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Results: 1 - 15 of 3169
Philippe Dufresne
View Philippe Dufresne Profile
Philippe Dufresne
2021-07-20 10:37
This is something we had not seen before. As I noted, the lack of a date in a bill does not prevent it from coming into force.
View Rob Moore Profile
CPC (NB)
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Thank you, Minister, for your appearance today. You've kept this committee busy. You're represented very ably on the committee and your department by Mr. Virani, but it's nice to see you in person as well. We appreciate the opportunity to ask some questions of you.
Minister, on the topic of the day today, you had said previously at the Senate that there was no consensus on proceeding with expanding MAID to those whose sole underlying condition is mental illness. You've now accepted an amendment that would require additional legislation to stop MAID from being expanded to those with mental illness.
The members of this committee don't always see eye to eye, but everyone works very hard on this committee. We take our responsibilities very seriously. When we studied MAID in Bill C-7, the mental illness component was not a part of it. This is causing grave concerns. I have a letter that was sent to me and signed by many organizations that I know you're familiar with and respect, who have concerns about this.
In light of the vote that's taking place tonight, would you use your influence to at least provide that your Liberal members of Parliament have a free vote on the Conservative amendment to remove the mental illness component in Bill C-7?
View Rob Moore Profile
CPC (NB)
Thank you, Minister.
I know we all have a responsibility to move forward together, and I know you and I haven't seen 100% eye to eye on the issue of Bill C-7. The world wouldn't be a very interesting place if we all agreed 100% of the time.
However, on this, I really strongly feel the wishes of this House of Commons and even your testimony.... I respect you and your opinion—the opinion that would have been backed by the charter analysis conducted by the Department of Justice—that, in fact, the bill as presented and as studied in the Senate was, in your opinion, constitutional.
With this amendment to include those.... I know we all share Bell's Let's Talk; we all urge people who are struggling with mental illness to try to get the help they need, to talk to friends and to reach out. I'm looking at a list that was sent to me: the Canadian Hospice Palliative Care Association, the Canadian Institute for Inclusion and Citizenship, Communication Disabilities Access Canada, Inclusion Canada, the British Columbia Aboriginal Network on Disability Society, the Council of Canadians with Disabilities, and the list goes on. There are well over a hundred individual organizations that are asking members of Parliament to please, at this point, not include mental illness. As you said, Minister, we should have started this study a year ago under Bill C-14 on possible expansions to MAID, but this is putting the cart way before the horse.
I appreciate the response you gave—that Liberal members will be given a free vote—and I hope they support Canadians with disabilities on this.
Minister, I have only 30 seconds, so I just have a quick question on consecutive sentences. The Quebec Court of Appeal reduced the sentence of the man who murdered six people in the Quebec City mosque to 25 years without parole rather than 40, after striking down consecutive sentences. Do you intend to defend this law?
Thank you, Minister.
View Dan Albas Profile
CPC (BC)
Mr. Lindgren, before we go to the next witness, I want to ask you about that point.
When we have discussions about what government should do, we have the government and then we have the House of Commons, various members, whether they support the government or are opposition. My understanding, though, is that through public accounts Parliament decides what the measure should be, and then we check with the Auditor General and the environment commissioner on whether that is being done.
By suggesting that the environment commissioner should be put in a role of actually defining under what terms those decisions are made, are you not suggesting that it would supplant politicians and electoral accountability?
Richard Lindgren
View Richard Lindgren Profile
Richard Lindgren
2021-03-08 16:28
No, and I look to the Ontario experience to support my position.
It's obviously up to Parliament to decide what policies, programs, and so on, get implemented, but I think the parliamentarians would definitely benefit from the expert policy review and critique that might be provided by an independent parliamentary officer.
Ultimately, MPs are still making the decision on policy, but the credibility and the effectiveness of that policy would be enhanced if you had an expert independent officer providing advice.
View Dan Albas Profile
CPC (BC)
Okay. Maybe we'll move to the other witnesses, but my experience here has been that we always hear about a democratic deficit where members of Parliament....
