Question No. 1710—
Mr. Dan Mazier:
With regard to the Centre for Rural Economic Development, since its founding: (a) how much has been paid out in bonuses and performance awards, broken down by year; (b) how many employees received bonuses or performance awards each year; and (c) what are the details of the $400,000 listed, under the standard object 0306-subscriptions and data, in the government’s response to Order Paper Question Q-1449, including, for each contract, the (i) vendor, (ii) date, (iii) amount, (iv) description of the goods or services?
Response
Mr. Darrell Samson (Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Rural Economic Development and Minister responsible for the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency, Lib.):
Mr. Speaker, between 2019 and late 2021, the centre for rural economic development was housed at Infrastructure Canada, INFC, and thereafter re-established at Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, ISED. As a result, this response reflects the combined records of both departments.
As previously reported in Question No. 1449, financial data for the period requested and the level of detail requested were not captured in INFC’s financial system. Therefore, and consistent with its response to Question No. 1449, INFC concluded that producing and validating a comprehensive response to the question could lead to the disclosure of incomplete and misleading financial information. As such, responses to (a) and (b) reflect the records of ISED.
The centre for rural economic development, since its founding, notes the following. With regard to part (a), in fiscal years 2019-20 and 2020-21, INFC had nil, as per the above justification. In fiscal year 2021-22, ISED had zero dollars in bonuses and $15,455.70 in performance awards. In fiscal year 2022-23, ISED had zero dollars in bonuses and $16,982.89 in performance awards
With regard to part (b), in fiscal years 2019-20 and 2020-21, INFC had nil, as per the above justification. For fiscal year 2021-22, ISED is withholding information in accordance with subsection 19(1) of the Access to Information Act, as the response contains information that when used alone or with other relevant data could identify individuals. For fiscal year 2022-23, ISED is withholding information in accordance with subsection 19(1) of the Access to Information Act, as the response contains information that when used alone or with other relevant data could identify individuals.
With regard to part (c)(i), in fiscal years 2019-20, 2020-21 and 2021-22, ISED had no vendor. In fiscal year 2022-23, ISED’s vendor was Statistics Canada.
With regard to part (c)(ii), in fiscal years 2019-20, 2020-21 and 2021-22, per ISED, there was no date. In fiscal year 2022-23, per ISED, the dates were January 17, 2023; January 17, 2023; and March 14, 2023.
With regard to part (c)(iii), in fiscal years 2019-20, 2020-21 and 2021-22, ISED’s amount was nil. In fiscal year 2022-23, ISED’s amounts were $130,000, $130,000 and $140,000 respectively to the above dates.
With regard to part (c)(iv), a description of the goods or services, the $400,000 expenditure was for a project aimed at progressively expanding access to data required to support rural policy formulation and evaluation, rural programs and more broadly the rural data needs of various stakeholders across Canada. The project was led by a team of analysts at the Centre for Special Business Projects, CSBP, of Statistics Canada, in coordination with relevant subject-matter divisions across Statistics Canada.
With regard to the $400,000, INFC did not code under standard object 03 but rather under standard object 04, consistent with its internal coding practices on memoranda of understanding and other business arrangements. The letter of agreement was transferred to ISED along with the transfer of responsibility of rural economic development. The letter of agreement was in effect at INFC during fiscal year 2021-22 with Statistics Canada. The total amount paid for the contract was $400,000.
Question No. 1712—
Mr. Warren Steinley:
With regard to the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC), since November 4, 2015: what are the details of all studies, completed or ongoing, which were conducted by or on behalf of CMHC, related to taxes on primary residences, including, for each, (i) the amount spent, (ii) who conducted the study, (iii) the start and end dates, (iv) the findings, (v) the website address where details are located, if applicable?
Response
Mr. Chris Bittle (Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Housing, Infrastructure and Communities, Lib.):
Mr. Speaker, with regard to completing or having any ongoing studies related to taxes on primary residences, the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, CMHC, has nothing to report.
