 9:16
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Fair enough, but if we look at proposed subsection 23(1), we see that it specifically mentions that the activities done by the centre “must not be directed at a Canadian or any person in Canada”, while proposed section 24 says, “Despite subsections 23(1) and (2), the Establishment may carry out”, and it goes on to what was already read. Essentially, we're saying that normally it wouldn't be against Canadians or any person in Canada, but now that's no longer the case, because it's specifically saying that it's “despite” proposed section 23.
Certainly, I understand the hypotheticals that are being offered, but does that section not allow for the retention and use of technology that can create these large webs that will inevitably catch people in Canada? We think of StingRay technology and things like that which can be used. Is that not going to be a potential...? The way this section is drafted, certainly it could, when we're looking at this:
acquiring, using, analysing, retaining or disclosing infrastructure information for the purpose of research and development, for the purpose of testing systems or conducting cybersecurity and information assurance activities on the infrastructure from which the information was acquired
To me, that seems to create a situation whereby you could be collecting information from infrastructure here in Canada, which obviously Canadians are using, without necessarily the same accountability that's created by omitting Canadians in proposed section 23.
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2017-11-30 9:18
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Certainly.
Minister, I want to go back to the information sharing section. I want to understand, because this is what you said in the House: that there's a difference between the language of disclosure that's now there, versus the language of sharing that was there. I want to understand what legal grounds that has to create any sort of difference.
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View Michel Picard Profile
Lib. (QC)
View Michel Picard Profile
2017-11-30 9:19
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Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Minister, my thanks to you and your team for making yourselves available.
My question is about the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, or CSIS, and about the fallout from Justice Noël's decision.
That decision found problems with the types of information that can be investigated and kept, and with the extent to which it is possible to investigate. I would like to know how those obstacles have been overcome. As the judge said, it is impossible to keep information, even though it could be useful for investigations that are under way.
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View Michel Picard Profile
Lib. (QC)
View Michel Picard Profile
2017-11-30 9:23
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Transparency is often welcome.
That said, this gives you greater flexibility in gathering information and, as a result, in being able to have more and better quality information. The downside of that is the possibility of having information about third parties.
As of now, what steps are you taking to protect information about third parties?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2017-11-30 10:05
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Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I want to quickly go back to Mr. Rigby and Ms. Beauregard on the subject of the no-fly list. I have two questions for them.
First, why is it so difficult to determine the costs of setting up the system?
Second, if the bill is passed, the legislation will be in place, but the money will not always be available. From what you are saying, I get the impression that we will not be seeing the money in the next budget. Does that mean that we will have to wait for the next budget cycle before the technical system can be implemented?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2017-11-30 10:07
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So, essentially, we are waiting for a reply from the Department of Finance in order to find out what will be possible in the budget. Is that what you are saying?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2017-11-30 10:07
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Thank you.
Mr. Vigneault, I would like to ask you about the unselected datasets. It is about the kind of net that can affect a number of people while you are conducting your activities. One of the justifications in the bill is that the Minister and the new commissioner are going to determine whether or not it is appropriate to gather and keep that data.
How do you go about distinguishing between the datasets? For example, the Minister or the commissioner could decide that one dataset is appropriate, because it relates to someone who poses no threat but who may have had a conversation with a suspect you are targeting. How do you distinguish that dataset from the other information about legitimate associates of the person who may be a threat too?
Put in a better way, how do you go about distinguishing between the other data and the unselected datasets that affect people who have nothing to do with the suspect?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2017-11-30 10:10
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When you accumulate datasets, one of civil society's great concerns is that the data can deal with all kinds of information that is not essential to your work and that can interfere with privacy. In that sense, it may also include what the bill calls unselected data.
Technically, how do you proceed? If the court determines that you have the right to collect that information because the target is legitimate, how do you go about distinguishing the legitimate target from the unselected data that will inevitably be collected? Has a system been put in place? Perhaps my level of understanding is not as high as yours, but, when you are collecting datasets, the net is clearly cast very wide and the information is not automatically relevant to the investigations.
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2017-11-30 10:12
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In a situation where a dataset comes from a widely cast net, how do you go about telling relevant information from the rest?
You set it aside, and that is fine; the intention is good. But how do you go about deciding which information, which data, will be set aside?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2017-11-30 10:42
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Thank you.
The last part of your answer is perhaps germane to the question I am going to ask.
Let me go back to proposed section 24 that we discussed earlier, and to the issue of information on infrastructure. Proposed paragraph 24(1)(b) reads as follows:
24(1)(b) acquiring, using, analysing, retaining or disclosing infrastructure information for the purpose of research and development…
I will let my colleagues read it in its entirety.
Further down, in the definitions, it says:
24(5) … Information relating to(a) any functional component, physical or logical, of the global information infrastructure; or(b) events that occur during the interaction between two or more devices that provide services on a network…
I would like to be sure I understand correctly. In light of the power you are being granted under the bill, what sort of infrastructure exercise would be conducted to help you do that kind of study or analysis on the sustainability and security of the network? I understand that your mandate deals with foreign threats, as you told me earlier, but you will inevitably be working on the Canadian network.
Can you give me an example of what would be done under the power granted in proposed section 24?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2017-11-30 10:44
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Can I just quickly ask a question on that point, though? My time is very limited.
Those measures protect privacy but they don't prevent you from collecting the data to begin with. Is that correct?
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View Matthew Dubé Profile
NDP (QC)
View Matthew Dubé Profile
2017-10-24 9:13
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The committee of parliamentarians and what's being proposed in Bill C-59 is the first time we're seeing any kind of review for CBSA. In that context, if I'm not mistaken—I just want to make sure I'm understanding correctly what's being proposed—that would only be for issues related to national security. Is that correct?
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