I'm all for getting better information and then having a debate about those things. I think anything that supplants members of Parliament from that role of debating policy is dangerous.
Maybe we'll move to the next witnesses, because I'd like to hear from them as well.
Corinne Le Quéré
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Corinne Le Quéré
2021-03-08 16:30
If it's not the job of the commissioner of the environment and sustainable development to check that Canada meets its climate target, then whose job is it? If that person has made it his or her job, then how come the climate targets are not achieved?
View Dan Albas Profile
CPC (BC)
That's a great question.
With all due respect, members of Parliament do come to a decision. The government does end up presenting a plan. We then count on the Auditor General and the environment commissioner to report on whether those goals are being met.
That's the question here. It really should be elected officials who represent the public who should be having these debates, and we should then be reviewing whether those resources are being spent in order to achieve what the laws that we pass come forward with.
Corinne Le Quéré
View Corinne Le Quéré Profile
Corinne Le Quéré
2021-03-08 16:31
Not being involved in Canadian politics, I cannot answer your question. All I can say here is that from my experience working with other countries, clearly there is an issue with the governance and how the trajectory of emissions is being verified in Canada. My understanding is that this is the person who should be verifying that Canada meets its objectives.
Ian Brodie
View Ian Brodie Profile
Ian Brodie
2021-01-28 11:04
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Thank you for inviting me to testify today and for accommodating my schedule.
Let me get directly to the issues that I think will be of most help to this committee.
On the issue of prorogation, I think the authority to request a prorogation is clear. For centuries, Parliament has met at the call of the sovereign, and since the development of the principles of responsible government in the 1800s, the decision to prorogue has been made solely by the Prime Minister. The Governor General prorogues but does so solely on the advice of the Prime Minister. Therefore, questions regarding prorogation are rightly answered by the prime minister as the decision-maker.
The purpose of prorogation, until 2008, was considered a routine matter. Prime ministers typically prorogued Parliament every year or two. Prorogation obviously clears Parliament's legislative agenda and gives the government an opportunity to present a throne speech.
However, there is no constitutional need for prorogation—of course, during the 42nd Parliament, Mr. Trudeau's government refreshed its agenda several times without proroguing over the four years—nor is prorogation required for the House to be able to demonstrate its confidence in the government of the day. The House holds regular votes on matters of confidence. As members of this committee certainly know, the business of supply and the business of ways and means ensure confidence votes are scheduled every few weeks when the House of Commons is sitting.
Prorogation, instead, is a strictly political act that's done strictly for political reasons.
On the essential elements of prorogation, while the Prime Minister may prorogue Parliament and then recall it days or even months later, leaving a gap between prorogation and the recall of Parliament is not advisable. Once Parliament is prorogued, if there's a sudden need for urgent legislation, then the formalities around a new session of Parliament delay the consideration of that urgent legislation.
It's better, if possible, to prorogue the day before the recall of Parliament, and prime ministers often do this by giving advance notice of their intention to prorogue.
I believe the committee has heard about the prorogation of December 4, 2008. As mentioned, prorogation was a routine matter until that prorogation. The prorogation of December 2008 was turned into a matter of partisan division, and that division gave rise to the reform of Standing Order 32(7) in the 42nd Parliament.
I think the report that has been laid before this committee perpetuates an effort to politicize that prorogation when it falsely claims that the government of the day prorogued to avoid a confidence vote that could potentially have caused its fall. Twelve years have passed since the events of 2008, enough time to allow for a more sober, non-partisan evaluation of those events. I've offered such an account in my book, At the Centre of Government, and I'm going to draw on my remarks in that book for my remarks today.
Committee members will recall that the federal election of 2008 delivered a disappointing result for all three opposition parties: The Liberals under Mr. Dion lost 18 of their seats in the House, the NDP failed to reach the 20% of the popular vote that they had long sought and the Bloc in that election was unable to eliminate the beachhead that the Conservatives had established in Quebec in the previous general election. Mr. Dion announced he would resign as Liberal leader, and the other two opposition leaders faced tough internal questions about their futures.