Question No. 1715—
Ms. Heather McPherson:
With regard to the implementation of Bill C-41, An Act to amend the Criminal Code and to make consequential amendments to other Acts: (a) what is the status of the required guidance for applicants to the authorization regime established by Bill C-41, including (i) which departments and agencies, and specifically which directorates, sectors, and branches, have been involved in drafting guidance for organizations wishing to submit an application, (ii) what privacy concerns have civil society organizations raised with government officials during consultations on guidance documents and what has been the government’s response to these concerns, (iii) was the deputy minister responsible for international humanitarian assistance or international development policy included in the consultations, and, if so, in what capacity; (b) what funds have been allocated under the new system, including (i) to which organizations, (ii) for work in which countries; (c) how many authorization applications has the government (i) made for its own activities, (ii) received from outside government, (iii) approved, and for which countries, (iv) sought for its own work in Afghanistan; and (d) what is the current list of countries and sub-regions for which an authorization is deemed necessary and which deputy ministers, including their departments and agencies, are involved in developing this list?
Response
Ms. Jennifer O’Connell (Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Public Safety, Democratic Institutions and Intergovernmental Affairs (Cybersecurity), Lib.):
Mr. Speaker, with regard to part (a), the government is developing operational guidance required for applicants that have been subject to consultation with both government departments and external stakeholders. This public-facing information will address all aspects of the regime, including in support of the authorization regime.
With regard to part (a)(i), a broad range of government departments and agencies have supported the drafting of this guidance. They include the criminal law policy section, the centre for information and privacy law, and legal services of the Department of Justice; federal policing national security through the Royal Canadian Mounted Police; the financial crimes and security division of the Department of Finance Canada; the charities directorate of the Canada Revenue Agency; the public international law bureau, international crime and terrorism policy division and Afghanistan division of Global Affairs Canada; the Canadian Security Intelligence Service; and Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada.
With regard to part (a)(ii), civil society organizations raised concerns regarding the collection of information as part of the application process required to facilitate the statutory security review requirement. The authorization regime will present a balance between clarifying permissible action and mitigating the risk of terrorist financing. Accordingly, this requires that certain information be collected from the directing officials of applicant organizations to enable the investigative agencies’ exercise of due diligence when reviewing applications.
Significant consideration has been given to managing and protecting personal information and limiting access to it for the purposes of the regime. Collection, use and disclosure authorities or limits are embedded throughout the legislative scheme for the regime. For example, the legislation contains safeguards with respect to limiting the use of this information for the administration and enforcement of the authorization regime under section 83 of the Criminal Code. The application will seek to collect sufficient information required to efficiently advise the Minister of Public Safety in their decision to grant an authorization, taking into account the risks and benefits of the activity.
With regard to privacy and transparency, the government is developing a multi-institutional privacy impact assessment, PIA, to identify privacy risks or gaps, ensure compliance with privacy laws and policies, minimize privacy intrusions and develop a mitigation plan to address identified risks. The PIA will be submitted to the Office of the Privacy Commissioner and a summary of the PIA will be made public.
Organizations also raised concerns about the upcoming requirement to table an annual report to Parliament on the regime. Once the authorization regime is operational, the extent of information that will be available and the level of involvement from stakeholders will be determined.
With regard to part (a)(iii), the deputy minister responsible for international humanitarian assistance or international development policy was not included in the consultations.
With regard to part (b), the authorization regime was designed to enable organizations to conduct needed activities in geographic areas that are controlled by a terrorist group. Organizations may conduct said activities with government funding or private donor funds. Once the regime is operational, the government will track the value of proposed projects and the associated source or sources of funds.
With regard to part (c), the annual report to Parliament on the regime is intended to provide statistics such as how many applications have been received, granted and refused, among other things. It is important to note that Bill C-41 received royal assent on June 20, 2023, and since that date, a humanitarian exception pursuant to subsection 83.03(4) of the Criminal Code has been in effect. This meets the immediate need for humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan and avoids the necessary process that will be associated with the authorization regime.
With regard to part (d), to remove the burden on potential applicant organizations of having to determine themselves which geographic areas are controlled by a terrorist group, the legislation includes a provision that allows an eligible person or organization to seek such information from the Minister of Public Safety. Subsection 83.032(2.1) of the Criminal Code provides, “The Public Safety Minister must, at the request of an eligible person or an organization, provide to that person or organization information in writing about whether an authorization is required to carry out an activity or a class of activities in a given geographic area.”
The threat landscape is continuously shifting, and a complicating factor is that territorial control is often disputed and can change frequently between the control of internationally recognized governments, terrorist organizations and/or their auxiliaries. As such, the government will not be maintaining a list of geographic areas that are controlled by a terrorist group, and instead will respond to inquiries on a case-by-case basis.
Question No. 1716—
Mr. Rick Perkins:
With regard to the government's funding assistance for the electric battery plant with Volkswagen Canada in St. Thomas, Ontario: what is the contracted construction schedule of the battery plant, including the anticipated day each stage of development will begin, until production commences?
Response
Hon. François-Philippe Champagne (Minister of Innovation, Science and Industry, Lib.):
Mr. Speaker, with respect to key milestones, it was announced on March 13, 2023, that Volkswagen and its subsidiary PowerCo will establish an electric vehicle battery manufacturing facility in St. Thomas, Ontario, making it the company’s first overseas battery cell plant. This news was shared on the Government of Canada’s website, found here: https://www.canada.ca/en/innovation-science-economic-development/news/2023/03/canada-and-ontario-welcome-historic-investment-from-volkswagen.html.
On April 21, 2023, the Prime Minister announced that Volkswagen would be investing $7 billion Canadian toward this project, which is the largest electric vehicle-related investment in Canadian history. Construction of the plant is expected to begin in 2024. Once completed in 2027, the plant will produce batteries for up to one million electric vehicles per year. Additional details on this announcement were shared on the Prime Minister of Canada’s website, found here: https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/news-releases/2023/04/21/volkswagens-new-electric-vehicle-battery-plant-will-create-thousands.
Question No. 1717—
Mr. Rick Perkins:
With regard to the April 21, 2023, news release by the Office of the Prime Minister on the Volkswagen battery plant in St Thomas, Ontario, (a) how was the estimated return on the investment calculated for the announced $200 billion generated by the battery plant; (b) what is the projected (i) final value on investment, (ii) initial value of investment, (iii) final cost of investment; and (c) how was each figure in (a) and (b) calculated, including the methodology and figures used for each calculation?
Response
Hon. François-Philippe Champagne (Minister of Innovation, Science and Industry, Lib.):
Mr. Speaker, with regard to part (a), after production ramp-up and assuming full capacity utilization of 90 gigawatt hours, the value of battery production from the PowerCo plant is estimated to reach $200 billion in less than 15 years, which is well within the average lifespan of a plant in this sector. The calculation is based on the average price of a battery cell in 2022 multiplied by an annual production rate of 90 gigawatt hours.
With regard to part (b), Volkswagen is investing $7 billion to establish its first overseas electric vehicle battery manufacturing plant in St. Thomas, Ontario.
Canada has committed to providing PowerCo with production support to match the advanced manufacturing production credit in the United States’ Inflation Reduction Act, equalling $35 U.S. per kilowatt hour for battery cells. Canada’s support will only be provided for what is produced and sold, and will phase out by 25 percentage points every year beginning in 2030. After 2032, the credit would be eliminated. The agreement also has the flexibility to be adjusted should the U.S.’s advanced manufacturing production credit be changed. For PowerCo, this means support ranging between $8 billion and $13.2 billion depending on production levels, two-thirds of which will be provided by Canada and one-third of which will be provided by Ontario.
Canada will also provide funding under the strategic innovation fund, SIF, for capital expenditures of up to $700 million for PowerCo.