The November 30, 2008, pact announced by Mr. Dion and the other two leaders was depicted as a reaction to the government's economic update and its proposal to phase out the per-vote subsidy for political parties, but it was later reported in the media that the pact had been under discussion weeks before that economic update was delivered.
In retrospect, I think it's now clear that the November 30 pact was a way for weakened party leaders, particularly Mr. Dion, to protect and extend their own leadership positions against internal party challenges. This view was validated by subsequent events. After the prorogation, the Liberal caucus forced Mr. Dion's immediate resignation. When the House returned a few weeks later, the Liberals, then led by Mr. Ignatieff, voted to keep Mr. Harper's government in office when it presented its budget.
The crisis of 2008, then, was the breakdown of good governance inside the Liberal caucus. The controversy about the 2008 prorogation was an effort to distract attention from that crisis.
Let me compare this to the prorogation that's under study by your committee, the prorogation of August 2020. Your study of last August's prorogation is extremely helpful. You are setting a precedent for how reports on future prorogations will be handled, and you're doing so with help from experts. I hope the Prime Minister will set a useful precedent and appear before you to answer questions about his decision, as it was his decision.
Let me suggest some questions that committee members could helpfully pose to the Prime Minister.
First of all, the August 2020 prorogation came after five months of special orders that had already greatly curtailed all parliamentary proceedings. Parliament had really not had a suitable amount of time for scrutiny, debate or legislation between March of 2020 and the prorogation. Was the Prime Minister worried that in proroguing he would further curtail the legitimate work of the House of Commons and the representatives elected here?
Second, he prorogued Parliament immediately and then recalled it weeks later. If the government had required urgent legislation to respond to the ongoing public health crisis—which it has done several times since March—that urgent legislation would have been delayed. In proroguing, what plans did the Prime Minister have for mitigating the risk of the need for urgent legislation?
Third, the government was already behind schedule in responding to the Truchon decision. Prorogation inevitably put pressure on the House of Commons and the Senate to cut short their debates on the weighty issues in Bill C-7. In short, I would say prorogation showed, in effect if not in intent, a disregard for the legitimate parliamentary debate of a medical assistance in dying bill, and that verges on contempt for Parliament. What would the Prime Minister say about the idea that he showed disregard for a legitimate debate on Bill C-7 by proroguing Parliament?
Fourth, of course thePrime Minister's decision to prorogue ended ongoing committee investigations of what appears to have been a major conflict of interest on the part of the Prime Minister himself and possibly the then finance minister. What steps is the Prime Minister prepared to take to dispel the cloud over this aspect of his decision?
In conclusion, members, the so-called “prorogation crisis” of December 2008 was in fact triggered by a crisis within the Liberal Party caucus. Proroguing the House back then gave the Liberal Party time to resolve its internal governance problems, this is evidenced by the fact that the Liberal Party, after resolving its internal problems, sustained the Harper government in office at the beginning of 2009. I would say the August 2020 prorogation took place in a similar situation, a breakdown of governance within the Liberal Party that was triggered by Mr. Trudeau and the then finance minister when they put themselves in what appears to have been a direct conflict of interest.
Madam Chair, I am happy to take questions if members have them.
Kathy Brock
View Kathy Brock Profile
Kathy Brock
2020-12-10 12:18
Hello, everyone. Thank you very much for the invitation to appear.
I am sorry, but I have to express myself in English only, because I don't master French very well and I speak it too slowly.
I've been asked to speak about the government's constitutional legal powers in the context of our governing system. I will talk about the foundations and then the legal basis and the constitutional basis, as well as the conventional basis—constitutional—for prorogation and then a little about some parallels with what has actually just transpired this year. Then I'll conclude with some remedies. You have my notes. I will be summarizing them fairly quickly.