With regard to part (c), the figure in part (a) is estimated based on the average price of a battery cell in 2022 of $120 U.S. per kilowatt hour, per BloombergNEF, converted to Canadian dollars using the average Canada-U.S. exchange rate for 2022, which was one dollar U.S. for $1.3013 Canadian, multiplied by the production rate of 90 gigawatt hours over a 15-year time period.
The figures in part (b) are the publicly reported value of Volkswagen’s investment and the funding committed to by the Government of Canada.
Question No. 1718—
Mr. Ryan Williams:
With regard to the government's announcement related to the electric battery plant with Stellantis Canada in Windsor, Ontario: what is the contracted construction schedule of the battery plant, including the anticipated day that each stage of development will begin, until battery production commences?
Response
Hon. François-Philippe Champagne (Minister of Innovation, Science and Industry, Lib.):
Mr. Speaker, with respect to key milestones, it was announced on March 23, 2022, that LG Energy Solution and Stellantis had created a joint venture with a total investment of more than $5 billion Canadian, or $4.1 billion U.S., toward a facility to manufacture batteries for electric vehicles in Canada. As per the announcement, the plant construction activities were scheduled to begin in late 2022, with production operations planned to launch in the first quarter of 2024. The facility will be operational by 2025. This news was shared on the Government of Canada’s website, found here: https://www.canada.ca/en/innovation-science-economic-development/news/2022/03/government-of-canada-welcomes-largest-investment-in-canadas-auto-industry-with-the-first-large-scale-domestic-ev-battery-manufacturing-facility.html.
Following this announcement, on July 6, 2023, LG Energy Solution, Stellantis, the Government of Canada and the Province of Ontario released additional information about the project and the level of support to be provided to secure this investment. Information with respect to the government’s obligations under the special contribution agreement was released in a statement from Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada. The statement can be found here: https://www.canada.ca/en/innovation-science-economic-development/news/2023/07/canada-and-ontario-establish-an-auto-pact-to-secure-stellantis-lges-and-volkswagen-deals.html.
Question No. 1719—
Mr. Ryan Williams:
With regard to the April 21, 2023, news release by the Office of the Prime Minister on the Volkswagen battery plant in St. Thomas, Ontario: (a) what methodology was used to calculate the announced 3,000 direct jobs generated by the battery plant, including the formula and figures used in the methodology; (b) what is the explanation for how each formula or figure used in (a) was arrived at; (c) what methodology was used to calculate the announced 30,000 indirect jobs generated by the battery plant, including the formula and figures used in the methodology; and (d) what is the explanation for how each formula or figure used in (c) was arrived at?
Response
Hon. François-Philippe Champagne (Minister of Innovation, Science and Industry, Lib.):
Mr. Speaker, with regard to part (a), the number of direct jobs generated by the Volkswagen battery plant in St. Thomas was provided by Volkswagen and is based on the level of employment it has determined it needs to reach the anticipated production capacity of the plant.
With regard to part (b), as indicated, the number for direct jobs was provided by Volkswagen. Unfortunately, we cannot provide any additional information with respect to how Volkswagen arrived at this figure as it is confidential business information.
With regard to part (c), the economic benefits of battery cell manufacturing are significant for job creation. The number announced for indirect jobs generated by the battery plant is based on a job multiplier of 10, which was derived from an internal study done by the Volkswagen Group regarding its plant in Valencia, Spain.
The Volkswagen study is currently not publicly available. However, it is fully anticipated that a significant portion of the supply chain surrounding the St. Thomas plant will be established within Canada, which will lead to a significant multiplier.
With regard to part (d), Canada’s battery manufacturing industry is still in its infancy. The government therefore had to rely on evidence from outside of Canada to determine the potential impact of this plant on job creation throughout the economy. Unfortunately, we cannot provide further details about how Volkswagen arrived at its job multiplier as it is confidential business information.
Question No. 1724—
Mr. Rick Perkins:
With regard to the Trans Mountain Expansion Project between Strathcona County, Alberta, and Burnaby, British Columbia, since 2019: (a) what are the details of all delays (construction, environmental, cultural, safety) related to the pipeline expansion, including, for each, the (i) reason, (ii) length, (iii) estimated cost as a result of the delay, (iv) date of the event or incident that caused the delay?
Response
Hon. Chrystia Freeland (Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, Lib.):
Mr. Speaker, in the Trans Mountain response to Canada Energy Regulator information request no.1 on August 16, 2023, five key categories of root causes of cost increases were presented. Cost increases can take many forms, but regarding delay costs, specific examples of delays are given below for each root cause.
For evolving and additional compliance requirements, delays were driven by legal and regulatory requirements beyond the execution plan.
For information maturity, delays were driven by changes in the availability and accuracy of information to support expansion project planning.
For indigenous accommodations, delays were driven by changes to support and accommodate the concerns of indigenous communities.
For stakeholder engagement, delays occurred in securing access to the right-of-way and construction workspaces, including the acquisition of land rights.
For exogenous factors, delays were driven by external events and acts of God impacting the execution of the expansion project that were outside of Trans Mountain’s control. These include but are not limited to extreme weather events, seasonal and severe wildfire seasons in British Columbia, and productivity losses from COVID-19 related to restrictions, outbreak stand downs and labour shortages.
Please note that in processing parliamentary returns, the Department of Finance applies the Privacy Act and the principles set out in the Access to Information Act, and certain information has been withheld on the grounds that the information constitutes third party information and commercial information.
In general, schedule delays can be either reoccurring, as they are tied to cyclical parts of construction such as bird nesting delays, archeological delays and permitting delays, or one time events such as weather events. Individual delays themselves may not cause serious cost impacts. However, multiple delays over time accumulate to larger costs. These events can also cause knock-on effects such as missed construction windows or can require construction teams to move to other areas, which results in a significant cost.
As a result of the reoccurring nature of many types of delays, multiple factors simultaneously contributing to delays, knock-on effects to other aspects of construction and construction occurring in parallel on multiple parts of the pipeline, it is difficult to attribute specific dates, costs and project level lengths of delay to the separate categories of delay.
Question No. 1725—
Mr. Mike Morrice:
With regard to Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada’s (IRCC) oversight of Canadian visa offices located outside of Canada: (a) has IRCC received allegations or reports of corruption or bribery committed by locally-engaged staff toward applicants for Canadian travel documents in the past 10 calendar years; (b) if the answer to (a) is affirmative, (i) what is the total number of allegations or reports (A) received, (B) investigated, (C) rejected, (D) resolved, broken down by office location, (ii) what actions has IRCC taken, whether solely or in collaboration with its partners, to investigate and address these allegations or reports; (c) does IRCC have internal controls, policies, procedures, or processes to specifically address the risk of corruption and bribery by locally-engaged staff toward applicants for Canadian travel documents; and (d) if the answer to (c) is affirmative, what are the details of such controls, policies, procedures or processes?
Response
Mr. Paul Chiang (Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship, Lib.):
Mr. Speaker, with regard to part (a), Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, IRCC, has received allegations or reports of corruption or bribery committed by locally engaged staff toward applicants for Canadian travel documents in the past 10 years; however, IRCC does not have records extending earlier than 2016.
With regard to part (b), IRCC has received 27 reports of corruption or bribery committed by locally engaged staff since 2016. This is the total number of reports. Due to the small number of investigated allegations, data is not further broken down by office due to safety and privacy concerns. Twenty-one did not require an investigation and one is ongoing. Five were investigated, of which two were rejected because they were not founded and three were resolved.