To begin, the heart of democracy in Canada is Parliament. It's fashionable to deride Parliament, to downplay its importance, but Parliament has truly stood the test of time in ensuring transparency of government actions and accountability of the government to the people, and in acting as a voice for Canadians, just as the founders envisioned. While prorogation is often derided as a political tool, closer examination I think situates it as an important aspect of the relationship between the executive and legislative branches of government.
As we know from the Supreme Court, Parliament is sovereign, and the executive and the courts should respect Parliament as the primary institution. A core strength of the Canadian political system is that the executive is strong, it's able to execute its agenda and it can act quickly and decisively.
Now, the support of the House of Commons is important to the executive and to ensuring that its agenda gets through. That is one of the first functions that the House of Commons must do: to support the government. But to ensure the government does not become too powerful, Parliament has a second important duty, and that is to hold the government to account, as you are doing by reviewing this report.
By confronting the government directly, the House of Commons shines a light on instances of questionable or poor judgment and offers alternative views or scenarios so that Canadians can decide whether they'll keep or fire the government in the next election. By performing this duty, the opposition parties, but the House of Commons generally, helps ensure governance is not only undisrupted in Canada, but also that it's transparent good governance during both normal times and crises.
Prorogation embodies these fundamental aspects of the relationship between the executive and Parliament. It's a more refined tool than the blunter one of dissolution, which, as you know, dissolves Parliament and forces an election. Prorogation pauses the work of Parliament rather than halting it, so it keeps government working, and that's important. You've heard that prorogation does have two components. It suspends the work of Parliament by ending its current session and it resets the parliamentary agenda with the start of a new session and throne speech.
In Canada, prorogations have been as short as a few hours, and they can go up to the constitutional limit of one year. The norm is usually 40 days, or the Prime Minister requests an extension. Prorogation is derived from the common law prerogative powers of the Crown under the Westminster model of parliamentary government, but we have a uniquely Canadian twist to them. Section 38 of the Constitution Act, 1867 states:
The Governor General shall from Time to Time, in the Queen’s Name, by Instrument under the Great Seal of Canada, summon and call together the House of Commons.
This has been interpreted to include prorogation and dissolution. By virtue of the Letters Patent,1947 the Governor General is authorized and empowered to exercise the powers of the Crown with respect to “summoning, proroguing or dissolving the Parliament of Canada”, and, by convention, the power to advise dissolution and prorogation lies with the Prime Minister.
To go on to the power itself, it's complex and it's controversial, in part owing to the fact that it's largely governed by conventions.
Under the conventions of responsible government, the Governor General acts under the direction and advice of ministers who are members of Parliament and who collectively hold the House of Commons. This ensures that the government is beholden to the legislature at all times. If the advice tendered by cabinet is lawful and constitutional, then the Governor General is obliged to accept and follow it. This ensures that the head of state is ultimately accountable to the citizens through the government and Parliament.
The Prime Minister, as head of government, is responsible for the decisions of the Governor General, and this is important because it keeps the Governor General above the political fray and keeps that office impartial. Things become trickier if the advice is unconstitutional or unlawful or if the government does not hold the confidence of the House.
In these cases, the very first responsibility of the Governor General is to advise and warn the Prime Minister of this possibility, and the first remedy rests with the Prime Minister and government. Matters become murkier if the government presses forward. If the remedy is unavailable and the advice contravenes the Constitution or legislation, then the Governor General can refuse the advice or defer action.
In the second case, whereupon the government is unable to proceed with its agenda in a deadlocked Parliament, then the first and preferable remedy is for the government to accept this responsibility and advise the Governor General on the best way out of the deadlock. In this case, prorogation is a less drastic decision and course forward than are dissolution and an election. A pause in the work of the House may allow passions to subside and a reasoned debate to take place after prorogation.
I can cover the rest of my remarks in the question-and-answer period.
View Daniel Blaikie Profile
NDP (MB)
Thank you very much.
I'm going to start by providing some comments.