IRCC, in collaboration with Global Affairs Canada, GAC, as the employer of locally engaged staff, takes allegations of misconduct seriously and follows a protocol to investigate misconduct, using forensic analysis of information systems, including emails, texts and GCMS access; interviews; the review of procedures, etc. Depending on the severity of the infraction, if the allegations are founded, discipline can range from an oral reprimand up to and including termination of employment.
With regard to part (c), IRCC has many levels of controls, policies, procedures and processes specifically to address the risk of corruption or bribery by locally engaged staff, including the following. All IRCC locally engaged staff must have valid reliability status, which is granted by GAC. IRCC travel documents are rigorously and closely managed by Canada-based staff, with frequent reconciliation and quarterly reporting to IRCC headquarters. Any loss or theft of counterfoils, or visas, is reported and investigated. Best practices are implemented and monitored in IRCC’s overseas offices to avoid malfeasance, including open-space work environments to allow for supervision, rotation of tasks, random assignment of files, regular quality assurance exercises, secure storage of travel documents and ongoing training. All fees for visa services are paid online directly to IRCC, and IRCC’s social media and websites warn clients against making payments to unauthorized representatives.
Question No. 1732—
Mr. Frank Caputo:
With regard to the smuggling of contraband in federal penitentiaries: has the government consulted or sought external advice within the past five years, and, if so, what are the details, including the (i) name of the individual or firm, (ii) date, (iii) value of the contract, if applicable, (iv) description of the parameters for the advice or consultation sought, (v) description of the advice or information received?
Response
Ms. Jennifer O’Connell (Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Public Safety, Democratic Institutions and Intergovernmental Affairs (Cybersecurity), Lib.):
Mr. Speaker, to better protect the safety and security of our institutions, the Correctional Service of Canada, CSC, continues to explore new, innovative means of preventing and seizing contraband.
The following are instances over the past five years where CSC has sought external advice relating to drone mitigation and signal jamming.
As to signal jamming, on August 3, 2021, CSC met with representatives from Corrective Services New South Wales, CSNSW, to discuss its experiences with the cellphone jamming of contraband cellphones. Following these discussions, CSC began looking into how it may introduce cell jamming technology. CSC has also held consultations with appropriate government departments, including Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and Justice Canada.
On February 1, 2023, CSC met with representatives of the Canadian Telecommunications Association, CTA, which represents Canadian telecommunication carriers that provide services and products across the wireless sector. The meeting with the CTA was to discuss mitigation measures involving contraband cellular communication devices.
On June 15, 2023, CSC co-hosted a discussion with the CTA and representatives from all major telecommunications carriers from across Canada. CSC is engaging with this group as part of its efforts to seek a regulatory exemption to deploy jamming technology.
As to body scanners, in September 2020, under contract, CSC worked with the former manager who oversaw the implementation of body scanners in the Ontario Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services.
From September 2020 through to June 2021, this individual worked closely with CSC staff and provided first-hand knowledge of infrastructure requirements, operating procedures and training considerations. The contract consisted of the development of a statement of technical requirements and statement of work for the procurement of two body scanners for a pilot trial of body scanner technology at two CSC institutions. Following a successful bidding process, the two devices were procured and deployed at the two institutions. CSC is now working to implement body scanners at other sites across the country.
On May 17, 2023, representatives of CSC attended the St. Lawrence Valley Correctional and Treatment Centre, a part of the Ontario Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services, in Brockville, Ontario, to view a demonstration of its body scanner in operation. This demonstration had been organized by CSC through reaching out to the Ontario Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services.
As to uncrewed aerial systems, or drones, on February 7, 2020, CSC sought the assistance of the vice-president of policy and legal affairs at DJI concerning the addition of geofencing to all facilities under CSC responsibility. This was the result of having procured six DJI AeroScope devices, which are radio frequency detection devices to counter drone incursions into CSC airspace.
On October 7, 2021, CSC held a meeting with representatives of the Swedish Prison and Probation Service, SPPS, to discuss issues related to drone incursions into prison airspace.
On June 6, 2023, a request for information was posted on CanadaBuys for the Correctional Service of Canada to receive industry feedback regarding counter uncrewed aerial system technology. Specifically, feedback was solicited about technological options and capabilities that would enhance CSC’s ability to counter the risks posed by drones, as well as contractual terms. CSC is currently in the process of reviewing all feedback received.
Through its networks and ongoing partnerships with various international and domestic correctional authorities, CSC has had discussions with other jurisdictions on various matters of shared interest, including their experiences with the use of drones to introduce contraband into prisons and penitentiaries. Examples of correctional authorities that CSC has discussed this subject with include provincial public safety partners such as Quebec’s Minister of Public Safety, and international correctional authorities such as the Government of Australia and the U.S. Federal Bureau of Prisons.
As to cellular devices detection, in an effort to address operational risks related to the unauthorized introduction and use of cellular devices by inmates in federal custody, and to help disrupt criminal activity targeting federal institutions, CSC initiated discussions with the Connecticut state police in the summer of 2022 to learn more about their deployment of detector dog teams specializing in the detection of electronic storage devices.
CSC sent two experienced dog handlers to participate in the 234th Connecticut state police canine team training cohort, which occurred in the winter of 2023. This international consultation and partnership initiative helped CSC obtain specific information about canine training techniques related to the detection of electronic storage devices. CSC is one of the first organizations in Canada to acquire this canine expertise, and the two new detector dog teams have successfully seized several electronic devices.
As to infrastructure and design, on February 9, 2023, CSC sought to receive information from other correctional jurisdictions within Canada about the strategies they use to mitigate the introduction of contraband via drone. As CSC facilities are larger than those of provincial and territorial counterparts, some of the methods used are not operationally feasible for CSC. However, CSC continues to consult with our partners to determine the best approaches for keeping our institutions safe.
Question No. 1733—
Mr. Frank Caputo:
With regard to the government's approach to jamming cellular signals in federal penitentiaries: has the government consulted or sought any external advice related to the topic in the past five years, and, if so, what are the details, including the (i) name of the individual or firm, (ii) date, (iii) value of the contract, if applicable, (iv) description of the parameters for the advice or consultation sought, (v) advice or information received?
Response
Ms. Jennifer O’Connell (Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Public Safety, Democratic Institutions and Intergovernmental Affairs (Cybersecurity), Lib.):
Mr. Speaker, on August 3, 2021, the Correctional Service of Canada, CSC, met with representatives from Corrective Services New South Wales, CSNSW, to discuss its experiences with the cellphone jamming of contraband cellphones. Following these discussions, CSC began looking into how it may introduce cell jamming technology. CSC has also held consultations with appropriate government departments, including Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and Justice Canada.
On February 1, 2023, CSC met with representatives of the Canadian Telecommunications Association, CTA, which represents Canadian telecommunication carriers that provide services and products across the wireless sector. The meeting with the CTA was to discuss mitigation measures involving contraband cellular communication devices.
On June 15, 2023, CSC co-hosted a discussion with the CTA and representatives from all major telecommunications carriers from across Canada. CSC is engaging with this group as part of its efforts to seek a regulatory exemption to deploy jamming technology.
Question No. 1735—
Mr. Richard Bragdon:
With regard to the new passport design: (a) how much was spent on the graphic design of the new passport; (b) which vendors were contracted or sub-contracted to do the graphic design work; and (c) how much was each vendor in (b) paid for graphic design work associated with the new passport?
Response
Mr. Paul Chiang (Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship, Lib.):
Mr. Speaker, with regard to part (a), an expenditure authority in the amount of $161 million has been provided by the Treasury Board Secretariat to design, develop and deploy Canada’s ePassport next generation suite of travel documents and all related printing equipment, software and infrastructure by October 2024. This amount includes costs payable to the Canadian Bank Note Company, CBN, for various project deliverables.