One of the things that I personally find frustrating about the nature of this prorogation and some of the prorogations under the Harper government was that.... As we've heard some witnesses say already, there is an important routine function of prorogation, and it can be used properly. I found it odd that we never saw the end of a parliamentary session in the last Parliament and I felt that that was based on, frankly, just a kind of ignorance of what prorogation really meant. I think that ignorance persists, and what we saw was a government that, not understanding the proper function of prorogation, earlier this year decided to use it and abuse it as a tool.
Not only did it mean that an important investigation into the WE Charity scandal was prematurely terminated, not only did it mean, and has continued to mean in spite of prorogation, that we're not getting a budget, which I think is important, and we saw that the government is able to speak to its fiscal situation notwithstanding the challenges of the pandemic and therefore, I think, could present a more fulsome budget, but it also meant that in that period of time....
I would say this perhaps to Mr. Turp's point, a month in a half, in some ways, is not a long time, and in other ways it's a very long time. That was a long time for Canadians who were on the Canada emergency response benefit and were waiting to see legislation tabled in the House, to get a sense of what was coming for them at the end of September. The fact that we weren't able to make progress on that issue and that the whole thing was decided within the space of a few days, because the government hadn't left time for them to table legislation to allow a proper conversation to happen, meant a lot of stress and anxiety for Canadians, who knew that the deadline for CERB was coming up and didn't know what was going to replace it. That's the truth. People didn't know. It came right down to the wire. That was another, as far as I'm concerned, shameful aspect of this prorogation, which was not a proper use of it. That's my opinion. Let there be no doubt about it.
I take the point that this is an exercise of political judgment, but I also think it's important, when we talk about the various divisions of power within Canadian society, that we recognize the importance of the legislature, which is far too often passed over in the context of the Canadian system. I find it frustrating that we would need a constitutional amendment to do what some other countries do, and rightly do, which is to require a two-thirds vote of the legislature in order to dissolve. I think it should also be applied to prorogation.
Now, in other fora, not here today but if you look at some of the testimony from the Special Committee on Electoral Reform, one of the subject experts, Professor Hugo Cyr, provided a brief that talks a bit about the power of prorogation and proposes that, although we can't actually make it binding that there should be a parliamentary vote for dissolution or prorogation, one of the things that might be within the purview of the House would be to put in the Standing Orders that if a Prime Minister recommends prorogation or dissolution without having a vote and the consent of the House of Commons, that Prime Minister would be deemed to have lost the confidence of the House.
We have four experts on the matter here today. I'm wondering if we could get a little bit of feedback on that idea or on what other mechanisms which would not require a constitutional amendment, would allow Parliament to assert its authority and demand that it be consulted on questions of either prorogation or dissolution.
Barbara Messamore
View Barbara Messamore Profile
Barbara Messamore
2020-12-10 12:53
I agree that there are other Westminster system jurisdictions that have looked at ways to put in place some sort of rules. I think it's also important to understand that, when we start looking at reasons, this is always going to be politicized. The report that some found unsatisfactory because it failed to address some of the things...this is one of the things that when we attempt to make things more transparent often it really doesn't have that effect. This is the question of the prerogative of the Crown. There's some debate about whether or not prorogation, while we know it's a prerogative power, is a reserve power. I think most people agree that it is, in other words, that the representative of the Crown does have some leeway in refusing in extreme circumstances a request or perhaps not refusing the prorogation but insisting on a shorter period of time. That's one consideration, too, that prerogative of the Crown.
I think since time is so short I shouldn't take all the time.
Daniel Turp
View Daniel Turp Profile
Daniel Turp
2020-12-10 12:55
Mr. Blaikie, I would add that it is essential to come up with a solution, which may be unconstitutional, because amending the Constitution of Canada is complex.
However, I believe that every responsible member of this Parliament should undertake an initiative to restrict this power, the prerogative that has been abused. In addition, your committee should conduct a comparative research study of solutions adopted elsewhere to see what is needed. The Prime Minister, who already has so much power in this country, really needs to be restricted in how he exercises that power.
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