This amount represents the entire project budget, including to develop and deploy new printing equipment, the new passport design and the infrastructure required to produce the new passport, as well as salaries, accommodation refits and IT components. The cost of the redesign was not captured as a separate deliverable but was blended as part of the overall implementation costs payable to the CBN. As such, it is not possible to identify the specific cost of the passport redesign.
As of August 31, 2023, $81.9 million has been spent on the entire project.
With regard to part (b), as part of the project, Canada launched a competitive procurement process in June 2016, and on May 24, 2019, a contract was awarded to CBN to deliver this solution for the Government of Canada. CBN was responsible, per the contract, for developing the designs for the new passport following the decision on theme by the Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship, IRCC.
A passport is a secure travel document whose primary purpose is to enable Canadians to travel, preventing counterfeiting to maintain credibility and to ensure it is recognized at global borders. It remains the exclusive property of the Government of Canada despite being issued in the name of the client. Updating passports is a routine process based on industry standard best practices and standards set by the International Civil Aviation Organization.
With regard to part (c), please refer to the response to part (a).
Question No. 1740—
Mr. Alexandre Boulerice:
With regard to the National Joint Council’s revised Isolated Posts and Government Housing Directive (IPGHD) and the Shelter Cost Differential methodology (SCD) that came into effect on August 1, 2023, broken down by province or territory: (a) what is the total number of employees who (i) experienced decreases in their SCD payments, (ii) were disqualified from SCD payments entirely; (b) how many employees were disqualified from the SCD because they own their home; and (c) does the government expect to see spending reductions as a result of the revised SCD methodology?
Response
Hon. Anita Anand (President of the Treasury Board, Lib.):
Mr. Speaker, the isolated posts and government housing directive, IPGHD, is a National Joint Council, NJC, directive that forms part of collective agreements. The revised shelter cost differential, SCD, methodology has been co-developed with bargaining agents. Implementation of the revised methodology will be applied for the annual update of the SCD, which takes place on August 1, 2023.
The purpose of the SCD is to provide an allowance to employees who are at an isolated post where the cost of renting private accommodation or government housing is higher than the national average threshold. This is to help offset the higher shelter costs. The revised methodology, which came into effect on August 1, 2023, replaces a methodology that had not been reviewed since 2012 and had not looked at the cost of shelter in all isolated posts. There are now 20 locations that qualify instead of only five. The same methodology applies for all locations, using census data, to establish which locations qualify and the rate. Once a location qualifies, the rate will be adjusted annually by the provincial or territorial consumer price index, CPI, as applicable, until the next census results are available. Transitional provisions have been agreed to with bargaining agents.
With regard to part (a), the shelter cost differential is provided to employees residing in private accommodation and government housing, housing that is leased or owned by the Government of Canada and rented out to employees. Prior to the August 1, 2023, implementation of the revised shelter cost differential, five locations qualified for private accommodation and three locations qualified for government housing. Furthermore, different rates were provided for each. The revised methodology provides the same rate for both types of accommodation: private and government.
With regard to private accommodation, the SCD was limited to employees residing in private accommodation in five locations. Employees in Inuvik, Yellowknife and Iqaluit residing in government housing received the SCD as well.
With regard to the Northwest Territories, in Inuvik, which has approximately 79 employees, the SCD applied to employees in private accommodation and government housing. In Norman Wells, which has approximately three employees, the SCD only applied to employees in private accommodation. In Yellowknife, which has approximately 830 employees, the SCD applied to employees in private accommodation and government housing. With regard to Nunavut, in Iqaluit, which has approximately 543 employees, the SCD applied to employees in both private accommodation and government housing.
With regard to Yukon, in Whitehorse, which has approximately 687 employees, the SCD applied only to employees in private accommodation.
Due to the transitional measures in place, to date, no employees have experienced a decrease in the SCD. However, as of December 1, 2023, SCD rates for some locations will begin a gradual decrease, which will be completed in September 2024.
With regard to part (b), data on the number of homeowners in isolated posts is not available.
With regard to part (c), any difference in cost to the government has not yet been established.